THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY Civilian Defense Division Final Report civilian defense division Dates of Survey: 15 January-15 August 1945 First Edition 29 October 1945 Second Edition January 1947 This report was written primarily for the use of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Surrey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey. This edition has been reproduced by a photolithographic offset process from the first edition of the report. To expedite, standardize and clarify the printing of this and other European reports* minor changes have been made on the cover* title page and some drawings. Foreword The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the late President Roosevelt, The officers of the Survey were: Franklin Duller, Chairman, Henry C, Alexander, Vice-Chairman, George W, Ball, Harry L, Bowman, John £• Galbraith, Renalb Likert, Frank A, McNamee, Jr,, Paul H. ITitze, Robert P, Russell, Fred Searls, Jr., Theodore P, Wright, Directors, Charles C, Cabot, Secretary, The Table of Organization provided for 300 civilians, 350 officers and 500 enlisted men. The Survey operated from headquarters in London and established forward headquarters and regional headquar- ters in Germany immediately following the advance of the Allied armies. It made a close examination and inspection of several hundred German plants, cities and areas, amassed volumes of statistical and documentary material, including top German government documents; and conducted interviews and interrogations of thousands of Germans; including virtually all of the surviving political and military leaders, Germany was scoured for its war records which were found sometimes i "but rarely* in places where they ought to have “been; some- times in safe-deposit vaults* often in private houses, in barns, in caves; on one occasion* in a hen house and* on two occasions* in coffins# Targets in Russian-held territory were not available to the Survey. Some two hundred detailed reports were made. During the course of its work* the Survey rendered interim reports and submitted studies and suggestions in connection with the air operations against Japan. While the European War was going on. It was necessary. In many cases, to follow closely behind the front; otherwise* vital records might have been irretrievably lost. Survey personnel suffered several casualties* including four killed. The Survey studied the effects of the air attack on Japan and further reports have been submitted to the Secretary of War and the Sec- retary of the Navy. S88T FINAL REPORT, C.D.D TABLE OF ‘CONTENTS Pages SECTION I PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1-12 Introduction 1 Purpose and Scope of Report 1 Attack Data on German Targets 2 II CONCLUSIONS 13-16 III ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN AIR-RAID PROTECTION SERVICES 17 - 30 Introduction 17 Basic Law 19 Decrees Pertaining to Basic Law 19 ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF GERMAN CIVILIAN DEFENSE 31 - 116 IV • Air-Raid Warning 31 V Control AO VI Air-Raid Wardens A3 VII Incident Control A6 VIII Fire Protection and Prevention A7 IX Bnergency Medical Services 55 X Rescue 68 XI Mobile Reserves 7A XII Post-Raid Clearance, Repair, and restoration 100 XIII Unexploded Bombs 110 XIV War Damage Claims 112 PROTECTION OF FACT CRIES, INSTAL- LATIONS AND BUILDINGS DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USB 117 - 1A0 XV Factory Air-Raid ITotection 117 XVI Extended Self-Protection 126 XVII Railroad Air-Raid Protection 131 XVIII National Post Office (Communi- cations) Air-Raid ITotection 13A XIX Harbor Air-Raid Protection and Port Security. 136 FINAL REPORT, C.U.D. TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont’d) Page* SECTION PASSIVE DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND PRECAUTIONS 141 « 174 XX Protective Lighting 141 XXI Shelters 150 XXII Gas Protection 164 XXIII Camouflage 167 XXIV Conduct of Public During Air Raids 171 XXV EVACUATION 175 - 193 Evacuation 175 Post-Raid Emergency Welfare 189 TRAINING 194 - 201 XXVI Training of Civilian Defense Per* onne 1 194 XXVII Training of General Public 199 APPENDIXES XXVIII Glossary of German Terms and Abbreviations XXIX List of Field Reports XXX Exhibits A. Notes on Interrogation of Colonel Arthur Le>nsch, Former Chief of Staff in the Air Protection Direc- tion Staff of the German Air Force (Lu ftwaffe)0 B. Notes on Interrogation of Colonel Ehrhard, Head of the Air Protection Direction Staff of the German Air Force High Commando FINAL REPORT. C. IX. D LIST OF CHARTS. TABLES, AND ILLUSTRATIONS Page 1. Chart - Tonnage of Bombs Dropped on GERMANY 1939-1945, by RAF, U.S. 8th and 15th Air Forces 6 2. Chart - Type of Botabs Dropped on GERMANY, 1 9 3 9 -45 , by RAF. U..&. 8th and 15th Air Forces 7 3. Chart - Tonnage of Bomba Dropped by Months on GERMANY, 1939-45, by RAF. U.S., 8th and 15th Air Forces 8 4. Chart - Monthly Statistics of Number of Persons Killed by Bombs Dropped on GERMANY. 1939-1945. by RAF, U.S. 8th and 15th Air Forces 9 5. Chart - Monthly Statistics of Number of Persons Seriously Injured by Bombs Dropped on GERMANY, 1939-45, by RAF U.S-. 8th and 15th Air Forces 10 6. Chart • Monthly Statistics of Number of Buildings Totally Destroyed by Bombs Dropped on GERMANY, 1939- 45, by RAF, U. S-„ 8th and 15th Air Forceis 11 7. Chart • Monthly Statistics of Numbex of Buildings Severely Damaged by bombs Dropped on GERMANY, 1939-45, by RAF, U.S.. 8th and 15th Air Forces 12 8. Organization Chart of German Air-Raid Pro- tection Services, 24 9. Notes on Organization of German Air-Raid Protection Services 25 - 27 10. Chart of German System of Air-Raid Warning 32 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. LIST OF CHARTS, TABLES, AND ILLUSTRATIONS (Con tinned) Page 24. Organization Chart of Factory A i r ®Ra id = Protection Service 121 25. Chart Shoving Organization, Control, and Chain of Command of Extended Self «Protec » tion Service 128 26. Chart of Plan for Organization of Air° Raid Protection in a Medium°Sized Harbor 137 27. Illustration of Large Size Rectangular ** Bunker with Flat Roof 159 28. Illustration of Cylindrical “ Bunker04 Faced with Brick 160 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. LIST OF CHARTS, TABLES, AND ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued) Rage 11* Table of Air-Raid-Protection Services Available to the Police Resident through the Control Center 41 12* Table Shoving Chain of Command and Sphere of authority of the Warden System. 44 13. Chart Showing Organization of the Emer- gency Medical Service 56 14# Floor Plan of Typical First-Aid Station 58 15* Operations Chart of German Emergency Medical Service 60 16* Organization Chart of Motorized Air- Protection Battalion, German Air Force (Luftschutz Abteilung (Mot) der Luftwaffe) 77 17. Table of Equipment of Motorized Air-Rro- tection Battalion, German Air Force 78 18. Organization Chart of Fire Protection Police Battalion (Motorized) (Feuerschutz- polizei Abteilung (Mot) ) 83 19• Organization Chart of Protection Service Battalion (Schutzmannschaft) 88 20. Illustration of *Piaten House*. Con- crete Uprights and Foundation 105 21. Illustration of *Platen House*. Con- crete Slabs Partially Installed 106 22. Illustration of *Piaten House*. House Complete Except for Windows and Interior Finishing. 107 23* Illustration of *Ley House*. Side view 108 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D* I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Introduction 1. Investigation of the operations of civilian defense forces in GERMANY has produced many significant features, not the least of which is the fact that conditions resulting from saturation raids in cities like HAMBURG, BERLIN and COLOGNE would have been hopeless beyond de- scription , had it not been for the work of the civilian defense forces* 2* Civilian defense, one of the phases of passive defense, has as its primary mission the minimizing of effects of enemy bombing on civil- ian communities, industrial plants, and other installations except those of the armed forces* All responsibility in preventing bombing lies with the forces of active defense before and during raids* The critical per- iod of action for civilian defense is after the raids* 3* The efficiency of civilian defense forces must be measured by the degree to which they lessen the effects of the bombs dropped upon their communities* Their capabilities are demonstrated by the extent to which they prevent fires from spreading, save lives of those trapped in buildings, handle expeditiously the care of casualties, and restore speedily the community to that point of its noimal operation that can reasonable be expected under the circumstances* 4* m order to accomplish those results, thorough planning by a nation and all of its political sub-divisions well in advance of anti- cipated hostilities is necessary $ and such plans must be carried into effect by procurement of equipment, training of personnel and the pub- lic, and the establishment of command authority which can, with flexi- bility, take the passive defense resources available in the country and put them into service wherever needed* 3* The mission of civilian defense requires that all of a nation's people be marshalled, under adequate direction, to protect themselves and tneir property* Studies made by this division confirm the conclus- ion that the civilian defense service can accomplish its mission, pro- vided it is properly planned, established, and operated* Purpose and Scope of Report 6* The purpose of this report is to present a study of German civilian defense organization, operation, and equipment, the manner in which it attempted to lessen the effect of aerial attack, and the extent to which it succeeded, in order to determine the implicat ions for the improvement of planning in the UNITED STATES and to assist in the formulation of the national defense policy pertaining thereto* 7» Approach* Research, interrogations, field investigations in COIDGNE, BONN, HANOVER, HAMBURG, BAD 01DESL0E, AUGSBURG, BAVARIA and FINAL REPORT* C®DcD® other German communities have developed the plan and its operation® and give definite indications of the functions* responsibilities* controls and methods of civilian defense and evacuation throughout GERMANY® 8» ExclusionSo No investigation was made of the effect of aerial attack on industry or commerce or upon the morale of the people0 nor of the defensive measures which industry took0 except as to matters involv- ing plant protection organization and shelter for as those subjects are being covered by other divisions of the Uo So Strategic Bombing Survey® 9® Time0 The period* 2? April 1945 to 5 July 1945* spent in field work in German communities* and observations are confined to that period of time® Attack Data on German Targets 10o The following statistics have been collected from several sources and are considered to be the best available at the date of this report* Because of the different bases upon which these figures were compiled it is difficult to drew any definite conclusions from them* but they are valuable in that they give a broad indication of the extent of strategic bombing of GERMANY and of the minumum results conceded by Gar- man authorities* a* The number of .sorties made and the tonnage of bombs dropped on civilian and industrial targets were taken from the records of the Royal Air Force* the U*So 8th Air Force* and the U*So 13th Air Force* The figures* which cover the period from 29 October 1939 to 3 May 19450 are shown in tons of 2*000 pounds and include high-explosive* incendiary and fragmentation bombs* It must be noted that tonnage figures do not include those of the tactical air forces* The total number of sorties made (one sortie representing an individual plane dropping its bomb load) was 413*357 and the total tonnage dropped was 1*205*842* The percentages by years of the total tonnage dropped are shown by the fol- lowing figuresg 1939 Percentage o00 Tons 8 1940 •75 9o001 1941 2o2? 27.359 1942 3° 49 42,031 1943 12o56 151 ©3^6 1944 480 94 589.873 1945 31° 99 386,204 (First 4 Totals 100000 months ) 1,205*842 2 FINAL REPORT b0 The figures of casualties suffered and of property damage incurred are entirely fran German sources and include only those re- sulting from British and American action,, They have been compiled frcm monthly reports issued’ by the Air Defense Staff (Luftschutzarbeitsstab) of the German Air Ministry, entitled,, "Summary of Bombs Dropped and Losses Suffered" (ftbersicht uber Bcmbenabwurfe und Verluste). These Ger- man figures must be considered an absolute minimum and should not be ac- cepted as giving a true picture,, Their unreliability is due to the fact that all casualty and damage figures were in the control of the police president, who was the head of the regular police in each locality, and, before forwarding reports to higher authorities in BERLIN, he submitted the figures to the security police (Gestapo) and the Nazi Party leader (Gauleiter) for scrutiny., The general practice was to understate casual- ty figures with no conscientious attempt to keep an accurate count0 Co The following table shows monthly totals, frcm January, 1943* through January, 1945* of persons killed, persons seriously injured, build inge destroyed, and buildings severely damaged0 One exception to be noted is that no figures on seriously wounded were available for the first nine months of 1943* 1943 Killed Seriously Injured Build ings Destroyed Buildings Severely Damaged Jan. 700 1,000 4.400 Feb. 500 l03oo 5,600 Mar. 2,900 8,400 14*300 Apr. 2,500 5.100 6,700 May 7.700 12,500 28,000 June 9,100 29,800 32,100 July 45*000 46,000 31o800 Aug 8,200 14* 200 18,100 Sept. 4.900 14*400 11,000 Oct. 9*930 18,355 19.098 33.150 Not. 4.708 19.379 12,747 14,039 Dec. 3.969 10,079 9.365 13.643 m Jan. 5*217 9*512 11,444 19,860 Feb. 6,059 12,126 9.614 9,479 Mar. 3.995 18,078 15.840 16.519 Apr. 9.946 17*739 15*013 16,220 May 10,776 17.509 9*512 12.983 June 5.220 10,020 4*121 6,900 July 9.683 18,317 11*909 20,332 Aug 13*072 27*309 25,405 17* 681 Sept 20,187 30,827 35*427 27,600 Oct 17*957 28,253 28,253 30.553 3 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. iM. Killed Injured Buildings Destroyed Buildings Severely Damaged Nov. 17.440 26,035 24,037 33.7x4 Dec. 24.748 24.037 ,24.024 32,248 Jan. 13*553 17,880 \ 20,052 21,102 Totals t 259,960 305,455 408,561 478,023 No comparisons can be drawn between the statistics and figures given above as they have been taken from different sources. Likewise the tonnage and sortie figures apply only to GERMANY proper, whereas the casualty and property figures apply to Greater GERMANY, rti ich included AISACB-LCRRAINE, SUDETENLAND, AUSTRIA ami portions of POLAND. d. The accompanying charts (see pages 6 to 12 inclusive) rep- resent a plotting of these statistics from the above-described sources: Chart 1 - Bombs dropped on GERMANY annually, 1939 to 1945» showing distribution of tonnage of high-explosive incendiary and fragmentation bombs. Chart 2 - Bombs dropped on GERMANY annually, 1939 to 1945* showing distribution of tonnage of high-explosive incendiary and fragmentation bcxnbs. Chart 3 - Bombs dropped on GERMANY monthly, October, 1939t through May, 194-5# showing tonnege dropped each month* Chart 4 - Number of persons killed by bombs dropped on GER- MANY monthly. January. 1943, through January, 1945* (NOTE: Attention is invited to the similarity of the curves, if projected upon this chart, of the relationship between the tonnage dropped and the number of persons killed® The outstanding ex- ception. July. 1943, appears to be the direct result of the heavy raids on HAMBURG during the last week of July), Chart 5 - Number of persons seriously infurod by bombs dropped on GERMANY monthly, October, 1943# through Januaryp 1945. Chart 6 - Number of buildings totally destroyed by bombs 4 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. dropped on GERMANY monthly, January, 1943# through January, 1945* Chart 7 - Number of buildings seriously damaged by bombs dropped on GERMAN? monthly, January, 1943* through January, 1945* 5 BOMBS DROPPED ON GERMANY BY AIR FORCE TONNAGE DROP RED RAF 6th AF 1 5th AF TOTAL U.S. TOTAL FIRST RAID 19/30 OCT.-39 27 JAN.-43 19 DEC.-'43 LAST RAID 2/3 MAV '45 25 APR.-45 25 APR.-45 1939 6 O O 8 1940 9,001 O O 9,001 1941 27,539 O O 27,5 39 1942, 42,031 O O 42,031 1943 124,789 26,477 100 (2fc,577) 151,366 1944 276,275 289,055 24,543 (513,596) 589,873 1945 179,948 195,725 10,551 (20fc,25t) 386,204 TOTALS 6 3 9,591 5 I 1,257 35.174 546,43 1 1. 206,022 PER CENT 54.7 42 *3 3.0 1453) 100-0 iuotf* i rr*N« ?nnn pounds CHART 1 CHART I BOMBS DROPPED ON GERMANY BY ROYAL AIR FORCE - U.S. 8TH a I5TH AIR FORCE BY TYPE BOMB-YEARLY BOMB TONNAGE - MONTHLY CHART 263 PERSONS KILLED BY BOMBS DROPPED ON GERMANY RAF, US 8TH AF AND 15TH AF BOMB TONNAGE AND PERSONS KILLED WCOROX FROM CAPTUBZO DOCUMENTS &frilCVP-D TO Bt OFFICIAL 5MOW THt NUMBER OF* PeitfONS KILLED DURING *1* %4IDJ ON fitRM*NY BV MONTH/ FOR THE- PERIOD JL4NIMRV 194.3 THROUGH >MNiU4Ry 1^4-5 PERSONS KILLED 1949 1944. 1945 J/1N 700 57 1 7 13553 HrB 500 eo 5 9 M/JR 2 9 OO 59 9 5 >4PR 2 50 0 994.8 MAY 77 OO *10 7 7 6 OUN 9 f OOO 52 2 0 JUL 54000 9683 AUG 82 00 1307 2 SErP ■4.9 O 2 0 18 7 OCT 9900 1 7937 NOV 4700 I 7A-40 DErC 4 000 24748 XcrCAU | i3T i.S^o 1 BO Z L5 5 5 3 OP- BOMBS INCLUOeS INC&NDIAHX AND F^/1GMP-NTION TOhJKLA&tr PHURtD ?000 POUSJO. ***ft, CHART 4 CHART 4 PERSONS SERIOUSLY INJURED BY BOMBS DROPPED ON GERMANY RAF, US 8TH, B I5TH A.F. BOMB TONNAGE AND PERSONS SERIOUSLY INJURED RECORDS FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS RELIEVED TO BE OFFICAL SHOW THE NUMBER OF PERSONS SERIOUSLY INJURED OURIKG AIR RAIDS OH GERMANY BY MONTHS FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER THRU JANUARY ifA-5. PERSONS INJURED 1945 1944 i94i" JAN 9.51 a I 1 7, a 8 0 FEB 1 2Lf 1 2. 6 MAR 1 Q,0 7 6 APR 1 7,7 3 9 MAY \ 7,509 JUN 1 0,0 2 0 JUL ( 8j3i r AUG 2 7,5 0 0 3EP 3 0,8 2 7 OCT i a, 3 s 5 a a,23 a NOV 1 9,3 T9 2 6,0 5 5 ~ 0 EC 1 0,0 r 9 2 4-jO 3 7 TOTAL 4-7. 6 1 5 Z J fl»962 ALL TOHKACE FIGURED A3 ZOOO POUNDS. PI4APT A BASIC DATA FROM U5. STRATEGIC BOMBING SORTCY TABULATING SERVICE BRANCH. vrlMn 1 O CHART 5 BUILDINGS TOTALLY DESTROYED BY BOMBS DROPPED ON GERMANY RAF, US 8TH, 8 US 15TH A.F. BOMB TONNAGE AND BUILDINGS TOTALLY DESTROYED • records non caftuko documents bto be strm rut number of 8UIL0M6S TTJTAtY DESTROYED DU ft m 6 MS RAIDS 6EKIUMY BY MONTHS FOB THE PERIOD JAMMST iHJ TNKOU6H 1f4-S. BUILDINGS DESTROYED 1 9 4 J i 9 44 1M5 JA N 1,0 0 0 1 1,4 A 4 2 0,0 5 2 FE B 1,5 0 0 9,6 1 4 MAR 3,4 0 0 1 5,64 0 APR S, 1 0 0 1 5,0 1 5 MAY 12,500 9.5 1 2 J UN 2 9,a o o 4, ) 2 1 JU L 4 6,0 0 0 1 1,9 0 9 AUG 1 4,2 0 O Z 5,4 0 5 «SE P 1 4,4-0 0 5 54 27 OCT 1 9,1 0 0 2 8,2 5 J NOV 1 2/0 0 24,037 DEC 9,4 0 0 24f024 TOTAL- f 17 3, 9 O O 2 1 4, ? T0NNA6E OF BOMBS INCLUDES M.E.. INCENDIARY 4 FRAGMENTATION TYPES. ALL TONNAGE FIGURED AS 2000 POUNDS. Basic data from us. stimtegk bombing survey tabulating service branch. CHART 6 CHART 6 BUILDINGS SEVERELY DAMAGED BY BOMBS DROPPED ON GERMANY RAF, US 8TH, a US I5TH A.F. BOMB TONNAGE AND BUILDINGS SEVERELY DAMAGED RECORDS FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS BELIEVED TO BE OFFICIAL SHOW THE NUMBER OF BUILDINGS SEVERELY DAMAGED DURING AIR RAIDS ON GERMANY BY MONTHS FOB THE PERIOD JANUARY 1949 THROUGH JANUARY 1945. BUILDINGS SEVERELY DAMAGED 1943 1944 1945 JAN. 4,400 19,860 21, 102 FEB. 5.600 9.479 MAR. 14,300 16,519 APR. 6.700 16,220 • MAY 28,000 12,983 JUN. 32,100 6,900 JUL. 31, 800 20,332 AUG. 18,100 17.681 SEP. 1 1,000 27,600 OCT. 33,150 30,553 NOV. 14,039 33,714 DEC. 13,643 32,248 TOTAL 212.832 244,089 TONNAGE OF BOMBS INCLUDES H.E., INCENDIARY t' FRAGMENTATION TYPES. ALL TONNAGE FIGURED AS 2000 POUNDS. a o-r BASIC DATA FROM U.5. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY TABULATING SERVICE BRANCH. CHART 7 CHART 7 AIRRAID PROTECTION AND ALLIED SUBJECTS IN GERMANY National Group Leader (Reichsgruppen- fuhrer). President of the National Air- Raid-Protection League (Reichsluft- schutzbund) (RLB) - responsible direct- ly to Goering. Provincial Group Leader (Landesgruppen- fuhrerj. Area of a province (former federal state) including approximately three regions (Gaue). Regional Group Leader (Gaugruppenfuhrer] (also called Bezirksgruppenfuhrer), Area of a political region (Gau). Area Group Leader {Kreisgruppenfuhrer). An area approximating a U.S. county. District Group Leader (Ortsgruppen- fiihrer). Area of a police district (Abschnitt) in large cities having dis- tricts; otherwise, municipal group leader. Precinct Group Leader (Revlergruppen- fuhrer). Area of a police precinct (Reyier). Approximately 15,000 to 20,000 persons. Sub-group Leader (Untergruppenfuhrer). Area of six to ten air-raid-protection blocks. Block Warden (Blockwart). Area of "an air-raid-protection block" - 10 to 15 houses or a large apartment building. House Warden (Hauswart). Area of one apartment house or group of small houses - 10 to 40 persons. AIR RAID WARDENS FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. II. CONCLUSIONS After study and consideration of the operations and accomplishments of the German civilian defense services, certain basic conclusions ar- rived at by the Civilian Defense Division are presented herevvith. It is concluded that; 1. At the national level, planning in civilian defense should be a continuous process, keeping abreast of the development of the tech- niques of war and weapons and the ways and means to minimize their ef- fect. 2, The control exercised by the German regular police fran the national level through the local level made for simplicity of control and command. The emergency created by war in civilian communities re- quires concentration of authority. 3» The German plan for civilian defense appears to have been based upon the possibility of comparatively small raids successfully carried out by the enemy, the raids increased to saturation proportions and were consistently recurring in every part of GERMANY, the burden upon the civilian defense organization originally set up was too great for it to beer efficiently. The basic structure of German civilian de- fense rested upon self-protection (Selbstschutz). The individual was trained to take care of himself, protect his property, end join with a few others in a small group under a warden to help others to do like- wise when the task was too great for them to bear alone. This training of the individual in self-protection and the feeling of confidence he had that all would be done that could be done kept alive a strong spirit in civilian defense forces which, in no small measure, was responsible for the fact that the home front did not collapse. 4* No city can have available permanently in every locality suf- ficient civilian defense forces and equipment adequately to handle the problems created by saturation raids. When those are experienced, it can always use more service. The demands of war upon manpower indicate that this assistance can best be supplied frem mobile reserves of, and controlled by, the national government, and so placed strategically with respect to potential targets that they can cane to the assistance of the stricken area within a short enough period to render effective service in their respective fields. In mobile reserves devoted to fire protect- ion the time should not exceed an hour. 5. The number and type of mobile reserves to be made available should be determined by the likelihood of attack, the vulnerability of the target, the forces available locally, and the assistance which can he obtained under mutual aid arrangements from other canmunities. 6, The network of German express highways (Reichsautobahnen) built for military purposes was of great value in getting mutual aid 13 FINAL REPORT, C.D J). services and mobile reserves to communities requesting assistance* 7* Tbe German air-raid warning system which changed frcm time to time to keep abreast of developments in the war, worked efficiently* 8* The outstanding characteristic of German control centers was their location in strongly protected shelters, making continued opera- tion under heavy air attack more probable* 9* The absence of adequate provision for an over-all incident con- trol officer was a defect* Such a person, well-trained, would have brought about more coordinated action of the services at incidents* 10. Complete nationalization of fire departments, as was accomplish, ed by GREAT BRITAIN, was the best method developed of operating fire serv. ices in war time* 11. Fire projection, prevention, and control should be an integral part of the training program of the armed forces in peace time. 12, The auxiliary mobile pump as used first in GREAT BRITAIN and later in GERMANS", proved of great value in combating fires resulting from enemy action, and it has definite peace-time auxiliary uses and should be developed further as a war emergency apparatus* 13• Heavy duty pumpers and facilities for the production of high caliber fire streams would have been extremely valuable in coping with serious fires. 14« Single-jacketed hose is not suitable for war time need. 15. In fires of large proportions resulting frcm aerial attack, such as were experienced by cert ain German cities, all communication, except by messenger, having been put out of action, proper control was lost. This could have been maintained by the use of two-way radio from central control to command car at the scene, and by walkie-talkie frcm command car to different places at the scene of the fire. l6. m addition to taking every advantage of natural water sources, properly placed stat ic water systems in sufficient quantity capable of quick replenishment from mains independent of the regular water supply are a requirement in modern warfare. 17* Although German cities, because of heavy construction and the use of incombustible material, were less susceptible to conflagrations, they had the weakness of a type of roof construction consisting of wooden battens with loose tiles which made them highly vulnerable to incendiary and high-explosive attacks, tfhen subjected to great numbers of incendiaries and high explosives which started large fires in con- gested areas, destroyed water supplies, made streets impassable, and FINAL REPORT, C.D.D* wrecked ccmmuni cat ions, great conflagrations resulted, with which the fire-fighting organizations were unable to cope. 18* German experience in conflagrations shows the desirability of continued planning to create fire breaks,, to prevent excessive densities of population, and to limit heights of buildings* 19* Tk© German emergency medical service was outstanding: a* In that it planned and had available when needed in bombed canmunities and war industries a sufficient number of well-trained medi- cal personnel to handle the casualties that could be reasonable antici- pated * b, In the development am equipment of first-aid stations which were so distributed and staffed as to be the backbone of the serv- ice. 20. The banbing of German hospitals created a serious bed shortage which was never satisfactorily met because of inadequate planning for alternate hospitals* That situation indicates the desirability in the construction of future hospitals of placing them away from potential military targets, so that they may be available to handle the overflow of casualties which might result frcm aerial attack. 21, The identification of bodies was made extremely difficult be- cause of the absence of any rule requiring individuals to have a means of identification, and the further fact that finger-printing was limited to criminals. 22, Although the preparations and equipment for the treatment of gas casualties were most elaborate, as was the training of all civilian defense personnel, the German plan of withholding adequate information frcm the public in matters of gas protection and identification was un- sound. 23* The rescue service was well planned and organized but fell down in that it gave insufficient training in rescue techniques to the personnel of the service* 24, The availability of army and air force personnel for street clearance, restoring order, rough rescue work, emergency feeding, and generally for those tasks which unskilled labor could accomplish, created for each community a large group of reserves which could re- spond quickly to appeals for help® 25, Industry, with its factory air-raid-protection service, co- ordinated with the air-raid-protection police locally, the national railroads and the national post office, each established and carried out a most effective air-raid protection program® 15 FINAL REPCRT, C.D.D. 26. flie subject of protective lighting should be re-evaluated in the light of experiences during this war, with respect to the benefits derived as compared with the costs in extra consumption of fuel, re- tardation of traffic movement, lower production efficiency, lowering of morale of the workers, and difficulties in times of panic. 27* The war brought about the development of two distinct govern- mental policies on shelters; in GERMANY, an attempt to construct above- ground shelters that would be bcmb-proof; In ENGIAND, a policy to con- struct shelters for the public which were proof against incendiaries and proof against a 550-pound (250-Kilo) bcmb falling 20 feet away. There was a difference of opinion within GSRMJfTY concerning their policy. The whole question, being involved with the development of weapons in modern war, is one that merits immediate, and continuing research. 28. pre-war German industrial construction generally was built with no idea of protective concealment and in such a way that it could not later be so protected. Much of the construction built during the war took advantage of proper techniques in the selection of sites and used various means which generally brought about effective concealment. 29. The training of civilian defense personnel ’was carefully and thoroughly conducted so that each participant was properly instructed in the responsibilities of his assignment and the performance of his duties. This training was constantly revised as conditions required, and a vigorous attempt was made to keep it current. 30. The technical planning of evacuation in GERMANY was well done for the volume of people for which it was planned to handle. A princi- pal failure of the program was the result of unreconciled differences of policy between responsible Nazi party organizations, parents and school authorities on the subject of instruction in religion and Nazi doctrines and philosophy, it continued to function reasonable well until trans- portation was disrupted, huge numbers rendered homeless, and reception areas overcrowded. Toward the end of the war when those conditions de- veloped, control could not be maintained and the plan collapsed. 31. The feature of the emergency welfare service was that during the war it was developed to a point where it was able to function even in the great confusion which followed saturation raids in so many German cities. 16 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. III. ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN AIR-RAID-PROTECT ION SERVICES Intros tlQB 1. The consciousness of an intending second great war with impli- cation* s>{ indiscriminate air attack upon civilian populations - total war - inspired in many nations, official or semi-official study 6f the means of resisting such attacks or of ameliorating their consequences. 2. As early as 1928, large-scale, realistic exercises were held in JAPAN, simulating procedures to he followed in civilian defense, and, in the early thirties, definite plans had been prepared by practically all European countries. Study and initial preparations were stimulated by the Japanese attack upon CHINA in 1931, by the Italian conquest of ETHIOPIA and the outbreak of the Spanish civil war in 1935, and they became still more urgent in view of the disclosed resurgence of the Ger- man war spirit in the latter half of the thirties. 3. GERMANY, herself, conscious of her future plans and the re- taliation she might expect, began her preparations early. By order of 29 April 1933, the Air Travel Section (Luftfahrtabteilung) of the Transport Ministry was expanded to form a separate ministry, that of the Ministry of Air Travel (Reichsluftfahrtministerium), and Gdring, then Prussian Prime Minister, was chosen to head it. 4. Besides his primary task, that of imbuing the German nation with a feeling of unarmed security in the midst of neighbors with power- ful air forces, which was to be accomplished through the Air-Raid-Pro - tection league, Gdring had also to create an air-raid-protection organi- zation. Such an organization was officially established on 24 June 1933, when it was announced that "foreign1* planes had flown over BERLIN, and had dropped leaflets insulting the government, a pure invention which GGring did not even take the trouble to stage. 5. As GERMANY became stronger and, consequently, more defiant, her plans were revealed to the extent that announcement was made by BERLIN, 13 March 1935, that GERMANY had rearmed in the air and that Q6ring had become commander-in-chief of the German Air Force and Minis- ter for Air. A few months later, responsibility for the air-raid-pro- tection service was taken over by the Air Ministry, 1 July 1935, approxi- mately the date of passage of the basic law establishing that organiza- tion. 6. A section Of the air force general staff (Fdhrungsstab) 1A, Op. 3, was formed to operate the air-raid-protection (Luftschutz) organi- zation which was administered by Inspectorate No. 13 of the Air Minis- try with primary interest in the organization and training of units and technical developments. 17 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. a. The composition of this Inspectorate, as originally estab- lished, was as follows: Section I. Direction and operations of warning service, formation and operations of motorized fire battalions. Supervision of the Air-Baid-Protection League. Section II. Organization. Operations of the factory air-raid-protection service, extended self-protection and the self- protection services. Section III. Research and experiment in Technical fields, equipment and instruction, fire-fightlng, fire precautions, anti-gas measures, bomb disposal, smoke screens, decoy sites, and allied subjects. b. The Inspectorate was first established at WANNSXE near BERLIN and later transferred to TANGEHMUNDE. In March, 1945, it was abolished because of the conclusion that it was over-staffed, compli- cated and unwieldy in operation, and the staff personnel, reduced to 96 from a former total of 300 persons, was formed into the Air-Raid- Protection Section of the air force general staff, with the following sub-divisions: Section I. Operations and organization. Press and propaganda. Section II. Warning service, lighting restriction# and con- trol, smoke screens, decoy sites, camouflage, field inspection of motorized fire battalions. Supervision of air-raid protection in military installations, railroads, post office system, and waterways. Section III. General Policies. c. With the reorganisation, the general direction and control 18 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. of air-raid-protection policy was vested in the chief of air-raid-pro- tec ti on (Chef des Luftschutzes) of the air force general staff® Basic Law ?• The basic law establishing a national service devoted to de- fense against air attack was passed by the G>erman government on 26 June 1935* and signed by both Hitler and G&ring on 31 August 1935* a. By the provisions of this law, responsibility for air-raid- protection was vested in Ooring9 the Minister for Air0 In the execution of the law, he was given power to avail himself of the resources of the Air Ministry, the services of the regular police, and, also, the serv- ices, establishments and facilities of the states, municipalities, local authorities and other public corporate bodies0 On matters of policy, the law provided that the Minister for Air work in cooperation with other competent government departments,, b® The law imposed duties upon all German citizens aid re- quired their obedience to its provisions® Exempt were members of the armed forces, certain public officials, and those of unsuitable age or physical condition. Other provisions of the law were that5 (1) In principle, no compensation would be paid for personal service in air-raid protection. (2) Secrecy was required on the part of all engaged in matters pertaining thereto® (3) Permission was required to publish articles, produce pictures or films, or to organize exhibitions upon the subject of air=raid protection. (4) Penalties for violations or resistance to its execut- ion should be applied® (5) Prior laws were amended to conform to its provisions® c. The Minister for Air was further authorized to issue, in agreement with other ministries concerned, administrative provisions for the execution of the law® Decrees pertaining to Basic Law 8® At the time of the passage of the air-raid-protection law, the nationalization of the German police forces was in process, the ulterior object being to use those powerful forces as a major tool of the Nazi Party® i*hen the first decree, providing for the application of the law, was promulgated in 1937® "that process had been virtually completed? con- trol of police activities had been taken from municipalities, and FINAL REPORT, C.DJ). delegated to Hinmler who had been appointed by Hitler in June, 1936 as commander-in-chief of the German police within the Ministry of the Interior. a. The first decree was dated 4 May 1937® It established the complete structure of the air-raid-protection service and the process of its administration. It defined the task of air-raid protection as that of securing the German people and the territory of GERMANY against the effects of air attack. (1) An air-raid-warning service was established to warn of impending danger to the people* public authorities* commercial and industrial undertakings0 This service was to be the responsibility of the regular police authorities* except in cases where the Minister for Air assigned particular duties to the air force® By later enactment* the air force was given full responsi- bility in this fieldo (2) To afford assistance in the event of injury to persons or damage to property* and to assist in maintaining public security and order where they were affected or threatened by air attack* a security and assistance service (Sicherheitsund Hilfsdienst (SoHoDo)) was provided® This service provided professional mobile units of the municipal air-raid-protection services and was responsible for all major tasks arising in emergencies caused by air raid0 It consisted of full- time members with the status of auxiliary policemen and was* in May* 1942* renamed air-raid-protection police (Luftschutzpolizei)® Its functions comprised fire fighting* rescue* demolition and clearance* build- ing repair* medical (including first-aid and ambulance services)* veterinary* gas detection* identification and decontamination® (3) The security and assistance service was supplemented in repair and rescue functions by the technical emer- gency service (Technische Nothilfe (ToN®))® This latter service was created on 30 September 1919 in large utility concerns to maintain productive capacity in the event of strikes or public disorder,, It was a body of uniformed engineers* technicians* skilled and semi-skilled building specialists* having under their direction groups of unskilled laborers® Its operation was in the field of building construct- ion and repair* public utility maintenance* rehabilita- tion of facilities in general* and it was called into action in emergencies involving widespread damage to property caused by riots or catastrophes® The organi- zation and identity of the technical emergency service 20 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. were preserved by the Nazi Party* and it was placed. 