2*5^. -c< G>OQ WS54mo 1855 • etc.; 1 C # ^■.v-ii': . .*v. M 4£. "3 if A Si C \ ONOGRAPH MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS BY FRANCIS WHARTON PHILADELPHIA: KAY AND BROTHER, 17 AND 19 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, EAST SIDE, FIRST STORE ABOVE CHESTNUT. LAW BOOKSELLERS AND PUBLISHERS. 1855. y boo W3J54- wcr Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1855, by Kay and Brother, in the Office of the Clerk of the District Court of the United States in and for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. PRINTED BY HENRY B. ASHMEAD. ADVERTISEMENT. The following pages form the First Book in a Treatise on Medical Jurisprudence, about to be published by the present writer, in connection with Dr. Moreton Stille, of Philadelphia. They are issued in this shape for private circulation only, and this opportunity is taken, to state the indebtedness the writer is under to Dr. James Paul, for the valuable notes received from him, comprising translations and abstracts from some of the more recent French text writers; and to Mr. Charles Goepp, for similar aid in connection with the German Psychologists. F. W. Philadelphia, June 10, 1855. A MONOGRAPH ON MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS. ANALYTICAL TABLE. CHAPTER I. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS IN ITS LEGAL KELATIONS. I. WHAT DEGREE OF UNSOUNDNESS INVALIDATES A CONTRACT OR WILL, \ 2. As to Lunatics or Idiots, \ 2. General legal principle is, that contracts or wills of idiots or lunatics will not be enforced, Cases where there is a sufficient degree of sanity to create responsibility for crime, and yet when a contract or will will be avoided, 1st. Imbecility generally, and herein of fraud and compulsion, Fraud itself vitiates a contract, and in this the contracting party's intellect becomes an essential item for consideration, \ 3. Lord Portsmouth's case, $ 3. Acts and contracts of persons of weak understanding will be held void, when such persons have been imposed upon by cunning or undue influ- ence, g 4. In cases of wills this is peculiarly the case, \ 5. The testator must have had a disposing memory, $ 5. Over-importunity of controlling friends may destroy capacity, \ 5. The question in reference to contracts and wills does not depend upon mere subjective capacity, and hence no positive definition can be given, § 6. Idiocy, to make it a positive incapacity, must be shown to have been accom- panied with business disability, \ j. The question of capacity will be greatly affected by the reasonableness or un- reasonableness of the act attempted to be set aside, £ 8. The inquiry in many cases is, whether the testator or grantor had capacity or information enough to comprehend and disregard any attempt at fraud or coercion, \ 9. Difficulties in such cases from conflict of medical opinion, \ 9. A distinction is taken between the cases where the court is asked to annul an executed contract, and where it is asked to execute an wwexecuted one, \ 11. Weakness of intellect, from extreme old age, works a disability, \ 12. But great caution should be exercised in this respect, the object being to protect old age, not to render it still more defenceless, § 12. How far the deaf and dumb are thereby incompetent, \ 13. 1 '■!> MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS.—ANALYTICAL TABLE. 2d. Partial Insanity, \ 14. Rule in this country is, that unless the contested act is the product of an insane delusion, it is not vitiated by it, $ 14. The present English rule, however, seems to be that the existence of an in- sane delusion destroys testamentary capacity altogether, g 15. Opinion of Lord Brougham on this point, \ 17. Objections to this view, \ 18. Compatibility of hallucinations with sound disposing memory, § 19. Instances of existence of hallucinations in persons otherwise sane, \ 21. 3d. Lucid Intervals. When habitual insanity is shown, the presumption is, that the act was com- mitted in an insane period, § 33. The character of the act goes a great way in determining whether it was committed in a lucid interval, \ 35. 4th. Intoxication. When actually existing renders a party civilly incompetent. A party, however, cannot use his drunkenness as a means of imposition, § 36. Difference in this respect between executed and unexecuted contracts, \ 37. In actions for torts, drunkenness is no defence on the merits. Drunkenness avoids a will when acted on by fraud or imposition, \ 38. II. WHAT IS NECESSARY TO BE PROVED, IN ORDER TO DEPRIVE A PARTY OF THE MANAGEMENT OF HIS ESTATE, \ 40. When a party is incapable, the practice is to appoint a committee, who take the alleged lunatic's place, $ 41. In what way the question of lunacy, under such circumstances, is tried, \ 42. General and not partial incompetency must be shown, § 42. The test is, is the respondent capable of managing his own estate? \ 42. What in such cases is required of medical witnesses, \ 43. The same process lies in cases of habitual drunkenness, § 44. The test here is, is there a fixed habit of drunkenness ? \ 44. III. WHAT DEGREE OF UNSOUNDNESS AVOIDS RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIME, §45. The difficulties in this respect have arisen from mistaking dicta given in particu- lar cases for general and absolute rules. Ill consequences arising from looseness of citation, \ 45, n. The true doctrine is, that medical science is a part of the common law of the land, and is to be treated as such, § 45, n. 1st. Cases where the defendant is incapable of distinguishing right from WRONG IN REFERENCE TO THE PARTICULAR ACT, § 46. Under this head fall cases of idiocy and amentia, § 46. 2d. Cases where the defendant is acting under an insane delusion as to cir- cumstances, which, if true, would relieve the act from responsi- bility, or where his reasoning powers are so depraved as to make the commission of the particular act the natural consequence of the delusion. An act committed under a bona fide belief of its necessity in self defence, will be regarded as if there really was such necessity, \ 47. And the gauge here is the defendants capacity, \ 47. An honest insane delusion is to be viewed in the same light, \ 48. But the delusion must have been the cause of the crime in order to excuse it, and not collateral, \ 49. 3d. Cases where the defendant is impelled by a morbid and uncontrollable IMPULSE TO COMMIT THE PARTICULAR ACT, \ 53. The doctrine of homicidal mania has been recognized by the courts of this country, \ 53. Chief Justice Shaw, \ 53. Chief Justice Gibson, g 54. Chief Justice Lewis, \ 55. Chief Justice Hornblower, contra, \ 57. The right and wrong test is impracticable as an absolute rule, § 60, 61. IV. HOW FAR INTOXICATION AFFECTS RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIME, \ 62. 1st. Insanity produced by delirium tremens affects responsibility in the same WAY AS INSANITY PRODUCED BY ANY OTHER CAUSE, \ 62. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS.—ANALYTICAL TABLE. 6 2d. Insanity immediately produced by intoxication, does not destroy respon- sibility where the patient, when sane and responsible, made himself voluntarily intoxicated, \ 66. 3d. While intoxication is per se, no defence to the fact of guilt, yet when the question of intent or premeditation is concerned, it is material for the purpose of determining the precise degree, \ 70. CHAPTER II. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED PSYCHOLOGICALLY. Classification of Dr. Ray, \ 74. " " Flemming, \ 75. " " Ellinger, \ 76. •' " Present Treatise, \ 77. I. GENERAL THEORIES OF MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS, § 78. 1st. Psychological theory, § 79. 2d. Somatic theory, \ 80. • 3d. Intermediate theory, § 81. Difficulties attending each of the first two, \ 82. Question as to moral responsibility of Lunatics, \ 83. Views of President Edwards, \ 84. Of Dr. Barlow, \ 85. II. HOW MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS IS TO BE DETECTED, \ 86. 1st. By whom, \ 86. Medical expert necessary for this purpose, § 86. Great skill and experience needed, \ 87. Dangers of an inexperienced examiner being baffled, § 88. Responsibility in law of medical examiner, \ 89. Importance of examiner adopting his manner to patient's condition, I 90. Important that legal and medical officers should, in such cases, act in concert, \ 92. Manner in which medical witness is to be examined on trial, \ 94. 2d. At what time, \ 95. (1.) Time of act, § 95. (2.) At trial, \ 97. (3.) At and after sentence, § 98. 3d. By what tests, § 100. (1.) Physiognomy, \ 100. Relations of the different features, \ 101. (2.) Bodily health and temperament, \ 102. State of bowels, \ 102. Physical disorganization, \ 103. Insensibility to pain and cold, \ 104 Irregularities in action of senses, § 105. Change in disposition, \ 106. (3.) Hereditary tendency, \ 107. Importance of this test, \ 108. Admissible in point of law, \ 108. Opinion of Gibson, C. J., \ 108. (4.) Conversation and deportment, \ 110. Necessity of great circumspection in this respect, § 110. Cases illustrating this, \ 111. (5.) Nature of act, \ 112. (a) Insensibility, § 112. (b) Its incongruity with antecedents, § 113. fc) Its motivelessness, | 114. \d) Its inconsequentiality, \ 115. III. FROM WHAT MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED. 1st. Emotions, \ 116. 4 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS.—ANALYTICAL TABLE. 1.) Remorse, \ 116. 2.) Anaer, \ 118. (3.) Shame, g 122. h.\ Grief, | 124. (5.) Homesickness, (Nostalgia,) g 125. 2d. Simulated Insanity, g 127. Necessity for close examination, \ 127. Tests to'be applied, \ 128. Delirium most usually counterfeited, but the most difficult, § 129. Physiognomy and health to be examined, $ 130. Case to be compared with other recorded cases, § 131. Simulation not to be inferred from absence of a trace of insanity at the examination, \ 132. Causes why such signs may be suppressed, § 132. Pretended insanity frequently turns into real, § 133. How examination is to be conducted, \ 134. Patient to be brought into a succession of relations, \ 135-8. To be furnished with pen, ink and paper, and other methods of examination, \ 135-8. Insania Occulta, features of, \ 139. Necessity of guarding against, \ 139. IV. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS, AS CONNECTED WITH DERANGEMENT OF THE SENSES, AND DISEASE, \ 140. 1st. Deaf and Dumb, \ 140. 2d. Blind, \ 141. 3d. Epileptics, \ 142. Peculiar tendency of epilepsy to insanity, \ 142. Nature of epilepsy, $ 143. Distinction between the several classes, \ 144. Different stages of the disease, \ 145. Actions committed during attack, not valid, \ 146. Rule as to intermediate stages, § 147. Tests laid down by Clarus, § 148. V. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS, AS CONNECTED WITH SLEEP, g 149. General effect of sleep on the senses, \ 149. 1st. Somnolentia or sleep-drunkenness, \ 151. 2d. Somnambulism, g 159. VI. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS, AS AFFECTING THE TEMPERAMENT, § 163. 1st. Depression, \ 163. 2d. Hypochondria, \ 166. 3d. Hysteria, \ 169. 4th. Melancholy, \ 170. VII. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS, AS AFFECTING THE MORAL SYSTEM, § 174. 1st. General moral mania, \ 174. Effect of, \ 174. General symptoms, \ 175. Illustrations, \ 176. 2d. Monomania, \ 177. Doctrine of Mania sine Delirio, § 178. Difference of opinion as to its existence, § 179. Tests to be applied to it, \ 180. Tendency in this country to recognize its existence, \ 183. (1.) Homicidal mania, \ 186. Cases where Esquirol supposes it to exist, g 186. Precautions necessary in its recognition, § 190. Tests suggested by Dr. Ray, \ 190. " " Dr. Taylor, \ 190. Dr. Mayo's objections to the entire theory, § 191. (2.) Kleptomania^—(morbid propensity to steal), \ 192. (3.) Pyromania—(morbid incendiary propensity), \ 195. How far recognized in England, g 197. Necessary tests, \ 198. \ MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS.—ANALYTICAL TABLE. 5 (4.) Aidoiomania—(morbid sexual propensity), § 199. (5.) Pseudonomania—(morbid lying propensity), \ 202. f 6.^ Oikeiomania—(morbid state of domestic affections), \ 204. (7.) Suicidal mania—(morbid propensity to self-destruction), \ 206. Tendency to this in cases of melancholy, &c, \ 207. Legal consequences in actions against life insurers, \ 208. (8.) Fanatico-mania, \ 209. (a) Supernatural or pseudo-supernatural demoniacal posses- sion, \ 210. Testimony of ancient writers to this, § 210. " of the New Testament, § 211. (b) Mental alienation on religious subjects, § 214. Tendency of infidelity to insanity, g 214. Conservative influence of Christianity, § 215. Insane delusion the result of a departure from Christianity, I 216. Illustrations of this, \ 217. Legal bearings of religious insanity, \ 219. (9.) Politico-mania, \ 220. How far an epidemic, §221. Causes likely to generate it, g 221. VIII. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS, AS CONNECTED WITH INTELLECTUAL PROS- TRATION, \ 222. 1st. Idiocy, \ 222. Nature of, \ 222. Physical incidents of, \ 223-5-6. Cretinism, \ 228. 2d. Imbecility, \ 229. With concomitant insanity, § 230. Original, \ 230. Supervening, \ 230. Specious, \ 230. With confusion of mind, \ 230. Without insanity, $ 231. Distinction between innocent and malignant imbecility, \ 232. 2d. Dementia, \ 234. IX. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS ACCOMPANIED WITH DELIRIUM, \ 235. 1st. General Delirium, \ 235. (a) Depressed delirium, \ 236. \b) Maniacal delirium, § 237. (c) Delirium tremens, \ 238. (d) Puerperal mania, g 239. 2d. Partial Delirium, \ 240. X. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS, AS CONNECTED WITH DELUSIONS AND HALLU- CINATIONS, I 241. 1st. General, § 241. Marked by general derangement of the perceptive faculties, \ 241. Various phases it assumes, \ 242. Tests of Ellinger, \ 243. Effect of general delusion, g 244. 2d. Partial, \ 245. Delusions and hallucinations, \ 245. When there is no other sign of mental unsoundness, § 246. When mental unsoundness has made some progress, \ 247. In cases of drunkenness, &c, \ 248. In cases of developed insanity, \ 249. Causes of delusions, \ 250. Abercrombie's classification, \ 252. Hallucination in regard to a change into, or a possession by, wild animals, \ 253. XI. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS, AS CONNECTED WITH LUCID INTERVALS, \ 254. 6 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS.—ANALYTICAL TABLE. XII. TREATMENT OF INSANE CRIMINALS, \ 259. Necessity of separate places of confinement in which insane criminals can be placed, \ 259. (1.) For Retribution, \ 260. In most, if not all, cases of crime resulting from insane impulse, there is original responsibility, \ 260. Insanity, in most cases, the result of moral excess, \ 261-9. Qualified responsibility of lunatics, \ 261-9. (2.) For Prevention, \ 270. Mischief to society if monomaniacs are suffered to go at large, § 270. Necessity of restraint, g 271. (3.) For Example, \ 272. Contagiousness of unchecked crime, § 272. (4.) For Reform, \ 273. Impossibility of patient recovering when permitted to run at large, §273. Injury to the community from the want of secondary punishments, the result being acquittals of dangerous parties, from an unwill- ingness to see the severer penalties inflicted, \ 274. Ordinary penitentiaries inadequate, §'275. And so of ordinary lunatic asylums, \ 276. CHAPTER I. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED LEGALLY. § 1. Three questions exist in which mental unsoundness becomes a subject of inquiry in the courts of the United States : I. Capacity to perform particular acts for the disposal of property, such as making contracts or gifts, and executing deeds or wills, in which cases the question is brought up by contesting the validity of the particular act itself. II. General business capacity, in which case the question arises upon a petition to the chancellor or proper judicial officer of the jurisdiction, for a decree pronouncing the party to be incapable from lunacy or habitual drunkenness, of managing his estate, and transferring the cus- tody of it to a committee. III. Responsibility for crime. In each of these relations the tests of unsoundness are distinct. In the first a very modified degree of incapacity will be sufficient, as will presently be seen, when accompanied with fraud, imposition or over exercise of authority, to set aside a contract or to invalidate a will. In the second a much less degree of general capacity is sufficient, than is necessary in the third; for there must always be a number of cases in which a party is morally capable of crime, and yet intellectually inca- pable of business. Keeping these facts in view, it is proposed to dis- cuss the subject under the following heads: I. What degree of unsoundness invalidates a contract or will. 1st. Imbecility generally, and herein of fraud and compulsion. 2d. Partial insanity. 3d. Lucid intervals. 4th. Intoxication. II. What is necessary to be proved in order to deprive a party of the management of his estate. III. What degree of unsoundness avoids responsibility for crime. WHAT INVALIDATES A CONTRACT OR WILL. 7 I. What degree of unsoundness invalidates a contract or will. § 2. With regard to lunatics or idiots, in the popular sense, there can be no question in this conneciion. Upon them the law affixes its visible stamp, and by virtue of a commission of lunacy, (a) to be con- sidered under the next head, pronounces them incapable of transferring property. Nor to invalidate their acts is it necessary that a decree of lunacy should have been actually pronounced. The madman, even though his madness be a mere temporary delirium, cannot, by an executory contract,(7>) bind himself either in person or in property; and consequently in such a class of cases the judgment of the law must relieve him from responsibility. In this respect the test is the same in the criminal and the civil courts. There are, however, a large class of cases in which, as has been noticed, a contract or a will will be declared void, but in which there is a sufficient degree of intellect to create a responsibility for crime. These may be ranked as follows : 1st. Imbecility generally, and herein of fraud and compulsion. 2d. Partial insanity. 3d. Lucid intervals. 4th. Intoxication. 1st. Imbecility generally, and herein of fraud and compulsion. § 3. Of this an illustration may be found in Lord Portsmouth's case, which has been too often erroneously supposed by medical writers to sustain the position, that mere mental debility is enough, by itself, to avoid even the most solemn contract. Lord Portsmouth Avas married for the second time in March, 1813, to a young woman who was the daughter of one of his trustees, the solicitor of the family, under whose charge he was at the time living. From earliest childhood he had dis- played great weakness, both moral and mental, being cruel, timid and fickle in his management of his household, and exceedingly capricious in his tastes. Upon his arrival at twenty-one, however, his incapacity was such, as to induce his family to take steps to put him under the charge of a committee, and at their instance he joined with his father in suffering common recoveries, and making a new settlement of the estate. It was not disputed that he mixed in society generally, (a) A prior inquisition of lunacy is competent, but not conclusive evidence of inca- pacity, (Whitenack v. Striker, 1 Green C. R. 8,) but even when the jury find that the lunacy was prior to the disputed act, and without lucid intervals, the finding may be collaterally impeached. (Bannatyne v. Bannatyne, 15 Jur. 864; 14 English R. 581.) (b) It should always be borne in mind, that in point of practice there is a great dis- tinction between contracts executed, (i. e., those which have already been performed,) and contracts executory, (i. e., those whose performance is sought to be enforced.) The latter a court will not in general lend its aid to execute, when the party sought to be effected was at the time a lunatic. But on the other hand, when in good faith a party makes a contract with a lunatic, supposing him to be of sound mind, and it is impossi- ble to restore the parties to their original position, the contract cannot afterwards be rescinded and the purchase money or other consideration recovered back. (See Beavan v. M'Donnell, 24 English Rep. 486; S. C. 9 Wels. H. & G. 310; Molton v. Cam- roux, 2 Exch. R. 487, 4 Exch. R. 17 ; see also cases cited, 9 Wels. H. & G. 314, n.) See post, §11. 8 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED LEGALLY. corresponded with his friends, and settled his own accounts with his steward. His first marriage was in 1799, and took place under his family's directions, with a lady several years older than himself, who it was understood took a general supervision of his affairs. In the settle- ment made at that marriage the father of his second wife was one of the trustees. The first wife died in November, 1813, and in February, 1814 Lord Portsmouth went down to London with his medical attend- ant and beinn- left in his trustee's hands, a week afterwards contracted a second marriage to the trustee's daughter. In 1823, not until after the birth of a child, which took place in 1822, a commission was issued to inquire into his lunacy, the result of which, after a long contest, was a finding that he was of unsound mind, and had been so since January, 1809. The committee appointed under this procedure immediately filed a petition in the Ecclesiastical court to annul the second marriage. Sir John Nicholl, in deciding the case said, " That considerable weakness of mind, circumvented by proportionate fraud, will vitiate the fact of marriage, whether the fraud is practised on his ward by a party who stands in the relation of a guardian, as in the case of Harford against Morris, (c) which was decided principally on the ground of fraud; or whether it is effected by a trustee, procuring the solemnization of the marriage of his own daughter with a person of very weak mind, over whom he has acquired great ascendency. A person incapable from weakness of detecting the fraud, and of resisting the ascendancy practised in obtaining his consent to the contract, can hardly be considered as binding himself in point of law by such an act. At all events, the circumstances preceding and attending the marriage itself may materially tend to show the contracting party was of unsound mind, and was so considered and treated by the parties engaged in fraudulently effecting the marriage. In respect to Lord Portsmouth's unsoundness of mind, the case set up is of a mixed nature, not absolute idiocy, but weakness of understanding,—not continued insanity, but delusions and irrationality on particular subjects. Absolute idiocy, or constant insanity, would have carried with them their own security; for in either case, the forms preceding, and the ceremony itself, could not have been gone through without exposure and detection; but here a mixture of both, by no means uncommon, is set up,—considerable natural weakness, growing at length from being left to itself and un- controlled, into practices so irrational and unnatural as in some instances to be bordering on idiocy, and in others to be attended with actual delusion—a perversion of mind—a deranged imagination—a fancy and belief of the existence of things which no rational being, no person possessed of his powers of reason and judgment, could possibly believe to exist. * * * It appeared that in February, 1814, Lord Ports- mouth was brought to London by his medical attendant, and delivered up to his trustees, Hanson being one and then in town—that day week he was married to the daughter of Mr. Hanson. The confidential solicitor of the family, one of the trustees, who had a great ascendency over him, who owed him every possible protection, married him to one of his daughters ! It is unnecessary to state the jealousy with which (c) 2 Hag. Cons. R. 423. IMBECILITY, AND HEREIN OF FRAUD AND COMPULSION. 9 the law looks at all transactions between parties standing in these rela- tions to each other. The whole transaction will bear but one interpre- tation: every part of it is the act of the Hansons! Lord Portsmouth is a mere instrument in their hands, to go through with the necessary forms; the settlement is begun in forty-eight hours after Lord Ports- mouth's arrival in London ! The contents of that settlement; the mode in which it was prepared; the concealment of the whole from the friends and the other trustees who were in town, some in the same house with Lord Portsmouth, all these particulars bear the same character. The necessary forms are gone through with, but in support of these mere forms, not a witness is produced to show that this nobleman was conduct- ing himself as a man understanding what he was doing, or capable of judging, or acting as a free and intelligent agent; nothing tending to show he was a person of unsound mind; nothing in his conduct inconsistent with unsoundness of mind; every circumstance conspires to prove that he was the mere puppet of the Hanson family, and that the celebration of this marriage was brought about by a conspiracy among them to circum- vent Lord Portsmouth, over whom, they, and particularly the father, had a complete ascendency, so as to destroy all free agency and rational con- sent on his part to this marriage. A marriage so had, wants the essential ingredient to make the contract valid—the consent of a free and rational agent. The marriage itself, and the circumstances immediately con- nected with it, do not tend to establish restored sanity; it was neither 'a rational act' nor was it 'rationally done,'—the whole 'sounds to folly' and negatives sanity of mind. The Hansons, in the mode of planning and conducting the transaction, show that they treated and considered Lord Portsmouth as a person of unsound mind, and Lord Portsmouth in submitting and acquiescing, and not resisting, confirms his own incompetency. Even if no actual unsoundness of mind, strictly so called—if no insane derangement existed—if only weakness of mind— and all admit that he was weak—yet considering the passiveness and timidity of his character on the one hand—the influence and relation of Hanson, his trustee, on the other—and the clandes-tinity and other marks of fraud which accompanied the whole transaction—I am by no means prepared to say, that without actual derangement in the strict sense, the marriage would not be invalid—but in my judgment Lord Ports- mouth was of unsound mind, as well as circumvented by fraud."(d) § 4. While, therefore, the learned judge before whom this case was heard came to the conclusion that Lord Portsmouth was of " unsound mind," the position was broadly taken by him that weakness alone, when circumvented by fraud, would be sufficient to invalidate even so solemn a contract as marriage, and on this position his decision in part rested. Still more unequivocal was the decree of the Privy Council in dismissing an appeal from the Court of Chancery of the Isle of Man, setting aside two deeds, on the ground that the grantor in both of them was of unsound mind at the time he executed them, and that they were obtained from him by fraud and undue means. The evidence showed that the grantor, an old man, feeble both in body and mind, separated from all his relations, without a friend to advise him, and surrounded (d) Portsmouth v. Portsmouth, 1 Hag. Ec. R. 355. 10 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED LEGALLY. by those only who were contriving to get his fortune, conveyed away nearly all that he was possessed of, even the house he lived in, to persons not related to him, either in blood or connection: and all his estate in lease was to become the property of the same strangers after his death. The consideration of £100 was inserted for conveying away property worth £1400; and this was not to be paid to the grantor, but to_ his executor after his death, without any interest being charged on it in the meantime. Lord Wynford in giving the opinion of the Privy Council said, that the law would " not assist a man who is capable of taking care of his own interests, except in cases where he has been imposed upon by deceit, against which ordinary prudence could not protect him. If a person of ordinary understanding, on whom no fraud has been practised, makes an improvident bargain, no court of justice can release him from it. Inadequacy of consideration is not a substan- tial ground for setting aside a conveyance of property. But those, who from imbecility of mind are incapable of taking care of themselves, are under the special protection of the law. The strongest mind can- not always contend with deceit and falsehood; a bargain, therefore, into which a weak one is drawn under the influence of either of these, ought not to be held valid, for the law requires that good faith should be observed in all transactions between man and man. If this convey- ance could be impeached on the ground of the imbecility of the grantor only, a sufficient case has not been made out to render it invalid; for the imbecility must be such as to justify the jury, under a commission of lunacy, in putting his property and person under the protection of the Chancellor; but a degree of iveakness of intellect far below that which would justify such a proceeding, coupled with other circumstances to show, that the weakness, such as it was, had been taken advantage of, will be sufficient to set aside any important deed."(e) This same view has been uniformly acted on in the English and American courts, and it is expressed by Mr. Justice Story with his usual precision.(/) "The acts and contracts of persons who are of weak understandings, and who are thereby liable to impositions, will be held void in courts of equity, if the nature of the act or contract justify the conclusion, that the party has not exercised a deliberate judgment, but has been imposed upon, circumvented or overcome by cunning or undue influence."(g) § 5. With even greater emphasis has the same doctrine been an- nounced by courts of law in respect to wills. Peculiarly liable as is a dying man, even though his intellect be of average strength, to have his comfort destroyed, if not his purpose overturned, by those in whose society he is placed, the policy of the law has anxiously sought for every safeguard by which such intrusions upon the sanctity of dissolution, as well as upon the rights of families, can be deprived of motive. " The same memory for the making of a will," agreed all the judges of Eng- land at an early date, " is not at all times when the party can answer to any thing with sense, but he ought to have judgment to discern and to be of perfect memory, otherwise the will is void."(A) "He ought to have a disposing memory," said Lord Coke, "so that he is able to (e) Blachford v. Christian, 1 Knapp's Rep. 73 ; Shelford on Lunacy, 272. (/) 1 Story Eq. Juris. \ 238. (g) See also 1 Fonbl. Eq. B. 1, ch. 2,-g 3. (A) Combe's case, Moore R. 759. IMPOSITION ON TESTATORS. 11 make a disposition of his lands with understanding and reason ; and that is such a memory as the law calls sane and perfect."(z) While, therefore, it ^ is only necessary that there should be the capacity of reasonable disposition, great jealousy has been exercised for the cor- rection of extraneous influence on the testator. Thus wills have been set aside when they were preceded by over-importunity of friends standing in confidential relations,^') where the housekeeper and physi- cian were shown to have earnestly urged a non-natural scheme of dis- tribution ;(k) where the wife in fact dictated the will, the testator being at the time unable to speak, she pretending to understand him, and making herself the sole devisee for life, and imposing as a devisee in remainder a fictitious niece ;(l) where one relation produced the disin- heritance of another by false representations as to his character ;(pi) where the testator was old and feeble, and the will was made under the direction and to suit the purposes of a colored woman in the family,(H.) and where a husband exercised coercion.(o) In short, when- ever the provisions of a will are inconsistent with natural justice, it will require strong proof of capacity and volition to sustain it, and slight proof of undue influence or fraud to set it aside, (p) Where a presump- tion of imposition exists, e. g., from the fact of the penman of the will taking a pecuniary benefit under it, the courts exact "the most decisive proof of the complete absence of influence and excitement at the pre- paration and making of the asserted will, and must require unimpeach- able evidence of unbiassed volition and of clear capacity, and must expect it to be shown by instructions coming from the deceased him- self."^) To authorize a will in favor of a wife, however, to be set aside, the influence alleged to have been exerted must be shown to have reached coercion, destroying the husband's free agency,(r) or fraud itself must be proved.(s) In ordinary cases also, it will not be enough (i) Marquis of Winchester's case, 6 Rep. 24; 2 Buls. 211. The same point is put with still greater simplicity by Judge Washington: "Had he a disposing memory—was he capable of recollecting the property he was about to bequeath—the manner of distribut- ing it and the objects of his bounty." (Stevens v. Vanclerc, 4 W. C. C. R. 262.) Proof, however, of intellect having been impaired by disease, or of intellectual feebleness alone, will not avail by itself to defeat a will, when adequate capacity remains. Sloan v. Max- well, 2 Green. Ch. 563; Andrews v. Weller, ibid. 604; Dunick v. Reichenback, 10 S. & R. 84. The cases will be found enumerated in 1 Powell on Devises, 127; Shelford on Lunacy, 275-6 ; 4 Kent's Com. 566 ; 1 Jarman on Wills, 28. See also Converse v. Con- verse, 21 Vt. 168; Home v. Home, 9 Ired. 99; Harrison v. Rowan, 3 W. C. C. R. 580; Grabil v. Barr, 5 Barr, 441; Denn v. Johnson, 2 South. 454; Kinne v. Kinne, 9 Conn. 102 ; Ford v. Ford, 7 Humph. 92 ; Howard v. Coke, 7 B. Monr. 655; Blanchard v. Nestle, 3 Denio, 37 ; Modern Probate of Wills, 91. In Scotland an arbitrary test is applied, it being there provided that no settlement or gift executed after the commencement of the disease of which a person dies, except those in the ordinary administration of the estate, shall be valid. If the testator survives sixty days afterwards, or has been to market un- supported, the will is validated. Bell's Diet. " Death Bed." (/) Hacker v. Newborn, Style, 427. (k) Hz parte Fearon, 5 Ves. 633. (I) Scribner v. Crane, 2 Paige C. C. R. 147. (m) Dietrick v. Dietrick, 5 S. & R. 207; Nussear v. Arnold, 13 S. & R. 323; Patterson v. Patterson, 6 S. & R. 55. n) Denton v. Franklin, 9 B. Monr. 28. (o) Marsh v. Tyrel, 2 Hag. Ec. 84, 141. p) Brydges v. King, 1 Hag. Ec. R. 256; Goble v. Grant, 1 Green C. R. 629; Baker v. Lewis, 4 Rawle, 356. {q) Dodge v. Meech, 1 Hag. E. R. 620; Barry v. Butlin, 1 Curtis, 637; see 2 Jarman on Wills, (Am. ed.) 421. (r) Clarke v. Sawyer, 3 Sanf. Ch. R. 351; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 22 Wend. 526. («) Scribner v. Crane, 2 Paige C. R. 147. 12 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED LEGALLY. to prove mere influence, without proof of fraud or contrivance,^) or such coercion as destroys free agency.(u) " Honest intercession and persuasion," " and fair and flattering speeches," though abundantly proved to have been used, do not affect the instrument's validity.(w) The fact of the paper being entirely in a party's handwriting gives a strong presumption of sanity, which is not effaced by proof of generally impaired intellect, nor by the fact, that when the paper is a will, in it omissions of property exist.(w) The same presumption exists when the testator has a distinct recollection, at the time of the execution of the will, of the terms he directed at the time it was prepared.(a;) § 6. It is obvious, therefore, that no fixed minimum of capacity can be determined upon, which will be necessary to sustain a contract or will. While, on the one hand, it is clear that a madman or a drunkard, during the prevalence of the insane or drunken delusion is totally in- competent for such a purpose, it is equally clear that perso* whose intellects are abundantly strong enough to create an entire responsi- bility for their acts in a criminal court,(?/) will yet be held incompetent to pass away their property, when it appears undue influence or fraud has been used upon them to produce an unjust result. § 7. The existence of idiocy, when that alone is set up, can be deter- mined by comparatively simple tests. If the pretended idiot can be shown to have intelligently performed acts of business during the period in which idiocy is claimed to exist, the allegation of incompe- tency falls, unless fraud or constraint be shown. Thus in a case deter- mined in Doctors' Commons in March, 1852,(2) Dr. Lushington said, "Before entering upon this branch of the case, I must bear in mind what the nature of the case set up in opposition to the will is. I must repeat that it is not lunacy—it is not monomania—it is not any species of mental disorder, the symptoms of which it may, at periods, be diffi- cult to detect; but the case presented is that of idiocy or imbecility, the characteristic of which is permanence, with little or no variation, though often, in case of idiots, it does sometimes happen that there will be a greater degree of excitement demonstrated than at other periods. How is such a case to be met ? I apprehend, to meet it and to show that such a_ state of things did not exist at any given period, proofs of acts of business are most important evidence. Many acts of business could possibly be done by a lunatic, and the lunacy not detected; but it is scarcely possible to predicate the same of an idiot or lunatic, or an imbecile person. I shall look, therefore, in the first instance, to the acts of business. It is proved by Mr. Falkner, that the deceased kept an account with Messrs. Tuckwell, at Bath, for four years, from 1818 to 1821, and during all that period, occasionally drew drafts, and all those drafts were paid to himself over the counter. According to (0 Lowe v. Williamson, 1 Green C. R. 82; Blanchard v. Nestle, 3 Denio, 37; 1 Jarman on Wills, (2d Am. ed.) 36; 1 Williamson on Exs. (2d Am. ed.) 37. (u) Brown v. Mollison, 3 Wh. 129; Potts v. House, 6 Georg. 324; Woodward v. James 3 Strob. 552; see 1 Jarman on Wills, (2d Am. ed.) 36. (v) 1 Jarman on Wills, (2d Am. ed.) 37. (to) M'Daniel's Will, 2 J. J. Marsh, 331; Fullock v. Allison, 3 Hag. 527. (x) Hathorn v. Emg, 8 Mass. 371. \y) See M'Taggart v. Thompson, 2 Harris, 149. (z) Bannatyne v. Bannatyne, 16 Jur. 864, 14 English R. 581. COMPETENCY TO MAKE WILLS OR CONTRACTS. 13 the evidence, the deceased came himself to the counter, and there is no proof of any one accompanying him on such occasions; he asked for the sum he wanted; the clerk filled it in, he signed it, and took the money. Surely no idiot could have done this, for he must have exer- cised thought to go to the bank, memory and judgment as to the thing required; and moreover, his conduct and demeanor could not at such times have been as described by the witnesses against the will, or, from the glaring colors in which his imbecility is'depicted, it must have been discovered, and the business never could have been transacted at all. * * * I consider these transactions, then, of first rate importance towards solving all the difficulties of this case; for here, after the lapse of about thirty years, the court has the advantage of facts proved, with the dates duly affixed to them. There is, I must say, not the least evidence to show that in any one of these acts of business the de- ceased was assisted by any person whatever, the presumption is the other way; and to put these acts upon the very lowest basis on which they can be placed, they do utterly disprove idiocy or imbecility. I will simply repeat what I have already indeed said, that those who are afflicted with lunacy, sometimes have the management of, and can manage, their pecuniary affairs—an idiot, never." § 8. It should be kept in mind, that the question of competency is intimately affected by the character of the act or instrument Avhich it is sought to annul. A reasonable marriage, such as that of Lord Ports- mouth to his first wife, entered upon under the advice of his family, and to a person every way competent to secure his position and his charac- ter from disgrace or injury, may be sustained; while an unsuitable one, to a woman of light character, will be set aside, when it appears that it was influenced by overpowering authority or trickery. A will, making a just distribution of an estate, will be held per se strong evi- dence of disposing capacity, while one turning the testator's property into an unnatural channel, gives at least some presumption to the con- trary, (a) This is broadly stated by Sir John Nicholl in a recent case,(b) where he declares, that where a will is traced into the hands of a testator whose sanity is fairly impeached, but of whose sanity or insanity at the time of doing or performing some act with relation to the will, there is no direct evidence, the agent is to be inferred rational, or the contrary, from the character of the act.(c) § 9. In all cases except those when the act sought to be annulled was committed during actual insanity, the question is not whether the party had a capacity to do the particular thing intelligently, but whe- ther he had capacity and information enough to comprehend and dis- regard any attempt which may have been made to coerce or deceive him. Precedents and authority on this branch of law, consequently, must stand by themselves, and cannot be considered as applying to the more important part of the present chapter, where this subject of res- ponsibility for criminal offences is considered. (a) Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 255; Means v. Means, 5 Strobh. 167; Roberts v. Trawick, 13 Alab. 68; Couch v. Couch, 7 Alab. 519; Bannatyne v. Bannatyne, 16 Jur. 864, 14 English Rep. 581. b) Scruby v. Fordham, 1 Addams, 90. c) See generally 1 Jarman on Wills, (2 Am. Ed.) 69. 14 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED LEGALLY. Mr. Shelford's views in this point are worthy of grave consideration. "One person," he says, "seeing a testator in extreme age, or under extreme sickness, thinks that if he knows those about him, and can answer an ordinary question with respect to the state of his illness, or his wants, such and similar matters render him capable of giving effect to a disposition by will, however complicated it may be, by the mere formal execution of the instrument; while another person may be of opinion, that though a testator, in the ordinary management of his affairs, can hold reasonable conversation, can fully comprehend all the usual and simple transactions of life, yet, if he is unable to take the active management of all his concerns, however involved those concerns may be, or if he is liable to become confused by entering into intricate transactions, he is totally incapable, and cannot enter into a testamen- tary disposition, however plain and simple it may be. Now, when opinions are formed by such opposite standards, it is obvious much contrariety will occur. Sir John Nicholl observed that experience in the Ecclesiastical Court teaches us, that evidence upon questions of capacity is almost always contradictory, such evidence being commonly that of opinion merely; and this contrariety proceeds from the obvious grounds, that of the witnesses, no two, possibly, have seen the party whose estate is deposed to, at precisely the same circumstances; and that each, again, of the several witnesses, no matter how numerous, measures, possibly, testamentary capacity by his own particular stand- ard. These sources of discrepancy, and many more might be enume- rated, are common to all cases of this description. There is an addi- tional source, when the transaction of which they have to speak is remote, a circumstance sufficient in itself to account for no inconsider- able degree of contrariety of evidence, even where the witnesses have to speak of facts merely, and not of opinions formed and inferences built upon facts, of which most of the evidence furnished upon questions of capacity is commonly made up. If the Court, therefore, on ques- tions of capacity, is accustomed to rely but little upon such evidence, so far as it is that of mere opinion, but to form its own judgment from the facts and the conduct of the parties at the time, it becomes it to do so, more peculiarly when much of the evidence not merely consists of opinions delivered long subsequently to the transactions which they profess to have suggested them, upon loose recollections, too, and after repeated discussions of the subject matter with interested parties."(d) § 10. The lowest test of capacity was applied in a very much con- tested case in New York, which is cited at large by Dr. Beck, and which excited great interest from the immense property at stake, and the respectability of the parties. It was there ruled,—and for the facts it is not necessary to do more than refer to the pages of the report, or to Dr. Beck's excellent summary,—that where a female had been always under the control of her friends, had never attempted to transact business, and manifested intellect and understanding only to a very low degree, a will executed by her in favor of a relative with whom she had spent the latter portion of her life, which was in accordance with in- tentions previously expressed by her, which was reasonable in itself, and (d) Shelford on Lunacy, 277-8. WHAT CONSTITUTES TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. 15 the object of which she understood, was valid, though it did not appear that she had given previous instruction for the draft of the will.(e) The authority of the case, it is true, is greatly weakened by the fact that it was decided by a vote of 12 to 6 of the Court of Errors of New York, which, under the constitution then in force, was the Senate of the State, and being chiefly a lay court, never possessed high profes- sional authority, and which in the present instance reversed a decision to the contrary of the late very able Chancellor. Without regarding this case, therefore, as of great weight, so far as the authority of the senators who concurred with the majority are concerned, it may nevertheless be cited as a powerful illustration of the reluctance felt in both the professional and popular mind to overturn a will which in itself is in accordance with common sense and proper feeling. § 11. LTpon similar principles the contracts of a person claimed to be imbecile or lunatic, are to be tested. An important distinction, how- ever, is to be noticed in this respect. While on the one hand the courts will not lend their aid to execute or carry into effect a contract entered into by an incapable person, unless, perhaps, for necessaries,(/) where the fact of incapacity was known to the creditor; yet such is not the law when the incapacity was unknown, and no advantage has been taken, particularly when the contract has been in part executed.^) " Where a person," says Pollock, C. B.,(A) " apparently of sound mind, and not known to be otherwise, enters into a contract for the purchase of property which is fair and bona fide, and which is executed and com- pleted, and the property, the subject matter of the contract, has been paid for and fully enjoyed, and cannot be destroyed, so as to put the parties in statu quo, such contract cannot afterwards be set aside, either by the alleged lunatic, or those who represent him."(i) It is true that the leaning of American authority was for some time towards the posi- tion that the contracts of a lunatic, executed or unexecuted, were per se void, unless for necessaries ;(j) but more recently the justice of the ex- ceptions already noticed have been recognized.(k) Nothing, however, but a strong case of fairness, innocence, and fullness of consideration, can validate a deed when the grantor is insane.(I) § 12. Testamentary incapacity does not necessarily presuppose the existence of insanity, in its technical sense. Weakness of intellect from extreme old age, whether arising from great bodily infirmity, or from intemperance, when it disqualifies the testator from knowing or appre- ciating the nature, effect, or consequences of the act he is engaged in, works a similar disability.(m) Great caution, indeed, should be used, (e) See 2 Beck's Med. Jur. 828, &c.; Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 255. (/) Chitty on Contracts, 112 ; Story on Contracts, \ 27; Addison on Contracts, 873. (ff) Molton v. Camroux, 4 Exch. 17 ; S. C. 2 Exch. R. 49. See ante \ 2. (h) 2 Exch. 503. ' (i) See also Beavan v. M'Dowell, 24 English R. 486; 9 Wells, H. and G. 309. (/) La Rue v. Giltyson, 4 Barr, 375 ; Mitchell v. Kingman, 5 Pick. 431; Rice v. Peet, 13 Johns. 543; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Connect. 103; Long v. Whidden, 2 N. H. 435; Fitzgerald v. Reed, 9 Sm. & Mar.; Ccaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304. (Jc) Beals v. See, 10 Barr, 56. (Z) Dcsilver's Est. 5 Rawle, 11; Bonsall v. Chancellor, 5 Wharton R. 37. (m) Leech v. Leech, 11 Penn. Law J. 177. See in this connection Dr. Day's "Practical Treatise on the Domestic Management of the Most Important Diseases of Advanced Life." T. & W. Boome, London. 1849. 16 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO WILLS. lest the existence of extreme old age should lead the medical witness to presume consequent imbecility. Against such a sequence the policy of the law and the interest of humanity unite in protesting. " It is one of the painful consequences of extreme old age," very beautifully said Chancellor Kent, in one of his earlier judgments, " that it ceases to ex- cite interest, and is apt to be left solitary and neglected. The control which the law still gives to a man over the disposal of his property, is one of the most efficient means which he has in protracted life to com- mand the attention due his infirmities. The will of such an aged man ought to be regarded with great tenderness, when it appears not to have been procured by fraudulent acts, but contains those very dispositions which the circumstances of his situation and the course of the natural affections dictated, "(w) In harmony with these views, wills have been sustained when the testator was eighty years of age, very deaf, and partially blind ;(o) where he was of the same age, and was afflicted with a palsy, so that he could neither write nor feed himself ;(p) and when he was between ninety and a hundred, and greatly debilitated, (q) It is true that when in old age the testator is shown to have been imposed upon or coerced, the will will be set aside; but this rather tends to strengthen than invade the sanctity of the testamentary privilege, (r) The same view is to be taken of the bodily infirmities peculiar to old age. If they produce mental debility, of course, they work incapacity. But their mere existence will not be sufficient to produce this result. As long as can be done so consistent with public justice, the policy of the law requires that the protection to old age, afforded by the right of testamentary disposal, should continue unimpaired; and it is permitted to cease only when actual wrong would be done to third parties by its continuance, or where, by exposing the possessor to undue solicitation or to imposition, it proves an annoyance rather than an advantage. Nor is this rule without its foundation in the results of observation. The truth that the mind is not necessarily affected by bodily infirmity, is illustrated by numerous cases, one of the most striking of which is that of Dugald Stewart, who when unable from disease to take general exercise, to use his right hand, or to articulate distinctly, composed the third and fourth volumes of his Philosophy of the Human Mind. § 13. While a person blind, or deaf and dumb, is fully competent to make a will, the burden is upon the party setting the will up to prove that the testator knew the contents of the will, and was not imposed upon.(s) It has been questioned whether a person who was both blind and deaf and dumb, is competent to execute any instrument requiring consideration,^) though in a late South Carolina case the possibility of a contrary view seems to be intimated.(u) And however wisely such may have been held to be the law at a time when to be deaf, dumb, and blind was equivalent to being utterly deprived of the avenues of per- ception, such can hardly be considered to be the case now, when to that (n) Van Alst, v. Hunter, 5 John. Ch. 148. (o) Lowe v. Williamson, 1 Green Ch. 82. (p) Reed's Will, 2 B. Monr. 79. (?) Van Alst, v. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. 148. (r) 1 Jarm. on Wills, (2d Am. Ed ) 53 (s) 1 Jarman on Wills, (2d Am. Ed.) 48. (t) Ibid. («) Reynolds v. Reynolds, 1 Spear, 75C-7. HOW FAR PARTIAL INSANITY DESTROYS CAPACITY. 17 unfortunate class a method of communication has been opened which may fit them to sustain and appreciate the relations of society. 2nd. Partial Insanity. § 14. It was for a long time the law in England, and remains so still in most of the American States, that proof of the existence of partial insanity is insufficient to defeat a will, unless the will be its direct off- spring : provided that, at the time of making the will, the testator be sane in other respects upon ordinary subjects.(v) " It appears to me," says Mr. Justice Sergeant, in delivering an opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1839,(w) "that the only question in such a case is, whether the person was of sound memory and discretion, con- sidering the act done in all its bearings, and judging of the soundness of the mind of the supposed testator by his conduct and declarations at the time, and as connected with his previous insanity, and the degree of restoration of mind in the interval; and that if the erroneous and groundless impressions, received during the time of his delirium, shall retain their hold, (whether by some physical derangement of the brain, or by some indelible stamp on the thinking faculties,) that person must be considered still under a delusion—the effect continues, and it is only by effects we can judge of the existence of the exciting cause—and if he is under a delusion, though there be but a partial insanity, yet if it be in relation to the act in question, it is well settled it will invalidate con- tracts generally, and defeat a will which is the direct offspring of this partial insanity." The converse of this result, depending, however, on the same princi- ple, is illustrated by a case decided by Judge King, in Philadelphia, in 1851, remarkable as being the last judgment of that eminent and clear- headed judge, who was then closing a judicial career of twenty-seven years' duration. "A monomaniacal delusion," he said, "inveterately entertained by a testator against one who would otherwise have been the natural object of his bounty, and shown to be the reason which has excluded him from it, and to have had no other existence except in the distempered imagination of the testator, would invalidate a will made under such influence. And for the very plain reason that a will made under the suggestion of such an insane delusion, is not what the law re- quires a will to be, the product of a mind capable of reasoning rightly. For although the law recognizes the difference between general and partial insanity, yet if the will has been made under the influence of such partial insanity, and as the product of it, it is as invalid as if made under the effects of an insanity never so general. Eccentricities of con- duct, absurd opinions, or belief in things appearing to us extravagant, although they may be and are evidences of testamentary incapacity, do not constitute it necessarily and in themselves. A man may believe in witches and witchcraft, as it seems this testator did, or like him he may have believed his health to have been permanently affected by (v) Shelford, Lunacy, 41, 296; 1 Jarm. on Wills, (2d Am. Ed.) 58. (w) Boyd v. Eby, 8 W. 70. 2 18 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO WILLS. slow poisons surreptitiously administered to him, and yet be competent to make a will, where such will is not shown to have some connection with such absurd opinions or extravagant belief, and where the mind is shown to be in other respects sound and vigorous, and the judgment intelligent and clear. This testator was upwards of eighty-three years old when he died, and consequently received his early impressions when the belief in witches and witchcraft still lingered among persons of a much higher social position, and of much better education than himself. Colonial America either inherited from the mother country, or received from the emigration of continental Europe, this absurd notion. Penn- sylvania did not so far escape the general contagion as to make it very surprising that a man in the condition of life occupied by the tes- tator, born before the American Revolution, should have partici- pated in it."(a;) § 15. The English rule was for a long time considered settled on the same basis, and was set forth Avith great fullness by the Prero- gative Court, during Sir J. Nicholl's presidency.^) The question there was as to the testamentary capacity of a gentleman named Stott, an eminent electrician, who had an only child, against whom he had, with- out cause, imbibed an uncontrollable disgust and aversion, which mani- fested itself in acts of great cruelty and oppression, and ultimately in a will by which she was cut off in favor of collateral relations. Sir J. Nicholl pronounced against the will, saying, " The deceased's state of mind at the time of making his will, is intimately, I think, connected with his state of mind on the subject matter of his will—understanding by this, the disposal, by will, of his property. If the deceased were at all times of unsound mind on the subject matter of his will, he must have been of unsound mind at the time of making his will. To suppose the contrary would be to suppose the deceased both sane and insane at the same time and on the same subject; a supposition, I apprehend, equally absurd in a legal and moral point of view. And, subject to these considerations, the question in the end to be determined, the point at final issue is,—not whether the deceased's insanity in certain other particulars, as proved by the daughter, should have the effect of defeat- ing a will, generally, of the deceased, or even this identical will—but it is, whether his insanity, on the subject of his daughter, as, also proved by the daughter, should have the effect of defeating, not so much any will, (a will, generally,) of the deceased, as this identical will—and to the decision of that question I am to be understood as solely addressing myself in the following observations : "Now the daughter being in this case the sole next of kin, the de- ceased's only child, it is quite impossible, I think, to disconnect the daughter from the subject matter of his will, that is of his property__ they are subjects, in effect, identified. Hence the deceased's insanity on the subject of his daughter, generally speaking, being proved at all times, in my judgment, it follows that his insanity, at the time of mak- ing his will, is also proved, in my judgment—unless the contrary is to be inferred from the will itself. But the inference furnished by the (x) Leech v. Leech, 11 Pa. L. J. 179. (y) Dew v. Clark, 1 Addams, 279; 2 Ibid. 102; 3 Ibid. 79. HOW FAR PARTIAL INSANITY INCAPACITATES. 19 will itself, (and it is for this only that I refer to the disposative part— to the contents of the will at all,) is quite the other way. For the prominent feature of the deceased's insanity, in respect to the daughter, was aversion or antipathy to the daughter, so pleaded and so proved; and the will is a will plainly inofficious, so far as regards the daughter, being a will by which she is, in effect, disinherited—disinherited, too, in favor of parties nearly utter strangers to the deceased, (for so it ap- pears,) though not remotely connected with him by blood, being his sister's children. Therefore it follows that, in my judgment, the de- ceased is proved, upon the whole matter, to have been insane at the time of his making this will: which was the daughter's case. * * * Had the contents of the will furnished a contrary inference—had the will, so far as respects the daughter, been in all parts of it, an officious will, the conclusion on this head, and so upon the whole case, might have been different; the very contents of the will would in that case have inferred that however partially insane (insane on the subject of his daughter,) the deceased might have been, generally speaking, still, that such partial insanity was not in actual operation at the time of his making the will, in which respect the will might have been valid. * * * It has been said repeatedly by the counsel for the residuary legatees, that this ' partial insanity' is a something unknown to the law of England. Now if it be meant by this, that the law of England never deems a person both sane and insane at one and the same time, upon one and the same subject, the assertion is a mere truism, (as well, indeed, in reason as in law,) and as such is incapable of being effectively opposed. At the same time, as no such sort of partial insanity is set up by the daughter, the case of partial insanity which she has really undertaken to sustain, is at no risk from the truth of that position, so understood, being conceded. But if, by that position, it be meant, and intended, that the law of England never deems a party both sane and insane at different times, upon the same subject; and both sane and in- sane at the same time upon different subjects—(the most usual sense, this last, of the phrase 'partial insanity,' and the one in which I take it to have been used throughout, by the counsel for the next of kin,) there can scarcely be a position more destitute of legal foundation; or rather, there can scarcely be one more adverse to the streams and current of legal authority." The learned judge sustained himself by the authority of Locke, who says, " A man who is very sober, and of a right under- standing in all other things, may in one particular, be as frantic as any man in Bedlam;" and of Lord Hale, who expressly declares " there is a partial insanity of mind, and a total insanity. The former is either in respect to things, [quoad hoc, vel quoad illud insanire—some persons, that have a competent use of reason in respect to some subjects, are yet under a particular dementia in respect of some particular discourses, subjects, or applications], or else it is partial in respect of degrees ; and this is the condition with very many, especially melancholy persons, who, for the most part, discover their defect in excessive fears and grief, and yet are not wholly destitute of the use of reason." § 16. It is true, that when in the same case a bill of review was ap- plied for to Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst, he limited with evident caution his approval of the judgment of Sir J. Nicholl in such a way as to re- 20 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO WILLS. serve the question of partial insanity as above stated. "I have read his judgment," he says,(2) "with great attention; and I collect from it that his meaning is this: that there must be unsoundness of mmd to invalidate a will, but that the unsoundness may be evidenced in refer- ence to one or more subjects. All that the learned judge meant to convey was, that it was no objection to the imputation of unsoundness, that it manifested itself only or principally with reference to one par- ticular question, or one particular person." § 17. But in 1848, in a very remarkable case before the Privy Council, an opinion was delivered, without dissent, by Lord Brougham, as the judgment of himself, Lord Langdale, Dr. Lushington, and Mr. T. Pem- berton Leigh, in which the notion of partial insanity on one point as consistent with testamentary capacity, was explicitly repudiated.(a) It is true that the case was one in which the same result could have been reached even on Sir J. Nicholl's reasoning. The testatrix, who was advanced in years, was excessively penurious and eccentric, was ex- tremely irritable, wrangled with her servants to an excess, at times in- dulged in very obscene conversation, believed herself the object of various amorous enterprises, and among others from Lord Melbourne, and Lord J. Russel, who she believed prowled about the house as fish- women. All this, and more, on Sir J. Nicholl's hypothesis, might have been consistent with a testamentary capacity. But in addition to this, it was shown that the testatrix had an insane delusion that her brother, whom she disinherited, had joined the Catholics, to whom she had an aversion, and haunted her house, also in disguise. Certainly, even on the theory of partial insanity, this, coupled as it was Avith an inquisition of lunacy, would have been enough to have vacated the will. But Lord Brougham, in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, went further. "The question being," he said, "whether the will was duly made by a person of sound mind or not, our inquiry, of course, is, whether or not the party possessed his faculties, and possessed them in a healthful state. His mental powers may be still subsisting, no dis- ease may have taken them away, and yet they may have been affected with disease, and thus may not have entitled their possessor to the ap- pellation of a person whose mind was sound. " Again, the disease affecting them may have been more or less general; it may have extended over a greater or a less portion of the understanding, or rather, we ought to say, that it may have affected more, or it may have affected fewer of the mental faculties. For we must keep always in view that which the inaccuracy of ordinary lan- guage inclines us to forget, that the mind is one and indivisible ; that when we speak of its different powers or faculties, as memory, con- sciousness, we speak metaphorically, likening the mind to the body, as if it had members or compartments, whereas, in all accuracy of speech, we mean to speak of the mind acting variously, that is, remembering, fancying, reflecting, the same mind in all these operations being the agent. We therefore cannot in any correctness of language speak of general or partial insanity; but we may most accurately speak of the mind exerting itself in consciousness without cloud or imperfection ; but (z) 5 Russ. Ch. Cases, 163. (a) Waring v. Waring, 6 Moore P. C. Cases, 349. HOW FAR PARTIAL INSANITY INCAPACITATES. 21 being morbid when it fancies; and so its owner may have a diseased imagination, or the imagination may not be diseased, and yet the me- mory may be impaired, and the owner be said to have lost his memory. In these cases we do not mean that the mind has one faculty, as con- sciousness, sound; while another, as memory or imagination is dis- eased ; but that the mind is sound when reflecting on its own operations, and diseased when exercising the combination termed imaginary, or casting the retrospect, called recollecting. " This view of the subject, though apparently simple, and almost too unquestionable to require, or even to justify a formal statement, is of considerable importance when we come to examine cases of what are called, incorrectly, 'partial insanity,' which would be better described by the phrase 'insanity,' or 'unsoundness,' always existing, though only occasionally manifest. " Nothing is more certain than the existence of mental disease of this description. Nay, by far the greater number of morbid cases be- long to this class. They have acquired a name;—the disease called familiarly, as well as by physicians, 'Monomania,' on the supposition of its being confined, which it rarely is, to a single faculty or exercise of the mind: a person shall be of sound mind, to all appearance, upon all sub- jects save one or two, and on these he shall be subject to delusions,—mis- taking for realities the suggestions of his imagination. The disease here is said to be in the imagination; that is, the patient's mind is morbid or unsound when it imagines; healthy and sound when it re- members. Nay, he may be of unsound mind when his imagination is employed on some subjects, in making some combinations, and sound when making others, or making one single kind of combination. Thus he may not believe all his fancies to be realities, but only some or one. Of such a person we usually predicate that he is of unsound mind only upon certain points. I have qualified the proposition thus on purpose; because if the being or essence which we term the mind is unsound on one subject, provided that unsoundness is at all times existing on that subject, it is quite erroneous to suppose such a mind really sound on other subjects. It is only sound in appearance; for if the subject of the delusion be presented to it, the unsoundness which is manifested by believing in the suggestions of fancy, as if they were realities, would break out; consequently, it is absurd to speak of this as a really sound mind (a mind sound when the subject of the delusion is not presented), as it would be to say that a person had not the gout, because, his atten- tion being diverted from the pain by some more powerful sensation by ]j|hich the person was affected, he, for the moment, was unconscious of his visitation. It folloAvs, from hence, that no confidence can be placed in the acts, or in any act, of a diseased mind, however apparently ra- tional that act may be, appear to be, or may in reality be. The act in question may be exactly such as a person without mental infirmity might well do. But there is this difference between the two cases: the person uniformly and ahvays of sound mind could not, at the mo- ment of the act done, be the prey of morbid delusion, Avhatever subject was presented to his mind; Avhereas, the person called partially insane, —that is to say, sometimes appearing to be of sound, and sometimes of unsound mind, would inevitably show his subjection to the disease 22 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO WILLS. the instant the topic was suggested. Therefore, we can, with perfect confidence, rely on the act done by the former, because Ave are sure that no lurking insanity, no particular, or partial, or occasional delu- sion does mingle itself with the person's act, and materially affect it. But we never can rely on the act, hoA\Tever rational in appearance, done by the latter, because we have no security that the lurking delusion, the real unsoundness does not mingle itself with, or occasion the act. We are wrong in speaking of partial unsoundness; we are less incor- rect in speaking of occasional unsoundness: Aye should say that the unsoundness always exists, but it requires a reference to the peculiar topic, else it lurks and appears not. But the malady is there, and as the mind is one and the same, it is really diseased, while apparently sound; and really its acts, whatever appearance they may put on, are only the acts of a morbid or unsound mind. Unless this reasoning be well founded, we cannot account for the unanimity with Avhich men have always agreed in regarding as the acts of an insane mind those acts, to all appearance rational, which a person does who labors under delusions of a plainly extravagant nature, though there is nothing in the act done, and nothing in the conduct of the party while doing it, at all connected with the morbid fancies. If these fancies only affect the party noAV and then; if for some months he is free from them,— laboring under them at other times, then his acts apparently rational would not be regarded as those of a person mentally diseased. But if we Avere convinced that at the time of doing the acts the delusion con- tinued, and was only latent by reason of the mind not having been pointed to its subject, and would have instantly shown itself had that subject been presented, then the act is at once regarded as that of a madman. Thus there have been many cases of persons laboring under the delusion that they were other than themselves; have believed them- selves deceased emperors or conquerors; others, supernatural beings. Suppose one, who believed himself the Emperor of Germany, and, on all other subjects, was apparently of sound mind, did any act requiring mind, memory, and understanding. Suppose he made his will, and either did not sign it (before signing was required), or, if he did, signed it with his own name; but suppose we were quite convinced that, had any one spoken on the German diet, or proceeded to abuse the German Emperor, the testator's delusion would at once break forth, then we must at once pronounce the will void, but as officious and as rational, in every respect, as any deposition of property could be ; of course, no one could propound such a will Avith any hopes of probate, if it hap- pened that Avhile making it the delusion had broken out, even although the instrument bore no marks of its existence at the time of its concoc- tion, it must always be a question of evidence, on the whole facts and circumstances of the case, whether or not the morbid delusion existed at the time of the factum; that is, whether, had the subject of it been presented, the chord been struck, there Avould have arisen the insane discord which is absent, to all outAvard appearance, from the chord not having been struck. The principles which have been laid down do not at all differ from those on which the courts have acted, which text writers have construed, and which scientific men, both moralists and physicians, have approved. In the well known case of Dew v. Clark, HOW FAR PARTIAL INSANITY INCAPACITATES. 