

AUG 10 2004



To: John Hamre <jhamre@csis.org>
Fcc: /jm/DSB, /jx/IRAQ
Subject: CSIS Memo 146
From: lederberg@mail.rockefeller.edu

Tue Aug 10 14:43:36 EDT 2004

Dear John

Once again, responding to your last memo.
I strongly agree with you about competitive assessment. That perhaps speaks to strengthening NSC, to be the supreme court.

Re:
"highest priority to support the American warrior in combat"

but, alas that derogates the strategic intelligence to help decide what combat to engage in. One time that was CIA's mission. CIA since has been pressed hard to show its relevance to the RComComs.

I don't really fault the IC for misguessing the current state of WMD's. Especially BW, they're so easy to hide and reconstitute that their main relevance is how current capabilities bear on near-future intentions. I think we're still thoroughly confused about just how Saddam would have threatened us: misreading his relationships with al Qaeda is more seriously consequential. I'm as fearful as anyone of the character of threat Saddam would have been in future; but the expectation that he'd be arming Al Qaeda is the only thing that would have made us be in such a rush to go to war. Can we do a better job of creating an intelligence service that can face up to the daunting task of estimating intentions?

I hope there's a smart team working on our options if there is a change of regime in Pakistan.

Josh