21 October 1933* under the supervision of the Ministry of Security,, In 1934* it was converted into a full- fledged Nazi Party formation* and* in 1937* passed to the control of the regular police* and its members armed. Later, in 1939* its basic functions became those of maintaining continuous operations of public utilities, of executing certain air-raid-protection tasks, and of dealing with major emergencies. The regular police (Schutzpolizei) consulted with its air-raid-protection specialists on air-defense matters. (4) Similarly® the German Red Cross was assigned special duties in relation to the air-raid-protection medical groups of the security and assistance service,, (5) To protect industrial and commercial enterprises and the persons engaged therein* and to assure maintenance „ of uninterrupted operations, the first decree estab- lished the factory (industrial) air-raid-protection service (Werkluftschutz) to be organized under the direction the National Industries Group (Reichsgruppe Industrie)* a department of the Ministry of Economics comprised of seven main sections* each section having supervision over a number of specific and correlated industries. Officers or representatives of the In- dustries Group extended their field of authority to sub-divisions of municipalities corresponding to those of the police. Decision was made by those representa- tives and confirmed by the ministry* regarding the relative importance to the war effort of factories or industrial plants within their jurisdiction. Based on those decisions* factory air-raid-protection serv- ices were required in certain plants and not in others. The character and extent of the service in respect to personnel and equipment depended upon the nature of the industry* acreage of the plant and the number of employees. In some instances* joint or common services were set up between two or more adjacent plants. In any case* aid frem a plant having a factory air-raid- protection service was obligatory* either to neighbor- ing plants* or to the community as a whole. In the event of extreme urgency* aid was given to plants by the municipal air-raid-protection service. (6) The self-protection service (Selbstschutz) was estab- lished to protect dwellings,, public and private build- ings® public offices and minor industrial enterprises together with their occupants and workerso Duty in this service was incumbent upon the whole population® 21 PINAL REPORT, C.D.D and was concerned mainly with air-raid protection and conduct in homed* It included within its scone the warden service in its entirety. (7) The organisation and formation of self-protection units were the responsibility of the German Air-Raid-Protect- ion League (Reichsluftschutzbund) (E.L.B.), which was to act solely in an advisory capacity and only at the request of the agency concerned, such as government Offices, the Nazi Party, states, municipalities, or other public authorities. Its activities in those cases were to be confined to the formation of self-protection units. The Air-Baid-Protection League developed from a consolidation of the following organizations devoted to the study and promotion of air protection: Air-Bald- Protection Club; Air-Raid-Protection League; the Flak Club; and the Circle of Airmen.. The amalgamation of these organizations was ordered, upon the indication of their willingness to comply, through a memorandum, dated 26 January 1932, issued by the Ministry of the Interior of PRUSSIA. The existence of these prototypes of the League at that date is a further indication of the early consideration that was given to air-raid protection in GERMANY. The final consolidation was effected, 29 April 1933, under the corporate title of the German Alr-Baid-Protection League, under the patron- age of Gflring, Minister for Air. It was stated in the cited memorandum that the purpose of the new tion was to inform the German people of danger in- herent in air raids, of the necessity of developing an air-raid-protection service, and to promote measures to that effect in cooperation with competent authority. Membership in the League was presumed to be voluntary and it rose to a reported total of more than 13,000,OCX). IXxes were assessed in proportion to Income and station of the individual member. Proceeds from assessed dues and voluntary contributions were ostensibly for the maintenance of the organization and to some extent for free distribution of minor items of air-raid-protection equipment among the poorer classes. Collection of dues and contributions was made under the supervision of the Nazi party, and no accounting was made of expenditures. Although the decree specifically directed that the Alr- Rald-Protection League act in accordance with instruct- ions of the Air Minister, its tasks were not specifi- cally defined by the minister until 28 June 1940. The tasks assigned to the League by this decree were to propagandize and enroll the German people in the air- raid-protection service, to organise and train personnel, to publicize techniques, to assist in distribution of FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. gas masks® to define local and defense sectors® and to call up persons for duty under the compulsory pro- visions of the air-raid-protection law„ Membership in the League was restricted to German citizens® Some officers were paid and all were uniformed® Administra- tive divisions and sub-divisions corresponded to those of the police and extended down fo warden sectors of police precincts (Reviere)® (8) In the first decree the extended self-protection serv- ice (Erweiterterselbstschutz) was provided to protect public and private buildings® public offices® and commercial and industrial enterprises of lesser import- ance than those to be served by the factory air-raid- protection service9 but of more importance than those included in the self-protection service,, It was organ- ized under the direction of the local regular police® 9. Tftxe foregoing describes the organizational structure of the air- raid-protection service as established by articles 1 and 2 of the first decree* Subsequent articles of that decree contained functional provis- ions necessary for its establishment and operation© under them, the pol- ice authorities could conscript personnel for the air-raid-protection services, and methods thereof were prescribed; provision was made for re- funds of expenses incurred; penalties for violations were fixed; authority to appoint special constables from certain categories was provided; the national railroads© post office department© and waterways were directed to establish air-raid-protection services in their respective fields; and the air forces was directed to organize the aircraft observer service© 10. In compliance with the provisions of the decree© a comprehensive plan was set up for observation and warning© A warden service for the protection of dwellings and for the reporting of incidents was provided© 11. The entire system was unified under the control of the regular police, an agency possessing full civil authority which could be extended when desirable to all members of the services© The chain of commend was clearly established© 12. The first decree under the air-raid-protection law was comprehen- sive in its scope and prescribed in detail the organization and operation of the air-raid-protection services© (Chart with explanatory notes fol- lows on page 2k») 13* The German air-raid-protestion service as outlined in this de- cree, fully manned by trained personnel, staffed by capable and exper- ienced officers, and with proper and sufficient equipment© could be expected to minimize to the greatest possible extent the effect of enemy air attack. It is interesting to note that because of the consideration and study given to the problem over a period of nearly two years between 736334 O—47 3 AIR RAID PROTECTION AND ALLIED SUBJECTS IN GERMANY REICH INDUSTRIAL GROUP J WORKS AIR RAID PROTECTION SERVICE RED CROSS MINISTRIES AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES INCLUDING Based upon the German Air Raid Protection Law of 26 June 1935 as promulgated by REICH3GE3ETZBLATT No 69 4 July 1935 and the First Decree for the application of that Law dated 4 May 1937. GERMAN AIR RAID PROTECTION SERVICES EXTENDED SELF PROTECT!ON SERVICE MEDICAL SERVICE INTERIOR ECONOMY FINANCE LABOR REICH AIR RAID PROTECTION LEAGUE vSELF PROTECTION SERVICE VETERINARY SERVICE MUTUAL AID UNITS AND MOBILE RESERVES ARE ALSO AVAILABLE TO TEE POLICE PRESIDENT FROM THE OUTSIDE. LETTERS REFER TO ACCOMPANYING NOTES. SEE CHART ACCOMPANYING "CONTROL CENTERS". REGULAR POLICE ORGAN! RATION CHART MINISTER OF AIR AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF AIR FORCES COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF POLICE REGULAR AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLIOS POLICE JRESIDENT OR DEPUTY (CONTROL CENTER) AIR RAID PROTECTION POLICE FIRE POLICE &. DECONTAMINATI01 SERVICE LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT AIRCRAFT OBSERVER SERVICE GAS DETECTION & IDENTI FI CATI01 SERVICE AIR RAID WARNING CENTRAL AIR FORCE INDEPENDENT AND SELF ADMINISTERED AIR RAID PROTECTION SERVICES RAILWAYS POST OFFICE WATTERWAYS ANTI AIRCRAFT HEADQUARTERS (FLAK) TECHNICAL EMERGENCY SERVICE RESCUE SERVICE FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. NOTES ON ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN AIR-RAID PROTECTION Based upon the Air-Raid Protection Law of 26 June 1935 and the First Decree for the application of that Law dated 4 May 1937 (To accompany attached chart) The Minister of Air was made responsible for air-raid protection® He was to avail himself of the services of regular and administrative police authorities and of the German Air Aiministration® He was to use all facilities and services of civic authorities® He was to operate in complete agreement with competent government ministries on matters of policy® The German railways, post office and waterways were directed to adopt air-raid protection measures within their own sphere of action, utilizing their own personnel and issuing orders for training operations and practices® Police authorities were to act only upon demand of such departments and said departments were directed to call upon local air- raid protection authorities for assistance in cases where their own staff might be insufficient® A* LUFTWAFFE® Charged with operation and integration of aerial observa- tion and air raid warning with other military agencies and police author! ties® B. DIE DEUTSCHE FOLIZEI® Regular and administrative police establish- ments and authorities® C* REICB3LDFTSCHUTZBUND® Sponsored unofficially by Goering, 29 April 1933* Organizes and forms Self Protection Services (J)® Acts in advis- ory capacity only in Extended Self Protection Service (K) and in other fields of Air-Raid Protection® D* REICB3GRUPPE INDUSTRIE® Functioned under Ministry of Economics® Charged with organization of forks (Factory) Air-Raid Protection Serv- ice (L)® £• POUZBIDIREKTOR or P0LI2EIFRASIDENT in towns with state police ad- ministration, elsewhere .BDRGERMEISTER® In general, air-raid protection areas coincided with those of local police divisions® F® FLUGMELDBDIENSTo Organized by Air Force to furnish reports of hos- tile aircraft to air-raid warning service® Q® WARNZENTRALE® Operated by local civilian personnel uner the direct- ion of the Air Force to relay warnings, audible and otherwise, to the public and to air-raid-protection services® 25 PINAL REPORT, CJD.D. H. DIE TECHNISCHE NOTHILFK. A technical volunteer organization under police direction with special duties in rescue and repair operations where no LUFTSCHDTZP0LI2EI is constituted« Also advised police in technical details concerning such operations« I. LOPTSCHUTZPOLXZEI. (Until 31 May 1942 known as SICHERHEIT3 UNO HIUSDIKN3T (Security and Assistance Service))« To afford assistance in case of injury to persons or damage to property. To maintain secur- ity and order under threatened or actual air attack, ihey comprised fire- fighting and decontamination, rescue and repair, first-aid and ambulance, veterinary and gas-detection units, in fulfilling the functions of this service in places where no such service was constituted use was made of State and Municipal Fire brigades, health service, building or public works departments, street cleaning and public utility services. J. 3ELBSTSCHUT2. Enrolment in this service was incumbent upon almost the entire population. It was concerned primarily in protection and pre- cautions to be observed in dwellings and minor enterprises which were the responsibility of the occupiers. It comprised the entire warden service of German -air-raid protection. See (C) above. K. BRWEITERTER 3ELBST3CHUTZ. A service to protect buildings and facili- ties of commercial and industrial enterprises and the occupants thereof where Self Protection Service (J) was inadequate and Works Air-Raid- Protection Service (L) was unnecessary. L. WERKLDFISCHUTZ„ To protect industrial and commercial enterprises and the persons engaged therein with a view to the maintenance of their uninterrupted operation. Organized under the direction of the represen- tative of the Reich industrial Group (D) in whose area such enterprises are located. M. Rescue Units to deliver trapped persons from ruined buildings. Equipped with tools to perform shafting and tunnelling operations and frequently with motor cranes and shovels for heavier duty, (see H above). N. Gas detection and identification laboratories were set up to enable chemists designated for that purpose to analyze and determine the char- acter of samples collected in case Of gas attack. 0. Units of local fire departments were dispatched at the direction of the police president during air raids. P. FEUBRWEHREN, Fire units of part-time personnel, recruited either voluntarily or compulsorily, who supplemented the fire departments in larger towns, or provided the fire service in smaller towns and villages. They were trained fire officers of the air-raid-protection police, and had standard fire equipment. 26 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. Q,. SCHUTZPOLIZEI DER OEMEINDBN. Detachments of the regular police of the municipality were dispatched during air raids when needed for traf- fic control, cordoning, guard or other similar duty. R. A veterinary service with stables and first-aid facilities was estab lished to confine stray animals or to treat those injured during raids. S. Medical facilities at the disposal of the control center consisted of first-aid stations and medical teams. The former were staffed by doctors and nurses during air-raids and the latter consisted of ambulances with drivers and stretcher-bearers under the direction of doctors. Liaison with hospitals was maintained to properly distribute cases. Mortuary duties also devolved upon this service. T, DEUTSCHES ROTE KREUZ. Entrusted with special duties where no IOTT- SCHUTZPOLIZEJ is constituted and is generally to act in cooperation with the medical service. 27 FINAL REPORT, CoD.D* the passage of the basic law and the issuance of the first decree, the structure established at that time remained practically unchanged dur- ing the entire course of the ware 14o The organization and operation of German air-raid protection followed the general pattern of civil defense in BRITAIN and of civil- ian defense in the UNITED STATES, except for its distinctive feature of complete control and operation at the municipal level by a strong nationalized regular police and, at the higher levels, by the air force* 15o A law nationalizing the German fire-fighting forces became ef- fective 23 November 1938* It was intended to transform the system from a series of independent and isolated deparlanents to a group of units supporting one another in any emergency without reference to political or geographical boundariesc Itie intent of the law was never fully carried out, and fire departments remained under local control and were maintained by local funds„ Nevertheless, this law did result in import- ant changes in the fire service,' which were to prove of inestimable val- ue when air raids began,, For example, a national system of fire train- ing was instituted, and hose, hose couplings and pumpers were all stand- ardized so that those items of equipment were interchangeable throughout the nation* Many municipalities substantially increased the number of fire-fighting appliances and added to their established quota of person- nel* Shortly after the outbreak of war, fire-fighting forces were further strengthened through an order, dated 24 October 1939* compelling the organization of voluntary and compulsory fire units in rural areas and small towns under the direction of the fire officers of the security and assistance service in the nearby cities* l6* The situation, then, in the early stages of the war found the fire-fighting forces of GERMAN? strengthened by some measure of unity of control, by additional appliances and augmented personnel* m an emergency, aid could be obtained from neighboring communities and even from distant cities* Subsequently, the need for a mobile reserve was appreciated, and from the static units of the security and assistance service, so-called motorized or mobile units were formed (S0H0D0 (Mot))* The fire-fighting components of these units, together with fire-fighting units of the army and of the special administrative departments and those of the factory air-raid-protection services of the larger-industrial plants formed such a reserve* Difficulties were experienced in obtain- ing physically qualified personnel for these forces because of the de- mands of the army and important war industries* The depletions neces- sitated the employment of members of the Hitler Youth organization and over-age or physically handicapped persons* Time permitted only ele- mentary training* Finally by an order issued in June, 19430 women be- tween the ages of 17 to 40 were made liable for service in the local fire-fighting forces* 17« The increase in the scale of attack and the number and wide distribution of the targets occurring subsequent to April, 1942, brought 28 FINAL REPORT, CoDcD. realization to the German air-raid-protection leaders that immediate and drastic actions must be taken,, Prior to that date a revised manual of the air-raid-nrotection service had been issued (4 February 1942), describing its duties and organization, differing in no important respect from the original plan„ In that manual, there was no intimation that the services were more than a local responsibility. a* On 1 April 1942, the air force took over responsibility for mobile reserves and the SoH.Do (Mot) became the motorized air-raid- protection battalions of the air force (LoSoAbt. (Mot))c Shortly after- wards, on 31 May 1942, the name of the static security and assistance service was changed to that of air-raid-protection police (Luftschutz- polizei), complete control being retained by the regular police,, b, In July, 194*o work units of the army an* air force were authorized at the call of the mayor or police president,. It was con- templated making these units available to communities for post-raid clearance and rescue through the commanders of the army corps areas (Wehrkreis)* c« Industrial concerns or contractors possessing or operating power shovels, cranes, air compressors, or like equipment, were required to place them at the service of air-raid-protection leaders upon demand. e« Air-raid-protect ion leaders were required by Himmler, 4 August 1942, to survey all available forces, md authority was given them to call for reinrorcements0 f* A decree or 6 October 1942, required all persons over 14 years of age to undergo air-raid-protection training under the super- vision of the Air-Raid-Protection League, go During October, 1942, an order was issued by the Minister for Air describing arrangements for mutual aid to be made by air-raid- protection leaders especially with respect to fire-fighting units. h, Hie Minister for Aire on 1? December 1942o also issued instructions continuing air force district commanders in their responsi- bility for air-raid protection within their districts (Luftgaue), These commanders had under their control air-raid-protection battalions (motorized) of the air force (Luftschutz Abteilungen (Mot) der Luft- waffe) for fire fighting0 decontamination*, rescue and repair,, io Within army corps areas, chief inspectors of the regular police were made responsible within their areas for the movement of their own motorized fire-fighting battalions (Feuerschutzpolizei Regiments' (Mot)) and were given authority to move local units of the alr-raid- FINAL REPORTo CoD0D0 protection police frcm one area to another© 18c It is apparent from the foregoing that efforts were being made during 1942 to strengthen the local air-raid-protection services by inducting every qualified person into those services and by providing for his training,, Effort was also devoted to initiating a logical sys- tem of mutual aid end the establishment of well-trained and equipped spec ialized mobile units stationed at strategic points,, ready far instant movement to localities under attack© 19© The attempt to improve the air-raid-protection service was continuous process* affected by the urgency of the situation and the shortage of manpower0 a. On© result of the latter was the recall of the Todt Organization from PRANCEo in 1943© This service had been created primarily to construct defense works,, and„ at that tlme0 it was parti- cipating in the construction of the West Wall0 Upon its return to MANY* it undertook large-scale,, debris-removal projects,, the building of shelters,, and repair of damage in industrial plantsi b0 A further concentration of effort was achieved when„ in October* 1943# the factory air-raid-protection and extended-self-pro- tection services were directed to place their farces at the disposal of the air-raid-protection leader of each conmunity© Co On 19 October 1943o an order was issued requiring «Eastern workers* to serve in the factory air-raid-protection service© 20© The German system of air-raid protection was well conceived in its several aspects,, such as the self-protect ion service,, the extended self-protection service* the factory air-raid-protection service* the public utility services* mobile reserves* and mutual assistance© It suffered* however* frcm the common defects of German* and particularly Nazi* procedures? complexity* overlapping* and conflict of authority,, It is believed that this study of the system will demonstrate clearly its excellent features as well as its defects* both of which should be given due consideration in the future planning of civilian defense meas- ures in the UNITED STATES© 30 FINAL REPORT, C,D0D, VTo AIR-RAID WARNING lo Introduction, The German system of air-raid warning,, as shown on the accompanying chart (page 32)0 entitled "Air-Raid Warning", is trated in two phases? the first,, "Detection*, indicating the sources of information and the channels through which it passedj and, the second, •Air-Raid Signals and Warnings", describing the methods by which this information was disseminated to essential installations and to the gen- eral publico Detection 20 Information of the approach and flight of enemy raiders was received from the following sources? a, Air Force Fighter Division (Jagddivision)0 In addition to its basic function,, that, of operating fighter planes, this unit also controlled the aircraft reporting service (Flugmeldedienst)0 described below0 and detection units called "FoTo* (Funk Telegraphie), which used radio interception or listening devices., With that facility, rqdio con- versations of Allied planes could be intercepted even before they took off for attacko Another source of early information available to this fighter headquarters was boats at seaQ Information was flashed by them to naval bases and thence to Air Fleet (Luftflotte) headquarters, from where it was telephoned to the fighter division headquarters. Informa- tion fran the fighter division headquarters was sent simultaneously to the anti-aircraft headquarters and to the warning central by telephone. b0 Aircraft Reporting Service Headquarters (Flugmeldedienst Kommando) ( Fluko)® This unit was an integral part of the fighter division under its aircraft reporting section (Department Flugmelde- dienst) and was composed of two divisions % the first0 a series of static observation posts (Flugmelderr served spaced throughout the country so as to insure adequate observation; and„ the second,, a motor- ized organization (Flugmeldekcrapanien)0 charged with the duties of re- placing any of the static posts which had been destroyed,, of widening the scope of observation of the regular fixed and of bolstering static posts at any point where reinforcement was indicated0 Informa- tion from the aircraft reporting service headquarters was communicated by telephone to the anti-aircraft headquarters„ to the air force0 and to the warning central0 A liason officer from the warning central was on duty at this reporting service headquarters0 c. Head quartersof the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division (Ge- fechtsstand der Flakdivision) (Flak), This unit received information from its observation posts located at or near the anti-aircraft bat- teries, and from radar stations, both connected with it by telephone. Telephone communication was also maintained with adjoining anti-aircraft artillery divisions, for the receipt and transmission of enemy informa- tion, and with the warning centrals which were included in the warning 31 AIR RAID PROTECTION AND ALLIED SUBJECTS IN GERMANY AIRCRAFT REPORTING SERVICE (FLUGMELDEDIENST) CONSISTING OF FIXED POSTS (FLUGMELDERE SERVEKOMPANIEN) AND MOBILE OBSERVERS (FLUGMELDEKOMPANIEN) HEADQUARTERS AIRCRAFT REPORTING SERVICE (FLUGMELDEDIENST KOMMANDO) (FLUKO) CONNECTED WARNING CENTRALS WARNING WATCHERS (WARNWACHEN) INFORMATION OF ENEMY RAIDS GIVEN TO PUBLIC BY SIRENS AND AUXILIARY SIGNALS k BY RADIO k WIRED RADIO ANNOUNCEMENTS RADAR "SPECIAL LIST" OF ESSENTIAL INSTALLATIONS AIR RAID WARNING HEADQUARTERS ANTI AIRCRAFT DIVISION (GEFECHTSSTAND DER FLAK DIVISION I1M. AIR FORCE FIGHTER DIVISION (JAGDDIVISION) WARNING CENTRAL (WARNZENTRALE) RADIO INTERCEPTION UNIT (FUNK TELEGRAPHIE) POLICE PRESIDENT (POL IZEI - PRASIDENT) k WARNING STATIONS IN THOSE TOWNS NOT HAVING WARNING CENTRALS COASTWISE SHIPPING AIR FLEET HEADQUARTERS (LUFTFLOTTE) HEADQUARTERS OF ADJOINING ANTI- AIRCRAFT DIVISIONS ANTI AIRCRAFT OBSERVER POSTS WATCHERS AND FIRE GUARDS IN INDUSTRIES RAILROAD WARNING CENTRAL (EIZENBAHN WARNZENTRALE) NAVAL BASE STATE LEADER (REICH33TATTHALTER) BROADCASTS BY RADIO &"WIRED RADIO" (DRAHTFUNK) FINAL REPORT, C„D0D® area served by the anti-aircraft artillery headquarters, not only for transmission of enemy information, but also for giving directions for the sounding of sounding of public air-raid alarms® d© Warning Watchers (larnwachen)© These observers were a part of the local air-raid-warning service (Luftschutzwarndienst) and did not belong to the aircraft reporting service (plugmeldedienst) of the fighter divisionQ They were stationed in high places around the periphery of the city in which was located the warning central of which they were a part® and were connected to their warning central by tele- phone In addition to reporting the approach and activity of enemy planes© they also supplied information of fires and bombings in the town. That information was telephoned to the warning central and from there to the control roan of the air-raid-protection leader (Luftschutzleiter)© e0 Watchers and Fire Guards in Large Industries© Information fran these sources was reported to the control room of the industry and from there relayed to the warning central© f© Railroad Warning Central (Eisenbahnwarnzentrale)© Each railroad division maintained its warning central, to which informa- tion of enemy activity along the railroad system was reported, and ich directed the giving of air-raid warnings throughout the railroad divi- sion® Information received at this center was supplied to the local warning central© g© Air-Raid-Protect ion Leader (Luftschutzleiter)© Informa- tion of local air-raid activity received at the control rooa (Befehls- stelle) of the police president or air-raid protection officer was sent by telephone to the warning central© Air-Raid Signals and Warnings 3o Authority© Authority to sound the public warnings rested with the commandera of the anti-aircraft artillery divisions on detection of enemy raiders0 Although this information© precise in its nature© was intended solely for the use of the military defense forces© the public soon learned the wave-lengths of these transmitters and© having secured a map with grids corresponding to those used by the military© they were able to plot enemy flights© Information of enemy raiders was broadcasted by the state leader or governor (Reichsstatthalter) over radio and wired- radio© These broadcasts© starting simultaneously with the giving of the first public siren warning and con- tinuing until the departure of the raiders© gave 37 FINAL REPORT* C,DoDo information of the general location of the planes* the sounding of the public alarms,, bombing activity and damagep end any other details deemed appropriate for the guidance and information of the general pub- lic® The authority to establish radio silence was vested in the state leader or governor end was put into effect by his broadcasting of code announcements* or the use of flash messages to the radio broadcast- ing stations® i0 Emergency Methods® In the event of the disruption of the siren system, the following emergency methods of sounding alarms were used; (1) Mobile sirens or loud speakers mounted on motor cars® (2) Portable hand sirens carried by wardens or policemen® (3) Anti-Aircraft Artillery® To disseminate alarms by the use of anti-aircraft units0 the following signals were adopted $ (a) "Small Raid Possible* (JKLe inalarm)® Three shots from heavy anti-aircraft guns0 with 13 second intervals® (b) "General Alarm" (Fliegeralarm) ® Five shots from heavy guns with five second intervals® (c) ar* (Entwarnung)o During the daytime nothing was used to indicate this signal0 At night searchlights were focused on a common point in the sky over the area alarmed® j® Auxiliary Methods® To supplement the siren signal* the following were usedg (1) Colored F3agsn. balls® cylinders * or placards® weye hoisted generally at the entrance to towns* along highways* waterways* in the harbors (see Section XIX* paragraph 8)* and in the railway system,, Flags (day) and lanterns (night) were placed at guide posts (stations in the outskirts of town to which reinforce ments reported)® Such signals were raised at the sounding of the first siren alarm and were lowered upon the announcement of the "All-Clear"® (2) Radio and wired-radio receivers were increased in volume and placed at open windows by individual owners upon official request0 to announce air attack informs tion0 38 FIBL REPORT „ C.DJ). (3) Wardens were required to insure that air-raid warnings were received by all persons under their care, espec- ially the sick and deaf« 736334 0—47 4 FINAL REPORT* C,DoD« Vo CONTROL CENTERS lo Introduction© The control center (Befehlsstelle) was the nerve center and command post of the air-raid-protection service© Its func- tions were s a* To serve as a message center for the receipt and trans- mission of information concerning incidents of air-raid activity within its area; b« To dispatch available services to the scene of an incident, and to exercise over-all control of the operation of services under its command\ Co To receive and render reports of the results of raids in the area concerned; and d© To request mutual aid and reinforcement of air-raid services from the outside# 2© Operation© The dropping of bombs required prompt action upon the part of wardens and residents of the house which was damaged© They assembled quickly and, using the tools with which each house was equipped (sand, water, stirrup-pumps, shovels, axes, fire-beaters), made an im- mediate effort to remedy the situation caused by the bombing© If these self-protection (Selbstschutz) forces by themselves, or with the help of reinforcements of other self-protection groups, could not control the situation, a report of the incident and a request for aid were made by the house or block warden to the police precinct (Revier) headquarters© That headquarters had no air-raid-protection services at its disposal (except, in some cases, first-aid medical groups), and it furnished assistance by calling upon other available self-protection groups with- in the precinct© If assistance was insufficient or unavailable there, precinct headquarters appealed to the control room which had the air- raid-protection police at its disposal© In larger cities this call was made to the police district (Abschnitt) control room (the district com- prised several precincts), and, in smaller communities it was made to the control roan of the air-raid-protection leader (Luftschutzleiter), both control rooms being under the command of the police president (PolizeiprSsident) or a deputy© (The list on page ijl shows the air- raid-protection services available to the police president through the control center©) These command posts were manned by a leader, by assistants who were experts in the various services represented, and by necessary operational, administrative and clerical assistants© An operations map was maintained in these headquarters cn which each re- ported incident was recorded© There was also maintained a map for the plotting of enemy air activity© From the information plotted on those two maps, decision was made regarding the services necessary to cope with the recorded incidents, and units were accordingly dispatched© The representative of each air-raid-protection service maintained a AIR RAID PROTECTION AND ALLIED SUBJECTS IN GERMANY LOCAL AIR RAID PROTECTION LEADER POLICE PRESIDENT SCHDPO PROTECTION POLICE ENTERPRISE OWNER AB3CHNITT POLICE DISTRICT OWNER OR MANAGER OF LARGEST ENTERPRISE FOR A ("COMBINED UNIT") REVTER POLICE PRECINCT ENTERPRISE AIR RAID PROTECTION LEADER AIR RAID PROTECTION IE ACER (COMBINED UNIT) AIR RAID PROTECTION ORGANIZATION OF SMALLER ENTERPRISE AIR RAID PROTECTION ORGANIZATION OF SMALLER ENTERPRISE AIR RAID PROTECTION ORGANIZATION OF LARGEST ENTERPRISE AIR RAID PROTECTION ORGANIZATION OF SMALLER ORDER GUARDS FIRE WATCHERS & FIRE FIGHTERS TELEPHON- ISTS AND ESSENGERS SPECIAL SQUADS FIRST AID CHAIN OF RESPONSIBILITY KEY - CHAIN OF COMMAND FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. AIR-RAID-PROTECTION (LUFTSCHUTZ) SERVICES AVAILABLE TO THE POLICE PRESIDENT (POLIZEIHRASIDENT) THROUGH THE CONTROL CENTER Locally Air-Raid-Protection Police Fire-fighting and Decontamination Service (Feuerlosch und Snt- giftungsdienst) Repair and Rescue Service ((Instandsetzungsdienst) Medical Service (Sanitatsdienst) Veterinary Service (VeterinArdienst) Gas Defense Service (Gasabwehrdienst) Protection Police (Schutzpolizei) Local Municipal Fire Department Nazi Party Welfare Service « 3tom Troop Battalions (Sturm Abreilungen) (SA) « Emergency Juvenile Police Reserves (Schnellkommandos) * Technical Emergency Corps (Tecnnische Rothilfe) * Protection Service Battalions (Schutzmannschaft Bataillone) * Trades Groups (Wirtschaftsgruppen) « From the Outside Air-Raid-Protection Battalions of the Air Force (Luftschutz Abteilungen (Mat) der Luftwaffe) Fire protection Police Battalions (Feuerschutzpolizei Abteilungen (Hot)) Volunteer Fire Brigades (Freiwillige Feuerwehren) Protection Service Battalions (Schutzmannschaft Bataillone) * Army Troops (Wehrmacht Truppen) Storm Troop Battalions (Sturm Abreilungen) (SA) Todt Organization - Regiment Speer (Bauamt OT) Emergency Juvenile Police Reserves (Schnellkommandos) * Technical Emergency Corps (Technische Rothilfe) * Trades Groups (Wirtschaf tsgruppen) * Telegraph and works Troops (Telegraph und Bauamt truppen) Nazi Party Welfare service Food Relief Columns - Bayern Convoys and Fuchs Convoys Air-Raid-Protection Police reinforcements from other communities - mutual aid 7 These services available locally in principal and obtain- able as mobile mutual-aid reinforcements from other cities0 wall chart of the units comprising that service* on which was indicated the assignments or availability of each group*. The size of the force to be sent depended upon the extent of the incident* the strength of the forces available, and the relative importance of the incident with respect to the amount of damage being inflicted* or which could be anti- cipated* in the area under the juisdiction of the control centers*, In the event the services at the disposal of these headquarters proved in- adequate, calls for reinforcements were made to the main control center (in the case of district headquarters) or to outside agencies (adjoining towns)* air force (Luftwaffe) or army (Wehrmacht) units* or higher police headquarters# Far purposes cf continuity of control in the event of damage to the control center* auxiliary headquarters could be established in adjacent or subordinate control centers# 3, crmnmimications# Reports of incidents and requests for assist- ance made to control centers were by telephone and messengers# Communi- cation to adjacent* higher* and auxiliary control centers was maintained by telephone* with emergency service by messengers and radio# 4# Reports# In addition to the reports of incidents and requests for assistance made during a raid* reports of casualties suffered and damage inflicted were made by the leader to higher headquarters as soon after the raid as the information could be secured# 42 FINAL REPORT 0. CoDoDo VI o AIR-RAID WARDENS I® Introductiono The basic principle governing the organization of the self-protection (Selbstschutz) plan ms that the primary duty of protection of the house rested upon the occupants under the guidance and leadership of the air-raid wardens,, The chain of command and sphere of authority of the warden system is shorn on the accompanying chart en- titled •Air-Raid Wardens* (see page 44)o It was noted® however, that all levels of the chain of command did not exist in every city. The warden°s zones of supervision depended upon the number of occupants of the buildings and the size of the area that they could conveniently con- trol „ Throughout the chain of command0 personnel of the warden service were members of, and trained by, the National Air-Raid-Protection League (Reichs- luftschutzbund)0 2* Appointment * House wardens and block wardens were appointed by the local police upon recommendation of the National Air-Raid-protection League,, Sub-group leaders and precinct group leaders were appointed by the League, usually in recognition of meritorious service in the lower echelons,, The district group leader was appointed by the police„ The area group leader and higher officers in the chain were appointed by the Leagueo 3® Dutieso a0 House Warden (Hauswart),, In preparation for the self-pro- tection of the premises under his care, the house warden’s chief duties were to organize a fire guard and to insure they were adequately equipped with the prescribed air-raid paraphernalia, and that the house shelters were properly constructed and equipped„ Further pre-raid duties were to familiarize himself with the plan of the houses under his charge3 to keep a current list of names of occupants, to insure the correct mark- ing of buildings to indicate shelters, to supervise blackout arrange- ments, and to familiarize himself with the location of all emergency services and installations available to his areac During the period of alarm, the house warden was chiefly concerned with the saving of life andprqperty, prevention of panic and of looting, control of traf- fic, identification and reporting of unexploded bombs, and the reporting of incidents beyond his control to his block warden or to police head- quarters* In the later stages of the war, his efforts were largely di- rected to the control of incendiary bombs and to mobilizing everyone in the buildhg for fire fighting* At the conclusion of the raid, he was concerned with salvage, identification of the dead, rehousing of bcmbed- out persons, making of reports, and any other work necessary to facilitate the restoration of order* In the exercise of his functions, the warden had no authority to arrest, but, if necessary, could call upon the police to enforce his orders* b* Block Warden (Blockwart)* The block warden supervised the pre-raid duties of the house wardens in his area, and organized a AIR RAID PROTECTION AND ALUED SUBJECTS IN GERMANY National Group Leader (Relchsgruppen- fuhrer). President of the National Mr- Raid-Protection League (Relchsluft- schutzbund) (RLB) - responsible direct- ly to Goerlng. Provincial Group Leader (Landesgruppen- fiihrer). Area or a province (former federal state) including approximately three regions (Gaue). Regional Group Leader (Gaugruppenfuhrer (also called Bezirksgruppenfilhrer). Area of a political region (Gau). Area Group Leader (Krelsgruppenfuhrer). An area approximating a U.S. County. District Group Leader (Ortsgruppen- fuhrer). Area of a police district (Abschnitt) in large cities having dis- tricts; otherwise, municipal group [leader. Precinct Group Leader (Revlergruppen- Area of a police precinct (Revier). Approximately 15,000 to 20,000 persons. Sub-group Leader (Uniergruppenfuhrer). Area of six to ten air-raid-protection blocks. Block Warden (Blockwart). Area of nan air-raid-protection block” - 10 to 15 houses or a large apartment building. House Warden (Hauswart). Area of one apartment house or group of small houses - 10 to 40 persons. AIR RAID WARDENS FINAL REPORT * C.D,D0 self-protection reserve unit (Selbstschutztrupp), generally of five aen, furnished with the usual fire guard’s equipment, to be used as reinforcements at critical points0 During a raid he coordinated all activities, supervised assignment of reinforcements within his block, and assumed the duties of the house warden when the exigencies of the situation demanded it. c. Sub-group Leader (Untergruppenfuhrer), Precinct Group Leader (Reviergruppenfuhrer), and District Group Leader (Ortsgruppen- ftlhrer), Duties of the sub-group leader, precinct group leader and district group leader consisted of inspections of pre-raid work of lower echelons, coordination of self-protection personnel during raids, and administrative details,, d, Area Group Leader (Kreispgruppenfflhrer)* Regional Group Leader (Gaugruppenfuhrer)0 Provincial Group Leader (Landesgruppenf uhrer), and Rational Group Leader (Reichsgruppenf«hrer)0 Duties of the area group leader* regional group leader„ provincial group leader„ and national group leader were purely administrative„ The regional group leader supervised promotions and pay within his region (Gau)» 4» gainingo Schools, operated and staffed by the National Air- Raid-Protection League, were conducted in the precincts for the precinct group leader and subordinate officers0 The League also conducted spec- ial classes for the general public, and many wardens supplemented this public instruction by voluntarily conducting classes in their own areas* 5* Equipmento House and block warden’s personal equipment gen- erally consisted of a steel helmet, gas-protection clothing, heavy gloves, coverall, boots, gas mask, packet of decontaminating material, rope, flash-light, and a whistle or noise-maker for warning occupants of houses of air-raid attack. 6* Compensation, House wardens, block wardens, and sub-group lead- ers served on a voluntary basis. Higher echelon officials were on full- time duty and were paid salaries by the. National Air-Raid-JE**otection League• FINAL REPORT* C.D.D. VIII o INCIDENT CONTROL !• Introductlon0 Organization of the German air-raid-protection services did not include a specifically designated incident control officer* although a definite and continuous chain of command was pro- vided at each bombing incident. 2. Operation. When an incident occurred within a house warden's sector, he made an immediate survey of the situation and assumed control. If the handling of an incident proved to be beyond the capabilities of the personnel and facilities available to tie nouse warden,, and he called upon his immediate superior, the block warden,, for assistance0 the block warden assumed commando If subsequent developments produced a situation beyond the control of the block warden, and he called upon the police precinct headquarters for further assistance, a policeman was sent from headquarters to assume direction of air-raid measures at the Incident and to perform regular police duties® If assistance was not available within the precinct or, if available, appeared to be in- adequate, and a request for further reinforecements was made to the next higher echelon, the leader of the services responding assumed control and the policeman reverted to his normal police duties® In the event that more than one service was dispatched to the incident, the leader of the service whose action was first required became incident control officer. As that unit completed operation, the next essential service proceeded with its particualr functions® For illustration, upon ex- tinguishment of the fire and departure of the fire fighters, the rescue service then began operations and the leader of that unit came into con- trol. If mixed services were employed simultaneously, control was exer- cised by the leader of the fire and decontamination unit® If only the repair and rescue and medical services were engaged, control was exer- cised by the leader of the former® Thus, as the air-raid-protection- police services completed their operations and departed, the control shifted to the leaders of the groups remaining, and eventually back to the policeman, block warden, and to the original control officer, the house warden. 3* Over-all Command. The foregoing sets forth the sequence of control at an ordinary incident* It is to be noted* however* that the police president or his representative had over-all command of opera- tions conducted within his area* For illustration* a precinct leader could take from a house warden or a block warden the control of the operations then being supervised by those officers* On the othSr hand* control by the leader of an air-raid-protection-policte service then en- gaged could be taken over only by the leader* or his representative* by whose authority the service had been dispatched* During raids* experts in the several air-raid-protection services were on duty in the main con- trol rooms. These expersts assisted the leader and advised him on matters pertaining to their particular fields. If the leader decided to exercise supervision of an incident* be* or one cf the experts at the leaderBs direction* could go to the incident and supersede the officer then in control*, but such assumption of command was* rarely* if ever* exercised. FINAL REPORT* C.D.D. VIII. FIRE PROTECTION AND PREVENTION Fire Protection 1* Tire Department Organlzationo a« Local Control. Prior to the war, German fire departments, even in larger cities, operated with a combination of paid and volunteer companies. During the war, there was a movement underway to have the national government take over the fire service and operate it along the lines of the National Fire Service of the United Kingdom,, However, that plan never fully materialized, and, although fire departments were nation alized to some degree, they still remained under lochl control and were financed by local governments. During air raids, however, control of the regular fire departments passed from the fire chiefs to the regular police and they came under the command of the police president who al- ready had under his command the fire and decontamination units (Bereit- schaften) of the air-raid-protection police. The fire officers became part of his staff and,, in most cases, directed the actual fire-fighting operations. b. National Assistance. During the war, the national govern- ment organized research and experimental stations to test the effect of incendiary bombs and to devise methods of controlling fires. It also instituted schools for the instruction and training of fire officers in new fire-fighting developments, as well as in ordinary methods of operation. The national government recommended the number of stations and personnel required in accordance with population, and that recommend- ation was generally observed. In cases where departments were believed to be poorly managed, more efficient leadership was provided by trans- ferring officers from one city to another under the direction of the commanding general of fire-protection police in BERLIN. There were organ- Ized with the assistance of the municipal fire departments, mobile aux- iliary fire-fighting units such as air-raid-protection battalions of the air force (Luftschutz Regimente (Mot) der Luftwaffe) and fire-protection police battalions (Feuerschutzpolizei Abteilungen (Mot)) as strategic reserves to assist the local departments during air-raid emergencies. c. Source of Personnel, To a large extent, fire department officers in large cities were graduate engineers who were required to serve one year as students in fire departments in several of the larger cities, after which they were employed by the various municipalities. In many cases they sought more important posts and transferred to other fire departments. The ordinary fireman could be promoted to take charge of companies but seldom attained higher rank. d. Administration. Military discipline and the wearing of uniforms were strictly enforced, and fire stations were administered much as military installations. Centralization of fire-fighting 47 FINAL■ REPORT* CoD.D. companies has always been standard practice in GERMANY* For many years prior to the two platoon system of working hours„ quarters were provided for the men end their families,, and even now many of the officers are still provided with such accommodations,, Since the war# the two platoon system in vogue throughout GERMANY has been abandoned as the need for men became acute# and# consequently# the hours of duty varied in the different cities* e* Repsirs of buildings and equipment were made by the fire department personnel with shop facilities prpvided by the city* f« Re cordso Records and statistics were well kept* Some de- partments maintained photographic units for their record making value* as well as for fire protection and prevention education* 2* Equipment* a* The German standard municipal fire department pumper is an enclosed apparatus with seating for the crew of one officer and eight men* They are gasoline or diesel operated* with a pumping capacity cf 660 gallons at 120 pounds pressure* carry 33° feet of two-inch hose* 800 feet of three-inch hose* and 3° feet of suction hose* Two extension ladders of 26 and 47 feet* respectively* and a 10-foot ladder 'are regu- lar items* The minor equipment consists of shut-off nozzles of alum- inium alloy from one-half inch to one inch* one street pipe of one and one-quarter inches* one adjustable fog nozzle* two Draeger self-contained oxygen-breathing appliances* dividers* Siamese* hydrant extensions* ropes* pike poles* axes* portable extinguishers* and a foam generator set* All firemen are required to carry on their service belts a hand axe* ges mask (filter type)* light rope* and pompier or scaling ladder snap* b* Municipal departments also have a number of mechanical turn-table ladders of the Magirus or Metz design* They are of welded light steel* or tubing* from 70 to 105 feet* fully extended* Most of them have permanently attached ladder pipes with hand-drawn detachable hose reels on the rear* The larger departments have hose carriers with capacities of 6*000 and 9*000 feet of two-inch and three-inch hose* respectively* c* Other standard pumpers are enclosed types of 400 and 220 gallons capacity* Trailer pumpers of 220 gallons capacity were extens- ively used by the auxiliary forces and the smaller town volunteer de- partments* d# Hose and couplings throughout GERMANY are standard* one of the results accomplished by partial nationalization* Some unlined hose is used* but, in general*, it is single-jacketed* lined with pure or synthetic rubber* and in lengths of 30 &ud 63 feet* Jackets are of ramie, flax, or hemp* Couplings are of aluminum alloy of a quick- 48 FINAL REPORT. C.D.D, coupling type, attached to the hose with a wire binder. e* A standard fire boat has been designed but because of the long life of this type of equipment„ many of the older designs remain in service* The standard boat is propelled and pumps are driven by a diesel engine of 2?0 horse power* with a pumping capacity pf 3®000 gal- lons at 150 pounds pump pressure* There are connections to two deck nozzles and 16 hose-line outlets* The boats are equipped with 4*000 pounds of CO2 *n cylinders and a supply of air foam* They carry two- inch and three-inch hose* together with nozzles and other necessary minor equipment* 3. Method of Operatlon. At ordinary fires0 all opening up. venti- lating, ladder work, laying and handling of hose lines are performed by members of pumper units. Hose is carried on hand-reels attached to the rear~of~pumpers, with the surplus rolled in lengths and stored in side compartments. The apparatus takes the hydrant nearest to the fire and. using a length of three-inch hose for supply, lays a line from the hy- drant to the Asuilding on fire. That line is divided into two two-inch hose lines with half-inch nozzles to reach points of operation. In the event of a water shortage while operating at a hydrant, additional three- inch supply lines to augment the supply are laid from the nearest ad- joining hydrants. Unless otherwise ordered, pumpers are operated at pressures not to exceed 75 pounds,' in order to avoid the bursting of hose. 4. PralnlPA. a. All departments were trained and drilled by their officers under a standard book of regulations for drills and training. Fire officers were regularly sent to a national training school for refresh- er courses. During the war many fire officers were given commissions in the armed forces for the purpose of organizing and training the var- ious auxiliary and mobile forces. b. Within the cities, the local department officers trained and drilled the volunteer groups (Freiwillige Feuerwehren) and Hitler Youth organizations (Hitler Jugend), together with the smaller private industrial fire departments. In the larger industries, the fire depart- ments were usually commanded by an experienced fire officer and were, in most cases, well equipped, efficient, fire fighting units. 