23 reported 3 Addams, 97, but also reported, with the great advantage of the learned Judge's corrections, and published separately by Dr. Hag- gard, we find Sir John Nicholl stating that mere eccentricity is not enough to constitute mental unsoundness, nor great caprice, nor vio- lence of temper, but that there must be an aberration of reason; and he adopts a definition of delusion given by the learned counsel in the cause (now a member of this court), deeming it well described by the expression that "it is a belief of facts which no rational person would have believed." Perhaps, in a strictly logical view, this definition is liable to one exception, or, at least, exposed to one criticism, namely: that it gives a consequence for a definition; and it may be more strictly accurate to term "delusion" the belief of things as realities which exist only in the imagination of the patient. The frame or state of mind which indicates his incapacity to struggle against such an erroneous belief, constitutes an unsound mind. Sir John Nicholl justly adds that such delusions are generally attended with eccentricities, often with violence, very often with exaggerated suspicions and jealousies." * * * * "The existence of delusions being proved, and their con- tinuance proved or assumed, at the date of the factum, so that the Court is satisfied of the testatrix then laboring under their influence, it is wholly immaterial that they do not appear in the will itself. The party propounding often approached this point in argument, and repeatedly adverted to the fact — perhaps we should say the assertion or as- sumption—that this will betrays no marks of the alleged delusions, or generally of an unsound mind. There was a manifest disposition to lay down a rule that no person laboring under monomania, or partial insanity, can be deemed intestable, unless the kind of insanity appears on the face of the will. But there was wanting the courage to lay down a proposition which would at once have been rejected, and must have been met with the question, Could any court admit to probate the will of the man who said (in the case cited by Sir John Nicholl in Dew v. Clark), 'I am the Christ,' although that will bore no marks whatever of an unsound mind, still less of the dreadful delusion under which the party labored?" § 18. It may therefore be considered as the present law of England, that a person partially insane is incompetent, so far as the making of wills or contracts is concerned, though as yet there has been no at- tempt to adopt the rule in this country. In fact its practical operation would be attended with many difficulties. It is true there are many cases, such as that just commented on, in which the particular monomania overshadows the entire intellect, or where it at least infringes upon the peculiar province of testamentary capacity. But it cannot be denied that in practice, cases of partial insanity or monomania frequently occur, in which there is an inflection of reason so definite and appreciable, as to make it impossible to exclude it from the general class of delusions, and yet which is found to be perfectly consistent with right reason, and with recognized business capacity in other respects. These cases will briefly be noticed. § 19. In the first place may be considered that common species of hallucination by which the mind, on being presented with a particular object, groups round it in a kind of reverie, the circumstances by which 24 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO WILLS. it is ordinarily associated, and then assumes these circumstances as sub- stantive existing facts. This is familiar to every one in the common process of a dream. " Thus," says Sir Walter Scott, " a dreamer hears a noise not sufficiently loud to awaken him entirely; at the same time something accidentally touches him. These impressions instantly form a part of his dreams, and adapt themselves to the tenor of the ideas that occupy his mind, whatever they may be. Nothing is more remark- able than the rapidity with which the imagination furnishes a complete explanation of this interruption to sleep, according to the manner in which ideas are presented by the dream, even without requiring a mo- ment's respite for this operation. For example, if a duel is the sub- ject of the dream, the noise that is really heard becomes the discharge of the pistols of the combatants. If an orator, in his dream, is making a speech, the noise becomes the plaudits of his supposed auditory. If the dreamer is transported in his dreams to the midst of ruins, the noise appears that of the fall of some portion of the walls. In a word, an explanatory system is adopted, in which the rapidity of thought is so great, that if we suppose the noise heard to be the first efforts of some one to awaken the sleeper, the explanation, although requiring a cer- tain train of deductions, is usually finished and complete before a second effort has perfectly awakened the sleeper. There exists in the succes- sion of ideas during sleep, an intuition so rapid, that it recalls the vision in which the prophet Mohammed saw all the wonders of heaven and hell, although the water contained in the jar, which was upset when his ecstasy commenced, was not completely emptied when he recovered the use of his ordinary faculties." § 20. The same process of association exists in many temperaments when the faculties are awake, and the hallucination becomes so blended with the reality as to become part of the texture of actual consciousness. A vivid illustration of this—though in this instance the hallucination was fleeting while for the time entire—is cited from Wigan by de Bois- mont.(S) "I was in Paris," says the former, " at a soire'e given by M. Bellart, some days before the execution of the Prince of Moskowa. The usher, having the name of M. Mare'chal aine, announced M. le Mare'chal Ney. An electric shudder ran through the assembly, and, for my part I own that the resemblance to the prince was for a moment as perfect to my eyes as reality." § 21. An instance of hallucination, produced by association, of a much more permanent character, occurred to the present writer. Hav- ing occasion to receive a check as a dividend, for an amount which Avas readily remembered, as it was the same as had been received on the same day for several previous years, he deposited it, as he supposed, with the teller of the particular bank, which may be called bank A., where he kept an account. It so happened that at the opposite wing of the same building, with an entrance precisely similar, stood another bank, which may be called bank B. He went by mistake into the latter bank, and at once, supposing himself to be in the former, he invested it with the same drapery which it would have had if his supposition had been correct. Not having his bank-book Ayith him, he presented the (b) Rational History of Hallucination, 106. HOW FAR DELUSIONS AFFECT TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. 25 check to the receiving teller, asking him to credit him with it, as a de- posit. It so happened that it had been his custom to hold a conversa- tion in reference to a particular matter in which they had a common interest with the teller of bank A. When some weeks afterwards he dis- covered, on applying to bank A. for the entry in his own book of the deposit, that no such deposit had been noted by the teller, he turned back to the particular day when the check was received, of which the day and the amount was accurately planted on his memory, for the reasons already mentioned, and the actual fact of the deposit was brought to his recollection, grouped Avith the hallucination that it was bank A. that he had gone into—that it A\as the teller of bank A. whom he met— and that the particular inquiry so frequently before put to him in bank A. had been put to him then. The fact had been that on forming for himself an arbitrary and fictitious stand-point, he grouped around it the associations Avhich would have attended the reality. So fixed, indeed, was his belief in the reality of the whole scene, that he Avould have tes- tified to it under oath AYith as much positiveness as to any fact in his re- collection. It Avas not until some time had expired that his mistake was discovered, and then only upon his accidentally being in bank B. and receiving an inquiry from the teller whether he meant to follow up the isolated deposit hejiad made on the particular day. § 22. Dr. Johnson a0s confident that he heard his deceased mother's voice crying "Samuel;" nor was this hallucination ever corrected; and yet no one would maintain that he was incapable of making a will. § 23. Lord Castlereagh, a short time before his very solemn death, and under eArery sanction A\diich could exclude jesting, gave a narrative of a supposed apparition, in which he firmly believed, and which exercised a material influence on his life. When in the Irish Parliament, he went to visit a friend at a castle in the north of Ireland. Shown into a dark and venerable chamber, Avhere there existed every material Avhich would excite a superstitious imagination, having dismissed his valet, he went to bed. Hardly, however, was his candle extinguished when he became aA\Tare of a glimmer of light in his room. No fire had been lighted—the curtains were closed—and no explanation affording itself of this phenomenon, he rose from the bed, when, to his surprise, on turn- ing to the point whence the light proceeded, he perceived the figure of a young and beautiful child, with a halo encircling its brow. With per- fect confidence in the reality of the object, but believing it had been got up artificially as a joke, he folloAved it until it nestled in the arch of the great chimney, and at last sunk beneath the fireboard. The next morn- ing he sought in vain for a clue by which the mystery could be dispelled. It Avas a subject which his host evidently shunned. On putting the question pointedly, hoAvever, Lord Castlereagh was informed that it was true that such a spectre as that had been reported in former times to have appeared under the title of the "Radiant Child." Once again the phantom appeared to the same noble and capable statesman—but no longer, it is said, Avith a radiant crown. This last appearance Avas not long before his own self-destruction, and yet, if the exterior alone was con- sidered, Avhen he Avas at the height of his poA\Ter and glory. Certainly the spectre can noAV be easily explained, because a man who is weak enough to commit suicide, is not too strong to be haunted in a dream by an ap- 26 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO WILLS. parition of whose traditional reputation he had undoubtedly heard, though the recollection afterwards escaped him. And yet we have here a case of an hallucination so entire as to produce partial insanity on that point, and perhaps to have been a motive poAver in his oavii suicide. Still it would hardly have been maintained that Lord Castlereagh, than whom no man of his day exhibited, Avhen in public life, greater coolness or business clearness, Avas incapable, because of this single delusion, of making a contract or will. § 24. It is immaterial, so far as the principle is concerned, whether the hallucination be the result of a morbid imagination, as was the case with Lord Castlereagh, or of imposition on the part of others. In either case, if the hallucination be groundless and absurd, the seizing upon it by the mind as an item of faith, equally constitutes partial insanity. § 25. A butcher in full health, many years ago, as was related by an eminent physician of Philadelphia, was on his way to the city, when he was met by a party of medical students, who determined to see what would be the effect on him of an attempt to persuade him that he Avas affected with the premonitory symptoms of a fever then prevalent. At different points, one by one, they accosted him Avith inquiries as to what was the cause of his paleness, of the livid state of his skin, &c, and as to whether he was aware that marks of the epidemic were on him, &c. At first he sturdily repelled the supposition, but graduall^bccame frightened, and at last returned home to be attacked by the very disease which had been attributed to him. Hearing that their experiment had been carried too far, his tormentors set to work in earnest to undeceive him; but it was too late. " You are joking now; or you are trying to cure a dying man by a trick," was his reply. " You were right at first; you cannot deceive me now by telling me it was a hoax." It was the firm belief of Lord Herbert, of Cherbury, that a divine vision had indicated to him the correctness of a particular course of re- ligious speculation which, on the faith of the supposed vision, he pub- lished, and which he made the basis of his future action. The second Lord Lyttleton was equally^persuaded that a divine warning had ad- monished him of his approaching death. And no less confident, though less serious in its consequences, AATas the conviction of Philip, second Earl of Chesterfield, of the reality of a similar preternatural interfer- ence. One night, in the year 1652, he saAv something white, like a spread sheet, at the head of his bed. He tried to seize it, but it slid away, and disappeared. His thoughts immediately turning to his wife, who was at Networth, with her father, he hurried there, but was met by a servant, with a letter from his wife, which informed him that pre- cisely the same apparition had appeared to her, and had been the cause of the journey of the messenger whom she had dispatched to inquire as to his health. § 26. Abercrombie gives an illustration of habitual hallucination which at the same time was consistent with reason. The patient, when he met a person in the street, was uncertain whether the latter was a real person or a phantom, though with close observation he was able to detect the dissimilarity. The features of the real person would be more decided and more complete than those of the phantom; but the power of discrimination by this process was too uncertain to be relied on, and HOW FAR DELUSIONS AFFECT TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. 27 , the only test of which the patient felt certain was that of the voice, footstep, or touch. The phantom had none of these; the substance, of course, had all. He had the faculty of recalling his visions at will, by powerfully fixing his attention on the conceptions of his mind, but while the hallucination could be invoked at will, it could not be arbi- trarily dispelled. That it was a hallucination, he was perfectly con- vinced ; and that it Avas entirely consistent with general reason was de- monstrated by his clearness of head and business capacity. § 27. A recent case in this country illustrates the same position Avith remarkable point. A merchant who had for years managed with shrewdness and success an extensive business, became thoroughly imbued Avith the spirit rapping and spirit conversing hallucination. Though he conducted his business as well as those Avho were not thus afflicted, his family conceived that this and cognate eccentricities made him a fit subject for a commission of lunacy. This he soon discovered, and laid his plans accordingly. He had theretofore done a cash busi- ness, and his punctuality and accuracy had Avon him extensive credit. He immediately proceeded to buy a large stock of goods from a number of the most sagacious business men within his reach, and gave long notes in exchange. " I do not knoAV how it strikes you," was the way he broached the matter to his family, " but whatever may have been your chances once, they are but light now. All I have to do is to subpoena my friends to whom I have just given my notes, and you may depend upon it, they will not only testify strongly as to their opinion of my sanity, but will bring that opinion down to this particular hour." § 28. If the principle announced by Lord Brougham be correct, in no one of the preceding cases could the party affected be considered as possessed of testamentary capacity, or the capacity to contract. " In- sane on one point, insane on all," would certainly disfranchise multi- tudes who are now considered practically competent to discharge all the business relations of life. Of such a doctrine it is difficult to esti- mate the perilous consequences. A party who cannot be compelled, on the ground of lunacy, to complete his own contract, cannot compel others to complete theirs, and the practical operations of society would be therefore seriously deranged. § 29. The cases Avhich have just been noticed, comprise chiefly those in A\-hich, while the hallucination is positive, the practical inflection of conduct produced thereby is slight. This, hoAvever, cannot be said to be the case with those instances in which a supposed supernatural vision or monitor is received as a guide on the most momentous actions of life. Napoleon declared on many critical occasions that he was conscious of the preternatural vision of a star, Avhich sometimes even appeared in his own cabinet, by which he allowed himself to be guided. Ber- nadotte, beyond doubt, on one important movement at least, was swerved from his course by the vision of an old woman. Constantme felt or feigned a similar impressibility. These cases, it is true, may be suspected, but suspicion cannot be thus cast on the multitudes of brave men who were driven in border or highland contests from the battle field by a threatening Avraith, or Avho were encouraged to the Avildest sacrifices by the beckoning of an imaginary finger or the invocations of a preternatural voice. 28 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO WILLS. § 30. There are, however, other cases in which there is a general morbid derangement of all, or of a material portion of the organs. To these, as Avell as to the great mass of instances where hallucination forms the ground work, the observations of de Boismont, on the case of a man Avho supposed that he had sank all his Avealth at the bottom of a well, apply Avith great force. " It may be asked whether, in the state of mind in which the patient was, Avhose history Ave have related, he was capable of making a will. This is a very difficult question ; but its solution is not an impossibility. When the conduct of the individual does not depart from received usages, Avhen it is not controlled by one of those false ideas that make him hate his relations and friends with- out any motive, and Avhen he regulates his expenses prudently, Ave do not think that Avhimsical actions, or words, the results of an erroneous belief, but having no influence on the prominent acts of his life, should deprive a person of his civil liberties, and of the power of making his will." § 31. Nor should it be forgotten that the effects of such incapacita- tion Avould be most cruel to the sufferer himself. Society is prone enough to make eccentricities and weaknesses the subject of contempt, ridicule or insult. The courts should be cautious how, by taking away the power to ensure respect, they thus increase the misfortune of a class into which no man can assure himself he may not fall—which includes almost the whole of those whose lot it is to reach extreme old age— and which already carries a burden sufficiently heavy. If such per- sons cannot reAvard by their bounty those by whom they are treated with tenderness, and by whose means their comfort is guarded, they will lose, in most instances, the only means remaining to them of self preservation. The law which thus deprives them of their own means of self support, should tender them in return a refuge by Avhich, by public sanction, they could exact that attention Avhich their oavii influ- ence no longer enables them to secure. This, however, is certainly not done now, nor could it be done on any intelligible basis, without con- signing a large proportion of the most efficient members of society to an asylum. As society at present stands, the only remedy seems to be to throw the same tender guardianship around the feeble minded and the eccentric, as in a passage already cited has been so touchingly invoked by Chancellor Kent for the old. § 32. In this country, as has already been seen, the law continues to be, that a vein of partial insanity does not affect testamentary capa- city, except where it enters into the texture of the will. This has been expressly held to be the case with regard to mere eccentricities, no matter how extravagant, such as a belief in witches, or in the loss of health from the application of slow poison surrept'tiously administered.(c) When they enter into the subject matter of the will, however, it of course falls.(d) And a will, othenvise capable of being sustained, was upheld, notwithstanding it appeared that the testator believed in reference to a future state of existence that there were degrees of happiness therein correspondent to and sympathizing Avith (c) Leech v. Leech, 11 Penns. Law J., 177 ; Lee v. Lee, 4 M'Cord, 183. (d) Johnson v. Moore, 1 Litt. 371. CAPACITY TO MAKE WILLS AND TESTAMENTS. 29 the circles of society on earth,—that as a man stood in the latter, so he stood in the former,—and that there his position would be very much determined by the amount of property which he had acquired here.(e) 3d. Lucid Intervals.(ee) § 33. Of course, a person who is actually at the time a lunatic, can- not bind himself civilly, and so far as this, there is no ground for dis- cussion. When a party is once proved to have been at the time insane, all question is at an end. The difficulty, however, is to the fact of time. Unless what in the courts has been called habitual insanity be shown, i. e., such insanity as is, in its nature, continuous and chronic, the fact of the existence of a prior period of lunacy does not suffice even to throAV the burden of proof on the party setting up competency. The case, however, is otherAvise when such habitual insanity is shown to have existed; in which case the presumption is that the party was insane at the time, and the burthen is on those seeking to prove the contrary.(/) " If you can establish," says Sir Wm. Wynne, as cited by Mr. Jarman,(g) " that the party afflicted habitually by a malady of the mind has intermissions, and if there was an intermission of the disorder at the time of the act; that being proved, is sufficient, and the general habitual insanity will not affect it; but the effect of it is this: it inverts the order of proof and presumption; for, until proof of habitual in- sanity, the presumption is, the party agent, like all human creatures, was rational; but when an habitual insanity in the mind of the person who does the act is established, then the party who would take ad- vantage of the fact of an interval of reason must prove it." And in a recent Massachusetts case, DeAvey, J., said, " Neither observation nor experience shows us that persons Avho are insane from the effect of some violent disease, do not usually recover the right use of their men- tal faculties. Such cases are not unusual, and the return of a sound mind may be anticipated from the subsiding or removal of the disease Avhich has prostrated their minds. It is not, therefore, to be stated as an unqualified maxim of the law, 'once insane, presumed to be always insane;' but reference must be had to the peculiar circumstances con- nected with the insanity of an individual, in deciding upon its effects upon the burthen of proof, or how far it may authorize the jury to infer that the same condition or state of mind attaches to the individual at a later period. There must be kept in view the distinction between the inferences to be drawn from proof of an habitual or apparently con- firmed insanity, and that which may be only temporary."(A) § 34. In case of idiocy, a slightly different rule seems laid doAvn. Thus, in a late case, the evidence showed that the deceased was, in 1815, placed in confinement as a lunatic, and there remained till 1817, (e) Gass v. Gass, 3 Humph. 278. (ee) See for the psychological view of this question, post, § 254. (/) Hoge v. Fisher, 1 P. C. C. R. 163 ; Whitenack v. Strykee, 1 Green, C. R. 8; Har- rison v. Rowan, 3 W. C. C. R. 580; Gable v. Grant, 2 Green, C. R. 629; Stevens v. Van- cleve, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 262 ; Jackson v. Vandusen, 5 Johns. 144; Kelly v. Webster, 8 Shep. 46; 1 Jarm. on Wills, (2d Am. ed.) G5. (g) 1 Jarm. on Wills, (2d Am. ed.) 65. (h) Hix v. Whittemore, 4 Mete. 545. 30 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO WILLS. when he was released. In 1820, about which time he was proved to have committed certain rational acts of business,(IJi) he made a rational will. In 1822 he Avas again placed in confinement, and so remained till his death, in 1849. In 1833 he Avas found, on a commission, to have been of unsound mind, without lucid intervals, since 1815. The will was sustained on the ground that though it is otherwise with regard to lunacy, yet when idiocy is set up, it is disproved by contem- poraneous intelligent acts of business.(i) § 35. Where no extraneous influence is shown to have been ex- erted, the character of the act itself, as has already been noticed, goes far to determine the capacity of the party at the particular time. In a very late case(/) Dr. Lushington said, " In the opinion of a very great judge, Sir William Wynne, in the celebrated case of Cartwright v. Cartwright, he said Avhere a rational act Avas done in a rational manner, such was the strongest and best proof Avhich could arise even as to a lucid interval. Now, I cannot say that I subscribe altogether to this observation of Sir William Wynne, for I do not, but it is entitled to great weight; and, to a certain extent, a rational act done in a rational manner, though not, I think, the strongest and best proof of a lucid interval, does contribute to the establishment of a lucid interval." 4th. Intoxication. § 36. As has been already incidentally observed, intoxication, when at the time prevailing, renders a party incompetent to make a contract or execute a will. It is true that most of the cases go on the ground of express or implied fraud, so far as acts inter vivos are concerned; for it is certainly only a little less culpable to enforce a bargain made with a drunken man than it is to make him drunk on purpose to secure it.(k) But the general position is well expressed by Pothier :(Z) " Drunken- ness," he says, "when it goes so far as absolutely to destroy the reason, renders a person, so long as it continues, incapable of contracting, since it renders him incapable of consent, "(m) So rigorously has this doc- trine been applied, that it was even held that drunkenness is a good defence by an endorser of a note against an innocent and bona fide holder ;(n) though when a man is sober enough to write his own name correctly, it will require strong evidence of stupefaction or delirium to induce a jury to sustain his irresponsibility against an innocent third party. But drunkenness, though it is a shield, cannot be made an offensive weapon; and the law will not permit a man to use his drunk- enness as a means of cheating others. Thus, a man who after buying goods when drunk retained them when sober, was held responsible for the price.(o) § 37. The distinction in this respect is thus stated by Vice-Chan- cellor Stuart: "The principles acted upon in Cook v. Clayworth were (M) See ante. \ 7. h) Bannantyne v. Bannantyne, 16 Jur. 864, 14 English R. 581. (/) Ibid. (k) Parke, B., Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & W. 626; 2 Greenleaf on Ev. \ 170; Pitt v. Smith, 3 Campb. 33; Fenton v. Halloway, 13 Stark, 126. (I) Obligations, N. 49. (m) See also Chitty on Contracts, 112 ; Story on Contracts, 27. \n) Sentance v. Poole, 3 C. & P. 1. (o) Alderson, B., Gore v. Gibson, ut supra. HOW FAR INTOXICATION AFFECTS CIVIL CAPACITY. 31 that a party being in liquor when he entered into an agreement, Avas no reason for the Court to refuse a decree for specific performance, and they pointed out the rule to be acted on in these cases. In Cory v. Cory, and, subsequently, in Nagle v. Baylor, the same rule had been acted upon. The course of the Court had been, in cases of this kind, that it Avould not assist a person who had obtained or wished to get rid of an agreement or deed on the mere ground of intoxication; but only where any contrivance was used to draw him in to drink, or any unfair advantage taken of his situation, or in that extreme state of intoxica- tion which deprived a man of his reason, did the Court interfere. The Court was disinclined to interfere in such cases; and if a bill Avere filed to enforce an agreement and it appeared that no fraud had been used, the duty of the Court was to dismiss the bill."(p) § 38. In actions, however, for torts (i. e. cases where the gist is personal injury), drunkenness is no defence to the merits. Thus, if a man is sued for injury to my property or person, it is no defence that he Avas drunk at the time, for the policy of the law is both to redress such Avrongs and to discountenance intoxication.(q) And the plain- tiff may even introduce the fact of drunkenness as an aggravating item, when the question is whether proper care was used in avoiding an accident. Thus, in a suit for injury to the plaintiff by running a sleigh against him, a very eminent American Judge, Gibson, C. J., said "the evidence of intoxication ought to have been received, not because the legal consequences of a drunken man's acts are different from those of a sober man's acts, but because, where the evidence of negligence is nearly balanced, the fact of drunkenness might turn the scale, inasmuch as a man partially bereft of his faculties would be less observant than if he were sober, and less regardful of the safety of others. For this purpose, but certainly not to inflame the damages, the evidence ought to have been admitted, "(r) § 39. Drunkenness to such an extent as to render a party uncon- scious of what he is engaged in, or drunkenness even to a slight degree, when its effect is to render a party subject to the influence of others, avoids a will ;(s) though the mere fact of the testator being at the time under the influence of liquor, will not suffice, unless consequent disa- bility be proved, (t) Long continued prior habits of intoxication also, will not, of themselves, afford a presumption of incapacity, unless the tes- tator was proved to have been drunk at the time.(w) The reason of this distinction between drunkenness and insanity is well pointed out by Sir John Nicholl. Insanity, he argued, may often be latent, where- as there can scarcely be such a thing as latent ebriety; and, consequently, all that is required to be shoAvn, in ordinary cases, is the absence of excitement at the time of the act done; at least, the absence of excite- ment in any such degree as would vitiate the act done; "for," he said, "I suppose it will be readily conceded that, under a mere slight degree (p) Stuart, V. C, Shaw v. Thackeray, 23 Eng. Reports, 21. (q) Ray. Med. Jur. 292 ; Co. Lit. 247(a); 4 Rep. 124 (b); 4 Bl. Com. 25. (r) Wynn v. Allard, 5 W. & S. 525. (s) Shelford on Lunacy, 274, 304. (t) Shelford on Lunacy, 276; Starret v. Douglass, 2 Yeates, 48; Andress v. Weller, 2 Green, C. R., 604; Gardner v. Gardner, 21 Wend. 526. (w) Ibid. Black v. Ellis, 3 Hill, S. C. 68; Ayrey v. Hill, 2 Addams, 206; Shelford on Lunacy, 276. 32 COMMISSIONS OF LUNACY. of that excitement, the memory and the understanding may be, in substance, as correct as in the total absence of any exciting cause. Whether, where the excitement in some degree is proved to have actu- ally subsisted at the time of the act done, it did or did not subsist in the requisite degree to vitiate the act done, must depend, in eacli case, upon a due consideration of all the circumstances of that case in par- ticular ; it belonging to a description of cases that admits of no more definite rule, applicable to the determination of them, than the one I have suggested, that I am aAvare of."(v) Where the will was executed under the influence of drink intentionally and fraudulently adminis- tered, of course it falls, by the operation of a rule already noticed with regard to contracts; but Avhere such is not the case, actual derange- ment of the reasoning faculties, arising by undue excitement, must be shown.(w) Certainly the effect would be most deleterious if the mere existence of excitement produced by stimulants was held to vitiate any act performed during its continuance. II. What is necessary to be proved in order to deprive a party OF THE MANAGEMENT OF HIS ESTATE. § 40. In most of the United States, as in England, process exists by which, when a party is incapable of the management of his estate, whether from mental unsoundness or from habitual drunkenness, a com- mittee may be appointed, to whom the custody of his property is com- mitted. It would be out of place to set forth here the statutes by which this process is defined and settled; it is enough now to notice the general scheme of practice which exists in England, and which has been with the exceptions of only slight alterations of detail, adopted in this country. § 41. When there is reason to believe that a party, from unsound- ness of mind or habitual drunkenness is incapable of managing his affairs, a petition lies, generally from any person interested in his person or estate, for the issuing of a commission. Upon the reception of the petition, the court directs a commission to issue to one or more persons—generally required to be learned in the law—directing the inquiry by commissioner and jury, as to the facts of the petition. The commissioner being thus authorized, directs a precept to the sheriff, com- manding him to summon a jury, Avho, Avhen they meet, hear testimony, —on both sides if desired—on the matter submitted to them, and after being charged by the commissioner as to the law of the case, return a finding as to whether, from the lunacy or habitual drunkenness com- plained of, the respondent is incapable of managing his estate. Should the finding be in the affirmative, the court will appoint a committee who will take charge of the respondent's estate,^) subject however to the absolute right (y) of the respondent to traverse the finding,—i. e., to put in a formal denial of it, in which case the question is determined (v) 1 Jarman on Wills, (2d ed.,) 54. (w) Wheeler v. Alderson, 3 Hagg. 602 ; 1 Jarman on Wills, (2d ed.,) 54-5. (x) See as to the practice in regard to the appointment and removal of committees Black's Est. 6 Harris, 434; Hulings v. Laird, 9 Harris, 268. (y) Cumming in Re. 11 Eng. Law & Eo^. 202. COMMISSIONS OF LUNACY. 33 before a court and jury, in the same way with any contested fact. Whether the alleged lunatic really is capable of volition as to a traverse, and desires that a traverse should be entered, will be determined, it seems, by the chancellor himself by personal examination or other- wise. (2) § 42. It will be seen that the point at issue under a commission of lunacy or habitual drunkenness, is the general, and not the partial or particular incompetency of the party who is the subject of the inquiry. It is a matter of some moment also, that the fullest opportunity of examination be given. When a particular instrument is sought to be vacated, or a particular crime to be excused, the testimony of the medical witness is necessarily drawn from but casual observation, made in most cases at a time when he had no reason to suspect the existence of the disease. Great incentives to fraud also exist, and it is well known how acute must be the penetration, and how sharp the tests which are not sometimes baffled by the simulation of mental unsoundness. On the other hand, a commission of lunacy is executed with deliberation, after a calm and full review of the previous life of the party under con- sideration. Nor is he likely himself to aid the inquiry by any undue sympathy, for his interests and his pride are both enlisted in resisting his moral and intellectual disfranchisement. It becomes, therefore, a simple test, Is the respondent prevented by mental unsoundness or habitual drunkenness from managing his own estate ? If not, no mat- ter how responsible he may be for crime, or capable at particular times of making a bargain, the finding must be against him. Upon a re- covery of competency, the commission, on due cause shown, will be superseded, (a) § 43. " In commissions of lunacy," says Dr. Winslow, "the witness must not only be prepared to give an opinion as to the then state of mind of the party, and competency to take care of his person and man- age his affairs, but he must be prepared occasionally to pronounce judgment as to a prior questionable condition of brain and mind. The alleged lunatic may, under the exercise of undue influence, have previ- ously alienated his property by will, or been induced to execute other important documents. The witness will be called upon to depose as to the probable state of the brain at the time, and as to the length of the alleged existing attack of insanity. Well-marked symptoms of organic cerebral disease may be present, and it will in some cases be an impor- tant point to decide, whether such a condition of physical ill-health has not been of some years' duration, impairing the mental vigor, destroying all power of rational conduct and healthy continuity of thought, and thus interfering with a right exercise of the judgment and affections in the legitimate disposal of property. "(6) In a case which attracted much popular attention at the time,(c) Chief Baron Pollock declared, that " no person ought to be confined in (z) Cumming in re. 11 Eng. Law & Eq. 202. (a) See Lackey v. Lackey, 2 B. Monr. 478; Matter of Russell, 1 Barbour C. R. 38; Matter of Barbour, 2 ib. 97; Matter of Mason, 1 ib. 436; John Beaumont's case, 1 Whar- ton R. 52. (6) Winslow on Medico Legal Evidence in cases of Insanity, 129, 130. (c) Nottridge v. Ripley, before Chief Baron Pollock, sitting at Nisi Prius, June, 1849, reported in full in Journ. of Pscy. Med. vol. 2, p. 630. 3 34 COMMISSIONS OF DRUNKENNESS. a lunatic asylum unless dangerous to himself and others." This dictum, which certainly is inconsistent Avith the necessities of medical practice, has been combated and exploded Avith great ability by very eminent psychological authority, (d) and has not been followed by the current of American judicial opinion. There arc necessarily cases Avhen the safety of property and the health of the patient himself, require con- finement in an asylum, though there be no danger of violence to him- self and others, and it is not likely that the existence of such cases will be again judicially questioned. Whether the confinement, in any particular case, Avas proper or not, will be for the court and jury, if an action of false imprisonment be brought, to determine specially. And the laAV in such a case undoubtedly is, that confinement is justifiable, if either the safety of the patient or others require it, or it is necessary for his restoration to health, (e) § 44. In respect to drunkenness the law is, that while occasional acts of intoxication will not justify a finding of "habitual" drunkenness, yet on the other hand, it is not necessary for such a finding that the party should be constantly in an intoxicated state. Thus recently in Pennsylvania, Knox, P. J., in putting the case upon a traverse to the jury, said, "Neither was it necessary to make out the case that a per- son should be constantly in an intoxicated state, that a man might be an habitual drunkard, and yet be sober at times for days and weeks together. That the question Avas, had the traverser a fixed habit of drunkenness ? Was he habituated to intoxication Avhenever the oppor- tunity offered ? The question is one of fact for the jury to find, but the court has no hesitation in saying, that the man who is intoxicated or drunk the one half of his time, should be pronounced an habitual drunkard." And in the Supreme Court, Rogers, J., said, " To consti- tute an habitual drunkard, it is not necessary that a man should be always drunk. It is impossible to lay doAvn any fixed rule as to Avhen a man shall be deemed an habitual drunkard. It must depend upon the decision of the jury under the direction of the court. It may, however, be safely said, that to bring a man within the meaning of the act, it is not necessary that he should ahvays be drunk. Occasional acts of drunkenness, as the Judge says, do not make one an habitual drunkard. Nor is it necessary he should be continually in an intoxicated state. A man may be an habitual drunkard, and yet be sober for days and weeks together. The only rule is, has he a fixed habit for drunken- ness ? Was he habituated to intemperance whenever the opportunity offered ? We agree that a man who is intoxicated or drunk one half his time is an habitual drunkard, and should be pronounced such. We also concur with the court, that if the jury found the traverser to have been at the date of the inquisition an habitual drunkard, it was neces- sary to decide whether he was capable or incapable of managing his estate. His incapacity in that event is a conclusion of laAV. It is not (d) See a remonstrance with the Lord Chief Baron, touching the case of Nottridge v. Ripley, by John Conolly, M. D., 1849. A letter to the Lord Chancellor on the defect of the law regulating the custody of lunatics, by Charles Curten Cooper, London, 1849. Psychological Review, vol. 2, p. 564; ib. vol. 3, p. 14. A letter to the Right Hon. Lord Ashley, M. P., relative to the case of Nottridge v. Ripley, Dundee, 1849. (: the State, and Pirtle v. the State, any fact that will shed light upon this sub- ject, may be looked to by them, and may constitute legitimate proof for their considera- tion. And among other facts, any state of drunkenness being proved, it is a legitimate subject of inquiry, as to what influence such intoxication might have had upon the mind of the offender, in the perpetration of the deed. AVe know that an intoxicated man will often, upon a slight provocation, have his passions excited and rashly perpetrate a criminal act. Now, it is unphilosophical for us to assume that such a man would in the given case, be chargeable with the same degree of premeditation and deliberation that we would ascribe to a sober man, perpetrating the same act upon a like provocation. It is in this view of the question, that this court held, in Swan's case, and in Pirtle's case; that the drunkenness of a party might be looked to by the jury, with the other facts in the case, to enable them to decide whether the killing were done deliberately and premeditatedly. But his Honor, the circuit Judge, told the jury, that drunkenness was an aggravation of the offence, unless the defendant was so deeply intoxicated as to be incapable of forming in his mind a design deliberately and premeditatedly to do the act. In this charge there is error, for which the judgment must be reversed. Reverse the judgment, and remand the cause for another trial." Hale v. State, 11 Humph. 154. (jo) Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 555. EFFECT ON THE QUESTION OF INTENT. 55 she was about, how can you find that she intended to destroy her- self V\q) So again, AA'hen the charge was assault with intent to mur- der, Patterson, J., said, "A person may be so drunk as to be utterly unable to form any intention at all, and yet he may be guilty of very great A'iolence. If you are not satisfied that the prisoners, or either of them, had formed a positive intention of murdering the child, you may find them guilty of an assault."(r) Beyond this the advance has been fluctuating. The furthest step taken was in an English case, decided in 1819,(s) where Holroyd, J., is reported by Sir W. Russell, who adopts his opinion as text law, to have said, that the fact of drunkenness might be taken into considera- tion to determine the question whether an act was premeditated or done only with sudden heat and impulse. This would make drunken- ness an item in every question of provocation or hot blood, and Avould of course open the way to the same difficulties as to general policy, which we have already pointed out in another connection. In 1835, however, this case was expressly repudiated by Parks, J., who said, in re- ferring to Holroyd, J.'s language, as just given, " Highly as I respect that late excellent judge, I differ from him, and my brother Littledale agrees Avith me. He once acted upon that case, but afterwards retracted his opinion. There is no doubt that that case is not law. I think there would be no safety in human life, if it were to be considered as law."(i) But the very next year, Alderson, B., in a case of stabbing, retraced at least a part of the retreat Avhich had been thus so emphatically sounded. " It is my duty to tell you," he said, " that the prisoner be- ing intoxicated, does not alter the nature of the offence. If a man chooses to get drunk, it is his own voluntary act; it is very different from a madness which is not caused by any act of the person. That voluntary species of madness which it is in a party's poAver to abstain from, he must answer for. However, with regard to the intention, drunkenness may perhaps be adverted to according to the nature of the instrument used. If a man uses a stick, you would not infer a mali- cious intent so strongly against him, if drunk, when he made an intem- perate use of it, as you would if he had used a different kind of weapon; but ivhere a dangerous instrument is used, which, if used, must produce grievous bodily harm, drunkenness can have no effect on the considera- tion of the malicious intent of the party, "(u) Perhaps this is doing no more than reiterating the principle Ave have already announced, that when there is evidence of sober premeditation, intermediate drunken- ness cannot be received to affect the question of intent; but that, Avhen there is no such evidence, it can. And it Avould hardly be possible to strain farther than this the folloAving charge, in 1837, by Parke, B., (to be distinguished from Park, J., Avhose opinion, tAvo years before, has been just noticed)—" I must tell you, that if a man makes himself volun- tarily drunk, that is no excuse for any crime he may commit Avlule he is so; he must take the consoquence of his oavh voluntary act; or most crimes would othenvise be unpunished. But drunkenness may be taken into consideration in cases where what the law deems sufficient provocation (q) R. v. Moore, reported 6 Law Rep., (N. S.), 581. (r) R. v. Cruse, 8 C. & P., 541. is) R. v. Grindley, 1 Rus. on Cr. 8, note n. (t) R. v. Carrol, 7 C. & P., 145. \u) R. v. Meakin, 7 C. & P., 297. 56 INTOXICATION AS A DEFENCE. has been given ; because the question is, in such cases, Avhether the fatal act is to be attributed to the passion of anger, excited by the previous provocation, and that passion is more easily excitable 'in a person when in a state of intoxication, than when he is sober. So, where the ques- tion is, Avhether words have been uttered with a deliberate purpose, or are merely Ioav and idle expressions, the drunkenness of the person ut- tering them is proper to be considered. But if there is really a previ- ous determination to resent a slight affront in a barbarous manner, the state of drunkenness in Avhich the prisoner Avas, ought not to be regarded, for it Avould furnish no excuse. You will decide Avhether the subsequent act does not furnish the best means of judging Avhat the nature of the previous expression really Avas."(v) § 72. The American cases present the same general result, depending in principle, if not in terms, on the position that Avhere the encounter Avas sudden, and the defendant, prior to such encounter, had no ma- lice or old grudge, intoxication at the time of the encounter, can be taken into consideration, to ascertain whether the defendant, Avhen under a legal provocation, acted from malice or from sudden pas- sion, (to) These cases have been arranged as follows, by a late learned writer, (a;) " In 1848 the question of intoxication was before the Supreme Court of Alabama, on an indictment for an assault Avith intent to kill. The Court Avas asked in that case to charge the jury, that, " although drunk- enness does not incapacitate a man from forming a. premeditated design of murder, yet as it clouds the understanding and excites passion, it might be evidence of passion only, and of a Avant of malice and design." This the Court refused, but told the jury that " drunkenness could have no effect in their consideration." The prisoner excepted, and on the hearing in full Court, Chilton, J., declared that it Avas a general rule, that although drunkenness reduces a man to a state of tempo- rary insanity, it does not excuse him, or palliate an offence committed in a fit of intoxication, and which is the immediate result of it; and that if the prisoner had killed the deceased Avith the deadly avcapon (a knife) Avith which he stabbed him, in a state of intoxication, the crime would not have been reduced from murder to manslaughter by his in- toxication, which must be presumed, in absence of contrary evidence, to be voluntary ; and the Court remark, upon the cases of Penna v. Nutall,(#) and Swan v. The State,^) that there it was important to ascertain Avhether the homicide was that "wilful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing," Avhich, by statute, constituted murder in the first degree. The mental state required for that crime, being one of deliberation and premeditation, the fact of the prisoner's drunkenness Avas material, not as an excuse for the crime, but to sIioav it had not been committed. The State v. Bullock.(a) Possibly this case may have gone too far in refusing to allow drunkenness to be given in evidence upon question of the intention. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has declared the same laAV. In 1848 a prisoner Avas indicted for mur- der. One defence was drunkenness. The judge told the jury that (v) R. v. Thomas, 7 C. & P., 817. (w) See Schaller v. State, 14 Missouri, 502. (y) Add. 257. (z) 4 Humph. 136. (x) 6 Law Rep., (X. S..) 550, kc. (a) 13 Alabama, 413, A. D. 1848. EFFECT ON THE QUESTION OF INTENT. 57 drunkenness would not lessen the prisoner's guilt, if they believed him sane before he became drunk. A new trial being moved for, on the ground of misdirection, Battle, J. said, "All the writers on the crim- inal laAV, from the most ancient to the most recent, so far as Ave are aAvare, declare that voluntary drunkenness will not excuse a crime com- mitted by a man othenvise sane, while acting under its influence. Even the cases relied on by the counsel for the prisoner, Rex v. Meakin,(6) Rex v. Thomas,(c) all acknowledge the general rule; but they say that when a legal provocation is proved, intoxication may be taken into con- sideration, to ascertain whether the slayer acted from malice or from sudden passion, excited by the provocation. AVhether the distinction is a proper one or not we do not pretend to say. It has been doubted in Eng- land, Rex v. Carroll,(d) and it is a dangerous one, and ought to be re- ceived with great caution. But whether admitted or not, has no bear- ing upon the present case. There is not a particle of testimony to show that the prisoner Avas acting, or can be supposed to have been acting under a legal provocation; and there Avas therefore no cause for the application of the principle for Avhich the counsel contends. The State v. John.(e) The case of Preble v. State,(/) is an important case on this point. The defendant was indicted for murder. At the time of the commission of the offence he was intoxicated from the use of ardent spirits. "And in relation thereto the Judges charged the jury, that the fact of such drunkenness could not be taken into consideration, by them, unless the defendant was so far gone as not to be conscious of what he was doing, and did not knoAV right from Avrong." " Out of this charge," said Turley, J., "arises the point to be considered by the Court in this case, and that is, how far drunkenness in laAV is a mitiga- tion or excuse for the commission of offences. This is no new question, presented for the first time for consideration, but one of the earliest consideration in the law of offences; one which has been again and again adjudicated by the Courts of Great Britain and the United States, and, as we apprehend, Avith a consistent uniformity rarely to be met with in questions of a like interest and importance. Upon the subject we have nothing to discover ; no new principle to lay doAvn ; no philosophi- cal investigation to enter into, in relation to mental sanity or insanity; but only to ascertain how the laAV upon this subject has been heretofore adjudged, and so to adjudge it ourselves." " In the case of Cormvall v. The State of Tennessee,(g) the able Judge Avho delivered the opinion of the Court, in speaking upon this subject, uses the folloAving very emphatic language : "A contrary doctrine ought to be forced out of circulation, if it has obtained it, by every friend to virtue, peace, quietness and good govern- ment. All civilized governments must punish the culprit Avho relies on so untenable a defence; and in doing so, they preach a louder lesson of morality to all those avIio are addicted to intoxication, and to parents and guardians, and to youth and to society, than comes in the cold ab- stract from pulpits. To the justice and correctness of these remarks, all who have had experience in the annals of crime can bear testimony. (b) 7 C. & P. 297. (c) Ibid. 817. 1 Russell on Crimes, 8. (d) 7 C. & P. 145. (e) 8 Jud. 330. (/) 9 Hump. 663, A. I). 1849. (g) Mar. & Ser. 147, 149 58 INTOXICATION AS A DEFENCE. It is only at the present term of the Court that avc have seen it proven that an offender, a short time before the perpetration of a horrid mur- der, inquired of a grocery-keeper Avhat kind of liquor Avould make him drunk soonest, and swallowed thereon a bumper of brandy. We have had three cases of murder, and one of an assault Avith an intent to murder, before us at this term of Court, in every one of Avhich these are convic- tions in the Circuit Court and affirmances in this; every one of which is of aggravated character, and in every one of which the perpetrator, at the time of the commission of the offence, was laboring under dementia affectata, drunkenness ; an awful illustration of the necessity of holding to the law as it has been adjudged upon this subject. There is, in our judgment, no conflict of authority upon this point of law; every case which may have such appearance, being a case of exception, on the application of the rule, or a case of no authority upon the subject. Lord Hale, in his work before referred to,(^) says: "If, by means of drunkenness, an habitual or fixed madness be caused, that will be excuse, though it be contracted by the vice and va ill of the party; for this habitual or fixed phrensy puts a man in the same condition as if it were contracted at first involuntarily. And it Avas to this principle the Circuit Judge was alluding, when he charged the jury in the present case, that the drunkenness of the prisoner could not be taken by them into consideration, unless he Avere so far gone as to be unconscious of what he was doing, and did not knoAV right from Avrong, in saying which he put the case most favorable for the prisoner; for a man may be so intoxicated as to be unconscious of what he is doing, and not to know right from wrong ; and yet not have contracted an habitual and fixed phrensy, the result of intemperance, of Avhich Lord Hale is speaking above." § 93. In Kelly v. State,(i) the same question came before the High Court of Error and Appeals of Mississippi. The court below declined to charge the jury that intoxication was evidence of intention in deter- mining Avhether the killing Avas murder. The prisoner Avas convicted of manslaughter only, but the court above in remarking upon this question, lays down the law as well established, that drunkenness is no excuse for crime, although sometimes held proper for consideration, where the sole question is whether the act done Avas premeditated or done only with sudden heat or impulse, which might be as truly said of anger or any other excitement arising from sudden provocation or peculiar circum- stances ; but not much importance Avas to be attached to it, as might be conceived from the presumption AA'hich Avas equally great that the design might have previously existed, and intoxication have been employed to nerve the criminal to the commission of the crime: that the law dis- criminates between the delusion of intoxication and the insanity Avhich it may ultimately produce. If drunkenness, they said, Avere to be considered an excuse for crime, there would be established a complete emancipation from criminal justice. The same principle was recognized in this country in State v. M'Cante, (j) being somewhat differently applied. The court here held " That if a crime was committed upon a provocation, AA-hich, if acted upon instantly (h) P. C. pt. 1, ch. 4. See ante, § 67. (i) 3 Smedes & Marshall, 518, A. D. 1844. (j) 1 Spears, 384. EFFECT ON THE QUESTION OF INTENT. 59 by a sober man would mitigate his offence, evidence of intoxication was admissible upon the question Avhether such provocation was, in fact, acted upon when the act Avas done. If a man uses a stick upon you, you would not infer a malicious intent so strongly against him if drunk, Avhen he made an intemperate use of it, as you would if he had used a different kind of weapon. But Avhere a dangerous instrument is used, AA'hich if used must produce grievous bodily harm, drunkenness can have no effect on the consideration of the malicious intent of the party." In a late case in Tennessee, already cited,(7c) it was said by Turley, J., " The case of R. v. Grindley, decided at Worcester Sum. Ass., 1819, by Holroyd, J., not reported but referred to by Russell in his work upon Crimes, page 8, and noAV insisted upon by the prisoner as putting the Circuit Judge in the wrong in his charge to the jury, and holding different principles upon this subject, is expressly overruled by Park and Littledale, judges, in the case of R. v. Carroll, (I) and if it were not, it is an anomalous case; and perhaps was not intended or considered by Holroyd to be in conflict with principles so well and so long settled. The case as stated by Russell, holds that ' though voluntary drunken- ness cannot excuse from the commission of crime, yet when upon a charge of murder the material question is whether an act Avas premedi- tated or done only with sudden heat and impulse, the fact of the party being intoxicated is a circumstance proper to be taken into consideration.' Now, in relation to this principle as thus laid down, it may be observed that cases may arise, even of murder at common laAV, in which it would be proper to receive such proof as explanatory of intention. To con- stitute murder at common law, the killing must have been done with malice aforethought; the existence of this malice necessarily implies the absence of all circumstances of justification, excuse or mitigation arising from adequate provocation; and this malice is either express or implied: express, when it has been perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or other deliberate and premeditated manner; implied, from the nature of the weapon, the Ariolence of the assault, and the inadequacy of the proA^ocation. It may become important in a case to know whether poison which has been imbibed was administered knowingly and design- edly or accidentally. And if it be wilful, which it is in the case of a medicine, there being two on the table, one a poison and the other not, and the poison be administered, is not the fact that the person Avho ad- ministered it, was drunk at the time, legitimate proof for the purpose of showing that it was a mistake which a drunken man might make, though a sober one would not. This Avould be, not to protect him from the punishment for his crime, but to shoAV that he had not given the poison premeditatedly, and therefore was guilty of no crime. So if the question be, whether the killing is murder or manslaughter, the defence being adequate provocation, and it be doubtful whether the bloAV be struck upon the provocation or upon an old grudge, it seems to us, proof that the prisoner was drunk when he struck the blow is legitimate, not to mitigate the offence but in explanation of the intent, that is, Avhether the blow was struck upon the provocation or upon the old grudge; for the law only mitigates the offence to manslaughter, upon adequate pro- (k) Pirtle v. State, 9 Hamp. 663. (0 X C. & P. 145. 60 MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS PSYCHOLOGICALLY. vocation, out of compassion to human frailty; and, therefore, though there be adequate cause for such mitigation, yet if, in point of fact, one avail himself of it to appease an old grudge, it is murder and not man- slaughter ; and in all such cases the question necessarily is, Avhether the blow Avas stricken premeditatedly, or upon sudden heat and impulse produced by the provocation, and the fact of the self-possession of the perpetrator of the crime is very material in a conflict of proof upon the subject. If this be the extent of the opinion of Holroyd, in the case of Rex v. Grindley, Ave are not prepared to hold that it is not law. But if it be understood to hold that a killing may be mitigated from murder to manslaughter in consequence of the drunkenness of the perpetrator, thereby making that adequate provocation in the case of a drunken man Avhich could not be so in the case of a sober one, Ave are prepared to hold Avith Park and Littledale, that it is not law." CHAPTER II. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONSIDERED PSYCHOLOGICALLY. § 74. " The various diseases included in the general term insanity, or mental derangement," says Dr. Ray, " may be conveniently arranged under two divisions, founded on tAvo very different conditions of the brain; the first_ being a want of its ordinary development, and the second, some lesion of its structure subsequent to its development. In the former of these divisions, we have Idiocy and Imbecility, differing from each other only in degree. The various affections embraced in the latter general division may be arranged under two subdivisions, Mania and Dementia, distinguished by the contrast they present in the energy and tone of the mental manifestations. Mania is characterized by unnatural exaltation or depression of the faculties, and may be con- fined to the intellectual or to the affective poAvers, or it may involve them both, and these powers may be generally or partially deranged. Dementia depends on a more or less complete enfeeblement of the faculties, and may be consecutive to injury of the brain, to mania, or to some other disease; or it may be connected with the decay of old age; These divisions will be more conveniently exhibited in the fol- loAArmg tabular vieAV: 1. Resulting from congenital defect. 2. Resulting from an obstacle to the development of the faculties, supervening in infancy. 1. Resulting from congenital defect. 2. Resulting from an obstacle to the development of the faculties, supervening in infancy. Intellectual, \\ J*6"?™1- ( 2. Partial. Affective, \\ J*0"?™1- { 2. Partial. 1. Consecutive to mania, or injuries of the brain. 1. senile peculiar to old age."(a) Defective development of the faculties. Idiocy. IlIUEC'ILITY. INSANITY. Lesion of the faculties subsequent - to their development. Mania. Dementia. (a) Ray on Insanity, 71. FLEMMING'S. CLASSIFICATION. 61 § 75. The following classification of Flemming,(5) while less simple, is very valuable both for the delicate precision of its analysis, and for the important aid it affords to the nomenclature of forensic psychology: I. INFIRMITAS. (Geistesschwache.) Imbecility, the characteristic being the diminution in psychical power. 1st. As to origin. (1.) Primaria seu congenita, (Syn. Idiotismus.) A defective development perceptible either at birth or infancy. (2.) e morbo, arising from wounds on the head, brain or nervous fevers, or epilepsy. (3.) Senilis, arising from decrease in vitality in the extreme stages of old ngc. 2d. As to extent. (1.) Infirmitas, Achtricta. Limited imbecilitj-, the characteristic being dim- inution of particular organic powers. (a) Dysmenia. AVeakness of memory, the characteristic being the feebleness of the reproductive power of the perceptive faculty, and the symptoms, an inability to remember things either re- cent or remote, distinctly or at all. (b) Infirmitas adstricta surdo-mutorum. Imbecility of the deaf and dumb. (c) Infirmitas adstricta coecorum. Imbecility of the blind. (2.) Infirmitas sj'arsa. General weakness of mind, the characteristic being the absolute or relative weakness of all the mental and moral func- tions, and the symptoms, obtuseness and feebleness of the perceptive and attentive powers; feebleness of comprehension, of ratiocination, of imagination, of memory, in a variety of gradations. II. VESANIA, (Geistes verwirrung.) Mental confusion, the characteristic being a depravity (depravation) of the psychical powers arising from excess or perversion^ 1st. Vesania dysthymodes, or dysthymic, disorder of temperament, the characteristic being the depravity (depravation) of the psychical powers connected with an overpowering disturbance of the temperament. Symptoms; an anomalous condition of the sensibility, the mental tone, the inclinations, and the impulses. The consequent deliria are the invariable effect of the dysthymia, and depend upon the prevailing feeling or sentiment. (1.) Dysthymia transiton'a seu subita. Sudden dysthymia, the characteristic being the suddenness and rapidity of its approach. Symptoms; irri- tability, proneness to agitation, irascibility, excessive disgust, fear of death, extreme timidity, despair of happiness. It occurs frequently in the Stadium prodromorum of cerebral affections and nervous fevers, or of epilepsy and the cognate complaints; and is sometimes, though more rarely, accompanied by the sudden suicidal impulse. It should be observed that dysthymia remittens sinks in the remission into the mere dysaethesis. (2.) Dysthymia adstricta, or partial dysthymia, the characteristic being an anomalous condition of particular states of feeling, inclinations, and impulses. (a) Atra, (the Melancholia Lypemonia, of Esquirol,) or gloomy Dysthymia, the characteristic being sadness, fear, dread, sus- picion, malevolence, homesickness, (nostahjia,) and the wild- ness and ferocity of the intoxicated. (Ferocitas et morositas ebriosorum.) (b) Dysthymia Candida, cheerful Dysthymia, (Melancholia hilaris, Chtrromanie Chambeyron,) the characteristics being hilarity, recklessness of manner, raillery, proneness to see all things in the most vivacious light. (c) Dysthymia mutabilis, variable Dysthymia, the characteristic being vacillation between the two foregoing forms. (3.) Dysthymia sparsa, (apathica,) general Dysthymia, (Melancholia Atto- nita.) The characteristics being, apparent obtuseness, dull, heavy reveries and abstractions, prevalence of an indistinct sensation of dis- comfort, apathy to all extraneous impressions. 