5* F *, PHOTOS 3 & 4 ON PAGE 108 10 7 Photo 3 - *PJ«tpo WftusfPott s r rOf-p! »»t #» extent for windows and interior finishing. iom P ho to 4 - * L fv Pov s ? * , Si rl ** v i r o r e f * h r i c a t <*H L *v : Du s r FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, not been damaged by high-explosive bombs. Most of these types were found only in HAMBURG® but wooden barracks were also found in both HANOVER and AUGSBURG. c. Construction was carried out by Party organizations, by city administrations, and by individual effort. 11. Sources of Labor. The labor used for repair and reconstruction came primarily from the building industry. The craft leader in each precinct knew the labor available from the building companies assigned to that precinct. If more labor was needed, he could request it from the city leader. The city leader could secure outside aid from the Party district leader of the craft, and, if sufficient help was not available within the Party district, that leader could secure it from the national leader. Occasions were reported when skilled help had been sent from great distances under this plan. 109 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. XIII. UNEXPLORED BOMBS 1, Introduction. Responsibility for the disposition of unexploded bombs rested with the German air force, and was delegated to the air force district commander. His duties were, however, administrative, and the actual disposition of the bombs was accomplished by bomb- disposal units (Sprengkommandos) consisting of an officer and eight to ten trained bomb-disposal soldiers (Feuerwerker). There were usually four or five such units in each air force district. In the interests of safety and the preservation of unexploded bombs for purposes of research and salvage, the removing or handling of unexploded bombs by anyone other than members of the bomb-disposal service was expressly prohibited. It is to be noted, however, that with a view to the elimination of useless demands on bomb-disposal units and unnecessary cordoning of areas, es- pecially in establishments of military importance and in vital traffic arteries, it was decreed that selected members of local civilian defense personnel, police, factory air-raid-protection service, and installa- tions of special administrations should be trained in the reconnaissance and recognition of unexploded bombs of all types. This training enabled such civilian defense personnel to dispose of enemy incendiary missiles (stick, liquid and phosphorous bombs, and incendiary leaves, bags, and bottles). The removal, however, of unexploded high-explosive bombs and mines, as well as flares and flash bombs remained the duty of the air force bomb-disposal unit. 2. Operation. a. Detection and Report. The discovery of an unexploded bomb, or of a hole in which it was reasonable to assume a bomb was lodged, was reported by the finder to the nearest police headquarters, usually that of a precinct (Revier). The existence of the bomb was then confirmed by a trained local police officer or warden who directed precautionary meas- ures and reported to his headquarters. The report was then forwarded to the local air-raid-protection leader and by him to the bomb-disposal officer, Thisrepbrt contained a description of the bomb, its location, and sufficient information of its surroundings to indicate whether its prompt removal was imperative. Bombs lying near a vulnerable or import- ant location*, such as a power station, railroad, main road, arsenal, essential industry and the like, were handled as rapidly as was practicable. Other bombs, lying in relatively unimportant areas awaited later disposi- tion, not earlier than three days. b, Precautionary Measures, Prior to the arrival of the bomb- disposal soldier, wardens or police took precautionary measures by sur- rounding the bomb with a safety area from which all people were evacuated and traffic prohibited. In the event that the bomb could not be removed promptly, or was so situated that immediate removal waa not required, it was covered with bundles of brush, turf, straw, or sand bags, and warn- ing signs were posted around the prescribed zone. The limits of the safety areas to be roped off around unexploded bombs were prescribed as 110 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D® follows (all equivalents to metric figures are approximate)* a) Bombs lying free, up to 44c lbs (200 kilograms) - 106l yards (1,CC0 meters ) (2) Bombs lying free, over 440 lbs - 2,122 yards (2,000 meters)® (3) Bombs buried deeper than 39 inches (one meter) - 285 yards (250 meters). (4) Bombs buried deeper than 39 inches with covering of 39 inches of earth - I06 yards (IOC meters)® (5) After seven days - 36 yards (35 meters) (6) When given protection from splinters (a) First seven days - 38 yards (33 meters). (b) After seven days - 16 yards (15 meters)® 07) The above safety distances were to be increased if that could be done without hindering industry and traf- fic installations, agricultural needs, or those who lived nearby* If there was natural protection from splinters in the area (such as houses, woods, or embankments) the safety distance could be decreased* The final determination of the proper safety distance was made by the bomb-disposal soldier* c. Removal and Disposition. The actual defusing or neutraliz- ing of the bomb was performed only by the bomb-disposal squad, consisting of the bomb-disposal officer or bomb-disposal soldier and a force of workers to perform the labor of freeing the bomb and handling it after its neutralization® These workers, usually, six, were volunteers from nearby concentration camps and, for satisfactory service in such work, they were permitted certain privileges, such as, in some cases, release from internment® Bombs which were found in places where recovery would have been difficult and where detonation in place would have occasioned no harmful results were occasionally exploded where they lay* If the removal of a bomb was abandoned because of its position in marshy ground, quicksand, or the like, the location was roped off and posted. FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, XIV, WAR DAMAGE CLAIMS 1. National Policy. The national government assumed the respon- sibility Itr the restoration of all war damage suffered by its nationals and the cpre and support of persons injured by enemy action. The basis therefor is found in two basic decrees issued in September, 1939* and in a series of amending orders, particularly those of November, 1940* In assuming this responsibility the government did not establish any insur- ance scheme for property damage such as was set up in GREAT BRITAIN or the UNITED STATES, but undertook to accept the full cost, although no bud- getary provision was made for meeting the costs thus assumed. 2. Types of damage covered were classified into three groups* a. Personal injury damage, for which the injured, or relatives dependent upon him for support, received maintenance and care. b. Damage to property, which was compensated for in accordance with regulations laid down in the war damage decrees. c. Compensation for loss of profit or use. Personal Injury Claims 3, Cases covered. a. Claims for personal injury or death could be made, if such were caused by direct action of armed forces; by the action of German forces or government to meet a threatened or imminent enemy action; by the action of enemy forces directed against GERMANY; by retreat or flight from the enemy when such flight became necessary because of the threat to life; or, if such flight were ordered by a competent German official; or, if it were the result of sabotage which could be assumed to have been carried out with the connivance or at the instigation of the enemy. b. A sharp line was drawn between injury which resulted from enemy action or from active steps to meet such action, and injury which resulted from the general war situation. For the latter, no payments were made. For example, injury caused by the blackout was specifically exempted from the provisions of the personal injury order, and, thus, no compensation was paid in such cases. 4. Payments Made. a, For those persons who came within the scope of the decree, payments were made on the same basis as those to the army. Full costs of treatment, including hospitalization, physician's bills, laboratory expenses and other incidentals were paid, irrespective of the length of injured person was incapacitated. Cost of such things as artificial limbs, and even of "seeing eye" dogs was paid. Funeral 112 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. expenses were also paid under stipulated conditions. b. In addition to costs of treatment, a pension was paid until the injured person was able to work again. This pension was based on his former income and on the degree of severity of the injury. In the case of the death of a married man, if he were the family's chief sup- port, a pension was paid to the widow. Additional payments were also made for orphans, varying in amounts in accordance with the age of the children. c. If a man were unable to work at his old job, he was trained in a new one, and paid a pension while learning. If his income at his new job were considerably below his former income, he was still paid a pension in a reduced amount as compensation for loss of earning power. J* OrgaBlaation. a* The office at which claims were first filed was an office of the city administration 1 and was normally the office that handled af- fairs for soldiers and soldiers1 families* in large cities, it might maintain several branches, while in smaller places, the claim would be filed at the central office* Normally, the city office verified the facts of tho case, determined whether the claimant were eligible, and, if so, started payments which continued until such time as tho case was taken over by the next higher authority. b. That was a national government office called the welfare office (Versorgungsomt), One such office normally served a large city and surrounding area. Several of these offices- were then grouped under a higher welfare office, of which there were 12 or 13 for the entire country under the direction of the National Labor Ministry. Appeals, however, went from the welfare office to the higher welfare office and finally to the national administrative court. 6, Funds. Funds used were national government funds, although they did not always come from the same source. To meet bills for treatment, funds were usually'secured from the national sickness insurance benefit funds which were raised by payroll deductions from persons employed throughout the country. For pensions, funds were either paid to the city administration directly by the Finance Ministry or by the welfare office. Material Damage Claims ?• Cases Covered. Claims could be made for damage to movable or immovable objects, provided such damage was caused by acts of war, either of German or opposing troops; by damage, destruction, or looting in ter- ritory occupied by the enemy, except when the damage had nothing to do with war measures; by evacuation or carrying off of belongings from a territory occupied, or in danger of occupation, by the enemy; by flight, 113 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. if it could not be avoided on account of great danger; or by the scuttling of a ship to avoid its capture by the enemy, 8* Extent of Payments. The rule followed for assessment of dam- age was the cost of repair or replacement. The normal practice was to pay claims on presentation of actual bills for work already completed, although, under some circumstances, payments in advance were made in order to get repairs started. Claims could be filed for completely destroyed buildings, but repair and settlement of such claims was usually to be postponed until after the war. 9* Organization, a. The plan of organization for handling war damage claims involved offices at three levels. The lowest level was normally under the authority of the mayor. In the case of smaller cities, the second level was a regional office with authority over several cities, but in the case of a large city like HAMBURG, it was a higher office for the HAMBURG region and was actually the upper branch of the local war dam- age office. The top level was the national war damage office. b. The office at the lowest level handled all claims below $40,000 (RM 100,000) except those involving a municipality. Cases not handled by the lowest authority were administered by the next higher office, as were appeals from the lowest authority. A variation from this pattern was noted in AUGSBURG, where the mayor confined the activi- ties of the lowest authority to claims of less than $20OCO (!RM 5»000), except when its actions were approved by the city legal authority. In contrast to that situation, the war damage office in HANOVER, which was headed by a very able director, appeared to enjoy almost complete inde- pendence of action. c, A separate office for handling all claims involving sea shipping was set up with headquarters at HAMBURG, 10, Method of Handling Claims, a. Claims could be settled either by agreement or by decision of the war damage office. If the war damage office and the claimant agreed on the amount to be paid and the representative of the National Finance Ministry approved the settlement, an agreement was signed, and from this there was no appeal. However, if such an agreement could not be reached, the war damage office decided the amount to be paid and issued its decision. This decision could be appealed to higher authority either by the claimant or the representative of the National Finance Ministry. b. Normally, before repair work was undertaken, it was approved by the local war damage claims office acting in conjunction with the local building police. After the work was completed, it was inspected 114 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D# by the building police and the claims were settled, if the cost of the work was in accord with the estimates originally approved# Co In- settling claims for furniture and household effects destroyed, the practice was to make the payment when the householder could secure the necessary replacements# However, owing to the large num- ber of claimso a standard table of values was set up in HAMBURG, and a householder could settle on the basis of that table which set values on the basis of householders income B number of rooms in his apartments and the num ber of persons in his family* This table does not appear to have been used elsewhere# 11# Limitations on Payments# The decrees affecting material war damage claims cautioned the administering authorities thatB while claims were to be recognized to the full extent of the loss, payments should be made only when they were in the national interest# That policy gave the authorities a logical basis for postponing payments, if it was desirable to do so from the point of view of the national economy# In actual prac- tice, however, the greatest brake on damage payments was the policy of paying onlfcr for actual repair or replacement, which became more and more the customary rule as the war continued# The shortage of materials • thus acted to restrict the number of claims settled# Loss of Profit# 12# The third form of war damage loss which the German government undertook to safeguard its nationals against was the loss of profit or use* due to the destruction of a material object, such as a building or the raw materials or products of manufacture# Settlements were hedged about with restrictions designed to prevent payments which were not deserved or which were not necessary to prevent economic distress to the individual or the business, and normally it was not possible for a large or profitable business to secure much compensation under these decrees# The> real benefactor was usually the small business man whose shop had been destroyed by bombing# 13# Under the'terms of the decrees, he could secure payments repre- senting the difference between what his earnings actually had been and what his anticipated earnings would have been had the bombing not occurred# The base year for comparison was normally the year preceding that in which the bombing took place, but it could be any other satisfactory year# In HANOVER, for example, 1939 was used for the basis of comparison. One important application of this law concerned landlords# Owners of destroyed dwelling places were paid the rent on the building or apart- ments under the loss of profit provisions, and they were required to con- tinue paying taxes as if the building were still in existence. If a man owned his own house and it were destroyed, he was paid a rent on it in accordance with the normal rentals paid for similar establishments# 115 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. 14* Administration, The loss of profit decrees were administered by the same offices that handled material war damage claims. 116 FI NAL REPORT, C.D.D. XV. FACTORY AIR-RAID PROTECTION 1. a. Realization of the future need of air-raid protection in German factories vital to the nation in the event of war was demonstrated by the fact that many key industries had voluntarily planned and some had already established, air-raid-protection organizations some time before GERMANY went to war. They had held practice drills, and even constructed seme air-raid shelters as early as 1934* b. Comrrents based upon air-raid-protection plans and ideas developed at that time by industries were published by the National Ministry for Industry. The early planning undoubtedly accounted for the speed with which factory management was able to effect well organ- ized protection programs as soon as war started, programs which required little change or adjustment throughout the war period. c. Provisions for industrial air-raid protection were covered by the German basic law and a number of its executive decrees, (See Section III of this report,) 2, under the air-raid-protection law, the National Industries Group (Reichsgruppe Industrie) was responsible for the planning, super- vision and inspection of factory air-raid-protection measures. Possess- ing ministerial authority, it issued a complete set of instruction book- lets describing in detail the manner in which each category of factory air-raid protection would be organized, trained and maintained at factory expense. This series of instruction booklets, entitled *Die Werkluft- schutz* sets forth factory air-raid-protection plans in detail, manning tables, list of needed equipment, plans for control, and general operat- ing policy. 3* Plan of Organization. a, For the supervision of war production as well as air-raid- protection measures, the National Industries Croup divided GKH.1AKY into industrial divisions (Bereichtstellen), somewhat similar physically to the Jparty districts (Gaue), but not always coterminous with them. In each such industrial division, an air-raid-protection leader was desig- nated. The industrial divisions were subdivided into districts or regions (Bezirkstellen) each with an appointed leader. This flare for echeloned organization was developed to the extent that in some large cities the division and the d istrict office would control the same area yet maintain the proper chain of command. The larger of such areas would be further subdivided so that finally the lowest direct representative of the National Industries Group would have under his immediate control only as many plants as he could efficiently super- vise. The number would vary from three or four large plants plus a dozen small ones, to 50 or 60 medium-sized factories plus the small ones located in the same area. 117 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D# b# The air~raid-protection leader was the representative at the plant level of the National Industries Group, and he had authority to inspect the efficiency of the plant-protection organization and to require management to comply with measures prescribed by the Ministry for Industry® In cases of dispute, the leader at the higher level (Bereichtstelle) usually possessed sufficient political authority to enforce protection measures, make changes in factory plans, or grant exceptions# 4# Basic Organization# a# The basic air-raid-protection organization for asmall fac- tory employing no more than $00 persons was a section of specialized groups, called readiness units (Einsatzgruppen)# These consisted of groups of squads, each consisting of eight men and one leader, and each having a distinctive armband identifying their particular specialty# The squads of a typical section were as follows? (1) Fire watchers (Brandwachen)# (2) Fire fighters (Feuerwehrtrupps)• (a) Heavy fire engine crew# (b) Light auxiliary pumper crew# (c) Bucket and sand hand fighters# (3) Spotters or observers (Beobachter)# (4) Order guards (Csrdner)# (Their duties were to act as guards, preserve order, and prevent panic#) (5) Plant guards (Werkwachttrupps)# (6) Messengers (Melder)0 CO Gas-deteotion squads (Gasspfirer)* (8) Decontamination squads (Entgiftungstrupps)# (9) Medical and first-aid squads (Sanitatstrupps)# (10) Veterinary squads (Veterinardiensttrupps)# (11) Working crews (Arbeitstrupps)# Some adjustments were required, depending upon the nature and size of the facility# For exanple, unless animals were used in the factory, the veterinary squad was omitted, and usually the plant guards and the order police were combined to save manpower# In most cases the worker squads 736334 0—47 9 FINAL REPORT© C0D,D. or debris removal squads were omitted and their work was handled in a manner that will be described later® Further, each of the above squads consisted of eight men and one leader except that the number of observers and fire watchers was flexible and only enough were used to cover proper- ly the observation of the area for which they were responsible® The number for each section of.that sort averaged three or four instead of eight® b® The above organization contained the basic unit for air- raid protection and it was controlled by a headquarters manned by a factory air-raid-protection leader and his staff 0 consisting of deputies, telephone operators, and messengers® During an air raid the chief engineer,, the chief electricians the chief of plumbers0 and similar technicians were required to be present in the control center as part of t he air-raid-protection leader®s staff® c® The control center0 located in an air-raid shelter in the center of the area of responsibility, was connected by telephone with the fire watching stations, the factory fire department headquarters* the headquarters of each department in the factory and© in case it was the central control station for the factory, it was connected by direct line with the warning central and control center of the nearest city* and, in the case of important factories„ with anti-aircraft (Flak) head- quarters o d© The fire watchers were given stations in specially construct- ed bullet-shape pill boxes of reinforced concrete, having a direct tele- phone connection with the leader°s control center© Each individual was properly equipped according to his specialty0 and all had gas masks, helmets0 armbands© and special insignia or badges© furnished at factory expense© e® If a large factory were concerned8 then the organization described above became an individual section of the factory air-raid- protection organization, and the control center described was known as factory air-raid protection section No«l (Werkluftschutzabschnitt 1B Abschnitt Befehlsstelle)© It retained all responsibility for its area except that warning service intelligence from outside sources was trans- ferred to the main factory air-raid-protection control center® In that case the specialists on the staff© such as the chief engineer, and the chief electrician© were on duty at the main control center® In the case of multiple sections, the heavy fire-fighting equipment was organ- ized as a central factory fire department, but the section leader was still required to fight incipient fires with his light squads® f© It was further prescribed for still larger factories© that in the %event the sections (Abschnitte) numbered more than seven, other echelons were to be created and called groups (Gruppen)® In other words, instead of having eight sections directly under the central control station, they would organize two groups of four sections each© being 119 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. identified as Group "A" and Group "B" (see chart on page 121 ), Group "A" (clearirg squads) was composed mainly of unskilled labor formed in- to units of 1C to 30 men under a leader, to be used in clearance work preparatory to the employment of skilled labor,, Group "B" (Auxiliary squads) was composed primarily of skilled and unskilled building labor and usually numbered 10# of the total employees of the facility. It was believed by the National Industries Group that decentralization in large factories produced more efficient protection in emergencies. The chart on page 0 describes a flexible type of organization designed to fit any size of factory by using it in toto or extracting therefrom the organization to accomodate one of lesser size. 5* Personnel, a« The personnel that made up the squads and sections previous- ly described above were recruited from the factory workers, no one being exempt from service with these readiness groups. The factory air-raid- protection leader had full authority, with the support of the local pol- ice president, to draft any employee and to use even foreign workers on a voluntary basiso Each section leader was required to organize suffic- ient groups so that they could rotate on duty by roster, Where night shifts were employed that posed no problem. Many plants, however, op- erated only one long day shift, usually 10 to 12 hours, hence far pro- tection during the night, the readiness troops had to take their turn at night alert duty0 Barracks or sleeping places were provided for those not required to be on actual watch duties, but they were required to be in readiness for instant call in case of an air-raid attack. b. The prescribed pay for this extra duty ranged from $0,80 (RM 2,00) to $1,40 (FM 3,50) and three to four hours granted on the following work day for additional rest. There was further limitations as to the number of times each month certain classes and age groups could be forced to stand alert duty, for in many cases women employees were required to s&rve in all capacities. 6, Warning System and Control, The main control center for the factory air-raid-protection service had direct telephone connections with the control center of the city in which it was located and with the local warning central. In addition to those two sources, it also received information of enemy air threats by radio from military broad- casting stations. Every effort was made to give early notice to essential industries in view of the fact that they were likely targets. In an effort to minimize stoppage of war production during air raids, indust- ries which were equipped to receive and disseminate 12 and 6 minute warnings (see paragraph 4 (g)» Section IV0 "Air-Raid Warning") did not stop work upon the sounding of the public siren alarms, but continued until the receipt of the six minute warning. That system enabled manage- ment to keep workers on the job until only enough time remained to evac- uate them to shelters* In factories of lesser importance, warnings were given by the Control center of the city in which the factory was located. 120 AIR RAID PROTECTION AND ALLIED SUBJECTS IN GERMANY MEDIGAT &.13T ai: SANITATE TRUPPE) GROUP B (SAME AS GROUP A) SECTION VIII SAME AS SECT I FTr^a Aid Sta vetEThTn ARY SERVICE i VETERNA DIENST) SECTION VII SAME AS SECT I wUHK CREW AR BEITS- TRUPFE) SECT! ON VI SAME AS SECT I JPCGnTIS [NATION - SQUAD (ENTIGIP -HMD ORGANIZATION CHART FACTORY AIR RAID PROTECTION (WERKLUFTSCHUTZ) HOSPITAL CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER factory air raid protection headquarters & CONTROL station Leader with Staff, Deputies, Telephonists.Messengers,Chief Engr,Chief Electrician and Repair Services (BEFEHLSTELLE) GAS SQUAD (GAS- pOrer) SECT! ON V SAME AS SECT I fTre '""I i’lGHTERS (FEUER- WEHE—, TBtffPE i MAIN FIRE STATION FIRE CHIEF leavy Fire Equipment Full-time Fire Brigade SECTION IV SAME AS SECT I WAT5B5« (BRAND- WAG HE ) SECTION III SAME AS SECT I SPOTTERS & OB- SERVERS (BEO- , ORDER GUARDS (ORDNEH] SECT!ON II SAME AS SECT I GROUP A HEADQUARTERS & CONTROL station ‘SlEffl BE“HL- PLANT GUARDS (WEPK- SECTION I (ABSCH- NITT I) MESSEN- GERS (MELDER) FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, This matter was usually decided by conference between tne district repre- sentative of the National Industries Group and the police president of the city. 7* Air.Raid shelters and Shelter Policy,, Qo As was indicated in the opening paragraphs of this section, the construction of shelters for factories was started before the war. Almost Invariably, early shelters consisted of reinforced basements and splinter-proof concrete "tube" bunkers in the plant yard0 Early raids proved the inadequacy of these types of sheltersc and thicker, reinforced ceilings were provided throughout the war on a progressive basis, along with splinterproof shelters which were constructed in many places some distance from the buildings. The managements of some factories were more far-sighted and progressive than others and constructed special air- raid shelters of the German multiple-story type0 called "Bunkern"0 with reinforced roof decks in some instances as thick as 12 feet0 In some factories air-raid shelter construction was still in progress at the end of the war, and several large factories were building great under- ground shelter systems blasted out of solid rock and consisting of tunnel networks 50 feet underground. b. Initially it was prescribed that the readiness troops, es- pecially the fire watchers, fire fighters, and other emergency troops, would man their posts 01 duty throughout a raid. The requirement was never withdrawn, although in individual factories management relaxed the policy and permitted air-raid-protection workers to remain in shel- ters until after a raid. In general, it was a definite policy through- out all Geiman industry to give their employees the best possible shel- ter protection not only to prevent loss of life but to reduce absenteeism. 8. Training. Training for factory air-raid-protection organizations was supervised by representatives of the National Industries Group0 Schools were set up by them in the industrial districts fcr factory air-raid-protection leaders and key personnel who, in turn, conducted schools within their own factories for the training of the rank and file in each specialty. Much attention was paid to gas protection, since most factory managers expected gas attacks at any time. Schools in all air-raid-protection techniques were held continually. The constant demands of the army drew heavily on factory employees causing a large turnover in the personnel of the readiness troops. Furthermorerefresh- er courses were required for old employees. The German Red Cross con- ducted training for first-aid groups and the city fire department had charge of the training for factory fire-fighting forces. 9, Mutual Aid. Mutual aid was well organized and extensively used, although not between factories nor by special arrangement made between factory managers. It applied principally to the factory fire-fighting forces which were officially auxiliary units of the city fire department, and subject to the call of the police president. 122 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. 10, Repairs and Post-Raid Restoration, Specific work troops (Groups "A" and "B") were prescribed for debris removal, emergency repairs, and to accomplish all work necessary to restore production in a damaged area of a plant. Deviations from this plan were numer- ous and will be commented upon in the paragraph "Operations'1 to fol- low, These special "A" and "B"’ troops, being in addition to all other organizations within the factory for similar work, were to be made available on call for work outside the factory as designated by police presidents or other higher authority. This was part of a system for mutual aid to other establishments, and it is noteworthy to mention that the plan existed largely on paper as the most important factories secured official exemption from that requirement. 11, Operations, In the actual operation of factory air-raid pro- tection throughout the war period, many variations seemed at first glance to be wide departures from the plan, but on closer scrutiny most were found to be the result of the exercise of good judgment un- der varying conditions, only a few being actual evasions by managers with attitudes ranging from indifference to unscrupulousness, Some of the typical deviations were as follows. a, A full-time paid "professional" air-raid-protection force of a strength ranging from 1% to 2% of the total number of employees, augmented by auxiliary readiness troops in numbers equalling about 20# of the total number of employees. This plan reduced the number of people to be trained and although it was more expensive, it appealed to many managers as a more efficient plan than the one prescribed. b, A full-time force with little attention paid to auxiliarieso Some managers had little faith in the efficiency of part-time# air-raid- protection workers# and placed the entire protection responsibility on a force organized along military lines, intensively trained in all phases of air-raid protection, and held in constant readiness in bar- racks on the premises. Co Some leaders specialized in fire fighting only# paying slight attention to organization for gas protection, plant police, and the stereotyped organization set up by the National Industries Group* d0 As a substitute for readiness troops organized in squads of eight, with each squad trained in a separate activity, many factor- ies organized factory air-raid-protection troops (Werkluftschutztrupps) consisting of 20 to 30 individuals, all well trained in the techniques of air-raid protection. Thus, one or more fully contained units could be dispatched to incidents as needed. e. In post-raid repair the majority of plants delegated the entire responsibility of restoration of production to the manager of the department in which the incident occurred, Quite frequently fomal organization was neglected or omitted. After a raid, employees of an 123 FINkL REPORT, C.D.De undamaged department would return to productive work while employees of a damaged department would work at restoration until production could again be resumed0 f0 The shelter policy jurescribed in the plan was almost uni- versally ignored* Deaths of fire watchers in splinter-proof shelters caused by the blast of exploding bombs would result in uncontrolled desertion of posts* It became quite general in the majority of factor- ies to evacuate the entire personnel to the most secure, deep shelter during an actual raid* Those specified for duty would rush to their posts during a lull and all would pursue their prescribed duties at the sounding of the *Pre-All-Clear" signal* go Some factory managers secured official approval to deviate from the requirements of mutual aid and submission to the authority of the local police president. As a result, their factories did not extend aid to the local fire department and conducted their own protection independently® h* The control- of the police presidents and their air-raid- protection police over factory air-raid protection varied with the personality of the local police president and with that of the National Industries Group representative* In some areas the most complete police supervision was exercised over factories, while in others the authority of the local representative of the National Industries Group prevailed* In the main, however, there was close and beneficial cooperation between these two branches of authority* i* The district representative of the National Industries Group, the chief of the local air-raid-protection police, and the factory air-raid-protection leader worked closely together to provide effective protection for the factory, and the result was so productive that most factory forces were able to lend aid to the local communities during heavy raids in the area« Although local air-raid-protection police of the appropriate precinct were given inspection responsibility of the factory, it was not considered a burden to management nor was it resented. On the contrary, it was recognized as being beneficial and the assistance of the police was utilized for training purposes and in emergencies. 12* Management Interest* a. Factory air-raid protection as organized and operated by German plant management was efficient, business-like and practical. No expense was spared to accomplish a practical purpose as it was antici- pated at an early date that ja sound orgenization, well trained and equipped, would be required under war conditions« It was also recog- nized that maintenance of production could be effected only by the most complete protection of personnel. The moment it was determined that an air-raid shelter was inadequate under the constantly increasing size of bombs, new and better shelters would be built0 It was often stated 124 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. that workers complained that they were better protected at their place of employment than were their families and loved ones at home, Although workers might complain, they would be sure to come to work, and many instances were found where factory workers habitually came to work from one to two hours early when early morning raids were commonly expected. Shelter construction was important in its influence on the morale of workers and absenteeism. When a direct hit would penetrate a certain type of shelter, employees would refuse to re-enter similar shelters. If shelters were not considered adequate by the employees, they would evacuate the factory grounds upon the first alarm and seek shelter in the city shelters or wooded areas. On the other hand, where factory shelters were entirely adequate, workers were willing to stay, and their morale remained high. b, Preference of the best shelters was given to German employees, foreign workers frequently being assigned secondary shetlers. It was evident that the source of labor determined the shelter policy where shelters were inadequate for all. For instance, in some factories con- centration cemp prisoners were refused shelter of any sort, and they were herded into fields or woods and guarded by their SS guards protected in slit trenches which surrounded them. If heavy casualties resulted among prisoners from direct hits, they would be replaced with others. c. Splinter-proof baffles were placed around machine tools to lessen the damage from direct hits. 125 FINAL REPORT. C#D,Do XVI o EXTENDED SELF •PROTECT! ON 1, Purposeo The extended self-protection service (Erweiterter Selbstschutz) was established by the basic air-raid-protection law. The service was to cover those commercial installations not large enough nor sufficiently important to the war effort to be placed under the fac- tory air-raid-protection services buildings which served as gathering places for large numbers of persons engaged in cultural, religious, educational and recreational pursuitsg buildings or groups of build- ings which comprised an institution, such as a hospital, home for aged, and similar organizations„ The service was developed to the extent appropriate to each individual case and was based principally on the organization of the self-protection service0 It constituted a separate unit in the local air-raid-protection organization but was neither so independent nor sc self-contained as was a unit of the factory air- raid-protection service. 