2d. Vesania Annoetos, or Anoesia. Disturbance of the understanding. The cha- racteristics being the depravity (depravation) of the psychical powers, with a controlling anomalousness of the intellectual faculties. Symptoms, deliria of various kinds, with manifestations of Dysthymia, which, however, are merely subordinate. (1.) Anoesia Transitoria, or Subita. Sudden Anoesia. The characteristics being unexpected appearance and rapid subsidence. (b) Psychiatriscb.es Journal, Bd. I. Hft. 1. p. 112. 62 FLEMMING'S AND ELLINGER'S CLASSIFICATIONS. (a) Anoesia efelre. Febrile delirium. ( b) Anoesia e potu nimio, (ebrietas.) Drunkenness. re) Anoesia ex affectu, madness caused by agitation of mind. (d) Anoesia semisomnis. Confusion of mind in sleep. Slcop-drunk- enness. (e) Anoesia Somnambida, or Spastica; Somnambulism. S2.) Anoesia continue), chronic Anoesia. 3.) Anoesia remittens. Remittent Anoesia. (4.) Anoesia adstricta, partial Anoesia or Lunacy. The characteristics being delirium in particular intellectual departments. (a) Anoesia ad sensationes. Hallucinations, (deliria of the senses,) (A'ar. afallacia sensuum et hallucinatio ebriosormn, derangement of the senses consequent on excess of drinking. (b) Anoesia ad cogitationes, eccentricity, fixed insane ideas. (5.) Anoesia sparsa. General Anoesia or lunacy, the characteristics being Deliria in every department of the intellectual faculties. Var. a Anoesia potatorum, (Delirium tremens.) 3d. Vesania maniaca seu Mania. The characteristic being a depravity (deprava- tion) of the psychical functions, with a concurrent anomalousness of the emotional and intellectual faculties. The symptoms are a violent and per- verse temper, inclinations and impulses, with violent deliria, which mutually sustain and aggravate each other. (1.) Mania transitoria subita, sudden mania, the characteristics being a sud- den breaking out of mania without perceptible premonitory stages, and without previous Dysthymia or Anoesia/ generally a crisis in sleep, or transition to the second class. (a) Mania subita a febre, (Delirium encephediticum,) sudden deli- rium, with feverish symptoms of the brain and nerves. (b) Mania subita a potu nimio, arising from and during intoxication. (c) Mania subita ex affectu, mania caused by excessive agitation of the affections. (d) Mania subita epartu, mania connected with parturition. (e) Mania subita e morbo oceidto, (vulgo) Amentia occulta, which also includes the previous species. (2.) Mania continua, permanent mania. (3.) Mania remittens, Remittent mania. (Remark—Remittent mania in re- mission turns into Anoesia, in some cases immediately into Dysthy- mia.) (4.) Mania adstricta seu instinctica. Moral Insanity. (Mania sine delirio of Pinel; Monomauie instinctive of Marc; Mania affectiva; Folie raiso- nante;) the characteristics being insanity, apparently confined to spe- cific morbid impulses. This class is almost always connected with the symptoms of Mania transitoria seu subita. (5.) Mania Sparsa, general mania is the characteristics being a depravity (depravation) of both the moral and intellectual powers. § 76. To Ellinger(c) we are indebted for the following: I. Diseases of the affections, when the affections, sentiments and desires are preponderatingly alienated, while the intellectual faculties are affected in an inferior or at least a secon- dary degree. (a) Melancholy, the prevalent type being sadness, depression, fear, dread and despair. ib) Phrensy, the prevalent type being mirth, mischievousness, anger. (c) Volatility, (Launenhaftigkeit.) Alternation between the two last mentioned phases. II. Delirium, the sentiments and intellectual faculties are equally affected, and both the sub- jective and objective relations alike distorted. («) (b) (c) Characterized by melancholy, phrensy, and the alternation of the two. III. Diseases of the intellect, where the affections take a subordinate part and the intellect is mainly disordered. (o) Partial. (bj General. (c) Debility, including idiocy and imbecility. § 77. Without attempting a formal analysis, it is now proposed to consider the several points in which Psychology comes in contact with the law of the land, in the following order:— (c) Ueber die antropologischen Momente der Zurechnungs fahigkeit. Ludwigsburg, 1846. PRESENT CLASSIFICATION. 63 I. GENERAL THEORIES OF MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS, \ 78. 1st. Psychological theory, \ 79. 2d. Somatic theory, \ 80. 3d. Intermediate theory, § 81. Difficulties attending each of the first two, \ 82. Question as to moral responsibility of Lunatics, \ 83. Views of President Edwards, \ 84. Of Dr. Barlow, § 85: II. HOW MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS IS TO BE DETECTED, \ 86. 1st. By whom, \ 86. Medical expert necessary for this purpose, § 86. Great skill and experience needed, $ 87. Dangers of an inexperienced examiner being baffled, \ 88. Responsibility in law of medical examiner, § 89. Importance of examiner adapting his manner to patient's condition, §90. Important that legal and medical officers should, in such cases, act in common, \ 92. Manner in which medical witness is to be examined on trial, §• 94. 2d. At what time, \ - a disturbed reciprocal relation of mind and body. Dr. Jamie- son (Lectures on the Med. Jur. of Insanity, by Robert Jamieson, M. D.) takes this same view. Sir Benjamin Brodie in a late very interesting essay, (Psychological Inquiries &c. Lon- don, 1854,) gives the following conclusive objections to the phrenological phase of the somatic theory:—"Now there are two simple anatomical facts which the founders of this system have overlooked, or with which they were probably unacquainted, and which of themselves afford a sufficient contradiction of it. " 1st. They refer the mere animal propensities, chiefly to the posterior lobes and the intellectual faculties to the anterior lobes of the cerebrum. But the truth is' that the posterior lobes exist only in the human brain, and in that of some of the tribes SOMATIC theory. 67 § 82. Independently of the pathological difficulties in the way of the somatic theory, psychological research testifies most strongly against it.(g) The mental and moral functions are the immediate pro- ducts of an independent sphere of organism, and not to be explained by anything lying outside of that sphere. The brain and the nerves have only the physical part of perception and motion, and to some ex- tent the regulation of the functions to perform; but the soul can- not otherwise be considered as entirely distinct from this activity of the nerves. The somatic theory, which confounds the two, will never be able to make a.satisfactory distinction between palsy and im- becility, between convulsions and ravings, between sensuous hallucina- tions and insanity, (h) The somatic theory fails entirely in affording support to any practical- system of therapeutics. The general expe- rience of modern times confirms the fact, that medicines are of very little avail against mental derangements, and that the most essential results are attained by a strictly moral treatment, and corresponding regulation of diet and habits.(i) of monkeys, and are absolutely wanting in quadrupeds. Of this there is no more doubt than there is of any other of the best established facts in anatomy; so that, if phrenology be true, the marked distinction between man on one hand, and a cat, or a horse, or a sheep on the other, ought to be, that the former has the animal propensities developed to their fullest extent, and that these are deficient in the latter. " 2ndly. Birds have various propensities and faculties in common with us, and in the writings of phrenologists many of their illustrations are derived from this class of ver- tebral animals. But the structure of the bird's brain is essentially different, not only from that of the human brain, but from that of the brain of all mammalia. In order that I may make this plain, you must excuse me if I repeat what I said on the subject formerly. In the mammalia the name of the corpus striatum has been given to each of two organs of a small size compared with that of the entire brain, distinguished by a peculiar disposition of the gray and the fibrous or medullary substance of which they are composed, and placed under the entire mass of the hemispheres of the cerebrum. In the bird's brain what appears to a superficial observer to correspond to these hemi- spheres is found on a more minute examination, to be apparently the corpora striata de- veloped to an enormous size ; that which really corresponds to the cerebral hemispheres being merely a thin layer expanded over their upper surface, and presenting no appear- ance of convolutions. It is plain then, that there can be no phrenological organs in the bird's brain, corresponding to those which are said to exist in the human brain, or in that of other mammalia. Yet birds are as pugnacious and destructive, as much at- tached to the localities in which they reside, as any individual among us." In his interesting work on Criminal Jurisprudence, Mr. Sampson adopts the views of the author of the " Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," and ascribes every criminal action to some abnormal or morbid condition of the cerebral organization. This fundamental proposition is, that " every manifestation of the mind depends upon the confirmation and health of its material instrument, the brain; and as it is not the function of a sound and healthy brain to give rise to any other than healthy manifesta- tions, so no error of judgment can ever arise, but as the result of a defective condition of that organ." Mr. Hurlbut, an eminent counsellor, and one of the Supreme Judges in the State of New York, in his "Essays on'Human Rights and Political Guarantees," a work which is well worthy of perusal, promulgates the same doctrine, which on the other hand is very ably controverted by Dr. Hoods.—" Suggestions for the further provision of Crim- inal Lunatics, by Charles Hood, M. D. London, 1854. pp. 126, 127." (ff) Siebold. Lehrbuch der Gericht. Med. Berlin, 1847. \ 194. L. Krahmer, Handbuch der Gericht, Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851. \ 126. Heinroth, Syst. der psychisch gericht. Med. Leipsic, 1825. Kant, Anthropologic, Kdnigsb., 1798. Metzger's Ger. Med. —Abhandl. Kbnigsb. 1803. (h) Legons Cliniques, sur 1'Alienation Mentale—par Falret. Legon 1, p. 8. Paris, 1854. (0 The most thorough of the German advocates of the somatic theory is Friedreich, particularly in his " Historisch, Kritische Darstellung de Theorien neber das Wesen und den Sitz der psychischen Krankheiten. Leipsic, 1836. 68 PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY. § 83. The psychological theory, at its first inception, split upon the rock of extremes, in denying the influence of the physical processes upon mental diseases in the face of experience. In opposition to the somatists it was thought necessary to exclude all natural causes from the explanation of the origin of mental affections, and to ascribe them to an act of voluntary self-enthralment, which, in all cases, Avas to be attributed to some prior moral excess or delinquency incurred, with a knowledge of the consequences. But a derangement of mind is not identical with sin. For though every vice, every sin, is an abnormity of the soul, yet every abnormity of the soul is. not sin. A lunatic may be in a human sense innocent of positive guilt, and on the other hand the worst of criminals may retain his sanity. It is impossible to ad- here to this doctrine in practice, without reducing the entire treat- ment of the disease to a system of rewards and punishments; and the vagueness of the idea of freedom and constraint, the impossibility of distinguishing between the moral thraldom of the criminal and that of the sick man, will throw into confusion the entire system of forensic psychology.(j) It is equally amiss to derive all diseases of the mind from the passions, although the latter may be important causes, and in the more advanced stages, symptoms of insanity.(k) At the same time, as will hereafter be very fully shown,(kk) there is in the mass of cases of insane convicts such an amount of responsibility as to require the infliction of a degree of punishment which, though different from that imposed on the sane, will yet be accompanied with a corrective as well as a preventive discipline. § 83. The truths contained in these opposing views and theories, could not fail to be appreciated and to lead to efforts at reconciliation. The unity of man's being was particularly looked to as a resolution of the discord. The theories constructed on such a basis must of course depend upon the light in which this unity of man is regarded. The most eminent European authorities now tend to the conclusion that mental unsoundness is a disease of the soul itself, but has its seat, not in the soul's intellectual but in its grosser spheres.(I) And inasmuch— according to this theory—as this lower sphere of the soul has the cha- racter of thraldom, of a want of self-control, mental affections are fre- quently termed "involuntary aberrations."(m) " The degree in which the operations of the mind are dependent upon its material instruments," (says Dr. Carpenter,) "is a question which cannot be regarded as conclusively determined by scientific evidence alone, and it has little practical bearing on physiological research. (/) Etudes Medico Psychologiques. M. Renaudin, p. 166. Art. 30. Sur la responsa- bilite Morale. Paris, 1854. Legons Cliniques, de M. Falret, p. 11, discours d'ouverture. Paris, 1854. Manuel Complet de Medicine Legale per J. Briand. Section Troisieme. Article III p. 560. Paris, 1852. (k) Heinroth is the leading representative of the psychological theory. See his " Lchrbuch der Scelenkrankhciien." Leipsic, 1818, and his " System der psychisch ger- ichtlichen Medicin," Leipsic, 1825. Dr. Mayo, in his "Medical Testimony on Lunacy," goes some distance in the same direction; and as has been seen, very justly argues i'n favor of a discrimination of punishment between the malicious and the unconscious in- sane criminal. Mayo, &c. 50, 51. (kk) Post § 259-276. (0 See Schurmayer, Gerichliche Medicin. \ 521. (m) " Unfreiwilliger Irrsein." Schurmayer. CONNECTION BETWEEN BODY AND SOUL. 69 The doctrine usually regarded as having the best Scriptural basis— that the mind has an existence altogether distinct from that of the body—is attended with several difficulties, of which those arising from the phenomena of insanity are perhaps the most important. On the other hand, the opinion held by some, that mental phenomena are the mere results of material changes, appears to involve difficulties at least equal: among'which may be noticed, the consciousness of personal identity, preserved throughout the continual and rapid changes to which the nervous system is subject. The assertion, however, that psychical operations cannot be the result of material changes, is based, on the assumption, that we know far more of the essential character of both than is admitted by the best metaphysicians to be the case regarding either; this is a question which scarcely comes within the boundaries of human knowledge. Neither hypothesis is inconsistent with the re- vealed doctrines of the immortality of the soul; though the second could not be made to conform to it, without the additional supposition that some refined form of matter, on which the psychical operations es- sentially depend, has also an external existence. All the upholders of this doctrine seek a confirmation of it in the expression 'spiritual body,' used by an authority which is all but supreme. The certainty of a future existence, in which all that is corruptible shall be done away, is the great practical fact for the Christian. On the mode of it the phi- losopher may speculate, and even though he may come to the conclu- sion that 'mind and matter are logically distinct existences,' yet he finds their operations so inextricably interwoven in the phenomena of man's terrestrial life, that he cannot pursue either class by itself alone." To this may be added the very high authority of Isaac Taylor, who, in his "Physical Theory of another Life," after pointing out how com- pletely the question whether the human soul is ever actually or en- tirely separated from matter, is passed over by St. Paul as an inquiry altogether irrelevant to religion, continues:—" Let it then be distinctly kept in view, that although the essential independence of mind and matter, or the abstract possibility of the former existing apart from corporeal life, may well be considered as tacitly implied in the Chris- tian's scheme, yet that an actual incorporeal state of the human soul, at any period of its course, is not involved in the principles of our faith any more than is explicitly asserted. This doctrine, concerning what is called the immortality of the soul, should ever be treated simply as a philosophical speculation, and as unimportant to our Christian profession, "(n) § 84. "Such," says President Edwards, the first metaphysician of his country, and perhaps the first of his age, "seems to be our nature, and such the laws of the union of soul and body, that there never is, in any case whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or incli- nation of the soul without some effect upon the body in some alteration of the motion of its fluids, and especially of the animal spirits. And, on the other hand, from the same laws of the union of the soul and body, the constitution of the body and the motion of its fluids may promote the exercise of the affections, but the mind only that is the proper seat of (n) Carpenter. Mind and Matter, by J. G. Millingen, M. D., M. A. pp. 128, 129, 130. 70 THEORIES OF THE SEAT OF THE SOUL. affections. The body of man is no more capable of being really the subject of love or hatred, joy or sorrow, fear or hope, than the body of a tree,—or than the body of a man is capable of thinking and under- standing. As it is the soul only that has ideas, so it is the soul only that is pleased or displeased with its ideas. As it is the soul only that thinks, so it is the soul only that loves or hates, rejoices or is grieved at what it thinks of. Nor are these motions of the animal spirits and fluids of the body anything properly belonging to the nature of the affections, though they always accompany them in the present state, but are only effects or concomitants of the affections that are entirely distinct from the affections themselves, and not essential to them; so that an unbodied spirit may be as capable of love and hatred, joy or sorrow, hope or fear, or other affections, as one is that is united to a body."(0) § 85. There can also he little doubt that the soul, in this sense, acts directly on the body, either with or without the usual muscular or nervous action. A curious case, recorded by the late Dr. J. Cheyne, seems to favor the opinion that there may be a set of fibres conveying to the brain a sense of general sensation, independent of the sense of touch. "We know an instance," says he, "of a remarkable delusion, arising from complete loss of feeling in the left side of the body, caused by an attack of palsy, which first originated, and then fatally termi- nated in apoplexy. In the morning the individual maintained he had two left arms; and when we tried to convince him that he was under a misconception, he promptly offered to produce the supplementary arm. ' There it is,' said he, patting his left shoulder with his right hand. 'Well, then,' it was asked, 'where is the other?' On which, turning round his head with great alacrity to show it, he seemed much disap- pointed when he could discover but one arm, vehemently declaring that 'there were two in the night.'Qj) Here there must have been general sensation in the arm, or the patient would not have felt that he had an arm at all; but when in the night he felt but could not see that he had an arm, and, on touching the surface of the palsied limb with the other hand, was sensible of no impression, he naturally supposed the real arm to be existing behind or beside the dead substance which he touched. Between sleeping and waking, even in health, we do not always reason; and here, probably, the reasoning power was somewhat disturbed by the lesion of the brain. If there should be a sense of this kind, it would account for the fact that pain is felt in palsied limbs which are insensi- ble to touch, as well as for those cases of insanity or idiocy where the sense of touch remains, hut that of heat, or the pain ensuing from a burn is lost^g) II. HOW MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS IS TO BE DETECTED. 1st. By whom. § 86. 2d. At what Time. § 96. (o) Edwards on Religious Affections, p. 15. (p) Cheyne's Essays, p. 60. (q) Barlow on Man's Power over himself to prevent or control Insanity. London W. Pickering, 1843 ; Phil. Lea k Blanchard, 1846. BY WHOM ALLEGED LUNATICS ARE TO BE EXAMINED. 71 1) Time of act. § 95. 2) At trial. § 97. (3) At and after sentence. § 98. 3d. By what Tests. § 100. (1) Physiognomy. § 100. (2) Bodily health and temperament. § 102. (3) Hereditary tendency. § 107. (4) Conversation and deportment. § 110. (5) Nature of act. § 112. (a) Its insensibility. § 112. (b) Its incongruity with antecedents. § 113. (c) Its motivelessness. § 114. (d) Its inconsequentially. § 115. 1st. By ivhom. § 86. It has already been stated that the experience of medical ex- perts, like that of experts in all other branches of science,(r) is part of the common law of the land. The illustrations of this principle are very numerous. Thus, if a question involving ship-building is the subject of judicial investigations, the testimony of a shipwright as to the meaning of terms of art, as well as to the general laws of the craft, enters into the basis upon which the case is tried. And if there has been any difficulty in the reception of the result of medical experience, when in- sanity is at issue, it has arisen from that occasional conflict of opinion among medical witnesses which the highest professional authority have lately so entirely united in deploring, (s) § 87. One or two illustrations will be sufficient to show the import- ance of a skillful medical examination. " Delusions are sometimes cunningly concealed for a length of time," says Dr. Winslow, "and, notwithstanding we are certain that they exist, no amount of ingenuity will induce the patient to disclose them, particularly if made aware of the object of our visit.it) I had been, recently, to see a lady whose insanity was manifested in a remarkable degree in her every action; but after paying her several visits I found it impossible to induce her to exhibit any one delusive impression or insane idea; but no sooner had I left the room, than her conversation and conduct became out- rageously insane. Many insane persons are able to talk with apparent rationality, but cannot write Avithout exhibiting their insanity. I have (r) li C'est aux lumieres et a la probite" des medecins que doit etre exclusivement re- serve le droit de juger chaque espece de alienation mentale, et de donner aux tribu- naux les seuls Clemens sur lesquels puissent etre raisonnablement fondes des jugemens equitables."—M6d. L6g., M. Orfila, tome 1, p. 360. Paris, 1848. (s) Lettsomian Lectures on Insanity. By Forbes Winslow, M. D., D. C. L., late Pre- sident of Medical Society of London, &c. London. John Churchill, New Burlington Street. Medical Testimony and Evidence in cases of Lunacy. Being the Croonian Lectures de- livered before the Royal College of Physicians in 1853. With an Essay on the conditions of mental soundness. By Thomas Mayo, M. D., F. R. S. London, John W. Parker & Son, West Strand. 1854. Marc, Die Geisteskrankeiten, in Beziehung auf die Rechts pflege I. p. 8 ; and see also particularly Mittermaier's late very interesting essay, "Die tfteliung und Wirksamkeit der Sachverstandigen in Strafverfahren," in " Archiv fUr Preussisches Strafrecht." Berlin, 1853. (J)----" Souvent meme il faut toute l'experience des hommes qui out fait une etude particulie"re des aberrations mentales pour constater Vexistencc de la folic."—Manuel de Midecine Ligale, par J. Briand, p. 542. Paris, 1852. 72 EXAMINATION OF ALLEGED LUNATICS. examined, recently, one very remarkable case of this kind, in a clever, well-read, and intellectual woman, whom I had occasionally to visit, (u) I never could detect the slightest aberration of mind in her conver- sation, and yet almost invariably upon my leaving, she placed in my hands a letter (which had been written previous to my calling), full of the most absurd extravagances and fancies: accusing strangers, myself, and members of her family of being engaged in deeply concocted con- spiracy against her property and life. Several of these peculiar and interesting cases are recorded, and the medical man has been advised, with the view of obtaining an insight into the true condition of the mind, to open a correspondence with the supposed lunatic, upon the principle that few persons positively insane can, for any length of time, write without exhibiting their delusions, whatever amount of self- control they are able to exercise over their thoughts and morbid ideas, during protracted conversations. It is essential for us to ascertain the degree of knowledge possessed of the ordinary and every-day occurrences of life. Upon one occasion I was conversing with a person whose state of mind was the subject of my investigation, and finding him rational and apparently sane upon all points, I questioned him as to who was the reigning sovereign, without knowing he had any delusion on the point. The person immediately started from his chair, exclaiming, in an excited tone of voice, " I am the sovereign l"(v) § 88. "I was requested," says the same high authority, "to see a gentleman who was said to be suicidally insane. Upon inquiry, I ascer- tained from good authority that under the influence of most distressing hallucinations he had attempted to hang himself. The patient firmly, earnestly, and apparently with great truthfulness, resolutely and re- peatedly denied the fact. He declared it was an invention,—a pure creation of the imagination, originating with the family; that he was happy, subject to no depression, had a strong wish to live, and great fear of death. I examined him, in conjunction with another physician, and neither of us could seize hold of the salient point, or satisfy himself that the man was actually insane. But, we asked ourselves, what mo- tive could his family have for thus misrepresenting the facts of the case ? We felt quite assured, from the character of the evidence pre- sented, that an attempt at suicide had been made; but the patient, with an ingenuity which would have reflected credit upon a nisi prius lawyer, parried with great skill all the questions, and gave such prompt and happy replies to our anxious interrogatories, that we were compelled to admit ourselves, for a time, perfectly defeated. By a course of con- versation I drew the gentlemen's thoughts into a different channel; and whilst my attention was directed apparently elsewhere, I kept a close watch upon all his movements. I perceived, as I imagined, some kind of instrument projecting from his pocket. He perceived that my eyes were directed to this, and he immediately expressed a wish to leave the apartment. I at once said, "I cannot permit you to do so until I know what you have concealed in your trowsers pocket." He at once mani- («) "Dans la folie raisonnante sans grand agitation, le malade peut paraitre devant celui qui l'interroge avec calme, repondre tres juste a toutes les questions et expliquer d'une maniere plausible les actions extravagantes qui lui sont imputces."—Orfila, tome I. p. 396. Paris, 1848. (v) Winslow on Medico Leg. Ev., 128. BY WHOM TO BE CONDUCTED. 73 fested signs of embarrassment and excitement, and rising rapidly from his seat, endeavored to rush out of the door. He was immediately prevented from doing so, and his pockets emptied, and a razor dis- covered. In his pocket-book a letter was found, addressed to the coro- ner, intimating to him that he was pursued by an evil spirit, and this impression had driven him to commit an act of self-destruction. For- tunately for our own reputation and the patient's life, this providential discovery was made.(w) It may be necessary to see and examine the patient on more than one occasion before the physician is satisfied as to the actual state of his mind. In cases of doubtful character, I would suggest that this course should invariably be adopted, taking the neces- sary precaution to recommend close vigilance during the interregnum. I I suggest this course, in consequence of my being acquainted with the case of a lady, whose removal from home was for a few days temporarily post- poned, in compliance with the cautious and judicious advice of the medical man, who admitted that he could not detect, according to his apprehension, sufficient evidence of insanity to justify him in signing the certificate. During the interim she succeeded in destroying herself. In a few instances we are justified in partially acting upon the representations of the family and friends of the alleged lunatic. If a delusion be de- tected, it must be referred to: and if the patient has committed any overt acts of violence, or manifested a suicidal disposition, it is our duty to refer to these facts, guarding ourselves by stating that we derived such information from parties immediately around the patient. It is important in all cases to specify the character of the existing delusion. The expression of a belief in the fact of delusive ideas, and of the pre- sence of abstract insanity without a specification of facts, renders a medical certificate invalid. I have often seen certificates worded to this effect: ' I have formed my opinions from the fact of the party being insane,'—'being under delusions,'—'being excited,'—'being violent.' These generalizations should be carefully avoided: the more concise the account of the patient's condition, the closer will it be in unison with the expressed wish of the Commissioners in Lunacy. The record of one clear and unmistakable delusion is quite sufficient for all legal purposes. But cases do occur where no delusion can be de- tected, and yet confinement may be absolutely necessary. Under such circumstances it is the duty of the medical man to enter more into de- tail as to the facts of the case. Perhaps I may be excused for suggest- ing, that in every instance of this kind, the parties should keep copies of their certificates."^) (w) It is only in having, says Orfila, an acquaintance with the whole life of an indi- vidual, in weighing and comparing every fact, that, in some cases, we can pronounce with certainty upon his actual moral state. It is in interrogating the past that we ac- quire a knowledge of the present. The same author also states, that when an opinion is asked from physicians upon the actual state of an accused person, they ought, in the examination of his previous conduct, to understand what act is imputed to him, if that should be necessary to influence their opinion. In a report, they should not confine themselves to a simple opinion upon the state of the person who is the subject of it, but, of necessity, should go into details upon the facts observed, in order that the same piece may be submitted to the examination of new experts. The employment of all the means indicated does not always lead to a positive result, and sometimes we are to remain in doubt.—Med. L4g., Orfila, tome I. p. 400. Paris, 1848. (x) Winslow on Medico Legal Ev. 152 ; see ante § 43. 74 EXAMINATION OF ALLEGED LUNATICS. § 89. " Certain recent actions at law in this country," says Dr. Ilarts- horne, " in which heavy damages have been incurred by parties charged with arresting and detaining an alleged lunatic against the will and in- terests of the latter, have led to greater circumspection, not only among the friends of lunatics, in the procurement of proper medical certificates and other forms required for the admission of insane patients into hos- pitals, but among the medical advisers in the preliminary examinations of the patients, and the filling up of their certificates. The principal hospitals for the insane of the United States, have printed forms and obligations, which are furnished to the friends of patients to be filled up and signed according to the law of the State and the rules of the hospital. • The form of the medical certificate generally requires the patient to have been seen and examined by the physician signing, on the day on which the certificate is dated. In all cases the certificate is expected to apply only to the actual condition of the patient at the time of signing, and to be used without delay in order to be available. The medical certificate must always be accompanied by a formal application for admission of the patient, signed by a responsible guardian, near re- lative, or friend. These papers have also annexed to them a series of questions relating to the past history and existing condition of the patient, the peculiar symptoms of the case, and the probable cause of the attack; which questions are to be answered by the friends and re- latives, and the attending physician. Some hospitals require the sig- nature of two physicians to the medical certificate, neither of them, of course, being connected with the hospitals applied to. The State Lunatic Hospital of New Jersey requires the medical certificate to he formally deposed to by two physicians before a magistrate. Patients sometimes obtain their discharge on a writ of habeas corpus, by proving their apparent fitness to be at large, but are generally removed by friends or discharged when sufficiently recovered, at the discretion of the superintendent. We are not aware of any legal restriction in this country on the liberation of insane patients, except in cases of homicidal or otherwise dangerous lunatics, who have been confined by order of a magistrate, or by a court of law. Such patients can only be released by an authority similar to that which first committed them. There are patients of this class now in durance at the Eastern State Penitentiary of Pennsylvania, and in different State Asylums."(y) § 90. It is well to keep in mind the suggestions of Hoffbauer in re- gard to the importance of an adaptation, by the inspecting physicians, of his own method of examination to the character of the subject. The uneducated and the refined, the bashful, timid, and retiring, and the cunning, insolent, and hardened, the eccentric, the victim of fixed ideas, and the lunatic, each requires a different style of treatment. He must worm his way into the heart of the ignorant man by reference to objects palpable to the sense, and must address the man of education in the spirit which animates him. He must approach the bashful, the timid, and the morose with cordiality and affability, and exercise practical tact, circumspection, and adroitness, in conversing with the cunning, the hardened, and the insolent, impressing them with respect for his per- (y) Taylor's Med. Jurisprudence by Hartshorne, Phil. 1853, 561, 562. BY WHOM TO BE CONDUCTED. 75 sonal and mental qualifications. On the whole, the tone of the subject must regulate the tone of the examiner. But where one style of treat- ment is found of no avail, recourse may be had to the opposite one. Where the patient sits immovable as a statue, without answering any question addressed him, which often occurs in cases of deeply-seated melancholy, further questions should not be asked, but observation alone resorted to.(z) § 91. That a man is of sound mind, will generally be sufficiently manifest to a prosecuting officer of discretion; but whether a man is really, or only apparently deranged, is a question which cannot be decided with the certainty belonging to science except by a physician; nor is it possible, without a thorough knowledge of psychological medicine, to pronounce upon the influence exercised by specific forms of disease upon given actions.(a) § 92. It should not be forgotten, however, that it is of much import- ance in the diagnosis of insanity, that the proper legal and medical functionaries should act in common. AVritten explanations are here of much less value than oral intercourse, where a few words will often suffice to remove a difficulty, to correct an error, or to supply an omis- sion. In visiting a deranged culprit for this purpose, the prosecuting officer should always invite the physician to accompany him. They may then alternately converse with the accused, whereby both the mor- bid and the criminal peculiarities of the subject will be clearly unfolded to them both. It is well established that a man of unsound mind will act very differently, according as he views the persons before whom he stands with fear, respect, or confidence. It is sometimes advisable to invite the physician's attendance at an official hearing, where, under the semblance of a mere occasional and unofficial companion, he may make a diagnosis the more accurate because unsuspected. § 93. It is not to be denied that a lay observer, or an unassisted judge or jury, may be able to distinguish a case of fully developed and clearly manifested insanity; but, aside from the necessity of a knowledge of all the particular relations existing between a given state of disease and a given act, there can be no proper foundation for the infliction of punish- ment in any case, where the judgment of which it is the execution is not based on the greatest attainable amount of certainty. But this certainty can be no other than that which bears the seal of technical science. Nor will a juryman, if properly tender of his conscience and of public opinion, base his verdict upon other evidence than that of those best able from long training and close attention, to understand the features of the case. In some cases the difference between a scien- tific, or technical, opinion, and that of a layman, is not so much in the results attained, as in the guarantee afforded by the superior attain- ments and more minute expertness of the man of science. The decla- (z) J. H. Hoffbauer, Die psychischen Kraukheiten in Bezug auf die Rechtspflege, Berlin, 31. (a) Notwithstanding Regnault's elaborate disquisition, " Du degre- de competence des Medicins dans les questions judicaires relatives aux alienation mentales," &t\, Paris, 1828, and notwithstanding the occasional contemptuous remarks of Nisi Prius judges in the hurry and irritation of trial, this position is recognized, as has already been seen, by the uniform practice as well as the recognized theory of the law. See ante g 45, n. See also Marc, die Geisteskraukeiten in Beziehung auf die Rechtspflege, vol. I. 98. 76 EXAMINATION OF ALLEGED LUNATICS. ration of such a man is insured against the possibility of error to the full extent of the protection of science in its present stage of develop- ment. Pro foro this degree of certainty is sufficient, because it is the highest attainable; but the same cannot be said of any other.(6) § 94. The American authorities falling under this head may be con- sidered as establishing the following points : (a.) Professional men, experts in psychological medicine, who have personally examined the party, may be asked whether he was insane or not.(e) Such, in fact, has been the uniform and undisputed course in practice in all cases where medical testimony is taken on this point. The English rule is equally definite, (d) (b.) Even though the witness has not had the opportunity of personal inspection, he may be asked for his opinion on an assumed state of facts, or upon the evidence given on trial, (e) In England this position has been disputed, and though in one or .two earlier cases the Courts allowed a greater latitude, yet now it seems to be understood that the witness will be restricted to the results of his personal examination.(/) But notwithstanding this retrogression, it may be maintained without the hazard of dispute that the rule as now settled in America is not only more in accordance with a full investigation of the points in dispute, but with the analogies of the law. It has been already shown that the common law consists of the wisdom of this particular age applied to the exi- gencies of the particular case; and in this sense it includes not only the decisions of the courts, but the opinions of experts on the particular branches to which their attention has been devoted.(g) Thus the evi- dence of persons acquainted with navigation is admissible upon the facts as developed in evidence in cases 'of collision, (A) or loss from alleged unseaworthiness ;(i) of persons conversant with handwriting as to whether a. paper was forged ;(j) of seal engravers as to the genuineness of an impression ;(k) of artists, as to whether a picture is an original or a copy ;(Z) of postmasters, as to the genuineness of a post mark ;(m) of sci- entific engineers, as to the effect of an embankment on a harbor ;(n) of (b) Schiirmayer, \ 512. (c) Com. v. Rogers, 7 Mete. 500; M'Allister v. State, 17 Alab. 434; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 483. (d) R. v. Searle, 1 Mood. & Rob. 75 ; R. v. Offord, 5 C. & P. 168. See a learned note on this point in 7 Bost. Law Rep. 692. M. Briand, (Med. Leg. 552, Paris, 1852,) says, " Appeles £ faire un rapport sur l'etat moral d'un prevenu ou d'un accuse, les medecins ne s'immiscent point alors dans les fonctions des juges ou des jure6s, mais ils eclairent la conscience des uns et des autres." See also Manuel de Med. Leg. de M. Orfila, T. I. 399. Paris, 1848. (e) Com. v. Rogers, 7 Mete. 500; M'Allister v. State, 17 Alab. 434; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 483; Com. v. Wood, MSS. Phil. 1836 ; Com. v. Mosler, MSS. Phil. 1845. (/) R. v. Wright, R. & R. 451; R. v. Frances, 4 Cox, C. C. 57; Opinion of Judges, postn. (r); though see contra R. v. Searle, 1 Mood. &Rob. 75; R. v. Offord, 5 C. & P. 1G8. (g) See on this point ante, \ 45, n. (h) Malton v. Nesbit, 1 C. & P. 70; Fenwick v. Bell, 1 C. & K. 312 ; Thornton v. Royal Exch. Co. Peak, 25. (i) Beckwith v. Sydebotham, 1 Camp. 116. (j) Revctt v. Braham, 4 T. R. 497; Hammond's Case, 2 Greenl. 33; Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick. 490; Com. v. Carey, 2 Pick. 47; Lyon v. Lyman, 9 Conn. 55; Hubley v. Van- home, 7 S. & R. 185 ; Lodge v. Phipher, 11 S. & R. 333. (k) Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Dougl. 157. (I) Ibid. (m) Abbey v. Lill, 5 Bing. 299. (n) Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Dougl. 157. ADMISSIBILITY OF MEDICAL TESTIMONY. 77 practical surveyors, as to whether certain marks were intended as boun- daries or terriors ;(o) and of naturalists, as to Avhether the habits of cer- tain fish were such as to enable them to overcome certain obstructions in a river.;(p) And so nothing is more common than to examine a surgeon as to Avhether death resulted from natural causes, or from certain arti- ficial agencies which may be the subject of inquiry.(g) On this princi- ple the opinion of medical men as to whether particular symptoms, sup- posing them to exist, constitute insanity, is part of the laAV of the case. It should be observed, however, as the cases in the note show, that the witness is not to be asked whether on the whole evidence of the case his opinion is that the patient was insane—for that, indeed, Avould be taking the jury's place—but whether if a certain state of facts be true the inference of insanity would result therefrom, (r) (o) Davis v. Mason, 4 Pick. 156. (p) Cottrill v. Mason, 3 Fairf. 222. (q) See cases quoted in Wharton on Homicide, 241-4; and see also 1 Stark. Ev. 154; Phil, and Am. on Ev. 899; 1 Green, on Ev. \ 440. (r) See 3 Greenlf. on Ev. § 5. In answer to an inquiry by the House of Lords, whether " a medical man, conversant with the disease of insanity, who never saw the prisoner pre- viously to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial and the examination of all the witnesses, can be asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was conscious at the time of doing the act that he was acting contrary to law, or whether he was laboring under any and what delusion at the time?" the English judges replied, "We think the medical man, under the circumstances supposed, cannot in strictness be asked his opinion in the terms above stated, because each of those questions involves the determination of the truth of the facts deposed to, which it is for the jury to decide, and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case such evidence is admissible. But when the facts are admitted, or not disputed, and the question becomes substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to allow the question to be put in that general form, though the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right." In this country the present practice, when medical men are examined as experts, is to ask their opinion as to a hypothetical state of facts. If they happen to have been pre- sent during the whole trial, they may be asked their opinion as to the particular facts, supposing them to be true; but the determination of the truth or falsity of the evidence itself should be reserved exclusively for the jury. " The opinions of professional men on a question of this description," says Chief Justice Shaw, in a late case, " are competent evidence, and in many cases are entitled to great consideration and respect. The rule of law, on which this proof of the opinion of wit- nesses, who know nothing of the actual facts of the case, is founded, is not peculiar to medical testimony, but is a general rule, applicable to all cases, where the question is one depending on skill and science in any particular department. In general, it is the opinion of the jury which is to govern, and this is to be formed upon the proof of facts laid before them. But some questions lie beyond the scope of the observation and ex- perience of men in general, but are quite within the observation and experience of those whose peculiar pursuits and profession have brought that class of facts frequently and habitually under their consideration. Shipmasters and seamen have peculiar means of acquiring knowledge and experience in whatever relates to seamanship and nautical skill. When, therefore, a question arises in a court of justice upon that subject, and cer- tain facts are proved by other witnesses ; a shipmaster may be asked his opinion as to the character of such facts. The same is true in regard to any question of science, be- cause persons conversant with such science have peculiar means, from a larger and more exact observation, and long experience in such department of science, of drawing correct inferences from certain facts, either observed by themselves or testified to by other wit- nesses. A familiar instance of the application of this principle occurs very often in cases of homicide, when, upon certain facts being testified to by other witnesses, medical per- sons are asked, whether in their opinion a particular wound described would be an ade- quate cause, or whether such wound was, in their opinion, the actual cause of death, in the particular case. Such question is commonly asked without objection ; and the judi- cial proof of the fact of killing often depends wholly or mainly upon such testing of opinion. It is upon this ground, that the opinion of witnesses, who have long been con- versant with insanity in its various forms, and who have had the care and superintend- 78 MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS. » (e.) The better opinion also is that Avitnesses, though not experts, who have for a given time had the opportunity of observing the patient, may be asked their opinion as to his sanity, (s) Such witnesses cannot, of course, be examined as to their opinions on a case stated, or on the facts developed in the case on trial, but only as to the results of their personal observation, just in the same way that a man plough- ing on the shore can be examined as to the fact of a ship striking a shoal before him, Avhen he could not be admitted to prove the cause of the disaster. And, on this principle, it has ahvays been held admis- sible to ask subscribing AA'itnesses as to their opinion of the testator's sanity at the time of the execution of the will. (?) 2d. At what time examinations should be made. § 95. There are three different times in Avhich the conduct of the accused may become the subject of a forensico-psychological investiga- tion : 1, at the commission of the deed; 2, during the trial, and 3, after sentence pronounced. At each of these periods, the judge has a separate point of view from Avhich to regard the state of mind of the defendant, in each the purpose of the inquiry is different, and in each the interrogations to be directed to the physician must be modified accordingly, (u) § 96. In regard to the first point, the questions to be asked the phy- sician should be, in general, Avhether a diseased mental state attended the commission of the act, wherein the disease consisted, and Avhether ence of insane persons, are received as competent evidenee, even though they have not had opportunity to examine the particular patient, and observe the symptoms and indi- cations of disease, at the time of its supposed existence. It is designed to aid the judg- ment of the jury, in regard to the influence and effect of certain facts, which lie out of the observation and experience of persons in general. And such opinions, when they come from persons of great experience, and in whose correctness and sobriety of judg- ment just confidence can be had, are of great weight, and deserve the respectful consideration of a jury. But the opinion of a medical man of small experience, or of one who has crude and visionary notions, or who has some favorite theory to support, is entitled to very little consideration. The value of such testimony will de- pend mainly upon the experience, fidelity, and impartiality of the witness who gives it. One caution, in regard to this point, it is proper to give. Even where the medical or other professional witnesses have attended the whole trial, and heard the testimony of the other witnesses, as to the facts and circumstances of the case, they are not to judge of the credit of the witnesses, or of the truth of the facts testified to by others. It is for the jury to decide whether such facts are satisfactorily proved. And the proper question to be put to the professional witnesses is this : If the symptoms and indications testified to by the other witnesses are proved, and if the jury are satisfied of the truth of them, whether in their opinion, the party was insane, and what was the nature and character of that insanity; what state of mind did they indicate; and what they would expect would be the conduct of such a person, in any supposed circumstances." See 1 M. & Rob. 75; Com. v. Rodgers, 7 Mete. 5. (s) Clary v. Clary, 2 Iredell, 78 ; Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 483 ; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Connect. 203 ; Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S. & R. 90; AVogan v. Small, 11 S. & R. 141; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499 ; Lester v. Pittsford, 7 Vt. 158 ; Gibson v. Gibson, 9 Yerger, 329 ; Potts v. House, 6 Georg. 324; Colver v. Haslam, 7 Barbour, 374; Baldwin v. State, 12 Missouri, 223 ; De AVhitt v. Barley, 13 Barbour, 550; Kinne v. Kinne, 9 Conn. 102; Norris v. State, 16 Alab. 776 ; AVheeler v. Wheeler, 3 Hagg. 574; and see 7 Bost. Law Rep. (N. S.) 696, where these cases are cited. (/) Chase v. Lincoln, 3 Mass. 237; Poole v. Richardson, ib. 330; Rambler v. Tryon 7 S. & R. 90; Buckminster v. Perry, 4 Mass. 593; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn. 203 ' Sheafe v. Rowe, 2 Lees R. 415; AVogan v. Small, 11 S. & R. 141. (w) See Schiirmayer, g 516, from whence this head is generally drawn. AVHEN AND HOW TO BE MADE. 79 the mental and moral functions exercised and implicated in the perpe- tration, were of such a nature that either a, there Avas no consciousness of criminality and no freedom of volition, or b, the possibility of such consciousness and spontaneity was excluded, or c, both the one and the other Avere incapable of ascertainment, and must be left in doubt. The practice Avhich has lately groAvn up, of interrogating as to a conclusion of laAV, (e. g. was the defendant capable of distinguishing right from wrong, or Avas he a free agent,) instead of as to a state of facts, (.e g. Avas he laboring under mental disease, and if so, Avhat,) is not only false in theory, but pernicious in result. § 97. The second period of time becomes of particular interest in our American Jurisprudence, from the fact that when a party alleged to be insane is put on his trial, if insanity be pleaded, the jury are specially sworn to determine the preliminary issue, whether the defendant be insane at the time of trial. If the fact be found in his favor, he is con- fined under special sanctions. If otherwise, the trial proceeds on the main issue. § 98. The third period of time, at which the state of a culprit's mind is open to medical investigation, is after the close of the trial, and before the execution of the sentence. A man of unsound mind is in- capable of understanding the justice of his sentence, or of recognizing a punishment in the evil inflicted upon him. In many cases also the evil Avill aggravate his disease. For all these reasons it is necessary to be certain that a convict is so far in the possession of all his faculties, that the object of the laAV in subjecting him to punishment will be ansAvered. The interrogations to be submitted to the physician are to be framed upon this simple principle; and if is self-evident that only such derangements will here come in question as are clearly manifest, and as clearly exclude the possibility of the prisoner's understanding the reason of his punishment. § 99. It would be a proper regulation to cause every convict, before undergoing his punishment, to be examined in body and mind by the physician, for the purpose of ascertaining his capacity for the ordeal. Even Avhere the general fitness of the subject is undoubted, there are frequently personal defects which require attention in the treatment of the prisoner during confinement. In several of the German States this precaution is observed—where a convict is found to be insane, he must be subjected to the proper treatment. If a cure is effected, the ques- tion Avhether he is now able to sustain the punishment without danger of a relapse or other injury, is to be decided by the forensic physician, upon a careful investigation of all the symptoms and attendant circum- stances. 3d. By what Tests. (1.) Physiognomy, (v) §100. "Close attention," says Schurmayer, (w) "should be first (v) The features of the face, says Falret, change at each instant or constantly preserve the same expression; the lips, the cheeks, the nostrils, the eyebrows, the eyelids, fre- quently show convulsive movement; it is the same with regard to the muscles of the eye, and under the influence of these convulsions, the look is troubled, bewildered and unsteady. Lemons Cliniques sur l'Alienation Mentale, M. Falret, huitieme lecon, p. 219. Paris, 1854; see also Orfila, Med. Leg. I. p. 379. Paris, 1848. (w) Gerichtliche Medicin, \ 529. 80 TESTS OF INSANITY—PHYSIOGNOMY. directed to the entire exterior of the subject, his posture, his motions, his gestures, his eye, his words, his intonation, and above all the first impression produced upon his mind by the appearance of the physician. What most distinctly characterizes a mental disease, and is never mis- understood by a skillful physician, is the physiognomy of such a patient. The eye of a madman is the mirror of his soul. He lacks the calm unobstructed gaze peculiar to the sane,u ntouched by passion or excite- ment." "Look," says Heinroth, (x) " upon the cunning leer of a lunatic, the savage glare of a maniac, the lack-lustre eyes of a splenetic, or the meaningless stare of an imbecile; such things cannot be counter- feited." (y) The form of the skull is often peculiar in every description of mental disease, but is particularly noticeable in the case of Cretins and natural fools. § 101. The expressions of the eje(z) and of the nose(a) have been very capably exhibited by two eminent physiognomists. The latter feature has been examined with peculiar ability by Hoefling.(b) "In the apparently joyous countenance of a laughing madman," he tells us, " the upward traction of the sides of the nose, nevertheless, indicate unmistakably the presence of pain, and this expresses much of the phy- siognomic peculiarity of such unfortunates.(c) In like manner the simple unmeaning smile of imbecility is marked by the form and shape of the nose, Avhich, with its doAvnward, circular openings, and the ten- sion of the skin on the peak, expresses a torpor, Avhile in the laugh of a sane man the nostrils contract, and become elongated, without a departure of the septum from its horizontal position." The mouth of the simpleton twitches with a constant unmeaning smile, accompanied with a low, inarticulate and thoughtless mumble, and the imbecile is almost always found, sitting or standing, with parted lips.(d) "With many," says Schurmayer, "the mouth is constantly in motion, as if they were talking to themselves. In the paroxysms of mania there is a convulsive distortion or contraction of the mouth. Receptivity for certain external impressions is generally Ioav, particularly in the case (x) System der gerichtlich psychischen Medizin. Leipsic, 1825, p. 343. (y) Drawings, very well executed, are to be found in Morrison's Outlines of Mental Diseases. London, 1829, and in Esquirol, Des Maladies Mentales. Paris, 1838. (z) Loebels, Grundriss der Semiologie des auges. Jena, 1817, p. 27. (a) Hoefling, in Caspar's AVochenschrift, 1834. (6) Ibid. (c) " To represent the prevailing character and physiognomy of a mad man, the body should be strong and the muscles rigid and distinct, the skin bound, the features sharp, the eye sunk; the color of a dark brownish yellow tinctured with sallowness, without one spot of enlivening carnation; the hair sooty black, stiff and bushy, or of a pale, sickly yellow with wiry hair."—Anatomy of Expression. Sir Charles Bell, London. 1844. "His burning eye whom bloody strokes did stain, Stared full wide and threw forth sparks of fire; And more for rank despight than for great pain, Shak'd his long locks, colored like copper wire, And bit his tawny beard to show his raging ire." [Faery Queen, Book ii. canto 4, v. 15.] (d) Danz, Allgemeine Mcdizinische Zeichenlehre. Heinroth's edition. Leipsic, 1812 p. 353. BODILY HEALTH AND TEMPERAMENT. 81 of impressions accompanied with pain,(e) of cold, heat, and certain medicines." (2.) Bodily Health and Temperament. § 102. Hereditary tendency to insanity will in a moment be con- sidered. Under this head, it is proper to notice the importance of the attention of the medical examiner being turned to temperament, dis- position, and age; in the case of females, to the development of the functions of menstruation, pregnancy, delivery, suckling, to mental characteristics, powers, and habits; to the condition in life and profes- sion ; to the questions of rest and exercise, sleep, and watching; to ex- cessive evacuations, particularly if connected with sexual gratifications ; to sexual abstinence; to bodily injuries, particularly in the head, in- flammatory affections of the brain or its membranes, diseases of the heart, hemorrhoids, obstructions of the abdomen,(/) and to cutaneous diseases. § 103. To what extent insanity is accompanied with physical disor- ganization, is illustrated by a case mentioned by Wigan in his remark- able work on the duality of the mind.(^) "The gentleman held a situation in Avhich he had many younger persons under him. I pur- posely leave the designation obscure. He had risen to the head of the office by long and exemplary services. He was a Avidower, and had had a considerable family, all of whom, however, died in their youth. He exercised a parental control over his subordinates, and was ex- tremely respected by every one who knew him. His salary was ample, his excessive benevolence had, however, always kept him poor, but as his style of living did not imply the expenditure of more than half his income, he had the reputation of wealth. Gradually, towards the age of sixty, this gentleman became garrulous and light in his conversation, and the others in the office suspected him to have been drinking. He had many rebuffs from the persons under his command, but this in no degree changed the indecorous levity of his conversation, which had formerly been remarkably dignified, and as reserved as was compatible with his excessive benevolence of disposition. Months and months passed on, his language became gradually worse, and at last was of the most depraved obscenity. This shocked and disgusted his juniors, and he was seriously threatened with exposure by them. The propensity was checked for a while, but after repeated offences and repeated for- giveness by the young men, they made a formal complaint to his supe- riors. The offender was taken to task very seriously, but, as the young men had given rather a lenient representation of his conduct, he was permitted one more trial, with the assurance that his next offence would be followed by dismissal. There was soon an opportu- nity of putting the threat in force, for his conduct and conversation became more and more gross and disgusting. He was dismissed. Having made no provision, he suddenly found himself utterly destitute, (e) Compare Friedreich, Handbuch der Allgemeine's Pathologie der psychischen Krarik- heiten. Erlangen, 1839, p. 121. (/) " Unterleibstockungen," Schurmayer, (g) A new view of Insanity, &c, by A. L. Wigan. London, 1844, p. 81. 6 82 PATHOLOGICAL TESTS. but did not make known his position. He packed a bundle of neces- sary clothes, put in his pocket Avhatever money and trinkets he^ pos- sessed, and wandered about the country without aim or object. Every one lost sio-ht of him for tAVO or three months, Avhen he Avas found in a remote part of the kingdom literally dead on a dunghill, Avhere it is supposed he had laid himself down for warmth; his money Avas gone, and from the state of the stomach and intestines, it is probable that he had died of Avant of food as the immediate cause, but on examining the interior of the skull, there Avas found extensive softening and disorgani- zation of the left cerebrum, and the other was not free from disease. He could not have lived long; though, under proper care, the disease would not have been immediately fatal, "(h) A diminution of sensibility, says M. Falret, in his late work,(z) is not of common occurrence in mental diseases, its exaltation being much more frequent. It is proper, hoAvever, to state that deranged persons are generally as sensible of temperature and impressions as persons ordi- narily are. Lesions of the sensibility, however, are observable in all kinds of insanity, and especially in those cases in which mystical ideas are predominant, in demonomania and paralytic insanity. General insensibility has been knoAvn to take away from some madmen the sense of their own existence. M. de Foville cites the example of a man who thought he had died at the battle of Austerlitz, at which he received a seArere AAround. His insanity consisted in his inability to recognize and feel his own body. When any one inquired after his health, it was customary for him to reply, " You ask me how father Lambert is ? but father Lambert is no more, he was killed by a bullet at Austerlitz. That which you see here, is not him, but a machine which they have made to resemble him, and which is very badly made, so try and make another." Never, in speaking of himself, did he say "me," (moi,) but "that," (cela.) This man fell several times into a complete state of immobility and insensibility, which lasted several days. Sinapisms and blisters applied to guard against these accidents, neA'er produced the least symptom of pain. He often refused to eat, say- ing : " 9a n'avait point de ventre." Esquirol was unable to discover any sign of pain in passing a pin through the skin of the arm of a demonomaniac, who asserted that he no more felt anything, and who imagined that his body had been car- ried away by the devil. In regard to anomalies of general sensibility associated Avith no illu- sion, there are madmen Avho appear insensible to the ordinary causes of pain. Esquirol speaks of an idiot girl who Avas in the habit of scratching a lump she had upon her cheek, and did not stop until she had perforated it, and after having performed this perforation, she enlarged the Avound by continually pulling at it with her fino-er. We have often seen deranged persons cut themselves in different parts of (h) Generally of all the causes of mental alienation, the most frequent, without doubt are cerebral affections or some alteration of the encephalic organ, and perhaps we should agree with Haslam in saying, that the primitive cause of mental derangement is always to be found in these alterations.—J. Briand, Mid. Lig., p. 544. Paris, 18°52. (J) Lemons Cliniques de 1'Alienation Mentale, par M. Falret. Septieme'lecon p 185 Paris, 1854. ' SENSIBILITY—HUNGER—PULSE. 83 the body Avithout appearing to suffer. But the greatest phenomenon of insensibility is the indifference with which persons afflicted with insani- ty support cold. They have been knoAvn to expose themselves in the open air, to sleep upon the ground, flagstones and the floor, when the ice and snoAV caused persons warmly clad, to shiver. And imprudences like these appear to have a less dangerous influence upon the insane than upon others. This fact, however, has been much exaggerated, and in many instances the ordinary effects produced by cold, are observable in the deranged. These unfortunates are so exposed to freezing, that in many establishments there is an express laAV to visit, morning and evening, and wrap in flannel the feet of those Avhose condition causes these dangerous consequences to be dreaded.(j) § 104. Hunger and thirst are usually quite vivid, digestion varies, while the boAvels are almost invariably obstructed. The skin is usually dry, rough, and inactive. The presence of almost all persons of unsound mind is distinguished by a peculiar specific smell.(k) Others show them- selves equally indifferent to heat. There are some who Avalk and sleep, entirely naked, in the sun upon the hottest days, and who can look fixedly, for a long time upon this planet, Avithout being dazzled by it. The genital functions are ordinarily preserved by the insane ; some- times, indeed, their activity is increased, although the mental disease may not be of erotic origin. This super-excitation of the genital organs, independent of physical or moral erotomania, is particularly observ- able in agitated delirium; whilst in despondent delirium they are inactive at least if it have not love for a cause or object. The cases, are rare, however, where the sexual organs are attacked with insen- sibility or impotence, except in general paralysis. The aptitude of man and woman for the venereal act and for fecundation is not lost; only in insanity as in sound mind, the rapid succession of ideas, the violence or tenacity of pre-occupations foreign to amorous de- sires are capable of bringing on an inactivity of the genital func- tions. The pulse forms no test. M. Jacobi has instituted experiments in a large number of cases of the different forms of mental unsoundness, indicating at the same time the relative pulsations of the several arteries, auscultating the heart, and counting the number of inspira- tions and expirations. The attempt to deduce a fixed rule, however, was in vain. "I had the vexation," he tells us, "to see that my researches, so conscientiously made, did not fulfil the end I had pro- posed ; and I saw that it was impossible to establish the necessary con- nection between the different pathological states of the intellect and feelings, and the observations I had collected on the state of the cir- culation, the respiration, and the temperature of the skin, in the insane. (I) (j) " Dans le plus haut degre de la manie les malades oublient leurs besoins, et sentent a peine, ou pas du tout, la douleur, lefroid et le chaud."—Manuel de Mid. Lig. M. Orfila. Tome I. p. 377. Dr. Rush makes insensibility to the weather, particularly cold, a marked test. (k) Compare Hill's Essay on the Prevention and Cure of Insanity. London. 1814. p. 401. Erhard in Wagner's " Bdtragen zur Philosophischen Anthropologic" Vol. I. Vienna, 1794. p. 111. Milling's Mentis Alienationum Semiologica Somatica, Bonn. 1828. g 15. Burrow's Commentaries, p. 297. (Z) Jacobi Annales Medico-Psychologiques. 84 PATHOLOGICAL TESTS—RESPIRATION. The secretions, and particularly the perspiration, are imperfectly per- formed in the majority of insane cases. In these cases there is a dry skin of an unhealthy color, and the exhalation of a disagreeable smell. They do not grow thin but even become fat, although eating little, because they perspire badly. They urinate a great deal, and the passage of urine is frequent as is common in all nervous disorders. Constipation is an almost habitual attendant of the disease. Without being oppressed, the Respiration in the insane is very often unequal, hurried, diminished, interrupted, and sobbing. Their breath is often fetid, and this accidental fetidity, an ordinary symptom of all nervous diseases, frequently announces the approach of an attack of melancholy, mania, or hysteria, (m) § 105. The most interesting symptoms are found in the various ab- normities of the sensorial system, as manifested in the excitement, depression, or delirium of one or the other of the senses. An excitement or depression of the sensorial system generally keeps even pace with the mental malady. Before the mental disease breaks out, and while its advent is indicated by mental and moral excitements, an enhanced excitability in the sensorial system becomes perceptible, Avhich, how- ever, where the psychical energies are gradually exhausted by the recurrence and violence of the paroxysms, frequently turns to an oppo- site condition, so that the failing, obtuseness, or loss of one of the senses attends the subsequent progress of the evil. According to Spurzheim,(w) the ear is the sense, which, of all others, suffers most among the insane, and there are more deaf than blind among them. The deliria of the senses, which are either illusions, or hallucinations, are found in every form of the disease ; they sometimes attack one sense only, sometimes several, and sometimes, though rarely, all the senses at once.