2« Iterticipating Enterprises0 a. The specific types of enterprises required to participate in the extended self-protection service were? Department stores Business and office buildings Larger recreation and entertainment centers Theaters (all types) Larger hotels Hospitals and nursing homes Homes for the aged and similar institutions Monasteries and c hurches Museums and Libraries prisons Schools and Universities CircusesB zoos8 and similar establishments Stock yards and food supply establishments b. Whenever more than one enterprise occupied a building, all were fomed into one extended self-protection unit, This system was particularly applicable in office buildings# It was also noted that adjacent buildings were very often grouped into one unit to simplify organization and control# c. While decrees specified the types of enterprises required to establish the extended self-protection service, evidence proved that invariably the local police president designated the enterprises which had to. install this service# The eighth amendment (dated March 1943) to the air-raid-protection law of 1935 stated that the air-raid-pro- tection police were responsible only for the appointment of air-raid- protection leaders (Luftschutzleiter) in single and grouped enterprises, but it was definitely established that they often appointed the entire 126 FINAL REPORT. CoDoDo personnel of the service in an enterprise, even specifying at times the particular duty to be performed by each individual, Service by indi- viduals was compulsory, and exemptions were made only when a.person was actively engaged in civilian defense duties elsewhere or was physi- cally or mentally unable to perform the required duties0 3o Organizationso The organization, control, and chain of command of the extended self-protection service are depicted in the chart on page 128* The enterprise air-raid-protection leader had the entire responsibility for the organization and development of the service« Generally, he selected the personnel and assigned to them particular duties on the basis of mental and physical ability,, The leader conduct- ed the operations of the groups from the control room which was usually established in a reinforced room in a basement. The organization, equip- ment and arrangement of these control rooms were of the simplest type possible. They consisted of the leader, several telephonists and mess- engers, a plan of the enterprise with locations of all teams, and a method (bells or klaxons) of sounding an alarm throughout the enterprises. All incidents taking place within the enterprise were reported to this control room either by a house phone system or messengers, and necess- ary movements of teams were ordered by the leader. The leader had a blueprint of the enterprise and surrounding area and was required to be familiar with all sections of it0 A copy of this plan and a list of all air-raid-protection personnel were filed in the police precinct headquarterso There was a deliberate attempt on the part of the air- raid-protection leaders to establish only essential measures, so that over-organization would not be a detriment to proper functioning of the serviceo a„ Girder Guards» These men were trained to guide persons to shelter areas, to preserve order, to remove valuables, to prevent thefts and to perform other*related duties» In some instances they acted as messengers during the raids. b« Fire Watchers and Fire Fighters,, Personnel of this group was trained in the identification of all kinds of bombs and the methods of extinguishing incendiary bombs, with particular emphasis on the phos- phorous type,, Definite posts were established to which these teams re- ported immediately upon the sounding of an air-raid alam0 Go Firat Aido These groups were, in the main, composed of women. In addition to first-aid training, members were given instruct- ions in gas identification and decontamination* Training in the latter was necessary for women when the manpower situation became critical. First-aid stations were located at advantageous positions throughout the buildings and in the shelter areas. d. Special Squads, These teams varied according to the enter- prise0 They were usually established for minor repair and clearance, or as veterinary squads (in a circus, zoo, or livestock establishment), and when manpower was available, there were trained in decontamina'i/ion. 127 LOCAL AIR RAID PROTECTION LEADER POLICE PRESIDENT SCHUPO PROTECTION POLICE A6SCHN ITT POLICE DISTRICT ENTERPRISE OWNER OWNER OR MANAGER OF LARGEST ENTERPRISE FOR A "COMBINED UNIT " REVIER POLICE PRECINCT ENTERPRISE AIR RAID PROTECTION LEADER AIR RAID PROTECTION ORGANIZATION OF ENTERPRISE AIR RAID PROTECTION LEADER (COMBINED UNIT) AIR RAID PROTECTION ORGANIZATION OF LARGEST ENTERPRISE AIR RAID PROTECTION ORGANIZATION OF SMALLER ENTERPRISE AIR RAID PROTECTION ORGANIZATION OF SMALLER ENTERPRISE ORDER GUARDS FIRE MATCHERS AND FIRE FIGHTERS FIRST AID TELEPHONISTS AND MESSENGERS SPECIAL SQUADS CHAIN OF RESPONSIBILITY CHAIN OF COMMAND FINAL REPORT, C,D,D, 4« Training, The training of ’all personnel was the responsibility of either the air-raid-protection police or the National Air-Raid-Pro- tection League, Generally, the air-raid-protection police trained the enterprise air-raid-protection leaders (Betriebs Luftschutzleiter) v?ho were responsible for the training of the readiness groups CEinsatzgruppen), All other personnel of the enterprise, who formed reserve groups (Bereit- schafts Gruppen), were obliged to attend lectures on general air-raid- protection topics, which would enable them to perform air-raid-protect- ion duties when called upon for emergency service. The latter training was always conducted by the National Air-Raid-Protection League, although sometimes supervised by the air-raid-protection police0 a. The courses of instruction covered the principles of first aidj methods of fighting all types of incendiary bombs $ gas defense and decontaminationj receiving, dispatching and carrying of messagesj handling of small groups o'f the public j and evacuation and transportation„ The length of the periods of basic instruction varied from four to 12 hours for the two groups of personnel and from 12 to 50 hours for the air- raid -protect ion leaders. In addition, refresher courses were compulsory fter the air-raid-protection leaders whenever new types of bombs were encountered or whenever new problems confronted the air-raid-protection authorities. The air-raid-protection leaders were responsible for giving this refresher training to both groups of personnel. b. Certain enterprises were required to have some of their personnel receive specialized training, such as evacuation and trans- portation, which all personnel in the hospitals had to undergo. c. In order to check upon the state of training, the air-raid protection police conducted drills without advising the enterprises of the time of occurrence. Wherever the air-raid-protection leader was anxious to develop a well trained organization, he arranged practical exercises. -5° Equipment, The supply of necessary equipment was the responsi- bility of the management of the enterprise. Generally, the equipment consisted of stirrup pumps or pump-tank extinguishers with jet and spray combination nozzles, hose, bags of sand, shovels, axes, crow-bars, gas niasks, and first-aid materials. The number and quantity varied with the size of the enterprise and the degree to which management wished to provide protection for its property. In some instances the larger enter- prises purchased portable motor pumpers capable of pumping 220 gallons of water per minute and also built tanks for reserve water supplies. Institutions, such as hospitals, were furnished equipment by the State, including portable pumpers and static water tanks. 6, No member of the extended self-protection service was paid for the performance of air-raid-protection duties during his or her regular hours of employment. However, when called upon to serve during a night watch or night air raid, each individual, except the FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. air-raid-protection leader, was paid $0.60 (tUI 1.50) which later was raised to $1.20 (RM 3*00) for duty on week-ends or holidays. Hie burden of this fee was placed upon the management of each enterprise. The total monthly pay for these duties was computed from the records of attendance entered in the watchbook (Wachbuch) maintained by each enter- prise. Copies of these records had to be forwarded to the police pre- cinct headquarters. 7. Shelters. The enterprises were required to provide shelter areas for employees and patrons. Usually the shelters were established in the basements which were reinforced and equipped with emergency exits. In most instances these basement shelters were inadequate protection against heavy bombing. This inadequacy was directly responsible for the adoption by the school systems of the policy of sending the child- ren home or to nearby specially constructed shelters immediately upon receipt of warning of an air raid. Again it was notpf3 that institutions, such as hospitals and homes for the aged, were given special considera- tion in that both bomb-resistant and splinter proof shelters were con- structed in sufficient numbers and size to house all employees and patients. The State provided funds for the construction of the shel- ters in these institutions* 8. Warning. In the early part of the war, all enterprises, with the exception of institutions (including school systems), received their first warning of an air raid when the public sirens were sounded, which occurred usually 15 to 30 minutes before the actual raid material- ized. The several institutions received a pre-warning by telephone from the warning central and then filtered it to their buildings by telephone or messengers. It was claimed that these pre-warnings were invariably received 30 minutes before the attack began. During the latter stages of the war, all of the enterprises without exception were using the wired-radio (Drahfunk) for the reception of advance information of enemy air raids. (See section IV, paragraph 4 11 (2))* 9. Mutual Aid. The early air-raid-protection directives stated that cooperation between various enterprises was a prime necessity in carrying out extended self-protection. There were indications of the operation of this mutual aid in the early part of the war when raids were light and sporadic. However, after raids became more intensive and more numerous, many enterprises refused to cooperate, mainly be- cause of the selfish desire to protect their own properties. Whenever mutual aid was desired, the request had to be forwarded to the police precinct headquarters by which the enterprises would be ordered to move their teams to the location of the emergency. Toward the end of the war there was movement to combine the extended self-protection services and the factory air-raid-protection services, the purpose obviously be- ing to bolster the weaker extended self-protection service and at the same time secure more mutual-aid benefits. No evidence was found of the successful completion of this plan. 130 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. XVII. RAILROAD AIR-RAID PROTECTION 1, Organization of Railroads, The German National Railroads (Deutsche Reichbahn) was a State organization controlled by the Minis- try of Transportation, It was divided into a variable number of divis- ions, 26 before the war, 31 after the annexation of AUSTRIA, with other boundary revisions having been made as necessary® Each division had as its head a division president, who was responsible for every phase of its operations, and was accountable only to the ministry in BERLIN® 2® Organization of Railroad Alr-Rald-JErotection Service, An in- dependent Railroad Air-Raid-Protection Service (Reichsbahnluftschutz) was established by directives dated as early as 1935o intens- ive planning, training, and building were not accomplished until air attacks became a reality, in some cases as late as the spring of 1943* Ah official (Dezarnent 36) of each division, subordinated only to the division president, was appointed to carry out the air-raid-protection directives of the ministry. This individual, prior to the wari was in charge of the athletic and welfare programs of the division® As his air-raid-protection duties made increasingly greater demands on his time, they became his sole responsibility, the other tasks being allotted to subordinates. The full-time air-raid-protection staff was limited to the division leader and the messengers, telephone operators, and re- porters in the control centers. Other personnel participated in air- raid-protection duties in addition to their regularly assigned jobs® Within each railroad division a subordinate air-raid-protection leader was designated for each headquarters or office building, railroad station, repair shop, roundhouse, yard, train, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the railroad, and he undertook the necessary pro- tective measures within the area of his jurisdiction, subject always to revision by the division air-raid-protection leader® 3• Railroad Aireraft-Warning Service, The railroad aircraft- warning service (Eisenbahnflugmeld-und Warndienst - EFLU) was designed to allow all activities to be adequately forewarned of impending at- tacks, and yet to cause a minimum of telephone calls for any single individual, or agency. The chain of command ‘in descending order was as follows g a® The railroad divisional air-protection center (Elsenbahn- luftschutzbezirkstelle - ELUZ), one per division, located in the divis- ion headquarters building, was directed by the division air-raid-pro- tection leader, with a staff of assistants who worked three eight-hour shifts® The staff consisted of one or more plotters who kept a con- tinuous check on the position of the enemy raiders| telephone operators who notified the lower echelonsj messengersj and several department heads, such as bridge, operations, and repair, who advised oil proper courses of action when necessary. Direct communications by telephone, wired-radio or radio between the division center and the a ircraft-warn- ing service of the air fbree and occasionally navy stations gave a pro- gressive estimate of the air situation which was relayed to the lower echelons® 131 FINAL REPORTt C.D.D. b. The railraod aircraft-warning centers (Eisenbahn Warnzent- ralen - EW2), two or more per division, were directed by sub-leaders and were located at large railroad terminals within the division. They were staffed by plotters, telephone girls, and messengers, and were the routine control centers from which orders were issued and directives disseminated, and to which reports of damage were sent for compilation before being forwarded to the division air-raid-protection center for action. They passed warnings to the next lower echelon (the relay stations) only. c. The railroad aircraft-warning relay stations (Eisenbahn- flugwarnmittlungen - EWV) were located at the largest terminals between two warning centers. They telephoned warnings received to each railroad activity in their zone which had canmunication facilities, such as stations, yards, sheds, roundhouses, crossing shacks, and works. d. The railroad aircraft-warning stations (Eisenbahnflugwam- stellen - EWS) was the term applied to all railroad air-raid warning activities. Each took appropriate action with regard to blackout, dis- persal or shelter of passengers, and warning of trains and wayfarers. Types of warnings were the same as those used to alert the general public. In addition, blue-and-yellow flags were used to warn trains in motion* stationary, they signified impending bomber attack? when waved, they indicated fighter-bomber attacks. Semaphore signals controlled by the station-master permitted or prohibited entry into stations. 4. Control. Final control of all activity during an air raid was vested in the division air-raid-protection leader. He could counter- mand whatever action subordinate leaders had thought appropriate to the situation. This prerogative did not extend through the chain of command. Beginning at the lowest level, the train conductor was the air-raid-pro- tection leader of his train. In case of fighter attack (strafing) he ordered the passengers to disperse after the engineer had either halted the train in place or driven it into a station, cut, woods, or other protected place. The station-master was responsible for all activity between the entry signals to his station. Air-raid-protection leaders of larger stations or of yards and works similarly decided on the proper action. As stated previously, this action, which had to be reported to the division center through channels, could be modified or changed by the division air-raid-protection leader. Railroad ticket offices and other buildings not situated on the railroad right-of-way were under con- trol of the local municipal air-raid-protection authorities. 5* Fire Services. a. The nomal peace-time facilities for dealing with catastrophes and maintenance were expanded considerably in anticipation of post-air- raid restoration and repair. Due to its specialized requirements in labor and materials the railroad system organized its own mutual-aid units, obtaining army and foreign worker reinforcemsnts only for tasks 132 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. which involved unskilled and manual labor. b. Damage sustained during an air raid and an estimate of mat- erial and labor required to effect repairs were immediately reported through warning channels to the division control center* Here the course of action was decided by the officer in charge of the particular phase involved in the damage, such as bridge, locomotive or track re- pairs. First priority was given to the repair of a single track which would permit through traffic to be resumed, and to bridge reconstruction. c. specialized repair units were manned by shop workers and trained laborers. Rolling stock containing equipment was strategically placed on sidings so as to be available in a maximum of 15 minutes. Freight yard shunting locomotives were used to transport these aid trains (Hilfzflge) wherever required. A heavy traffic division would have, for example, five building construction trains for effecting re- pairs to stations, shops, and rail breaks; two bridge-repair trains; two trains fcr the repair of telephone and telegraph lines and exchanges (the railroad operated its own communications system); a train for ef- fecting light repair work on strafed locomotives; and several squads of specialists which e ither worked independently or as supervisors or ad- visors to untrained gangs. d. Array engineer troops and private contractors were occasion- ally used to help in bridge rebuilding; soldiers in removal of debris; and foreign workers formed a large percentage of the regilar road gangs. 7* Anti-Aircraft Defense (Flak). Special flat cars with .50 cali- ber machine guns and 20-nmanti-aircraft cannon were assigned to the divisions which marshalled the greatest volume of traffic. High prior- ity cross-country trains had multiple-mount cars, manned by military anti-aircraft personnel, which were assigned by the air force district conmander. Railroad-owned "flak cars" were originally manned by the conductor and other personnel on the train, and later by police reserves. 133 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. XVIII o NATIONAL POST OFFICE (COMMUNICATIONS) AIR-RAID PROTECTION 10 Organization of German Communications System. The German Post Office Department (Deutsche Reichspost) controlled the postal0 tele- graph and telephone systems of the entire nation through the Ministry of Communicationso The country was divided into approximately 40 com- munications district a(Reichspcstdirektionsbezirke), including the oc- cupied countries. Each district had at its head a district president, who was accountable only to the ministry, and he, in turn, had subord- inates in charge of each of the three services0 2. Organization of Conminications system Air-Raid Protection (Reichs- post Luftschutz). The president of each district was responsible for its air-raid protection. He appointed a full-time leader who carried out the directives of the Ministry of Communications, and was respons- ible for the training of employees, the procurement of equipment, and all other air-raid-protection measures. This leader had three or more full-time air-raid-protection deputies, each representing one of the three services or a large branch thereof. Other air-raid-protection leaders were appointed on an additional duty basis for each branch of the postal, telephone and telegraph services, as well as for warehouses, works, garages, and offices. In addition to those leaders, every indi- vidual employee was obliged to serve in some air-raid-protection capa- city unless a physical disability or the demands of his office prevented. Fire watching, duty in the control center, and similar duties were pre- scribed by roster with employees being called upon once in every seven to 16 days. They were paid a clothing deterioration allowance for each of duty and an additional reimbursement for food and transportation. 3° Training. Training of the air-raid-protection leaders of the several departments in t-he communications systems consisted of fire- fighting, gas defense, first aid and self-protection. Fire-fighting technique was taught by members of the municipal fire departments s first aid ard gas drill by the Red Cross or a staff physician. The leaders themselves then trained their subordinates in all phases of air-raid- protection work, usually during evenings of duty. Inspectors and in- structors traveled throughout the district to give refresher courses. 4. Equipment. Fire apparatus, both mobile and stationary, was dispersed at strategic locations within the district and was used wherever the district air-raid-protection leader directed. Telephone operators and all those on duty as air-raid-protection workers were furnished gas masks, other employees being required to purchase them on the open market. Gas mask microphones were available for the telephone opera- tors on duty. The other usual equipment was on hands shovels, hand pumps, sand boxes, first-aid kits, helmets, buckets, and miscellaneous hand tools. 5° Shelters. Reinforced basement rooms were provided for use as shelters. They were equipped with gas-proof doors, forced air ventila- tion, and one or more first-aid rooms. The control center was situated 736334 O—47 10 im REPORT, C.D.D, in one of these rooms, together with offices for key officials and on auxiliary telephone switch-board* In some cities the telephone ex- changes were permanently installed in deep shelters or mowed to special shelters in the suburbs. 6. Post-Raid Work. Due to the specialized nature of repair and reconstruction in the communications system, a series of mobile teams was formed from among the regular maintenance personnel of the organ* ization. See Section DC, paragraph 13, for discussion of these teams. 7. Telephone and Telegraph Service. a. a large percentage of the telephones in GERMANY are of the automatic dial type. As few of the automatic exchanges were damaged, that phase of reconstruction did not make large demands on labor or materials. In some instances, large areas were destroyed in which lines and installations were not replaced, so that telephone service was dis- rupted ohly for short periods of time in the areas, owing to increased numbers of maintenance personnel being available. b. Immediately upon hearing the alert, telephone operators in vulnerable exchanges proceeded to the basement shelters, in which auxiliary switch-boards were installed. Only priority traffic was per- mitted during and immediately after the attack. c. The telegraph system used the same lines as did the tele phone net, thus facilitating repairs. 8, Postal Service. All incoming mail was held at suburban offices if a city post office was damaged. The scattered populace called for its mail at the general delivery windows, and evacuees made known their new addresses. Mail that was uncalled for in four weeks was returned to the sender. 9. Remarks. a* The telephone exchanges, whether manual or automatic, that were housed in bomb-resistant shelters continued service uninterruptedly during raids• b. Mobile teams of skilled workers for mutual aid proved their value throughout the war. 135 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. m, HARBOR AIR-RAID PROTECTION AND PORT SECURITY 1. It was apparent that the Gormans realized early the importance of providing protection for waterway facilities and surrounding areas, since provisions specifically dealing with such protection were in the basic air-raid-protection law, and executive decrees relating thereto. 2* The typical crowding and interlacing of facilities and installa- tions along a harbor waterfront usually cause much confusion ih delin- eation of authority responsibility, and in placing structures and areas into "water", "shore", and "waterfront" categories. To provide police supervision over harbor areas, the Germans established the water- protection police (ftasserschutzpolizei)• This organization was specially trained and equipped to handle problems peculiar to waterfront areas. It was attached to, and controlled by, the regular police organization and when Himmler consolidated and took: over the police forces of GERMANY it came under his direct control. 3. Basic Organization. a. Under the German plan of organization the entire waterfront and harbor area (land and water) of a port city was usually established as a separate police district. The senior water police officerof the area became the conmander of the district and was responsible for carry- ing out all regular police duties, including air-raid-protection regula- tions. bo The second officer in command was usually appointed harbor district air-raid-protection leader (Hafen Luftschutzleiter) and was provided an adequate force to act as air-raid-protection police, Al- though these men held rank in the water police they wore armbands which identified their special services. The air-raid-protect!on leader was given over-all conmand of forces and units within the harbor area, They included professional fire companies, emergency medical units, heavy rescue units, nautical salvage units, water police and all avail- able auxiliary forces and units. The harbor air-raid-protection leader closely supervised all air-raid-protection matters and organizations connected with factory-air-raid protection (for all shipyards, war plants, power plants, manufacturers and other industries), the extended self-protection service, railroad air-raid protection (for coordination only), and the self-protection program when residential and shop dis- tricts were included in the harbor area. This close supervision of all services had its greatest value in the development of mutual aid. See page 137 for chart "Plan for the Organization of Air-Raid Protection in a Medium-sized Harbor." c. It is frequently the case that most of a harbor area is not readily accessible from other parts of the community except by water, vulnerable bridges or tunnels, and that damage to, or destruct- ion of, them would partially isolate the district or important parts 136 AIR RAID PROTECTION AND ALLIED SUBJECTS IN GERMANY PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF AIR RAID PROTECTION IN A MEDIUM SIZED HARBOR LOCAL CIVILIAN AIR RAID PROTECTION LEADERSHIP HARBOR AIR RAID PROTECTION SECTION COMMANDER: LEADER OF HARBOR POLICE OR WATER PROTECTION POLICE READINESS SQUADS LAND WATER 1 OFFICER, 35 POLICEMEN 2 FIRE COLUMNS 3 FIRE GROUPS - EACH 1 LEADER,8 ME I 1 HOSE CART 1 MEDICAL SECTION 2 REPAIR UNITS 1 REPAIR PARK v 2 DECONTAMINATION UNITS 1 DE CONTAMINATION PARK 2 SPECIALISTS EUR: GAS,WATER, ELECTRICITY,CANALS,HARBOR CONSTRUCTION 1 OFFICER, 20 POLICEMEN 2 DAMAGE UNITS FIRE EXTINGUISHING UNITS 1 FIRE EXTINGUISHING BOAT 1 AUXILIARY EIRE EXTINGUISHING BOA' MINERS AND RESCUE WORKERS ACCORDING TO NEED REGULAR CORPS HARBOR AIR RAID PROTECTION PRECINCT 1 HARBOR AIR RAID PROTECTTON PRECINCT 2 POLICEMEN 1 EIRE & RESCUE UNIT 1 MEDICAL UNIT 2 GAS RECOGNITION SPECIALISTS 3 FIRST AID STA 3 INSPECTION STA POLICEMEN 1 HARBOR DAMAGE UNIT POLICEMEN 1 FIRE & RESCUE UNIT 1 MEDICAL UNIT 2 GAS RECOGNI- TION SPECIAL- ISTS POLICEMEN 1 HARBOR DAMAGE UNIT HARBOR AIR RAID PROTECTION PRECINCT 3 POLICEMEN 1 FIRE AND RESCUE UNITS 1 MEDICAL UNIT 2 GAS RECOGNITION SPECIALISTS POLICEMEN 1 HARBOR DAMAGE UNIT FINiL REPORT C.D.D. thereof. Therefore, It was necessary to organize and equip the harbor protective forces, including the fire departments, so that they could be reasonably expected to be self-sufficient and not depend upon mutual aid and outside mobile reserve units. Fire Protection, As stated above, conditions usually made it necessary to organize extensively both land and water equipment in a harbor area. On land, regular city fire department equipment and personnel were increased and organization of auxiliaries was required. Much attention was paid to the training and inspection of the fire departments cf private industries, war plants and shipyards in the dis- trict, the fire departments of which were required to become regular auxiliaries of the municipal system. On water, the regular fire boats were augmented by placing auxiliary pumping equipment on ferries and private craft regularly plying the harbor and waterways, by organizing and training crews aboard them, and requisitioning their services when- ever needed. 5* Bnergency Medical Units. These units coordinated the efforts of auxiliary medical groups, first-aid and ambulance units, and the evacuation of wounded to other sections of the conmunity. 6. Heavy Rescue Units, Well equipped heavy rescue units were con- sidered essential in a harbor area because of the usual remoteness of outside help. These units, in addition to the customary rescue train- ing, were instructed in the engineering technique of emergency repairs to bridges and other essential structures, and were equipped with the necessary heavy machinery. 7* Nautical Salvage Units. These units consisted of tug boats, each with a crew of 23 men, trained and equipped in emergency salvage work. They specialized in hastily shifting cargoes, reloading from a damaged ship to a dock or another ship, preventing the sinking of damaged ships and other typically "preventative" salvage. They were also trained and used in emergency rescue and first aid. 8, Air-Raid Warning, Harbor areas received their warnings in the same manner as other air-raid-protection districts or sub-divisions of a municipal area, that is, from the warning central or city control cen- ter by telephone, teletype, or radio to the control center of the har- bor group. If the harbor area was large or remote, its leaders were sometimes ordered to sound their own sirens but usually the sirens were connected to, and operated by, the master switch at the main warning central of the municipality. The harbor group control center trans- mitted warnings to its subordinate headquarters, but important indus- tries and installations in the harbor received confidential warnings direct nearest warning central or anti-aircraft headquarters. Visual signals such as large colored balls and signal flags raised on lighthouses and placed above channel direction lights were given to harbor shipping as an alert. In addition, the direction lights were FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, blinked three times to denote a warning of probable attack and were extinguished to indicate a general alarm. The "All-Clear'’ was indi- cated by the re-appearance of the lights and the lowering of flags and signal balls. 9» Harbor and Waterways Alr-Rald-ITotectlon Rules, a. Jurisdiction within a harbor area was vested in the com- manding officer of the water police. His authority extended along in- land waterways to the designated point where it joined the jurisdiction of the next port conmander of water police. b. Ships on waterways away from regulated harbors were required to maintain plane-observation watches os a supplement to the signals or warnings that might be received by radio. Upon entry into a harbor, ships and crews were subject to inspection and practice drills to deter- mine their proficiency in fire protection and prevention, and in emer- gency air-raid-protection measures. Crews were subject to call in furnishing mutual aid to other shipping in the harbor. Ships in chan- nel or in motion, upon receipt of a warning of probable attack or upon the sighting of enemy planes were required immediately to steer clear of the main channel and drop anchor until receipt of the "All-Clear" signals in order to prevent sinkings in the channel. Ferry boats were prohibited from starting a trip after the sounding of ah alarm, and, if underway, were required either to return or to complete the trip, or to put in at another landing, whichever of the three expedients would most quickly get the passengers to a communal shelter. 10. Traffic Control. The handling of traffic on both land and water was definitely considered the responsibility of the air-raid- protection leader. The problem of getting large numbers of workers, mostly skilled, to and from places of employment which were Important to the war effort constituted a major problem for harbor officials who' believed that such movements were potentially important targets for air attacks. The planned defense was to stagger working hours and establish "relay" shelters, but no occasion ever arose to test the plan. H* Shelter Policy. The providing of adequate shelter protection for employees was the responsibility of individual installations. The splinter-proof surface shelters erected in the earliest stages of the war were quickly replaced by heavily reinforced concrete surface and underground shelters. 12. Unexploded Bombs. In the early stages of the war, harbor res- cue squads were trained to neutralize or dispose of unexploded bombs. Later, regular air force bomb-disposal units were accountable for un- exploded bombs while navy units disposed of unexploded mines. However, in some emergency and isolated cases, harbor rescue units were called upon to function in that capacity. 139 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. 13* Mutual Aid, Self-sufficiency within the harbor area was a requirement, since, in many cases, facilities were isolated from direct connection by land. Each facility, installation, industry, or enterprise, whether public or private, was required to make the sections of its protective organization available at the call of the air-raid-protection leader of the area, and, as a result, harbor areas seldom required assist- ance. FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. XX. PROTECTIVE LIGHTING 1. Frcai the inception of war preparations, it was accepted'by military GERMANY that a very sever eiimout approaching a blackout would afford some measure of night-time protection against air attack. For strategic bombing, that was undoubtedly true, but, for blanket bombing, it had less significance. Following the organization of the German Air-Raid-Protection League in 1933* certain lighting pre- cautions were initiated, but few active operations were undertaken until warfare became an actuality in September of 1939* The basic light control measures were established by the Air Ministry; were reviewed by the Ministry of Transportation or other headquarters in- volved; were interpreted to the public by all manner of propaganda (printed, radio, posted orders, movies, and verbal instructions); and were enforced by the local police. The control measures also fixed fines and penalties ranging from five to several hundred Marks or im- prisonment or both, but there is no record of such penalties having been numerous. The public was anxious to comply for its own safety. Any blackout exceptions had to be for sufficient reasons, on written request, and with full military approval. 2. Because of the severe dimout at all times, GERMANY did not need to consider the matter of sky-brightness, which was such a studied part of the American defense methods. In fact0 the American evaluation of a dimout was based primarily upon the reduction of sky-glow and con- sequential lessening of the silhouette visibility of ships. Nothing of this kind seems to have been a part of GERMANY'S protective light- ing program. Her problem was merely the one of direct observation of ground lights, or of reducing the brightness of all illuminated surfaces and objects to about the equivalent of full starlight, viz., a bright- ness of .0002 foot-lamberts of the roadway as a criterion. In full moonlight and with surface brightness of no more than 0.02 foot lamberts, the clear weather visibility of larger ground objects was good enough for bombing, so, in essence, GERMANY*s result was the elimination of distinctive ground patterns of lights, and the establishment of low brightnesses on dark nights. 3. The Basic Decrees. The major rules that established the basis for air-raid-protection lighting were s a. The blackout order of 23 May 1939® b. The order of 1 September 1939 which covered the treatment of windows, behavior of citizens, and reasons for controlling light. c. Hie decree cf 3 0 December 1939 covering the official or military type of motor vehicle headlamp. d. The 8th air-raid-protection decree of 18 February 1939» which covered vehicle and vessel lights as to visibility range. 141 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. e. The decree of 11 November 1941 which lifted the require- ments for special small-sized bulbs in vehicles. f. The decree of 26 February 1942 which included certain lighting precautions, along with camouflage. Other rules were issued from time to time that involved colors of light, or light-locks at entrances, or which indicated the personal interest of Hitler in the subject,, In fact, so many rules and local modifies* tions grew up that the subject tended to be confused0 and the local interpretations by the air-raid-protection police had to be the final authority. Nevertheless, by the late summer of 1939 (simultaneously with ENGLAND), the larger cities were well blacked out each nightB and continued 30 until the war’s end. 4. Training and Measurements. Defense lighting was included in the special training of some 300,000 young people, especially following a mandatory order of July, 1941* that required four hours per month in- struction in that subject for those aged 13 and 14. Some lighting studies were included in training programs set up in 1939 by the Nation- al Air-Ifeid-Protection School, at 7/ANSEE near BERLIN. Local police were equipped in a few cases with light measuring instruments or photometers chiefly to check street lighting, but they fell back on the specialists of electric or gas utilities in cases of detailed checks. By and large, the approvals were matters of visual inspection, and, by the very nature of the rules, they could be only rough approximations of personal judg- ment. 5. Times for Dimouts and Blackouts. The severedimout was in operation continuously# each night from dusk to dawn. A time schedule was published in the daily papers and "Verdunklungszeit", or the light-dimming period, was given usually for a week at a time. It should be noted that natural darkness in GERMANY is comparatively shortj in summertime it averages from 2200 to 0400 hours (on the war-time clock schedules, or double "daylight-saving"). Dimout thus did not impose nmch of a handicap upon normal life because night traffic and night life were almost non-existent. The blackout of factories did, however, inter- fere with labor. The "complete" blackout, which compared more to the operation in ENGIAID and never was so complete as what was attempted in the UNITED STATES, went into effect at the time of the public air-raid warning, and was relieved at the "All-Clear". One aim was to have ship- yard workers use full lighting right up to the last minute. If raids had been widely intermittent, this schedule would have worked well, but when attacks or only warnings were frequent, the system broke down. That can be understood when it is noted that in HANOVER there were some- thing like 1#000 raid warnings, although bombs fell during little more than 1Q£ of them. Moreover, the extensive use of gas for lighting, with its plurality of valves and its slowness of control, made quick extinguishing and rapid (or safe) relighting a difficult matter. This relation between blackouts and frequencies of night raids should be kept. 142 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, In mind, Qpick shifts from dimout to blackout were not easy In GERMANY, and they would not be easy in any country. Hence, frequent night warn- ings drive the defender to continuous blackout, if he relies upon that protection. 6. The Basic Lighting Rules. All outdoor or out-leaking light had to be invisible at a range of roughly 1,60C feet and greater dis- tances, when viewed from any angle by a dark-adapted eye in total dark- ness. Variations and details were as follows* a. Vehicle lamps were to be easily visible up to 330 feet, but not farther than some 1,600 feet. Early in the war, automobile head- lamps were masked with opaque covers having horizontal slits0 two to three inches long, four-tenths inches wide, plus a visor. At first, smaller than normal bulbs were decreed but, as these grew scarce, this item was neglected. Later, as of 20 March 1940® it was decreed that by October, 1940* all automobiles must have one standard design of driving headlamp, viz., the "Notek" device, mounted on the left front guard or at the center, at regular headlamp height.' This had a narrow horizontal slit, plus a wide six-inch visor. Its price was $6.00 (M 15*00). The headlamp beam at 6o feet was to have its upper edge two and a half inches below the tope of the aperture, i.e., tilted downward one degree. Police were permitted to use unmasked headlamps, screened with violet filters. Dimmed parking lights and rear marker lights (blue) were mandatory. b. Bicycle lamps were required in the foims of a masked head- lamp of low candlepower, and a dim blue tail lamp. c. Hand flashlights had to be screened with diffusing filters of blue color, and always pointed below the horizontal. A limiting size was the six-volt, .04 ampere miniature bulb. d. Street railway cars were required to have headlights or headlamps conforming to the basic visibility range, plus a pair of outer-edge marker lights visible in the forward direction only. e. Vessels on inland waterways were directed to screen their fixed navigation lights so they would be visible only up to 20OOC feet, and be especially shielded to minimize water reflections0 On outside waters, the maximum visible range of mast-head lights was two miles, and no more than one mile for others* Portholes had to be covered, similar to other windows* f. Traffic control lights on streets could have no rays above horizontal; must be unnoticeable beyond about 1,60C feet; must avoid casting silhouettes of pedestrians, and be waterproof and vibration- proof. Small,bulbs (or mantles) plus shields or masks effected this, not unlike the masking of signals in LONDON, or NEW YORK CITY. 143 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D# g, Railway signals could operate, if specially hooded, A control device was developed for them, consisting of laminated silvered mirrors through which the rays came horizontally, limited to a vertical spread of some six degrees. With a 75-watt clear bulb, the maximum beam candlepower was 200 Hefner candles# These units complete for rail- way sidings and switches listed at $16,00 (Hi 40*00) to $20.00 (FM 50.00), Within railroad cars, the 25-watt blue electric lamp was standard, plus the previously existing miniature blue bulbs serving for regular night lights. Either could be used, provided all windows were well curtained. h# Out-door industrial fires and furnaces were problems for local treatment# Generally the instructions were to blanket or roof over all fires that could be permanently shielded to provide decks or hoods for arc-welding* to bank the fires in boilers or furnaces at pre- liminary alarms, and to cut all air-blasts or fuel-feeding wherever possible. In short, as in other countries, too many varieties of opera- tions were In action to permit any one fixed set of applicable rules. i# Show windows and displays could be used sparingly. Shop windows (subject to fuel shortage) could be lighted from 060C to 1800 hours, but any spill light onto sidewalks was forbidden, since it might be glaring in the eyes of a dark-adapted vehicle driver. In some places it was permissible to burn illuminated advertising from HOC to 1400 hours, but all such usages decreased for power rather than for safety reasons. 7# Treatments of Windows and Openings, a. The light-tight treatments were obvious ones? plywood sect- ions to be fitted into windows at twilight, opaque fabric curtains, paper, shutters, or paint. Use of paint was extensive on glass sky- lights and commercial windows, but deprecated because of fragility, and because all naturual daylight that could possibly be admitted was needed. Not so much attention was paid to natural ventilation as in AMERICA, probably because of the cooler climate in GERMANY, Show windows could not legally be closed to prevent an interior view from the street, but many other commercial openings were permanently closed with lumber or brickwork* Where the building openings were opaqued, any reasonable amount of interior lighting was permitted, provided that it could be instantaneously cut off if windows were blown out. Should the citizen or business man elect to reduce interior lighting and not employ complete blackout windows, he was limited to a special black-coated electric bulb with a one-inch diameter bottom aperture, emitting no more than three lumens. As an alternative he could use small blue bulbs. Such usage was chiefly for hallways where outside doors might be opened. Since most window coverings were likely to leak light, the interior lighting had to be reduced in many cases# b# The coats of providing window coverings were usually borne by the landlord or owner# Much plywood and valuable (later scarce) 144 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. fabrics were used, but there is no evidence that the costs, dispersed as they were, constituted any seriously burdensome load upon civilians, German interior lighting in industries is not generally good by modem standards, and not only did opaque industrial windows and skylights re- duce daytime illumination to a point of decreased production or of in- creased strain on workers, but all resultant extra artificial lighting consumed vital fuel. Except for the underground emergency factories, German industries had practically no windowless buildings. c. Light-locks were mandatory on entrances to all public build- ings and communal shelters. Blast walls often formed one part of such locks; interior extra partitions or curtains the other part. In this feature practices in ENGLAND were very similar to those in urban GER- MANY. All new construction in GERMANY had to incorporate light-locks, if considerable foot-traffic were probable. 