(o) Esquirol gives it as the result of his experience(p) that Avhen the alienation of the mind begins, and sometimes a little earlier, smell and taste have changed, but the deceptions of the ear and the eye generally characterize the fancies of most madmen. The deliria of smell are less frequent than those of the other senses, those of taste are of the most various kind, and those of touch impress the patients with the existence of attributes in bodies other than those which they possess. These deliria frequently give rise to fixed ideas; particu- lar postures, various attitudes and motions, are observed in almost all madmen. Guislain(g) comprises them under the name. § 106. A change of moral disposition is one of the first symptoms, (m) Lecons Cliniques de l'Alienation Mentale, par M. Falret. SeptiemeLecon. p. 185. Paris. 1854. (n) Beobachtungen ueber den Wahnsinn. Nach dem Englischen und Franzoesischen bear- leitet von Embden. p. 81. See Med. Leg. M. Orfila. Tome I. p. 358. Paris, 1848. Or He'd. Leg., Briand. p. 540. Paris, 1852. (o) For a full account of the illusions and hallucinations of the senses we would refer the reader to the Legons Cliniques sur l'Alienation Mentale de M. Falret. 3d, 4th, 5th, 16th lessons. Paris, 1854. Also to the Etudes Medico-Psychologiques sur l'Alienation Mentale, par F.'E. Renaudin. Chap. 8th, p. 388. Paris, 1854. (p) Compare Hagen Die Sinnetaunschungen in Bezugauf Psychologie Heilkunde, und Rcihtspflege. Leipsic. 1837. (q) Traite sur les Phrenopatpies. Bruxelles, 1833. p. 240. SENSIBILITY—MORAL DISPOSITION. 85 other than physical, with which the disease usually makes its appear- ance. Extreme irritability, proneness to anger, suspicion, concealment, obstinacy and perverseness, are common. In regard to the affec- tions, various abnormal impulses and inclinations are observed. Fond- ness or aversion to particular persons, without any special reason; disposition to exercise cruelty, murderous desires, a wish to com- mit arson, or to steal.(r) Memory is generally good in reference to things occurring during the disease, or to persons with whom the patient was then connected, but defective or mistaken as to things Avhich occurred previously, (s) Of the intellectual faculties not all are uniformly in an abnormal state; on the contrary, some func- tions occasionally improve, thus producing a complex state of mad- ness, on the one hand, and of Avit, reflection, and shrewdness, on the other.(t) Monomania is also included under this head. There is often a disposition to soliloquize aloud; and to laugh, without a visible reason. (3.) Hereditary Tendency.(u) § 107. The teaching of observation on this point is that not only does the existence of insanity in the offspring afford a violent presumption of (r) See \ 192. A deranged person, says Orfila, regards with indifference the dearest ob- jects of his affections, he thinks no more of them or holds them in such aversion as to repel, injure, and maltreat them. Hatred, jealousy, anger, wickedness, fear, terror, a disgust for life, a desire to destroy and kill, replace the most equal, calm, and softest na- ture.— Manuel de Mid. Lig. M. Orfila. Tome I. p. 382. Paris, 1848. (s) A great many remember things which occur; and after their recovery, they often astonish by remarks which they had made at a time when they seemed most completely deprived of their reason.—Mid. Lig. J. Biiand. p. 540. Paris, 1852. (t) See cases collected by Friedreich, Handbuch der allgemeiner Pathologic p. 189. See post, \ 113. (u) "Although at the first glance," says Renaudin, "man appears to possess an inde- pendent existence, isolated from his birth from those who begot him, although there is but little apparent relation between his ripe age and first infancy; it is not the less true that behind the characters peculiar to his individuality, we can discover certain typical signs some of which betray his nationality and others relate to his family. These typi- cal signs are to be encountered not only in his physical organization, but are also found in his moral idiosyncrasies, and if tradition is of any force as regards manners and cus- toms, inheritance is certainly of great value as relates to the tastes and habits. It is, in fact, manifested in the transmission from generation to generation of the most inveterate maladies, before which art is obliged to confess its weakness ; and it is with difficulty prophylactic measures ward off the sad result. In mental alienation also, experience furnishes us daily proofs of this transmission, of which it is essential to study the mode. The question whether this transmission is direct, or results from a predisposition whose development is due to the influence of an occasional cause, or, in other words, whether by itself it is an essential condition of causality, is no longer doubtful, and we now possess numerous examples not only of hereditary transmission, but also of an hereditary accumulation of the morbid predispositions. This is particularly the case in families where wedlock is limited to a small circle of fortune and social fitness. The royal families of many countries have not escaped this law. We see generations of insane succeed each other with an unyielding regularity, and there are families which in this relation seem pursued by a desolating fatality. Aside from idiocy and imbecility, which show themselves a short time after birth, the predisposition does not ordinarily show itself until the individual has reached a certain development—that is to say, when all the conditions of causality are reunited. This native predisposition does not suppose that those that preceded were insane, it depends, above all, upon the conditions in which they are placed and which re-act upon the phases of their existence. This predisposition is also progressive from one generation to another; and it is in this manner that great social commotions and certain epidemics 86 TESTS OF INSANITY. its existence in the parent, but that its existence in the parent affords the same presumption as to its existence in the offspring. ^ In regard to idioci/, the facts are very striking. " Suffice it to say, we are told by Mr. S. G. HoAve, chairman of the Massachusetts State Idiocy Commission, in a very luminous report, submitted in 1848, " that out of 420 cases of congenital idiocy examined, some information was obtained respecting the condition of the progenitors of 359. Noav in all these 359 cases, save only four, it Avas found that one or the other or both of the progenitors of the unfortunate sufferers had, in some way, widely departed from the normal condition of health, and violated the natural laws." The hereditary transmission of moral insanity is equally well authen- ticated. "We have no doubt," says a very eminent physician, "that various immoral and vicious practices ought to be ascribed to insanity. When periodic insanity has shown itself in a large family, it is probable that some members of the family will evince a propensity to thieving or swindling.(v) And when more children than one of the same parents, bursting through all the restraints imposed by carefully-instilled prin- ciples and established habits, engage in SAvindling transactions, it will often appear, upon inquiry, that insanity has generally broken out in that family, "(w) And the same high authority tells us that in families where insanity prevails with the progenitors, he has known two, three, or four children of the same parents become deranged. One instance in particular he dwells upon, in Avhich, among a family of twenty persons, the children of a brother and of two sisters, tender e afflicted with insanity. A late very interesting table, originally published in the Lon- don Quarterly RevieAv,(z) and endorsed by Dr. Winslow,(y) shoAvs at once the importance of this inquiry: contribute to the production of insanity, in leaving after them deep distress or in pro- ducing a disordered exaltation. All causes capable of altering the public health have a marked influence upon the immediate production of insanity or upon the hereditary transmission of its predisposi- tions. The unhealthiness of dwellings, and insufficiency or bad quality of food are so many circumstances influencing its production, and to which municipal governments should pay serious attention. It is on account of these and other analogous causes that cretinism and idiocy are endemic in certain localities, and that this influence is exercised not only on natives, but also upon those establishing themselves there. The mode of life of the parents, and the diseases thay have had are no less efficacious in producing a predisposition to mental unsoundness. If insanity has existed in those that preceded, the chances of a direct transmission are much more probable. This predis- position is sometimes so marked as to be in some measure the only cause. Among the circumstances most likely to produce an hereditary predisposition, we should mention, drunken habits in the parents. Many, indeed, are the cases of idiocy and imbecility which owe their situation to this cause. Many generations thus suffer the punishment inflicted for the faults of one alone. The hereditary predisposition presents numerous varieties in its evolution. Many members of the same family are free from mental unsoundness ; and one only becomes insane. In another the inheritance shows itself from mother to daughter as a conse- quence of parturition. This predisposition sometimes consists only in the peculiarity of character, which drags the man towards a precipice which conducts irresistibly to insanity."—Etudes Medico-Psychologiques, par L. F. E. Renaudin. Chap. II. p.'33. Paris, 1854. (v) See post, \ 192. («) Essays on Partial Derangement in Supposed Connection with Religion. By the late John Cheyne, M. D. Dublin, 1843. (x) No. 163. (y) Lectures, &c. 150. See Rush on the Mind, 46, where this point is fully examined. Initials of Criminals. Verbatim extracts from Letters of Referee. Observations on degree of intellect, &e. by the Chap- lain when first seen. School-master's Report on Leaving Prison. State of leaving tho Prison, as noted by Chaplain. J. C. R L. J. n. H N. J. C. D. M. J. D. AV. J. alias AV. C. B. AV. O. A. II. L. J.N. W.N. A. A. Mother touched with symptoms of Insanity. Grandmother insane. Sister rather weak in mind. He and most of the family evinced :ymptoms of insanity. Two sisters insane. His mother subject to nervous fits. One of his family (his mother, I have every reason to believe) laboring with insanity. Of a simple turn of mind. Uncle in Asylum. Skull fractured three years ago. Sister considered rather silly. Had become dejected and absent af- ter failure in business, and showed symptoms of insanity. Considered rather as an idiot. Almost irresponsible. AA'eakness of mind, made sport of by fellow-servants. Read imperfectly. Only knew the alphabet. Of the lowest kind. Of the lowest intellect, did not know A, B, 0. Improved in reading and writing. Read well, wrote imperfectly, four rules of arithmetic. Read and wrote well; Rule of Three. Read very imperfectly; write a lit- tle ; learned a little arithmetic. Read well, wrote tolerably, 4 rules. Read and wrote well; Rule of Three. Read and wrote well; four Rules. Improved considerably. Improved in reading and writing. Rule of Three. Of the lowest intellect, did not know the alphabet..Rules. Very low in spirits. Read and wrote imperfectly; four Very low degree of in- tellect. Of very weak intellect. Low in spirits and intel- lect. Rend and wrote well. Rule of Three. Read and wrote well. Rule of Three Well educated previously. Read and wrote well. Rule of Three Improved generally. Very cheerful; improved in general knowledge. Sent away incorrigible. Somewhat improved in general. Mentally, not morally improved. Improved in religious knowledge; very cheerful. In Scriptural knowledge also. Improved in Scriptural knowledge. Cheerful. Much improved in spirits; found comfort in religion. Improved in general knowledge. Rather improved mentally. Mentally improved. 00 -4 Initials of Criminals. Verbatim extracts from Letters of Referee. Observations on degree of intellect, CONVERSATION AND DEPORTMENT. 95 respect to his real destination; but he said nothing on the subject, made no resistance, and seemed to enjoy his jaunt. When they ar- rived at Lancaster, it Avas too late in the evening to proceed to the asylum, and they took up their quarters for the night at an inn. Very early in the morning the lunatic got up and searched the pockets of the officer, Avhere he found the magistrate's order for his own detention, AA'hich, of course, let him completely into the secret. With that cunning which madmen not unfrequently display, he made the best of his way to the asylum, saw one of the keepers, and told him that he had got a sad mad fellow down at Lancaster, Avhom he should bring up in the course of the day, adding: " He's a very queer fellow, and he has got very odd Avays. For instance, I should not Avonder if he was to say I was the madman, and that he was bringing me; but you must take good care of him, and not believe a Avord that he says." The keeper, of course, promised compliance, and the lunatic Avalked back to the inn, Avhere he found the officer still fast asleep. He aAvoke him, and they sat down to breakfast together. " You're a lazy felloAV to be sleeping all day; I have had a long Avalk this morning," says the lunatic. "Indeed," says the officer, "I should like to have a Avalk myself after breakfast; perhaps you will go Avith me?" The lunatic assented, and after breakfast they sat out, the officer leading the Avay toward the lunatic asylum, intending to deliver his charge; but it never occurred to him to examine whether his order Avas safe. When they got Avithin sight of the asylum the lunatic exclaimed,—"What a fine house that is !" " Yes," said the officer, " I should like to see the inside of it." "So should I," observed the lunatic. "Well, I dare say they will let us through,—I will ask," Avas the response. They went to the door; the officer rang the bell, and the keeper whom the lunatic had previously seen, made his appearance, with tAVO or three assistants. The officer then began to fumble in his pockets for the order, Avhen the lunatic produced it, and gave it to the keeper, saying: " This is the man of whom I spoke to you about. You will take care of him; shave his head, and put a straight waistcoat on him." The ■ men immediately laid hands on the poor officer, who vociferated loudly that the other was the madman, and he the officer; but, as this only confirmed the story previously told by the lunatic, it did not at all tend to procure his liberation. He was taken aAvay, and became so indig- nantly furious that the straight-waistcoat was speedily put upon him, and his head was shaved, secundum artem. Meamvhile, the lunatic walked deliberately back to the inn, paid the reckoning, and set out on his journey homeAvard. The good people in the country Avere, of course, surprised on seeing the wrong man return; they Avere afraid that the lunatic, in a fit of phrensy, had murdered the officer, and they asked him, Avith much trepidation, Avhat he had done with Mr. Stevenson. "Done with him?" said the madman, 'Svhy, I left him at the Lan- caster Asylum, as mad as a fury!" which, indeed, was not very far from the truth; for the wits of the officer Avere well nigh upset by his unexpected detention and subsequent treatment. Further inquiry was forthwith made by his neighbors, and it was ascertained that the man Avas actually in the asylum. A magistrate's order Avas produced for his liberation; and he returned home Avith a 96 TESTS OF INSANITY. NATURE OF ACT. handkerchief tied round his head in lieu of the covering which nature had bestowed upon it. (I) § 111. A man mentioned by Pinel, Avho had been for some time con- fined in the Bicetre, was, on the Adsitation of a commissary, ordered to be discharged as perfectly sane, after a long conversation in Avhich he had conducted himself Avith the greatest propriety. The officer prepared the prods verbal for his discharge, and gave it to him to put his name to it, when he subscribed himself Jesus Christ, and then indulged in all the reveries connected with that delusion. Lord Erskine gives a very remarkable history of a man who indicted Dr Munro for confining him without a cause in a madhouse. He undenvcnt the most rigid exami- nation, by the counsel of the defendant, Avithout discovering any ap- pearance of insanity, until a gentleman came into court who desired a question to be put to him respecting a princess with whom he had cor- responded in cherry-juice. He immediately talked about the princess in the most insane manner, and the cause was at an end. But this having taken place in Westminster, he commenced another action in the city of London, and on this occasion no effort could induce him to expose his insanity; so that the cause Avas dismissed only by bringing against him the evidence taken at Westminster. On another occasion, Lord Erskine examined a gentleman who had indicted his brother for confining him as a maniac, and the examination had gone on for great part of a day without discovering any traces of insanity. Dr. Sims then came into court, and informed the counsel that the gentleman considered himself as the Saviour of the world. A single observation, addressed to him in this character, showed his insanity, and put an end to the cause. Many similar cases, says Abercrombie, are on record. Several years ago, a gentleman in Edinburgh, who was brought before a jury to be cognosced, defeated every attempt of the opposite counsel to discover any traces of insanity, until a gentleman came in court, who ought to have been present at the beginning of the case, but had been accidentally detained. He immediately addressed the patient by asking him Avhat were his latest accounts from the planet Saturn, and speedily elicited ample proofs of insanity.(ZZ) M. Orfila states, that deranged persons who are conscious of their condition, and Avho yet preserve some control over them- selves, will answer correctly all questions that are addressed them, and will not betray their condition if they have an interest in conceal- ing it.(w) (5.) Nature of the Act. (a.) Its Insensibility. § 112. " In foro medico," as is well remarked by Schurmayer,(w) " a (l) Manchester, (England,) Guardian. (II) Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, pp. 253, 254; see also 3 86-92 (m) Med Le"g., M. Orfila. Tome I. p. 396. Paris, 1848. (n) Gerichtliche Medicin, \ 522. PRESUMPTION FROM NATURE OF FACT. 97 derangement of the mental faculties is generally to be presumed Avhere the consciousness, imagination, or sensual apperception or impulse, Avhen subjected to common and usual provocations, internal or external, respond in a manner different from Avhat they would in a normal state. But Avhether a certain action, undergoing a criminal investigation, Avas the effect of a diseased mental activity of the subject, and committed when he was not master of himself, is a question to be answered prim- arily from the indicia presented by the action itself, and then from the results of an examination of the accused, in reference to his physical, moral, and mental condition before, at, and after the deed in question. Illustrations of acts whose insensibility can be received to shoAV their irresponsibility or incompetency of the actor, may be found in the old law cases of a legacy to the King of Siam, and of an executory devise to all the children in a particular parish Avho should, in a specific year, be born with moles on their faces. The presumption of irresponsibility would, of course, attach Avith great force under similar circumstances, to criminal acts equally insensible, as in the case of the idiot who was found putting an infant brother into the pot to boil for dinner." (b.) Its Incongruity with Antecedents. § 113. When a man of uniformly mild character boldly and openly com- mits a deed of blood,—Avhen a woman of previous purity gives Avay to lasciviousness,—when a long course of irreproachable honesty and exact- ness is suddenly broken in by profligacy; or domestic peace, by unpro- voked ebullitions of violence, or by expressions of distrust to those for- merly most loved or most trusted,(6) it is proper to consider how far un- soundness of mind may not be considered as the cause. Illustrations of this species of change will hereafter be noticed in other connections. It should be observed that omission to fly is a very important ingredient to make up this species of presumption.(p) It should be observed, also, that a man of unsound mind generally chooses the most injudicious time and place for the perpetration of the act, although the cunning and address with which an offence Avas committed, do not exclude the supposition of derangement,(q) and repels with indignation every intimation of his insanity; in many cases asserting that he committed the crime with perfect consciousness, and when entirely in his senses, and disregarding all that is said to extenuate it.(r) M. Falret thus speaks of the change of character, which is a pro- minent symptom of commencing insanity:—Sometimes instead of a simple exaggeration, it is a veritable transformation that the character undergoes. Avarice gives place to prodigality, piety to irreligion, modesty to obscenity, temperance to drunkenness, the love of truth to deceit, the most tender and tried affections to indifference and even hate, (rr) (o) See also, Medicine Legale, par M. Orfila. Tome I. p. 389. Paris 1848 (p) 2 Mittermaier Deutsch St., $ 12. Wills on Circumstantial Ev. TO. Best on Pre- sump., 322. AArharton's Cr. Law, (3rd ed.,) 332, 333. (q) See M^d. L6g. J. Briand. p. 553. Paris, 1852 ; and see ante, \ 60, 61 (/) Compare Friedreich, Handbuch der gerichtsaertztlichen Praxis. Vol. I. p. 370. (rr) See ante, \ 106. 7 98 PRESUMPTION OF INSANITY FROM NATURE OF FACT. A frequent result is the neglect of the duties due to family and society, disorder of conduct and derangement of affairs, and those ebullitions of irritation and violence Avhich momentarily, and sometimes for ever destroy the harmony existing between relations and friends.(s) The changes of conduct observable, in the incubation of mental diseases, are infinite, the deranged show a neglect or an unaccustomed zeal for their customary occupations, and for the cares and attentions of family, and for social customs and duties. Patients Avho Avere before sedentary in their habits, indulge in long absences from their dAvellings. Some show an indifference and neglect for the persons and things they loved the most, and seek after objects which they did not like. Others over- whelm you with demonstrations of obligingness and devotedness. Generally those thus affected are absent and forgetful, they do not remember what they have done or what they were about to do an instant before, and then seem much surprised when these frequent absences of mind are pointed out to them. Their conduct abounds in contrasts. Those who were orderly become dissipated ; those Avho Avere careful in business, noAV enter upon the most dangerous speculations, and they addict themselves to play, drinking and sexual excesses, and in fact to all the vices which were before unknown to them.(ss) (c.) Its Motivelessness.(t) § 114. " It is assumed or implied," says Dr. Taylor with great justice, "that sane men never commit a crime without an apparent motive, or one of delusive nature only in the perpetration of a criminal act. If these positions were true it would be very easy to distinguish a sane from an insane criminal, but the rule Avholly fails in practice. In the first place, non-discovery is here taken as a proof of the non-existence of a motive; while it is undoubted that motives may exist for many atrocious criminal acts without our being able to discover them—a fact proved by the numerous recorded confessions of criminals before exe- cution, in cases of which, until these confessions Avere made, no motive for the perpetration of the crime had appeared to the acutest minds. In the case of Courvoisier, Avho was convicted of the murder of Lord William Russell, in June, 1840, it was the reliance upon this alleged criterion before the secret proofs of guilt accidentally came out, and led many to believe he could not have committed the crime; and the absence ' of motive' was urged by his counsel as the strongest proof of the man's innocence. It was ingeniously contended, ' that the most trifling action of human life had its spring from some motive or other.' This is undoubtedly true, but it is not ahvays in the poAver of man untainted with crime to detect and unravel the motives which influence criminals to the perpetration cf murder. No reasonable motive was (s) See post, § 204. (ss) Legons Cliniques sur l'alienation Mentale, M. Falret. 8th Legon. p. 215. Paris, 1854. Post, \ 204. See ante, \ 106. (t) Medicine Legale, J. Briand. p. 548-49. Paris, 1852. Pinel, Alienation Mentale, p. 157. Etudes Medico-Psychologiques sur l'alienation Mentale, par L. F. E. Renaudin. Paris, 1854. Chap. 18th, p. 779. See also Lemons Cliniques de Medicine Legale, M. Falret, Le5on 2d, p. 55-67. Paris, 1854. Also Medicine Legale, par Orfila. Tome I. p. 304, Paris, 1848. MOTIVELESSNESS AND INCONSEQUENTIALITY. 99 ever discovered for the atrocious murders and mutilations perpetrated by Cireenack and Cood; yet these persons Avere very properly made responsible for their crimes. On the trial of Francis for shooting at the Queen, the main ground of the defence was, that the prisoner had no motive for the act and therefore he Avas irresponsible; but he Avas convicted. It is difficult to comprehend under what circumstances any motive for such an act as this could exist; and therefore the admission of such a defence would have been like laying doAvn the rule, that the evidence of the perpetration of so heinous a crime should, in all cases, be taken as a proof of the existence of an irresponsible state of mind. Crimes have been sometimes committed Avithout any apparent motive, by sane indiA'iduals who were at the time perfectly aware of the crimi- nality of their conduct. No mark of insanity or delusion could be dis- covered about them, and they had nothing to say in their defence. They have, hoAvever, been very properly held responsible. On the other hand, lunatics confined in a lunatic asylum have been known to be influenced by motives in the perpetration of crimes. Thus they have often murdered their keepers in revenge for ill treatment Avhich they have experienced at their hands.(u) Thus Farmer was acquitted as insane, while the clear motive for homicide was revenge and ill-feeling. In another case the act of murder was perpetrated from jealousy.(v) On the whole, the conclusion with respect to this assumed criterion is, that an absence of motive may, when there are other strong evidences of insanity, favor the view of irresponsibility for crime; but the non- discovery of a motive for a criminal act cannot of itself be taken as any proof of the existence of homicidal monomania in the perpetrator. It is right to state, however, that the law invariably acts on the humane principal, that the absence of a sufficient motive forms a strong pre- sumption of innocence—the presence of one is no proof of guilt, "(w) (d). Its Inconsequentiality. § 115. Of this an illustration may be found in the case of the mad- man mentioned by Hitzig, who occupied himself with incessant and anxious labor in rowing an imaginary boat. He never, alas ! reached the shore towards which he so toiled, until death released him from his labors; and the last pulse of life was given to a tremulous, and, then, scarcely perceptible movement of the spectral oars. III. From what mental unsoundness is to be distinguished. 1st. Emotions.(x) Briand says, that from the height of passion to madness is but one step, but it is precisely this step which impresses upon the act com- (u) See the case of the Queen v. Farmer. York Spring Assizes, 1837. (v) Reg. v. Goule. Durham Summer Assizes, 1845. (w) Taylor's Med. Jurisprudence, p. 578, 579. (x) See particularly Aristotle's delineation of the Passions in the Second Book of his " Rhetoric ;" and see also L. Krahmer, Handbuch der gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. SchAvet- schke, 1851, § 12G. 100 FROM WHAT INSANITY IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED. mitted a distinct character. It is important then to knoAV exactly the precise characteristics of the passions and of insanity. But here science fails, for it must be admitted that Ave are unable to point out the place A\*here passion ends or Avhere madness commences.(y) M. Orfila draws the following distinction between a man acting under the impulse of the passions and one urged on by insanity. The mind is always greatly troubled A\dien it is agitated by anger, tormented by an unfortunate love, beAvildered by jealousy, overcome by despair, humbled by terror or corrupted by an unconquerable desire for vengeance, etc. Then, as it is commonly said, a man is no longer master of himself, his reason is affected, his ideas are in disorder, he is like a madman. But, in all these cases, a man does not lose his knoAvledge of the real rela- tion of things, he may exaggerate his misfortune, but this misfortune is real, and if it carries him to commit a criminal act, this act is per- fectly well motived. Insanity is more or less independent of the cause that produced it; it exists of itself; the passions cease with their cause, jealousy disappears Avith the object that provoked it, anger lasts but a few moments in the absence of the one Avho by a grievous injury gave it birth, etc. Violent passions cloud the judgment, but they do not produce those illusions which are observable in insanity. They excite for a moment sentiments of cruelty, but they do not produce that deep moral perversion Avhich influences the madman to sacrifice, without motive, the being he most cherishes.(z) (1.) Remorse. § 116. "When remorse," says Cogan, "is blended Avith the fear of punishment, and rises to despair, it constitutes the supreme Avretch- edness of the mind."(a) And of all stages of passion, remorse is the one most liable, Avhen the conscience is acute, to be mistaken for insan- ity itself. Of this we have a very melancholy case in our OAvn local experience. A young gentleman of peculiarly nice sense of honor and keen sensibility, killed an intimate and beloved friend in a duel, hastily forced on by his oavii undue susceptibility. For twenty years he has never ceased to stride to and fro the chamber in Avhich he has been confined, firing an imaginary pistol at intervals, and then throwing himself back Avith the acutest expression of misery. In this instance remorse has run into madness. In others it has made but a slight progress in that direction; in others entire sanity and responsibility remain. And yet in all it presents symptoms Avhich it is Avell for the forensic physician to examine in relation to their moral as well as their psychical origin. Harpsfield, in his Ecclesiastical History, gives us the following graphic report of the dying Avords of Cardinal Beaufort, Avhich is a poAY- erful illustration of the effect of this passion: " And must I then die ! Will not all my riches saA^e me ? I could purchase the kingdom, if that would save my life. What! is there no bribing of death ? When my nepheAV, the Duke of Bedford died, I thought my happiness and my (jj) Med. Leg. p. 551. Paris, 1852. (z) Med. Leg. Tome I. p. 407. Paris, 1848. (a) Cogan on the Passions, Vol. I. chap. 2. sec. 3. REMORSE. 101 authority greatly increased : but the Duke of Gloucester's death raised me in fancy to a level Avith kings, and I thought of nothing but accu- mulating still greater wealth, to purchase at last the triple crown. Alas ! Iioav are all my'hopes disappointed! Wherefore, 0 my friends, let me earnestly beseech you to pray for me, and recommend my de- parting soul to God!" A few minutes before his death his mind appeared to be undergoing the tortures of the damned. He held up his two hands, and cried—" Away! Away! why thus do ye look at me?" This same scene in the Cardinal's life is thus still more vividly depicted by Shakspeare: SCENE—The Cardinal's bed-chamber. Enter King Henry, Salisbury and AVarwick. King Hen. How fares my lord ? speak, Beaufort, to thy sovereign, Cardinal. If thou be'st death, I'll give thee England's treasure, Enough to purchase such another island, So thou wilt let me live, and feel no pain. King Hen. Ah, what a sign it is of evil life, When death's approach is seen so terrible! Warwick. Beaufort, it is thy sovereign speaks to thee. Cardinal. Bring me unto my trial when you will, Died he(6) not in his bed? where should he die? Can I make men live, whe'r they will or no ?— 0 ! torture me no more, I will confess.— Alive again ? then show me where he is; I'll give a thousand pounds to look upon him.— He hath no eyes, the dust hath blinded them.— Comb down his hair; look ! look ! it stands upright, Like lime-twigs''set to catch my winged soul!— Give me some drink; and bid the apothecary Bring the strong poison I bought of him. King Hen. 0 thou eternal Mover of the heavens, Look with a gentle eye upon this wretch ! 0, beat away the busy meddling fiend, That lays strong siege unto this wretch's soul, And from his bosom purge this black despair! Warwick. See, how the pangs of death do make him grin. Salisbury. Disturb him not, let him pass peaceably. King Hen. Peace to his soul, if God's good pleasure be! Lord cardinal, if thou think'st on heaven's bliss, Hold up thy hand, make signal of thy hope.— He dies and makes no sign; 0 God, forgive him! Warwick. So bad a death, argues a monstrous life. King Hen. Forbear to judge, for we are sinners all. Close up his eyes, and draw the curtain close; And let us all to meditation.(c) M. Guillon relates the following remarkable case: " The Chevalier r\e S----had been engaged in seventeen 'affairs of honor,' in each of which his adversary fell. But the images of his murdered rivals began to haunt him night and day: and at length he fancied he heard nothing but the wailings and upbraidings of seventeen families—one demanding a father, another a son, another a brother, another a husband, &c. Harassed by these imaginary followers, he incarcerated himself in the monastery of La Trappe; but the French revolution threw open this asylum, and turned the Chevalier once more into the world. He was (b) Meaning the Duke of Gloucester. (c) King Hen. VI. part ii 102 FROM AVIIAT INSANITY IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED. now, no longer able to bear the remorse of his own conscience, or, as he imagined^ the sight of seventeen murdered men, and therefore put himself to death. It is evident that insanity was the consequence of the remorse, and the cause of the suicide.(d) § 117. Schurmayer's(c) vicAvs on this point are of peculiar interest, as indicating the conservative jealousy Avith Avhich the continental autho- rities guard against that involuntary dissimulation on the patient's part which makes real, and yet at the same time responsible emotions so difficult to distinguish from irresponsible disease. " Remorse," he says, " often affects the mind so pOAverfully, as to assume the appear- ance of insanity. The smothered self-reproach of the criminal some- times expresses itself in the shape of deep dejection, and sometimes in that of petulance and irritability. Almost every defendant Avho is guilty, Avill be seen to lapse at least periodically into a deep reverie, with the eyes staring into vacancy. The most consummate villains alone are exempt from such feelings. Criminals generally endeavor to suppress the voice of conscience, because they fear to be betrayed by it. But this very reaction is perfectly legible in their faces, ges- tures, and general bodily condition. Under these circumstances the qualms of conscience frequently assume the appearance of disease. The accused, particularly if in confinement, does not sleep at night for weeks, and consequently looks pale and haggard, loses his appetite, and speaks with hesitation, and sometimes with trembling. When this condition reaches a point of great intensity, the guilty is visited by visions and hallucinations; avenging angels appear to him, or evil spirits, phantoms, or the shades of the dead and injured. Add to this a little superstition, and the victim is firmly convinced of the reality of these apparitions, and regards them as punishments sent from heaven. In the course of the trial itself, these symptoms are less perceptible; and generally the culprit hesitates to tell an official person Avhat he suffers in seclusion, but the struggle within frequently breaks out in spite of his efforts, or at least interferes with the coherence of his speech. In such cases a man, perfectly hale in mind and body, will frequently talk at random, or at least express himself in so confused and stupid a manner as to induce doubts of his sanity. It is remark- able, that those Avho confess their guilt are subject to these attacks equally with those who deny it. It might be supposed that the crimi- nals who have made a public confession, would experience a regene- rating sense of relief in consequence of having removed a load from their minds; but the confession often precedes the first sensations of remorse, by directing the attention to the moral and religious aspects of the deed. " This proves that even a confessed criminal should be treated Avith great circumspection. Instead of overwhelming him Avith reproaches, the victory gained by his integrity over his fears, should be held up to himself as a restorer of self respect. " The more depraved order of culprits do not allow their consciences to drive them to despair, but only to petulance ; but even this frame of mind sometimes goes so far as to lead the subject to do the most incom- (d) AVinslow's Anatomy of Suicide, pp. 53, 54. (e) See Gericht. Med. § 519. REMORSE—ANGER. 103 prehensible things, such as asserting things against reason, refusing to answer, or causing constant trouble and vexation in the prison. Such persons are often greatly misunderstood, sometimes by ascribing their offensive conduct solely to malice and spite, and sometimes by regard- ing them as demented, when, driven by their chagrin, they lose all reflection, and say or do things to their OAvn injury. The conscious- ness of crime, coupled Avith the despair of expiation consequent upon having denied it, produce an internal schism Ayhich may result in the most singular and distracting phenomena. " A tolerably sure criterion of an aAvakened conscience is often to be found in the desire of the culprits for some consolatory assurance. Even those who deny their guilt are generally anxious to know how they Avould be able to bear the condition of a criminal, sentenced ac- cording to laAV. In many cases there is an exaggerated idea of the impending punishment, still further increased by the imaginings which haunt the prisoners solitude. When such erroneous notions come to the knowledge of the examining physician, it is perfectly right in him to correct them, and the information thus imparted will generally pro- duce a change of feeling Avhich must at once dispel every idea of mental derangement."(/) (2.) Anger. § 118. "Anger," says Archbishop Tillotson,(#) an authority not dis- tinguished for undue poignancy of description, " is a short fit of mad- ness, and he that is passionate and furious deprives himself of his rea- son, spoils his understanding, and helps to make himself a fool." And Dr. Cogan, while more exact, is not much less emphatic: "Anger is the strong passion or emotion, impressed or excited by a sense of injury received or in contemplation; that is, by the idea of something of a pernicious nature and tendency, being done or intended, in violation of some supposed obligation to a contrary conduct."(A) § 119. "A morbid paroxysm of anger," Dr. Rush tells us, " appears in a preternatural determination of the blood to the brain, a turgescence of the blood-vessels of the face, a redness of the eyes, an increased secre- tion of saliva, which is discharged by foaming at the mouth, great volu- bility or a total suppression of speech, agitations of the fists, stamping of the feet, uncommon bodily strength, convulsions, hysteria, bleeding at the nose, apoplexy and death. Sometimes this disease appears Avith paleness, tremors, sickness at the stomach, quick respiration, puking, syncope and asphyxia. It is in this case generally combined with fear, and hence arises the abstraction of blood from the brain, and its deter- mination to other parts of the body."(z) "Anger," says Dr. Millingen, "will vary in its symptoms according to our temperament. Thus we may observe Avhat is called red anger and pale anger. The first is of a violent and explosive nature; it gen- erally affects the sanguineous; the circulation of the blood is acceler- ated—the breathing is difficult and panting—the features flushed—the (/) SchUrmayer, Gericht. Med. § 519. (<7) Works. Vol. I. ser. 4. (h) Cogan on the Passions. Vol. I. p. 113. (0 Rush on the Mind, p. 332. 104 FROM AVHAT INSANITY IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED. swollen veins are visildy enlarged under the integuments—the eyes flash fire, and become injected with blood—the lips contracted expose the teeth—the voice becomes hoarse—the hearing difficult—foam will occa- sionally issue from the mouth; in short, the features assume the cha- racter of mania, arising evidently from a congestion of blood on the brain; and under the violence of the paroxysm the angry man will know no restraint, and is indeed, for the time being, a maniac, indis- criminate in his fury and perfectly uncontrollable. Such was the case of Charles VI. of France, who, being violently incensed against the Duke of Bretagne, and burning Avith a spirit of malice and revenge, could neither eat, drink, nor sleep, for many days and nights, and at length became furiously mad; as he was riding on horseback, drawing his sword and striking promiscuously every one Avho approached him. During this paroxysm of anger the violence of an infuriated man is such that he will break and destroy every thing about him. On this subject Dugald Stewart has entertained a singular notion, and fancied that in these outrageous acts, the angry man thinks that the inanimate objects that he attacks are alive. The following are his words:—' The dispo- sition AArhich we sometimes feel, Avhen under the influence of instinctive resentment, to wreak our vengeance upon inanimate objects, has sug- gested to Dr. Reid a very curious query—Avhether, upon such an occa- sion, we may have a momentary belief that the object is alive ? For my own part I confess my inclination to answer this question in the affirmative.' Noav, with all due respect to the opinion of these psycholo- gists, daily experience proves the fallacy of this doctrine; for, although such furious persons may break and demolish pots and pans, bottles and glasses, chairs and tables, they rarely expend their fury on bystanders, who Avould not remain as quiet as crockery or furniture, but have re- course to retaliation, with capital and interest. True, such men may beat their wives and their children, but they are more cautious with strangers; and their outrageous conduct I consider as an indication of a cowardly desire to seek revenge, rather than a resentful spirit to avenge wrongs or insults; and these outbreaks are nothing more than a mani- festation of power that mankind is ever proud of possessing and display- ing. And I truly must again differ in opinion with the philanthropic Dugald Stewart, when he maintains that a man wishes to punish an offender with his own hands, owing to ' a secret wish of convincing our enemy, by the magnanimity of our conduct, how much he had mistaken the object of his hatred.' I must confess that I should feel much hesi- tation in exposing myself to this chance of a benevolent display of mag- nanimity, on the part of an infuriated person."^') § 120. And a still higher metaphysical authority, Dr. Reid, likens it to " a storm at^ea, or a tempest in the air."(A) " It does not, therefore, signify anything in the mind that is constant and permanent, but some- (/) Mind and Matter, by J. G. Millingen, M. D., M. A. pp. 326-7-8. (k) " Saepe, mihi hum amana? meditanti incommoda vitse, Spesque leves, trepidosquc, metus vanosque labores, Gaudia que instabili semper fucata sereno, Non secus ac navis lato jactata profundo, Quam venti violensque aestus canusque magister In diversa trahunt," &c.—Buchanan us. Montaigne (says Sir AYilliam Hamilton,) alludes to these verses in the tenth chapter ANGER—REMORSE. 105 thing that is occasional and has a limited duration, like a storm or tem- pest. Passion commonly produces sensible effects, even upon the body. It changes the voice, the feature, and the gesture. The external signs of passion have in some cases a great resemblance to those of madness; in others to those of melancholy. It gives often a degree of muscular force and agility to the body, far beyond what it possesses in calm mo- ments. The effects of passion on the mind are not less remarkable. It turns the thoughts involuntarily to the objects related to it, so that a man can hardly think of anything else. It gives often a strange bias to the judgment, making a man quick-sighted in everything that tends to inflame his passion and to justify it, but blind to everything that tends to moderate or allay it. Like a magic lantern, it raises up scep- tres and apparitions that have no reality, and throws false colors upon every object. It can turn deformity into beauty, vice into virtue, and virtue into vice. The sentiments of a man under its influence will ap- pear absurd and ridiculous, not only to other men but even to himself, when the storm is spent and succeeded by a calm. Passion often gives a violent impulse to the will, and makes a man do what he knows he shall repent as long as he lives. That such are the effects of passion I think all men will agree. They have been described in lively colors by poets, orators and moralists in all ages.(?) But men have given more attention to the effects of passion than to its nature; and while they have copiously and elegantly described the former, they have not precisely described the latter." of his third book, but without naming his master. He has thus puzzled his commen- tators. "Nubibus Atris Condita Nullum Fundere pos'sunt Sidera lumen Si mere volvens Turbidus Auster Meseeat sestum, Vitrea dudum, Parque serenis Unda diebus, Mox resoluto Sordida Cceno A'isibus Obstat. Tu quoque, si vis Lumine Claro Cernere verum, Tramite recto Carpere callem: Gaudia pelle, Pelle timorem, Spemque fugato, Nee dolor adsit, Nubila mens est, Vinetaque froenis Hajc ubi regnant.—Boethcus. (T) Milton thus describes what Dr. Millingen calls pale anger: " Thus, while he spake, each passion dimm'd his face, Thrice charg'd with pale ire, envy, and despair, AVhich marr'd his borrow'd visage, and betray'd Him counterfeit." Thompson has also depicted the same state : " Senseless and deformed, Convulsive anger storms at large, or pale And silent settles into fell revenge." 106 FROM WHAT INSANITY IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED. § 121. Schurmayer very justly remarks that in practice, anger and revenge afford much less difficulty, because much more readily distin- guishable from insanity than is remorse. With the more depraved, ex- perience tells us that that malignant hatred Avhich led to crime, is often increased after the crime is committed, and is further aggravated by displeasure at the unfavorable testimony of Avitnesses. The fury of such miscreants is often directed against the judge, the keepers, and all who contribute to the execution of their sentence. In the case of Car- rigan, AA'ho Avas recently convicted in North Carolina for murder, so high did this temper run, that the defendant, immediately after the verdict of conviction was rendered, dreAV forth a pistol, Avith Avhich he aimed a shot at the prosecuting attorney, and then shot himself. In the fierce outburst of passion, it is quite possible to mistake a man under such circumstances for a madman, particularly Avhere philanthropy predisposes the mind to doubt, and science and skill are not at hand to correct the first erroneous impressions. But these doubts will vanish if the examiner abstains from doing anything Avhich may still further stimulate the passions, and preserves an imperturbable composure. If after this, a seArere reprimand is found, either at once, or after one or two repetitions, to make a AA'holesome impression, and quell the excite- ment, there is certainly no derangement of the faculties; for a man with mania, or under the ravings of disease, will never be restored to self-control by the voice of reason. Where the man is very wild and debased, reproaches will not ahvays ansAver the purpose, and it becomes necessary to menace him with coercion. The manner in which such announcements are received Avill also suffice to remove all doubts of his sanity. (3.) Shame. § 122. The feeling of shame may also exert a very considerable influence on the demeanor of an accused man, not entirely lost to this sensation by a long course of vice. Shame rises and sinks with the feeling of honor; " shame is the disagreeable perception of the unfavorable opinions en- tained of us by others." Men of ordinary stamp, who value external honor far above the dignity of self-respect, can imagine no more dread- ful fate than degradation in the eyes of the public. By injudicious treatment such individuals may be reduced to a state closely resembling insanity, particularly in the form of melancholy, which will disappear the moment a more judicious course is resorted to. It is not necessary for us, in order to make out the similarity of symptoms between insanity and excessive shame, to find many parallels to the story told by Dr. Benton, and cited without protest by Dr. Rush, of a school-master Avho Avas accidentally discovered upon a close-stool by one of his scholars, and Avho in consequence became deranged.(m) § 123. Dr. Rush also tells us of an American Indian, Avho became deranged and destroyed himself, in consequence of seeing his face in a looking-glass soon after his recovery from a violent attack of small- pox. The loss of one eye by an affray in a country tavern, Avhich ma- (m) Rush on the Mind, p. 38. SHAME—GRIEF. 107 terially affected the beauty of the face, produced derangement in a young man who was aftenvards a patient in the Pennsylvania Hos- pital. There are other facts Avhich sIioav the depth of this attachment to beauty, in the human mind, and the poignancy of the distress occa- sioned by its loss or decay. The once beautiful Lady Wortley Mon- tague tells a friend, in one of her letters, that she had never seen her- self in a looking-glass for eleven years, solely from her inability to bear the mortifying contrast between her appearance in the tAVO extremes of her life. A clergyman in Maryland became insane in consequence of having permitted some typographical errors to escape, in a sermon Avhich he had published on the death of General Washington.(n) A young gentleman of considerable promise, of high natural and ac- quired attainments, had been solicited to make a speech at a public meeting, Avhich was to take place in the town in which he resided. As he had never attempted to address extemporaneously a public body, he expressed himself extremely neiwous as to the result, and asked per- mission to withdraAV his name from the published list of speakers. This wish was not, however, complied with, as it was thought that Avhen the critical moment arrived he Avould not be found AYanting even in the art of public speaking. He had prepared himself with considerable care for the attempt. His name Avas announced from the chair: when he rose for the purpose of delivering his sentiments. The exordium was spoken without any hesitation; and his friends felt assured that he would acquit himself Avith great credit. He had not, however, advanced much in his prefatory observations Avhen he hesitated, and found him- self incapable of proceeding. He then sat down, evidently excessively mortified. In this state he retired to a room Avhere the members of the committee had previously met, and cut his throat Avith his penknife. He wounded the carotid artery, and died in a few minutes.(o) (4.) Grief. § 124. Shakspeare very touchingly as Avell as naturally describes the symptoms of that species of morbid grief which becomes monomaniac by self-confinement and self-involution: " Grief fills up the room of my absent child; Lies in his bed, walks up and down with me; Puts on his pretty looks,"repeats his words; Remembers me of all his gracious parts; Stuffs out his vacant garments with his form; Then I have reason to be fond of grief ." "Physicians," says Dr. Rush, "in their unsuccessful efforts to save life, are often obliged to witness this passion. It is of consequence for them, therefore, to be Avell acquainted Avith its symptoms and cure. Its symptoms are acute and chronic. The former are, insensibility, syncope, asphyxia, and apoplexy; the latter are fever, wakefulness, sighing, with and Avithout tears, dyspepsia, hypochondriasis, loss of memory, gray hairs, marks of premature old age in the countenance, catalepsy, and madness. It sometimes brings on sudden death, Avithout any signs of («) Rush on the Mind, p. 40. (o) "VVinslow's Anatomy of Suicide, p. 64. 108 FROM WHAT INSANITY IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED. previous disease, either acute or chronic. Dissections of persons AArho have died of grief, show congestion in, and inflammation of the heart, with a rupture of its auricles and ventricles.(oo) But there are in- stances in which the sympathy of the heart Avith the whole system is so completely disseA*ercd Avith grief, that the subject of it discovers not one mark of it in his countenance or behaviour. On the contrary, he some- times exhibits signs of unbecoming levity in his intercourse Avith the world. This state of mind soon passes away, and is generally followed by all the obvious and natural signs of the most poignant and durable grief. There is another symptom of grief which is not often noticed, and that is profound sleep. I have often Avitnessed it, even in mothers, immediately after the death of a child. Criminals, we are told by Mr. Akerman, the keeper of the Newgate, in London, often sleep soundly the night before their execution. The son of General Custine slept nine hours the night before he was led to the guillotine, in Paris. These facts, and many similar ones that might be mentioned, will serve to vin- dicate the disciples of our Saviour for a Avant of sympathy with him in his suffering. They slept during his agony in 'the garden, because their "flesh Avas weak," and in consequence of "sorrow having filled their hearts, "(p) Tears, or the capacity to weep, form no test in this respect. "How often," very beautifully says Dr. Cheyne,(^?p) "have we, in passing through this vale of tears, heard the folloAving lament: ' Oh, that I could only cry! I feel as if it would so relieve me! There seems nothing natural in my grief. I, who wept so bitterly for my father, have not a single tear to shed for my child.' This tearless state sometimes remains to the very end of life; and we may hear indi- viduals, who Avere originally possessed of the liveliest affections, declare: 'Ever since my husband, son, or daughter died, my affections have been frozen, and my eyes dried up.' It is very generally observed, when the first bitterness of grief is overpast—when the more violent, selfish, or ecstatic stage of the passion has had time to subside—that tears will again begin to flow." One distinction, however, may be relied on with almost certainty. Grief may be, in most cases, relieved by the counter-irritation of some affection other than that wounded; but insanity never. Bishop Jebb, in his one hundred and thirty-ninth letter to Mr. Knox, very touchingly illustrates this: " Mr. Wilberforce one day proposed to take me out to pass next Tuesday Avith our valuable friend, Mrs. II. Thornton, at Clapham. I most gladly embraced the offer. She was much affected, and spoke freely to me about her feelings. At first she had been reduced to a state of inert grief, which would have made her willingly lie down in the same bed Avith him that Avas just gone, and die with him. A sense of affection and duty to her children soon roused her from this torpor, and she then felt, and continued many days to feel, as if she were in heaven. This high-Avrought feeling, however, could not long remain, and nature since has had its griefs and tears." "On this passage," says Dr. Cheyne, "Ave Avould offer the folloAAring (oo) Late researches, however, indicate such cases to be very exceptional. (p) Rush on the Mind, p. 346, 347. (]p) Cheyne on Derangement in Connection with Religion, p. 107. HOME-SICKNESS—SIMULATED INSANITY. 109 short observation. By the 'inert' state of her grief, Ave understand that, though it was profound, so that she willingly would have died with her husband, yet that it Avas Avithout its natural expression; there was no Availing. Then another affection was roused, and that assurance of Divine protection, which is the inheritance of the servants of God, filled her mind with gratitude and joy. Lastly, as the ecstasy subsided, and when her anguish was exhausted, nature had its 'griefs and tears.' It is ahvays desirable that tears should come to the relief of the deeply afflicted; and it is easier to allow the first gush of grief to be over, be- fore we attempt, by religious consideration, to moderate its poignancy." (5.) Home-sickness (Nostalgia).(q) § 125. This often assumes a shape hardly distinguishable from Hys- teria. Thus Goldsmith writes :— " The intrepid Swiss that guards a foreign shore, Condemn'd to climb his mountain-cliffs no more, If chance he hear the song, so sweetly wild, AVhich, on these cliffs, his infant hours beguil'd Melts at the long-lost scenes, that round him rise, And sinks a martyr to repentant sighs." "It is remarkable," says Dr. Rush, "that this disease is most com- mon among the natives of countries that are the least desirable for beauty, fertility, climate, or the luxuries of life. They resemble, in this respect, in their influence upon the human heart, the artificial ob- jects of taste which are at first disagreeable, but which from habit take a stronger hold upon the appetite than such as are natural and agreeable, "(r) § 126. Nostalgia, as Siebold(s) tells us, develops itself principally in that period of childhood approaching puberty. When the malady is of long continuance, it runs into voluntary starvation, sleeplessness, deli- rium, derangement of the senses, together with the usual melancholy con- sequences of unsatisfied desire. Sometimes symptoms of Pyremania are discoverable. Thus Ave are told of a girl of ten years who exposed two children, committed to her care, to the flames, under the stress of home-sickness, (t) 2d. Simulated Insanity.(u) § 127. In every case, the examining physician will be led at once to inquire, Avhether the apparent abnormal state of mind is real or feigned. (q) Orfila gives the following symptoms by which Nostalgia may be recognized: Pro- found sadness to which succeeds a gloomy melancholy, silence and a great desire to be alone, a great indifference for every thing which does not recall the objects regretted. Spasmodic contraction of the stomach, prostration of mind and body, marasmus, &c— Mid. Lig. Vol. I. p. 331. Paris, 1848. (r) Rush on the Mind, p. 38, 39. (s) Gericht. Med. 3 213. n „ . Q . +1 ,. . OSee Jahrb. des Osterreich Staates, 15 Bd. 1834. § 597 fee also the article under the head of Heimweh, by Jesse, in the Encyclop. Yvorterb. der Med. Vvissensch. Band 25. Berl. 1841. \ 292. . . (u) In relation to simulated insanity, M. Orfila says, that as there exists_m the world a very false idea of madmen the one who simulates insanity, after this idea, will 110 FROM AVHAT INSANITY IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED. One thing, however, must not be overlooked, and this is that impostors of this kind are but very rarely able to keep up the character of the disease assumed, with consistency, and Avithout involving themselves in contradictions. It is important to adopt here the precautions pre- scribed by Schurmayer,(v) to watch the subject most closely when he supposes himself least observed, as at such times he generally drops his mask, AAdiich is irksome to him. In all such investigations the phy- sician must never shoAV the most trifling sign of doubt or hesitation ; he must, on the contrary, appear to know everything, in order to discover everything, and must present a firm and imposing front in all his inter- course with the accused. Where the disease in question is of such a nature, as, if genuine, to interfere Avith or suspend sleep, it becomes necessary to watch the patient unobserved at night. To subject him purposely to mental irritation or excitement is improper, reprehensible, and liable to cause harm. Threats of painful medicines or operations are admissible Avhere the processes threatened are really indicated by therapeutics, but the execution of such threats must depend upon the principles laid down in another part of this Avork, in reference to the tests applicable to feigned bodily diseases. § 128. Schurmayer gives us the following reasons for suspecting dis- simulation or deception. 1. When the party has committed some act, the punishment of which he would escape by inducing a belief in his aberration of mind, in this case the comparison of the offence committed, Avith the form of mental disease assumed, will often suffice to confirm the suspicion, (w) 2. When the individual has frequently expressed an aversion to a particular occupation or profession it is expected to assume, as, for instance, that of a soldier. 3. When the general character of the party is open to imputations of malice and deceit.(#) 4. When it is impossible to discover any previous indications, physi- cal or mental, of the pretended derangement of the mental faculties.(y) § 129. The species of mental unsoundness most frequently imitated by the vulgar as delirium—which, at the same time, is that which it is the most difficult to sustain. Sheridan, Avith his usual tact, hit upon perform, at every instant, contradictory and false acts; thus, he will pretend not to remember his past actions, he will not recognize those whom he knows very well, he will not make a single correct reply to questions that are addressed to him. His features will not have the expression of such a violent condition, he cannot for so long a time prevent himself from sleeping, he will play the fool particularly Avhilst he thinks himself observed, finally, his pretended malady will not have developed itself until he feared the pursuit of justice; it will not have been preceded by that originality of character, by those marked symptoms of moral disorder which are observable in the majority of cases of insanity.—Mid. Lig., Tome I. p. 400. Paris, 1848. See also Med. Leg. J. Briand. p. 396. Paris, 1852. See on this point, Principles of Medical Psychology, being the outlines of a course of lectures by Baron Ernest von Feuchtersleben, M. D. Vienna, 1845. Translated from the German by the late H. Evans Lloyd, Esq. Revised and edited by B. G. Babington, M. D., F. R. S., &c. London, printed for the Sydenham So- ciety, 1847. p. 376. (v) Gericht. Med., \ 392. (w) Compare Heinroth, System der psychisch gerichtlichen Mcdizin. Leipsic, 1825. p. 453. (x) Heinroth Medizinische Zeichenlehre. Ausgabe von Danz. Leipsic, 1812. p 380 (y) Friedreich, Handbuch der gerichtlichen Psychologie, p. 155. SIMULATED INSANITY. Ill this Avhen he made the mock-author in the Critic throw his heroine into precisely this stage :— Enter Tilburina and Confidant, mad, according to custom. Sneer. But, what the deuce, is the confidant to be mad, too ? Puff. To be sure she is; the confidant is always to do what her mistress does; weep when she weeps, smile when she smile?, go mad when she goes mad. Now madam confidant—but keep your madness in the back-ground, if you please. Tilb. . ■ . The wind whistles—the moon rises—see, They have kill'd my squirrel in his cage! Is this a grasshopper ?—Ha ! no ; it is my VVhiskerandos; you shall not keep him— I know you have him in your pocket. An oyster may be cross'd in love !—who says A whale 's a bird ?—Ha ! did you call, my love ?— He 's here ! he 's there ! He's everywhere ! Ah me ! he 's nowhere ! [Exit. Puff. There, do you ever desire to. see any body madder than that ? Sneer. Never while I live ! Puff. You observed how she mangled the metre ? Dang. Yes—egad, it was the first thing made me suspect she was out of her senses ! Sneer. And pray, what becomes of her ? Puff. She is gone to throw herself in the sea, to be sure; and that brings us at once to the scene of action, and so to my catastrophe—my sea-fight, I mean. It is much more easy to counterfeit imbecility in its lower stages, as inaction rather than action is then required. § 130. The physiognomy of mature madness, does not admit of imi- tation—though the case is otherwise with imbecility. The demeanor of the individual under threats, or even under the application of painful remedies, is a criterion of inferior value, because skillful imposters Avithstand the test, and because many who are really affected, particu- larly before the disease has assumed a settled character, manifest fear and dread of such remedies, and retain, in a considerable degree, sensi- bility to pain. The torpor of the stomach and bowels under the use of emetics and purgatives is equally unreliable, because the same condition is found unconnected with unsoundness of mind; of greater value is sleeplessness, which a deceiver will not long sustain after the fashion of lunatics, (z) § 131. The shortest road to certainty (a) is by comparing the case in hand with those recorded or experienced, and by a strict application of the inductive tests. Experience teaches that the various abnormal conditions of the mind have certain symptoms in common, by means of Avhich they admit of being arranged in greater and smaller subdivisions, and finally of being reduced to certain clearly defined forms and com- binations of forms. Although every case, to a certain extent, furnishes its OAvn rule, yet this logical process will be of great avail in detecting dissimulation, on the one hand, or groundless imputation of insanity, on the other. The more the phenomena of a case of alleged insanity subject to examination differ from recorded observations, or the more a person of dubious insanity presents an array of symptoms at variance Avith the form of the disease to which they ought to belong, the more reason is there to guard against deception.(b) At the same time, it must be admitted, that the science of psychical medicine has not attained such (2) Schiirmayer Gericht. Med. \ 533. See also ante, \ 100, 101. (a) Ellinger Ueber die anthropologischen Momcnte der Zurechnungsfaehigkeit, p. 97. (b) Mare, Die Geisteskrankheiten, &c. Vol. I. p. 104. 112 FROM WHAT INSANITY IS TO BE DISTINGUISHED. a degree of perfection, as to exclude entirely the possibility of cases arising, Avhich would not admit of being classed with any of those already observed and noted. At times they incline to mere moral per- versity, and are often treated as such for years; or the disease itself is not yet clearly developed; or, finally, it has apparently ceased, or arrived at a stage in which the patient is able to control and direct his condition, as a drunkard his intoxication.(c) § 132. For various reasons, simulation is not ahvays to be inferred from the absence of a trace of insanity at the time of the investi- gation.^) 1. Patients, whose minds are unsound on one subject only, have the poAver of burying their madness in their OAvn hearts, to such an extent as to betray no sign of derangement in the course of the examination; because it is not necessary that the disturbance of one mental function should impair the action of the others. There are many cases, Avhich have been in part noticed, and some of which will appear in the course of the folloAving pages, in Avhich the sufferer is insane on one subject alone, Avhile all the other operations of his mind proceed in their normal manner, so that any one unacquainted Avith the fixed idea Avhich controls him, Avould pronounce him perfectly rational, (e) 2. It is established by experience, that lunatics, even when their disease is not that of monomania, enjoy intervals in which their under- standing has not only its normal vigor, but even displays uncommon poAvers.(/) 3. A genuine mental disease may be suspended or removed by the ' very circumstance which give rise to' the investigation, by analogy to the cases of madmen restored to health by great mental and moral shocks, as well as of persons attempting suicide from melancholy or despair, who are cured of their folly by the impressions received while making the attempt, (g) § 133. Another consideration which must never be lost sight of in investigations of the kind is this, that a pretended mental disease may turn into a real one.(h) A man who makes every effort to appear deranged, may be so much affected by his efforts, that what he pre- tends may assume a reality in his mind, and he become in fact insane.(i) In conclusion, there is also a class of cases in which genuine paroxysms of madness alternate Avith pretended ones, which calls for especial caution in pronouncing upon them.(y) § 134. There are persons of unsound mind, who, in the incipient (c) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. \ 533. (d) Compare Friedreich, p. 165. (e) Compare Wagner, Beitraege zur philosophischen Anthropologie. Vienna, 1794. Vol. I. p. 114. Perfect, Annalen einer Anstalt fur Wahusinnige. Hanover, 1084. p. 341. Esquirol, Note sur la monomanie homicide. Paris, 1837. p. 3. (/) Muratori, Ueber die Einbildungs Kraft. Leipsic, 1785. Vol. II. p. 8. Reil's Rapsodien, p. 76. (g) Etudes Medico Psychologiques sur l'alienation Mentale, par L. F. E. Renaudin. Chap. IX. p. 522. Paris, 1854. (h) For an interesting essay on Monomania induced by Imitation, see 1 Am. Journ. of Insan., 116. 0) !bid. p. 172. (/) Compare Neumann, Die Krankheiten des Vorstellungsvermoegens. Leipsic, 1822. p. 397. And Pye, Aufsaetze, &c. aus der gerichtlichen Arzueiwissenschaft, Third series, p. 219. And see particularly Schurmayer, \ 535, whence the above observations are drawn. FEIGNED INSANITY. 