8, Colors of Lights. Definite decrees from headquarters had specified blue lights as mandatory for defense purposes. This seems to have been a fetish of Hitler. The choice of color may have been influenced by the long-standing usage of blue night lights in railways or naval vessels, but except for red stop-lights on vehicles, almost every dimout effort centered around blue lamps. Early in the war the blue bulbs were available with a fairly permanent (silicate) coating, but they later became unobtainable. Dipped or lacquered colorings were tried, but they peeled off, and, toward the end, theblue bulb usage was neglected. On 2? October 1940. certain easements of earlier orders were issued, which stated that: a. Blue lamps were not to be used in headlamps, tail lamps or marker lamps of automobiles - only on the inside of car bodies and for rear license plates. The "free" lamps of taxicabs were to be a pale yellow, not noticeable farther than 1,500 feet. b. Danger spots in highways were to be marked by a blue light, as should all unusual obstructions, filling stations, or roped-off areas# c. Electric pocket flashlights were to be blue, except the red ones of police inspectors, (In ENGLATD the aperture was limited to one inch, plus a filter, of at least one thickness of newspaper) d, Automobile rear and stop-lights were to be red. e. Trailer lights (triangles) were to be yellow. f. Special entrance lights or entrance signs were to be blue. g. Only one approved coloring liquid was official, viz., the "Tauchlackfarbe" as approved by the Air Minister, 145 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. 9# Dimout of Electric 3treet Lights, Street lighting ,was likely to afford the most distinctive guiding pattern to an attacker, and it received the first and most critical attention. Details of how dimout was achieved are given elsewhere in field reports of this divis- ion for three representative cities. Suffice it to say iii summary that typical procedures included? a, Eliminating all light sources of distinctive color. This primarily removed a fair number of high intensity mercury lamps (yellow- green) and a lesser number of sodium vapor lamps (orange-yellow). b# Drastically reducing sizes or wattages of lamp bulbs# Pre-war sizes ran from 40-watt to 1,000-watt, with 75 to 500-watt sizes making up more than 85# of the total. Usually the war-time or dimout sizes were from 10 to 6C-watt, inclusive, chosen with regard to mount- ing height, and used one per fixture, instead of previous clusters. The neon glow lamps of less than 5-watt size were also used, chiefly for markers. c. Reducing the socket voltage by one of two customary methods? a) Connecting a pole-base transformer into each street light circuit, to cut the voltage roughly in half, i.e#, from nominal 220 to about 10C volts# In HAM- BURG about 18# of the units were thus treated, and the candlepower reduced to perhaps 1# or 2# of normal# (2) Using a second lamp bulb in the pole base or hood, in series with the one overhead, where direct cur- rent was present (often a fair percentage in business districts), with the same effect as above# For shel- ter signs and units that could not be well shielded, three bulbs were wired in series, which lowered the candlepower to a dull red glow# d. Installing special blackout fixtures overhead at important street intersections, or at spacing greater than feet, at the cost of seme $8.00 (RM 20.00) each, or else coating existing glassware with black paint, and hooding with metal cylinders. The characteristic light distribution resulting was roughly a candlepower of two to five, with no light above the horizontal, and a goal of something less than the equivalent of full moonlight illumination on.the street beneath. Where a private electric utility had a contract with the city, the national government was supposed to assume a large part of lost revenue. An idea of the power reduction may be had from HAMBURG’S records. Its normal street lighting consumption was on the order of 6,000,0CC kilo- watt hours annuallyj its blackout consumption was about 150,0C0. 10. The Dimout of Gas Street Lights. On a mileage basis, probably 6o% of GERMANY'S streets were lighted with low pressure gas. The 146 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, customary control was by a pressure valve in each fixture, and a pilot flame* The usual unit had from two to 12 or more mantles, pendant. In larger cities the typical dimout procedure was to? a. reduce to one mantle per unit, and from the pre-war 20 millimeter mantle of 50 Hefner lumens to a "Baby* mantle of about one quarter that size. b0 Remove all units except those at important street inter- sections,, Co Burn all of the remaining mantles day and night, since the gas supply, ’•'M to be maintained for household use on the same pipe line and the mantle consumption was no more than that of a pilot flame which could be blown out by bomb blasts0 cU Coat diffusing glass globes with black paint9 or insert a metal disc within the globe beneath the mantle so thatlight might leak downward through a small aperture thereins or drop a sylinder of tar- paper around the unit beneath its metal reflector-hood0 Modifications of these methods led to the same general results as in the case of electric street lighting,, 11, The Use of Luminescent Paints and Special Devices* It was per- missible (even encouraged) to band the static hazards, or edge doorways and mark obstructions with phosphorescent paint. Light yellow and light blue tints were approved, presumably the types well known as zinc and calcium or strontium sulphides, Himmler decreed these in 1942# the criterion being visibility at one yard for 12 hours of darkness. This practice had considerable, but scattered, usage and lack of materials probably prevented wider application. The professionally made phos- phorescent signs, quite common in the UNITED STATES, were not in evidence. Traffic signals of types known in ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES as safety- island lights or bollards, were often masked to small apertures. In GERJIANY what few existed were largely eliminated. 12, Blackouts Easier, Pre-war conditions made blackouts in GEJMANY much easier to establish than in the UNITED STATES, For street lighting, GERMANY had comparatively few series eledtric circuits, and could break up its wiring into flexible groups. There were fewer miles of streets per unit of urban population, and easier change-over methods when so many fixtures were hung on cross-street cables. In AMERICA, thousands of special wardens were needed to turn off street lights, Xh NEW YORK CITY there were some 32,000 individual switch controls to be manually operated. In GERMANY, no such services were required. One executive order could specify a certain make of fixture (as for automobiles) and the inspectorfs job was simply to report the absence of that particular device. On the other hand, as is always the case when preparations are left until war time, the calm, non-political studies and tests could not 147 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. be made, and results were thereby more costly. 13• The Utility Situation. A civilian defense study of protective lighting brings into focus the relations between the diioouts or black- outs of a voluntary sort, and the continuity of utility services under bombing. The field reports have listed certain large electric generat- ing plants, some of hydro but the majority of steam turbo-generators, or, in smaller units, of stand-by diesels, almost all of which escaped serious bomb damage. Inter-connecting high lines, of 50 cycle at 25 or 30 KY especially in north and central GERMANY, helped the exchange of vital power, but these alone would have been almost useless, if the major generating units had been demolised, or eiren if only the vulner- able switching and transformer stations had been destroyed. Relatively little damage can be done to underground electric cables. True, many were out but were promptly repaired, and, even in badly demClished cities, they were mostly in good operating shape at the end of the war. With one known exception - the underground steam generating plant at MANNHEIM - the plants were above ground and vulnerable. Buildings were prominent, stacks tall, coal piles indicative-, out-going wires on towers definitely characteristic. Usually these plants were beside waterways. Their roof construction was very light, often glass sky-lights. Loose masonry splinter-proof walls between generators formed about the only protective construction within. 14* An Appraisal of Defense Lighting, The world may probably have seen in ENGLAND and GEFMANY the most extensive and the last of the pas- sive defense measures that have been termed blackouts. It is difficult to conceive of more submissive attitudes towards this operation, or of better public compliance than in those countries. Indeed, in view of the confusing laws and variable interpretations of German defense light- ing, it is surprising how well it functioned. Some of the regulations (blue light for concealment, for example) seem based upon snap judgment of uneducated or non-scientific officials, and other rules (such as the visibility ranges in exact figures, when just the ordinary variables of human vision, let alone weather, could cause differences of several hun- dred percent) were actually unenforceable in practice. In spite of those difficulties the lighting was modified to as low a value as concealment from air-observation required. Whatever may be said of defense lighting, the betterments of GERMANY’S effort would have been along the lines of a practical program worked out in peace times, proved at leisure, and not subject to sudden changes as events educated the politicians. In the UNITED STATES* this method of handling a very complicated operation seems the only logical one. 15, Coheb nts, The question for the future is: •How much protection does a blackout give?" The German results show that for night-time blanket bombing it was at best a slightly delaying factor. For strategic bombing, the trend of, and known developments in, detecting instruments makes it seem doubtful that a city or even a large structure therein could be long concealed in the most perfect of blackouts. Rocket bombs would 148 PINAL REPORT,C.D.D. be totally unaffected by blackouts# Flares and incendiaries vitiate its value# It needs a calmer appraisal than it has received# 149 FINAL REPORT, C„D©D© XXIo SHELTERS lo In order to understand what was probably the most tremendous constructional program in civilian or passive defense for all time, it should be recalled that a plan and a promise upon the part of top-rank- ing German officials were that safe shelters were to be available for every German citizen© This meant sure protection against high-explosive bombs up to perhaps 2,000 pounds weight, and immunity to all known in- cendiaries© German authorities failed to realise or to face this re- quisite of strength at first, but attempted to achieve it later© The shelter program meant gas-tight structures© It meant housing ofccm- munication and control headquarters, of fire departmentsB telephone and alarm centers© It meant the protection of hospital patients9 and safe storage of public documents© It meant a sufficient number of cellar retreats for Whatever fraction of GERMANY*s 40,000,000 citizens might be caught at their residences, plus great cave systems0 supplemented by concrete buildings above ground that could be reached in a lc minute run or rapid walk by all the business folk and workers away from home, or by those lacking good cellar shelters© It meant a program which at a minimum would have required 5a333,000 cubic yards of concrete and 290,000 tons of steel reinforcing for each million citizens housed in reasonably.bomb- proof structures© Toward the end of the war the amount of concrete per person was more than doubled, running up to 10 cubic yards© It meant underground caves with a capacity of cubic meters (almost 4#000,000 cubic yards) of air space per million people, a truly stagger- ing concept'© If the promises had been fulfilled along the lines of the 1944"45 activities, namely„ the erection of heavy concrete surface shel- ters (Bunkern), the estimated cost per person housed would probably have exceeded $200©00*perhaps double that© 2„ Evolution of the Programo a© In spite of propaganda of safety and the hope of immunity from bombing, certain architects8 drawings published about the time of the MUNICH pact (1938) indicate that large communal shelter structures were being planned before the war© In 1937, a fairly good underground shelter, gas tight, and resistant to light bombs was built at the HANOVER railway station© Ballistic experts of the air force at the EHRA LESSIEN testing station checked the strengths of shelter materials and outlined standards for concret slab thicknesses, and upontheir find- ings it was at first thought thatt (1) yards thickness would protect against a 500 pound bomb© (2) 2©2 yards thickness would protect against a 1,000 pound bomb© (3) 2«75 yards thickness would protect against a 20OCO- pound bombo 736334 O—47 11 150 FINAL REPCRT, CoDoD, However, as experience developed the fact that these thicknesses were in- sufficient, the Germans increased the "safe" thickness to some 6®5 feet® Then, in shelters built in the last year of the war, the roof thickness was increased to about 8 feet, and where a vital operation was to be protected, up to 13®5 feet® These figures are set forth to illustrate the undecided race between bomb-resistant structures and bombs that con- stantly increased in penetrating force® bo By the wargs end, approximately five percent of GERMANY’S population could be temporarily housed under shelter roofs of three to four feet thickness of concrete„ Fifteen percent had access to shelters with ceilings of six to eight feet thickness0 Reinforcing went from over 300 pounds of steel per cubic yard to 6o„ Sizes and shapes of shelters varied greatly0 3° Developmento a0 It is not surprising to find that GERMANY waited many years after preparing for war before making definite plans for civilian defense shelters® History afforded them no experiences along those lines0 In heavy concrete construction, the building of the West Wall defenses may have taken preference0 Nevertheless, some plans were formulated by 1935 and public bulletins on small shelters came from the national government as early es 1934o These early bulletins and instructions were devoted largely to assisting the householder in supplementing the natural -pro- tection of his own property0 By 1939 emphasis was being placed upon the building of large public shelters. It may be said in general that the actual construction of the latter on a large scale did not get under way prior to 1940* From then to the end of the war, construction con- tinued, although delayed much by lack of material ® The most notable shortage was that of steel used in reinforcing the concrete,, In anti- cipation of that, instructions of 1 June 1937 were issued by the German Air Minister concerning the construction of shelters without steel0 and, by 1945s the reinforcing in some cases was one-fifth of the earlier pro- portions ® As bombing became more severe0even without saturation raids, the inadequacy of the average shelters became apparent0 Actually most large public shelters were reinforced because even so they were not resistant enough, and the roof and side walls were made continually thicker, with 12 feet of reinforced concrete not uncoramon0 bo It should be noted, however, that really safe public shelters were not available to the vast majority of the German people® Reliance had to be placed on house shelters, many of which were found to be entire- ly unsatisfactory even prior to saturation raids, because they were traps in a conflagration, or easily penetrated by medium bombs® Toward the end of the war, there was a renewed interest in building public shelters, ex- tending even to those sections of GEHviANY theretofore somewhat remote from Allied air attacks® In those places the typical attitude "It can*t happen here" led to emergency last-minute construction, and precluded 151 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. the possibility of building large concrete public shelters requiring six to nine months to construct. 4* The Code of Practice for Building Shelters. In July, 1941, there was issued a code of practice which was edited by the Air Ministry and by the heads of the inspection divisions of air-raid protection. This code summarized the fundamentals of bomb-proof shelter construction as follows: a. Any program was to be for the entire city, and planned on an area basis with regard to local architecture and urban real estate developments. b. Multi-story buildings above ground were given preference; underground shelter were approved only in exceptional cases because of their higher costs. c. For civilian protection, the material could be varied accord- ing to capacity with 2 0% added for heavy foundations, as follows: Type Capacity Cu,yds. per person, max. Min.thickness A Over 1CCO 9*75 10.0 feet A 10CC to 750 10.4 10.0 feet B 750 to 600 11.0 10.0 feet B 600 to 500 12.3 8025 feet B 50C to 400 13.6 8.25 feet B 40C to 300 14o9 8.25 feet 0 Under 300 606o feet d. For extended self-protection personnel such as average factory shelters, the above quantities of material were to be reduced by 25%. Hospitals and units of high importance could use whatever seemed necessary. e. Roofs were to be of horizontal slab construction. Any false superstructure had to be fire-resistant. f. Peace-time usage was to be subordinated. g. Decorations were to be postponed until peace time, but camouflage was to be considered. h. A complete shelter had to have the following rooms: (1) Gas-lock entries, preferably at least two. (2) Guard rooms, for seven people. (3) Wardens office. 152 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. (2f) First aid room. (5) General rooms* for six or more people. (6) Halls as needed, and stairs. (7) Lavatories; one seat per 25 persons. (8) Wash rooms; one basin per 25 persona. (9) Booms for mechanical devices. i. Entries had to be three feet wide for 150 persons; over five feet for 250 persons. Area of the gas-lock had to be at least six square feet. j. Rise of stairs had to be less than seven and one-third inches; width of tread not less than 10 inches. No stairs should b© less than four feet wide, plus about one and one -half feet for every 100 persons. Ramp gradients should not exceed one and one-half to one. All stairs were to have hand rails on both sides. k0 First-aid rooms had to be provided in all shelters having a capacity of 300 persons or more. 1. Storage of fuel for eight days was mandatory. m. For shelters housing more than 1,000 persons, or having more than six floors, one or more elevators were to be provided, carry- ing 10 passengers or 1,500 pounds. 5. Special Features and Equipment. a* Of the 12,000,000 gas masks that were Issued to German civilians, sufficient quantiiies were kept in shelters to take care of the scheduled occupants0 In addition, the double steel doors with rub- ber gaskets and pressure fasteners, plus the air flow that came in through purification chambers or tanks and went out through high baffled apertures inwalls or tall vertical stacks, were ample to ex- clude poison gaseso Cellar shelters of private homes lacked these refinements, but were required to cover all openiigs, even to the ex- tent of puttying up cracks or pasting paper over keyholes and joints. b. In semi-public shelters it was forbidden to have water or gas mains through the rooms, lest a break in them might flood the closed spaces. Multiple exits were always encouraged, such as holes broken through cellar walls to connect whole blocks of apartments, so that egress could be ahead of a progressive White painted arrows on streets showed the paths to safety. No shelter doors were ever to be locked, or if so, then a key in a box with a glass cover was to be 153 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. beside each door. The width of the door increased with the size of the shelter; usually it permitted four persons abreast in shelters for over 300, and in the largest, where perhaps 30,000 people might seek shelter in a 15 minute period, there were four doors as much as 15 feet wide. (The standard shelter entrances in ENGLAND were 27 inches wide.) c. All large shelters had firm foundations, often with a wide apron to prevent angle bombs penetrating beneath the building. However, the "round houses" (see paragraph 10 d of this section) of medium size were generally on piling, probably with the idea of minimizing the transmission of ground shock. d. Fire-retardant paints were tried for wooden parts of shel- ters, but for small fires the use of lime wash was probably the most practical. No oil lanterns, gas flames or acetylene were permitted in any shelter. Oxygen cartridges were noted in some; also ammonia cap- sules for fainting persons. e. In the building of concrete shelters: banked-up sand some- times replaced wooden forms. Sand or earth in fibre bags or even paper bags were used for temporary shelter work, but the containers rotted too fast. f. The success of heavy shelters led to a program of building some six great structures for factories, totallying perhaps 100,OCX) square yards of floor area. Some 30$ of airplane production went underground in tunnel shelters. g. All large shelters were electrically grounded with heavy lightning rods. Interior wiring was exceptionally well done and shock- proof, with practically non-breakable fittings. 6. Some Shelter Failures. About June, 1943, the shortcomings of communal shelters became evident. In COLOGNE, a direct penetration through the roof of a large shelter killed all of its many occupants, In HANOVER the first railroad shelter had its two-foot ceiling prentrated, and a half-cylindrical shelter in HAMBURG was destroyed by the penetra- tion of a ceiling of eight feet of heavy steel rails and concrete. A too light shelter (underground) in BAD OLDESLOE was penetrated and its occupants killed. Even the submarine pens had penetration through 13 feet of the best concrete obtainable. Similar examples showed that at the war*s end, a concrete slab 12 feet thick was not a sure protection. 7. Location. a* Public shelters were distributed unevenly throughout GERMANY, as might be expected from the character of the places. In cities furnish- ing good military targets, more shelters were found than in towns without war industries. Rural communities in general made little or no provision for public shelters. The German plan of placing public shelters only in important cities appeared sound, but as air mastery was lost, then the 154 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, medium-to-small town became a vulnerable target, and many casualties resulted. The policy of too little and too late within certain cities like MUNICH and AUGSBURG, on the basis of their being too far removed from Allied air bases for serious bombing, was a grevious error, 'Hie location of shelters within a city depended somewhat on population de- mands, although this was not so important as might be first supposed. It was the aim to have a communal shelter within a l,5C0-foot radius of occupants, or twice this distance at the most. b. In many cases public shelters had to be built entirely underground. Particularly was this true in the business districts where available ground space was at a premium. On the other hand, tunnel shelter were usually limited to sections of towns where hills were found, or where the levelof ground water was low. Large many- storied shelters were necessarily placed where ground space was avail- able, preferably remote from adjacent buildings. This often meant in city parks and plazas. In spite of the desirability of a remote loca- tion, many shelters were built in a row with apartments and camouflaged to appear like them, with painted squares to look like windows and with a false roof. The few subways were too near the surface to make good shelters, and their use as such was forbidden. In LONDON# by contrast, over 150,000 used the deep subways regularly. 8, Home Shelters, a, In spite of the prevalence of many public shelters in GERMANY, most persons actually had to rely upon house shelters, usually located in basements0 As early as 1934* instructions for building those shelters were sent out by the German Air I.Iinistry, and emphasis was placed upon them throughout the war. The air-raid-protection serv- ice usually inspected and approved the shelter. In some cities, the cost was partially borne by the national government; in others, by property owners; and in still others, by the national government in oases of low income families. In general thee State after 1937 under- took (1) the provision of rudimentary gas-proofing; (2) the provision of at least one emergency exit Into adjacent cellars; (3) the bricking up of all existing openings to the exterior of the building; (4) in some cases, rudimentary strutting. In some cities the ground water level precluded the possibility of deep cellars in certain sections and more large above-ground public shelters were required. The size of the cel- lar shelter varied, depending partly upon the number of persons to be acconmodated* but considerably upon the space as found. However, saturation raids proved these house shelters entirely inadequate, many people being killed by shelter collapse and many others trapped and smothered by fire. b. Jhe policy of using steel domestic huts, known as Anderson shelters, which prevailed to such a large extent in the UNITED KINGDOM# or of using a plurality of splinter-proof street huts ohiefly of brick, 155 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. had no counterpart in GERMANY. Neither was the portable splinter-proof device such as the British Morrison shelter found there. Open trenches seldom served as shelters for house-owners. A few outdoor shelters were found of the same general type as the home shelter, on the order of a strutted "root-cellar". These were ordinarily built mainly be- low grade, and were lined with prefabricated sections of steel and con- crete, some few were lined with wood. The Minister for Air reported in early 1944 that these trenches afforded effective protectibn. How- ever, the provision that they should be dispersed, and not house more 1 than 50 people each, plus the fact that they were futile against direct hits or gas, leads one to doubt their effectiveness. No provision was made for forced ventilation or toilet facilities, although most house shelters had electric lighting. 9* Semi-Public Shelters, Many basements in schools and public buildings were remodeled as shelters to provide protection fdr those in the building during the day and for the general public at other times. Many of the school shelters were open to thepublic at all times during the last year of the war, since in some cities more than one-half of the school children had been evacuated to small communities not likely to be bombed. Some had forced ventilation and all had elec tricity and toilet facilities. Gas-proof steel doors were provided. They were equipped with benches but not with bunks. Not all schools and public buildings had a shelter and, during the last two years of war, priority for materials for such shelters had been difficult to get. Furthermore, the policy of sending children home on the first public alarm, had relieved the demand for such protection in school buildings. 10, Public Shelters, There were four types of public or communal shelters in GERMANY3 the trench shelter; the tunnel shelter; the cellar shelter; and the "Bunker", a. The trench shelter was slightly below ground and usually covered by a concrete slab from one foot to three feet thick on which one foot to five feet of earth had been placed« The trench was usually about seven feet high on the inside and about six feet wide0 The walls were of either concrete or wood. The length of the trench varied seem- ingly with the available space, but sections or off-sets usually divided it into galleries for some 50 persons each, and minimized a longitudinal blasto At each end of‘the trench there was an entrance usually through a wooden door, although some had steel0 With few exceptions, wooden benches had been provided for each side of the trench. Forced ventila- tion, toilet facilities, and running water were not available. Little if any protection could be had from a direct hit of the smallest bomb although they were, in most cases, splinter-proof. The advantages of the trench type were rapidity of construction and low cost. This type of protection was standard for slave labor or foreigners but was used by others in emergencies. 156 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. b, Tunnel shelter systems (Stollenanlagen) were much less com- mon than covered trenches, but each was usually of large capacity* They were shafts run into a hill and, in most cases, with rooms opening out of a series of passageways* Seme had as few as two outside entrances but one was inspected that had 15, although not all had been completed at the end of the war. Baffle walls of concrete were found at most en- trances. Some had two and three floor levels which could be reached on concrete ramps, Usually there would be from 20 to 50 feet of earth on the top. The better examples of this type had reinforced concrete ceilings and sidewalls, and concrete floors, separate small rooms equipped with benches and bunks, running water, adequate toilet facilities and forced ventilation systems. Several examples of direct bomb hits were found in which no persons were injured. Not ell tunnel shelters were so satisfactory. Some had ground water in them, were lined with wood, were without any conveniences save electricity and force ventilation. Some were merely dirt-floor tunnels lined with bent railway rails and corrugated sheet iron. Many times these large tunnels were located at inconvenient points since obviously they could be built only where the contour of the ground permitted. In spite of those limitations, cases of overcrowding occurred, especially as bombings became more severe. c. Large communal cellar shelters were numerous, particularly in congested parts of cities. Not only were available basements utilized, but they were extended by further excavation, often by constructing sub- basements. Furthermore, many were found which were not located under buildings, but were under a parkway in a street. One parkway cellar shelter inspected, about two city blocks long, was approximately 30 feet underground and consisted of two levels divided into small rooms. Nearly 10,000 people could be accommodated. The effectiveness and com- fortof these shelters varied widely in spite of basic instructions and general specifications,, but the general level of comfort was fair. The roof ceilings were usually of two to five feet of reinforced con- crete, the amount depending upon the earth or building structure above them. Sidewalls and sometimes partitions were likewise of concrete,. Forced ventilation was standard and could be maintained in case of failure of the city electrical supply either by diesel electric generators or hand-operated machines. In seme, temperatures could be controlled within limits. Adequate toilet facilities were had for normal capacity but as bombing increased, overcrowding became a serious problem. In some cases adequate hospital service was available. Many of these hos- pitals were still in operation at the time of the survey and will probably continue for some time to come, since many outside hospitals have been demolished. d, The massive shelter above ground, was GERMANY'S great experiment. No shelter buildings exist in the UNITED STATES or ENGLAND similar to these so-called "Bunkern", They were tall heavy buildings designed solely for the air-raid protection of persons, documents, and instruments, but with a tentative peace-time usage in mind. From the standpoint of external appearance, "Bunkern" fall into three groups? 157 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. (l) the apartment house type with a false roof and painted walls to imitate windows; (2) the large rectangular concrete building with flat roof; and (3) the round, cylindrical buildings faced with masonry. Ex- amples of the last two types are shown in illustrations T-83-D-1 and T-82-D-4 on pages 159 and 160. Later in the war the "round house" was no longer approved in GERMANY, perhaps due to the excessive cost for its capacity of 300 to 500 persons. The exterior wall was about three feet less in diameter at the top than at the bottom. The interior wall was cylindrical. The walls of non-reinforced concrete were six and one-half feet thick at the base and five feet at the top. Not all, but most, of these houses were veneered with brick. They were designed so that in post-war times they might serve as storage houses. A variation of the "round house" was the Winkel shelter, more of a conical shape designed to deflect direct bomb hits, but not proving dependable in this, nor economical to build. e. The more recent shelters of cube-like shape varied in size hut a typical one recently built in HAMBURG was 56 feet square and 80 feet high, with walls and roof about seven feet thick. Some 6,914 cubic yards of concrete made frbm 2,239 tons of cement, and reinforced with 366 tons of steel were required in the construction. It was eight stories high and had a capacity of 1,300 persons. The cost of construct- ion was $280,000.00, equivalent to 700,000 Reichsmark, or roughly $215.00 for each person to be housed. Shelters of this type required mine months at a minimum to complete. Many shelters were larger than the one de- scribed and many were smaller, most having capacities of from 500 to 2,000 persons. f. The usual "Bunker" had five or six stories above ground and commonly a basement. Upper floors could be reached by several stairways, usually two, and in a few cases by elevators. On each floor there was a number of rooms equipped with bunks and benches. Some rooms were reserved for mothers with small babies. On each floor would be found suitable toilet facilities. In many cases a complete hospital was avail- able with rooms for doctors and nurses. In cases where there was no hospital, at least first-aid service could be had. Some few had kitchens. g. Assured ventilation in a massive shelter was a serious problem. It had to provide (l) for the removal of the carbon dioxide given off by so many persons in such a small space; (2) for the possi- bility that the Allies would use gas; (3) for humidity control; and (4) for removal of" odor. The recommended amount of air was 11 cubic feet per minute per person; the maximum and minimfim temperatures 24° C and 17° C; the maximum and minimum relative humidity 75$ and 25$. Combination machines for providing the heating and ventilation were recommended in 1941 and were installed in many shelters. They were operated by city electrical current or, in case of its failure, by a local diesel generator. In one case two large "Bunkers" were served by a 750 KVA machine. The most serious difficulty encountered during raids 158 PHOTOS 5 & 6 ON PAGE 160: Photo 5 - tar** rectangular concrete ‘Bunker* with flat roof. Photo 6 . Cylindrical ‘Bunker* faced with masonry. FINAL. REPORT, C.D.D. arose when three or four time the listed capacity of persons would crowd into these shelters, thus making the ventilation condition very acute. Some attempts were made to assign space to persons hut tlyit procedure was never very satisfactory, and it broke down altogether during heavy raids. Many bombed-out families late in the war did have temporary living quarters in shelters assigned to them, hence the venti- lation system was in constant operation. 11. Special Purpose Shelters. Typical examples were as follows: a. BEUHSWICK state Hosoital shelter, typical of the better class of shelter for the sick, was Joined on to two wings of the hospital, T e Hospital and shelter were four stories high and entrances were pro- vided from each wing on each floor. Elevator service was also available. The shelter was large en ugh to take care of 600-bed patients as well as the staff of 300. About two-thirds of the hospital was destroyed, but the shelter was undamaged, and no one injured during any of the air raids. b. AUGSBEEG railway station shelter was designed for the pro- tection of railroad equipment and not for passengers. The emergency construction was under the rubble of an adjacent building (destroyed in February 1944) for housing the telephone, telegraph and teletype equips ment normally in the station. All equipment had not been installed at the end of the war because excess humidity stopoed its use. The necess- ity for an alternate set of such vital equipment in a shelter seems obvious, but the best heating and ventilation system obtainable had to be used, particularly for reducing relative humidity. c. The main purpose of the Wielandstrasse shelter in HlMBURO was to house valuable papers, although the basement and first floor accommodated attendants and some local citizens. Many valuable records were protected and still were in this shelter. Birth and marriage docu- ments, church papers, and certain important and original documents from libraries predominated. This shelter, seven stories high plus basement, with walls and roof more than eight feet thick, and floor size approxi- mately 80 by 160 feet, could also accommodate 200 persons. In spite of the example given, it is more probable that GSHMANT's attempt to preserve valuable papers and instruments in shelters was a secondary matter. d. The policy of providing a safe location for the headquarters of control center for the air-raid-protection services was not unique in GERMANY, The same policy wxisted in GREAT BRITAIN and in the UNITED STATES, One such interesting control center shelter was located in AUGSBURG. It was designed and constructed after a previous location had been recognized as unsafe. This control room shelter (Befehlsstelle) was constructed in 1940 and 1941 in an old beer storage cellar. It was equipped with electricity and toilet facilities; a ventilation system which could be operated by diesel generator in case of power failure; and all equipment necessary for a control headquarters. Doors were 161 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. indicated by phosphorescent paint and the control room itself was en- tirely so painted. No persons other than those connected with control room operations were admitted. Some attempt was made at camouflage by placing branches of trees upon the top of the shelter, although the only evidences observable were vent pipes. The cost of this shelter, paid by the national government, was $100,000.0 0(FM 250,000), e. An interesting combination of a public shelter and a setting for anti-aircraft guns, together with the necessary housing of the anti- aircraft personnel and warning central group, represented "Bunker" con- struction at its best. In HAMBURG, there were two groups of these mass- ive structures, each consisting of two such shelters. One is shown in illustration T-82-D-1 (page 159)* They were started in 1942 and com- pleted in 1943, requiring six to nine months to build. Several under- ground shelters held more persons, but in volume of material above ground these shelters were among the largest in GERMANY, The larger one shown had a rated capacity of 18,000 persons, most of whom were members of the anti-aircraft forces or other military personnel. In fact, the civilian capacity reported by the police was only 3*400 persons, A great deal of overcrowding was reported, and it seems conservative to estimate that it had been occupied by no less than 50,000 or 60,000 persons on several occasions, or 100,000 for the pair. The building was six stories high, plus penthouses on two elevations. It had two large elevators and all the modern conveniences previously listed for the best shelters. The roof was almost 10 feet thick as were the side walls of the first floor, above which the walls were seven feet thick, A para- pet seven yards wide at the comers and four yards wide above the sides shielded the walls and the ground close by. On the two levels above the roof were anti-aircraft guns. The number of direct hits made on this "Bunker" by Allied air forces had been reported from one to about one dozen. Inspection leads one to believe that several hits had been made on the parapet and roof, and more on the ground nearby, but no crippling damage resulted. There were no evidences of transmitted ground shock. f. Shelters were also used to house certain essential indus- tries where necessary floor area was small. An excellent example was a submarine pen of massive construction at HAMBURG, It was sufficiently large to house 20 small submarines at ©ne time-, having five sections, each docking four submarines. The size of the structure was estimated to be 500 by 475 feet. The top of the three lower pens was approximately 11 feet thick; and the top of the two highers pens, a full 13 feet of neavily reinforced concrete. This structure had an inside ceiling height of seme 35 feet and could shelter about 5*000 workers. On 8 April 1945, in the afternoon, six direct.hits were made, all of which penetrated the roof, killing 40 persons and upsetting a dry dock carrying one sub- marine and splintering othersin the slips. This destruction suggests that as shelters are made more bomb-resistant, larger bombs may be dropped from larger planesand continue to destroy whenever direct hits are made. 162 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. 12, Non-raid Uses of Shelters, a. The first continuous use to be made of shelters was for the emergency housing of bombed-out persons, particularly those engaged in essential industry or in the air-raid-protection service. Other citizens were evacuated wherever possible. Such use had rapidly disappeared prior to the survey, but existed during the latter months of the war. b. A second use of the better shelters was to continue to accommodate hospitals that had been demolished and such can be continued for years. These hospitals seemed well equipped and, from a layman’s point of view, well organized. It is quite possible, however, that the dreary atmosphere found in shelters may have a bad psychological effect on the patients. c, A third use of shelters was for housing displaced persons. The shelters seen were not among the best and were not well kept. No records are available of rentals or obligations of occupants, nor of any system of priorities. d, A fourth use of, or plan for, shelters, was for storage. It had been planned by the German to use the better ones for that purpose after the war, and Inside partitions were removable for that reason. 163 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D XXII. GAS PROTECTION 1. Introduction. The program of protection of civilian popula- tions against poison gas was a well planned and integrated part of the air-raid-protect ion services. As early as 1934* a few gas-protect ion leaders were appointed in the most important districts and cities, small technical staffs were organized, and plans were made which could be put into effect at the local level. It was not until 1939* however, that complete organizations were ordered set up andthat active preparation was begun. The leaders were appointed by, and we re responsible to, the local police president. The railroads, postal and communications serv- ices, the national highway traffic service and the waterway services had gas-protection units as part of their independent air-raid-protect- ion services. Even the air force had mobile troops in organized gas- protection units to assist communities in case gas was used. 2, Organization. An industrial or teaching chemist or a pharma- cist was generally chosen as the local gas-protection leader. On a higher level were regional leaders and the highest authority rested in the Air Ministry in RERUN, The local leader was responsible for organ- izing and training his staff which consisted of a relatively few chemists who were assigned to specific areas within the city. Members of the gas- detection and decontamination units were selected from the auxiliary fire- men and were given training under the plan that they were to work as fire- men until needed in the gas-protect ion service. Laundries and motor parks were designated and were staffed with trained personnel and equipped for decontamination of clothing, vehicles and movable equipment. Cleans- ing stations for persons were built in all first-aid stations and im- provised in public bath houses and school gymnasiums, and staffed with trained personnel. 3. Gas Protection in Construction. All buildings and public shel- ters constructed or modified to house air-raid protection activities were gas proof. It is an interesting feature in construction detail that two heavy steel doors with rubber gaskets were used at each entrance or exit to form a gas-lock chamber. All of these installations had mechanical ventilating systems with auxiliary diesel or hand pumps. Aln»st all of the ventilating systems had gas filters. Elaborate cleans- ing facilities were built in each first-aid station. (See diagram in Section IX, paragraph; 3 e of this report.) 