113 stages of the disease retain sufficient consciousness to endeavor, for various reasons, to conceal their malady. A continued attentive obser- vation of such individuals will, however, suffice, in general, to furnish the data for a correct view of the case. But even in cases of confirmed insanity, an occult condition, so-called, may occur, in which the mad- man tries and manages to conceal his ailment, or rather his impulses, fancies, and feelings. This is particularly frequent in lucid intervals and in partial insanity.(k) Under such circumstances, in addition to the maxims adduced under the head of dubious cases, the following suggestions will be found useful. To interrogate the patient directly to the point is of very little avail, for if he is anxious to conceal his madness, any questions will inspire him with a suspicion of the ques- tioner which must frustrate all such efforts. More circuitous means are preferable. 1. By bringing the patient into a succession of different relations of life, and regarding .closely the effect produced upon him, some indica- tions of his fixed ideas may be made to escape him. If the subject of his lunacy is thus brought into question, by contradicting his views in connection with it, the perversion of his intellect will be doubly apparent, (kk) § 135. 2. Amelung's advice is to furnish the party with pen, ink, and paper, and induce him, under some pretext or other, to write ; he will not be able to refrain from setting down something which will throw more or less light on the nature of his derangement. § 136. 3. Heindorf proposes that the physician should narrate the patient's own history, or so much of it as he had learned or could sur- mise, to the patient, as the history of the physician; this is to enlist the confidence of the patient and make him suppose a parallel between his own case and that of the examiner, so that the dulce habere socium malorum may elicit circumstances which he would otherwise have concealed. § 137. 4. A similar proposal is to associate the individual with an- other, of equal rank, degree of education, social position, &c, with himself, as a confidant, as persons of this description generally display more frankness towards people of their own order, than towards those whom they regard as above them. This idea, however, it will be easily seen, is very difficult of practical application. § 138. Though patients of this kind may conceal, they can never deny their fixed ideas. Many persons, says Heinroth, who, in a healthy state, had no scruples in telling a large series of falsehoods, whenever their interest required it, or a confession of the truth would subject them to a disagreeable exposure, forget all this the moment they have a fixed idea to maintain. Then they overlook every advantage, and stand at no absurdity and no disgrace. To hold fast the fancy which en- chains them, is their only aim. If the physician can discover this fancy, he has but to ply the party with questions in reference to it, to make (k) Friedreich, Diagnostik, p. 38; and his Handbuch der gerichtlichen Psychologie, p. 175. (kk) See ante, § 89-92. 114 DEAF AND DUMB. him betray himself, and, in many cases, disclose more than the inquirer had ever thought of investigating."^) § 139. In this view it is peculiarly important not to lose sight of latent insanity, or insania occulta.(m) This term is used to designate an unsoundness of mind Avhich becomes perceptible externally, and consequently to others, only by the commission of a crime, the motive of which is derived exclusively from the mental disorder. The forms it assumes may vary, as even furor transitorius may issue from insania occulta. Whatever difference of opinion exists as to the possibility and the explanation of occult insanity, the facts of experience compel us to consider such a condition as possible. But to detect and substantiate it in any given case will be attended Avith more or less difficulty, accord- ing to the circumstances, and must be undertaken with reference to the same criteria as were pointed out in regard to the furor transitorius.(n) IV. Mental unsoundness as connected avith derangement of the SENSES, AND DISEASE. 1st. Deaf and Dumb.(o) § 140. The deaf and dumb, where their infirmity is congenital, or contracted in early infancy, are always in an abnormal mental and moral condition, owing to the absence of hearing and speech, the two main faculties for the culture of the mental and moral man.(j)) For the same reason, only this description of the deaf and dumb comes under consideration, and in every case the point of inquiry will be the degree of development of the mental and moral powers ; that is to say, of the power of understanding the consequences and the wrongfulness of the act committed. What Avill always exert great influence, is the question whether the deaf and dumb person has received any, and Avhat instruc- tion ; where no instruction has been efficient, there is ahvays great reason to conclude that the psychological conditions are Avanting upon which moral responsibility depends.(q) The most difficult part of the task is always the examination of the individual, which, to lead to a reliable result, requires the assistance of an adept,—that is to say, a teacher of the deaf and dumb. In pronouncing upon such cases, it must not be forgotten that the deaf and dumb have a peculiarly irascible dispo- sition, and that many of them, especially those whose features are marked by a froward, morose, gloomy and sinister expression, and more or less resemble those of the Cretins, are born with a tendency to deceit, malice, cunning, duplicity, and cruelty, (r) In regard to the form and manner in which the intellectual con- (Z) See particularly Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. \ 536; and also L. Krahmer, Hand- buch der Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851, § 126. (m) Friedreich, 580. (ri) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. \ 553. (o) See an interesting treatise on this point, 8 Am. Jour, of Ins., 17. L. Krahmer, Handbuch der Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851, \ 122. (jp) Friedreich Handbuch der Geritchtlichen Psychologie, p. 659. (?) See J. Briand, Med. Leg., article sur la surdi-mutite, p. 569. Paris, 1852. See also M. Orfila, M£d. L£g, sur la surdi-mutite\ Tome I. p. 460. Paris, 1848. Also Traite des maladies de l'oreille et de l'audition, par Itard, Vol. XL (r) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med., \ 562. DISEASES OF THE SENSES. 115 dition of the deaf and dumb should be examined and probed, Hoff- bauer and, after him, Friedreich have given a series of directions, sub- stantially as follows: AVhere the deaf and dumb person is able to understand spoken words by following the motions of the lips, the in- quirer must speak distinctly and with marked articulation, so as to enable the patient to see what he says. Where oral examinations are impracticable or unsatisfactory, the scrutiny, if possible, must be made in writing, when it becomes especially important to propound simple questions, intelligible to every one. But they must not be such merely as the patient is likely to expect beforehand, for these might be an- swered promptly and correctly; not, however, because he has properly examined into and understood their meaning, and properly concentrated in his own thoughts the answer he returns, but because he considers the question as written down, without thinking further about it, as a request to commit to paper that which perhaps would be his answer if he thought at all about it. So long as these answers are correct or, if not correct, at least congruous, there is room to believe that the questions were understood by the patient, and that he is able, to a certain extent, to make himself intelligible to others by means of writing. But the con- trary does nbt appear if his answers are incongruous. But if several ansAvers are incongruous, and particularly if it is found that a certain number of answers are constantly repeated, no doubt remains that the individual, however capable of tracing written characters, is not able, in the proper sense of the word, either to read or write. Where it is necessary to converse with the deaf and dumb person by means of signs, and for this purpose to call in the assistance of an expert, the capacity of the latter must be so far taken into account as to obtain the assurance that he will speak and interpret according to the intention of the judi- cial purpose had in view; for which reason, it will be important to in- struct the interpreter fully on this subject. It may also be necessary, and is declared indispensable by some,(s) to employ two interpreters at the hearing. It may be said, in passing, that such examinations are almost always unsatisfactory in their results. Itard is of opinion that the intellectual capacity of a deaf and dumb person should be tested by a written colloquy, and that if incapable of taking part in such communications, he is to be looked upon as lacking the necessary in- struction, and idiotic. The same high authority further remarks, that if a deaf and dumb man denies having received any instruction, in the hope of escaping punishment on the score of ignorance, the proper course is to accuse him of a graver crime, and one of another character from that imputed to him,(t) and that, on the whole, a deaf and dumb man who understands the questions asked of him in writing, is much the same as a man entirely compos mentis. Marc says that when the re- sponsibility of a deaf and dumb person who has been taught to converse, is in question, a hearing should be had, without any judicial preparation, under the form of a conversation on general subjects entirely foreign to the offence committed, from which, by an association of ideas, a transi- tion should be effected to general questions of morals and social order. (s) Kleinschrod. . if) If he knows how to write, he will have immediate recourse to this method, in orde r to justify himself, and will thus show the whole range of his intelligence. 116 DEAF, DUMB, AND BLIND. "There is but little difference," says Orfila, "between the unin- structed deaf and dumb and the idiot, and such is the affinity existing between these two conditions of the intelligence, that more than the fortieth part of the deaf and dumb are afflicted with idiocy. It may be that this mental incapacity is the result of inaudition, or it may depend upon the same cause that paralyzed the auditive sense. It should be observed, however, that the idiot is incapable of learning, whilst the deaf and dumb, on the contrary, can receive an almost com- plete education. Even if the uninstructed deaf and dumb do not know all the consequences of certain criminal actions, still they are not slow in learning that these actions are censurable, and even that they are the subject of punishment."(u) 2d. Blind. § 141. Blindness(v) can only come in question here when it is con- genital or has originated in early infancy, for then only can it exercise decisive influence on the mental and moral development. In general, however, blindness is no reason to suspend the personal responsibility of an agent; the defects of the mental and moral nature consequent upon it, are not diseases ; and the bearing which they have upon the degree of culpability ascribable to an act committed in violation of law, must be referred to the discretion of the court, as guided by the circum- stances of each case.(w) 3d. Epileptics.(x) § 142. Epileptics, from their nervous susceptibility, and their ten- dency to mental alienation, should be regarded with peculiar ten- derness by those to whom is committed the administration of public justice. Nor should the idea of a recent recovery ever exclude one who has been so afflicted, from that protection which would secure at least a patient investigation of the question of moral responsibility. Recent investigations, conducted by men of eminent sagacity and great opportunities of observation, have led to the conclusion that epilepsy produces not only general mental prostration, but anomalies in the entire moral and intellectual |^stem. And although the malady some- times co-exists with great intelligence, yet the patient retains, not only during the attack, but for an indefinite period afterwards, but an imperfect use of his faculties.(y) § 143. Epilepsy consists in periodical attacks of insensibility, accom- panied with involuntary, convulsive, and more or less violent motions (w) Med. L6g. Tome I. p. 460. Paris, 1848. (?>) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. 563; and see L. Krahmer, Handbuch de Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851, \ 122. (w) Compare Friedreich, 676, where the learning on this subject is collected. (z) See L. Krahmer, Handbuch del Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke 1851 2 122; see J. Briand, M6d. Leg. p. 568. Paris, 1852 ; M. Orfila, M6d. Le"g. Tome I. p. 332.' Paris 1848; M. Falret, Lecons Cliniques de Me"d£cine Mentale, p. 521. Paris 1854. Of) Boileau de Castlenau: De l'epilepsie dans ses rapports avec l'alienation' mentale, considers au point de vue m£dico-judiciare. Annales d' Hygiene publ. et de M£d£cine l£g. Avril, 1852, No. 94. Erhardt-Ueber Zurechnungsfahigkeit der Epileptischen. EPILEPTICS. 117 of the limbs. That persons committing a violation of laAV while in this condition, are entitled to the full benefit of all the considerations which affect the responsibility of the agent, needs no argument after Avhat has been already said on the subject of unsoundness of mind. The case, however, admits of more difficulty when the question is, whether, in the interval between the attacks, a state of mind does or does not exist cal- culated to destroy or diminish responsibility.(z) § 144. It will be peculiarly necessary here, to make a division be- tween the several classes of epileptic diseases. The infirmity is well known to appear in very different degrees of intensity, under different circumstances, and as it arises from different physical causes, it may be considered as exerting different retroactive influences on the mind and the body. It may affect the intellectual faculties in a very subordinate degree, as the cases of men like Caesar, Napoleon and Mohammed suf- ficiently prove. The doctrine therefore results, that in general epi- lepsy, the usual presumption of responsibility applies to acts committed in the intervals between one attack and another. In epilepsy, according to Briand, moral liberty is entirely suspended during the attacks. An epilectic who commits a homicide during the height of his disease, has had no criminal intention, and therefore cannot incur responsibility. It is also unjust to throw upon persons, thus affected, all the responsi- bility of actions which they may commit immediately before or after an attack, for authors are agreed in thinking, that whether these attacks occur frequently or rarely, the mind never fully recovers all its power. § 145. In particular cases the responsibility of the agent may be de- stroyed, where real symptoms of derangement present themselves, and where it is possible or probable that the offence was brought on by such abnormal state of the faculties. The higher grades of the disease, where it is of long standing, and where the attacks recur at brief in- tervals, cast a doubt upon the psychical requirements of responsibility, even where nothing is observed which expressly characterizes an aber- ration of the mental faculties. The stage which immediately precedes an attack, the premonitory symptoms of heaviness in the head, dizzi- ness, loss, of consciousness, &c, as well as that which immediately suc- ceeds an attack, and consists in a manifest disorder of the bodily and mental functions of the subject, is to be treated as connected with the immediate attack.(a) § 146. The moral requirements of responsibility are satisfied when the disease is not of great intensity, and where the intervals show no trace of an alteration of the intellectual functions produced by it, and the incitement to the act complained of is found not in the obtuse- ness or ebullition generally peculiar to such patients, but in a selfish motive, and where the execution of the act betrays forethought, reflec- tion, and wilfulness. § 147. Persons truly epileptic are easily excited to anger and revenge on the slightest provocation, in the intervals between their attacks. Although these attacks do not always attain to such a degree as to de- serve the name of mental derangement, yet it should never be forgotten (z) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. § 565. (a) Ibid. § 567. 118 RELATIONS OF EPILEPSY TO INSANITY. that there is always a morbid predisposition to insane ebullitions, and in general a morbid irritability, which must impair, if not destroy, the moral responsibility of actions growing out of them. And even Avhere a sentence of punishment is pronounced, it must not be overlooked that its execution may possibly exercise a most deleterious influence on the health of the individual, by aggravating the disease, and perhaps in forcing it into real insanity. It is not advisable, therefore, to exe- cute a sentence of punishment upon an epileptic, without having submit- ted the case to the examination of a duly authorized forensic phy- sician.^) § 148. Different views, however, have existed on this point. Plat- ner(c) denies the responsibility of any epileptic Avhatever. Clarus(d) takes a ATiew more in harmony with those we have just advanced, main- taining the following propositions: 1. All actions and omissions which take place during the paroxysm of epilepsy, are neither valid nor the subjects of responsibility. 2. When the attack of habitual epilepsy is succeeded by, or alter- nates with, a state of mania or imbecility, all responsibility is at an end, even where this latter state is but transitory, because no human insight or experience can decide with certainty, whether the patient, at that particular instant, was in an entirely sane condition. On the other hand, there are no reasons against the validity of civil acts done under such circumstances. 3. Swooning, heaviness of the head, weakness of memory, restless- ness, enhanced irritability, &c, which precede or follow the attack, destroy as well the responsibility as the validity of acts committed during their continuance. 4. Where it is capable of proof, that the epileptics, in the intervals of their attacks, betray symptoms of malice and obtuseness, justice de- mands that their faults should be regarded as effects of the disease and that they should be held irresponsible for acts committed in an ebullition of rage or other passion, while such condition should operate in mitigation where the crime presupposes forecast and reflection. 5. Where the signs of an altered state of mind are wanting both be- fore and after the attacks, the possibility still remains that these signs continue undetected because of their minuteness, and that patients of this description are less able to resist sudden impulses than persons in good health; which would suggest a mitigation of punishment for actions of violent passion, but not for those involving reflection. 6. All these propositions only apply to idiopathic and habitual epi- lepsy ; not to isolated attacks, which ensue upon other diseases, and where no trace remains, after their cessation. 7. The diseases connected Avith epileptic symptoms, particularly hys- terical spasms, accompanied with insensibility, and diseases of the generic character of St Vitus's Dance, are subject to the rules above laid down, under the restrictions mentioned in the last head, because the (6) Schiirmayer, Gericht. Men. \ 568. (c) Quaest. Med. For. P. VI. (d) Beitragj zur Erkenntniss and Beurtheilung zweifelhaften Seelenzustaende Leipsic 1828. P. 96. ' ' MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS AS CONNECTED WITH SLEEP. 119 presumption of a latent propensity to ebullitions of passion is not, in such cases, vouched by experience.(e) V. Mental UNSOUNDNESS AS CONNECTED WITH SLEEP.(/) § 149. Under this general head may be grouped Somnolentia, or sleep drunkenness, (Schlaftrunkenheit,) Somnambulism, and night- mare, the two last of Avhich may be joined.^) In the forensic treat- ment of such maladies each case must depend upon its own circum- stances, when it will also be important for the judge to consider whether the person subject to such a disorder was properly aware of it, and of its possible consequences, and able to take the precautions by which those consequences might hafe been averted. § 150. Sleep would seem to be only a peculiar form of cerebral life, and not a negation of the life of the brain, producing consequent fatigue, exhaustion, or weakness ; it is not to be supposed that the state of sleep issues out of the intellect itself, but the intellect is diverted by the peculiar change of the action of the brain into that state of existence which we call sleep. But the intellect does not sleep ; nor can it ever be said that its activity diminishes during sleep; we merely cease to perceive its activity. But that the activity which involves sleep may also be morbid—abnormal—and connected with cramps or convulsive symptoms, is not to be doubted. The centripetal action of the senses is extinct during sleep, in dreams it is half active, and produces isolated, dim, and hazy sensations, forming the usual substratum of dreams. Sleep is interrupted by whatever terminates the peculiar condition of the brain upon which sleep depends; by the natural expiration of the state of the brain, by vivid and sudden impressions on the senses, and by disagreeable sensations. Now, in a certain morbid condition of the brain this awaking is not complete, and does not restore the waking state with a full and correct perception of surrounding things—but an intermediate state between sleeping and waking is produced, which re- sembles intoxication, and is called the intoxication of sleep, (schlaftrun- kenheit.) This state admits of action, which is directed by the phantoms of the dream; talking in sleep being very nearly allied to waking, and dreams themselves being midway between sleeping and waking, for in the depths of sleep we no longer become con- scious of dreams.(A) The nightmare is grounded upon a morbid (e) Compare, on the responsibility of epileptics, Friedreich, " Handbuch der gerichtlichen Psychologic" p. 637, and Henke, " Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der gerichtlichen Medain." Vol. IV. p. 1. (/•) See Me"d. Leg. M. Orfila. Tome I. p. 456. Paris, 1848; Med. Leg. M. Briand, p. 563. Paris, 1852 ; Renaudin sur L'Alienation Mentale, Chap. 6th, p. 255. Paris, 1854 ; Lecon's Cliniques de M. Falret. Lecon 4th, p. 117. Paris, 1854. (g) Siebold—Lehrbuch der Gericht. Med. Berlin, 1847, \ 196; L. Krahmer, Hand- buch der Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851, \ 115. (A) The following extract from the Medecine Legale, &c. J. Briand, is very pertinent to this point: "De me me que, lorsque nous nous endormons, nous conservons encore plus ou moins longtemps l'idee des objets dont nous venons de nous occuper, et que notre imagina- tion nous les retrace souvent dons nos reves ; de menie aussi, lorsque des idees plus ou moins bizarres, plus ou moins extravagantes, se sont emparees de notre esprit pendant le sommeil, elles ne nous quittent pas tout d'un coup, quand nous nous reVeillons. Pour peu que le re veil soit brusque, les premiers objets qui frappent nos sens sont mo- 120 SOMNOLENTIA, OR SLEEP-DRUNKENNESS. aggravation of abnormal sensations in sleep as colored by dreams; under certain external circumstances, and certain forms of transi- tion into the state of semi-consciousness, it may lead to acts of violence. In examining such cases it is important to inquire into the existence of abnormal physical conditions, such as plethora, predispo- sition to congestions in the head or breast, actual congestions, diseases of the heart, abnormal plethora, suppressed haemorrhoids, eruptions of the skin, or other habitual secretions which have been driven in, nervous affections of various kinds, impure air in the bed-room, a hearty meal, or indulgence in ardent spirits immediately or shortly before going to sleep. Somnambulism is not a mere intensified dream, but inforo medico, must be treated as a morbid independent state, and in a legal point of view, every act shown to have been committed under its influence is to be disconnected with voluntary moral agency, (i) 1st. Somnolentia, or Sleep-drunkenness. § 151. Sleep-drunkenness may be defined to be the lapping over of a profound sleep on the domains of apparent wakefulness, producing an involuntary intoxication on the part of the patient, which destroys at the time his moral agency. Under the name of Somnolentia, which was given to it by Ploucquet and the consequent French writers, and of Schlaftrunkenheit, which it was styled by the German School, it became the subject of general discussion at the beginning of the pre- sent century. The first case in which the symptoms were unmistak- ably observable, was that of Buchner. (j) A sentry, who had fallen asleep during his watch, being suddenly aroused by the officer in com- mand, fell upon the latter with his drawn sword, with an attack so furious that the most serious consequences were only averted by the interposition of bystanders. The result of the medical examination was, that the act Avas involuntary and irresponsible, being the result of a violent confusion of mind consequent upon the sudden involuntary waking from a profound sleep. § 152. Shortly afterwards, occurred the case of a day-laborer, who killed his wife with a waggon-tire, the blow being struck immediately upon his starting up from a deep sleep, from which he was forcibly awakened. In this case, there was evidence aliunde that the defendant was seized when waking with a delusion that a " woman in white" had snatched his wife from his side and was carrying her away, and that his agony of mind Avas so great that his whole body was wet with per- spiration. There was no doubt of the defendant's irresponsibility, (k) In this country, the case properly would fall under the head of excusable homicide by misadventure. (I) In point of result, these difiespor ces idees antec£dentes, comme a la faible lumire'eede la nuit les objets qu nous voyons sont alteres par les fantomes de notre imagination. Nous sommes deja en 6tat d'executer des mouvements avec une certaine precision que nos sens ne sont pas encore completement eveill6s: et "souvent ces mouvements se rapportent non pas a notre etat r£el, mais a celui dans lequel nous croyons etre, en melant aux ide"es qui nous ont occupes les sensations obscures des objets qui nous environnent reellement " Med. Leg. p. 563. Paris, 1852. (t) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. § 561. (/) See Henke's Zeitschr. 10 B. p. 39. (k) Wildberg's Jahrbuch, 2 Bd. p. 32. (l) See Wharton on Horn. 210. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONNECTED WITH SLEEP. 121 cases vary little from an early English case, in which, though there was no psychological question opened, there were the same delusions as to danger heightened by the same disturbance of mind as is produced by a sudden waking up from a deep sleep. The defendant, being in bed and asleep in his house, his maid-servant, who had hired the deceased to help her to do her work, as she was going to let her out about mid- night, thought she heard thieves breaking open the door, upon which she ran up stairs to the defendant, her master, and informed him thereof. Suddenly aroused, he sprang from his bed, and running down stairs with his sword drawn, the deceased hid herself in the butlery, lest she should be discovered. The defendant's wife, observing some person there, and not knowing her, but conceiving she was a thief, cried out, "Here are they who would undo us;" and the defendant, in the paroxysm of the moment, dashing into the butlery, thrust his sword at the deceased and killed her.(m) The defendant was acquitted under the express instructions of the court, and the case has stood the test of the common law courts for over two hundred years, during which it has never been questioned. It is important to observe, how- ever, that if it differs from the two cases already noticed under this head, in the increased naturalness of the delusion under which the defendant was laboring, it differs from them in the comparatively longer interval in which his perceptive faculties had the opportunity to arrange themselves. Let it be supposed that it was the wife, and not the husband, who had slain the deceased. Under the circumstances, the result would hardly have been different, and yet in this case the distinction between her responsibility and that of the laborer who killed his wife on the waking spasm, is simply in the degree of proba- bility of delusions, which in both cases were unfounded. If in the one case, this improbability was more glaring, let it be recollected that there Avas much less time afforded to the patient to compose himself to a reasoning state of mind. § 153. Much more recently, a case has occurred which has led to the whole question being re-examined and discussed. A young man, named A. F., about twenty years of age, was living with his parents in great apparent harmony, his father and himself being alike distin- guished for their extravagant devotion to hunting. In consequence of the danger of nocturnal attacks, they were in the habit of taking their arms Avith them into their chamber. On the afternoon of September 1st, 1839, the father and son having just returned from hunting, their danger became the subject of particular conversation. The next day the hunting was repeated, and on their return, after taking supper Avith the usual appearance of harmony, the family retired at about ten o'clock, the father and mother occupying one apartment, and the son the next, both father and son taking their loaded arms with them to bed. At one o'clock, the father got up to go into the entry, and on his return, jarred against the door opening into the entry, upon which the son instantly sprang up and discharging his gun at the father, gave the latter a fatal wound in the breast, crying at the same time, " Dog, what do you want here ? " The father fell immediately to the ground, (m) Levet's case, Cro. Car. 438; 1 Hale, 42, 474. 122 SOMNOLENTIA, OR SLEEP-DRUNKENNESS. and the son, then first recognizing him, sank on the floor crying, " 0 ! Jesus, it is my father." The evidence was, that the Avhole family Avere subject to great restlessness in their sleep, and that the defendant in particular Avas affected by a tendency to be easily distressed by dreams, Avhich lasted for about five minutes on Avaking, before their effect was entirely dissipated. His own version of the affair Avas, "I must have fired the gun in my sleep; it was moonshine, and we Avere accustomed to talk and Avalk in our sleep. I recollect hearing something jar; I jumped up, seized my gun and shot Avhere I heard the noise. I recollect seeing nothing, nor am I conscious of having spoken. The night was so bright that everything could have been seen. I must have been under the delusion that thieves had broken in." The concurrent opinions of the medical experts examined on the trial Avere, that the act was committed in a state of Somnolentia or Sleep-drunkenness, and that it was not that of a free and responsible agent, (n) It is important to distinguish Somnolentia, or Sleep-drunkenness, which is a state which to a greater or less extent is incidental to every individual, from Somnambulism, which is an abnormal condition incident to a very few. The experience of every-day life demonstrates how much the former enters into almost every relation. Children, parti- cularly, sometimes struggle convulsively in the effort to wake up, which often is continued for several minutes. The very exclamations, " Wake up,"—" Come to,"—which are so common in addressing persons in the waking condition, are scarcely necessary to bring to the mind many recollections of cases where the waking struggle has been pecu- liarly protracted. Of course there are constitutions Avhere this struggle is peculiarly distressing, just as there are constitutions in Avhich the tendency to sleeplessness is equally marked. Dr. Kriigelstein tells us of a merchant of distinction who had an irrepressible tendency to sleep in the afternoons, and yet who, whenever he was Avakened up, Avas for a few moments overcome with a paroxysm, over which he had no control. Dr. Meister himself, (o) relates the following phenomenon:—" I was obliged to take a journey of eight miles on a very hot summer's day, my seat being with my back to the horses, and the sun directly in my face. On reaching the place of destination, and being very weary and with a slight headache, I laid myself down, with my clothes on, on a couch. I fell at once asleep, my head'having slipped under the back of the settee. My sleep was deep, and, as far as I can recollect, Avith- out dreams. When it became dark, the lady of the house came with a light into the room. I suddenly awoke, but for the first time in my life, without collecting myself. I was seized with a sudden agony of mind, and picturing the object which was entering the house as a spectre, I sprang up and seized a stool, which, in my terror, I would have thrown at the supposed shade. Fortunately, I was recalled to consciousness by the firmness and tact of the lady herself, who, Avith the greatest presence of mind, succeeded in composing my attention until I was entirely awakened." (n) Henke's Zeitschrift, 1853, Vol. LXV. p. 190-1; and see also a case of much greater doubt in Klein's Annalen der Gesetzgebung, &c. viii. B. Berlin, 1798 • and Mbllers gerichtliche Arzneiwissen-schaft, Vol. I. 302. (o) Henke's Zeitschrift, Vol. LXV. 456. MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS CONNECTED AVITH SLEEP. 123 § 154. The existence of this intermediate state between sleeping and waking, and of the "drunkenness" by which it is sometimes accom- panied, is recognized by even the older elementary writers. Thus Wendler(p) says: " Discerni autem possit expergefactio naturalis a prgeternaturali. Etenim somno sensim reficitur sensibilitas animi, quae, cum in eum evehitur gradum, ut solemnibus pistoque non fortioribus excitamentis ad cogitandum excitetur, naturalis expergefactio est; contra ubi facultate ilia parum aucta, insolita incitamentorum vis ani- mum cogit ad statum vigiliae, prseternaturalem hanc dicimus exper- gefactionem." § 155. The following tests it is important to apply in order to determine the question of responsibility :— (a.) A general tendency to deep and heavy sleep must be shown, out of Avhich the patient could only be awakened by violent and convulsive effort. (b.) Before falling asleep, circumstances must be shown producing disquiet which sleep itself does not entirely compose. (j na- ture or accident to relieve anguish of mind, patients often inflict them upon themselves. Walking barefooted over ground covered with frost and snow was resorted to by a clergyman of great worth in England for this purpose. Carden, an eminent physician of the 15th century, made it a practice to bite his lips and one of his arms, in order to ease the distress of his mind. Kempfer tells us that prisoners in Japan, who often became partially deranged from distress, used to divert their men- tal anguish by burning their bodies with moxa; the same degree of pain, and for the same purpose, is often inflicted upon the body, by cutting and mangling it in parts not intimately connected with life. But bodily pain, whether from an accidental disease, or inflicted by patients upon themselves, is sometimes insufficient to predominate over the distress of their minds. Dr. Herberden mentions an instance of a man Avho was naturally so afraid of pain, that he dreaded even being bled, Avho in a fit of Ioav spirits cut off his penis and scrotum with a razor, and declared after he recovered the natural and healthy state of his mind, that he felt not the least pain from that severe operation. A similar instance of insensibility to bodily pain is related by Dr. Ruggieri, an Italian physician, of a hypochondriac madman, of the name of Louvel, who fixed himself on a cross and inflicted the same wounds upon himself, as far as he was able, that had been inflicted upon our Saviour. He was disco- vered in this situation and taken doAvn alive. During the paroxysms of his madness he felt no pain from dressing his wounds, but complained as soon as they were touched, in the intervals of his disease.(p) Dr. Haindorft, in his German translation of Dr. Reid's " Essay on Hypochondriasis," in alluding to the possibility of a patient laboring under hypochondriasis being able, by an exercise of the power of voli- tion, to control his morbid sensations, justly observes, " We should have feAver disorders of the mind if we could acquire more power of volition, and endeavored by our own energy to disperse the clouds which occa- sionally arise within our own horizon: if we resolutely tore the first threads of the net which gloom and ill-humor may cast around us, and made an effort to drive away the melancholy images of a morbid imagi- nation by incessant occupation. How beneficial Avould it be to mankind if this truth Avere universally acknowledged and acted upon, viz : that our state of health, mental as well as bodily, principally depends upon ourselves!" " By seeming gay we grow to what we seem." It was the remark of a man of great observation and knowdedge of the Avorld, " Only wear a mask for a fortnight, and you will not know it from your real face."(^) (p\ Rush on the Mind, pp. 90, 91, 92. (q) AVinslow's Anatomy of Suicide, pp. 169, 170. 138 HYSTERIA. § 168. A late French writer mentions the case of a rich peasant who was possessed with the idea that he was bewitched, and who complained to his medical attendant that seven devils had taken up their abode in his body. " Seven, not more?" Avas the physician's inquiry. "Only seven," was the reply. The physician promised him to rid him of the visitors*, one each day, upon condition that for the first six he was paid twenty francs, but for the seventh, Avho was the chief of the band, forty. The patient agreed, and was subjected by the physician, Avho set apart the fee for charity, to a series of daily shocks from the Leyden jars, the seventh and last of which was so powerful as to produce a fainting fit in the supposed demoniac, who, however, awoke from it entirely freed from his delusion, (r) Burns suffered much from indigestion, producing hypochondria. Writing to his friend, Mr. Cunningham, he says: " Can'st thou not minister to a mind diseased ? Can'st thou speak peace and rest to a soul tossed on a sea of troubles, without one friendly star to guide her course, and dreading that the next surge may overwhelm her ? Can'st thou give to a frame, tremblingly alive to the tortures of suspense, the stability and hardihood of a rock that braves the blast ? If thou can'st not do the least of these, why would'st thou disturb me in my miseries with thy inquiries after me ?" From early life, the poet was subject to a disordered stomach, a disposition to headache, and an irregular action of the heart. He describes, in one of his letters, the horrors of his complaint:—" I have been for some time pining under secret wretchedness. The pang of disappointment, the sting of pride, and some wandering stabs of remorse, settle on my life like vultures, when my attention is not called away by the claims of society, or the vagaries of the muse. Even in the hour of social mirth, my gaiety is the mad- ness of an intoxicated criminal under the hands of an executioner. My constitution was blasted, ab origine, with a deep incurable taint of melancholy that poisoned my existence." (s) 3. Hysteria, (t) § 169. Hysteria, which only attacks individuals of the female sex, or males having a feminine organization, resembles hypochondria in its mental and moral symptoms; but the nauseous and painful feelings manifest themselves in convulsions, and the alternation between the different states of feeling is far more abrupt, (u) SDemonomanie, singuliere guerison. Annales med. psychol. 1847. Winslow's Anatomy of Suicide, p. 147-48. (t) Siebold, Lehrbuch der Gericht. Med. Berlin, 1847, § 208; Krahmer Handbuch der Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851. \ 110. (u) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med., \ 543; Krahmer. Handbuch der Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851. \ 109. Burton, in his Anatomy of Melancholy, has described this state: " They are soon tired with all things; they will now tarry, now begone; now in bed they will rise, now up, then they go to bed; now pleased, and then again displeased; now they like, by-and- by they dislike all, weary of all. ' Sequitur nunc vivendi, nunc moriendi, cupido,' saith Aurelianus. Discontented, disquieted upon every light occasion or no occasion, often tempted to make away with themselves; they cannot die, they will not live; they com- plain, weep, lament, and think they live a most miserable life; never was any man so bad. Every poor man they see is most fortunate in respect of them. Every beggar that MELANCHOLY. 139 4. Melancholy.(v) § 170. The state of depression undergoes a change, in consequence of Avhich the complaints of bodily indisposition diminish, and the patient comes to regard his former sufferings as delusions, and his present con- dition as a healthy one. When such a person is found to have com- comes to the door is happier than they are. Jealousy and suspicion are common symp- toms of this misanthropic variety. They are testy, pettish, peevish, distrustful, apt to mistake, and ready to snarl, upon every occasion and without any cause, with their dearest friends. If they speak in jest, the hypochondriac takes it in good earnest; if the smallest ceremony be accidentally omitted, he is wounded to the quick. Every tale, discourse, whisper, or gesture, he applies to himself; or if the conversation be openly addressed to him, he is ready to misconstrue every word, and cannot endure that any man should look steadfastly at him, laugh, point the finger, cough, or sneeze. Every question or movement works upon him and is misrepresented, and makes him alter- nately turn pale or red, and even sweat with distrust, fear, or anger." And thus says Charles Lamb : " By myself walking, To myself talking; When, as I ruminate On my untoward fate, Scarcely seem I Alone sufficiently: Black thoughts continually Crossing my privacy; They come unbidden; Like foes at a wedding, Thrusting their faces In better guests' places; Peevish and malcontent, Clownish, impertinent, Dashing the merriment. So, like the fashions, Dim cognitions Follow and haunt me, Striving to daunt me; In my heart festering, In my ears whispering, 'Thy friends are treacherous, Thy foes are dangerous, Thy dreams are ominous.' Fierce Anthropophagi, Spectra Diaboli, AVhat scared St. Anthony; Hobgoblins, Lemures, Dreams of Antipodes, Night-riding incubi, Troubling the fantasy, All dire illusions Causing confusions; Figments heretical, Scruples fantastical, Doubts diabolical. Abaddon vexeth me, Mahro perplexes me, Lucifer teareth me, Jesu! Maria! liberate nos ab his dires tentationibus inimici."—Miscellaneous Poems, p. 6. " Ed. Moxon: 1841. 31 ind and Matter. By J. G. Millingen, M.D., M.A. pp.76, 77, 78. (y) Siebold. Lehrbuch der Gericht. Med. Berlin, 1847. § 208. Dr. Cheyne, rather jocularly than otherwise, applied the term, " The English Malady," to that species of melancholy which is most affected by the weather and by other depressing circum- stances. This term has been seized upon by Siebold, Gericht. Med. \ 212, Melancholia Anglica, sive Autochira. Fr. B. Osiander, in his interesting volume on Suicide, dis- cusses the same topic. Hannov. 1813. 8. \ 207. 140 DERANGEMENT OF THE TEMPERAMENT. mitted an act forbidden by the penal code, it may be assumed, Avithout hesitation, that his liberty of action is gone. In the higher degrees of melancholy, the various gloomy and morbid feelings are accompanied by distinct imaginings, Avhich take their character from the sort of agitation in which the disease commenced, the general opinions and character of the individual, the pursuits which last occupied him, and the dread and bitter experience Avhich has produced them.(w) For all these feelings the patients seek explanations, and find them either in themselves (melancholia concentrica), or in surrounding things and cir- cumstances (melancholia peripherica). In the former case they take themselves severely to task for small or inconsiderable errors, or declare, with an air of so much conviction, calmness, and firmness, as sometimes to mislead the judge himself, that they have committed great crimes, as murder, &c, and have incurred, by their own inexpiable fault, the displeasure of God and of the world, and eternal damnation. In melancholia religiosa they ask to be tried and punished; they com- plain of the loss of Avhat is most dear to them, apprehend poverty for themselves and their families in the future, or even imagine themselves possessed by demons. In mel daemonia, they accuse other persons of malevolence and persecution, to which they ascribe their ailments. It is characteristic of the general phase that the patient never sees sur- rounding things as they are, but always in a light corresponding to his gloomy frame of mind; frequently, also, this false coloring turns into a real illusion of the senses, particularly in the peripheric form of the disease, which is the reason that it so frequently ends in lunacy. The external conduct of the patients, the manner in which they execute the dictates of their wills, is very various. In melancholia attonita they sit motionless and speechless; in other cases, they can hardly find words enough to depict their distraction; sometimes they are perpetually in motion—melancholia activa et errabunda. In peripheric melancholy they scold and swear about their grievances, become noisy and excited, and resort to violent means of resistance or revenge. In this manner, melancholy often becomes the occasion of murderous assaults, and sometimes murders of the most cruel kind, as Avell as of suicide.(a;) § 171. In a mature case falling under this head, the motives are often not even present to the consciousness, and the act is committed in a state of intoxication, blind frenzy, fury, and confusion, preceded some- times by the almost imperceptible symptoms of silent depression, sometimes by the traces broad and deep of havoc in the affective facul- ties, and accompanied often by a sudden loss of self-control, visible paroxysms of terror, and a fancied pursuit by fiends, (y) The transi- tion from melancholy to mania is open to the simple explanation, that depression is the first stage of psychical disease in general, and contains within itself the germs of all other phases, (z) § 172. In other cases there is also an absence of conscious motives, but in their place an uncontrollable restlessness, an indistinct but over- (w) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. \ 544 ; compare Ellinger, p. 108 ; Lecons Cliniques sur l'alienation Mentale; Falret, lecon 7th, p. 185. Paris: 1854. Etudes Medico Psycho- logiques sur l'alienation Mentale. L. F. E. Renaudin, chap. iv. p. 178. Paris: 1854. (x) The above summary is taken from Schurmayer. Gericht. Med. \ 544. (j/) Ellinger, p. 112. (z) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. \ 545. MELANCHOLY. 141 awing feeling of dread, and an incessant morbid approach of those abnormal moral propensities Avhich will be considered under the next head. Ellinger correctly observes (a) that, " impulses of this kind often excite the most desperate struggles in the mind; evoke the most various external means to overcome them; place the murderous instrument into the hands of the individual, from which reason wrests it again; drive him into solitude and far from the subject of the mad desire, and induce him to give warning to the threatened victim; to meditate and to at- tempt suicide; and Avhen at last the fatal deed is nevertheless accom- plished, there is a calmness and a clearness in the manner in which he anticipates the impending punishment, which to an unpracticed observer must exclude every idea of an underlying mental derangement. Such subjects either betray the ordinary symptoms of depression, or only those incident to the specific propensity, which throws the conciousness into a state of distraction, and fills the mind with fear and dread. In either case, the impulse, whether preceded or not by a brief relaxation, comes suddenly, in which case it will be found in connection with dis- turbances of the bodily functions, among which may be enumerated cessation of the natural period or of other natural or ordinary evacua- tions, rush of blood to the head, exhaustion by loss of blood, protracted nursing, excesses, epilepsy, approach of severe attacks of sickness. The immediate occasion of the act may be the view of a naked figure, the sight of an execution, of blood, of a murderous instrument or other means of committing crimes, or the recital of such an occurrence; the ultimate cause is found, according to Ideler, in the associations of feelings and desires according to their contrast, and the struggle and contradic- tion thus arising." § 173. In still another order of cases, as Ave are told by Schurmayer, the consciousness is not only in full possession of the motives, but the act is conceived on the ground of a chain of reasoning and executed with a degree of arrangement and circumspection apparently insepar- able from a clear state of the understanding. Here, as will be seen more fully hereafter, the motives are sometimes hallucinations, particu- larly of the ear, (voices heard) which give commands to the madman, sometimes a wish to die without the courage to commit suicide directly, but Avith the design of incurring capital punishment by the murder of others, (persons the subjects of an old grudge, or such as are entirely innocent, as children ;) sometimes the notion that the destruction of the world is at hand, or that a terrible misfortune impends, against which it was necessary to protect the object of particular affection, which is best effected by death. In the latter case, as will presently be more fully seen, (b) suicide, or self-inculpation, is common, and sometimes a vindictive feeling against the supposed authors of the person's suffering, which the mind often debates with itself for a length of time, until all doubt is removed by some neAV hallucination, (c) Attacks of hysteria, although in appearance bearing considerable analogy to those of epilepsy, rarely produce a state of complete insen- (a) Ellinger, p. 114. (b) Post g 206-208, 247-253. (c) Schurmayer, \ 547; Ellinger, p. 116; Siebold, Lehrbuch der Gericht. Med. Berlin, 1847, I 208; Krahmer Handbuch der Gericht. Med. Halle. C. A. Schwetschke, 1851. §110. 142 DERANGEMENT OF THE MORAL SYSTEM. sibility, and although they may last longer, they never leave behind them that bewilderment of mind. HoAvever frequently they may occur, they hardly ever produce mania or dementia, and therefore they rarely exclude responsibility, (d) VI. Mental unsoundness, as affecting the moral system. 1st. General Moral Mania. § 174. As depression is based upon an unduly subdued state of the feeling of self and a want of self-confidence, so the fundamental trait of mania, considered in its present relation, is an exaggeration of the feeling of self and of self-confidence, (e) Unsoundness of mind rarely takes this form at first; it is usually developed from depression, the mistaken idea usually reversing its purport, while the impulses of expression in some manner overstep their normal limits, compelling the will to act in a corresponding manner. Here the madman either makes constant motions with his head or his arms, or runs about until he is completely exhausted, which might be called the madness of motion ;(f) or he vents his humor in gestures and declamations, or the motive impulse is con- fined to the tongue, and becomes morbid garrulity or madness of the tongue. This talkativeness is not the effect of a superabundance of ideas, but all the thoughts are uttered hastily as they occur, without being shaped or sifted, giving rise to contradiction, incoherence, and the semblance of a wandering imagination. If in the end the malady is imparted not only to the will but also to the sentiments, the unde- fined impulse of action and expression receives the form and color of chagrin and anger, which the sufferer supposes to be well founded and directed to real objects, and the disease becomes frenzy or fury, which may take some specific form, as that of general destructiveness, or of a thirst for blood. This also includes many unnatural cravings, such as a desire to bite, or to do something extravagant; a sort of mental or moral vertigo, which develops itself sometimes, though more rarely in the propensity to steal. In cases of this class it is impossible for the patient to resist the morbid impulse. He has lost his self-possession, that is, the power of contrasting the necessary consequences of the action with his present position and its requirements, and the calcula- tions of prudence, as well as the impulses of conscience, are alike un- heeded. The morbid sentiment thus controls his entire perceptive fac- ulty, admitting of no other perception in connection with the subject, and cutting off all reflection, all doubt of the fitness of the action and its relation to the laws of the land.(^) § 175. In the lower stages of mania there is generally so much ex- ternal self-control, and such a connection and logical consistency in the ideas, that the process of mental evolution becoming more compact and rapid, produces a vivacity of combination, of memory, and imagination, (d) Briand, Med. Leg. p. 569. Paris, 1852. (e) See Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. § 548. (/) Compare Hagen in R. Wagner's Handwcerterbuch der Physiologic Vol. II. p. 819. (g) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. \ 548. GENERAL MORAL INSANITY. 143 that a layman is not easily induced to suspect to arise from a disorder of the reasoning faculties, particularly when external circumstances concur to furnish an explanation of the condition in which the person is found. This may throw difficulties around the medico-legal consid- eration of such a case, and under such circumstances the true view in those penal systems Avhere the correct principle is observed of graduat- ing the punishment of the insane to the degree of their freedom of agency and consequent responsibility, is to declare moral responsibility in its common-law sense to have ceased. It happens that the offences committed during and in consequence of mental aberrations of this de- scription, are either petty misdemeanors, or of a nature to call for the interference of the police only, or resolve themselves into mere civil questions, or into objections to the competency of witnesses. The higher grades of mania involve far more serious considerations of re- sponsibility for any action, which will presently be fully considered.(A) § 176. " In this form of insanity," says Dr. Ray, "the derangement is confined to one or a few of the affective faculties, the rest of the moral and intellectual constitution preserving its ordinary integrity. An exaltation of the vital force in any part of the cerebral organism, must necessarily be followed by increased activity and energy in the manifestations of the faculty connected with it, and which may even be carried to such a pitch as to be beyond the control of any other power, like the working of a blind instinctive impulse. Accordingly, we see the faculty thus affected, prompting the individual to action by a kind of instinctive irresistibility, and while he retains the most per- fect consciousness, of the impropriety and even enormity of his conduct, he deliberately and perseveringly pursues it."(i) The following cases are given us by Bay, in which, this perversion of the moral faculties was accompanied in its latter stages by some delu- sions, furnishing a striking illustration of this form of disease, as Avell as its intimate connection with intellectual mania:— Col. M. was a man of superior intellectual powers, and moved in the higher walks of society. He was a lawyer by profession, and was appointed district-attorney in one of the south-western states by Presi- dent Jackson, whom he had previously served in a military capacity. Towards the meridian of life, his conduct became so disorderly and boisterous, that he was often confined in jails or hospitals for the insane. On one of these occasions he cut off his nose, and subsequently came to Boston in order to have it replaced by Dr. J. Mason Warren, by means of the rhinoplastic operation, which proved quite successful. While in Boston he made the acquaintance of Dr. Bell of the McLean Asylum, for the purpose, as he declared, of getting his aid in obtaining redress for the wrongs he had sustained in being placed under guardian- ship, and confined in jails and hospitals, his object being not to retaliate, but to protect his future reputation. The Dr. has kindly furnished such particulars of his case as came to his knowledge from various sources. " I inferred that he was naturally of a proud, arrogant, and QY) Krahmer. Handbuch der Gericht. Med. Halle. G. A. Schwetschke, 1851. \ 110. Siebold, Lehrbuch der Gericht. Med. Berlin, 1847. \ 208. (j) Ray on Insanity, 189. 144 DERANGEMENT OF THE MORAL SYSTEM. extravagant spirit, Avhich was kept in check, Avhile she lived, by the discretion of his Avife. He was sensual but not intemperate, until his nervous system had become excited. His peculiar theory Avas, that while he admitted that he had held—and, tOAvards the last of my inter- ATiew, avoAved that he then held—certain fanciful notions Avhich Ave might term delusions, if Ave pleased, still ■ they were such as did not interfere with his right to entire liberty of action. ' For instance,' said he, ' I feel that I am cousin to the Duke of Wellington and to Napo- leon. It seems ridiculous. I can't make it out by any kind of proof. I even laugh at it. But still, I dwell upon it as a reality. It con- cerns nobody else. It has in it no dangerous element. Why, then, should I be interfered with for harboring a delusion, if you choose to call it so, no more absurd than a thousand religious sects feel them- selves happy in resting upon.' He would often argue thus: 'I pro- test against being called insane on account of my ideas. For my actions I am accountable. I never yet claimed—I never will claim— immunity as an irresponsible being. I Avill permit no one to set up such a defence for me. Try me by the laws of the land and the strict rules of evidence, and I will abide by the result, as a good citizen ; but I must have opportunity to argue my own cause, and examine the wit- nesses brought before me.' " He had often been arrested for assault and battery, but always continued to beat the complainants, by his familiarity with legal pro- ceedings, and by his quick perception of whatever made for or against himself. If, in his best estate, he had been counsel for another party, he could not have managed the case better than he did his own. How- ever wild, extravagant, and boisterous at hotels and such places, of which he was the terror, as soon as he was in the atmosphere of a court of justice, he bectme calm, dignified, and respectful, but tenacious to the last degree. For example, when carried before the police-judge of New York, on a warrant, the printed form of which had been in use for twenty years, setting forth that in consequence of insanity ' or otherwise,' he was dangerous to be at large, he, at once, advocated suc- cessfully his constitutional right to have the offence set forth specifically and precisely. " He had most carefully considered the extent of his rights^—the precise amount of force justifiable in ejecting an unwelcome guest, or, what Avas a more common event, in resisting an ejectment; the obliga- tion of innholders to receive applicants, and the value of proving the first blow in defence of assaults. On one occasion thinking the hack- men and cab-men of New York were insolent and exacting in regard to the right of way, he armed himself with a heavy whip, took a good witness by his side, and drove through Broadway in a strong carriage, running against every charioteer who failed to give him his exact half of the road. This, of course, produced a collision of tongues as well as wheels. His peculiarly sarcastic language tempted a touch of the whip from some of his opponents, and upon this, our hero turned to and thrashed them within an inch of their lives. They appealed to the courts, but his witness soon and truly proved the aggression on them. " While in the Pennsylvania Hospital for the insane, and again, I MORAL MONOMANIA. 145 believe, while in the jail in Washington, he got discharged by means of a writ of habeas corpus, which he was allowed to sue out. When thus brought before the court, he argued his case upon the settled legal doctrine, that an ability to distinguish right from wrong is the sole test of sanity. Of course, no judge could, or did, hesitate in opinion, that a gentleman who was able to make an elegant and an astute argu- ment on the nature, origin, and protection of the rights of the subject, could, by any means, be within the category of individuals intellectu- ally incapable of discriminating between right and wrong. In fact, processes of detention as a lunatic, held, in his case, only until he could get before some tribunal. And yet when thus turned loose upon society, he was a passionate, dangerous lunatic. When hard pushed by evidence of extravagant and boisterous actions, he would attribute the fact to his having unfortunately taken a little too much wine, (which Avas probably true to some extent,) comprehending perfectly that an offence of that kind would be followed by a much lighter con- sequence—a mere fine, in fact,—than seclusion as a lunatic. When the self-mutilation was alluded to, he would most frankly attribute it to his ignorance of physiological laws, and allege that his lost organ, being covered with blotches and carbuncles, he cut it off, absurdly sup- posing that nature had a renewing power, as in the groAvth of the hair. " After he became so wild in his conduct in Boston as to be a uni- versal annoyance, I advised his friends in Missouri to place him under care as a lunatic. They replied that the thing was impracticable; that no institution had been found able to hold him, and they would not arouse his vindictive feelings by any farther trials of that sort. His intemperate habits increased, and his delusions became more palpable, yet without affecting his intellectual power. The idea returned that parts of his face, if removed, would grow again, and he cut out the cicatrix on his forehead whence the nasal flap had been taken. Fortu- nately death stepped in at this point, and removed a man whose fate was so melancholy; for, under all the ravages of mental disease, there were traces of noble sentiments and lofty aspirations." (j) (2.) Monomania, (k) § 177. The observation that, in many cases of insanity, particular impulses, such as sexual appetite, acquisitiveness, &c, attain a pre- dominance, has led to the adoption of the term monomania,(l) which is occasionally subdivided into heads, which will presently be noticed. This, however, is only admissible in so far as it designates certain fixed objects towards which the ravings of the maniac are directed, and which supply the apparent motives of his actions; it is not to be supposed that a single impulse is diseased, while all the other functions of the mind retain their healthy action. While the entire intellect enjoys sound health, there is nothing in which a morbid desire of theft, murder, &c, could originate, and such a phenomenon is a psychological impossibility, and the assumption of such requires a psychological contradiction. A (/) Ray on Insanity, pp. 181, 2, 3, 4. (k) See 4 Am. Jour, of Ins. 16. (J) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. \ 549. 10 146 MORAL MONOMANIA. mania sine delirio, a mania without a morbid participation or disturb- ance of the perceptive faculties, is therefore out of the question, as a desire to injure or destroy is impossible without an act of the mind by Avhich this purpose is entertained, and as reason and understanding are alike disordered whether they insinuate a wrong motive for the morbidly conceived purpose of the act, or whether they entirely omit the sug- gestion of any reason whatever, (m) § 178. The dispute about the reality and possibility of a mania sine delirio continues, because the facts adduced in support of this form of unsoundness of mind are not denied as effective causes, but are sub- jected to different interpretations of their psychological significance; different conclusions being drawn as to the kind of hyper-physical function producing them. Inasmuch as a direct inspection of the condition of a mental or moral function is impossible, our knowledge of it being confined to the result of inferences from effects to causes, the first requisite, to avoid incorrect deductions, is a severe analysis of the fact from which the inference is to be drawn. This fact consists mainly in the statements and assurances of the persons concerned, that they are conscious of the wrongfulness or unreasonable nature of the act they are committing, but that the impulse to commit it is stronger than their will to resist. Is this really the case ? May there not be a de- lusion in the statements themselves ? As it is not the mental condition obtaining immediately before and after the commission of the offence which is in question, but that which obtains at the moment of the raptus maniacus, we may not be certain that the indiATidual judges cor- rectly, or is even competent to judge correctly, of himself, (n) § 179. The mania sine delirio appears to have been first mentioned by Ellinger, under the name of melancholia sine delirio sive perturbatio mentis, melancholia sine delirio. Pinel subsequently called it manie sans delire, after having made the assertion, based upon facts, "that there are madmen in whom there is no perceptible alteration of the intellectual process, of the perceptions, judging faculty, imagination, or memory, and yet a perversion of the manifestations of the will, in a Iblind impulse to the commission of violence, or even of bloodthirsty rage, without any assignable dominant idea, any delusion of the imagi- nation, which could cause such a propensity." Where there is no will, but only a blind impulse, a perversion of the manifestations of the will is not to be supposed. The results hitherto arrived at in the discussion of this subject, may be compressed into the following three points : § 180. (1.) Shortly before the attack self-consciousness may be present, and connected with the impulse to the commission of violence; and immediately after the attack, self-consciousness may return; but it remains to be proved, that it was also undisturbed during the attack. (m) Schiirmayer, Gericht. Med. \ 549. (n) See, on this head, Principles of Medical Psychology, being the Outlines of a Course of Lectures by Baron Ernst von Feuchtersleben, M. D., Vienna, 1845. Translated from the German by the late H. Evans Lloyd, Esq. Revised and edited by B. G. Ba- bington, M. D., F.R. S., etc. London: Printed for the Sydenham Society, 1847. pp. 224, 374, 292. TESTS BY WHICH IT IS TO BE TRIED. 147 (2.) In the attack, at all events, the power of self-control is to be regarded as suspended. (3.) Many of the cases classed under the head of mania sine delirio are to be eliminated, an d referred to the categories of morbid irasci- bility, of remittent and irregularly returning and transitory mania, of depression and partial insanity, in which the hallucinations impelling to the act are kept secret. § 181. As we have already shown, the present tendency of judicial practice is, when the defence of monomania is set up, to tell the jury that if they believe that the act was committed under an involuntary and uncontrollable insane impulse, the defendant is entitled to an ac- quittal on this particular ground.(o) It is proper, however, that the jury in those States in which there is provision made for the treatment of insane offenders, should make a special finding, so that the statu- tory confinement may be imposed. The importance of a specific form of imprisonment for insane convicts, will be hereafter considered, (p) That of the responsibility of monomaniacs, has been noticed already, (a) § 182. It is proper to notice that the term "Monomania" is used by high authority in a wider sense than that given above. Thus Dr. Tay- lor declares it to be that form of insanity in which the mental aliena- tion is partial. The delusion is said to be confined either to one sub- ject or to one class of subjects. One fact is well ascertained, that mo- nomania varies much in degree; for many persons affected with it are able to direct their minds with reason and propriety to the performance of their social duties, so long as these do not involve any of the subjects of their delusions.(r) "Monomania," we are told by the same high authority, "is very liable to be confounded with eccentricity; but there is a difference between them. In monomania there is obviously a change of character—the individual is different to what he was; in eccentricity such a difference is not remarked; he is and always has been singular in his ideas and actions. An eccentric man may be convinced that what he is doing is absurd and contrary to the general rules of society, but he professes to set these at defiance. A true monomaniac cannot be convinced of his error, and he thinks that his acts are consistent with reason and with the general conduct of mankind. In eccentricity there is the will to do, or not to do; in real monomania the controlling power of will is lost. Eccentric habits suddenly acquired are, how- ever, presumptive of insanity, "(s) Recently, however, the entire theory of moral insanity(t) has lately been combated by very able writers, among whom may be noticed Heinrich,(w) Leubuscher(v) and Mayo.(w) § 183. On the other hand, this theory has, though no longer receiv- ing uniform approbation in the land where it was first recognized, met with an increased support in our own country. It has been expressly re- cognized by two of our most eminent jurists, Chief Justice Gibson and (o) See ante, \ 53. (p) See post, \ 259-276. (?) See ante, \ 53—61. (r) Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence, p. 553. (*) Ibid. if) Pinel's Mania sine delirio. (w) Kritische Abhandlung Uber die von Prichard als Moral Insanity geschilderte Krankeitsform. Allgem. Zeitschr. fur Psychiatrie, V. Bd. 4 Hft. (v) Bernerkungen liber Moral Insanity und ahnliche Krankheitszustande. Casper's Wochenschr. Nr. 59 u. 51. (w) Medical Test, and Ev. in Cases of Lunacy. London, 1854. 