4. Equipment and Supplies. In 1939 all air-raid-protection person- nel and war workers were issued gas masks. the firemen• police and import- ant protection personnel received a superior-type mask. By 1944, masks of a simpler design were either issued or available by purchase to every citizen, «nd special box or sac-type masks equipped with bellows were provided for infants and small children. The police, firemen and gas- protection personnel had rubberized protective clothing. It is signifi- cant that the manufacture of gas masks and protective clothing continued until the last days of the war. The decontamination groups had trucks 164 /INAL REPORT, C.D.D. equipped with cleansing apparatus and chemicals. In important harbors there were ships equipped for gas detection and decontamination. In addition, in each region there were large trucks which were completely equipped, manned and available to be sent into nearby areas. There were also large boxes of complete equipment for gas protection all packed for transport by air to areas needing them. The gas detection teams had small portable chemical testing and collecting kits. The gas-identification laboratories had complete chemical equipment, some having elaborate gas analysis and research apparatus. 5. Training of the Public. This was a divided responsibility of the leader of the gas-protection service and the National Air-Raid Protection League, Members, and especially the instructors of the League, were taught by the leader and his assistants. They also assisted in the lectures given by the League to the public. To avoid frightening the public, instruction and publicity were kept at a minimum. Only about 30 minutes time was spent in discussing the use of the gas mask and self-protection methods. 6. Oas-Protection Schools« The local leaders attended several courses of training in regional schools. These courses were given once or twice a year throughout the war. At the local level, schools were conducted by the leader and his s taff for the training of the independent gas-protection units which'were part of the air-raid- protection organization in the more important industries. These courses ran for about five days and the time was divided between lectures and demonstrations which were conducted in the plant. The nature of poison gases, their recognition, their effects, decontamina- tion, first aid and medical aid were stressed, air-raid-protect ion police were given even more elaborate instruction* The leaders of the self-protection units received less detailed training. Doctors, nurses, and helpers in the emergency medical services, were given lect- ures and demonstrations on the nature and behavior of poison gases. The teaching of the diagnosis and treatment of gas injuries was the duty of the chief of the emergency medical services. 7* Mobilization and Operations Plan. During the first bombings there were many "false alaims" due to the odors of unusual non-poison- ous gases from explosives, incendiaries, the incomplete combustion of burning material and sewer gases. When one of these reports was made by an air-raid warden, specimens were secured and an analysis was made. No poison gas was found to have been used in any of the raids. Had one been positively identified, a report would have been made to the leader in the central control room. The kind of gas, the amount, atmospheric temperature, the direction and velocity of the wind and other factors operating would determine the nature of the instructions to be given to the public along with the gas alarm. For those reasons, it was planned to give the alarm by radio and sound trucks. A warning triangle was to be used in outlying and rural areas. The fact that different gases would present different problems made most of the opt rat ion plans subject to the direction of the leader. 165 PINAL REPORTo C.D.D. 80 Comments a The gas-protection service seems to have been ade- quately planned and the personnel veil equipped and trained. The feet that both contaminated and clean casualties were to be brought through a cannon entrance and gas-lock of a first-aid station into a waiting rceci before separating them would certainly have resulted in contam- inating all the injured0 the staff,, and the station, even though the protection was apparently adequate. The lack of education and train- ing of the jublic would probably have caused a panic during a gas attack. Many of the gas-protection leaders thought the National Air- Raid Protection League should have penult ted more education of the public. Certainly the use of the radio and sound trucks would have failed during heavy bombing. There was no plan for other methods of giving the alarm in cities. The uncertainty of being able to give directions during a raid would not have been an adequate alternative for the training of the public. Although there was a strongly divided opinion about the probability of the use of gasv the protective serv- ices and supplies were maintained at a high Isvel until the end of the war. FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. XXIII CAMOUFLAGE 1. Any reasonable camouflage is valuable in defense, chiefly upon the basis of how much or how long it may delay or to what degree it may divert "pin point" bombing. In any phase of operations previous to com- plete control of the air, good camouflage is fair protection. After air mastery develops or when blanket bombings (particularly night operations or attacks through cloud strata) become the type of attack, then the val- ue of camouflage dwindles or ends. Thus it was in GERMANY, where pro- tective concealment was practiced with a greater variety of materials, probably with greater Ingenuity, and certainly with greater expenditure of manpower, than has been used heretofore by any warring nation. 2. An appraisal of protective concealment of civilian structures in war time GERMANY should consider two basic types, namely: a. Long range or permanent camouflage. b. Emergency, temporary, or seasonal camouflage. 3. PgrmaAe.nl. Camouflage. a. The embellishment of enduring structures such as large shel- ters represents this type of protective concealment. Prom the first- even before MUNICH (September 1938), it was planned to finish the tops of large shelters so that they would simulate neighboring large buildings. Architects' drawings show elaborate roof treatments, dormer windows, false peaks or towers and sidewall veneer. Earlier communal shelters such as those common in COLOGNE, HANOVER, And HAMBURG were actually so built. Some appeared like large country barns; others like the commercial buildings nearby; and still others not unlike chapels or old water towers. The false roof was often of wood beam and tile construction above a horizontal concrete slab which was the real bomb-resistant roof, and variations ran all the way from over- lays of sod or earth to a Norman chateau tower with its pointed cone surmounted by a filial or weather cock. b. As the tempo of shelter construction attempted to keep pace with the increased scope of bombing, these concealing roofs were set aside, but up until the last, the large shelters had project- ing reinforcing rods and similar features providing for later additions of brick veneer. In the case of industrial structures, this form of camouflage was not evident. But few major factories, however, were added during the bombing years, and such as were above ground were sometimes divided into relatively small buildings and scattered among thick growths of trees. Isolated structures such as bricks would gain very little from being disguised to blend with surrounding buildings, if any; furthermore, where temporary coverings could be added at any time, structural camouflage was unnecessary. There were exceptions of note, however. Netting over oil tanks or petroleum stills or over 167 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. such units as art peculiarly characteristic* fails to disguise them completely. c. Could GIRMANY have continued her program of construction of large six to eight-story shelters above ground* it is obvious that superficial constructional features would have been planned for con- cealment reasons. German officials point out* in confirmation of American and British experts, that the best camouflage is built into the structure from its inception. It cannot be effectively added later. A logical conclusion, therefore, is that it is continuously prudent to guide and control the peacetime building of structures of military or civilian protection value* so that in their sites* their heights, and in their exterior trims or details* they will take advantage of the first principle, that of blending into their surroundings. iu Emergency or Temporary Camouflage. In order of importance, the concealment methods used in urban areas were: a. Coverings of netting* characterized by new materials rather than methods. b. Dumny cloth and fabric coverings, or structures simulating the extension of streets and park land over water. c. Paint treatments, including coloring of concrete d. Artificial fogs, especially in harbor areas. e. Glare confusion of aircraft with powerful ground search- lights • 5* Camouflage Netting. Wide usage was made of coarse netting to conceal fuel storage tanks, to shelter small harbor craft, to cover medium-to-small buildings, to drape over vehicles, to conceal trench shelter entrances, and to cover raw earth, or to roof over small sect- ions where close-growth timber had been cut away. As experience was accumulated, certain features of value evolved that should be noted. a, The earlier netting was of fairly small mesh cord, with scraps of green and black burlap* Tnis held snow or lacked strength without excess support when horizontal, and was not fire proof. Betting and other bad features caused it to be disapproved. b. Later netting was of light soft iron wire, meshes roughly six inches square, and with clusters of small twigs or tufts, similar to bunches of pine needles, every six to ten inches. On occasion* scraps of rag or of coarse paper were twisted in. virtue of this netting was its high tensile strength, and, except for the inflammable twigs, its fire-proof nature. It was an obstacle to fire fighters because it interfered with water sprays on fuel tanks or fell with its supporting 168 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. poles and burned fire hose beneath. Nevertheless, it served well on bridges, in roofing over numerous groups of 60,000-barrel oil tanks, or in covering parts of low industrial buildings. It was commonly held clear of the structures by telephone-size wooden poles and wire messenger cable. c. A refined design made use of twisted strands of flexible plastic and strips of coarse black paper, roughly one-half inch by 10 inches, both being fire proofed. This synthetic netting was very strong, neutral in color for both winterand summer, and although it would melt in intense heat, yet it seemed to be the best solution to date. At least it would not be rotted by sulphur trioxide or similar fog fumes, as was the case with cord and fabric netting. 6. Dummy Coverings over Water. Most ambitious of all individual camouflage installations were the coverings built over water to simulate Examples have been described of the two 30,000-square-yard areas of Lake Maesche in HANOVER, and the 180,000-square-yard area of the Binner Alster, HAMBURG. Essentially these bodies of water were decked over with framed horizontal wooden forms of flat timbers supported by medium piling in fairly shallow fresh water, the frames either just sub- merged or just above water. Upon this base was loosely laid' or nailed an open work of flat scrap lumber, pieces from one to ten inches wide, and over the whole was a mat of rushes, branches, and coarse netting . On occasion, imitation hills 15 feet high were added, or clusters of net-covered lath framework were erected to imitate trees or bushes. The whole was irregularly sprayed with paint roughly to match the adjacent land. Whether or not the paint used had high infra-red-reflectivity to match natural foliage is not known. Unless it did, much of its value would have been lost. The work required tremendous manpower and effort but yet it was vulnerable to fire. The Alster basin covering, built in 1941* was destroyed in the great fires of 1943* A failure of the technique of this work resulted from its very size an$ its too-noticeable change in the landscape. Further, the construction was done in daylight, or was photographed in progress, so that it lost its major value. Even so, the protection must have been of real value at least in HAMBURG, where the addition of a dummy viaduct, displaced from, but parallel to, the real (Lombard's) viaduct may have contributed to saving the latter very vital rail and transportation link. 7« Paint Treatment, jn no disclosed cases did the German camouflage usage of paint attempt such elaborate scenic effects as were applied on several American industrial plants. In fact the typical application in GERMANY was merely an irregular mottling of surfaces in green, gray, black, tan or brown, or else, as exemplified by large shelters, coating the concrete in dull black. On the sides of some structures were painted dummy windows, but the value of that was apparently negligible, Gmail harbor craft were not generally camouflage-painted, although ocean going vessels had the characteristic zig-zag or bright and dark patchwork on hulls and superstructures. German seamen believed that the imitation 169 FINAL REPORT, C.D.-D. of the bow wave, or extension of a white wake, was the chief aim of ship camouflage. A noteworthy paint application was the green coloring of sections of the concrete center strip of automobile express highways (Autobahnen) to imitate the customary strip of sod. Here the idea was to use these sections for airplane runways and the operation seemed successful. 8. Artificial Fogs. Use was made, especially in low lying areas such as harbors, of sulphuric acid and lime or sulphur trioxide vapor, compressed in 26-gallon (or 100-liter) steel drums. Such artificial fog was not practical over extensive areas and seemed confined to such vital spots as oil refineries. It was corrosive to fabrics. 9o Glare Confusion. The use of tremendously powerful arc search- lights for glare confusion of bomber pilots seemed part of the defense plan. Tactically, it appeared likely that these were used in groups of several units mostly mobile and well camouflaged beneath netting or held in dense woods during daytime. American tests had disclosed the futility of glare confusion with small volumes of light (such as from a 1,000-watt incandescent lamp), but the results from the super-sized German searchlights were good. These units had optical glass mirrors as large as 80 inches and carbon arcs taking 450 amperes at 110 volts. The smallest had 60-inch mirrors, and used 200 amperes at about 75 volts. They were remote controlled. 10. Comments. a. Decrees urged civilians, or the air-raid-protection police, to do what they could with camouflage but little was done except with netting. The costs of camouflage for communal projects were assumed by the national government. Installations ofcamouflage were super- vised by the local police. The impracticability of decking over large water areas, or of manipulating material that should be fireproof, dis- couraged that type of camouflage. Artificial fogs were useful only as a thin ground veneer on calm days and they were corrosive. Scarcities of materials plus failures of pre-war types of netting led to light, neutral-colored non-metallic netting of high tensile strength* b. Superimposed upon such rather academic teaching of camou- flage practices as have existed at Fort Belvoir, or in addition to texts on this subject such as the excellent compilation of Major Breckenridge, it would seem profitable to correlate ground data contained in the field reports of this survey with photographic and reconnaissance records of the army, to reach practical appraisals of protective concealment. Some functions of camouflage, particularly the constructional trim, orientation and placement of vital structures, should not await the incidence of war, 170 FINAL REPORT, G.D.D. XXIV. CONDUCT OF THE PUBLIC DURING AIR RAIDS 1. At the time of air-raid "General Alarm1* the progress of civil- ians to shelters seems to have been orderly and to have been sufficient- ly spread over the available 10 to 15 minutes warning period, so that crowding at entrances was not commonly serious. In general, people wnt to shelters willingly, especially after their initial bombing experience. 2. Some types of public reaction are listed below: a. Passengers on railroad trains when in the country kept inside the coaches; when in the stations they were rushed into the rail- road shelter under charge of the conductor. b. Industrial workers on important jobs remained at work until the final raid warning and were supposed to have a company or factory shelter close at hand. c. Mothers with children proceeded to shelters at early warn- ings; men of middle age were supposed to remain at their residences if not at work, in order to cope with local small fires. d. School children were evacuated to their homes at the time of the first public warning. e. Hospital bed patients were frequently placed in shelters regularly each night. 3. Who were allowed in Shelters. a. Athe public warning, only unemployed citizens, old or decrepit persons or children were to go to communal shelters. At the "General Alarm", workers took cover. Priority industries were supposed to see that workers had a short radius of movement; in other cases the citizen was generally to have no more than a rapid five minute walk but it was often longer. b. Able-bodied citizens were supposed to stay outside the shelter entrance to assist late arrivals and to heljb the guards. In the order of priority for occupancy the following were listed. (l) Women and children. (2) War casualties or injured. (3) Old or helpless people. (4) People with no home shelters, and with police pass. 171 ~ REPORT, C.DoD* (3) .Yorkers in the vicinity unable to reach their homes. (6) Employees of industries with police authorization who could not reach their own shelter.. (7) Foreign male and female workers having certificates that they could get no other shelter, provided there still remained roof mor them. Co Recordso not altogether clarified* disclose that the issu- ance of shelter tickets was a subject of rivalry between the Party chiefs and the air-raid-protection police. The former wished to distribute patronage in this way* but confusion resulted and local civilian authori- ties resented the discrimination. Up to the war's end* there were argu- ments on this score* but -when raids grew in intensity* all segregation failed. About the only regulation adhered to was the one whereby the foreigners - had to make the best of very inadequate andunsafe covered trencheso 4, Guides and Markers for Large Communal Shelters. a, majority of communal shelters were marked by a trans- lucent glass sign at each entrance, supplemented by a flat enameled metal sign screwed against the wall* The latter sign measured 34 inches long by 12 inches wide; carried the working "Public Air-Raid shelter Room" in black letters at least oneinch high on both sides of a cen- tral horizontal red bar or arrow about four inches wide, and in black figures on the bar was stated the capacity of the shelter. The black- ground was yellow-orange color. Signs of similar design, except always with a direction arrow upon which was given the street name and address of the shelter, were mounted about eight feet high on trolley or street lighting poles, or special wooden posts. Each such sign was visible in daylight from a neighboring one, These direction signs were usually spaced one block apart, and distributed on street corners within a radius of two or three blocks from each shelter. In some instances a large billboard in front of the main railway station carried a list of several neighboring shelters, with street addresses. b. Obviously a stranger in a blackout might have difficulty locating a shelter, so luminous translucent signs were mounted at side- walks in front of important shelters and other strategic spots. These signs were two-faced, each face measuring roughly 11 by 32 inches, and the two faces, with sheet metal cover and projecting eaves, inclined some 30 degrees from the vertical. Each face carried the same red direction arrow on a yellow background and the street address. The mounting was abo\jt eight feet high, on wooden posts. Inside each sign were three of the clear bulb 15-watt electric lamps, usually wired to burn in series so that each had one-third normal rated voltage. Thus, instead of giving their normal 135 Hefner lumens, each was reduced to a dull glow of about ,03 lumens. Because of their low brightness, these signs burned all of each night. 172 FINAL REPORT9 C.D.D. c. Supplemental to all signs, it was not unusual to bum a small blue lamp at shelter entrances up until actual raids, and white light came out of shelter entrances around blast walls until the doors were Glased at the last minute, so there was little reason for a citi- zen failing to find a communal shelter if one existed. 5. Sudden Movements at Raid Warnings. a. Vehicles moved up until the "General Alarm”, then were parked so as not to block emergency traffic or entrance ways, until then motor car speeds were limited to l6 up to 3° miles per hour. Bi- cycles could move at all times but there was no checking system for them or for other things at shelters, so people moved mostly on foot. Night-time traffic was almost altogether official business, and pro- ceeded as usual until stopped completely. Daytime traffic, at the raid warnings speeded up suddenly and some increase in accidents oc- • curred, but in view of more pressing events "people got used to it”. b. Some of the hazards of rapid movements of pedestrians ware reduced by banding trees with broad markings of white paint, and paint- ing the bases of street lighting and trolley poles, as well as any prominent sidewalk objects. Gateposts were edged in white - sometimes with phosphorescent paint - and edges of curbs painted in alternate black and white strips, each about two feet long, Automobile fenders were edged in white. For safety in emergency connections, all utility services were colored green for gas, blue for water , and red for electricity. Diagonal bands marked stair treads. Citizens carried pocket flashlights (with approved diffusing blue screens or filters) and no restrictions were enforcedregarding personal noises, whistles, calls or white clothing. Occasionally people ran for as long as 10 minutes to reach a shelter, but even though there were no special emer- gency traffic police immediately on duty at raid warnings, the public seemed to move as well and as orderly as might be expected in a country accustomed to regulations. 6. Precautions .and Regulations in Shelters. a, Bach private or cellar shelter had its full quota of gas masks, air-raid-protection tools, and common accessories such as water, sand, and in better homes, bunks and blankets. The senior house- holder or warden maintained discipline, and with common-sense rules, such as no smoking, there seemed to have been no severe problems of order, things were not so simple in large public shelters. b« Upon arrival at a "Bunker* entrance, citizens were per- mitted to bring only small bundles, no carts or carriages and no animals except "seeing eye* dogs. There were no public shelters for animals. Women with baby carriages were supposed to use a special entrance, if there was one. Small children had to wear address and name tags around their necks. Earlier in the war, some shelters had certain rooms assign ed to specific families or a special group, but that system broke down 173 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. under later conditions of crowding. No lockers or hangers were provided, except wall hooks in the better shelters, but most of the people expect- ed merely standing room, occupants were cautioned not to lean against walls because of transmitted ground shock, and never to leave until the •All-Clear* signal. Actually, about one hour's stay seemed a fair average. c. m large public shelters with practically no fire rjsk, the sand and water storage, or quotas of small tools were usually absent. However, large numbers of gas masks were available. On occasions, it seems that collections were taken for charities, or blood-donor opera- tions were used to fill the time. There could be no smoking and "all unseemly" conduct was forbidden. 7« Evacuating Shelters after Raids. The *All*-Clear* signal was supposed to start workmen out of shelters promptly. Most people reacted with a species of thankful relief - almost cheerfulness - upon the con- clusion of araido and were anxious to get out to view damages or get to their own properties. Women and children could spend the remainder of the night, if they so chose, and many did in winter weather, but shelters had to be cleared as soon as possible and cleaned. This was the responsibility of the air-raid-protection police and local wardens. After a raid it was forbidden to use a telephone for at least one hour. No photographs were permitted at any time in or around public shelters. 80 The Over-all Appraisal of Public Conduct and.Movement. It had been the hope of the national government to provide safe shelters for all the native public. Although the actual program fell far short of that goal0 the public seemed to accept the situation with reasonable complacency., probably the man in the street did not know his scant margin of safety even when in the best of shelters, or scarcely realized that his shelters were really just extra-strong splinter-proof or fire- resistant structures, perhaps the German public accepted conditions with a pholosophy, such as the British, namely, that their shelter would protect against splinters and incendiaries but all could be destroyed by a direct hit. One simply had to take that chance, until the great conflagrations, German citizens thought their cellar shelters sufficient; after such events they doubted, and it is likely that, had the war con- tinued, these doubts would have crystallized into distrust and wide dissatisfaction. 174 FINAL REPORT, O.D.D XXV. EVACUATION AND POST-RAID EME2CENOY WELFARE 1. introduction. a. m view of the chaotic conditions which were brought about by Allied air and ground attacks on German cities and on her transport and comnunicat ions systems® it is doubtful whether any plans for evacu- ation and pcst«?raid emergency welfare could have functioned in a com- pletely successful manner. The field survey which was carried out in various bonbed cities makes it possible to evaluate and draw conclus- ions about the relative efficiency that was demonstrated by the several evacuation programs in acconplishing their purposes which were : to save life and prevent injury, to avoid subjecting non-essential persons to air raids by moving them to relatively safe areas, to provide emer- gency care and new living quarters for those who had suffered bomb damage or who were bembed out of their dwellings. b* For the sake of clarity, this report is divided into two sectionsj(l) evacuation; and (2) post-raid emergency welfare, in each, plans, organizations, and operations are described in sufficient detail to form a background for the evaluations and conclusions, A section of the report of the Morale Division, So Strategic Bombing Survey, con- tains a detailed study of the effect of evacuation on people, whereas this report covers that subject only to the extent necessary for clarity. c« No attempt has been made to indicate the number of evacuees who were cared for in GERMANY, Estimates are too inaccurate to be of value and any known figures have been invalidated as a result of the confusion which was caused by the unplanned movements of refugees toward the end of the war* Evacuation 2* Classifications* The planned evacuation of civilians in GERMANY was divided into two general classifications, namely* a. precautionary evacuation to safe areas of special groups whose presence in vulnerable areas was not necessary. bo The evacuation of persons who were made homeless as a result of air raids o Those in the former group were encouraged to move, but those whose labor was required were prevented from leaving by restrictions and, if they did get away, were compelled to return and carry on with their jobs. c. precautionary evacuation itself was sub-divided into the following types for which special programs were developed* (1) The evacuation of mothers and their pre-school-age children* FINAL REPORT, CcD.D0 (2) The evacuation of school children between the ages of si* to ten years to family care. (3) The evacuation of persons to live with relatives. (4) The evacuation of pregnant women. (5) The evacuation of the old and feeble. d. Evacuation of Homeless, The evacuation plan for the •bombed-out" (persons whose dwellings had been destroyed or were un- usable) provided for whole families, as well as individuals. The facili- ties which were established to take care of this type also provided a means of caring for persons who left their homes in disorderly flight, as occurred in HAMBURG after the heavy raids of 1943* The centers which were established to provide post-raid emergency welfare were used to re-house and evacuate the "bombed-out", (See "Emergency Welfare" section below.) 3« Responsibility„ The Nazi party assumed primary responsibility for evacuation and also for most post-raid emergency welfare services, because the propaganda value of assistance to people in distress was regarded as high. 4. Agencies, The principal Party agency involved was the National Socialist people's Welfare organization (Nationalsozialistischer Volks- wohlfahrtsverein) or NSV as it will be called in this report. 3d 1933* it had been given full responsibility for all organized welfare in GER1ANY and, prior to the war, it had operated two programs which formed the framework upon which evacuation was developed. These were. a. The scheme for country holidays for children which became the "Extended Childrens Evacuation Program" (Erweiterte Kinderland- verschickung), hereafter referred to as KLV* through which children from crowded areas were sent for limited periods to the country for recreationo health, ad as a means of acquainting them with other parts of their country. b, The mother-child help program through which care was ex- tendedto expectant mothers and to mothers with small children. Special care was provided in NS7 homes which had been established for the pur- pose, These programs are described in sane detail later in this report Co Other agencies which had responsibility or which assisted wares (1) Hitler Youth (Hitler jugend) (HJ)* to be called HJ in this report, which shared in the extended KL7 program. 176 FINAL REPORT* C,D,Do (2) The Teachers* League (Nationalsozialistischer lehrer- bund)(NSIB) which also shared in the KLV until its suspension in 1943» (3) The Naijonal Socialist Women's League (NS Frauenschaft) (NSF)o (4) The German Red Cross (Deutsches Rote Kreuz) (DRK) which assigned nurses' aides to KLV camps. dc Besides the party organizations many branches of the govern- ment participatedo After evacuation grew to large proportionss Party funds were not sufficient so that national funds had to be allocated for the purpose through the Ministry of the Interior. That ministry also controlled the right to commandeer houses and other accommodations necessary in billeting evacueeSo The army high command was consulted and had final decision with regard to what areas were to be designated as dangerous areas and which could be considered as safe. For other ministries see the section on KLVo 5* Basis of Evacuation plan. a. The basis for the original evacuation plan was the assign- ment by authorities in BERLIN of a single reception area in a remote part of GERMANY and even nearby foreign countries for each target dis- trict from which it was planned to evacuate people. These areas were established geographically on the party district (Gau) basis. Thus each party district which was designed as a target or evacuation area had a corresponding reception district assigned to it in a remote part of the country. Only evacuees were billeted there who came from the corresponding evacuating district. b. This policy of establishing reception areas far from the evacuation districts resulted from the fact that safe regions were naturally those farthest removed from industrial or target centers. In the beginning* also* authorities believed that GERMANY would win with ease* and* therefore* asthe period of evacuation would be for a short time only* it would more attractive to people to be sent to the most beautiful parts of the country* m addition* the KLV had sent children to these remote regions before the war* and the practice was continued because no one envisioned any disruption to transportation, communication and supply services. The distance factor* however, be- tween evacuation and reception areas became the principal obstacle to the successful operation of the plan. Co Later, as the severity of air raids increased* the number of bombed-out persons grew to a point where overcrowding in the recept- ion districts caused additional areas to be established, and those in turn became crowded, so that people were found to be going to areas in which no preparations had been made for them. Even officials were 177 FINAL REPORT. CoDoD, forced, on some occasions, to send trainloads of evacuees to unauthor- ized places. Such action tended to break down control because people who were billeted in areas not assigned to them were subject to evict- ion by local authorities in favor of those who might be regularly assigned there. The result wasthat an amended plan ms developed which permitted evacuation either to assigned regions in the remote parts of GERMANY, or to nearby unbombed portions of the district in which the evacuees lived. This plan was called "intra-district Evacuation* (Gaueigene Verschickung), 60 Evacuation.In GERMANY. a, It was established that the evacuation programs which are listed above were used throughout GERMANY and that variations in opera- tion occurred from place to place, but only to a minor degree. The KLV program was operative in all bombed cities studied. Although the agencies listed above were active, it was found that in some cities the Hitler Youth organization was dominant under the primary direct- ion of the NS people's Welfare Organization, while, in others, the school administrations played a more important role. It is clear, there- fore, that within the over-all plans, considerable latitude was per- mitted local organization in their methods of operation. b. Evacuation in the cities studied followed a generally con- sistent pattern,, m the early months of the war there was no govern- ment-sponsored evacuation# and only a few people# mostly from the wealthy class# left of their own volition for country homes# relatives# and places of their arm choosing. The earliest government evacuation oc- curred in the summer of 1940 and consisted mainly of removing or re- housing persons who had been bombed out. In addition# the NS People's Welfare Organization evacuated sane expectant mothers to Party homes which had been provided for that purpose# and also evacuated small numbers of mothers and young children to places selected by the mothers in the reception areas which were assigned to their respective cities. Co By the autumn of 19400 BERLIN, HAMBURG and some other cities launched campaigns to evacuate children under the Extended Child- Evacuation scheme (KLV“)« This met with varied success, and while about 800000 children were moved from HAMBURG, other cities which had not pushed the campaign evacuated relatively fewer, The schools did not participate to any great extent in the first evacuations, because it wasstill believed that the war would be of short duration, and that the children could return before any great loss of schooling would occur. The evacuation was on a voluntary basis, andparents were not generally enthusiastic about permitting their children to leave them. do The year 1941 brought increased bcmbing which resulted in more interest being shown by the people® Schools began to participate by sending groups in school classes with teachers to KLV camps. A* raids became heavier# parents also applied in large numbers to the NSV 178 FINAL REPORT, C,D.Do for evacuation of their children, Authorities felt, however, that there was still an unsatisfactory number willing to send their children away from cities likely to be bombed, pressure was then brought to bear on parents by prohibiting children who remained at home from receiving in- struction after their classes or schools had been evacuated. Authori- ties also threatened to refuse food cards to children who they felt should be evacuatedo However, evidence indicates that this threat was not ac- tually put into practice until the autumn of 1943* when, for the first time, KLV adopted the practice of evacuating entire schools. The raids of 1942 made large numbers of persons homeless. At that time, the plan to send all evacuees from one city to a corresponding reception area be- gan to break down, and people were sent to both distant and nearby areas. During the period of evacuation, confusion was created by the number of persons who returned to their homes after a short stay in re- ception areas. Many of them, particularly school children, were evacu- ated more than once. Also, many reception areas which had been consider- ed safe were themselves bombed, and, in turn, people were sent to safety within the same district or to other reception areas. e« until approximately August of 1943« KLV functioned effi- ciently according to an interview with its head, up to that time about 3OO0OOO children had been evacuated from large urban centers. By the spring of 1944# to® KLV camps were no longer able to handle the inrush of childreno and the administration of the problem became a function of the intra-district evacuation organizaticnso It was said that throughout 1944 and until the end of the war * improvisation rather than planned procedure characterized the evacuation of children*. f. The majority of schools in heavily bombed cities were closed by the end of l$43o and by the middle of 1944* the principal problem had become that of re-housing bonbed-out persons. That proced- ure is described in the "Emergency Welfare* section below, and was again a matter of improvisation. g. From the middle of 1944 to the end of the iwar, the picture of evacuation is most confused, m addition to the evacuation which was necessitated by continuing air attacks, large movements of civilians were caused by the invasion of German territory both from the east and west. Some idea of this confusion is illustrated by the fact that sev- eral cities were found to have been evacuating people to other districts and at the same time were having to care for evacuees from other areas. h. At the last, orders were issued from BERLIN to destroy all records of evacuation. This was carried out to an extent that made it difficult for authorities to re-sort and return people to their proper localities, 7o The. Extended Children*a Igyacuetlon Program (KLV). ao As was stated earlier in the report the extended KLV of NSV 179 FINAL REPORT. C*D*D, was developed from the scheme for country holidays for children and it started in 1940 for the purpose of evacuating children from threatened or bombed places* in October of that year. Hitler appointed Balder von Schirach, who was the Reich Laader for Youth Education, as "Fuhrer's Conmissioner for Expanded Evacuation of Children to Plural Areas". b. Schirach organized the program which was the common concern of the N3V, Hitler Youth (HJ) and the NS Teachers' Association (NSIB)» and established a central commission in BERLIN which was composed of deputies from those agencies* By agreement, the representative organi- zations divided their responsibilities for the program and allocated the work in clearly defined fields. (1) NSV assumed responsibility for, including the cost of the care of, children up to 10 years of age. (2) Hitler youth (HJ) in collaboration witlh the Teachers1 Association and school authorities had the responsibility of children between the ages of 10 and 14* Co KLV-was built around the use of camps in which children were placed and which were operated by the HJ and Teachers' Associations* do School evacuation of the children up to 14 years of age in- cluded public schools and the four lower classes of and middle school*9 although in some cases where school buildings were badly dam- aged o the fifth class was Included which raised the age limit in those instances* e* Children in the age group of 6 to 10 years were sent by NSV to family care hemes of NSV or to "foster" parent care, and school- ing was either continued in the local schools where crowding sometimes required staggered sessions to be held, or new schools started. f* The 10 to 14 year old children were usually evacuated oy classes or entire schools, earlier they bad been encouraged to evacuate individually under NSV» g0 These various divisions gave rise to two types of KLV camps $ (1) The so-called "open" camps in which the children were billeted in villages with families or in "homes", and all met together for classes at the local school or in some appropriate building. (2) The "closed* camp which was usually in an inn, board- ing school or some similar place and which was adequate both to house the children and furnish school accomo- dations., 180 FINAL REPORT, CoDoDo 8* KLV procedureo The work of the KLV was organized in the following manner* a. At the national level, the German ccnmissioner for KLV, his deputy and associate workers of the three primary agencies worked in his association with representatives of ministries which had jurisdiction in matters pertaining to KLV* They were* the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Culture and Education, and the Ministry of Finance, The National Management of Railroads also assisted. b* At district (Gau) level a district commission of KLV was established under a commissioner (Gaubeauftragter KLV), who had assoc- iated with him the party district local administrator (Gauaratslelter NSIB), the district leader of HJ (Gebietsfuhrer HI), the chief party district administrator of NSV (Gauhauptamtsleiter NSV), augmented by district workers from the railroad administration, farm supply officer and others* was also attached to this office a KLV representative of the district from which evacuees were sent to camps» For every county in reception areas the district commissioner appointed a county (Bann) commissioner of the KLV who had immediate supervision of the camps* Co The camps were organized as followst chief camp leader, HJ camp leadi&So aurse°s aide0 household manager0 cooks, teaching corps, and HJ camp student leaders completed the staff» if it werj a girls* camp the HJ was represented by HJ girl leaders (lagermaedelfuh rerin), A control unit consisting of a KLV inspectorate was maintained at dis- trict (Gau) and county (Bann) level, (NOTE? The Teachers0 Association was suspended in March, 1943o and the Ministry of Culture and Education and the district and local education administration became influential in KLV camp activities,) 9° Operation* Briefly the operation of KLV was this* a* At the national level, the selection of education and re- ception areas was determined by the central commission after consulta- tion with the army and other ministries as has been described* The decision was transmitted to the party district leaders (Gauleiter) whose districts were affected, and they, in turn, notified the proper authorities, such as district representatives of NSV, HJ, and school administrations* Local practice varied but not in any essentials* It was the district leader's responsibility to decide what evacuation was necessary and when* As in one of the cities covered by the survey, the district leader acted upon the advice of the school administration which, in turn, was in consultation with a city committee of which it was a member along with NSV, Hitler Youth, and a representative of the school parents* Hitler youth always played a prominent part because of the party's prestige and the fact that much of the administrative con- trol and funds of KLV were in its hands* With delegated authority from the district leader, the school administration advised*the Hitler Youth 181 FINAL REPORT, CoDoD© when schools should be evacuated. The HJ then contacted the school director which© in the case investigated© was done through the mayor, and gave him the details of when and where* In preparation for the move, the HJ which operated *travel bureaus* where lists and detailed information about estates,, hotels© camps, boarding schools were main- tained© called in the directors the schools in question and a select- ion of accommodations was made. ihe consultation with the director was more or less a matter of form with final decision resting with HJ* How- ever© the reception area KLY representative from the evacuation area in which the school was located usually had some knowledge and influence in the selection Hitler Youth would then call a meeting of parents of the school children and of the faculty to explain the necessity and desira- bility for evacuatioai© and through well known propaganda methods enlist their aid and consent to the evacuation which was on a voluntary basis, printed matter and details of the evacuation were sent through school children to their parents. The forms were standardized throughout GERMANY? although minor variations were found from city to city, physi- cal examinations were given prior to acceptance of children for evacu- ation and© in most cases© children were immunized for such diseases as scarlet fever© diphtheria© and typhus, parents were responsible for getting their children to the collecting or departure point with full equipment© including enough prepared food for the journey. b« Transportation© always by railroads when long journeys were required© was arranged by HJ and the journey was made under its control and with HJ leaders in charge of the children enroute* Costs of the journey were met by KLY funds. Co While the evacuation of the children was maintained on a voluntary basis until late in the war© the teachers had no choice and were required to accompany the schools.or classes to the camps© and to remain with them. Either the school director or a deputy went along when evacuation of an entire school was concerned, in all cases the salaries of accompanying teaching staffs were paid by the school ad- ministration of the area evacuated. do The typical KLY camp was organized and operated as follows* the school director who accompanied the school was the chief camp lead- er© but he was responsible only for the continuation of schooling, and therefore was in charge of only the class work and teachers. The ad- ministration of the camp© which included authority over the children in matters of discipline© and all activities and time outside of pre- scribed class and study periods© was in the hands of the HJ leader© who was usually a youth from 15 to 18 years of age. He was also responsible for the teaching of Nazi philosophy and doctrines to the children. Each house of a camp (usually a camp consisted of several) had a teacher as leader and also an HJ camp student leader. The duties of those two within the house were similar to those of their respective chief camp leader and HJ leader. 