148 MORAL MONOMANIA. Chief Justice Lewis, of Pennsylvania, who, at the same time, happen to be among all recent American legal authorities, the two avIio have been most addicted to the study of diseases of the mind.(a:) And Dr. Ray, to whose skill, experience and capacity, too high a standard can scarcely be assigned, says: "In fact it has always been observed, that insanity as often affects the moral as it does the intellectual percep- tions. In many cases there is evinced some moral obliquity quite un- natural to the individual, a loss of his ordinary interests in the relations of father, son, husband, or brother, long before a single word escapes from his lips, " sounding to folly." Through the course of the disease, the moral and intellectual impairments proceed pari passu, while the return of the affections to their natural channels is one of the strongest indications of approaching recovery. Such being the fact, it ought not to be a matter of surprise that in some cases the aberration should be confined to the moral impairment, the intellectual, if there be any, being too slight to be easily discerned, "(y) §184. "The reality and importance of this distinction," says the same author subsequently, " which thus establishes two classes of mania, is now generally acknowledged by practical observers, among whom it is sufficient to mention Esquirol, Georget, Gall, Marc, Rush, Reil, Hoffbauer, Andrew Combe, Conolly, and Prichard, though some of them are inclined to doubt whether the integrity of the understand- ing is as fully preserved in moral mania, as Pinel affirmed. Still, its apparent soundness, and the difficulty, at least, of establishing the ex- istence of any intellectual derangement, while the moral powers are unequivocally and deeply deranged, render it no less important in its legal relations, than if the understanding were unequivocally affected. It is defined by Prichard, who has strongly insisted on the necessity of assigning it a more distinct and conspicuous place, than it has hitherto received, as ' consisting in a morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, tempers, habits, and moral dispositions, without any notable lesion of the intellect or knowing and reasoning faculties, and particularly without any maniacal hallucination.' It will be con- venient, even if not scientifically precise, to consider it under two divis- ions, according as it is general or partial, "(z) (x) See Note, § 53, 54, 55. («/) Ray on Insanity, p. 166. (z) Ray on Insanity, p. 167. Instinctive mania, (manie raisonnante of Pinel,)—we quote generally from Morel—includes homicidal and incendiary monomaniacs, &c. Those thus affected seldom complain of being tormented with hallucinations of the senses, but are subject to indefinable pains which betray themselves exteriorly in headaches, roar- ing in the ears, dazzlings and indescribable sensations. If we sometimes see in them perfect digestive powers or an exaggerated appetite, the opposite phenomena of want of appetite, depraved tastes, &c, are much more frequent symptoms. They feel an in- cessant need of movement, an activity out of all proportion with their physical forces, 'alternating with an insurmountable apathy. If, under certain circumstances, the absence of sleep astonishes us, we, on the contrary, often observe them in a torpid and almost death-like state. Sometimes their sensibility is so exalted that the whole exterior world becomes for them nothing but a source of pain, anguish, and irritability. Sometimes the most unhappy sensations, and the most painful emotions do not seem to affect either their physical or moral nature. When these patients are brought into a court of justice they are unanimous in attri- buting the same motives to their actions. They accuse themselves of irresistible im- pulses, they are ignorant why they so acted, and in this respect are very different from CLASSIFICATION OF. 149 § 185. Monomania, as affecting the moral sense, will be considered under the following heads:— (1) Homicidal mania (morbid propensity to kill). (2) Kleptomania (morbid propensity to steal). (3) Pyromania (morbid incendiary propensity). (4) Aidoiomania (morbid sexual propensity). (5) Pseudonomania (morbid lying propensity). (6) Oikeiomania (morbid state of domestic affections). (7) Suicidal mania (morbid propensity to self-destruction). (8) Fanatico-mania (morbid state of the religious feelings). (9) Politico-mania (morbid state of political feeling). those suffering from hallucinations or systematic madness, who astonish and frighten us by the inexorable logic of their actions, who express only imperfectly shaped regrets, who are indifferent as to the condition of their victims, as much as to their own interests, and who are not able to say but that they will perform the same act again if the oppor- tunity should occur. In scrutinizing the former life of such patients we must remain convinced that the lesions of their intelligence, the disorganization of their instincts and tendencies must be due to deep organic disturbances. Hereditary influences, malforma- tion of the great organ of the intelligence, certain diseases which may have changed the general health, idiopathic affections, arrests of development; troubles at the period of puberty, or in the normal phenomena of gestation, are so many involuntary causes. These causes are the more striking and palpable as the patients cannot always be excused on account of a vicious education. The malady with which they are afflicted has some- times attacked them in the midst of the best social conditions, and when a relatively feebler intelligence and the manifestation of depraved instincts have early been remarked in them ; conditions of system which have not always found their corrective in an appro- priate hygienic treatment and education. And this is why we have called this form of mania, instinctive mania, because we see in it something so essentially connected with the organic conditions, that it is impossible for us to consider such patients as other than what they really are, viz., things deprived of their free-will and reason. There do exist voluntary causes which produce identical consequences as regards the derangement of the tendencies. The subversive and selfish passions, debauchery, lewdness, drunken- ness, and solitary habits, are of this class. This form of mania will be best shown in the following case, of an educated maniacal woman who was irresistibly urged on to attempt the lives of her companions and relations :— The previous mode of living of Marie C, by no means explains the aberration of her sentiments and the disorganization of her feelings. Born of honest parents, who spared nothing for her education, she embraced, early in life, the profession of teacher in a small village. She quitted this position, which was too laborious for her, and entered as domestic into a family, where she was treated rather as one of the household than as a servant. She remained there eight years, as happy as it was possible for one so afflicted to be. " I do not know," she says, " how to explain my mode of life. I never amused myself like the other children of the village; I possessed a ridiculous, fantastical, capricious temper, and I generally preferred seeing evil done than good. I was sometimes extra- vagantly gay but more generally I was sad." Question.—1' Had you any cause for being so ?" Answer.—" None. My parents loved me, if possible, more than my other brothers and sisters ; but I really took pleasure in no- thing- I have been a teacher, but that became very wearisome to me. I have been .....r n ' ■ •■ n----il— -- iU:---however I that they wished to insult me." Q.—" Have you suffered from violent gne cannot truly say that I have suffered more pain than pleasure, it was only when my brother was accidentally drowned that I experienced a great blow; but what is singu- lar, I was not grieved at the idea of having lost him but at the thought of his dying un- confessed." v.(f) He tells us that demoniacs do not use their own dialect or tongue, but that of the demons who have en- tered into them.(w) Lucian declares " the patient is silent: the demon returns the answer to the question asked." And yet at the same time it would seem that the possibility of the cure of the de- moniacs by medicine was recognized, which would scarcely be the case if the malady was regarded as exclusively supernatural. Thus we are told, " Helleboro quoque purgatur lymphaticus error."(v) And Josephus and the Jewish physicians speak of medicines composed of stones, roots, and herbs, being useful to demoniacs.(w) § 212. With regard to the New Testament history, two views have been taken, each of which has the sanction of great authority both for learning and for loyalty to the Christian cause. On the one hand, it is urged that the language of the Gospel writers is express to the A'ery point; on the other, it is maintained that the accounts given by them may all be understood as exhibiting no more than the phenomena of certain diseases, particularly hypochondria, mania, and epilepsy; that the popular terms Avere used to describe these diseases, just in the same way that " Possession," (Besessenheit) is now used by some of the most technical German psychologists to describe the same thing; and that the sacred penmen meant to convey no more than that the patients (0 Plato, Sympos. p. 202, 203. Lipsiae, 1829, p. 252. See also Plutarch, De Defect. Orac. Farmer's Essay on the Demoniacs. (w) Plato, apud Clem. Alex. Strom. I. 405, Oxon. (v) Seren. Sammon, c. 27, v. 507. (w) Gittei, f. 67. QUESTION AS TO EXISTENCE OF. 175 were affected with the complaints which those phrases described, (x) It may not be considered out of place, however, to observe that the excessive theological liberality which, in order to accommodate the sacred text to the supposed requirements of science, resolves state- ments of facts into metaphors and narratives into parables, is in this, as in most other respects, insufficient to reconcile the captious, and is unnecessary for the purpose of relieving the sincere inquirer. Those who have gone such great lengths in thus adopting the statements of our Lord's treatment of the demoniacs to the supposed standard of modern medical experience, would do well to observe how unnecessary their labors appear to one of the most eminent and experienced of modern physicians. " We have heard these, and similar cases," says Dr. Cheyne, " accounted for on the assumption of demonism, but we never have seen a case of disordered mind, even when attended with the most subtle malignity, which could not more easily be explained upon natural principles. We acknowledge the power of Satan, and it may be as great as ever in the dark places of the earth, which have received no benefit from Christianity; but as there are no rules for distinguishing between the workings of the human mind, when influ- enced by bodily disease—when yielding to its unrestrained propensity to evil, and when acted upon by Satan, the extent of Satanic agency cannot be known, nor ought the mode of its operation be assumed upon conjecture. It is one of the devices of man's great enemy, to have his power, nay, his existence, denied by those who are his subjects ; and we can only play his game, and confirm Sadducean principles, when we allege of Satan what we cannot prove. Probably nothing so much weakened the influence of Luther as his account of his conflicts with the devil. The mind of the reformer yielded to delusions prac- ticed upon it by his senses ; and consequently many who are uiiAvilling to admit the power of his judgment and the rectitude of his principles, especially the minions of superstition, and the abettors of infidelity, have persuaded themselves that the master-spirit of his age—with whom the Charleses, the Henrys, and the Francises, were no more to be compared than Ahab was with Elijah—was a dreaming and credulous enthusiast. Those who admit the authority of Scripture are not per- mitted to doubt that when our Lord cured the demoniacs, he actually dispossessed them. It could not have been, as some have alleged, that he merely removed epilepsy or insanity. Without entering into all the particulars of the discussion, any Christian who will read with attention the fourth and eighth chapters of St. Matthew's gospel, must reject the hypothesis of Mode, that the demoniacs mentioned in the gospels labored under natural diseases. In the fourth chapter it is expressly specified that our Lord ' healed all sick people that were (x) The student is referred to a very comprehensive article on this point, by the Rev. J. F. Denham, of St. John's College, Cambridge, in Kitto's Bib. Cyc. tit. Demoniacs, in which the arguments on both sides are very fairly exhibited; to Farmer's Essay on the Demoniacs ; to Jahn's Biblisches Archaologie ; to Winer's Biblisches Real Wdrtenbuch, art "Besessene;" to Moses Stuart's sketches of Angelogy, in Bibliotheca Sacra, 1843; to Bishop Burgess' sermon on Demonology, in the Phil, course of Lectures on Evidences, Phil. 1854 ; to President Appleton's discourse on the same ; and to a very brilliant though eccentric treatise, recently published, under the title of " The Apocatastasis Progress Backwards." Burlington, 1854. 176 FANATICO MANIA. taken with divers diseases and torments,' including epilepsy, Ave may fairly infer, 'and those Avhich were possessed Avith devils,' a separate class, 'and those which Avere lunatic,' or of unsound mind. In the eighth chapter, the same distinction is observable between casting out devils and curing diseases: sixteenth verse, ' and he cast out the spirits with his word, and healed all that Avere sick.' But the relation which decides the question is that of the miracle performed in the country of the Gergesenes. (y) Before we can believe that the two men who came out of the tombs were maniacs or epileptics, it must be proved that disease is not merely a mode of animal life, but something substantive and transferable from one class of beings to another—from man to the lower animals." (z) § 213. Without, therefore, any further attempt to determine the question whether demoniac possession is taught as a fact by history, either sacred or profane, we come to the inquiry as to whether it exists at the present day. And we feel ourselves warranted in saying, without any hesitation, that in a lego-psychological view, Ave have no evidence of any such possession. All modern phenomena can be satis- fied by the recognition of the independent existence of that species of mania Avhich causes an insane belief in the patient that he is pos- sessed with a demon.(a) § 214. (b.) Mental alienation on religious subjects. As is well remarked by Dr. Rush,(b) in Christian countries, depar- tures from the Christian faith, (e. g. infidelity and atheism,) are "fre- quent causes" of insanity, (c) And the same is equally true of (y) Matt. viii. 28. (z) Essays on Derangement in connection with Religion, by John Cheyne, M. D., F. R. S. E., M. R. I. A., Physician General to His Majesty's Forces in Ireland. Dublin, 1843, p. 68, &c. (a) Schiirmayer, Gericht. Med. \ 550. For a case of supposed Demoniacal Possession, see Journal of Psychological Medicine, vol. iii. p. 262; Metzger's verm. Schrift. Bd. 3, s. 217; Ces. Ruggieri's history of the self-crucifixion of M. Lovati at Venice, trans- lated by Schlegel, Rudolst, 1807. (In the latter case, the patient first cut off his own private members, and then crucified himself.) Henke's Zeitsch. E-H., 11 s. 291— (Two Swiss girls, who immolated themselves.) Henke's Zeitschr. Bd. 47, p. 447. Pyl's essay, 6 Samml. p. 214. (Infanticide by a demoniac.) Henke's Zeitschr. 27 Bd. p. 330—(Periodical Demonio-mania.) Demoniacal possession, as Siebold (Gericht. Med. \ 210) very justly remarks, was much more common in former days than the present, and of this, to say nothing of the New Testament period, illustrations may be found in the many cases of witches, seers and soothsayers, of the middle ages.—The Convulsions, &c, of St. Aledard fall under this head. See Hecker on the Dancing Mania, Berl. 1832 ; Published also by the Sydenham Society. See also case, ante, \ 584, note (z). And also a series of very curious and valuable articles on Pythonic and Demoniac Possession in Dublin Univ. Mag. for Sept. and Oct., 1&48, for March and Dec, 1849, and for January, 1850. (b) Rush on the Mind, 64. (c) Air. AVinslow, in his late interesting work on suicide, gives us the following in- stances of this: " It may be mentioned, as a fact corroborating the opinion, that pro- ductions of an infidel character have a tendency to originate a disposition to suicide, by weakening the moral principles ; that when the celebrated and notorious Tom Paine's "Age of Reason" was first published, the papers of the day recorded many cases of self- murder, committed by persons who avowed that the idea never entered their heads until they had become familiar with the above-mentioned writer. An individual zealous in the diffusion of Paine's principles, purchased several hundred copies of his work which he most industriously circulated, gratuitously, in quarters where he knew the doctrines of Christianity had already obtained a footing. A copy of the " Age of Reason " ele- gantly bound, was received by a young lady who was acting in the capacity of gover- RELIGIOUS INSANITY. 177 departures in the direction of ignorant and fanatical superstition. The former position is readily explained. The soul, as well as the body, to enable it to stand steadily, requires that the eye shall be fixed upon some distant and external point. No man, for instance, can succeed in standing on one foot if he fixes his eye on his own person; and he succeeds in maintaining his upright position precisely to the extent he is able to fix his eye firmly on a point in the distance. And in a psychological view this is readily explicable. It is only by the recognition of & future state that the soul can be effectually steadied in this. And it is precisely such a system as the Christian religion de- scribes,—one which affords a positive assurance of immortal peace to those who seize upon it for their portion,—which, while it recognizes that innate depravity, which the heart is but too ready to testify to from its own experience, promises divine aid in the struggle—which announces the pardon of past sin by a vicarious atonement, Avhile it affords to the creature the aid and succour in all his troubles, of a divine friend and yet of a human example. "I envy no qualities of the mind or intellect in others, nor genius, nor power, wit or fancy," says Sir H. Davy: "but if I could choose what would be most delightful, and, I believe, most useful to me, I ness in the family of a gentleman of great respectability. The lady had no conception from whom the present came, and having heard of the book she felt a curiosity to become acquainted with the doctrines which it inculcated. The circumstance of her having re- ceived the book was not mentioned to any member of the family with whom she resided, and in the evening when she retired to her own room, she read it with great attention. The family noticed, in a few weeks, a perceptible alteration in the appearance of the young lady. She became exceedingly thoughtful and contemplative. Her health also appeared sensibly affected. The mother of the children whom she was instructing took advantage of the first opportunity of speaking to her on the subject. She expressed herself very unhappy in her mind, but refused to disclose the cause of her mental un- easiness. It was thought she had formed an attachment, and was suffering from the effects of disappointed affection. She was questioned on these points, but persisted m concealing the circumstances which had been operating so injuriously on her mmd. The mental dejection increased, and the result was an alarming attack of nervous fever, of which she was cured by an able physician with much difficulty. When convalescent she was noticed one day busily employed in writing, and when interrupted showed great anxiety to secrete the piece of paper on which she had been transcribing her thoughts. In the course of the evening of the same day, a deep groan was heard to issue from her room. The servant immediately entered, when, to her great horror, she saw the gover- ness on the floor with a terrible gash in her throat. Assistance Avas directly obtained ; but alas! not in time to save the life of the poor unfortunate girl. On searching her desk a sheet of paper was discovered, on which she had disclosed her reasons for the rash'act. She said, that from the moment she read the " Age of Reason," her mind be- came unsettled. Her previous religious impressions were undermined; in proportion as she was induced to imbibe the doctrines of Tom Paine, so she became miserable and wretched From one error she fell into another, until she actually believed that death was annihilation ; and although she appeared firmly rooted in this belief, she expressed herself horrified beyond all expression at the bare idea of dissolution. For some time nrior to her illness, she had felt an impulse to sacrifice her life, but had not the courage to perform the act. After her recovery, she felt the impulse renewed with increased strength, until, with a hope of escaping from an accumulation of misery which was weighing her to the earth, she determined to commit suicide. She also, in the document referred to, asked her friends to forgive her, and to take warning from her fate -Vin- siow's Anatomy of Suicide, pp. 87-89. It has been asserted and remains uncontradicted Jhat Mr. Hume, lent his « Essay on Suicide," to a friend, who, on returning it told him it was a most exceUent performance, and pleased him better than any thing he had read for a long time. In order to give Hume a practical exhibition of the effect of his de- fence of suicide, his friend shot himself the day after returning him the essay— Win- dow's Anatomy of Suicide, pp. 31, 32. 12 178 PRESERVATIVE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. should prefer a, firm religious belief to every other blessing : for it makes life a discipline of goodness ; creates neAv hopes when all earthly hopes vanish; and throws over the decay, the destruction of existence, the most gorgeous of all lights; awakens life in death, and calls out from corruption and decay, beauty and everlasting glory." § 215. The habitual practical recognition and adoption of such a system as this must necessarily generate a sobriety of temper, Avhich Avill of all others be the most distant from derangement. That the reception of Christianity, Avhether real or nominal, should cure insanity, is no more to be expected than that it should cure the small-pox. If it did—if a special miracle was wrought for the purpose of destroying the original characteristics of each indiAidual, it Avould not only de- stroy moral agency and hence break up probation, but Avould produce an almost entire derangement of human affairs by obliterating the marks of individuality, to say nothing of identity. To the same effect are the following just observations of Dr. Cop- land : "It must not be supposed, from Avhat I have advanced, that the Christian religion is truly chargeable Avith causing insanity; it actually has an opposite tendency. Mistaken views, excessive fervour, un- founded fears, and various feelings arising from these sources, are the only causes of insanity in connection Avith religion. Among those Avho entertain just and sober opinions on religious topics—who make Chris- tian doctrines the basis of their morals, the governors of their passions, the soothers of their cares and their hopes of futurity—insanity rarely occurs. The moral causes of derangement which would not fail of pro- ducing injurious effects on others, prove innocuous in them, for these causes would be met by controlling and calming considerations and sentiments, such as would deprive them of intensity or neutralize their effects. Truly religious sentiments and obligations soothe the more turbulent emotions, furnish consolations in affliction, heal the wounded feelings, administer hopes to the desponding, and arrest the hands of violence and despair, "(d) And the testimony of Dr. Cheyne, who stood for many years at the head of the medical profession in Ireland, occupying the responsible post in that kingdom of physician-general to the forces, is equally em- phatic : " Our experience of, and inquiries into the nature of insanity, during a period of forty years," he says, " enable us to say, that such cases as that Avhich we have just related," (those of insanity from mor- bidity of the religious affections,) " are not in the proportion of one in a thousand to the instances of insanity which arise from wounded pride or disappointed ambition."(e) " True religion," he tells us in another place,"(f) is a preservative, although not a complete preservative against derangement of the mind. We have no intention of concealing that we have known many instances of insanity among believers, but it was not caused by their creed. We have also known instances in which all sense of religion has been permanently destroyed by insanity. Of such cases we would remark, that the believer has no right to expect (d) Copland Med. Diet., Art. " Insanity." (e) Cheyne on Derangement in connection with Religion, pp. 178, 179. (f) Ibid. p. 146. RELIGION AS CONNECTED WITH INSANITY. 179 for his believing friend exemption from evils arising from the state of the body, on which insanity always depends. Let him moreover recol- lect, that as total insanity puts an end to moral accountability, nothing which may take place during a paroxysm of the disorder, can affect the future happiness of his friend." "When fairly examined," says Dr. Combe, "the danger is seen to arise solely from an abuse of religion, and the best safeguard is found to consist in a right understanding of its principles and submission to its precepts. For if the best Christian be he, who in meekness, humi- lity, and sincerity, places his trust in God, and seeks to fulfill all his commandments, then he who exhausts his soul in devotion, and at the same time finds no leisure or no inclination for attending to the com- mon duties of his station, and who so far from arriving at happiness or peace of mind, becomes every day the more estranged from them, and finds himself at last involved in disease and despair, cannot be held as a follower of Christ, but must rather be held as a follower of a phan- tom assuming the aspect of religion. When insanity attacks the latter, it is obviously not religion that is its cause; it is only the absence of certain feelings, the regulated activity of which is necessary to the right exercise of religion; and against such abuse a sense of religion would, in fact, have been the most powerful protection. And the great benefit of knowing this is, that whenever we shall meet with such a blind and misdirected excess of our best feelings in a constitutionally —nervous or hereditarily—predisposed subject, instead of encouraging its exuberance, we should use every effort to temper the excess, to in- culcate sounder views, and to point out the inseparable connection which the Creator has established betAveen the true dictates of religion and the practical duties of life, which it is a part of his purpose in sending us here to fulfill." § 216. These views are not uncorroborated by practical observation. It is not necessary to record the cases where mania, particularly that of the suicidal cast, has been generated by an undue estimate of the im- portance of this life's incidents as compared with those of the next.Q?) On the other hand we may find a pregnant illustration of the converse process by the fact mentioned in the thirteenth report of the Hartford Retreat, that two hundred and eight farmers, fifty-eight merchants, and thirty-four day-laborers have been admitted into that institution to four clergymen.(A) And in a very capable pamphlet, published in Phila- (g) Dr. Rush, after noticing the fact that 150 suicides having taken place in Paris in the year 1782, and but 32 in London, says, " It is probable the greater portion of infidels in the former than in the latter city, at that time, may have occasioned a difference in the number of deaths in the two places, for suicide will naturally follow smaU degrees of insanity, where there are no habits of moral order from religion, and no belief in a future state." Rush on the Mind, p. 69. (h) The chaplain in the same report states : " The usual week-day services in the chapel of the institution, singing, reading the Scriptures, and prayer, have been performed during the year. On the afternoon of the Sabbath, there have been religious exercises similar to those in other Christian congregations. The singing is still conducted by a choir composed of the attendants and patients, and adds much to the interest and value of the services. In these various exercises the patients have engaged with gratifying de- corum and solemnity. Strangers who for the first time are present at our worship in the chapel, often express surprise at their apparent devotion, and the stillness and steady 180 RELIGIOUS INSANITY— delphia in 1850, on this very point—a pamphlet which, though anony- mous, is understood to have been AVritten by a gentleman of great ex- perience in the discipline of insane convicts, and to have been revised and approved by the two very eminent principals of the tAVO chief Phila- delphia lunatic asylums(z)—the history of what is called religious in- sanity is thus traced: " The unsubdued temper of a child exhibits itself in paroxysms of passion. Every little disappointment occasions violent irritation. This morbid impatience ripens into sullen discontent with all the allotments of life. The unhappy creature persuades himself that an evil spirit haunts all his footsteps and rules his destiny. This con- ception is easily made to assume a religious phase or association, and is succeeded by settled gloom, which the hospital register or the neAvs- attention with which they listen to divine truth. Indeed, it is believed that few congre- gations of the sane, in an ordinary state of feeling, exceed them in these respects. " A sense of need opens a way for the gospel to the hearts of these sufferers. The ser- vice checks, for a few moments at least, the dark current of sorrow, calls the wandering mind away from its delusions, and aids in forming a healthful self-control. A sense of propriety, the strong associations connected with such scenes in happier days, and the quiet of fellow worshippers, combine to restrain outbursts of feeling which they are often unable to resist in their own rooms. And aside from these influences of religious wor- ship, who shall set limits to the great Physician of both soul and body, in making the gospel a means of moral renovation to the deranged mind ? " Increasing experience strengthens my conviction that the distinguishing principles of the gospel are no less adapted to the mind when disordered, than when in its normal state. In the former case, indeed, more care and a different mode of exhibition are de- manded ; but these principles unfolded calmly and clearly, in the sober manner of the Bible, will find as ready and intelligent and cordial a response in a congregation of the insane as in most others. " The full value of the gospel in relation to mental derangement, both as a preventive and a remedy, is not, it is believed, fully appreciated. Official reports show that cases of insanity, in great numbers, result from causes against which the controlling daily in- fluence of religious principle would guard the mind. By checking vices which prey on the body and mental feelings, such as envy, jealousy, inordinate grief, which waste its energies, the gospel prevents diseases that result in insanity." » The fact that sound religious discipline exercises a salutary influence in assuaging the malady, does not, of course, go to refute the position that unsound religious excitement may not have produced it; but it does show that a judicious presentation of the sanctions of religion—even involving their most solemn features—is a conservative and not a dis- tracting influence. The reports of Dr. Kirkbride and Dr. AVoodward are strong to this point; and we cannot refrain from adding to them the following testimony from Miss Dix: " That among the hundreds of crazy people with whom her sacred missions have brought her into companionship, she has not found one individual, however fierce and turbulent, that could not be calmed by Scripture and prayer, uttered in low and gentle tones. The power of religious sentiments over those shattered souls seems miraculous. The worship of a quiet, loving heart, affects them like a voice from heaven. Tearing and rending, yelling and stamping, singing and groaning, gradually subside into silence, and they fall on their knees, or gaze upwards with clasped hands, as if they saw through the opening darkness a golden gleam from their Father's throne of love." Armed with this gentle influence, we are told by an observer, she does not fear the violence of the madman. Well do we remember an instance that we heard from her own lips, in which she entered the cell of a maniac, against the remonstrances of the terrified keeper. As she persisted in entering, the door was instantly closed behind her to pre- vent escape. Alone she stood face to face with that wild man. He raised himself in a threatening attitude, and glared upon her with his fierce eye. She opened the Bible, and read the words of a Psalm. After a few lines, he bent his head to listen. The look of rage and terror passed from his countenance. His eye grew less wild, and sent forth sweet, blessed tears, until the madman sank down at that helpless woman's feet. And as she finished, he said, Will you read those words again ? (i) The relations of Religion to what are called " Diseases of the Mind," Phila. J. W Moore, 1850. REAL CHARACTER OF. 181 papers record as a case of religious melancholy, whereas it is really a case of ripe stubbornness. "AVe might readily illustrate our position by actual cases of disap- pointed ambition or affection. As where one has aspired to high dis- tinction, and has suffered a defeat so unexpected and mortifying as to unhinge the mind, it is natural that he should assume some exalted character, and insanely supposes himself to be a king, or even the King of Kings. Or when the young affections have been so sadly blighted as to veil all the joys and hopes of life, and excite a disgust for life itself, we might expect that reason, overpoAvered by such a shock, would lead the sufferer into some morbid conception of herself, that would be most congenial to seclusion and a renunciation of the world; and hence she is very likely to assume the character of the Virgin Mary, or to hold herself in readiness for an extraordinary holy service as a com- panion of some angelic potentate. These are not fictitious cases. They have had their parallel if not their counterpart in many lunatic hos- pitals, and in neither of them, Ave apprehend, could there be found a single feature to justify us in classing them among cases of "religious insanity," or in ascribing to religion the remotest connection with their unhappy state. " If in the instances just cited, and others of like character, faith in God had been a controlling principle, the mind would probably have stayed itself on Him, and its integrity would have been preserved. Have our readers never known a lone woman, in humble life, buffeting courageously with the rising tide of disappointment and sorrow;—a kind and faithful husband removed by death: the means of daily sus- tenance straitened, perhaps almost to penury; a promising son proving reprobate; a helpful and cheerful daughter deprived of sight, and an- other prostrate under the power of chronic disease—have they never known such an one in these or like circumstances reposing her trust in her covenant God, and saying with the afflicted but not despairing patriarch, ' Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil ?' Or in the Avords of one who knew the bitterness of grief, ' My lifted eye without a tear, The gathering storm shall see; My steadfast heart shall know no fear; That heart shall trust in thee.' " It is not a superior mind, nor high moral gifts that makes this ob- vious difference. It is that in the one case religion is inculcated, and the mind entertains it as an infinitely pure and Avelcome system of di- vine truth, embraces its sublime and often mysterious doctrines as^ a little child receives the lessons of paternal wisdom, and esteems its precepts as just and good, and worthy of prompt and cheerful obedience. God's providence is regarded as directing and overruling all; and the spontaneous language of the soul is, ' Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him. Though the fig-tree shall not blossom, neither shall fruit be in the vines, the labor of the olive shall fail, and the field shall yield no meat, the flocks shall be cut off from the fold, and there shall be no herd in the stall, yet will I rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation.' 182 RELIGIOUS INSANITY— " In the other case a perverse, fretful, impatient spirit, indulged in childhood, falls, and is utterly cast down in the first conflict with the stern realities of life, and becomes the prey of fitful melancholy, if not of settled mania." § 217. The history of religious insanity in this country goes a great way to fortify the position that it is to a departure from the gospel system that most cases of what may be called Dsemonio-mania may be traced. This is shown with peculiar ability as Avell as weight of ex- perience in the following passages from the pamphlet Avhich has been just noticed: " Passing over the many instances of such erratic and fanatical ex- travagances which history records, and to some of which the review be- fore us alludes, we will glance at two recent and notable ones, occurring among ourselves, that Ave may the better judge whether religion makes men insane, or whether it merely fails, in many cases, to bring them to their right mind; so that it may be said that they continue insane in spite of all that religion can do for them. " A clergyman, in infirm health, sought to amuse his listless hours by framing a puerile romance, after the manner of eastern fabulists, with names, dates and localities, bearing no relation to sober history. These writings, in some way, without the author's privity, came into the hands of strangers. In 1826, one Joseph Smith professed to have found, in the town of Palmyra, N. Y., some brass plates enclosed in a box, such as is used for packing windoAv-glass. Of these plates he pretended to be the interpreter. With a stone in his hat, and his hat over his eyes, he dictated what a man, named Harris, wrote. In consequence of some dispute, Harris departed before the interpretation was ended, and one Cowdrey took his place and completed the ' Book of Mormon.' Smith then avowed himself a prophet, and the founder of a new dispensation, and gathered many disciples, who accompanied him to the state of Mis- souri, where they established a city and built a temple. We need not pursue their adventures. "The contents of the Book of Mormon, or the Mormon Bible, were neither more nor less than the self-same tales of romance which the invalid clergyman amused himself with writing. A large number of persons, however, embraced the delusion; many abandoned a profitable business; some sacrificed large property, and not a few were ruined in soul, body and estate, by putting their trust in this barefaced imposture. "It is perfectly obvious, we think, that a mind well informed and established in the received doctrines of the Christian faith, and endued with but very ordinary discernment, would be proof against so bold an imposture. If any intelligent and respectable persons joined the Mormon ranks, that, of itself, shows either a predisposition to insanity, which this fanciful revelation was fitted to develop, but with which religion has no connection whatever; or that there is a deficiency of discernment, or a neglect or abuse of the reasoning powers, or a morbid love of distinction and notoriety, to gratify Avhich they are willing to sacrifice all other interests. If a judicious, faithful parent or Sunday-school teacher had given direction to their inquiries and furnished their minds with just and systematic, though exceedingly REAL NATURE OF. 183 simple, views of the doctrines of revelation, they Avould have had balances whereAvith to weigh the pretensions of the new prophet, and by means of these vanity and falsehood would have been made manifest. " At a somewhat later period, a man named Miller, (a Baptist minister, as it is said,) professed to have had a revelation of the precise day on which the second advent of Christ would occur, and when his people would be called to rise and meet him in the air ! He and his deluded apostles, or agents, went from town to town and from house to house, 'leading captive silly women,' and imposing upon the credulity of the ignorant. So settled was the conviction of many minds of the truth of his predictions, that they arranged their worldly affairs in reference to it, as an ascertained event, and made no contracts extending beyond the designated day. Prosperous citizens sold their estates, and de- clined the ordinary avocations of life, that they might give themselves wholly to the business of preparation; and, as the eventful period drew nigh, many evinced the sincerity of their convictions by providing what they regarded as suitable apparel for an aerial flight; and some actually assembled in groups upon summits which might be supposed most favorable to an early and easy ascension ! The dupes of the false prophet were counted by thousands. Scores were committed to insane asylums Avho were crazed with excitement, or with disappoint- ment ; and many within and without the charmed circle were doubtless left to believe that all revelations are as idle and delusive as Miller- ism.(A;) " AVe need not say how the plainest scriptures must have been wrested from their true intent and meaning, nor how deaf an ear must have been turned to the voice of reason and common sense, before the mind could haAre surrendered itself to such a fancy. There is not a trace of insanity, however, in any stage of the process. It is a simple, volun- tary subjection of reason to the influence of imagination or superstition, instead of a childlike submission of all the powers and faculties of body and mind to the revealed will of God. And, although we may admit that such delusions have, in many instances, been the ostensible cause of insanity, as our hospital returns allege,—"revealed religion" is no more responsible for them than for paroxysms of mania-a-potu. It is because the plain truths of revealed religion were misapprehended, perverted or rejected, that the imposture succeeded, and the mind was led captive by Satan at his will. It is not strange that a vessel left to itself, on a stormy sea should, sooner or later, go to the bottom, or fall into the hands of wreckers. "(I) By the same able Avriter the following propositions are laid down:— § 218. "I. It is as unjust to ascribe cases of what is commonly called ' religious insanity' to religion, as their cause, as it would be to charge our insane hospitals with originating or confirming the cases which they do not cure.(w) (k) See an Essay on this point, in 1 Am. Jour, of Insan. 249. (1) Relations of Religion to what are called Diseases of the mind. Phil. J. W. Moore, 1850. (m) The third annual report of the Ohio Lunatic Asylum very justly remarks in this connection: — "There is no country where the subject of religion is more immediately and forcibly brought home to the heart and conscience than in the United States. It is 184 PRESERVATIVE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. " II. There is no such thing as religious insanity: i. e. it cannot be said of religion, as it can be of grief, or disappointment, or chagrin, that it causes insanity. one, too, upon which every variety of opinion exists. Unlimited discussion is in con- stant practice among all classes ; and the feelings and apprehensions of our nature are much aroused, and frequently excited. And it cannot be doubted that in many cases where persons are predisposed to this fearful disease by natural constitution, incorrect education, feeble health, and other circumstances, anxieties connected with the awful realities of eternity and the immortality of the soul, have been the exciting causes of mental derangement. But pure and undefiled religion, whose genial influences shed peace and joy over the path of our existence, and light us with elevated hopes to the prospects of a happy eternity, can, in its unperverted results, have no such injurious effects upon the mind. ' The caviler may accuse religion of producing insanity, but he does not see how many causes of insanity it averts; how much comfort it affords to the weary and heavy laden, how effectually it buoys up the desponding, and how directly it points out to the transgressor the way of pardon and peace.'* As the result of some attention to this matter, we feel satisfied that the true remote cause of insanity, very frequently lies behind the religious influences which appear so conspicuous, that, at most, religion can only be accused as the occasional or exciting cause of a disease whose foundation is completely established in the system; that, in a great many of these cases, the mental derangement will be found mainly to depend upon ill health, or that peculiar debility and irritation of the nervous system which so frequently follow various acute disorders that severally try the organic structure, and, in not a few instances, so far is the disease of the mind from a religious origin, that it is clearly and properly chargeable to the indulgences of vicious habits. It is certainly a fact, that a maniac may imbibe a religious, as well as any other extravagant delusion, and yet his derangement may be occasioned by the reverse of any thing like a religious cause. Some, indeed, never appear to speak seriously upon the subject of religion, only when they are crazy, and then it would seem as if the anguish of remorse had commenced a drill upon the dis- turbed and distracted conscience. ' But the religious only appear to constitute the largest number of exciting causes in our annual reports; for if we carefully analyze the tables, and faithfully consider those of intemperance, ill treatment, domestic trouble, jealous}-, masturbation, and perhaps several others, with a fair proportion of the un- known, it will be found that vice predominates, and its-victims far exceed all others."— Journal of Psychological Medicine, Vol. III. pp. 474, 475. On this subject Morel says : "All the depressive forms are far from presenting such symptoms. There are certain melancholic patients who, with the external symptoms of sadness, feel a certain pleasure in remaining concentrated upon their delirious con- ceptions. They finish by believing themselves exceptional men; the hallucinations of sight and hearing, frequent in them, tend to keep up these new ideas. It is not unfrequent to see individuals who were first presented to our observation with a delirium of humility, become, in consequence of the systematization of their ideas, impressed with the belief that they are prophets, New Messiahs, &c. The depressive form is then re- placed by the form accompanied with excitement, and we have regular maniacs to treat. An old gendarme, pursued for a long time by the blackest ideas, and thinking himself damned, is to day a maniac of this description, (and these are often the most dangerous.) He thinks himself the husband of the Virgin, he sees and hears her, he receives her inspirations, and as these cannot separate themselves completely from the prejudices he formerly imbibed in his terrors, he pursues us with his anathemas, and daily predicts for us the most horrible end. " Another lypomaniac who has spent all his fortune in travelling to the most celebrated spots of Christendom, in hope of finding a relief for his exaggerated fears of Hell, is to day in a veritable state of exaltation, because the Holy Ghost has revealed itself to him. The heavens are open to his looks; the Apocalypse has no longer any mysteries for his mind; if we attempt to combat his follies, he overwhelms us with scorn and contempt and will not answer men, who only live in the lust of their passions and in the corrup- tion of the flesh. Insane of this class have been called demonomaniacs, but they do not always present themselves in such a high state of exaltation. The following is a case of lypomania, which would formerly have been considered as a perfect example of demonomania: S----, is twenty-three years old, and the exaggeration of his religious feelings has been the starting point of his insanity. Two years ago S. still worked and talked ; since then he will no longer do any thing, or answer any question. The hesi- tation that he showed in performing the most ordinary acts of life, alone indicated his *Dr. AVoodward. RELATION OF RELIGION TO SANITY. 185 " III. To inculcate the doctrines, as well as the precepts, of revealed religion upon the human mind, at the earliest period of its capacity to receive them, is the clear scriptural duty of all persons Avho have the care of children and youth. superstitious terror, and the excessive fear of offending God that possessed him. _ He was constantly reproaching himself for imaginary faults, and spent his time in fastings that destroyed his health. It often happened that he no longer wished to eat, and when by the use of the douche we compelled him to take nourishment, he murmured in a low voice, "That Thy will, Lord, may be done; pardon them, they know not what they do : what happiness it is to die for Thy holy name." A moment out of sight, and he would place himself upon his knees, and remain in that position entire days, wrapped up in his fixed idea, and beating his head against the wall. A year ago, I tried to make him go to chapel, and was astonished at his opposition; he clung to the door and made an extraordinary resistance, notwithstanding his state of extreme emaciation. AVhen, to-day, they threaten to conduct him to chapel, when any one brings a crucifix near him, or attempts to make the sign of the cross upon him, his sensations are shown in a striking manner in the expression of his face, and in his gestures. His face be- comes flushed, he sighs profoundly, stops his ears, and his resistance betrays itself in a struggle, in which he displays a violence and an energy of which one would not think him capable." See Etudes Cliniques des Maladies Mentales, par M. Morel. Tome I. p. 391. Paris, 1852.—Also, Etudes Psychologiques sur l'Alienation Mentales, per L. F. E. Renaudin. Chap. X. p. 674. Paris, 1854. " Religious monomania," says M. Renaudin, " which for a long time was thought to be more common in women than in men, appears to divide itself equally between the two sexes. But it exhibits in its manifestations the influence peculiar to the physical and moral idiosyncrasy of each. The hysterical element in women plays an important part, and the ecstatical state in them is more convulsive than in man; and this explains to us the reason why the devil figures more in delirium in that sex. The immunity of the Romish clergy, socially speaking, from this form of mental unsoundness may be attributed to the principle of authority that governs them, which they can sometimes evade, but from which they can never escape. Besides the clerical life is an active one, and if it does present something exceptional which separates it from men, the obligations of the minis- try temper whatever danger this isolation may possess. Communities of women, on the contrary, present more numerous openings to this disease, especially when they are sub- mitted to the danger of a contemplative life. This temper is not unlikely to terminate in exhaustion and lypomania, or hysterical mania. In religious monomania we meet with all the characters of active over excitement of the general sensibility, and of the most energetic concentration of psychical intuition. It may or may not be complicated with the errors of the individual, and generally borrows some traits from the affective sentiments. If it reconciles itself sometimes with marked intellectual ability, it ordinarily has for a starting point some special predisposition, which is less properly called a religious character than a vague and uncertain re- ligiousness. The same acute though not always reliable thinker proceeds to recognize a special cause of Fanatico-Mania, arising from the distress of mind provoked by the reading of mystical works, or of the wilder class of forced prophetical interpretations, forming in this way the first step towards the incubation of the disease. Sometimes also as a con- sequence of the impression of depressing causes, the individual draws the resistance, which he makes to the circumstances in which he may be placed, from misplaced fana- tical assumption ; (e. g. that of spirit-rapping,) he reacts strongly against his own grief or disappointment on this false basis, and active over-excitement is the result. Fear and remorse, when acted against by the same loose motives, lead to the same consequence. Fanatico-mania is frequently connected with either organic or dynamic affections of the chest or abdominal viscera. If there are among such patients any examples of longevity, it is when the anaesthetic ecstasy is reproduced only at long intervals. The system with difficulty accommodates itself to this convulsive spasm, and above all to the fast- ings and mortifications which are its habitual consequence ; and a proper maintenance of the vital forces rarely resulting. The anomalies of sensation are greatly multiplied, and the impressions received, apart from the period of ecstasy, are much more durable. It is especially amongst these monomaniacs that perversions of the affective feelings are observable. The real and the morbid religious feeling may be in fact distinguished from each other by the test of selfishness. The man who yields to the false impulse has neither family nor country; provided that he gains his salvation, the rest is of but little import- ance. If he wishes to control others, it is more through intolerance than charity. Under 186 RELIGION AS CONNECTED WITH INSANITY. "IV. To neglect or delay such an encouragement of the religious sentiment, from any apprehension of deA'eloping a tendency to " cerebral disease," is as unphilosophieal and fatal, as it Avould be to withhold all food from a child through fear of strangling it, or destroying its diges- tivc organs. " Ar. The due apprehension and influence of religious truth, as revealed in the scriptures, constitutes the best preservative against mental aberrations—especially such as are supposed to originate in moral causes. " ArI. The earlier the mind is brought under the supreme influence of religious truth, the more likely it is to retain its integrity, when the exciting occasions of derangement occur."(n) An additional illustration of the truth of these positions is to be found in the late development of Spirit-Rapping. Precisely to the degree in which the alleged Spiritual developments depart from the dogmas of Christian Revelation, are they associated with mental de- rangement. As long as the "media" profess to be orthodox, so long do they keep within the bounds of right reason. AVith them, however, as with the Mormons, deviations from the moral law keep pace with devia- tions from the divine. Thus the cases of " spiritual marriages," of which we have lately heard, have been preceded by alleged supernatural communications, vacating the Scriptural precepts. And a careful examination of the cases of insanity produced by Spiritualism shows that in each instance, infidelity became a concomitant, (o) § 219. Crimes committed under the influences of fanatical impulses, such as those which have been just mentioned, may be considered in the same light as crimes committed in a state of drunkenness. In the latter case, an individual who knowingly takes intoxicating liquor, cannot defend himself on the fact of guilt by proof of his intoxication. It is otherwise, however, when the guilty act is the immediate result of mania-a-potu, in Avhich case the malady has assumed the shape of a substantive and permanent desire, and like any other delirium, is to be treated as destroying responsibility.(oo) In like manner, the voluntary adoption of a religious belief which includes among its incidents a known violation of laAV, does not relieve the party who commits such violation of law under such influences, from responsibility. If, however, he sink into consequential delirium, and then commit the crime, he is irresponsible, (p) the influence of this excitement, the voice of nature is not heard, and history bears wit- ness to the crimes which fanaticism has been led to commit. Every affection, every duty is sacrificed to this exclusive sentiment; and whilst a well understood religion enjoins love to God and our neighbor, blind fanaticism produces selfishness." See Re- naudin sur l'Alienation Mentale. Paris, 1854, chap. x. p. 744. (n) Ibid. (o) See on this topic a most able but, in some respects, eccentric Volume, under the title, •' The Apocatastasis, or progress backwards, a ' new tract for the times." Bur- lington, Chauncey Goodrich, 1854," to which the reader is referred for a very effective exhibition of the absurdity of the whole Spirit-rapping system. (oo) See ante, \ 62-70. (]) See an essay on this point, 3 Am. Jour, of Insan. 166.—See also for a report of Thorn's case, Ibid. 170. POLITICO-MANIA. 187 (9.) Politico-Mania.(q) § 220. " Psychical infection," to use the expressive term of, Ellinger, is peculiarly operative in political relations. Attempts at insurrections, acts of laAvlessness against government, murderous assaults upon public officers, become at times epidemic. Marc illustrates this by the cases in Avhich public conspicuous crimes have become contagious ; e. g., arson and murder. The tendency to seditious violence is generated by an oppressive government bearing on temperaments tainted with just such an infection. § 221. " Certain forms of goA7ernment," says Dr. Rush, "predispose to ^madness. They are those in which the people possess a just and ex- quisite sense of liberty, and of the evils of arbitrary power against which complaints are stifled by a military force. The conflicting tides of the public passions, by their operations upon the understanding, become in these cases a cause of derangement. The assassination of tyrants and their instruments of oppression is generally the effect of this disease. That madness is thus induced, I infer from its occurring so rarely from a political cause in the United States. I have known but one instance of it, and that was of a gentleman who had been deranged some years before, from debt contracted by extravagant living. In a government where all the power of a country is representative and elective, a day of general suffrage, and free presses, serve, like chimneys in a house, to conduct from the individual and public mind all the discontent, vexation, and resentment which have been generated in the passions by real or supposed evils, and thus to prevent the understanding being injured by them. In despotic countries, where the public passions are torpid, and where life and pro- perty are secured only by the extinction of the domestic affections, mad- ness is a rare disease. Of the truth of this remark, I have been satisfied by Mr. Stewart, the pedestrian traveller, aat1io spent some time in Tur- key, also by Dr. Scott, who accompanied Lord M'Cartney in his em- bassy to China, and by Mr. Joseph Rexas, a native of Mexico, who passed nearly forty years of his life among the civilized but depressed natives of that country. Dr. Scott informed me that he heard of but a single instance of madness in China, and that was in a merchant who had suddenly lost £100,000 sterling by an unsuccessful speculation in gold dust."(r) With regard to Mexico and China, hoAvever, recent observations show that these remarks should be greatly qualified. VIII. Mental unsoundness as accompanied with intellectual PROSTRATION. 1st. Idiocy.(s) § 222. "Idiocy," says Dr. Ray, "is that condition of mind in which (q) See on this point " Influence des Eve"nemens et des Commotion Politiques sur le Developpement de la Folie. Par le Docteur Belhomme. Paris, 1849 ;" and a review of the same in Jour. Psych. Med., Vol. III. p. 31. (r) Rush on the Mind, pp. 66, 67. (s) Krahmer, Handbuch der Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851, § 110, 125. Siebold, Lehrbuch der Gericht. Med. Berlin, 1847, \ 200. See on this point the following works : The Principles of Medical Psychology, being 188 IDIOCY— the reflective, and all or a part of the affective powers, are either en- tirely Avanting, or are manifested to the slightest possible extent."(t) The intellectual and moral faculties, in cases properly falling under this head, are almost null, the effect being in most instances congenital, and arising in all cases from want of development, not from perversion of the functions. And the development of the senses is almost equally defective.(m) The power of speech does not exist, or exists only so far as to enable the patient to articulate a few unintelligible monosyllables. This incapacity depends sometimes on the imperfect conformation of the organs of speaking, sometimes upon those of hearing, but more fre- quently on a deficiency in or want of the powers of imitation; so that even Avhen the hearing and the speech are both entirely mature, the patient remains unable to do more than in the one case to shoAV his knowledge of the existence of sound, and in the other, to give utterance to noises not above, if equal to, those of the brute creation. Taste and smell are equally imperfect. In many cases there is an inability to perceive odors, and in most, nothing but the coarsest discrimination in the selection of articles of food. Wallowing in personal filth, devouring even excrement with apparent avidity, indisposition to eat at all unless food be placed directly before the eye, drinking urine with as little ap- pearance of distaste as water, are incidents one or more of which are to be found in almost every case of idiocy. And the same Ioav grade of sensibility and of flexibility is found in the purely physical system. The nerves are almost torpid. Limbs sometimes have been amputated without apparent pain, and Esquirol even tells us of labor having been undergone without the patient being conscious of the fact or of its meaning. The arms are frequently of unequal length, and misshapen ; and the limbs generally are crooked and feeble. A careless and broken gait distinguishes them in most cases. Even the eyes are defectively hung, and seem incapable of poising themselves at a right level. And in the lower class of cases there is sometimes so great a defectiveness of vision as to prevent the patient from perceiving the most obvious objects. And even when the powers of vision and of motion exist, the intellectual powers are sometimes so attenuated as to make attempts to reach a desired point, entirely abortive, though there be entire muscular power for such a purpose. § 223. While, however, the reasoning powers are almost entirely defective, there is sometimes a perceptible, though unequal, develop- ment of the moral sentiments. Self-esteem,(v) love of approbation, religious awe, sometimes assume a supremacy over the system, which is the more marked because it is checked by no countervailing qualities. Dr. Rush tells us of an idiot who spent his life in little acts of benevo- lence to others, though in the dispensation of them, as well as in all other points in his life, he showed no reasoning powers whatever. Re- the outlines of a course of lectures by Baron von Feuchtersleben, M. D. Vienne, 1845. Translated from the German by the late H. Evans Lloyd, Esq. Revised and edited by G. B. Babington, M. D., F. R. S., &c. London. Printed for the Sydenham Society, 1847 : p. 354. Morel, sur les Maladies Mentales, Arol. I. p. 52. Paris, 1822. And see a very remarkable report by Samuel Kneeland, Jun., M. D., read before the Boston Socfor Med. Improvement, Jan. 13, 1851; Am. Jour, of Aled. Science, 1851; and a review of the same Journal of Psychological Med., Vol. IV. p. 366. (0 Ray, \ 51. (u) Esquirol, 466. (v) Ray, \ 53. NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF. 189 ligious veneration and awe is sometimes developed to an exaggerated degree, expended upon the most unnatural objects. Vanity,—such as that Avhich distinguishes some branches of the brute creation,—finds with them a pregnant place. And Esquirol gives us numerous in- stances in which the talent for thieving, and that to a very remarkable extent, was found associated with entire vacuity of mind in all other relations. The same observation applies, though in a much less marked extent, to the sexual propensities. § 224. The following useful classification of these beings is made by Mr. S. G. Howe: 6 " Idiots of the lowest class are mere organisms, masses of flesh and bone in human shape, in which the brain and nervous system have no command over the system of voluntary muscles; and which consequent- ly are Avithout poAver of locomotion, without speech, without any mani- festation of intellectual or affective faculties. " Fools are a higher class of idiots, in whom the brain and nervous system are so far developed as to give partial command of the volun- tary muscles ; who have consequently considerable poAver of locomotion and animal action; partial development of the intellectual and affective faculties, but only the faintest glimmer of reason, and very imperfect speech. " Simpletons are the highest class of idiots, in whom the harmony between the nervous and muscular systems is nearly perfect; who, con- sequently, have normal powers of locomotion and animal action; con- siderable activity of the perceptive and affective faculties, and reason enough for their simple individual guidance, but not enough for their social relations, "(w) § 225. It does not take the case out of the definition of Idiocy, that some particular faculty has been saved from the general wreck. This is often the case, particularly with music. Thus there is at present in the Saltpetriere a girl idiotic to an extreme degree, who does not speak, and cannot e\T < o AVonien in a state of health, Insane, Imbeciles, Idiots, Idiots. Microcephalous, 21.87 in. 20.82 20.19 19.92 15.07 13.30 in. 11.50 11.49 11.26 7.51 6.98 in. 6.96 6.69 6.85 4.88 5.29 in. 5.67 5.63 5.39 4.17 47.44 in. 44.95 44. 43.42 31.63 From this table we learn: 1st. That the circumference of the head, according to admeasurements taken among women, enjoying the use of their reason; from insane women, imbeciles and idiots; diminishes in an almost equal proportion from the women in the enjoyment of usual health, to the idiot, deprived even of instinct. 2d. That the fronto- occipital curvature diminishes in a remarkable degree from the women in sound mind, to the insane female: Avhilst no variation is noticed in the insane person to the imbecile, and a difference of but six millemetres between the latter and idiocy. 3d. That the fronto-occipital diameter is the same in the case of the women enjoying the use of their reason and the insane women; and that there is a diminution of but six mille- metres between the insane person and the idiot; while the difference is enormous on passing to the lowest degree of idiocy. 4th. That the bi-temporal diameter is more considerable in the case of the insane women and even the imbecile and idiot, than in that of a woman pos- sessing the ordinary degree of intelligence. 5th. That if we suppose that the sum of those four admeasurements, express the volume of the brain; it follows that the volume of this organ, diminishing in the same proportion with the intellectual capacity; that of the cranium would be the expression of this capacity, "(z:) § 227. "In that remarkable obliteration of the mental faculties," says Abercrombie, *' which we call idiocy, fatuity or dementia, there is none of the distortion of insanity. It is a simple torpor of the facul- ties in the higher degrees, amounting to total insensibility to every impression; and some remarkable facts are connected with the manner in which it arises without bodily disease. A man mentioned by Dr. Rush was so violently affected by some losses in trade, that he was (x) Esquirol on Insan. Lea & Blanch. Phila., 1845. p. 473. NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF. 191 deprived almost instantly of all his mental faculties. He did not take notice of any thing, not even expressing a desire for food, but merely taking it Avhen it was put into his mouth. A servant dressed him in the morning, and conducted him to a seat in the parlor, where he re- mained the Avhole day, with his body bent forward and his eyes fixed on the floor. In this state he continued nearly five years, and then recovered completely and rather suddenly. The account which he afterwards gave of his condition during that period was, that his mind was entirely lost; and that it was only about two months before his final recovery that he began to have sensations and thoughts of any kind. These at first served only to convey fears and apprehensions, especially in the night-time. Of perfect idiocy produced in the same manner by a moral cause, an affecting example as given by Pinel: Two young men, brothers, Avere carried off by the conscription, and in the first action in which they were engaged, one of them was shot dead by the side of the other. The survivor Avas instantly struck with perfect idiocy. He was taken home, where another brother was so affected by the sight of him, that he was seized in the same manner; and in this state of perfect idiocy they were both received into the Bicetre. I have formerly referred to various examples of this condition super- vening on bodily disease. In some of them the affection was perma- nent; in others it was entirely recovered from."(a;) (x) Abercrombie on the Intellectual powers, pp. 273, 274. As the different races of men, says M. Renaudin, have a characteristic physiognomy, and as individuals reflect in their features the most salient points of their moral idiosyncrasy, so the idiot in this respect presents a peculiar stamp, which the least discerning can recognize. It is a type which can be distinguished in all its varieties, even when the external conformation of the head does not differ much from the normal proportions. But that which strikes us most in this class, is the want of symmetry, not only in the encephalic organ, but also in the other parts of the body, and if sometimes the physiognomy is deceitful in this respect, the other parts of the organism soon reveal to us the want of co-operation in- dispensable to the complete development of man. It is rather by an observation of the whole constitution than of its separate parts, that the essential characters of this infir- mity are to be detected. Idiots, generally, deceive in their age, which always offers at the different periods of their existence a ridiculous admixture of decrepitude and pueril- ity. The hypertrophy of certain glands, the flaccidity of the tissues, malformation of external essential organs, absence of all proportion in the length of their limbs, difficulty and uncertainty in their movements which are almost convulsive, the retraction of cer- tain tendons, an arrest of development in the figure and in muscular contractility;—such are the general appearance that characterize the idiot in his external conformation. His mode of living is in keeping with this degradation of forms, and furnishes us with the means of perceiving some of the relations existing between the physical and the moral. His language is scarcely rudimentary. He does not think, has nothing to say, and nothing in him calls for the vocal motion. When, however, this mutism is not idiopathic, he can be made to articulate certain words, and his movements can be placed under some moral control; but in undergoing this external influence, he still rests faith- ful to that automatism which is his principal characteristic. It is always a material and instinctive impulse that controls. The idiot shows, in the satisfying of his wants, a bru- tality in close connection with the irregularity of all his actions, and the want of balance of his functions which all coincide with personal instinct. He yields himself to onanism with a revolting cynicism; he eats with a voracity that defies everything, and which proves how obtuse his sensibility is, although he in fact suffers more than any other the unhappy effects of climacteric changes. Finally, in spite of the violence of certain appetites, the functions are so incompletely performed, that we must not be surprised to see these unfortunates very short-lived. If on the one hand nothing has wasted life, nothing on the other hand has vivified it, and one can easily conceive that it is extin- guished, since it is without essential nourishment and without object. _ The psychical element plays no part in such an organization. External influence is 192 IMBECILITY. § 228. Cretinism finds no place in the United States, and cannot, therefore, claim here extended consideration^?/) 2d. Imbecility.(z) § 229. Imbecility has perhaps as many degrees as it has victims, and yet it becomes the task of psycho-forensic medicine to assign a line of demarcation within which the judge is to declare the responsibility of the agent to cease to exist. But this problem is only so far capable of solution as we are enabled to detect and recognize the existence of im- becility in general, and to estimate its relation to a given action; the personal discretion of the tribunal must always have considerable scope in all cases near the boundary line. In order to obtain as firm a com- mon ground as possible, it becomes advisable to subdivide and classify imbecility, particularly where it depends upon particular diseased con- unable to develop it, since the somatic element is not in a condition to receive it; and as to spontaneousness, one can but with difficulty perceive the germ. So, when these degraded beings, impelled by a brutal instinct, or obeying another's will whose instru- ment they are, commit a culpable act, all the world agree in not imputing to them any moral responsibility. (See Etudes psychologiques sur l'Alienation Mentale, per L. F. E. Renaudin, p. 170. Paris, 1854. Idiocy, says M. Falret, cannot, strictly speaking, figure amongst the forms of insani- ty. In this degraded state, man is fallen below the brute; he does not even possess the instinct of self-preservation. It is necessary for charity not only to bring him the food required for his nourishment, but to place it in his mouth, and to protect him against the mischievous influences which surround him, and against all destructive causes. Instead of language, the exclusive appendage of man, since it is the expression of thought in aU its development, the complete idiot only utters certain harsh, savage inarticulate sounds. Instead of that firm, assured step which executes the exact command of the will, the rough, disorderly movements of idiots seem only phenomena of irritability. Besides, they are often immovable, bent down towards the ground, and only execute a kind of rocking movement, balancing forward and backward, to the right and to the left. AVithout doubt this is the extreme degree of idiocy, for there are idiots less de- graded in their organization, and consequently in their manifestations ; but unfortunate- ly to this feeble development of the intelligence is too often joined either an absolute want of character, or low tastes, incitations to a brutal lasciviousness, to robbery, pyro- mania and ferocity, which they turn against themselves and against inanimate objects. (See Legons Cliniques, de M. Falret, p. 243. Paris, 1854.) (y) The student, however, who seeks for particular information as to its character, is referred to the following treatises: Etudes des Maladies Mentales, de M. Morel. Tome I. p. 64. Paris, 1854. Gedanken liber Kropf und Cretinismus als Beitrag zur Homato- logie und Homonymie. Von Joh. Mich. Huber, Geritchswundarzt zu Ried in Tyrol. Mit einer Abbildung. (Medicin. Jahr. des k. k. bsterr. Staats, Mai.) Ueber den Cre- tinismus in Canton Waadt in der Schweiz. von Dr. H. Lebert, prakt. Arzt zu Paris. (Archiv fur physiologische Heilkunde ArII. B. 6 Heft.) Notice of a remarkable disease analogous to Cretinism. By Hugh Norris ; Med. Times, Jan. 1848. Les goiteux et les cretins de la Savoie; Annales de Therapeutique, 1848. Mais, Ueber den Cretinismus in grossen Sfadten und dessen Aenlichkeit mit dem in den Alpen. Von Dr. Behrend. (Gaz. des hopitaux, 1848. Nos. 6 and 7.) Cretinismus als genetisch—contagiose Endemie in Neudenau, &c. Bad. Annalem d. Staats-Arzneikunde, 1846. Esquirol Mental Maladies, &c, 481-2. Sonsburg, ueber den Cretinismus. AVurzb., 1825. Haii- flser, ueber die Beziehung des Sexualsystems zur Psyche ueberhaupt und zum Cretinis- mus ins besondere. AATurzb., 1826. See also a very valuable report on this point, by Samuel Kneeland, jun., M. D., read before the Boston Soc. for Med. Improvement. Jan. 13, 1851. Am. Jour, of Science, 1851 ; and a review of the same in Journal of Psy- chological Med. Vol. IV. p. 366. See also "A Physician's Holiday, or a month in Switzerland in the summer of 1848. By John Forbes, M. D., F. R. S." London, 1848 • in which the management of the Cretins is fully described. (z) Siebold, Lehrbuch der Gericht. Med. Berlin, 1847. \ 200. L. Krahmer, Hand- buch der Gericht, Med. Halle; C. A. Schwetschke, 1851. \ 125. Etudes Cliniques des Maladies Mentale, par M. Morel. Tome I. p. 39. Paris, 1854. IMBECILITY WITH CONCOMITANT INSANITY. 193 ditions capable of ascertainment and distinction. In this respect we distinguish, in the first place, imbecility with, and imbecility without concomitant insanity. § 230. Imbecility with concomitant insanity presents the following subdivisions: 1. The original imbecility which has lapsed into unsoundness of mind. The nature of the latter will determine in the first instance, in how far the patient is amenable to the penal laws in a given case; but the fact of imbecility will always favor the psychological arguments in favor of irresponsibility. 2. Imbecility supervenes upon the course of a mental disorder, and manifests itself particularly in the form of a failure of memory. The question of responsibility will depend in this case, upon the same prin- ciples as stated in the last preceding head. 3. Specious imbecility, as in the case of melancholia attonita, and as such will receive but little attention at the hands of the forensic physician. 4. Imbecility with confusion of mind. This is found side by side with a failure of memory, and a more or less conspicuous incoherence and inconsistency of the perceptions, and a certain agility and activity of the super-physical life. It is either a primary or secondary form, and in the former case it may be consequent upon severe diseases of the brain, epilepsy, intemperance, sexual excesses, and senility; in the latter case it may arise from the various forms of mental unsoundness, and may be considered as always excluding the idea of moral respon- sibility. 5. Imbecility remaining after the patient has recovered from an attack of insanity. It will never contain a sufficient reason for sus- pending the responsibility of the agent, but may often deserve the attentive consideration of the judge in the moulding of the sentence.(a) (a) In some circumstances, says M. Renaudin, the idiotic germ is less prominent, nothing tends to reveal it in infancy, and the early years lead us to expect a normal ulterior development. But it may happen that a severe disease, deeply affecting the organ- ism, supervenes, or the subject may have been submitted to an intellectual labor above his powers, and at a given moment an arrest of development, as much in the physical as in the moral system, shows itself. This condition sometimes supervenes even without the action of any apparent cause and then we can only attribute it to the influence of this idiotic principle. Instead of pursuing the course marked out by the laws of nature, it is arrested at a point of development, rarely transitory but most generally permanent, which is known every where under the name of imbecility. The physical organization in imbeciles offers less abnormities than that of idiots; the body is straighter and if the physiognomy is less repulsive and shows a little more regularity in its features, it ex- hibits but little animation. The feelings are seen in their rudimentary state in this class of beings ; they are susceptible of a more advanced education and when they belong to a family of easy circumstances, they can be made to submit themselves to the habits of a regular life. The impressions they receive are sufficiently durable, providing they do not overstep a sufficiently restricted limit. They are susceptible of a certain amount of memory, which in some cases reaches a very remarkable height. Sometimes the ideas they acquire are very limited and their intellectual spontaneousness is on a footing with the small development of their physical spontaneousness. Although less stupid than the idiot, automatism is the characteristic trait of the imbecile. He never gives the im- pulse, he receives it; and it is amongst the imbeciles that an asylum especially finds valuable aids in its internal service. If the affective sentiments are but feeble, the instinct of the feeling of personality shows itself perhaps in an absurd vanity, or in a savage egotism in the satisfaction of wants whose stimulus is ordinarily very energetic. Hence an excessive irritability that readily degenerates into mania, or a malicious cun- 13 194 IMBECILITY WITHOUT INSANITY. § 231. Imbecility without insanity has several gradations, all being separate denominations; the highest degree is called idiocy. Next to this is imbecility proper; dullness, feebleness, stupidity, are inferior grades of a stunted groAVth of mind. The reasons Avhich, in the higher stages, exclude understanding and self-control are the more potent, as no education has been imparted here, or, if imparted, has produced no effect. The lower stages do not justify the physician in casting a doubt upon the existence of legal responsibility. They are for the considera- tion of the judge alone, and are interesting in this point of vieAv, be- cause simpletons and fools often have a touch of malice, brutality, ill- will, and mischief in their dispositions, and may be led, by teasing and ill-treatment, to vindictive hatred, revenge, and violent outbursts of anger. § 232. The Emperor Napoleon hits upon a very happy illustration of the distinction between two of the above mentioned phases. In one of his conversations with Las Casas, he said that there was such a thing as ufolie innocente," and ufolie terrible"—a fatuous state which is safe, and one which is dangerous. A fatuous person uunfou," of the first kind, the Emperor describes as reasoning Avith the proprietor of a vine- yard in which he was trespassing, thus : " Why, here are Ave tAvo : the sun sees us both ; therefore, I have a right to eat grapes." The "fou terrible," he proceeds, "is he who cuts off the head of a man whom he found sleeping under a hedge; then hid himself behind it, in order to witness the surprise—embarras—of the body Avhen waking." " Of these half-Avitted persons," remarks Dr. Mayo, "the former in- dulges a love of grapes, the latter a love of bloodshed: the process of thought in each case is that of a deficient understanding, Avhich could neither prevent the one from stealing grapes, nor the other from com- mitting violence under the influence of opportunity, but rather for- warded the crime by suggesting excuses." "An idiot," says Dr. Hains- dorff, "in the Hospital of Salzburg, appearing to be singularly insus- ceptible of fear, an experiment of an appalling character, and of appalling consequences, was made upon him, as a means of putting his susceptibility to the test. It was proposed to make the impression upon him that he saw a dead man come to life. A person accordingly laid himself out as a corpse, enveloped in a shroud; and the idiot was ordered to watch over the dead body. The idiot perceiving some motion in the corpse, desired it to lie still; but the pretended corpse raising itself, in spite of this admonition, the idiot seized a hatchet, which unluckily was within his reach, and cut off first one of the feet of the unfortunate counterfeit, and then, unmoved by his cries, cut off his head. He then calmly resumed his station by the real corpse ;—a ning, in order to obtain the thing coveted. The imbecile has but few ideas ; and as he knows but littlcebandons himself to his impulses when fear does not control him. But little capable of distinguishing between good and evil, he may be a dangerous instru- ment in criminal hands. The imbecile commits a murder with coolness, shows often a great depravity of tastes, and it is only an exception, if you can perceive in him any rudimentary traces of the moral sense. It is at this point that his intellectual aptitude ceases, and we can easily understand how a like condition necessarily excludes all responsibility.—Renaudin sur l'alienation Mentale. p. 173. Paris, 1854. GENERAL IMBECILITY. 195 strong illustration of the dangerous hypothesis of harmlessness as con- nected with this state of mind. "(5) § 233. "Dr. Rush says," we quote from Dr. Ray, "that in the course of his life he has been consulted in three cases of moral imbe- cility; and nothing can better express the true character of their physiology, than his remark respecting them. ' In all these cases,' he observes, 'there is probably an original defective organization in those parts of the body which are occupied by the moral faculties of the mind,'—an explanation which will receive but little countenance in any age that derives its ideas of the mental phenomena from the exclusive observation of mind in a state of acknowledged health and vigor. To understand these cases properly, requires a knowledge of our moral and intellectual constitution, to be obtained only by a practical ac- quaintance with the innumerable phases of the mind, as presented in its various degrees of strength and weakness, of health and disease, amid all its transitions from brutish idiocy to the most commanding intellect.' "(c) (b) Mayo on Medical Testimony in Lunacy, pp. 93, 94. (c) Ray on Insanity, p. 90. In a course of clinical lessons delivered at Bicetre, M. Ferrus gives an account of the different intellectual debilities in a way that throws a strong light upon these difficult questions: Between idiocy and dementia, he says, there is a most striking analogy. In both cases, human intelligence is abolished; it no longer possesses the means of perfectibility. But the analogy ceases in examining the producing causes. AVith the idiot, deprivation of reason is congenital; the demented, on the contrary, arrives progressively at the total loss of his faculties. Dementia is the abolition of the intellectual faculties, both moral and instinctive, supervening after the period of puberty: it is a kind of debility which appears either in an insensible manner or with the rapidity of lightning,—breaking, more or less, all the connections which unite the man with the rest of the world. The characters of dementia are sufficiently decided, so as not to be confounded with those of other mental affections. In idiocy, the faculties of the mind have never existed, or have been destroyed before their complete development. In dementia, you may still possibly see some traces of an intelligent past; but it betrays in vain its past perfection : it is stamped forever with the seal of feebleness and nullity, and destined to be extin- guished by a kind of exhaustion of nervous influence. Stupidity consists in an accidental, sudden, complete abolition of the intellectual, moral and instinctive faculties, as well as of the movements. It has for its cause a sudden and violent physical or moral shock: it is distinguished from dementia by the rapidity of its appearance, the intensity of its symptoms, their frequent remission and exacerbation, and especially by the possibility of a complete cure.—Ferrus, legons clini- ques faites a Bicetre. Dementia, says Esquirol, is characterized by the enfeeblement of the sensibility, in- telligence, and will. Incoherence of ideas ; want of intellectual and moral spontaneous- ness, are the signs of this affection. The man suffering from dementia has not the faculty of properly receiving objects, of noticing their relations and comparing them, of preserving a complete remembrance of them ; whence results an impossibility of reason- ing correctly. In dementia, he adds, the impressions are too feeble; it may be because the sensibility of the organs, or of the sensations, is weakened ; or it may be because the brain itself has not sufficient power to perceive and retain the impression that is trans- mitted to it. From this it necessarily results that the sensations are languid, obscure, and incomplete. Individuals in dementia are not susceptible of a sufficiently strong attention,—objects only strike them in an obscure and false manner: they can neither compare nor associate ideas, nor abstract them; the organ of thought has not sufficient energy,—it is deprived of the tonic force necessary to the integrity of its functions. Then the most incongruous ideas succeed each other, following each other without connection and without motive: the matter is incoherent; the patient repeats words and entire phrases without attaching to them distinct sense ; he speaks, as he reasons, without any consciousness of what he is saying.—(Esquirol de la demence, p. 221.) The demented, in spite of the general decrepitude of his organic functions, is not freed from the laws of 19U DEMENTIA. 3d. Dementia.(d) § 234. "This form of Insanity," says Dr. Ray, "is attended by a general enfeeblement of the moral and intellectual faculties, Avhich were originally sound and Avell developed, in consequence of age or disease, and is characterized by forgetfulness of the past, indifference to the present or future, and a certain childishness of disposition. The appa- rent similarity of this state to that of imbecility or idiocy, renders it necessary that they should be accurately distinguished; for nothing could be more improper or unjust than to vicAv them merely as different shades of the same mental condition. Idiocy and the higher degrees of imbecility are congenital, or nearly so, and consist in a destitution of poAvers that Avere never possessed."(e) "Dementia," continues the same high authority, "is distinguished from general mania, the only other affection Avith which it is liable to be confounded, by characters that cannot mislead the least practiced ob- action and reaction. There are periods in his existence when the old phenomena of possession appear to be renewed. When he is agitated, he cries and tears his clothes, and may, perhaps, perform some dangerous actions. The hallucinations are often suffi- ciently intense to provoke veritable attacks of fury; but this rage lasts but a little while; it is appeased like the anger of a child. The demented from this excited state falls back into his ordinary automatonism. He has no more any wishes, hate, or tenderness; he holds the objects formerly so dear to him, in the greatest indifference ; he sees his relations and friends without pleasure, and leaves them without regret. He is not disquieted by any privations imposed on him; and pleasures obtained for him gratify him but little. What goes on around him does not affect him. The events of life are as nothing to him, since he is unable to attach any remembrance, any hope to them: indifferent to every thing, nothing gratifies him. He laughs and plays whilst other men are afflicted, and weeps when all the world is satisfied. If his position discontents him, he does nothing to change it. His determina- tions are vague and uncertain: he is a perfect automaton, that has not sufficient energy to be ungovernable: his isolation is the more necessary, as he yields himself to acts which are the result of the abolition of conscience, and as he becomes but too often the sport and the victim of those who wish to take advantage of his condition.—See Morel sur les Maladies Mentales, Tome I. p. 402. Paris, 1852. Dementia, according to Falret, is a period, and not a true form of mental unsoundness. Amongst the demented, who are only the chronic insane arrived at an advanced stage of the disease, there are some who are agitated like maniacs, and some who remain motion- less, like hypomaniacs. There are others in whom are seen some predominant ideas,— resembling, in this respect, monomaniacs; but it is difficult to classify them. If they speak, their unconnected words have no relation, and convey no sense ; often even this is not due to incoherence alone, but to the absence of ideas: it is a flow of words without thoughts. If they remain quiet and silent, their countenances express neither concentration or passion, but dullness and stupidity; they seem, at least in extreme cases, to be ciphers both in understanding and character. The observer, in fact, sees in them only ruins: he sees before him all the moral and intellectual elements in an almost complete state of isolation from one another. This separation is a kind of dissolution which betrays the radical blow that has been inflicted upon the psychical forces, and destroys all hope of ever seeing these elements united and coordinate. If sometimes a gleam of intelligence sparkles in this chaos, and in the midst of these ruins,—far from consoling, it adds to the gloom, so manifest is it that the patient himself is neither its author nor its witness. Every thing, in fact, in dementia, betrays an inability to form ideas, to experience sentiments, to possess a will. It is the tomb of reason, with the exception of some flashes that mark it, and which are, as it were, the reflections of the ancient brilliancy of the mind.—See Etudes cliniques sur l'Alienation Mentale, par M. Falret, p. 242. Paris, 1854. (d) L. Krahmer, Handbuch der Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851 § 125 ; Siebold—Lehrbuch der Gericht. Med. Berlin, 1847, \ 200 ; and also see post, § 233, n (c.) (e) Ray on Insanity, p. 291. DELIRIUM. 197 server. The latter arises from an exaltation of vital power, from a morbid excess of activity, by Avhich the cerebral functions are not only changed from their healthy condition, but are performed with unusual force and rapidity. The maniac is irrational from an inability to dis- cern the ordinary characters and relations of things, amid the mass of ideas that crowd upon his mind in mingled confusion; while in demen- tia, the reasoning faculty is impaired by a loss of its ordinary strength, whereby it not only mistakes the nature of things, but is unable, from want of poAver, to rise to the contemplation of general truths. The reasoning of the maniac does not so much fail in the force and logic of its arguments, as in the incorrectness of its assumptions; but in de- mentia the attempt to reason is prevented by the paucity of ideas, and that feebleness of the perceptive powers, in consequence of which they do not faithfully represent the impressions received from without. " In mania, when the memory fails, it is because new ideas have crowded into the mind, and are mingled up and confounded with the past; in dementia the same effect is produced by an obliteration of past impres- sions as soon as they are made, from a want of sufficient power to retain them. In the former the mental operations are characterized by hurry and confusion ; in the latter by extreme slowness and frequent apparent suspension of the thinking process. In the former, the habits and affec- tions undergo a great change, becoming strange and inconsistent from the beginning, and the persons and things that once pleased and inter- ested, viewed Avith indifference or aversion. In the latter, the moral habits and natural feelings, so far as they are manifested at all, lose none of their ordinary character. The temper may be more irritable, but the moral disposition evinces none of that perversity which charac- terizes mania. " In dementia, the mind is susceptible of only feeble and transitory impressions, and manifests little reflection even upon these. They come and go without leaving any trace of their presence behind them. The intention is incapable of more than a momentary effort, one idea suc- ceding another with but little connection or coherence."(/) IX. Mental unsoundness accompanied with delirium. 1st. General Delirium. § 235. What distinguishes delirium from the delusions of the senses is, that in the latter the sensational faculties are really acted upon, subjectively, though in an eccentric manner, while in the former the in- terior reproductive activity of the brain predominates in the generation of phantoms.(#) Consciousness is disturbed at the same time, and there is incoherent speaking and action, as if it were a Avaking dream. Ex- ternal objects are perceived indistinctly, or not at all, and on the whole there is the less delirium, the more activity there is in the peripheric nerves, for Avhich reason hydrocephalic children generally relapse into delirium when they cease vomiting. The external senses may, however, (/) Ray on Insanity, pp. 292, 293. (g) Haygen. Vol. II. p. 707 ; Schurmayer, &c. \ 555. 198 delirium : be at the same time open to perceptions, and may convey them; but the patient is so controlled by his internal dreams as to act as if they did not exist. Here there is, accordingly, a predominance of dreams, Avhich de- prives the individual of the possibility of the power of maintaining a cor- responding relation with the external Avorld. Delirium may, therefore, be defined as a state of dreams brought on, not by sleep, but by disease. Like a dream, a delirium may become active, the beginning of Avhich is the speaking delirium. Where a crime or misdemeanor proceeds from a delirium, there is no freedom of agency, i. e., the action is to be re- garded as the product of a morbid state of mind. It is judicious for forensico-medical purposes, to distinguish par- ticularly the folloAving forms of delirium: § 236. (a.) Depressed Delirium, Avhich is both passive and active. § 237. (b.) Maniacal delirium, which comprises several varieties, depending upon the frame of mind by which it is accompanied.(h) (h) The most remarkable phenomenon of mental unsoundness (we translate from Morel) is unquestionably delirium, whether it shows itself in words or deeds. Delirium, considered as an essential symptom of insanity, should possess a type of continuity, should connect it- self with lesions of a special nature, and should present altogether the elements of a certain systemization of the frenzied conceptions. This systemization alone gives to the delirium which produced it, a particular stamp. It shows off what has been called the fixing of ideas, and that logic peculiar to the insane that leads them to the justification of the falsest conceptions, and the most deplorable acts. If it was otherwise, who could have flattered himself that he had escaped insanity; for we have all suffered in a more or less degree the phenomena of delirium. We are delirious during fever, under the influence of spirituous liquors, as also of some narcotics. Febrile delirium is a generic term com- prising the universality of abnormal phenomena that can in a more or less permanent manner, in a given disease, hinder the association of our ideas, or that directs this asso- ciation in the way of producing illusions and hallucinations of all kinds. The word insanity is likewise a generic expression for pointing out the universality of the abnormal phenomena which, under the united influence of physical and psychical causes, can, in a more or less permanent manner, pervert our manner of feeling and seeing, or in other words, bewilder our understanding. In this point of view, febrile delirium and the delirium of madness are the same, in- asmuch as deliriums are identical; but it is excessively important not to confound the symptoms with the diseases that produced them. An individual suffering from an acute disease approaches the period of convalescence. At the approach of night, or whenever he shuts his eyes, fantastical apparitions besiege him. He himself recognizes that these painful impressions are the results of his fever; or if he does not recognize it at the first glance, he receives the explanations of those sur- rounding him. He raves before sleeping, and it is not strange if he still raved under the influence of the depression as well as of exaltations of the organs of the senses. Upon awaking, he makes known to his relations and friends the fatiguing sensations that his dreams have produced, and seems to search with eagerness for explanations to reassure him. As he returns to consciousness, the motives of his judgment become more certain, the tumult of his bewildered senses is appeased, the nights are quieter, and when con- valescence follows an ascending course, there only remains a vague and confused remem- brance of the stormy scene through which he has passed Things, unfortunately, do not pass so when the delirium has a tendency to the per- manent or chronic form; and it is this which makes the essential difference between properly called febrile delirium, and maniacal delirium. There may be a period when these two deliriums possess the same external characteristics on account of the similitude of the perverted sensorial phenomena; but when the phenomenon of delirium is produced by a maniacal state, it is then a situation which often passes unnoticed in the beginning, but which, as a diagnostic element, it is of the highest importance to describe. This situation, so painful for the friends, first betrays itself in a perversion of the feel- ings, and in a complete change in the character and habits of the patient. He becomes impatient and fretful; speaks passionately, and in an unaccustomed tone. He often loses the feeling of modesty, whatever may be his age or education. His friends and re- lations attribute these disgusting phenomena to the effect of the primitive disease which shows itself with all the characteristics of an ordinary febrile delirium. But soon another general characteristics of. 199 § 238. (c) Delirium tremens.(i) § 239. (d) Metnia puerperarum, which attacks women in child-bed, and is sometimes distinguished, in addition to a high degree of violence, by leAvdness and shamelessness, and more rarely by the homicidal mania, (j) more disgusting phenomenon shows itself, and often without enlightening them. The care bestowed upon the sick person, the marks of the liveliest affection which are shown to him are repulsed, sometimes with irony and disdain, and sometimes with passion and fury. In ordinary diseases the sick person attaches himself with happiness to every thing that tends to recall him to existence. He hears with emotion of the different stages of his disease and of the delirium which was its consequence; he speaks often of its causes, deplores its effects, and makes innumerable excuses for any malignant or obscene words which may have escaped him during the delirium. The patient, on the contrary, in whom the insanity is confirmed, will not admit that he was delirious. He sustains the errors of his imagination, and takes them for realities. The hallucinations and de- lusions of all sorts which he has felt, and which still beset him, fortify him in his mad- ness. Still more, in this he systematizes his delirium, and whatever intellectual energy is left, is employed by him in establishing upon the basis of a desperate logic, motives for the new existence which he is just commencing. Several authors, basing themselves on the fact that the delirium of insanity is often found unaccompanied by fever, (delirium sine febre,) have thought that the train of physiological phenomena that accompanies the delirium of acute diseases, is sufficient to mark out the difference between these primitive conditions. This appreciation, though very true on one side, may neverthe- less lead us into error. AVe willingly admit that the delirium of acute diseases is ac- companied with redness of the checks and turgidity of the face. The expression is troubled, and there are marked changes in the circulation. The eyes are brilliant, res- piration often painful, and the excretions involuntary; the language takes an unaccus- tomed accentuation. The sick person expresses himself sometimes with vivacity; some- times with great slowness ; his sentences and his words are badly articulated ; he speaks sometimes to himself, and at other times deep drawn sighs are the only manifestations of his soul. But these phenomena are also to be met with in the delirium of insanity, and especially in the first stages of this disease. See Etudes Cliniques des Maladies Mentale, &c. M. Morel. Tome I. p. 124. Paris, 1852. (i) L. Krahmer Handbuch der Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851. \ 116. See also 7 Am. Jour, of Ins.364. See as to responsibility of persons so affected, ante,\ 36-38. Privation of stimulants, says Morel, and the employment of opiates, generally suffice to restore reason to those persons who are generally not considered as insane unless afflicted with a special affection known by the name of dypsomania; even when the fatal con- sequences resulting from the abuse of spirits impress upon the delirium, which is its con- sequence, a form of continuity which has by some authors been pointed out under the name of drunken madness. Errors made in this respect may be productive of grave con- sequences for those who are the victims of them. The following is an example : In the month of Alay, 1850, there was brought to the asylum of Moreville, a sick per- son, whom a physician's certificate represented as a dangerous madman. We observed at first in him a very great disorder of ideas, and a peculiar difficulty of expressing him- self. The face was pale, and the lips agitated with convulsive movements, and there was a general trembling of the limbs. The employment of opiates and a bath soon removed these appearances, and the next day we had a man in the perfect possession of his facul- ties before us The error in this case had arisen from the fact, that the physician's cer- tificate had been given without a proper examination of all the causes necessary to a cor- rect iudgment. If he had, indeed, gone back to the appreciation of the causes, he would have found out that very grave dissensions existed between two brothers, of whom one was this pretended madman, who, endowed with a violent but feeble character, after having yielded in the strife of discussion, ordinarily sought to console himself in alco- holic libations. It was after having swallowed a too abundant ration that a family quar- rel brought its contingent of trouble to the natural excitement that controlled him, and resulted in delirium tremens, which, if it had been better appreciated in its origin and effects, would not have brought this person to an insane asylum, and compromised in a certain degree his social position. Morel sur les Maladies Mentale. Tome I. p. 146. Pa(7) "Thomicidal propensity," as we are told by Dr. Taylor, "towards their offspring, sometimes manifests itself in women soon after parturition. It seldom appears before the third day, often not for a fortnight, and in some instances not until several weeks after delivery The most frequent period is at or about the commencement of lactation, and between that and the cessation of the lochia. According to Esquirol, it is generally 200 PARTIAL DELIRIUM. 2d. Partial. § 240. This head may be considered as including Furor transitorius, mania transitoria, transitory ravings.(k) By this, says Schurrnayer,(/) is understood an attack of frenzy, fury and raving madness, accompa- nied with more or less confusion of the senses, and of the thinking faculties, and peripheric consciousness, which arises Avithout any per- ceptible, or from a very slight external provocation, generally lasts but a short time, hardly a few hours, and after sometimes leading to the most serious consequences, leaves but an indistinct trace in the memory. It is either the opening symptom of a disturbance of the super-physical faculties which has hitherto remained occult, and now first manifests itself, or it appears in persons hitherto entirely sane, or in individuals who have already suffered from pronounced insanity, particularly from melancholy, depressed delirium, lunacy and imbecility. In the latter class of cases, the question of responsibility presents no difficulties ; far more in the former, in view of the possibility that the guilty act may have been the result of the outbreak of A'iolent passion.(U) It will then be often impossible to do more than to set forth the possibility or pro- bability of a furor transitorius, which is effected by establishing the existence of facts which may have caused it. Such are epilepsy, irregu- lar development, gastric irritations, disturbances of the menstrual or hsemorrhoidal courses, or the secretion of milk, the sudden dispersion of eruptions of the skin, sun-stroke, drunkenness, poison, violent agi- attended by a suppression of the lochia and milk. The symptoms do not differ from those of mania generally, but it may assume any of the other forms of insanity; and in one half the cases it may be traced to hereditary tendency. According to Dr. Burroughs there is delirium, with a childish disposition for harmless mischief. The woman is gay and joyous, laughing, singing, loquacious, inclined to talk obscenely, and careless of every thing around. She imagines that her food is poisoned. She may conceal the sus- picion, and merely avoid taking what is offered to her. She can recognize persons and things, and can, though perhaps will not, answer direct questions. Occasionally there is great depression of spirits, with melancholy. These facts are of some importance in cases of alleged child-murder. This state may last a few hours, or for some days or weeks, and we are told by Dr. Hartshorne, the accomplished American editor, sometimes for months and years; but it generally goes off within a few months, if not earlier. The murder of the child is generally either the result of a sudden fit of delirium, or of an un- controllable impulse, with a full knowledge of the wickedness and illegality of the act— so that the legal test of responsibility from a knowledge of right and wrong cannot be applied to such cases. Mothers have been known, before the perpetration of the murder, to request their attendants to remove the child. Such cases are commonly distinguished from deliberate infanticide by there being no attempt at concealment, nor any denial of the crime on detection. Several trials, involving a question of puerperal mania have been decided generally in favor of the plea within the last few years. Dr. Ashevell has remarked, that undue lactation may give rise to an attack of mania, under which the murder of the offspring may also be perpetrated. (Diseases of AAromen, 732.) Females in the pregnant state have been known to perpetrate the crime apparently from some sud- den perversion of their moral feelings. I am not aware that a plea of exculpation on the ground of insanity has been admitted in this country under these circumstances. (See case Ann d'Hyg, 1831, I. 374.) For an able analysis of the present state of our know- ledge on the subject of Puerperal Insanity, by Dr. Reid, see Jour. Psychol. Med. 1884, pp. 128, 284. Taylor's Med. Jurisprudence, pp. 594, 595. See as to the legal responsi- bility in such cases, ante, \ 53-61. (k) Friedreich, Handbuch der gerichtlichen Psychologie, p. 591. (I) Gericht. Med. \ 552. (II) Ante, \ 53-60. DELUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS. 201 tation, anger, dread, fright, deep shame, over-exertion of the mind. But Avhere no such probable causes are to be discovered, the examina- tion is necessarily confined to the statements of the party, and the immediate investigation of his intellectual and moral condition, the principal point of attention being the search and scrutiny of the motives of the acts, and the inquiry whether or not they were mingled with hallucinations or illusions, and whether the act was not preceded imme- diately or for some length of time by bodily disturbances, sleepless- ness, restlessness, sadness, &c. Very great difficulties are involved in those cases in which an additional doubt arises Avhether the ravings Avere not occasioned by the criminal act itself, the probability of which, with a certain class of temperaments, has been already noticed, (m) X. Mental unsoundness, as connected with delusions and hal- lucinations, (mm) 1st. General. § 241. Under this head will be treated that species of mental un- soundness which is marked by the continued and controlling existence of insane ideas, without being either accompanied with delirium or with moral-maniacal propensities to specific crimes. It may be considered as covering the same phase as the partial lunacy (partielle verrucktheit) of Schurmayer, who declares it to consist in crazy notions, with only a secondary participation of the affective faculties, without damage to the peripheric consciousness, and without a decided weakness of the intel- lectual powers. The subjects of it have completely resolved their indi- viduality into their madness, it is in their eyes an absolute truth, and all demonstration and argument in opposition to it, are idle. Persons of this kind often suffer no mark of their inward disorder to mark their external demeanor, frequently speak and act quite rationally about, and in matters outside of the circle of their hallucinations, and only suf- fer the point of derangement to transpire when it is adverted to in conver- sation or when they have occasion to write. The malady may easily lead to the gravest violations of law, for which reason it is of the greatest judi- cial interest. Where the act is clearly the result of this morbid condition of the mind, no legal responsibility can attach to it.(n) This species of mental unsoundness appears less frequently as a primary disease, than as a secondary result, developed out of prior disease, in the form of melancholy or otherwise. When the general expansive and depressive affection of the sentiments recedes, the confusion of the peripheric consciousness is dispelled, the bodily health regains its equilibrium, the patient finds himself endowed with a system of affections and perceptions to which he was before a stranger, but which revolve round one or more manifestly insane stand points. § 242. These various fancies are reducible to certain groups, which (m) See ante, \ 116-118. (mm) For full account of Hallucinations and Illusions, we would refer the reader to Les Legons Cliniques de AI. Falret, Lecons 3, 4, 5, 6., pp. 95, 185. Paris, 1854; also Etudes Psychologiques par L. F. G. Renaudin, Chap. viii. p. 388. Paris, 1854. (n) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. g 556, ante, \ 47-49. 202 DELUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS : take their point of departure, (1.) in the relations of the individual to the external world, to the supernatural, and to his own personality, or (2.) in perceptive anomalies of depression and mania. The former Ariew admits the following classification: crach-brained- ness,(o) where the erroneous notions relate to the objects and relations of the external world, and of the body of the individual; frenzy, where they concern things beyond the reach of the senses, religious mysteries and divine inspirations; folly, (Narrheit,) where the identity of the person has undergone a change, and advanced to a higher stage of worldly honors. In the latter view, the subject matter of the delusion generally depends upon the kind of erroneous notion which accompa- nied the preceding stages of depression and mania. The delusion itself is of a depressing or elevating description. The depressive form suh- diAddes as follows: (a.) Hypochondriacal delusions, Avhere anomalous bodily sensations, —delusions of the sense of touch,—suggest the idea, that particular parts of the body have been transformed, that there are parasitic ani- mals in them, or injurious substances, which must be removed, &c. (b.) Demoniacal delusions. The patients declare and maintain, with perfect self-possession and entire calmness, that demoniac beings or other persons, living or dead, have their seat in their bodies.(oo) (c.) Such delusions,(p) called by Ellinger " Concentric," as con- sist in the delusion that the personal reputation of the sufferer has been injured by a real or imaginary misfortune, that the infamy in- curred has reached the ears of the highest circles,—impressions still further confirmed by delusions of the sense of hearing,—and that no resource is left but either seclusion from all intercourse with mankind, or restitution of good fame by some brilliant exploit. (d.) Peripheric delusions, in which the patients regard themselves as the objects of a plot on the part of the authorities or of their relatives, or of some secret society, surrounded by spies and functionaries of the secret police, watched and dogged at every step, injured bodily and mentally in action and repose; persecuted and endangered in life and property, or that they are beleaguered by thieves, robbers, and murderers, or that spirits hover in the air to torment and disquiet them, &c. The elevating phase of this species of mental unsoundness, subdivides itself, according to Schiirmayer(j!?p):— (a.) Religious delusions, which may be considered in connection with daemonia-mania, already noticed,^) in which the patient pretends to stand in a particular position, as regards degree and distinction, in the eye of God, to have been appointed censor, prophet, reformer, and Messiah, &c.; it is generally accompanied with hallucinations of sight and sound, and often leads to the most dreadful crimes. (b.) Delusions of pride. The patients suppose themselves called, by their qualifications of person and mind, to the most important missions. (c.) Delusions of vanity. The delusion here is a supposed descent (o) <•' A little cracked," to use Dr. Rush's popular synonyme, for what he at the same time tells us is expressed by the Scotch by the phrase " having a bee in his bonnet." (oo) See ante, \ 210-219. (p) Ellinger, p. 132. (pp) Med. Jour. \ 556. (g) Ante, § 210-221. CLASSIFICATION OF. 203 from a princely lineage, elevation to a higher social position, &c, the enjoyment of which, however, is destroyed by the machinations of the envious and malevolent. (d.)^ Sexual delusion, which is sometimes of a more intellectual, sometimes of a more carnal nature, is a state of mind in which the pa- tients suppose that, in consequence of their personal charms or other advantages, either all people of the opposite sex, or even persons occu- pying a higher rank, such as princes, are in love with, or betrothed to them in spirit. This is attended with many hallucinations, particularly of the sexual kind.(g^) § 243. It is not to be denied that the proper consideration of this species of mental unsoundness presents great difficulties, and the prac- tical suggestions of Ellinger(r) are indeed worthy of peculiar attention. He notices the following phases : "1. An impression of having sustained wrongs at the hands of cer- tain persons, against whom revenge is meditated and executed. Here the diseased individual often acts on mature reflection, and in the full knowledge that he has no right to take revenge, and of the conse- quences which ordinarily ensue, and then it may occur either that he prefers undergoing the extremity of the law, and perishing together Avith the supposed wrong-doer, to remaining longer exposed to his assaults, or that he proceeds on the ground of his known and estab- lished insanity, calculating to escape responsibility and punishment on the strength of the indulgence accorded to his case. Here there ap- pears in general some ground to assume a moral responsibility, (rr) " 2. An impression that the patient is acting at the instigation, or under the constraint of demons. In this case it might become neces- sary to inquire Avhether, and in how far, the patient understood that the demands of the demons were wrongful, and that he was at liberty to withstand them, and whether, and in how far, it was actually in his power to withstand them. " 3. The patient imagines himself beset by thieves, &c, and neither sure of his property nor of his life. This may perhaps be treated as a case of self-defence, and all responsibility excluded. " 4. The self-consciousness of the patient is perverted, and he acts with that plentitude of power with which he is invested in vieAv of his position and his destiny, in religion, politics, &c. In this case, as under the third position, responsibility is out of the question. " But as a fixed idea never occurs in such isolation as is erroneously supposed, there being always a series of phantoms connected into a system, the outlines of which it may be, perhaps, impossible to define with accuracy; as the entire affective life has become altered and irre- gular, the general vieAvs of men and things having become distorted, and illusions of the senses being often brought to light by a rigid scru- tiny, which entirely escaped the eye of the superficial observer; as the action, re-action, and intro-action of the psychical faculties is no longer measurable by the ordinary standard: opinions must be given with the greatest circumspection and every possible reservation, whenever the con- nection or want of connection betiveen the illusion and the deed is not perfectly evident."(s) (qq) Ante, I 199. (r) p. 137. (rr) See ante, § 47-49. (*) Ibid. 204 DELUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS. It is not easy to mistake between the error of a lunatic and the error of a sane man. The decisive point of difference between them is, that in the latter case, the action of the thinking faculties, from whatever cause it be, only terminates too soon, and before the entire subject has been thoroughly sifted, and that such an error, after having been pro- perly refuted, can only be maintained by dint of obstinacy or indo- lence. In insanity, on the contrary, the error of the understanding is occasioned by the abnormal function of the perceptive faculty. One or tA\ro prevailing schemes of perception(ss) are applied to almost all other perceptions to Avhich they can be adjusted in any way, and thus one and the same tout ensemble of perceptions is continually repro- ducing itself on the slightest provocation. Here the chain of associa- tions loses, in the eye of the individual, its accidental, personal, and contingent character, and, by its constant recurrence, deludes the understanding with the idea that the same connection subsists between the objects in reality as in the imagination of the individual, until at last reason herself is misled into seeing a necessary relation of cause and effect in the perceptions which it finds itself invariably associated. The individual is therefore compelled to think accordingly, and even if it is sometimes brought, by instruction, to acknowledge its error, it is only to relapse into it, not so much from obstinacy, as because of this com- pulsory synthesis of the perceptive faculties. A sane man in error retains the power of doubting, not the madman. This condition of the perceptive faculties is also the cause of the great indifference manifested towards surrounding things, of the dreamy manner and the illusions growing out of it. It is also a matter of course that the perceptions, by their constant recurrence, cease to be mere perceptions, but subse- quently take rank as thoughts and ideas, in consequence of their con- stant action upon the understanding, and their assumption of the form of propositions.(t) § 244. Delusion may spread in such a way as to cover the whole surface of the mind, leaving no sound perception untouched. It is then distinguished by the general want of connection and consistency between the perceptions, and by the absence of any symptom of positive feebleness of the understanding, in spite of the disruption of the thread of ideas and the incongruous juxtaposition of the fragments. Dr. Rush, in the folloAving report given by him of the conversation of a patient laboring under this phase, very happily illustrates this inco- herence, and at the same time the occasional point by Avhich its intellec- tual operations are distinguished: — "No man can serve two masters. I am Philip, King of Macedonia, lawful son of Mary, Queen of Scots, born in Philadelphia. I have been happy enough ever since I have seen General Washington with a silk handkerchief, in High street. Money commands sublunary things, and makes the mare go; it will buy salt mackerel made of ten-penny nails. Enjoyment is the happiness of virtue. Yesterday cannot be recalled. I can only walk in the night- time, Avhen I can eat pudding enough. I shall be eight years old to-morrow. They say R. W. is in partnership with J. W. I believe (ss) Compare Hagen, Vol. II. p. 707. (I) Ibid. p. 818. PARTIAL DELUSIONS. 205 they are about as good as people in common—not better, only on certain occasions, when, for instance, a man wants to buy chincopins, and to import salt to feed pigs. Tanned leather was imported first by lawyers. Morality with virtue, is like vice not corrected. L. B. came to your house and stole a coffee-pot, in the twenty-fourth year of his majesty's reign. Plum-pudding and Irish potatoes make a very good dinner. Nothing in man is comprehensible in it. Born in Philadelphia. Our fore-fathers were better to us than our children, because they were chosen for their honesty, truth, virtue and innocence. The Queen's broad R originated from a British forty-tAVO pounder, which makes too loud a report for me. I have no more to say. I am thankful—I am no Avorse this season ; and that I am sound in mind and memory, and could steer a ship at sea, but am afraid of the tiller. * * * Son of Mary, Queen of Scots. Born in Philadelphia. Born in Philadel- phia. King of Macedonia."(u) And Shakspeare gives, with equal truth, the following soliloquy of a, madman, in whom the depressing rather than the elating phase is exhibited: "AArho gives any thing to poor Tom, Whom the foul fiend has led through fire, And through flame, through ford and whirlpool, Over bog and quagmire, that hath laid Knives under his pillow, and halters in his pew, Set rats-bane by his porridge, and made him to Ride upon a bay trotting horse over fom--inch Bridges, and to course his own shadow for a traitor." And Lear, in language still more expressive of misery, thus com- plains : -----------------" I am bound Upon a wheel of fire that mine own tears Do scald like molten lead." 2d. Partial Delusion.(v) § 245. Under this head maybe enumerated, Delusions of the Senses, Illusions and Hallucinations. A distinction is very properly drawn by Schurmayer, following in this respect the general current of modern opinion, between illusions and hallucinations, the former comprising mistakes in the conception and interpretation of the perception of objects actually present, while in the latter, the perception which originates in a diseased action of the senses, appears to the patient as if the sensation were produced by a real external object acting upon fllP SGIlSGS.l *W) The same distinction is thus stated by Dr. Taylor : " Hallucinations are those sensations which are supposed by the patient to be produced (u) Rush on the Mind, pp. 242-243. . (vi See the very interesting discussion of this point by Feuchtersleben,—Principles of Medical Psychology, being the outlines of a course of Lectures by Baron Von Feuch- tersleben, M. D. Vienne, 1845. Translated from the German by the late H Evans Lloyd, Esq. Revised and edited by G. B. Babington, M. D., b. R. S., &c. London, printed for the Sydenham Society, 1847, pp. 279-343. (w) Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. § 554. 206 HALLUCINATIONS : by external impressions, although no material objects may act upon the senses at the time.(.r) Illusions are the sensations produced by the false perception of objects."(y) "When a hallucination," he proceeds to say, " or an illusion is believed to have a real and positive existence, and this belief is not removed either by reflection or an appeal to the other senses, the individual is said to labor under a delusion ; but Avhen the false sensation is immediately detected and is not acted upon as if it Avere real, then the person is sane." "As a morbid condition of the brain," says Sir Benjamin Brodie, "may produce the impression of visible objects, or of voices, which have no real existence, so it may also produce notions of a more com- plex and abstract character, and these may be constantly obtruded on the mind, so that the individual is unable to withdraw his attention from them, being, as it would seem, as much beyond the influence of volition as the muscles of a paralytic limb. Thus, one person believes himself to be ruined as to his Avorldly affairs, and that he and his family, though really in affluence, are reduced to extreme poverty ; while another is persuaded that he is in possession of unbounded wealth, the consequence being that he is in danger of being ruined by extra- vagance ; and a third, is under the apprehension of his being accused of some dreadful crime, and perhaps seeks refuge from his fears in self-destruction. It is more difficult to escape from the latter than from the former class of illusions, as the appeal lies not from one sense to another, but to a more refined process of thought and reflection, and the examination of evidence, "(z) We may step for a moment from the strict line of discussion to notice the striking remarks on this point of the great Scotch metaphy- sician. " Several phenomena in human nature," says Dr. Reid, "lead us to conjecture that, in the earliest period of life, we are apt to think every object about us to be animated. Judging of them by ourselves, we ascribe to them the feelings we are conscious of in ourselves. So we see a little girl judges of her doll, and of her playthings. And so we see rude nations judge of the heavenly bodies, of the elements, and of the sea, rivers and fountains. If this be so, it ought not to be said that by reason and experience we learn that certain things are in- animate, to which at first we ascribed life and intelligence. If this be true, it is less surprising that, before reflection, we should for a moment relapse into this prejudice of our early years, and treat things as if they had life which we once believed to have it. It does not much affect our present argument, whether this be or be not the cause why a dog pursues and gnashes at the stone that hurt him ; and why a man in a passion, for losing at a play, sometimes wreaks his vengeance on the cards or dice. It is not strange that a blind animal impulse should sometimes lose its proper direction. In brutes, this has no bad conse- quence ; in men, the least ray of reflection corrects it and shows its absurdity, "(a) (x) See on this subject, remarks by Dr. Sigmond, Jour, of Psychol. Med. 1848. p. 585. (y) Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence, p. 552. (z) Psychological Inquiries, &c. London, 1854. p. 79. (a) Reid on the active powers of Malevolent Affection, p. 569. See also Schurmayer, Gericht. Med. § 554. CLASSIFICATION OF. 207 "Hallucinations," says Ellinger, "generally occur in every form of mental derangement, but chiefly in the higher stages of depression and mania, in deliriums, in lunacy and in confusion of mind, and lead to the commission of crimes, particularly Avhen the patient Avas origin- ally not without the taint of culpable passions."(5) For judicial purposes it will be found advantageous to arrange hallucinations under the four folloAving heads : § 246. 1. In individuals Avho show no signs of disorder in their affec- tive or intellectual systems, they will not operate to suspend the respon- sibility of the agent; but they may become the motives of violations of the law.(c) § 247. 2. In individuals in whom the disease of the mind has made some progress, but has not yet acquired a permanent form; the victims often make no secret of them, and recognize them as intruders into the working of their thoughts ; while in other cases, they keep them to themselves. § 248. 3. In persons who are in a state of total drunkenness, under the influence of poison, or overpowered by sleep, where external con- sciousness is entirely gone, and utter confusion of the senses obtains in such cases the free power of self-control may be entirely dislodged. § 249. 4. In individuals Avhose insanity is equally mature and mani- fest, the absence of freedom of agency is not to be doubted; the res- ponsibility of such persons inforo is, therefore, out of the question. § 250. According to Hagen,(c£) the cause of the delusions of the senses is either a mere physical stimulus which, acting upon the foun- tain heads of the sensational nerves in the brain, produces eccentric sensations, and induces the individual to incorporate his sensations into an image, in which case it will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case, especially on the mental and moral condition of the individual, whether or not such apparitions are believed to be genuine. And upon another hypothesis, suggested by the same author, the disease is only a strong morbid susceptibility of the brain to eccentric sensations, Avith which some fancy or other comes into such a collision as to act as the stimulating cause of a paroxysm, bringing, at the same time, a com- plete phantom before the external sense, just as in cases of convulsive diseases, St. Vitus's dance, &c, an intended slight motion may bring a convulsion into that particular system of muscles. Great care must be taken, however, not to include under this head Avhat is not really a delusion of the senses. If, for instance, a madman takes a person or a black cat for the devil, there is no delusion of the senses. On the con- (b) Ellinger. p. 167. (c) Boswell says, " Dr. Johnson mentioned a thing as not unfrequent, of which he (Boswell) had never heard before—being called, that is, hearing one's name pronounced by the voice of a known person at a great distance, far beyond the possibility of being reached by any sound, uttered by human organs. An acquaintance, on whose veracity, Boswell says, he could place every dependence, told him that, walking home one even- ing to Kilmarnock, he heard himself called from a wood, by the voice of a brother who had gone to America, and the next packet brought the account of that brother's death. Macbean asserted that this inexplicable calling was a thing very well known. Dr. John- son said, that one day, at Oxford, as he was turning the key of his chamber, he heard distinctly his mother call Sam! She was then at Litchfield; but nothing ensued." Winslow's Anatomy of Suicide, pp. 127-128. (d) Compare Wagner's Handwoerterbuch der Physiologic Vol. II. p. 811. 208 HALLUCINATIONS AND DELUSIONS. trary, in supposing the devil to have assumed such a shape, the maniac only directs his madness to an object of which in itself he has a correct perception. Delusions also, Ave are admonished by Schurmayer, must not be mistaken for confusion of the senses, Avhich consists in an entire obstruction of the conceptions, an incapacity to obtain adequate apper- ceptions, and sometimes in an entire want of objective consciousness and recollection. § 251. The following interesting illustration of partial delusion is given to us in Dr. Mayo's late work: " In a case to Avhich I Avas called in by Dr. Monro, a few years ago, it was our painful duty to resist the liberation of a patient, an old lady, Avhose confinement under certificates had continued for sixteen years. For six years she Avas described as having been in a state, first of acute, and then of chronic mania. For many years, we learned, that she had regained the power of conversing consecutively and sensibly, indeed without the smallest evidence of incoherent or irrational remark, and such appeared to us, her present state. The objections which existed to her being then considered sane, if she had been insane up to the time we saw her, on the ground of her advanced age, weighed on our minds, but seemed insufficient. The evidence of her attendants, who considered her still insane, on the ground of occasional outbreaks of temper, was that of interested wit- nesses. She was a patient in chancery, and the visiting physicians had become favorably disposed to her enlargement, as a sound-minded per- son. Now the question Avas, in this instance, determined in our minds, by a discovery of a very remarkable notional delusion which held its ground in her mind. In a set of draAvers in this lady's bed- room, and in certain trunks, there, to which we Avere conducted witnout her knowledge, Ave witnessed a large and very heterogeneous and dirty collection (dirtiness had been a symptom of her insane state) consisting of old bottles, broken cups and saucers, brass knobs, bits of old string, shreds of linen and cloth, small bundles of wood such as light fires, pieces having been apparently picked up and tied together ; a cup containing dirty food of the most disgusting appearance, which had evidently been long there; bits of valueless stones, coals, nails, &c. This accumula- tion AArhich could not have been extemporized by the attendants to make out a case, and of which accordingly the patient must have been long aware, would have occasioned strong doubts as to her sanity, even if no prior grounds of suspicion had existed; but, carefully preserved by one, Avho, up to a recent date, had been so far suspected of insanity that she had not been set free by the visiting commissioners ; who was in her seventy-first year, and therefore the less likely to have obtained a cure, it became the opinion of Dr. Monro and myself, a conclusive ground for resisting this lady's immediate enlargement."(e) § 252. Particular hallucinations are classified by Abercrombie under the following heads:— 1. Propensities of character, which had been kept under restraint by reason or by external circumstances, or old habits which had been sub- dued or restrained, developing themselves without control and leading (e) Mayo on Medical Testimony in Lunacy, pp. 33, 34. PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF HALLUCINATIONS. 209 the mind into trains of fancies arising out of them. Thus, a man of an aspiring, ambitious character may imagine himself a king or great personage; Avhile in a man of a timid, suspicious disposition, the mind may fix upon some supposed injury, or loss either of property or reputation. 2. Old associations recalled into the mind, and mixed up perhaps with more recent occurrences, in the same manner as Ave often see in dreaming. A lady, mentioned by Dr. Gooch, who became insane in consequence of an alarm from a house on fire in her neighborhood, im- agined that she was the Virgin Mary, and had a luminous halo around her head. 3. Visions of the imagination which have formerly been indulged in, of that kind which we call waking dreams, or castle-building, recurring to the mind in this condition, and now believed to have a real existence, I have been able to trace to this source of the hallucination. In one case, for example, it turned upon an office to which the individual imagined he had been appointed; and it Avas impossible to persuade him to the contrary, or even that the office was not vacant. He afterwards ac- knowledged that his fancy had, at various times, been fixed upon that appointment, though there Avere no circumstances that warranted him in entertaining any expectation of it. In a man, mentioned by Dr. Morison, the hallucination turned upon circumstances which had been mentioned when his fortune Avas told by a gipsy. 4. Bodily feelings giving rise to trains of associations, in the same extravagant manner as in dreaming. A man, mentioned by Dr. Rush, imagined that he had a Caffre in his stomach, who had got in at the Cape of Good Hope, and had occasioned him a constant uneasiness ever since. In such a case, it is probable, that there had been some fixed or frequent uneasy feeling at the stomach, and that about the com- mencement of his complaint, he had been strongly impressed by some transaction in which a Caffre was concerned. 