736334 0—47 13 182 FINAL REPORT, CoDoDo Go pousekeeping responsibility, including the procurement of food and other supplies rested upon the proprietors or operators* (lagerbewirtschafter) of whatever establishment the camp occupied, in the event no operating staff was at the camp, the KLV commission provided it through its county coiunissioner and HJ, The school children usually assisted with the housekeeping chores such as making their own beds and washing dishes, but their duties varied from camp to camp. f0 The food supply was under the ultimate control of the Minis- try of Food and Agriculture in BERLIN, and from that ministry there were issued0 through 1he district and county food offices down to the operators of the camps0 instructions in which required diets were set forth0 practical handbooks0 and ration instructions. The basic theory of the Food Ministry in the supply of KLV camps was to have the opera- tors avail themselves of local food supplies and facilities under the established ration system. In that wayc no drain on central warehouse supplies was made until all other sources were exhausted and then the distribution was made to existing shops and markets rather than directly to the camps. ( go M&dical and health services of the camps were administered from KLV district and county offices by medical doctors who made period- ic inspections and who were on call as needed* A Red Cross Nurse's aide was attached to each camp and was responsible under the KLV medical doctors for camp hygiene9 sanitations, and first-aid treatment. She remained under the administrative direction of the district Red Cross director. h. Full details of finance methods are not available in English translation. The cost of canp operation, except teachers salaries, was paid from KLV funds in the control of the district office. They, in turn, were allocated from the national level through the national pay* master from funds allocated to KLV by the Party, later, as the evacu- ation problem grew, government funds were supplied through the Ministry of the interior. Each camp had to submit vouchers for purchases made before the monthly ration cards could be validated for the next month's purchases, but how detailed a financial accounting was required was not learned. i. There exists no reason to doubt that the KLV cangp program was successful as a physical means of removing children from dangerous areas. As far as health conditions are concerned, the record seems good. Only isolated cases of contagious or infectious diseases were found recorded. j. Discontent which was evident among many of the children was the result of long separation frail parents and worry over their welfare. It may also have developed as a result of the basic and jurisdictional difficulties which were common between the teaching staffs and Hitler Youth leaders and which must have been evident to observant children. FINAL REPORT, O.D.D. k, The relationship between the Teachers' Association and Hitler youth is of major importance in KLV» because differences were major factors in the ultimate suspension of the Teachers' Association as well as the main cause of strife in KLV canps, The difficulties between HJ and the teachers dated from the early days of the war when KLV camps were being used on a modest scale under the direction of HJ* Assistants in the camps, chosen from members of the teaching profession by the Teachers' Association0 were given leaves of absence by the State for that purposeo To quote from an interrogation of a KLV official, "the unfelicitous phrase of Baldur von Schirach who said, 'youth can only be led by youth' was here placed in practice, and it cannot be described how many battles0 arguments and recriminations derived from this," Several factors entered the problem. The teachers were, as a rule, much older than the Hitler Youth leaders who controlled the camps and who, in many cases, were too inexperienced in the work. Also the fact that the discipline of the children was in the hands of the HJ and when problems arose between the school child and the teacher, the HJ leader generally sided with the child. Such action tended to destroy the prestige and influence of the teachers. In addition, the HJ appar- ently undermined the teaching because of their incessant demands on the time of the children for work in the camps, for drill and many other extra-curricular activities, result of this strife was that the influence of HJ was sufficient to cause the Teachers' Association to be suspended for the duration of the war. The controversy apparently made KLV top authorities, other than HJ* realize the limitations of the HJ camp leaders, in consequence, a new set of service regulations (called KLV la) was promulgated which placed the Education Ministry in top position with the camp leader (teacher) in sole charge and the camp student leader subordinate to him* There was not time to set the revis- ion in operation before the end of the war, although the same end was achieved by the fact that most of the HJ cap leaders were called into military service or ran away with the approach of the Allies, leaving the teachers in charge. 1, The attitude of the party toward religious teaching was of great importance in the resistance of parents in sending their children to KLV camps, Schirach, according to hisown statement, "advised Hitler in 1940 that if the evacuation of children was to proceed successfully, non-interference with religious practice was essential. Hitler agreed. If that were true, the Hitler youth defied orders, for at many camps no religious teaching was permitted and there was evidence of interfer- ence by the HJ leaders in others where religious meetings were held. m. There is also evidence that many teachers, because of their greater maturity and experience, were able to influence the children and circumvent the detrimental influence of HJ camp leaders. m. During the last six months of the war, difficulties in the camps became more pronounced because HJ received orders that child- ren born in 192Q were to be sent to the storm troops (SA) for training 184 FINAL REPORT, CoDoD, of one year when they would be formed into combat division. In March of 1945o orders were received that HJ was to encourage the children to join the "Werewolf11 movement. At the time of this survey, there was little evidence that this move was successful in gaining the support of the children. Again there were instances when the teachers were able to prevent cooperation on the part of the children. 10o Other precautionary Evacuation Programs. The others precaution- ary evacuation programs which were mentioned earlier, include those for mothers and small children, the old (women over 55 and men over 65 years of age), feeble persons and pregnant women. They were all a responsi- bility of NSVo both for sending them to reception areas and providing for them during their stay and return. a. Again, the programs were voluntary in nature until late in the war when authorities- in many places ordered evacuation of all but the people who were noededto maintain essential services or who were required to help defend ;hat area against Allied ground attack. The persons in the categories above were considered non-essentials. Attempts by the authorities to force compliance with the evacuation order took the form of refusal to issue food cards to children under 14 and adults over 65 years of age. b. The methods of evacuation operation hove been described in field reports and they followed a consistent pattern GERMANY1 with minor local deviations, A brief summary of operation methods and organization of NSV for handling evacuation of the above groups follows* At the national level, NSV* in consultation with military authorities and others, designated districts which were to be considered as evacu- ation areas, and allocated to each of them corresponding reception or safe areas. The same policy erf sending people long distances as was described under KLV was adppted for these programs, and the same prob- lems were present. later, as the number of evacuees became large, nearby communities in the evacuation district were used. On paper, at least, the policy was established that mothers with both pre-school-age and school-age children should be sent to the same locality os her school-age children who had been evacuated by KLV or NSV. However, that policy was not enforced and there is evidence that the Hitler Youth opposed it. c0 At district (Gau) level0 the district office and leader for NSV (Gauamtsleiter) was in charge of a staff of paid and volunteer workerso The employees of the affected civil administrations assisted along with NS Women8s Organization. d, persons were ev acuated by special trains in groups and as individuals, both to relatives and to billets which had been assigned them or, in the early part of the war, to places of their own selection. 185 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, e. If the evacuee wished to go to a relative, it was necessary to secure and submit a signed form from the relative stating his willing- ness to provide accommodations, in all cases it was necessary to secure a release from the local labor office and then apply with it, plus ident- ity card and ration book, for an official departure certificate. The evacuee was supplied with a travel certificate which could be exchanged at the station for a railway ticket. It was permissible to ship some household goods by arrangement with the NSV« f, pressure was applied by radio and press to secure the co- operation of the public for evacuation. When a sufficient number had signified their willingness to go, information concerning the numbers and types of persons was sent to BERLIN headquarters which notified the reception district NSV office through the district leader (Gauleiter), That office then made the necessary preparations to receive the given number. They included the allocation of persons to specific towns or conmunities, and often a representative of the particular reception town was sent to escort the evacuees to their destinations. previously the NSV had made a survey of the rooms and other suitable accommodations in the area. It was necessary for NSV to secure permission from the district (Gau) and county (Bann) leaders before rooms or houses could be requisitioned, The NS Women's organization frequently supplied assistance in the way of food and help to mothers with small children as did the Hitler Youth (Girls' division)# h, A copy of the departure certificate was retained and used by the evacuee in the reception area to obtain money, food and housing. Not until notification of arrival in the reception area was a person checked as having been evacuated from his place of origin. i. At the reception town the people were allocated to specif- ic private homes and some attempt was made, initially, to see that "host" and "guest" were congenial, Much readjusting was required before all, cases of incompatibility could be satisfactorily settled. j. Careful attention was given to the welfare of both the evacuees and their "hosts" in reception areas. Women with several small children could receive help from the NS Women's organization, in the form of assistance in looking after the children, sewing, wash- ing and bathing. k. Many towns provided clinics to which evacuees could go. Unwell mothers and sickly children were sent to special NSV homes for periods of treatment and recuperation. Expectant and nursing rrothers were provided with special food. Community restaurants were established when hotels and billets were unable to serve adequate meals, NSV main- tained stocks of clothiqg and seme household utensils and supplies for the use of evacuees who arrived unequipped. 186 FINAL REPORT, C.D.Do 1. Evacuees received about $1.20 (RM 3.00 per day which cov- ered the cost of food, lodging and incidentals. There are instances where towns paid the difference between higher costs of food in their community kitchens and the amount of monetary allowance. m. Evacuees with private means were required to pay, and hus- bands who remained at work and continued to earn adequate incomes were obliged to send funds for the support of their evacuated families. How- ever, any expense over and above normal living which resulted from evacu- ation was paid by NSV and later by the national government. n. Education of evacuated children from 6 to 10 years old was continued in the Iocs'1 schools. o. Recreational activities such as sports, lectures, and danc- ing were sponsored locally for evacuees through the propaganda office in an effort to speed up their assimilation into the life of the new com- nunitieso This was not always easy. Even though they understood the necessity for the presence of evacuees, the local residents frequently resented the influx of strangers. Misunderstandings occurred as the re- sult of language difficulties, character and habit differences. Trained workers who were familiar with these conditions were sent along by the evacuation area authorities to alleviate this problem. 11. The Evaluation of Bombed-out Eersona*. a. This program was also the responsibility of the NSV. The mechanics of it were very similar to those just described. The fact that this form of evacuation provided for the moving of persons who were forced because their homes had either been destroyed or rendered unlivable, places it in a category with post-raid services. As raids became progressively heavier, greater numbers of homeless persons were created. Emergency welfare centers or collecting stations as they were called, were set up from which all immediate post-raid services to the bombed-out or bomb-damaged could be dispensed. Arrangements for evac- uating the bembed-out were frequently made from these stations, particular- ly after heavy raids when large numbers required moving immediately. The stations will be described in the "post-Raid Emergency Welfare" section below. b, With the increase in intensity and frequency of raids, trans- portation became difficult, reception areas were overcrowded, and evacua- tion began to get out of control0 As a result, in addition to evacuation to distant reception areas by train, the bombed-out were evacuated to rural districts and small towns near the bombed city and were moved there by truck, bus or any available means of transportation. c. catastrophic element was great after heavy raids when huge numbers of people needed to be moved from the attacked city immediately. FINAL REPORT C.D.D, Under difficult working conditions it became Impossible to register and keep track of who was sent or where they went. As a means of meeting this problem at hAfifiUHO, every resident was required to carry on his or her person a completely filled out departure certificate ready for use in case of need. In that way, individuals in great numbers could be checked as they boarded their transportation and their destinations recorded upon the stub which would be collected by the checker and filed. The certificate indicated whether the person was occupied in essential work or whether he was non-essential and could leave. d. Evacuation within the district (or Gaueigene Verschickung) was the result of the need to house people quickly and it was used when transportation to distant reception areas was difficult and there was overcrowding in those areas. No particular change of method was neces- sary. e. The Ministry of the interior was responsible for "billeting11, and under it entire families were moved end parts of bembed cities re- settled. After heavy raids when large numbers of persons were moved and cared for, it became an academic question whether a person was being evacuated or rehoused. 12. Comments. a. Evacuation was successful as a means of saving life and pre- venting injury. It can also be assumed that from an emotional point of view, persons benefited by not being subjected to heavy bombings. Against this the serious problems which arose because of long separations of families and worry concerning the safety of members of families who stayed at home detracted from the advantages of evacuation. b. The evacuation policy of sending persons to distant recept- ion areas did not allow for the possibility of the eventual breakdown of transport, communication and supply systems, upon whose smooth funct- ioning the success of such a policy was dependent. Those services were necessary in order that members of families could maintain communication, pay visits and ultimately be reunited. After the breakdown ot these facilities, larger numbers of people traveled under great hardship in an effort to find children and parents. This added considerable con- fusion to problems which faced military authorities and accentuated the absence of resettlement bureaus where inquiries and information about missing persons could be centralized. c. The later policy, which kept evacuees in the same district as the city from which they came, avoided many of the difficulties, although housing was generally inferior to what was available in the remote reception areas. d. Before any decision of preference is made between the prac tice of evacuating people to nearby or distant reception regions, it 188 FIHAL REPORT, C.D.D. should be born© in mind that had the former been adopted for early pre- cautionary evacuation, it would have filled up the bcubed areas and people would have had to be sent long distances at a later time when all the difficulties of transport and other services were becoming most acute. e. Given a choice, most people preferred to remain near their homes and accept both poorer accoranodat ions and added danger than to go to distat reception areas. Some causes for this preference are as follows t (1) people were afraid of the unknown living conditions which they would meet in distant places. (2) They did not like the necessity of adjusting them- selves to language and custom differences. (3) They feared separation from family and friends. (4) When air raids became heavy and were reported as affecting all parts of the REICH, people could see no safety in moving long distances. Post-Raid Emergency Welfare 13# Responsibility. The care of bomb-damaged and bombed-out per- sona in was the responsibility of the NSV which worked closely with branches of city administrations and other party agencies. Relief was organized on a city-wide basis and mutual aid between communities was much in evidence. 14» Operational Technique. post-raid relief plans had been care- fully laid before the war but practical experience gained during raids resulted in many revisions andimprovements in operating techniques. It was observedthat best results were obtained in those bombed cities where the plans were flexible# and, most important# where welfare and service workers had been trained so thoroughly in their particular jobs that they could work in the midst of great confusion without supervis- ion or direction*, This factor was important because very often collect- ing stations were isolated by debris or broken communications and# as a result# the workers were completely dependent upon their own initiative. Without exception, plans had to be revised in order to decentralize operating control which could not be maintained during and after heavy bombing attacks# 15o Collecting Stations. All relief measures which wereput into operation immediately after each attack were supplied at collecting stations, m them, each party or municipal agency that had any respons- ibility for relief was represented by its workers. Thus the victims of air raids did not have to spend time and energy in seeking assistance in widely separated offices. FINAL REPORT. CcDoDo 16* Organization of Collecting Stations, Ihe typical organization of collection stations included representatives of the following agencies} a. For the Qltyg (1) Food office (Ernahrungsamt) to distribute such things as ration cards, clothing coupons, (2) Billeting Office (Quart ierarat) to supply rooms, apart- ments and houses for bombed-out persons, (3) War Damage office (Reichskriegschadeamt) for the dis- tribution of cash assistance and clothing. (4) City Building Office (Bauamt) for emergency repair of homes and to supply temporary repair materials. b. For the partyg (1) NS Welfare Organization (NSV) to handle and administer the work of the collecting stations, issue bomb-pass- ports o give advice and information to the bomb-damaged people o (2) NS Women's Organization (NSF) to help with the prepa- ration and serving of food and other services such as caring for children. (3) German Red Cross (DRK) to provide first aid (see the "Emergency Medical section)o (4) NS Motor Corps (NSKK) to transport food, persons0 and to haul salvaged furniture andother belongings. (5) Hitler Youth Maidens (BDM) to assist in first aid, cooking and ot her services similar to NSF. Usually the service organizations listed above were organized into three administrative levels within the city which wereg city, district (Kreis) and local (ortsgruppe), Frequently, operating staffs of the agencies were also organized at the three levels and their leaders met in confer- ence after air attacks and determined together or advised the Party leader, if he was in charge, what relief measures were required. 17° Operation, a, The operation of post-raid relief usually took the follow- ing ccurse. The collecting stations were in schools, taverns, restaurants, halls or similar places and their locations were known both to the workers and to the people of the neighborhood „ in large cities these were divided 190 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. into three t:pes according to their use and location: (l) Primary or small stations were in the heart of the city where most damage could be expected to occur, and to which those in the immediate vicinity could go quickly to receive assistance. (2) Main stations were usually located in the tuburbt or away from the most thickly populated districts and could service large numbers of persons who would collect there when primary stations had been hit or were inadequate to fillthe needs. (3) Country collection stations were located away from the city in nearby communities to which people could be taken for temporary feeding, housing and care and from which food and other assistance could be tent into the city. b. After a raid, the local party leader (Ortagrupoeleiter) determined which collecting stations should be opened immediately. The local representative of the other agencies on his staff notified their district (Kreis) offices and those offices sent their workers to the appropriate station in accordance with pre-arranged mobilization plans. Workers at the station were secured from regular social administration personnel, or were volunteers and employees from other non-emergency departments, such as school and finance. c. One of the techniques was to have the workers carry with them their own kits containing all the needs of their particular Jobs, such as forms, pencils and the like. d. At the collecting station the person requiring assistance could receive any or all of the following: (l) Hot drink and a light meal. (2) A bomb passport which became his identity card and upon which was indicated the extent of his losses, recommendations for evacuation or other action. (3) Cash assistance with which to buy food, household goods and the like. (4) Rehousing or billits and temporary sleeping accommo- dations. (5) Assistance in filing apolication for bomb-damage and other relief (this became a case history). 191 FINAL REPORT, C.D„D, (6) Emergency food and clothing coupons and reissue of ration books* (7) Tickets entitling him to secure food for about three to four days without cost or coupons0 (8) Emergency storage of furniture and household goods from his damaged dwelling. {9) Assistance in securing minor repairs or materials with which to repair his home. (10) Family consultation and advice. (11) Assistance in locating lost or missing persons. (12) Departure certificates prior to evacuation. (13) Evacuation or relocation, if needed or desired. NOTE; yor burial service see "Emergency Medical" section. Early in the war when raids were not too severe, the post-raid services functioned easily within the cities. As raids increased in intensity and damage became widespread, the- work had to become decentralized and much of it operated from outside the city itself. For instance, after the great raids on HAMBURG, HANOVER, and COLOGNE0 people were transported to collecting stations outside those cities and from there evacuated or resettled. e. Comnunity kitchens were set up outside the cities and hot food sent to more centrally located dining rooms in schools, restaurants and similar places. Relief trains and convoys were sent in. (See section of report on "Mobile Reserves".) f* Mutual aid became an important service to a bombed city and this help was established so that in the event communication broke down, the assistance would be sent without waiting for the requests. go The so-called "Rendezvous point" or "pilot Station" was a village or road junction where incoming assistance units and supplies could receive directions concerning where help was most needed, stations were kept informed by radio, telephone and couriers. 18o Comments. a. A large city can be paralyzed by heavy air attacks. The programs to decentralize foodstuffs, household goods, and furniture were most essential and the reported lack of cooperation on the part of shop owners, produce and warehouse people was to the disadvantage of the communities. 192 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. b. An observed fact was that people had a great reserve of ingenuity in being able to fend for themselves after air raids* Ifeny resisted attempts to mate them relocate or evacuate, or if they did go, they frequently returned within a few days and lived under most diffi- cult conditions in cellars, air-raid shelters and the like. The ef- forts of authorities to force them to go by refusing them food cards showed the presence of widespread black market activity, 1he refugees were able to patronize it because they usually had funds from the settle- ment of damage claims which had been on a liberal scale when the national government publicized the fact that the Allies would have to pay for it ultimately. 193 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. XXVI. TRAINING OF CIVILIAN DEFINE PERSONNEL 1, Origin, During the years 1932-33* the air-raid-protection serv- ices in GERMANY were being formed, apd from the first it was realized that great care would have to be exercised in the selection of the per- sonnel, and in the arrangements made for their technical training. As far as possible, personnel was recruited for the new services from mem- bers of the civilian population who already had some training in the work they were to undertake, as, for example, the formation of the res- cue service (instandsetzungsdienst) from thetechnical emergency serv- ice (Technische Nothilfe), This, however, did not cover the problem and a series of national schools (Heichsschulen) was set up, each deal- ing with one subject in air-raid protection. These national schools were limited as to the numbers they could instruct at any one time, and their syllabi were devised to deal with the high officials of the service con- cerned and with the instructors to be used at a high level. 2. General Organization of Training Schools. Below the national schools, a complete organization of training schools was set up, cover- ing the entire country, immediately below the national schools were the provincial group schools (landesgruppenschulen). Next came regional schools (Gauschulen), and below them came the air-raid-protection high schools (Luftschutzhauptschulen) opened in all large cities. At the provincial schools, activities were very largely confined to training teachers for the regional schools and the city high schools. 3. National Air-Pteid-Protection schools (Reichsluftschutzschulen), The following is a short account of the national air-raid-protection schools in GERMANY, giving their locations and some details of their functions. a. An air-raid-protection academy (Luftschutzakademie) was set up in Kesseldorfer Strasse, in BERLIN, jt dealt solely with the training of the higher officials of the air-raid-protection police (Luftschutzpolizei)• Courses lasted for 14 days and included instruct- ion in all branchesof air-raid-protection measures, and in the adminis- tration of the services. The premises at Kesseldorfer Strasse were destroyed by bombing andthe school was immediately reopened in the Luisenplatz, ORANIENBURG, just outside BERLIN, b. The National Industries Group (Reichsgruppe Industrie) opened a national school for the training of leaders of industrial air-raid protection at the Central School of the National Industries Group (Centrale schule der Reichsgruppe Industrie), This school was located at 26a Goethe Strasse, BERLIN,W. courses varied in length from 14 days to six days, instructors were also trained for the factory air-raid-protection schools (Werkluftschutzschulen) which were opened in all the large cities. This national school had a very good reputation and was well regarded by all who had attended it. 194 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, c. The technical emergency service (Technische Nothilfe) con- ducted a national training school at BEI2IG, BRANDENBURG, far the train- ing of itsown personnel and also rescue party (instandsetzungsdienst) leaders and assistant leaders. Courses lasted for four weeks and during the last 18 months of the war, a great deal of the time was spent in giving instruction in the demolition of damaged buildings by explosives. No copy of the school syllabus is available. Reports as to the effi- ciency and general value of this school to the rescue service varied. There was some criticism that the men were only taught things which they already knew, but a majority of the persons questioned considered that the school had performed valuable service. do The fire service in GERMANY had a national training school for its higher officers established at LBERSWALDE # northeast of BERLIN. Originally this school was intendedonly to carry out the advanced training of fire officers, but„ under war conditions, it became imposs- ible to keep up the supply of junior officers in the service# At the end of 1944* it was therefore decided that high ranking non-commissioned officers (oberbrandmeisters and Brandmeisters) should be admitted to the school fbr a course of training specially designed to prepare them to be officers. Examinations were held at the end of these courses and those passing were given ccranissioned rank in the fire service. All reports on this school agree as t o its excellence, both in training and in ad- ministration. 4. Provincial, Regional and High schools (Landesgruppenschulen, Gauschulen und Hauptschulen.)0 a. For the training of the fire-protection police (Feuerschutz- polizei) 29 provincial fire-fighting schools were opened GERMANY. These schools dealt with the training of junior officers and non-commissioned officers and also with that of the leaders of the volunteer fire departments (Freiwillige Feuerwehren) which had been established all over the country. The trailing of the rank and file of the volunteer fire departments was carried out locally under arrange- ments coordinated by the chief of the fire service. An interesting development in fire training was the setting up of a special school in TUQHELER HEIDE, POMORZE, P01AND, where a complete town was con- structed with every type of building represented. large numbers of men of the German fire service have been through a four-weeks course in fire fighting at this school. b. The National Air-Raid-protection League (Reichsluftschutz- bund) established provincial group schools in every province to provide instructors for the local air-raid-protection schools in the cities. c. The National industries Group (Reichsgruppe Industrie) established regional schools in'nearly all large cities. The schools were known as factory air-raid-protection schools (Werkluftschutzschulen) andthey were all affiliated with the Central School established in 195 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, BERLIN, The subjects taught included the usual air-raid-protection measures, and in addition, the particular problems arising in industry, instructors of this school were trained at the Central School in BERLIN. These schools were exceptionally well equipped and staffed and were capable of giving complete instruction in every phase of factory air- raid protection, including the training of factory fire brigades. All large factories had to be able to deal with their own incidents and were allowed to call for assistance from the town services only in case of real emergency. In consequence, the firms took great interest in their own local regional traihing school, and, if money viere required for additional equipment, it was always forthcoming, or one of the firms made the e quipment and presented it to the school. Courses originally extended over five to six days but toward the end of the war, courses, other than fire-fighting courses, had to be cut to three days in many places, as men could not be spared from their work for longer periods, Every effort was made to keep the courses up-to-date. As the satura- tion raids became more and more severe, it was realized that sane of the rules laid down in the textbooks could no longer be applied. To meet this new situation, many of the lectures were given by men wno were called in fran one of the blitzed tarns. They gave an account of their experiences and stated what they had done to meet the actual situation, m that way, the latest information was made available. The personnel attending these courses were the officers in charge of the different factory air-raid-protection services (Werkluftschutzleiter) and the leaders and assistant leaders of the several services. Refresher courses were arranged at frequent intervals. All reports on these schools have agreed regarding the excellence of the instruction given and the general administration. d. The air-raid-protection police (Luftschutzpolizei) opened high schools for the training of the rank and file of the air-raid-pro- tection services in their own areas. The instructors in these high schools (Hauptschulen) were trained at the air-raid-protection academy in BERLIN, thereby insuring continuity and standardization of training throughout GERMANY, The syllabus of instruction covered all aspects of air-raid-protection measures* rescue, first aid, fire fighting, de- contamination squads, gas protection, and the veterinary service. Courses lasted from four to five weeks, and it would appear that in the larger cities, at any rate, they were efficiently managed* The numbers attending these schools at any one time varied up to a maximum of 300 at HAMBURG, m that city two or three different courses would be run simultaneously. It was the general practice to issue certifi- cates of efficiency and men who failed to achieve the required standard could not be employed as leaders until they had had further training at the local high school. 5. The Technical Emergency service (Technische Nothilfe), Leaders of this service were sent to the national school at BEIZIG for advanced or special training in rescue work or demolition, and to the local air-raid-protection high schools (Luftschutzschulen) for general air-raid- protection instruction. The service formed the basis of the German 196 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. rescue service, and it served as an immediate reinforcement available at very short notice. Training of the service in air-raid-protection duties, and rescue work in particular, continued throughout the war. Exercises were held regularly up to 1943 in conjunction with the res- cue service and other air-raid-protection services, in most places exercises had ceased by 1944 especially in those areas under heavy attack. 6. Rescue Service (Ihstandsetzungsdienst), Since the original personnel was already technically trained, that fact greatly eased the early problem of training, as it was only necessary to give a full course of training to the remainder of the personnel, ihis procedure could not, however, be kept up after 1943 and there was a fairly rapid deter- ioration in the quality of the men joining the service. Toward the end, unskilled labor was being accepted to keep the numbers up to re- quirements and that was occurring at a time when the training of the personnel was meeting with much greater difficulties. In addition, the average age of the men in the rescue service was rising rapidly. It is certain that from 1943 onwards the efficiency of the rescue par- ties was depreciating continuously. Efforts undoubtedly were made to keep training going, but it was not on a large scale. The only train- ing that some of the men had was in the school of experience. 7* The Fire-protection police (Feuerschutzpolizei), Before the war, officers were selected for the fire services from graduates of high schools, They were given a year's training, three months in each of three different towns, with a final period of three months at the national fire school at EBERSWAUDE. if they passed their final exam- ination they were given commissions in the fire service. They were choseniWith special regard to their physical fitness and were trained in the fire stations in which they were working. By a decree dated 23 November the fire-protection police force (Feuerschutzpolizei) was created. Approximately 9° of the larger German cities and towns were ordered to organize these forces and to transfer their regular fire-fighting services to them. In addition, the new fire police force took charge of the voluntary fire departments and assumed complete responsibility for their training. This was carried out locally, with the exception of leaders who might be sent to the nearest regional fire training school. o T o. The Women’s Service (Frauenschaft)„ his service was organized with a national woman leader (Reichsfrauenfuhrerin) at the head. The whole country was divided into regions (Gaue), the area corresponding to a Nazi party district, Ehch region was commanded by a regional woman leader (Gaufrauenschaftleiter imnd the lower organizations were headed by a county woman leader fereisfrauenschaftleiterin), a local women's leader (Zellenfrauenschaftleiterin) and a block women's leader (Blockfrauenschaftleiterin), was practically no selection of personnel and no training in this service. Ahy woman was eligible for the service which had a total estimated strength of 4»000,000. The 197 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. tasks carried out were those that required organization but little train- ing, such as cooking of food for homeless after raids, caring for child- ren and general welfare work. 736334 O—47 14 198 /INAL REPORT, G.D.D. XXVII. TRAINING OF GENERAL PUBLIC 1. policy. The birth of the idea of informing and training the public in in air-raid-protection measures took place many yea before the war began. As the plan developed, the policy of requiring the direct cooperation in the work of forming an aif-raid-protection service became well established, with a view of bringing home to the public its duties in regard to making provisions for its own defense against air attacks. 2. principal Agency. The principal agency concerned with the training of the general public was the National Air-Raid-Protection League (Reichsluftschutzbund) whose development, responsibilities and functions are discussed in Section III, paragraph 8a (?)* of this report. 3* Training Organization of the National Air-Baid-Protaction i&flgyg.* a. m order to carry out its mission of the people of GERMANY air-protection minded and of strengthening their will to resist air attack, the Lsague organized the training of the public and arranged for its instruction in air-raid-protection matters, both theoretical and practical, including fire fighting, gas protection, and first aid. b. The League likewise undertook all work in connection with the distribution, fitting, and sale of the civilian anti-gas respirator. c. league training schools were organized throughout GERMANY, At the head of them all, a national school was opened at WANSEE near BERLIN, Then came provincial schools (landesgruppenschulen) opened in every province, m the larger cities the air-raid-protection high schools (Luftschutzhaufctschulen) were opened. At the lowest level, came the air-raid-protection schools opened in every police precinct (Revier), xn 1939» the National Air-Raid-protection League had 28,000 trained teachers and operated air-raid-protection schools. 4. Func.tiQA8 of-the .Training Schools - The National School (Reichs- schule). The national school was opened at WANSEE for the purpose of training the higher officials of the National Air-Raid-Protection League, principals and instructors of the provincial schools (landes- gruppenschulen) and in some cases of the city high schools (Hauptschulen) received their training at this school. The premises occupied by the school at WANSEE were taken over by the National Air Ministry (Reichs- luftfahrt Ministerium) and the school was then transferred to JENA. 5. Provincial Schools (landesgruppenschulen), in every province a provincial school was opened. The main objective of these schools was to train instructors for the high schools opened in cities and for 199 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. the air-raid-protection schools opened in every police precinct (Revier), Courses lasted a week and covered all aspects of air-raid-protection measures, rescue, first aid, chemical warfare, and all measures for self-protection (Selbstschutz), schools have had an excellent reputation in GERMANY and there has been practically no criticism, either of their syllabus of instruction or of their formal organization and administration. 6. High Schools (Hauptschulen)• in the larger cities further arrangements had to be made for the training of instructors and of the wardens' service, as*the provincial schools were unable to deal with the large number requiring instruction, m these schools the instruct- ion frequently took place during the evenings. Full courses were held for the training of the house wardens (Hauswart) and block wardens (Block ?art) and these wardens were required to pass on the instruction they received to the small sections of the town for which they were responsible. Refresher ccurses wore not held at regular intervals, but whenever they were considered to be necessary. Instructors for the air- raid-protection schools in the police precincts (neviere) were also trained in these schools. The men who gave the instruction had been trained in the national school at WANSEE, or in one of the provincial schools• 7* Alr-Ra id-protect ion Schools (Luftschutzschulen), a. It was in these schools that instruction in air-raid-pro- tection measures reached the public. In every police precinct (Revier) an air-raid-protection school was opened, in some places the instruct- ion was carried out in the local police station, and in other places, educational schools were used for the purpose. This could be done as classes were held in the evenings, unless women only were concerned, in which case they sometimes took place in the daytime. b. It was made compulsory for the public to attend for so many hours each year, the number varying according to the vulnerability of the. area. The police were responsible for getting the public to the classes and each person carried a card on which were recorded the de- tails of his or her attendances, m the larger cities these classes were held on five nights in each week and refresher courses were held frequently. Any information in regard to new methods of dealing with old weapons, or instructions as to how to deal with new ones, was passed to the public through these schools, in addition to the instruct- ions given to every member of the public in the necessary measures to be taken for his own self-protection (Selbstschutz). 