5. There seems reason to believe that the hallucinations of the insane are often influenced by a certain sense of the new and singular state in which their mental powers really are, and a certain feeling, though confused and ill-defined, of the loss of that power over their mental processes which they possessed when in health."(/) § 253. Hallucinations involving a belief that the patient has been transformed into various species of animals have been at times almost epidemic. Analogous to these is the belief that worms, frogs, or snakes have taken up their abode in the head or stomach, which consume the brain or entrails. Men have fancied themselves pregnant, and imagined themselves shadows or corpses, or to be constructed of glass, butter, or wax. At one time the belief in a transformation into wolves or other wild animals became so prevalent as to acquire a title to itself (Lycan- thropia). In cases of this last phase the disease became so uncontrol- lable as to impel its victim to a close imitation of the wild animal itself, falling upon other men and animals, and snapping at and biting them. Andral relates a case of a child of fourteen years, who tore wildly (/) Abercrombie on the Intellectual powers, pp. 255, 256. 210 LUCID INTERVALS. about the fields, biting other children that came in its way, and pro- ducing the greatest consternation in the neighborhood.^) XL Mental unsoundness as connected with lucid intervals.(h) § 254. Mental diseases are not ahvays continuous, but they improve, and alter their form in such a manner as to exhibit abatement or cessation of the disease. When, therefore, an illegal act has been committed by a man at such a time, i. e. after the occurrence of a manifest disorder of his mental faculties, the question at once arises, whether the mental alienation has really ceased, or Avhether it is not still present in a slumbering state, and possibly influential in determin- ing the act.(i) (#) Cours de patholog. Interne. Tome III. Paris, 1836. 8 p. 186. The curious will find a very interesting disquisition on this point in AVierus's work De praestigiis diemo- num, Lib. IV. c. 23. (h) L. Krahmer, Handbuch der Gericht. Med. Halle, C. A. Schwetschke, 1851, \ 124. (?) The subject of lucid intervals has lately been investigated in a very learned treatise by Dr. Lehr (Die Lehr von den lichten Zwischenzeiten in Geritchtlich. Medi- cinisher Beziehung. Henke Zeitschrift, 3). Two views of lucid intervals present them- selves, which vary widely in their judicial relations, one of which (that espoused by Dr. L.) regards them as a suspension of the disease, while the other treats them merely as a temporary suppression of its manifestation. AVe condense from M. Renaudin the following very interesting remarks on this point:— Lucid intervals is the name ordinarily given to the condition in which the insane per- son is. placed at the end of a strong delirious excitement, or when he awakes from a profound stupor. AVe are generally led to believe the existence of a lucid interval when delirious ideas no longer manifest themselves, and when the insane person shows himself accessible to other pre-occupations, and thus appears to enjoy the full amount of moral liberty allowed to him. It has been already said that the approach of insanity is rarely sudden; and that being based, in some respect, upon a natural or acquired predisposition, it is preceded by a period of incubation, that paves the way for a manifestation of the disorder often long before its actual appearance. When a retrospective examination of the antecedents of the disease is made, a proof is found of the latent advances which insanity makes. But under this apparent reason is concealed a disorder, which makes a sensible pro- gression every day. Irritability is developed; the regimen is irregular; the affective sentiments are changed or perverted; everything has become an object of contrariety: delirious convictions are organized upon the perceptive errors every day more numerous; and finally insanity shows itself in a critical excitement, the more decided as the lesion of sensibility has become more complete, and as the incubation is marked by a more or less concentrated struggle. The patient is then isolated ; irritating causes are removed, and immediately the over-excitement diminishes ; a calmness succeeds. This transient remission, however, ceases as soon as the unhealthy influence regains its empire, and we then see that which was called a lucid interval, was, in fact, but a transient remission. Continuity is essentially the characteristic of monomania and lypomania. Either the insane person, by convalescence, advances to a complete cure, or he still remains affected with the original type. Every intermediate situation is inadmissible, except when an incidental affection, causing a kind of metastasis, for the moment suspends or masks the madness. Whenever it is not a true crisis, it only causes a fleeting remission of the symptoms rather than of the pathological condition; and the physician assumes a serious responsibility when, simply on the face of this apparent calm, he conceives the possibility of the patient's return to his family, where but too soon the causes will be found reunited that restore to insanity all its intensity. It is in not sufficiently resisting the desires of friends, that the physician paves the way for these returns, which are less relapses than the recrudescence of an uncured pathological state. But though, in an absolute diagnostic point of view, we reject the lucid interval; LUCID INTERVALS. 211 As indicated above, there is, strictly speaking, but one species of unsoundness of mind, and Avhat we term forms, are more properly stages though, when the existence of mental unsoundness has been once shown, we do not admit that the remissions diminish irresponsibility; we still think that the deranged can perform certain acts with a perfect knowledge of cause, and can even exercise his intelli- gence, provided that he is placed under the influence of certain protecting conditions. The regulating discipline of an asylum tends greatly to this result, and therefore it is not astonishing if our insane can perform certain civil acts of a simple character, and may consent to a division of property, or even authorize a marriage. The legality of the act is essentially subordinate to a previous appreciation of the extent of the delirium at the time, and the relations existing between the action and the delirious conceptions. So, though not admitting the existence of a lucid interval, we still believe that the madman may be placed in a situation that permits him to appreciate the action demanded of him. In a criminal point of view, this distinction cannot be established, since the action is a logical consequence of the madness; and daily observation teaches us that it is during these moments of apparent sanity that the maniac meditates and prepares the most dangerous projects, as much against himself as against others. The ingenious combina- tion of means that the lypomaniac uses in order to obtain his object, is urged in vain as proof of lucidity; since the delirious conceptions, whilst rendering the premises false, are far from always deranging the logical chain of the other intellectual operations. We should then consider the lypomaniac as an oppressed person who conspires against his enemies, and as he is the most feeble, he calls cunning to the aid of his legitimate means of defence. In the maniac, especially in the paroxysm, we observe a disordered agitation, accom- panied with such an amount of incoherence that the affected person appears to be rather the sport of some strange motive power than the originator of this extreme mobility. There are times when even this storm is dissipated as if by enchantment. Dissimulation becomes possible for a certain time; the delirium is in some degree suspended, and we may be led to suppose a spontaneous return to reason. How often have we seen maniacs cease to rave during the questioning of the judge, and immediately afterwards recom- mence their course of wanderings. The more vivid the excitement is, the more considerable is the expenditure of the vital forces ; so that when it has lasted a certain time, a period of prostration arrives; but, allowing a remission of some somatic symptoms, still the incoherence of ideas is per- sistent with other symptoms. Sometimes the transition is rapid; and then, above all, is it necessary to attribute the situation to its true causes, in order not to expose the ex- aminer to an error of diagnosis. Periodicity is generally observed in mania; and it is then that insanity of actions must be distinguished from insanity of ideas. Though often united, still they are sometimes isolated from each other, or follow one another. It is on this account that the most extravagant acts sometimes correspond with a certain intellectual lucidity, which at the first glance may impose upon us; and it is then that we observe persons thus insane justify their actions by the most specious reasonings. We must not, how- ever, take this intellectual waking for a lucid interval; for, although masked, the deli- rium still continues. In other cases, the madness is less intense. All excitement has disappeared, and the insane person answers all our questions so reasonably as to lead us to infer the existence of a lucid interval; but the illusion is soon destroyed when, in pushing our examina- tion, we weary him with questions : he becomes agitated; loses the thread of his ideas; becomes more and more incoherent, and so proves to us that he has had what scarcely might be called a transitory remission. There are cases where the periodicity appears more determined, and where the con- duct of the patient betrays no sign of the insanity which he formerly manifested. The lucid interval can perhaps be sometimes admitted under these circumstances; but it is still necessary to exercise some caution in regard to the value of these appearances. If the patient denies his situation; if he refuses to acknowledge the principal acts which have characterized his paroxysm; if he seeks to attribute them to some foreign cause, it is a proof that the reason is not sound, and that a paroxysm is always imminent; and lucidity cannot be admitted, since errors of perception and judgment still exist. This observation especially applies to that kind of mania in which excessive irritability plays the principal part; where the remissions are irregular, and the paroxysms are shown under the influence of the slightest cause. We cannot, then, consider this momentary repose of a permanent effect which is always ready to break out, as a lucid interval. AVe might say as much of the period of prostration following a period of strong excitement. When periodicity is complete, it is recognized at first by the appearance of the pa- 212 LUCID INTERVALS. of one and the same disease. This disease, however, may become fixed for life at one or the other stage, or may-travel slowly or rapidly, and so to speak, imperceptibly from one stage to the other, if recovery does not intervene. We must therefore look for criteria to prove that the symptoms observed are not those of a progress of the disease, but of recover//, for Avithout such criteria we should be induced to presume the continuance of the disorder. The folloAving suggestions, given by El- linger, and repeated by Schurmayer, are important in the considera- tion and decision of such cases. As a general thing, there is no reco- very from mental unsoundness which has been attended with permanent and general delusion: in the other forms it sometimes, though very rarely, takes place suddenly, the consequence of strong excitement, as a sudden outburst of rage, or even in sleep, Avithout any preceding phy- sical or moral change. Its general development, hoAvever, is slow, being marked with a gradual lessening of the affective irritations, Avith an increased coherency and consequentiality of thought, with a return of the natural inclinations and appetites, of sleep and nourishment, and with a disappearance of the physical anomalies. Sometimes, however, it advances with a more fluctuating step, agitated as it Avere with men- roxysm, which has, in some measure, a critical termination. The lucid interval can then be admitted, if there is a complete contrast between the two situations, if the pa- tient appreciates them, and if the manifestation of each fit is shown by an approach which is always regular, and which is always produced under the influence of the same causes. It is, if we can thus express ourselves, a momentary cure, which is prolonged for a long- er or shorter period of time, and which often finishes by becoming a complete one. Finally, when the affection passes to the chronic state, the patient raves less, because excitement fails him, and also because his will is in want of a regulating force. Wc cannot consider this as a lucid interval where the patient is unable to act except when directed by another's mind. AVhen mania passes into dementia, the transition is some- times shown by an apparent re-awakening of reason, which is, as it were, its last glim- mer. Generally, it is the mobility of maniacs which is most favorable to the action of the derivations whose results sufficiently impose upon the superficial observer so as to cause him to admit the existence of a lucid interval. The stimulated attention of these patients fixes, for a moment, this mobility, directs cunning towards the accomplishment of a project, where a personality is in play, and we are often surprised with the address shown in organizing a plan of escape. But, in spite of this incidental derivation, the maniacal temperament still remains the same, unless, indeed, this transitory action of the mind should become a crisis. Dementia, where the psychico-somatic existence is gradually extinguished, is a ruin in which a trace of a better time is sometimes found. If, occasionally, remembrances of the past show themselves, this apparent lucid interval is no more than a retrospective reasoning without actual application. When, instead of being the termination of the other forms, dementia is primitive or idiopathic, the lucid intervals can be sufficiently clearly drawn, and the diagnosis does not present as many difficulties as in the other forms. In fact, the demented cannot dissimulate; since, to do this, a reactive power would be necessary, which in him is entirely wanting. He cannot conceal his incapacity under the mask of an energy whose absence is the principal feature of his disease. More submissive than the others to somatic influences, he is sometimes a prey to an almost maniacal excitement; but if this is not critical, it forms an expenditure of power resulting in pure loss, and making one more step in this period of prostration. In a word, if the man lives for a moment in the past, he is as nothing in the present; and it is under privilege of this restriction that a lucid interval, provoked by some foreign stimulant, but without root in an exhausted moral system, can be admitted. Hence we see that the lucid interval is of much rarer occurrence in mental unsound- ness than is generally thought. It is in mania that the periodicity of regular paroxysms permits us to admit it; but then, also, it is still necessary to guard against being im- posed upon by a remission of excitement, which is not that of the frenzied condition.— See Etudes Physio-Somatiques sur l'Alienation Mentale, par L. E. F. Renaudin, chap. ix. p. 522. Paris, 1854. LUCID INTERVALS. 213 tal tides, the flood of each of which, however, falls below the high water-mark of its predecessor, while each ebb more and more nearly approaches the line of sanity. To constitute a recovery, the patient, if he has not acquired a more rational constitution of his moral character, must at least have regained that which he enjoyed before the ap- pearance of the disease: he must have re-acquired a taste for his former occupation, must again display his former inclinations and points of interest, must understand what he remembers of his disease when assisted by explanations, must speak of it as of something to which he is now superior, must clearly see the erroneous nature of the delusions under which he labored, and must be really contented and internally at peace. But if, on the other hand, the former character of the disease has only disappeared in part; if the old insane grudge against one person or another is manifested; if there is a smothered rage, or aversion to persons or things formerly cherished; if the alleged convalescent refuses to acknoAvledge his disease in general or in regard to particular points; if he dislikes to speak of it; if his conduct is marked by unnatural irritability, suspicion or boisterous and immode- rate joy, or by other anomalous features, a perfect recovery has not taken place, although in point of intelligence, formal and substantial, not the slightest anomaly is perceptible.(j) § 255. Where the patient's recovery from a mental disorder is not clearly established, it may still be doubted whether an alleged criminal act was committed under circumstances involving the full responsibility of the agent. Whether the malady was of long or short duration, whether it was more or less intense, is here of no decisive import, and of equally little moment is the apparent reflection and preparation with which the act may have been committed. The different kinds of improvement or interruption in cases of un- soundness of mind, present various features, which vary in accordance with the duration and degree of abatement. 1. Intervallum lucidum, with a restoration of consciousness in general and of insight into the past and present, but Avithout entire clearness, and Avith the continuance of a more, though not entirely subdued tem- perament. The patient is not yet the same as he was before the disease overtook him. If he was, he would have to be regarded as restored to health, and there would, in its strict meaning, be no question as to a lucid interval. 2. Remission differs from a lucid interval only in degree, being gene- rally attended with a subsidence of the external manifestations of the disease, not sufficient, however, to be mistaken for recovery. 3. Alternation is the term given to the change from one form of mental unsoundness to another, particularly from depression to mania and the converse, not however from psychical to bodily, or from bodily to psychical manifestations. Where for instance the individual has long suffered from morbid depression or elation of spirits, this may gra- dually decrease and give place to an apparent return of health, which hoAvever does not last long, but sooner or later lapses into the opposite condition, so that depression tujjns into mania, and mania into depres- sion. (j) Compare Ellinger, p. 169. Schurmayer, \ 573. 214 LUCID INTERVALS. 4. Intermission, when the disease recurs at more or less regular periods, and the disease presents no anomalous symptoms. § 250. The restoration of moral responsibility progresses in corres- pondence Avith the progress of recovery. In passing, therefore, upon a given case, regard should be had, not only to the individual circum- stances, but also to the time intervening between the cessation of patent insanity and the commission of the offence.(k) § 257. On this point Dr. Rush thus speaks: " The longer the inter- vals between the paroxysms of madness, the more complete is the resto- ration to reason. Remissions rather than intermissions take place when the intervals are of short duration, and these distinguish it from febrile delirium in which intermissions more generally occur. In many cases every thing is remembered that passes under the notice of the patient during a paroxysm of general madness, but in those cases Avhere the memory is diseased as well as the understanding, nothing is recollected. I attended a lady in the month of October, 1802, who had crossed the Atlantic ocean during a paroxysm of derangement, without recollecting a single circumstance of her voyage any more than if she had passed the whole time in sleep. Sometimes everything is forgotten in the interval of a paroxysm, but recollected in a succeeding paroxysm. I once attended the daughter of a British officer, who had been educated in the habits of gay life, who Avas married to a Methodist minister. In her paroxysms of madness, she resumed her gay habits, spoke French and ridiculed the tenets and practices of the sect to Avhich she belonged. In the intervals of her fits, she renounced her gay habits, became zeal- ously devoted to the religious principles and ceremonies of the Metho- dists, and forgot everything she did and said during her fits of insanity. A deranged sailor, some years ago, in the Pennsylvania Hospital, fan- cied himself to be an admiral, and walked and commanded with all the dignity and authority that are connected with that high rank in the navy. He was cured and discharged: his disease sometime afterwards returned, and with it all the actions of an admiral which he assumed and imitated in his former paroxysm. It is remarkable that some per- sons when deranged talk rationally, but act irrationally, while others act rationally and talk irrationally. We had a sailor some years ago in our hospital, who spent a whole year in building and rigging a small ship in his cell. Every part of it was formed by a mind apparently in a sound state. During the whole of the year in which he was em- ployed in this work, he spoke not a word. In bringing his ship out of his cell, a part of it was broken. He immediately spoke and became violently deranged soon afterwards. Again, some madmen talk ration- ally and write irrationally; but it is more common for them to utter a few connected sentences in conversation, but not be able to connect two correct sentences together in a letter. Of this, I have known many instances in our hospital."(I) § 258. Mania frequently assumes a type in which the periods of return and of cessation are marked Avith the greatest exactness and reguhtrity.(w) Medicus, in his history of periodical diseases,(w) tells us m (k) Schiirmayer, Gericht. Med. § 574. (I) Rush on the Mind, pp 162 163 164 (m) Siebold, Gericht. Med. \ 217. (n) Kailsr. 1764. TREATMENT OF INSANE CONVICTS. 215 of a girl who was subject to a delirium Avhich came on every evening at exactly the same hour, and lasted three hours and a half. ^ Of two women attacked Avith periodical madness, one was deranged nine days in each month, and the other two days.(o) XII. Treatment of insane criminals. § 259. The enlargement of the range of insane irresponsibility which the preceding sections recognize, and particularly its extension to cases of monomania, (mania sine delirio,) makes the subject of the subsequent treatment of the insane offender of very momentous importance. EAren if we adopt the severest legal tests, yet when a case occurs of an ac- quittal, as it sometimes must on the most stringent principles, the offender, who in this case, on the law's own assumption, is a mere "animal," should be no more permitted to range the streets than should a mad dog or a mad bull. But in point of fact, there are a myriad of phases of mental unsoundness, none of which are consistent with entire responsibility, and yet each of which has its distinct degree of moral culpability attached to it. Rare, indeed, are the instances, where there is not a consciousness of guilt, which, though distorted or faint, is, nevertheless, appreciable. Still rarer are the cases of ac- quittal where the insanity of the perpetrator is so abhorrent as to exclude it from the range of imitation by those who may desire to commit crime with impunity. And if these considerations be thrown aside, there still remains the fact that insane crime becomes epidemic when it becomes heroic; and that the only way to divest it of this qual- ity, is to subject it to that wholesome but homely discipline which strips it of its sentimentality, and at the same time, destroys its capa- city for mischief. In this view it is recommended that wherever such provision do not already exist, there should be a separate penitentiary establishment for insane offenders, where they may continue to be con- fined, under the severest discipline consistent with health, until it appear on evidence taken upon due notice to the prosecuting authori- ties, that the patient is entirely sane. The propriety of such a course will appear by an examination of the subject under the following heads: (1.) Retribution. (2.) Prevention. (3.) Example. (4.) Reform. § 260. (1). Retribution. The question here depends on that of guilt. Was the offender in any sense a moral agent in the act com- plained of? The answer presupposed by the present inquiry, viz., that of the relations of a person judged irresponsible on account of insanity, is, that he Avas not. And in a strict technical sense, this is undoubtedly true. The inquiry, however, may be pushed farther back, and here the case of delirium tremens may be taken as an illustra- tion.^) Delirium tremens, even on the most stringent principles, (o) See also Henke's Zeitschr. 13 Bd. sec. 159. (p) This question has already been touched upon, and the authorities bearing upon it have been noticed. See ante, \ 62-70. In opposition to the views expressed in the text 216 TREATMENT OF INSANE CONVICTS. exonerates its subject from the penal consequences of a crime com- mitted under its direct influence. And yet it is clear, first, that deli- rium tremens is the result of a prior vicious indulgence; second, that if the patient be permitted to Avander about when the delirium conti- nues, he will do further mischief, and, third, that if the offender escape in entire immunity, the example will be likely to be folloAved as a pre- text, if not caught as a contagion. And under' these circumstances what is to be done ? It is plain that some species of confinement must be resorted to; and that if such a method of discipline be applied, it will be, in a moral point of view, thoroughly justified by the delinquency which was the voluntary cause of the diseased mental condition under which the crime was committed. § 261. What has just been said of delirium tremens applies with greater or less exactness to all other cases of mental unsoundness. Insanity, which is not congenital, or the result of accident or old age, is, in most cases, the result of causes which the patient himself might have averted if he had chosen.(pp) And particularly is this the case with that very species of mental unsoundness,—that of monomania, or moral insanity,—which is the cause of the greatest difficulty in the present connection. This is very admirably stated by Dr. Barlow in his pow- erful essay on this very point: § 262. " I have said that mental derangement and madness are dif- ferent things; thus, a person may fancy he sees others around him Avho have no existence, as in the well known cases of Nicholai of Berlin and Dr. Bostock. This is a certain degree of mental derangement while it lasts; but as both soon satisfied themselves that these personages Avere merely the creation of a morbid physical state, they were not mad. A man of less resolution would have shrunk from the labor of convincing himself that he was fooled by his senses, and Avould have insisted that the figures Avere real, and then he Avould have been mad. On these cases Dr. Connelly very justly remarks, ' Let any one reflect how Nicholai preserved his reason under such visionary and auditory delu- sions for so many months; and Avhy the English physiologist, though visited with the images which are so Avell known to be familiar Avith mad people, never lost the use of his excellent understanding. The ready answer Avill be, they never believed in their real existence. But why did they not ? And Avhy does the madman believe in their real exist- ence ? The evidence of both is the same, the plain evidence of sense. The explanation must be this. The printer of Berlin and the physician in London retained the poAver of comparison: they compared the visual objects of delusion, with the impressions of other senses,' and the per- ceptions of other persons, and became convinced of their unreality. ' This is exactly what madmen cannot do. One form of madness con- sists in this very illusion of sense, but it is conjoined with the loss or defect of the comparing poAver, and the madman concludes that what is only an illusion, is a reality. But the illusion is not the madness.' Thus, according to the opinion of this very able judge, the affection of the brain which causes these delusions, is not madness, but the want of power or resolution to examine them is. Nothing, then, but an extent will be found Air. M. B. Sampson's " Criminal Jurisprudence considered in relation to cerebral organization." London, 1843. See also ante, § 79-85. {pp) See ante, \ 79-85, where this subject is discussed. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICS. 217 of disease, Avhich destroys at once all possibility of reasoning, by anni- hilating, or entirely changing the structure of the organ, can make a man necessarily mad."(^) § 263. "A man may labor under a mental delusion," and yet be a responsible agent; and if sanity or insanity be in a great many in- stances the consequences of a greater or less resolution in exerting the power of reasoning still possessed, the same kind of motives which influ- ence a man in common life, are still available, though they may require to be somewhat heightened. It is on this principle that the treatment of lunatics has been generally conducted. Fear, one of the lowest, but also one of the most general of instinctive emotions, has been called in to balance the delusions of sense, and excepting in cases where the structural disease is so extensive as to deprive the man of all power of connecting cause and effect, it has been found sufficient to curb violence, and enforce a certain degree of peaceable demeanor towards the attend- ants. And in this the insane person differs not from the cultivated man who is left at liberty, whose self control rarely amounts to more than the avoiding actions Avhich Avould have unpleasant consequences to himself. Suppose an irascible man, incensed by a false report, Avhich, however, he believes to be true; he seeks his supposed enemy, and horseAvhips, or knocks him down; he does not assassinate, because he fears for his own life if he does; for it is clear that no feeling of duty has held his hand, or he would not have transgressed the laAvs both of God and man by thus revenging himself. The madman has the false report from his OAvn senses; wherein do the tAVO differ ? Neither has employed means within his power to ascertain the truth, and both are aware that such vengeance is forbidden. I can see no distinction be- tAveen them, save that the delusion of sense has, as a chemist would say, decomposed the character, and shoAvn how much of the individual's pre- vious conduct Avas rational, and how much the result of mere animal instinct. It would be well for the world if the soidisant sane Avere sometimes to ask themselves how far their sanity would bear this test, and endeavor to acquire that rational self-command Avhich nothing but the last extremity of cerebral disease could unseat. We do not descend from our high rank with impunity; and as when the matter has become organized, if the process of change, occasioned by the vital force, be impeded or arrested, the plant pines away and perishes; as, after the organs of locomotion have been superadded, the animal debarred from the use of them, languishes and becomes diseased; so man, if he give not full scope to the intellectual force, becomes subject to evils greater than animals ever knoAV, because his nature is of a higher order.(r) § 264. " Neither do severe injuries from external causes, though, like paralysis, they might cause a loss of those faculties which connect man with the world about him, necessarily disconnect him with the Avorld within, so as to place him beyond his own command. " A case has been communicated to me illustrative of this. A young lad Avho had been carefully instructed in the principles of religion and virtue, by the clergyman of his parish, aftenvards went to sea. When he Avas about tAventy-tAvo, he unfortunately fell from the mast upon his (q) Barlow on Alan's Power over Himself, to Prevent or Control Insanit.v. London. AV. Pickering, 1843. Phila. Lea & Blanchard, 1846. (r) Ibid. 218 MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICS. head on the deck, and the injury to the brain was such that he was dis- charged from the service in a state of imbecility, and sent home to his parish. He Avas then in possession of the use of his limbs and hearing; but articulation was apparently difficult to him, and collected thought, Avhich should enable him to speak connectedly, still more so; his sight, too, Avas subject to a delusion Avhich made him imagine he saw gold and silver coin strewed about on the ground; which, as was natural, he eagerly endeavored to pick up. He was now visited by the clergyman who had been the instructor of his youth, who in kind terms assured him he was under a false impression, and advised him to give no heed to what he imagined he saw. The poor young man thanked him, and promised to do as he desired, and for a time abstained from attempting to pick up the coin, but gradually the delusion became too strong for his resolution, and he recommenced. Yet, after every visit from his former instructor, he again controlled himself for a time ; and, if he did not come, anxiously sought him at his OAvn house. He died in a few months, but during the whole time was mild and submissive, seeming perfectly aware that his mind was disordered; and, like a child who distrusts his own power, seeking to throw himself on the guidance of one whose kindness he remembered, and whose character he respected. This man was suffering mental derangement from injury of the parts, but was not insane; for the faculties left him were rationally exercised.(s) § 265. " Cases of this kind have been considered by some as a pecu- liar type of insanity. By French authors it is entitled manic sans delire. Dr. Prichard styles it instinctive madness. I am inclined never- theless to refer such deranged propensities in some instances to a pe- culiar and morbid state of sensation, and these will come under the head we are now considering, consequently the desire is not irresistible, though strong, for we see that it has been successfully resisted; in others I should refer it to the second class, under the head of ' In- efficiency of the intellectual force,' and then it depends on the resolution of the person so affected whether the morbid sensation shall be medi- tated on and indulged, and thus acquire fresh force, or whether by ex- citing other sensations, it shall be weakened and by degrees vanquished. § 266. " There is no greater error than to suppose that thinking about a propensity which ought not to be gratified, will conquer it; on the con- trary, every hour of lonely thought gives it fresh force ; but let the man plunge into business that must be attended to, or even a lighter occupa- tion, so it be an engrossing one; and do this resolutely, hoAvever irk- some it may at first appear, and the very repose thus given to the diseased part, if there be disease, by throAving the whole stress on other portions of the brain, will assist in effecting the cure.(t) § 267. " When a man has reached mature age without making any effort to render the brain subservient to the rational will, the fatigue and even pain consequent on the endeavor to obtain the mastery over it, is such, that few have resolution to undergo it voluntarily. Thus the man subsides more and more into the animal, and is at last guided only by those instinctive emotions which belong to the vital force merely. His passions assume a delirious violence, and he is only distinguished (s) Barlow on Alan's Power over Himself to Prevent or Control Insanity. London, W. Pickering. 1843. Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard. 1846. (t) Jbid. TREATMENT OF INSANE CONVICTS. 219 from the brute from the greater skill with which he pursues their grati- fication. There is no disease of brain, but it has been left unexercised and ungoverned till it is as unmanageable as a limb that has been treated in the same way. " Toes have been used for writing and other arts which are usually performed by fingers; they are capable, therefore, of such use, but those who have constantly worn shoes cannot direct one toe separately from the rest, as they can the fingers. Yet with much trouble this poAver of directing might be acquired. It is thus that the brain, un- accustomed to direction from the intellectual force, rebels against it, and if this latter fails to assert its sway, it may justly be termed ineffi- cient. In a man thus animalized, the actions differ from those of his more spiritualized fellow men, who happily are more numerous; and when they find no such motive as they would consider a sufficient one for his conduct, they call him mad, by way of accounting for it. He commits a crime, and a plea of insanity is set up as a shelter from punishment. I will give an instance. It is recorded by the elder Pinel: ' An only son, educated by a silly and indulgent mother, Avas accustomed to give way to all his passions Avithout restraint. As he grew up, the violence of his temper became quite uncontrollable, and he was constantly involved in quarrels and law-suits. If an animal offended him, he instantly killed it; yet, when calm, he Avas quite reasonable, managed his large estate with propriety, and was even known to be beneficent to the poor; but one day, provoked to rage by a woman, Avho abused him, he threw her into a well. On his trial, so many Avitnesses deposed to the violence of his actions, that he Avas con- demned to imprisonment in a mad-house.' Yet any choleric man who does in his rage Avhat he is sorry for afterwards, is as much insane as this man was ; both are under the influence of the vital force. A shock to some nerve of sensation stimulates the sympathetic system ; the cir- culation is hurried, and the blood floAving more rapidly through the brain, gives an unusual activity to the motor nerves, the movements are sudden and violent, the speech hurried, loud, and perhaps incoherent; but the intellectual force knows the source of these symptoms, and can curb them by resolute silence and inaction till the blood again flows at its usual pace; if it does not, the man, for a time, is in a state of mania, but is not the less responsible for having allowed himself to be so. " Let us suppose another case; the thing is so constantly seen that every one could quote examples of it. A man unaccustomed to self- control, becomes occupied by one thought:—his ambition has been dis- appointed perhaps, or a law-suit has plagued him, or he has been much employed in some engrossing pursuit. Unable to regulate his thoughts at will, he finds the one which circumstances have made habitual, recur uncalled for. An effort would dismiss it, for every one Avho has studied, knoAvs that he has had to dismiss many an intruding thought, and with some effort, too, if he wished to make progress in Avhat he has under- taken ; but this individual has never been accustomed to make any such effort, and he knoAvs not how to free himself from the subject which thus haunts him. If it be an unpleasant one, he is wearied and worn by it; but every day that it is not driven off, it assumes a greater power, for the part of the brain thus brought into action is noAV by habit rendered 220 MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICS. more fit for use than any other :—he has not resolution enough to free himself from his tormentor by a determined application to something else Avhich would require all his attention ; he sits brooding over it, and, when life has thus become irksome, he strives to terminate his discomfort by suicide; yet here is no structural disease; and if the man could be persuaded to exert himself, he might be sane. I will give an instance. The master of a parish work-house, about thirty years of age, Avas sub- jected frequently to groundless suspicions of peculation. Being naturally a taciturn, low-spirited man, these false accusations which involved his character, and consequently the maintenance of his family, preyed upon his mind, and a profound melancholy Avas the result, attended by the usual symptomatic derangement of the digestive functions, and a constant apprehension that he had done something wrong, he did not know what. No assurance on the part of those Avho kneAV and esteemed him had any effect, and finally, after some months of melancholy, he attempted to destroy himself. He was then removed to St. Luke's hospital, whence, after a year had elapsed, he was dis- charged incurable. He was now placed in a private receptacle of the insane, and here suffered all the misery Avhich at that time pauper lunatics were subjected to. He was visited at this place by a bene- volent man, who, seeing his state, immediately ordered him to be re- moved into the gentlemen's apartments, and paid for his maintenance there. In a few months afterwards he was visited by the clergyman of his parish, who, on conversing with him, considered him sane. The man begged to be allowed to rejoin his Avife and family, and the rector, after many difficulties and some threats to the parish authorities, succeeded in setting him free. The man from that time Avas able to maintain his family by his trade of shoemaking, for if ever a fit of melancholy came over him, a threat from his wife that he should be sent back to the mad- house Avas sufficient to engage him to make an effort to resume his cheer- fulness ; and he remained to old age a sane man. Here the insanity had been merely inefficiency of the intellectual force. Placed in a situation of comparative ease, his mind had become calm; the Avish to return to his wife and family, and the hope of it, kept up by the visits of bene- volent friends, did the rest: for, be it observed, during the Avhole time he never felt himself abandoned. The poor and the uneducated are the classes which most usually suffer from the inefficiency of the intellectual force: it is among the higher ranks usually that its misdirection is a source of insanity. Among these, more distant objects of pursuit keep the thoughts longer upon the stretch toAvards one point; the organs of mechanical memory are strengthened, nay, even strained by the habit of learning much by rote, while the constant supply of learn- ing ready-made, leaves no necessity for the more laborious pro- cesses of reasoning and comparison. Hence we not unfrequently find an elegant scholar, Avho can readily quote the words and opinions of others, unable himself to carry on a course of close argument, or to prove the truth of Avhat he advances. Whoever has moved in society, knows that it is rare to meet with any one who can command his thoughts in con- versation frequently to reject all that is not relevant to the subject, so as to keep on the chain of reasoning unbroken.(u) (u) Barlow on Man's Power over Himself to Prevent or Control Insanity. London, W. Pickering. 1843. Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard. 1846. HOW LUNATICS ARE TO BE DISCIPLINED. 221 § 268. "When the mind is thus exercised in remembering the opinions of others, thus unaccustomed accurately to examine its own, what wonder is it if it should become prepossessed with some irrational notion which cannot be removed by reasoning, because the individual man in his healthiest state had never chosen so to exercise his mind; or if, when a delusion of sense occurs, he should choose rather to act upon it as truth, than to examine into the grounds he has for believing it to be such. It is a melancholy fact that a great number of man- kind are in this estate as regards the faculties most requisite to self- control, and depend far more on the accident of good health, than the exertion of their own intellectual power, for their sanity. I have heard of more than one instance of hard livers, as they were termed, who probably, in consequence of a slight affection of the brain from the un- natural stimulus of Avine long kept up, became possessed with an opinion that they were slighted by one or more of their friends; and, resisting all reasoning on the subject, ended by destroying themselves. Yet, they were rational on other matters of importance, and therefore it is to be concluded, that, even on this point, they were capable of being rational also, had they chosen to make the exertion. It is recorded of Henri of Bourbon, son of the great Conde, that at times he imagined himself transformed into a dog, and would then bark violently. Once this notion seized him while in the king's presence; he then felt it needful for him to control himself, and he did so : for though he turned to the window, and made grimaces as if barking, he made no noise. Had the king's eye been upon him, it is probable that he Avould have avoided the grimaces also."(v) § 269. " The indulgence of violent emotions," observes Dr. Connolly, " is singularly detrimental to the human understanding, and it is to be presumed, that the unmeasured emotions of insanity are sometimes perpetuated in consequence of the disorder of brain originally induced by their violence. A man is at first only irritable, but gives Avay to his irritability. Whatever temporarily interferes with any bodily or mental function, reproduces the disposition to be irritated, and circum- stances are never Avanting to act upon this disposition till it becomes a disease. The state of the brain, or part of the brain, which is produced whenever the feeling of irritation is renewed, is more easily induced at each reneAval, and concurs with the moral habit to bring on the parox- ysm on every slight occasion—other vehement emotions and passions effect the same disorders of the mind."(w) (2.) Prevention. § 270. A very eminent American physician tells us, that " no argu- ment should weigh, for a moment, with a court of justice, in favor of liberating such an individual (one subject to homicidal mania). The fact that life has been taken, should overbalance all motives to send such person into society again, while the delusions and estrangements (v) Barlow on Alan's Power over Himself to Prevent or Control Insanity. London. A. Pickering. 1843. Phila. Lea and Blanchard. 1846. See ante, 78-85. (w) Ibid. 222 TREATMENT OF INSANE CONVICTS. of insanity continue; and, avc add, not until montlis, if not years, of peace, and freedom from excitement should have confirmed their entire release from this dangerous form of disease." "We recently attended (says the same authority) " an interesting trial on a subject of this nature in a neighboring county in this state. An habitually peaceful and worthy man was indicted for the most shocking murder of his Avife, with an axe, and a horrible attempt upon the lives of his children Avith the same Aveapon. The facts Avere not denied, and his only defence was, that of insanity. He was acquitted, principally upon our testi- mony as to the fact of his being insane at the time the murder Avas committed, of which we have not the slightest doubt; but our astonish- ment was only exceeded by our alarm, Avhen subsequently informed that bail had been admitted, and this afflicted, but truly dangerous man, Avas permitted to go at large. This ought not to be so. Science and human- ity may interpose for the life of the homicide, but society should ever be protected from the effects of his dreadful disease. The lunatic asylum is their proper place; and it should be duly prepared for their reception and detention."(a;) § 271. The man who, in an insane impulse, kills one man, is more than likely, under the same impulse, to kill another. And, indeed, the several facts of moral mania implies a chronic tendency to the particular crime. This was agreed on all sides in Hadfield's case Avhere the point Avas first mooted: "For his own sake," said Lord Kenyon, "and for the sake of society at large, he must not be discharged, for this is a case Avhich concerns every man of every station, from the king upon the throne, to the beggar at the gate—people of both sexes and all ages may, in an unfortunate, frantic hour, fall a sacrifice to this man, Avho is not under the guidance of sound reason, and therefore it is absolutely necessary, for the safety of society, that he should be properly disposed of, all mercy and humanity being shown to the unfortunate creature; but, for the sake of the community, he must somehow or other be taken care of, with all the attention and all the relief that can be afforded him." Hereupon the counsel for the Crown, and the counsel for the defendant, agreed that the safety of the community required that he should be taken care of. "It is laid doAvn in some books," said the former, (Sir John Mitford, afterwards Lord Redesdale), " that by the common law, the judges of every court are competent to direct the confinement of a person under such circumstances." "That may be, Mr. Attorney- General," interposed Lord Kenyon, "but at present Ave can only re- mand him to the confinement he came from; but means will be used to confine him othenvise in a manner much better adapted to his situa- tion." It avus then suggested by Mr. Garrow (afterwards a Baron of the Exchequer) that " it would be for the benefit of posterity, if the jury would state in their verdict the grounds upon which they gave it, viz., that they acquit the prisoner of this charge, he appearing to them to have been under the influence of insanity at the time the act was committed. There would then," he added, "be a legal and sufficient reason for his confinement."^) This recommendation was adopted by (x) Dr. Woodward, cited in 4 Journal of Psychological Medicine, p. 469. (y) Howell's State Trials, Vol. XXVII. p. 1354, et. seg. Suggestions for the future provision of Criminal Lunatics, by W. Charles Hood, M. D. London, 1854. pp. 16 17. EXAMPLE—REFORM. 223 the jury, who returned a verdict in these terms. Thus originated the form of verdict noAV commonly returned in cases of this description. (3.) Example. § 272. The recorded cases are numerous in which the supposed irrespon- sibility of lunatics has led to the perpetration of crime by the insane. " They cannot hang him," Avas Avhispered about in the York lunatic asy- lum, when the firing of York Minster, by a supposed lunatic, Avas under consideration, "he is one of ourselves." And one of the most danger- ous convicts in the Eastern Penitentiary,—one laboring under homicidal mania in its most inveterate shape,—was constantly expressing his dis- appointment at finding that notwithstanding his acquittal on ground of insanity, he was to be continued in prison. He had, in fact, supposed himself privileged by his disease to commit this particular crime. And even taking the strongest case,—that of the man AArho is possessed by a homicidal mania which equals in intensity the passion of particular classes of dogs for sheep's blood,—we will have strong ground to believe that such an instinct can be tutored. Monomanias, in fact, are epidemics, and spread precisely to the degree in which they are invested with sentimental celebrity. The Leipsic "Msedchen-Schneider," who when charged Avith gratifying a morbid sexual impulse by striking lancets in the arms of such young girls as he might meet in a crowded street, never exercised this propensity except when it was likely it would be un- detected. Shame and the fear of punishment restrained him thus far, but it was quite otherwise when he became the object of a sentimental curiosity Avhich visited him during his trial and imprisonment with the same attentions,—perhaps more,—which would have been paid to a Live Mermaid or the Siamese Twins. The monomania became an epidemic, and would have remained so had not an ignominious punishment been affixed. (4.) Reform. § 273. To permit a monomaniac to go at large, will be to give fuel to his disease, as well as to supply it with victims— " Mobilitate viget, Viresque acquiret eundo;" And to nothing does this apply Avith greater force than that exaggerated state of the moral system, which has just been discussed. If the in- dulgence in passion, even in a healthy mind, tends, as has been just shoAvn, to derangement, it will readily be seen that no recovery can be effected while the patient is permitted to run at large, exposed to all the irritating influences of unguarded society, and gathering a momen- tum for coming excesses from the very liberty he is allowed in the present. § 274. Dr. Mayo thus well illustrates the awkward position of insane criminals under the present administration of the law.—" It must be confessed that the conditional responsibility which the law, and, as I think, the reason of the case, attributes to the insane, is not easily 224 TREATMENT OF INSANE CONVICTS. applicable in practice, either under lucid intervals, or under such other phases of the insane state, as might seem to justify it. The hnv Avill remain a dead letter, or Avill be continually ignored by the sympathies of judges, juries, and I may add, of medical Avitnesses, unless some practical distinction can be arranged, Avhich may enable the responsible insane to undergo some loAver degree of punishment than that inflicted on similar delinquents being of sound mind. The position of many such persons under capital charges, is at present anomalous. They are acquitted in defiance of the law, as laid down by the judges respecting M'Nughten's case, because the punishment at present appertaining to the offence would be too severe; and then, instead of being consigned to confinement in a gaol, as a secondary punishment, they are consigned to it in an asylum, as a place simply of detention. This becomes a scene of severe virtual punishment to some of them, of gratification to vanity and idleness to others; those, meanwhile, to whom it is a grieAT- ance, as they do not regard it in the light of a punishment, derive from it none of the preventive effects of punishment on future conduct, while the public, for the same reason, find it equally unproductive of good, as an example to persons of actually diseased mind, or to that large class of other persons Avho are drifting into disease under uncon- trolled eccentricity. "(2) § 275. It is impossible to carry out the proper disciplinary and remedial measures in a penitentiary common to the sane and insane. " I am satisfied of the fact," says Dr. Hood, "that Criminal Lunatics are more difficult to manage than other lunatics; there is more irritability of temper, and general restlessness about them; they are cognizant of the offences they lune committed, and being under the impression that they Avill never recover their liberty, they are less disposed to be con- tented or happy. They are also conscious that they are separated into, and form a distinct class of patients, and this very circumstance esta- blishes a species of fraternity among them; for they are in constant communication Avith each other, and their curiosity is naturally excited to ascertain the circumstances connected Avith every neAV arrival. They thus soon become acquainted with each other's history, Avhich is often the cause of much quarreling and mutual recrimination; the better class of patients are unhappy at being associated with the inferior order—criminals whose manners and language are habitually of the most revolting description. Hence, I conclude, that the fundamental principle upon Avhich Ave should proceed, in providing for the safe cus- tody, maintenance, and medical care'of our Criminal Lunatics, should be that of establishing a certain classification among them, founded upon the degrees, or nature of the crimes which they may have com- mitted. This principal conceded, we have then to consider the expedi- ency or inexpediency of organizing a State Lunatic Asylum for their common reception; the possibility, or impossibility, of each county providing adequate accommodation in existing asylums for its own Criminal Lunatics; and Avhether arrangements might not be made in prisons, and houses of correction, for the medical treatment of such (z) Mayo on Medical Testimony in Lunacy, pp. 50, 51, 52. UNSUITABLENESS OF THE ORDINARY ASYLUMS. 225 prisoners as may, Avhile undergoing imprisonment or penal servitude, become insane."(a) On the other hand, the confinement of an insane criminal in an ordi- nary lunatic asylum, is beset with still greater difficulties. " It is," says Dr. Hood, " not only annoying to other patients, but greatly disturbs the ordinary discipline of the establishment; for be it observed, luna- tics, whether criminal or non-criminal, are capable of some degree of reasoning; and their conscious incapacity of enjoying this faculty to its full extent, often recoils painfully upon their feelings, and becomes, in itself, a source of irritation. In providing, indeed, for the safe custody, and the management of the insane of all classes, we should proceed upon the same principles as if Ave were legislating for profess- edly sane persons; because, the mind is never totally eclipsed, there is always some lingering ray of light which the intact reflection may seize upon with instinctive truthfulness."(b) § 276. If the vieAvs taken in the preceding sections be sound,—if, in the first place, there are inherent difficulties in the way of making insanity a ground of defence on the trial of a man, avIio, on this hypothesis is psychologically incapable of either tendering or preparing any such issue ;(c) if, in the second place, the doctrine of instinctive (a) Suggestions for the future provision of Criminal Lunatics, by AV. Charles Hood, M. D. London, 1854 p. 28-29. (b) Ibid. pp. 27, 28. (c) The absurdity of our present practice, in making insanity a personal defence, to be taken or rejected by the alleged lunatic in the exercise of a volition which the very nature of the defence supposes him incapable of exercising, is fully exhibited by the following case:— SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA. The Court met Monday, April 9th, 1855. Present, their Honors Thomas Slidell, Chief Justice; Cornelius Voorhies, A. M. Bu- chanan, A. N. Ogden, H. M. Spafford, associate justices. The State of Louisiana, Appellee, | . from lgt Digtrict 0ourt New t i, ^ a n ♦ I 0rleans- James Patton, Appellant. J Spafford, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court. Upon the trial of James Patton for the murder of AY alter Turnbull, the following bill of exceptions was taken by the prisoner's counsel: Be it remembered, that on the trial of this cause, on the 20th day of March, 1854, after the evidence on the part of the State was closed, and when the counsel of the prisoner were proceeding to prove by the evidence of witnesses the insanity of the said prisoner, at the time of the killing set forth on the indictment, and a long time before, and ever since the said killing, the said prisoner arose and objected to and repudiated the said defence, and insisted upon discharging his counsel, and submitting his case to the jury without any further evidence or action of his counsel in his defence; his counsel opposed and remonstrated against the prisoner's being permitted to do so, alleging that they were prepared to prove the defence by clear and irresistible testi- mony ; but the court overruled the objection of the said counsel, and permitted the prisoner to discharge his counsel, and refused to hear them further on his defence, and gave the case to the jury without any further evidence or pleading on his behalf; to all which opinion and ruling of said court the defendant's said counsel excepts, and prays his exceptions may be signed, &c. (Signed) John B. Robertson, Judge. There was a verdict of "guilty without capital punishment"—and, after the former counsel had in the quality of amici curice attempted to obtain a new trial and arrest of judgment without success, the prisoner was sentenced to hard labor for life in the penitentiary. 15 226 HOW OUR PRESENT SYSTEM SHOULD BE REMODELLED. or moral mania be allowed in legal theory the sweep Avhich is asserted for it by medical experts, and Avhich in this country at least is conceded From this judgment the present appeal has been taken :— The sanity or insanity of the prisoner is a matter of fact; the admissibility of evidence to establish his insanity, under the circumstances detailed in the bill of exceptions, is a matter of law, and the only matter which the constitution authorizes this tribunal to decide. The case is so extraordinary in its circumstances that we are left without the aid of precedents. In support of the ruling of the district judge, it has been urged that every man is presumed to be sane until the contrary appears, and that a person on trial for an alleged offence has a constitutional right to discharge his counsel at any moment, to repudiate their action on the spot, and to be heard by himself; hence the inference is deduced that the judge could not have admitted the evidence, against the protest of the prisoner, without reversing the ordinary presumption, and presuming insanity. In criminal trials, it is important to keep ever in mind the distinction between law and fact, between the functions of a judge and those of a jury. It was for the jury, and the jury alone, to determine whether there was insanity or not, after hearing the evidence and the instructions of the Court as to the principles of law applicable to the case. By receiving the proffered evidence for what it might be worth, the judge would have decided no question of fact; he would merely have told the jury, "the law per- mits you to hear and weigh this evidence ; whether it proves any thing it is for you to say." By rejecting it, he deprived the jury of some of the means of arriving at an enlight- ened conclusion upon a vital point peculiarly within their province, and, in effect de- cided himself, and without the aid of all the evidence within his reach, that the prisoner was sane. It is idle to say that the legal presumption, and the prisoner's own declarations, ap- pearance and conduct on the trial, established his sanity to the satisfaction of both judge and jury;—for presumption may be overthrown, declarations may be unfounded, and conduct and appearances may be deceitful; and the prisoner's counsel, sworn officers of the court, with their professional character at stake upon the loyalty of their conduct, alleged that they stood there prepared to prove by what they deemed clear and irresistible testimony that the accused was insane at the time of the homicide, long before, and ever since ; so that the sole inquiry now is, not whether they or the Court were right as to the fact of sanity upon which we can have no opinion, but, whether they should have been allowed to put the testimony they had at hand before the jury, to be weighed with the counter evidence. If the prisoner was insane at the time of the trial, as counsel offered to prove, he was incompetent to conduct his own defence unaided, to discharge his counsel, or to waive a right. Upon the supposition that the counsel were mistaken in regard to the weight of the evidence they wished to offer, as they may have been, still its introduction could do the prisoner no harm, nor could it estop him from any other defence he might choose to make on his own account; neither could it prejudice the State, for it is to be presumed that the jury would have given the testimony its proper weight; if, on the other hand, the counsel were not mistaken as to the legal effect of this evidence, the consequences of its rejection would be deplorable indeed. The overruling necessity of the case seems to demand that, whenever a previous soundness of mind and consequent accountability for his acts are in question, the rule that he may control or discharge his counsel, at pleasure, should be so far relaxed as to permit them to offer evidence on those points, even against his will. Considering, therefore, that it would be more in accordance with sound legal principles and with the humane spirit which pervades even the criminal law, to allow the rejected testimony to go before the jury, the cause must be remanded for that purpose. It was said in argument, on behalf of the State, that the alleged insanity was, at most, but a monomania upon another topic, which could not exempt the prisoner from respon- sibility for the homicide. The judge will instruct the jury in regard to the principles of law which govern this subject, when all the facts shall have been heard.—At present, the discussion is pre- mature. It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the Court below be reversed, the verdict of the jury set aside, and the cause remanded for a new trial according to law. INSANITY SHOULD BE INQUIRED INTO AFTER CONVICTION. 227 to it by the Courts; if, in the third place, it be right that the present system of confinement of insane criminals be remodelled,—then it will become necessary for those to whom the work of legislation is commit- ted to amend the law so as to reserve the question of insanity to be de- termined by a competent tribunal after a conviction of the fact of guilt. For the following undeniable evils result from the present system: (a.) A tribunal of, at least, but secondary competency is charged with the determination of the most difficult and yet most momentous question to Avhich human observation can be applied, (d) (b.) A subject is introduced into the question of guilt or innocence, as to which no fixed judicial rules can be laid down, and which really concerns only the character and the extent of punishment. (c.) A fearful confusion takes place between the sane convict; the insane malignant convict, who requires discipline and is, in some degree, morally responsible; the innocent insane convict ;(e) and the lunatic, who is in confinement but is not charged with crime: for all of whom there is in some jurisdictions but one common method of discipline provided, Adz : that of the penitentiary; in others, but two, that of the penitentiary and of the ordinary lunatic asylum. The result of this is acquittals in some cases, when there should be convictions; convictions in other cases when there should be acquittals, and in almost all cases an erroneous system of punishment. The remedy for these difficulties is one to which avc must come sooner or later, and for Avhich the common law has been from the beginning always striving, and yet always losing from almost its very grasp. It is to confine the inquiry before the court and jury to the mere factum of the commission of the offence; reserving the question of treatment to be determined by a special commission of experts, to be appointed for the purpose of examining convicts alleged to be insane. The proposition to be put by the court to the jury, under such circumstances, is not, "Was the defendant capable of judging between right and wrong," a proposition Avhich no jury can determine, but, " Did he," as a matter of fact, " commit the specific act charged." For whether he committed it as sane or insane, (d) Dr. Hood very justly remarks, "All human tribunals are fallible, and how, when this plea of insanity is raised, can we unveil the mind of the accused, and determine where responsibility ends and irresponsibility begins ? We may appreciate outward and visible signs but we have no mentometer, (if I may be allowed to coin a word) which will indicate the thoughts that may be passing through the mind. In medical juris- prudence the diagnosis between sanity and insanity is, in many cases, infinitely difficult; and it is upon this account that specialists in this branch of our profession so often come into collision with members of the bar, and draw down upon themselves occa- sionally animadversions from the judges on the bench. There would be no difference of opinion between the two learned professions if we could arrive at any fixed principles by which we could explain the silent operations of the mind ; but this, so far as insanity is concerned, is as impossible in law as it is in medicine. We may adjudicate upon the overt act, but the motive which dictated it will very often elude the most searching examination. But this happens continually in sane as well insane life." Suggestions for the future Provision of Criminal Lunatics, by AV. C. Hood, M. D. London, 1854. And we may add to this the testimony of a great poet on a kindred point: " May it please your Excelleney, your thief looks Exactly like the rest, or rather better; 'Tis only at the bar or in the dungeon That wise men know your felon by his features." (e) See as to distinction between these, ante. \ 232-251. 22S HOAV INS ANITA*' SHOULD BE TRIED. the result is, if the offence in point of law be indictable, that the safety of societv requires that he should be placed in seclusion for such a period as will promote the joint ends of personal reformation and the preserva- tion of,the well-being of the community at large. If he be guilty without the palliation of mental infirmity, certainly the severest penal code—with the single qualification of cases of murder in the first degree,—can ask nothing more than this. If, on the other hand, he Avas at the time laboring under mental derangement, in no other Avay can the extent of his responsibility be accurately determined, and the proper degree of discipline adjusted. For this great question of sanity or insanity can really be only determined by those to whose daily and hourly care the convict is committed, and who have thus full opportunity of inquiring into his antecedent as well as his present condition. " Thus," to adopt the language of a late very intelligent commentator,(/) " except a3 regards the curative course to be adopted, on our view of the case, the subtle line of distinction Avhich there have been so many abortive attempts to draw, betAveen criminal and non-criminal lunatics is of no practical importance, and the unavailing search, unless as a matter of metaphysical speculation, may be abandoned as unnecessary. In either case, the person concerned, Avhether called a lunatic, a criminal lunatic, or an ordinary criminal, should be so placed as to put it out of his power to inflict further injury, and to afford the most likely means for his cure." And thus, also, not only will the sanctions of human life and property be protected from the recurrence of those monstrous acquittals, by Avhich, under the plea of insanity, the most dangerous criminals are suffered to run at large, but the interests of humanity Avill be subserved by a proper discipline, as Avell as a just classification, of those Avhose accountability is diminished or destroyed. (f) XXI. London Law Review, 364. "tS~TP* r5u^>M>'>: »> ■5 *v; Si 5S X^>' :ts>- :> >- > > ■- ► »£>