8, Self-protection (Selbstschutz), a. The whole object of the passing of information to, and he training of, the public in air-raid-protection matters, was to teach hem to take care of themselves. The term *self-protect ion* (Selbstschutz) 200 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. was used to express this meaning and a complete syllabus of instruction for the public was prepared, specifically designed to spread the work of dealing with air raids over as large a number of persons as possible. Every man and woman had to take the basic course of instruction which dealt with choice and preparation of shelter in every house, defense against chemical warfare, first aid, fire-fighting measures, and organ- ization of the local air-raid-protection system. b. The main objective of the program of the National Air-Raid- protection League was to spread this gospel of self-protection as widely as possible and to train the public in its duties. The intention was to reduce casualties from air attack and to make the public self-reliant and thereby ease the work that would necessarily fall on the air-raid- protection service. c. Women took an ever-increasing part in this work, frequently taking over the duties of house and block wardens. Their other duties were many and varied, especially in regard to the welfare of women and children. 9. Extended Self-protect ion (firweiterter Selbstschutz). The N&tional Air-Raid-protection League took over, whenever required to do so, the training of persons to carry out the duties of extended self- protection. 10. Siren (Die Sirene), To implement and coordinate its instruction the National Air-Raid-protection League published "The Siren* (Die Sirene), a fortnightly paper, containing nothing but articles on air-raid-protection matters of interest to the public. It was profusely illustrated with photographs and drawings. 201 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GLOSSARY OF GERMAN CIVILIAN DEFENSE TERMS GERMAN ENGLISH Abbefftrdern To evacuate (prisoners of war, wounded etc.) Abblendon To blackout (a room, etc.) to screen (a light) Abblendolicht Dim light Abgeblendet fahren To drive with dim lights Abreisebescheinigung permit to leave Abschubstelle Evacuation station or office Abaperrdienst Blocking off service (craters, unexplo- ded bombs etc.) Ab sperrtruppe Roping off squad (unesqploded bombs, damaged areas, etc.) Abteilung (Abt.) Battalion or detachment (in other connections it may be a division, department or service) Abwehr Defense; active Alarm Alarm; air raid warning Alarm aufheben To give the all clear Alarrabeleuchtung Restricted lighting in force during warning period. Alarmdienat Warning service Alarme inheiten Storm-Trooper units to summon mobile fire-fighting detachments. Alarmierer Warning operators Alarramittel Apparatus for sounding the alarm. 1 FINAL REPORT, GcD.D, GERMAN ENGLISH Alarmplatz Alarm - station Alarmposten • Alarm sentry Alarmstelle Alarm sirens (on housetops, etc.) Alarraunterkunft Quarters in which people are sheltered during a state of alarm. Alarmzustand Status or condition of alert Amt Bau 0«To War construction administration - Todt organization (later Speer) Amtsgruppe Ministry sub-section / Amtsgruppearbeitseinsatz Division for labour supply Amtstr&ger Office holder Angriff Attack Angriff (sturz) Dive bombing attack Angriff (Tiefflieger) Low level attack (Fighter-bontoer) Anhdnger Trailer Anleitung Instructionj training Ansetzen To launch or direct (alarm, all clear, attack, etc.) Auffanglager Temporary housing center for homeless Aufhellung Relaxation of black-out Aufhellungsgonehmigung Official exception permit to blackout regulations. Aufkl&ren To reconnoiter or observe AufklArer Observer, spotter Auflockerung partial evacuation AufnahmerSume Reception space (parks, open areas, etc.) 2 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D GERMAN ENGLISH Aufrduraetrupps (A. Trupps) Clearance and debris removal squads Ausbildungstrupp Instructional squad Ausfullungsgruppe Reinforcement or relief group Auslag©rung Dispersal of stocks from warehouses and stores Ausnahme Betriebe industries with permission to continue work during alarm. Auaquartierung Rehousing outside the original locality of the homeless. Ausr&ckbereiche Zone of military activity to be evacuated. Ausweichsbefehlstelle Command post (auxiliary) Ausweichsstolle Auxiliary post Bann Regiment (Hitler youth) BaubevulLj&chtigter Building controller Bau -und - Stortruppsabteilung public utility repair column Bauhilfstrupps (B. Trupps) Building repair units Baupolizei Building police Beauftragter des £>rt lichen Luftschutzleiters Deputy of 1>he local ARP chief Beauftragter f5r luftschutz- verdunkelungen beim Reichsminis- ter flir Rhstung und Kriegsproduktion• Deputy for blackouts in ministry for armament and war production. Beendung des Alarms End of alert Befehlshaber der Ordnungs- polizei Commander of the regular or order police. Befehlsstello Comnand post Behe If salami improvised a lam signal Bann FINAL REPORT, G.D.D GERMAN ENGLISH B eheIfsalarmgerate improvised alarm apparatus Behelfsmassig Improvised Behelfsmfissige Kraftfahr- sirenen Improvised sireis mounted on motor vehicles Behfirdlichter Luftschutz Air raid protection organization for government offices, etc. Beobachter Observer or spotter Beobachtung Observation Beobachtungsbereich Zone of observation Beobachtungsdienst Observer service Beoba cht ungspost en Observation post Beobachtungsstand Observer post Beobachtungsstelle Observation post Bereitschaft preparedness Bereitschaftsdienst (B.D.) Emergency or readiness service Bere it schaft sgra de The degree of preparedness Bore i t scha f t sgruppe Reserve & reinforcement group Bereitschaftskrflfte Emergency replacements Bergekommando Salvage unit for rescue of trapped persons Bergen To delve; to salvage (material); to re- cover; rescue (wounded) Bergung Delving; rescue Bergungskolonne Salvage or rescue unit Bergungsmassnahmen Salvage or rescue measures Bergungstrupp Rescue squad Berufsfeuerwehren professional fire units 4 FINAL REPORT. C.D.D GERMAN ENGLISH Bescheinigung Certificate or receipt Betreuungs - bereich The territory administered. Betreuungsstelle Care and welfare station Betriebsluftschutzleiter Air raid protection leader in a small factory, office or business undertaking. Blindganger Dud; unexploded bomb or shell Blitzlichtbomben Flashbombs Blockbrand Fire of an entire block or large area Blockwart Head warden of a "block* (approx. 7 to 10 houses) BOmbensicher Bomb-proof Brandabschnitt Fire sector B ra ndbe kampf ung Fire-fighting Brandbombe incendiary bomb Brandbombemeldeanlagen incendiary bomb indicator, reports roof fires to those below in cellar shelters. Bra ndb ombenme 1 dege rfi t incendiary bomb -indicator, reports roof fires to those below in cellar shelters. Brandempfindli chke it Fire vulnerability Brandflaschen Incendiary bottles ("Molotov cocktails") Brandkanistar incendiary container Brandmauer Fire wall Brandmauerdurchbruch Breach in a fire wall (usually in cellar) to permit emergency exit. BrandplAttchen incendiary discs (phosphorus on celluloid) Brands&ck© Incendiary bags 5 FINAL REPORT. C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Brandschutz Fire protection Brandwache Fire guard B ra ndwa chenbe re i ch Area to be covered by the fire guards BCirgerraeister Municipal official (mayor) Bund deutsche Madel (B'.d.M.) Girl's section of Hitler youth organiza- tion (age 14-21) Bunker Shelter (above ground) Chef der Ordnungspolizei Chief of the regular or order police Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes Chief of security police & security service. Deckung Cover; protection; shelter Deckungsgraben Trench Deutsche Arbeitsfront (D.A.) German labor front (nat'l worker's union) Deutsche jungmldel l Girl's section of Hitler youth organization (age 10-14) Deutsches Rote KTeuz (D.R.K*) German National Red Cross •Die Sirene* A fortnightly ARP illustrated magazine wired radio Druckkupplung Fire hose coupling Druckschlauche Fire hose Durchffihrordnungen Executive orders Einberufung Simmons to duty Eingreifkommando (der Feuer- schutzpolizei Motorized fire brigade units Einleiten To prepare; to institute; to launch (an attack) 6 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Einsatzgeraeinschaft Action unit. Usually formed from teams of technical emergency services in a given locality and employed at major in- cidents. Einsatzgruppe Stand-by or preparedness group Einsatzkrafte Available personnel Einsatzstabe Tactical definition for units to be employed Einstellen To suspend or terminate Einsturz Collapse Einsturzgefahr Danger of collapse Einteilung Division or organization (of duties) Entgi ft ungsparke Decontamination parks Bntwamung All clear Entwa rnungss i gna1 "All clear" signal Erdbunker Dugout earthen shelter Erfahrungstrupps Expert units representing the production Command (Rustungskoramando) used to super- vise armament firms) Erg&nzungs - und mstand- setzungsdlenst Repair service Brkundigungsdienst Reconnaissance service Erkundigungsstreife Reconnaisance patrols Ern&hrungsarat Food office, providing assistance to victims of catastrophies. Erste Hilfe First aid Erste Hilfestelle First-aid post Erwelterte Kinderlandsver- schickung (extended K.L.V.) Extended child evacuation scheme FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Erweiterter Selb*stschutz (ESS) Air raid protection scheme for small businesses, factories, and institutions# 'Fachgruppe Special technical squads Farbtarnung Camouflage through painting Fe1dgendarmerie Military police Fernlicht "Bright" beam of headlamp Feuerloschbereitschaft Fire fighting unit Feuerloschdienst Fire fighting service FeuerlSscher Fire extinguisher Feuerl&schtruppen Fire fighters Feuerlo schverban d Fire fighting association Feuerlftsch - und Ausbildungs - Abteilungen peuerlftsch - und Entgiftungs - bereitschaften Fire fighting and training battalions Fire fighting and decontamination units Feuermelder Fire alarm box Feuermeldestelle Fire alarm box location Feuerpatsche Fire beater (made of rags or twigs) Feuerschutz Fire protection FeuerschutzmltteIbehandlung Fire-retardant coating for inflammable materials# Feuerschutzpolizei peacetime municipal fire brigade or fire fighting forces. Feuerschutzpolizei Abschnitts- koramando A fire department command corresponding to the division in the ordinary police organization. Feuerschutzpolizei Abteilungen (MOT) Motorized fire battalions 8 FINAL REPORT, CcDoD. GERMAN ENGLISH Feuerschutzpolizei Konrnando Fire protection police command Feuersturm •Fire storm”# a gale produced by area conflagrations Feuer - und - -Entgiftungs- bereitschaft der luftschutz Polizei (Fo-UoEoBer0) Fire and decontamination column of the air raid protection police Feuerwart Fire warden Feuerwehr Fire brigade5 generic term for fire services. Feuerwehrbereitschaften inter-communal fire brigades Feue rwehren Fire brigades Feuerwehrfuhrer Ihief of fire brigade Feuerwehrschar (HJ) Hitler youth fire-fighting platoon Feuerwehr und Bergungstrupps Fire brigade and rescue squads Feuerwerker Bomb de-fuser Fllchenbrand Fire of several blocks (or city parts) Flaramstrahlbombe Incendiary bombs (flame throwers) « Fliegende Einsatzstabe Commands representing the nat’l, minister for war production (lit0« "fiying labor staffs”) Fliegeralarm Air raid warning Fliegeralarm. passierschein pass to permit activity during air raid F1iegerangriff Air attack Fliegerbe s cha digte Air raid victims Fli ege rbe s chS. digt en label on kitchen utensils and furniture set aside for those who lose these scarce goods in the raid. Fliegerei Colloquial for Luftwaffe„ and flying 9 FINAL REPORT, CcD.D GERMAN ENGLISH Fliegerwannungsdienst See Luftschutzwarndienst Flis s i gke i t sbran db ombe n Incendiary bombs (liquid) Flugmeldedienst Aircraft warning reporting service FlugmeIdekompani© Aircraft warning company Flugmeldenetz Observer corps network Flugme1de re se rvekompanie Reserve air observation unit of the air- craft reporting (observer) service Flugwachen Observation stations or observers Flugwa chkommando Hq. of observer corps Flugzeug Abwehr Kannone (flak) Anti-aircraft cannon Freigabebescheiningung Employment release for prospective evacuees Freiwillige Feuerwehr Voluntary (i.e. part-time) firemen in small towns and rural areas Freiwilliger Volunteer Freya Code name for radar detector Formtarnung Camouflage through netting or construction F&irung der Luftwaffe Command of the air force Gasabwehrdienst Gas defense service Gau Administrative unit or district Gaueinsatzstab District organization staff Gaugebiet District territory or area Gauleiter District leader Geb&udebrand Fire of a whole building Gabeit Districtj areaj zone; or department Gefalien© persons killed due to enemy action 10 FINtL REPORT. C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Geneime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) Secret state police Gemeindegruppen Group of small communities Gendarmerie (Gend.) Rural police General Bevollralchtigter fftr die Regelung der Bauwirt- sehaft plenipotentiary for the regulation of the building industry. Gene raldlrektor der deutschen Reichsbahn Lfcnaging director of the German Natiora 1 Rai Iways General - Inspekteur der Feuerschutzpolizei und Feuer- wehren Inspector general of the fire protection police and fire brigades Geschdtze Guns Gliederung Organization or membership Grossanlagen large warning systems Grossnotstand Extreme emergency circumstances (after air raids# etc») Gros s scha de ns t e He An area of extensive damage Gruppe Squad or group Gruppe (Bezirks) County or regional group Gruppe (Gemeinde) parish group Gruppe (landes) provincial group Gruppe (Orts) Borough group Gruppe (Ortskreis) Rural district Gruppe (Revier) Ward group Gruppe (unter) Sub-group Gruppenwache Operational unit of 12-15 fire fighters to man pumps 11 FINAL REPORTo C.DoDo GERMAN ENGLISH Handdruckspritze Manually operated pump Handfeuerl&scher Hand fire extinguisher Handspritz Stirrup pump Hauptamt f&r Volkswohlfahrt Main office for national welfare Hauptbra ndbekdnrpf ungslinie Main fire fighting line Haupttruppmann A senior NCO in the fire protection police Hausfeuerwehr House fire party Haptfeuerwa che Main fire guard Hauptverbandplatz Main dressing station (med.) Hauptwarnung Main warning sounded on sirens Hauslandluftschutzgemeinschaft A house party of the rural air protection fellowship. Hauswart House warden Havarie « Abteilungen Damage battalions (harbor) Havarie Bereitschaften Damage preparedness units (harbor) Heimatfla k Civil anti-aircraft defense Heranziehen To draft or muster Heult on Warbling note HiIfspoilzei Auxiliary police HiIfsatelie Aid post Hilfstruppen Auxiliary squads Hitler jugend (H»Jo) Hitler Youth movement Ho Jo Feuerwehrscharen Fire fighting platoon of the Hitler youth Hoch - Bunker Concrete shelter (above ground) Hofunterweisung Training in self protection in rural areas 12 FINAL REPORT, CeD»D„ GERMAN ENGLISH Hohere Lifts chut zstlibe Higher air raid protection staffs Instandsetzungsabte ilungen Repair units (battalions) Instandsetzungbereitschaften Repair preparedness units Instandsetzungsdienst Repair and rescue service instandsetzungsparke Rehabilitation parks Karaeradschaft (H0J0) Litg "coir radship* squad (Hitler Youth) approximately 16 youths - a subdivision of the firefighting platoon (Feuerwehr- schar of the Hitler Youth), Karapfstoffschadenstelle Location affected by the employment of gas Kartel Karte File index card Kellerwart Cellar warden Kinderlandverschickung (KLY) Child evacuation scheme Kleinbrand Small fire Konmando der Schutzpollzel (Kdo0 do Scho) High command of the protection police Kommandostelle Headquarters Kontrollg&nge patrol beats Kraftfahrsirenen Sirens mounted on motor vehicles Kraftspritze Motor pump Krankenkraftwagep Motor ambulance Krankenkraftwagen - Kolonne Motor ambulance column Kra nkenkraf twagenzug Motor ambulance section Krankentransport - Abteilung Ambulance unit Kreis (Litog * circle*), rural communal district; area; region; county* Kreisleiter Local or district party-leader 736334 0—47 15 FINAL REPORT, G.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Kriegsschldenamt War damage office; reparation settlements Kriminalpolizei (K^IPO) Criminal police LagerfAhrer Director at camps for children Lagermannschaftsfuhrer Councellors at Hitler Youth for children between 10-14 years. lagerplane Sketches, plans Laienhalferinnen Nurse's aids landluftschutzgemeinschaft Rural air protection fellowship Landluftschutzleiter Chief of a rural air raid protection unit landrat District mayor langzeitzunderbomben Delayed Action bombs Leichtbeschddigt Lightly damaged Leichte Loschgruppe (Mot.) Motorized light fire fighting group Leichtverwundete persons with minor injuries Letter der Sofortmassnahmen (L.D.S.) leader of emergency services leuchtbomben (einf&rbig) Flares, single color Leuchtbomben (mehrf&rbig) Flares, multi-colored Lichttechnische Verdunklung Reduce candlepower by means of voltage and current reductions or smaller bulb sizes Loach Anh&nger Fire engine trailer L&schbomben Extinction bombs - used by the army for demolitions Loschkarren Fire cart, manually operated ii Los chkraftwage n Fire engine Loschmittel Fire extinguishing material 14 final report, c.d.d. GERMAN ENGLISH I^schtruppe Fire fighting squad lischwasser Water for fire fighting LSschwasserentnahmestelle Supplementary water supply point LSs chwa sse rve rs orgung Water supply for fire fighting • Loschzug Extinction (i.e, fire fighting) section of a column or company Lotsenatelie pilot station (guide post) at city peri- phery iMftabteilungsstabe z.v.B (zur besonderen Verwendung) Air protection units for special use Luftabwehr Air defense (active) Luftangriff • Air raid Luftangriffsschaden Damage caused by air attack Luften^findlichkeit Vulnerability to air attack Luftgau Air force district luftgefahr Signal denoting impending attack Luftgefahrdung Air raid danger Luftgefahr mit Zeitangabe Warning with the indication of how long it will be before the attack may begin luftgefahr vorboi All clear Luftgefahr vorbei, aber gespannte Luftlage Signal indicating al 1 clear, but repeti- tion of attack possible Luftkreis Air force area (Subdivision of luftgau) Luftkriegseinsatz Employment of all air raid protection services LuftlagemeIdung Announcement of enemy movement in the ai r Luftmeldedienst Aircraft reporting service 15 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Luftschutz Air Raid protection (passive); civil defense Luftschutzabschnitt Air raid protection adninistration dis- trict of the police Luftschutzabteilungen (Mot •) Motorized air raid protection battalion Luf t schut zbefehlsste He Command post of an air raid protection unit Luft schutzbere its chaft permanent air raid protection personnel Luftschutzbereitschaft dienst Air raid protection service Liftschutzbund Air raid protection league Luftschutz Bunker Air raid protection concrete shelter mftschutzbunderverwalter Air mid protection shelter Luftschutz Bunkerwachgruppe Air raid protection shelter (outside) guards luftschutz Bunkerwart Air raid protection shelter warden luftschutzdecke protective roofing or covering Luf ts chut z de ckungsgrab en Air raid protection slit trench Luftschutzdienst Air raid protection service Luftschutzdienst der Wehr- maoht und der Hibringen besonderen Verwaltungen Air raid protection service of the Army and other special administrations Luf t schut z di e nst st elie local ai r raid protection headquarters Luftschutz Ersatzabteilung Air raid protection training unit for Air Force Luftschutz Fachdienst Skilled air raid protection services Lu ftschutzgesetz law of air raid protection league of 26th June, 1935* plus executive decrees Luftschutzgemeinschaft Air raid protection community of several houses 16 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Luftschutzger&testelle der Luftwaffe Warehouse of air raid protection equip- ment of the air force Luftschutzger&te Air raid protection equipment Luftschutzgruppe (in large cities like Berlin or Hamburg) Air raid protection group of the police Luf t s chu t zha uswart Air raid protection house warden luftschutz Havaried!enst Air raid protection ship salvage ser- vices lu ft s chut zheIfer Member of the air raid protection organi- zation trained in first aid luftschutzkeller Air raid protection cellar; shelter luftschutz Kleinverdunkelungs- vorri ch tungen Small air raid protection black-out installations luftsohutzkompanien zur Bedie- nung von Scheinanlagen Air raid protection companies for the manning of searchlight batteries Luftschutzleiter Air raid protection leader Luftschutz Lotsen Air raid protection guides or pilots Luftschutz- Lotsendienst Air raid protection guide service Luftschutz Lotsenstelle Air raid protection guide post or pilot stat ion Luftschutzmlssiges Benehmen Correct air-raid protection behavior Luft schutzmassnahmen General air raid protection measures Luftschutzmassnahmen f&r Tiere Air raid protection measures for animals Luf t s chut zmerkblatt Air raid protection leaflet or pamphlet of instructions Luftschutzobmann (plural - luftschutzleute) V Air raid protection person in charge Luftschutzort A town or other air raid protection local area 17 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Luftschutzpolizei Air raid protection police Luftschutzraum Air raid protection shelter Luftschutz Raumanlage Several connection air raid protection shelters with gas-chairibers luftschutzrettungsstolle Air raid protection first aid station luftschutzrevier Air raid protection district; same bounda- ries as police revior luft s chutz-Rundbau Air raid protection circular shelter (above ground) Luftschutz Sachbearbeiter Specialist in air raid protection matters u Luftschutzsanitats Bereit- schaften Air raid protection first aid units luft schut zsanit&tsdienst Air raid protection medical and first aid service Luftschutz Sanit&tsraittellager Air raid protection evacuation hospital t luftschutz SanitAtsstellen Air raid protection first aid stations luftschutz Schadenmeldungen Air raid protection reports on damage caused by air attack. luftschutzschule Air raid protection school luftschutzstollen Air raid protection shelter, underground tunnel luftschutz Tierrettungsstellen Air raid protection veterinary first aid stations luftschutz Tiersarnael - Lazarette Air raid protection veterinary collecting hospitals luftschutz Trupp der Luftwaffe Air raid protection unit of the Air Force luftschutz unterkunft Air raid protection shelter for personnel and material 18 FINAL REPORT, CoD0D« ENGLISH luftschutzverbondkasten Air raid protection first aid kit Liftschutzverkehrsgesetz Air raid protection traffic law LuftschutzveterinArdlenst Air raid protection veterinary first aid service Luftschutz VeterinSrmittellager Air raid protection veterinary evacuation hospitals luftschutzwacht Air raid protection ground observer; air sentinel Luftschutzwarndienst Air raid protection warning service liif t s ch ut zwa rnkomma ndo Air raid protection warning command Luftschutz Warnstellen Air raid protection warning station Luftschutzwarnzentrale Air raid protection warning center Luftschutzwart Airraid protection warden luftschutzzentrale Air raid protection central control post Luftspaher Aircraft spotters distributed throughout an area Luftwaffe German Air Force Luftwaffenf lak Air forces anti-aircraft artillery Mehrzwecke Boniben Multi-purpose bombs Meldekopf _ Message center Melderose A graduated hearing aid Ms Ide samrae Ids te lie Report center; signal center Meldestelle Local reporting office Minenbomben Aerial mines Motorstaffeln ) Divisions or groups of the NSKKo National MOtorstandarte ) socialist motor corps Motorst&rme ) 19 FML REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Nachbarliche Hilfe Neighbourly help; units to help in neigh- bouring communities Nachrichtensammelstelle Information center Nationalsocialistische deutsch Arbeitorpartei (NSDAP) Nazi party; National-Socialist German Labor party National socialistische Frauen- schaft N.S.F. National socialist woman’s organizations, active in welfare and in air raid protec- tion and relief. Nationalsocialistischer Kraftfahr-Korps (NS^K) National socialist motor corps Nationalsocialistischer Lehrer Bund (NSIB) National socialist teacher’s league Nationalsocialistische Volkswohlfahrt (N*S.V.) National socialist people's welfare organi zation. Organization of the Nazi party with jurisdiction over all public welfare organizations and functions. Naturtarnung Natural camouflage Nebelabteilungen imd Nebel- companien Smoke screen battalions and companies Nebelwerfer Smoke laying apparatus Notbelegschaft Skeleton working crew Notdienstpflichtige persons required to serve in an emergency at the Home Front Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe- Commander-in-chief of the Air Force Oberburgermeister Senior fjayor (in large cities) ftffentlicher Bunker public shelter of concrete ftffentliche Luftwarnung preliminary air raid warning (warning of danger, but not imminent) &ffentlicher Luftschutzraum Public air raid protection shelter 20 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH • „ Offentliche Samuelschutzraurae public shelter intended for use of persons in the streets who cannot reach home. Ordnungspolizei (OHPO) Regular or Order police, air raid protection, traffic, aliens. Ordnungs-und Absperrtrupps Squads used to police and rope off an area Organization Todt Todt, organization; war time building and con stmction Ort Locality, village Ortlicher Luftschutzleiter Local air raid protection leader Ortsgruppen Local groups Ort skre1sgrupp en Rural district groups Ortsluftschutzleiter Local air raid protection leader, usually the local police chief. Ortspolizeibehorden Local police authorities Ortpolizeiverwalter Local police administrator pflichtefeuerweheren Compulsory fire brigade phosphorbran db omben Incendiary bombs (phosphorus) Phys ika li scht e chni s che Reichsanstalt An organization equivalent to Munder- writer's laboratories"; stamp appears on electrical equipment, etc. polizoi police polizeidirektor police chief poli ze ipr&si dent police president; sometimes Bilrgermeister (mayor) polizeireservisten police reserves poli ze iverwaltung police administration polizeivollzugsbeamte police executive officials 21 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Q,uartieramt (QA) Billeting office Raumordner Shelter usher or guide N Rauraung Evacuation R&umungsdienst Clearance or clearing service Reich Nation (country) Reichsamt technischo Nothilfe National office for technical help in emergencies. See Technische Nothilfe, of which it is the central office. Reichsanstalt der Luftwaffe) fftr Luftschutz National Air Force Institute for Air raid protection Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) National Labor Service Roichsarbeitsminister National Minister of labor Reichsarbeitsministerium National Ministry of labot Reichsarchiven National archives Reichsbahn National railways Re i chsbahndi re kt i on National management of railroads Reichsfinanzminister National minister of finance Reichsfuhrer der Schutz Staffed (SS) und Chef der deutschen polizei Leader of the protection Staff (SS) and chief of the German police Re i c hsgo sundthe it samt National health office on Ministry of interior Relchsfursorge und Versor- gungsgesetz National welfare and social law Reichsgruppe Industrie National council for industry Reichskanzlei National Chancellery Re i chskr i egss cha denarat National war damage office 22 FINAL REPORT, C.D*D GERMAN ENGLISH Reichskriminal polizei (kRIPO) National Criminal police Reichsleiter A National Director Reichsluftschutzbund (R.L.B.) National air raid protection league Reichsluftschutzbund Bezirks- gruppen District groups or gau groups of the Aif protection League Reichsluftschutzbund Gamaindo- gruppen Conmunity groups (local) of the Air protection League Ra i ch s luft schut zbun d Reviergruppen police district groups of the Air protec- tion league Re ichslufts chutzbund unte r- gruppen Sub-units of local groups of the Air pro- tection League Re ichsminl star National minister Reichsminister dor luftfahrt National minister of air transport Raichsministar das mneran Minister of the interior Reichsministarialblatt dor inneren Verwaltung National administrative publication of the Ministry of the Interior Reichsministarium National ministry Raichspost National post Office and communications system Raichaverkohrministor National minister of transportation Rai chsverte idigungsbezirk National defense district Re i chsvert aidigungskommi s sar National Commissioner for defense Rai chswohnungskanmi ssar National housing commissioner Rettungsarbeit Rescue work Rettungskrafte Rescue personnel 23 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D, GERMAN ENGLISH Rettungsmassnahmen Rescue measures Rettungastelle First aid post Rettungsstellen (Gruppen) First aid posts (sections) Ret tungss te11engruppe First aid personnel at aid station Rettungswege Fire exits (paths) Revier An area corresponding approx, to a police precinct. Reviergruppe District group, sub-division; group; war- den group. Ruhrstab Speer Speer staff representatives in the Ruhr area Rimdbau Circular concrete shelter Rustungs inspektion Armament inspection Saraariterdienst "Samaritan service"; first aid service Samraelschutzraum Collecting protection room; shelter n Sarame Istelle fur Gefallene Collecting point for the killed Saramelstelle fur Verwundete Collecting point for wounded Samme Iwa sserversorgung Water supply for general use Sani tat sbere it schaft Msdical, first aid, and ambulance column Sanitatsdienst Medical first aid and ambulance service Sanitatskraftwagen Medical motor ambulance Sanitatstruppen Medical first aid squads Sanit&tswagen First aid van (ambulance) Schadensgebiet Area of damage Schadensstelle Location of damage 24 final report, c.d.d. GERMAN ENGLISH Schadensstellenffthrer Incident officers appointed from among police officers Schlaunchtruppraann Fireman (hose squad) Schnellkommand os Motorized emergency units; fast moving units used for fire and damage Schnell - L&schtruppe Emergency fire brigade Schutz Defense; protection Schutzpolizei (Schuppo; Sch.)Regular or protection police Schutzpolizeibereitschaft Company of town constabulary Schutzraum Air raid shelter Schutzraumordner Shelter usher or guide Schutz Staffel (S.S.) Protection squad (Hitler's personal body- guard) (Himmler's Black Guards) 3S. Katastrophen St&rme Emergency company of SS police SS Industrieschutzraann- schaften Industrial safety crews of 3.3. formations SchwerbeschUd igt Heavily damaged Schwere L^schgruppe Motorized heavy fire fighting group Schwerverwundete Persons with serious injuries Selbstschutz Self protection; self defense; air raid protection for homes and individuals Selbstschutzbereich Area of several air raid protection commu- nities under one leader - t Selbstschutzbereitschaft Self-protection company Selbstschutzdienst Self-Protection Service (fireguards, house and block wardens) Selbstschutztrupp Fire fighting unit of an air raid protec- tion community 25 FIM REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Selbstschutzzug A unit of the self protection service operating within a «cell" of the Nazi Party Sicherheitsbeleuchtung Security lighting (dim- or black-out) Sicherheitsdionst (S.D.) Security service Sicherheits- and Hilfsdienst Security and assistance service Signalswurfmunition Aerial-signal ammunition Sirene Siren; klaxon (also name of National Air raid protection League publication) Sirenenfernsteuerung Electric gadget, which will start all sirens in one area simultaneously Sofortmassnahmon Emergency measures Splitterboraben Fragmentation bombs Splittorschutz Protection from splinters aprengbomben E&plosive bombs Gprengkommandos dar Luftwaffe Air force bomb de-fusing *ad disposal units staatUcb (adj) State Stabbrandbomben Incendiary bombs (thermite) Stddtlicb (adj) Oity atahlbluseben Industrial "keyman" shelter Standrohr Standpipe (hydrant) statistisoboa Reichsamt National statistical office Stauwaasor Static water; dammed up water Stackstoff lost Nitrogen mustard Stollan Gallery obolter (underground) Stroifendienst dor Hitler Jugend Patrol service of the Hitler Youth 26 26 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Sturm Abteilung (SA) Storm trooper detachment or the police of Nazi Party Tarnung Camouflage Technische Hi If spolizeien Technical auxiliary police Technische Nothilfe (T.N.) Technical emergency service Technisches Amt Technical office Todt Organization (OT) See Amt Bau 0*T. Tragspritze Portable pump TrWner Debris; ruins Truppenverbandplatz First aid stations (improvised) Unabh&ngige iSschwasser- v.ersorgung Independent water supply for fire fighting (farm brooks, rivers, lakes, etc.) Verdunkelung Darkening; black out. Verdu nklungs er1e i cht erung Official exception permit to black-out regulations verdunklungserleichterung zugelassen Black-out facilities in effect Vermisste Persons missing Versch&ttete Persons buried under debris Verschfittung Burial due to collapse of building Verwaltungspolizei (Verw.P.) Administrative police Verterinkr Polizei Veterinary police Vor en t wa rnung Pre-all clear signal Wachbezirke Observation or watch areas Warngebiet Area covered by the airraid protection warning service Verdunklungserleichterung aufgehoben Cancellation of black-dut facilities 27 27 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN ENGLISH Warnwache Warning guards or watches Warnzentrale Air raid warning center Wassergasse Fire exit, created by means of water streams Wehrkreis Military district of the type formerly designated in the U.S. as "corps area «; defense command Wehrkreisbeauftragter Military district deputy Wehrmacht Armed forces . / Wehrma ch t s h i If skommando Army units to be called in case of exten- sive damage Werkalarm Alarm in industrial places Werkfeuerwehren Fire fighting forces composed of factory workers Werkfdhrer leader of the factory Werkluftschutz Works, industry, or factory air raid pro- tection Werkluftschutz Bereichsstellen District agency for factory air raid pro- tection Werkluftschutzbezirksstelien District agency for,factory air raid pro- tection Werkluftschutzdienst Works (factory) air raid protection ser- vice, responsible for large factories, commercial, and industrial undertakings. Werkluftschutz Ortsstellen Local agency for factory air raid protec- tion Werkluftschutzpolizei Factory air raid protection police Werkluftschutz Zentralstelle National agency for industrial air raid protection 'A’arnbefehl Order initiating warning measures FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. GERMAN musn Winkel Tower shelter Wirtschaf tsamt ♦ Economic or finance office providing assis- tance to air raid victims. Zelle A cell; several tenement blocks Zerstftrt Destroyed Zug Section (10 - 20) in Fire Service Zugwache Unit of 8 - 12 fire fighters to man pumps. 736334 0—47 16 29 FBI REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS a. - from) out of (aus); on (an; am) A* - accepted (on bills of exchange) (akzeptiert) A.A. - Secretary of State (Auswtrtiges Amt) a«a*0* - in the before mentioned place (amangeffihrten Ort) A*B. - Regulations of carrying out (Ausftthrungsbestimmungen) Abb. - illustration (Abbildung) ABC Staaten - Argentine; Brazil; Chile Abf• - departure . (Abfahrt) Abg. - member of Parliament (Abgeordnete(r)) Abh. - treatise (Abhandlung) Abk# - abbreviation (Abktrzung) Abs. - paragraph or sender (Absatz' Oder Absender) Abschn* - paragraph or chapter (Abschnitt) a.c. - (of) this year (laufendes Jahr) A*Ch. - before Christ; B.C* (vor Christi) A*D« - in the year of the Lord a.D* - retired; on half pay (ausser Dienst) a.d. - on the (an der) (before names of rivers) a.d. - from (this) date A.D*A.C* - General German Automobile Club (Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil Club) ALGB - Federation of German Free Trade Unions (Allg.Deutscher Gewerksch.Bd.) A.E.G* - General Electric Company (Allgemeine ElektrizitAtsge- sellschaft) a.G« - mutual (auf Gegenseitigkeit) FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS Ag. - silver (chem.) (Silber) A*G. - me. (Aktiengesellschaft) Agfa - German photographic and analine company A.H. - former member of a (students) club ahd. - Old High German (althochdeutsch) allg. - general ( allgemein) Angekl. - the accused, (Angeklagte(r)) Anh. - appendix (Anhang) Ank. - arrival (Ankfunt) Anm. - note (Anmerkung) Anzb - advertisement or advertiser (Anzeigen(r)) A.0« - Order (Anordnung) a.o.P. - assistant professor, university lecturer (ausserordentl* Professor) Art. - article (Artikel) a.St. - old style (alten Stils) Asts - General Student Conmittee (Allgem. Studenten Ausschuss) A.T* - Old Testament at.(Atm.) - atmosphere (Phys. ) Au. - gold (chem.) Aufl. - edition (Auflage) Aussp. - pronunciation (Aussprache) A.V* - General Decree (Allgemeine Verfuegung) AVU - Incapability of working (Arbeitsverwendungsunffehig- keit 2 FINAL HiUPQttT, G.L.Do ABBREVIATIONS AVU-Rente - Allowance in case of incapability of working a*Z. - on credit; on account (auf Zeit) b* - at; with; by; near - b - final, as the second part of a word, stands fort 1* -bau e.g. Bergb* - mining (Bergbau) a. -ber e*g* Ffirb. - dyer (Fairber) B* - bills; papers ( in opposition to G money (Geld) B* - example; z.B* - for instance (zum Beispiel) BA* - share (Bankakti^) Bayr. - Bavarian (Bayrisch) Boh. - book (Buch)' Bd* - volume (Band); Bde* - volumes (Bftnde) BDA - Association of German Architects (Bund Deutscher Architekten) BdM* - Hitlerite Girls Organzation (Bund deutscher Madel) Bdtg. - meaning Bearb* - adaptor or version (Bearbeiter(ung)) Bed* - signifies (bedeutet) Beibl* - supplement (Beiblatt) Beif* - (sent) herewith (beifolgend) Beil. - enclosed (beiligend) Bern* - note; comment; observation (Bemerkung) Ber* - report (Bericht) bee. - especially (besoriders) best* * destined (bestiamt) betr* - concerning (betreffend) 3 FINAL REPORT. C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS bev. - authorized; plenipotentiary (bevollnAchtigt) bez. - paid; with reference to (bezahlt; bezftglich) Bez. - district (Bezirk) Bf* - bills (Brief) (in opposition to money) Bg« - sheet (Bogen) BOB - civil code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch) Bi* - bismuth (chem») (Wismut) bibl. - biblical (biblisch) bildl* - figuratively; metaphorically (bildlich) bisw* - sometimes; occasionally (bisweilen) Bl. - paper (Blatt) B«P* - fast passenger train (Beschleunigter Personenzug) Br0 - brother (Bruder; latitude (Breite); br* - wide (breit); stitched (broschiert); gross weight (brutto)o B*RoT* - gross register tons (Brutto Register Tonnen) Bugra - Annual Exhibition of Printing and Graphic Arts (Buchgewerbe u» Graphlk) V bezw. - respectively; or (beziehungsweise) C* - carbon (chem<.) Kohlenstoff ca. - about (circa) cand.phil. - Student of Philosophy before his final examination Chr« - Christ; chronicle (Christus; Chronik) cbm. - cubic meter (Kubikmeter) 4 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS ccm. - cubic centimeter (Kubikzentimeter) cm. • centimeter (Zentimeter) crt. - current c. - 15 minutes later D* - Germany d. - the elder; senior (der Altere) das. - in the same place (daselbst) DAZ. - newspaper. "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" DB - Regulation of procedure (Durchfdhrungsbestininungen) DBG - law for German Officials (Deutsches Beamtengesetz) d.d. - dated; from the date Delag. - German Electricity Company d.G# - by favour (of) (durch Ghte) d.h. - that is; viz (das heisst) dgl. - similarly (dergleichen); u.dgl. - and so etc. (und dergleichen) d.Gr. - the Great (der Grosse) d.i. - that is (das ist) Din. - Direction of German Industries (Deutsche Industrie Normen) Dipl. Ing. - engineer with diploma (Diplomingenieur) Dipl* Kfm. - person with diploma in conmerce (Diplomkaufmann) d.J. - of this year (dieses Jahr); the younger; junior (der Jtlngere) D.J. - German Administration of law (Deutsche Justiz) DJH * German Youth Hojtel (Deutsche Jugendherberge) FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS DJZ - Official Paper for German Lawyers (Deutsche Juristen Zeitung) d®M. - of this month (dieser Monat) D*N«B. - German News Agency (Deutsches Nachrichtcnbflro) d«0* - the above mentioned (der Obigc) do» - the same DO X - German flying boat (of Dornier works) (Dornier I’lug- schiff) DR - German Law (Edition A) (Deutsches Recht, Ausgabe A) DV - German Administration (Deutsche Verweltung) d*Vf« - the author (der Verfasser) DVO - Regulation of Procedure (Durchftihrungsverordnung) D«Wbo - German Dictionary DrWagen - corridor-carriage (Durchgangswagen) / dz® - 100 kilogrammes (Doppelzentner) dz® - at present; then (derzeit) D*Zug - through (corridor) - train (Durchgangszug) ea. - (to) each other (einander) ebdo - in the same place (ebendaselbst) eod® - published by E«G®M*B.H* registered company with limited liability (Eingetragene Genossenschaft mit beschrlinkter Haftpflicht e®ho - honorary (of degree) (ehrenhalber) Ehape - chain-stores (Einheicspreisgeschafte) eidg® - Tederal (swiss) (eidgenftssisch) eigtl® - properly; really (eigentlich) 6 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS Einl» - introduction (Einleitung) einschl. - including (einschliesslioh) Einz. - singular (Einzahl) einz. - separate; single (einzeln) E»K« - iron cross (Eisemes Kreuz) em. - retired » engl« - English Entschl. - resolution (Entschluss) entspr. - corresponding (entsprechend) entw, - either (or) (entweder (oder)) Erdg* - basement (Erdgeschoss); history of the earth (Erdgeschichte) erg. - supply; add (ergAnze) Erl» - explanation (ErlAuterung) Erl*, - Edict (Erlass) EtynuWb# - etymolo'gical dictionary E.V. - incorporated (Eingetragener Verein) eVo*Luth. - Lutheran evtl* - perhaps* possible (eventuell) Ew. - your (Eure) EWFZG - law of Welfare and Maintenance exklo - except; not included Expl« - copy (Exemplar) Exz. - Excellency (Exzellenz) 7 FINAL REPORT. C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS ErZug - fast passenger train (Eilzug) f* - for (f*r)5 following page (folgende Seite) F* - telephone (Fernsprecher) F - Fahrenheit (Farad) FAD - Voluntary labor Service (Freiwilliger Arbeitsdienst) FDsZug - long-distance corridor-train (FernrD Zug) Fe* . - iron (chem) Feka - long-range artillery (Fernartillerie) Festst.Bh* - office of Confirming War Damage (Feststellungsbeh6rde) ff* - the following (folgende); extra fine (sehr fein) fl# - florin (Gulden) Flak - anti-aircraft gun (FlugzeugrAbwehrrKanone) Fleiverkehr - traffic by air and rail (Flugzeug-Eisenbahn-Verkehr) Flugschr. - pamphlet (F lugs c hr if t) fm - cubic meter (of solid wood) (Festmeter) FMBl* - Paper of the Prussian Finance-Minis try (Preuss* Finanzminist•Blatt) Fol* - page (Folio) Forts* - continuation (Fortsetzung) Forts*f* - to be continued (Fortsetzung folgt) fr* - free; post-free; paid (franko; frei) \ Fr. - Madame; Mrs. franz. - french (franz&sisch) frdl* - kind (freundlich) FINAL REPORT* C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS Frhr. - baron (Freiherr) Frl# - Miss (Frfuilein) FsSchlassel - bass-clef g - gramme (Granin) GBA - Representative General for labour (GeneraIbevollnuf #d# Arbeitseinstz) GB Bau - Representative General for Regulating the Building Trade (Gen.Bev) GdA - Federation of Trade Unions of (commercial) employees (Gewerkschaf tsbund der Angestellten) geb. - born; (geboren); bound (gebunden) Gebr. - brothers (Gebrtider) Geb Sch VO - Decree of Building-Repairs (GebAudeschadenverordnung) gef# - kindly (gefAlligst); zur gef# Ansicht - on approval gegr# - founded (gegrtmdet) geh. - stitched (geheftet) Geh#Rat - privy councillor (Geheimrat) geistl. < - spiritual (geistlich) gek. - abbreviated gen. - mentioned; sumamed (genannt) ges#gesch# - registered trademark (gesetzlich gesch&tzt) Ges# - society; club; company (Gesellschaft) geschr# - written (geschrieben) gespr# - spoken (gesprochen) gest# - late; died (gestorben) 9 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. \ ABBREVIATIONS Gestapo - secret state police (Geheime Staats Polizei) gew. - usually (gewbhnlich) Gew.o* - trade regulation (GewerbesOrdnung) gez* - signed (gezeichnet) G«H*ty - General Headquarters (Grosses Hauptquartier) CKR - Leaflets about law of War Damage in Great-Germany (G«D«KTiegsrechtbI.) gleichbd. - synonymous (gleichbedeutend) gl.N* - of the same name (gleichen Name ns) GMBH - limited (liability) company (Gesellschaft mit besbh- rftmkter Haftung) gr* - free of charge (gratis) Grdr - outline; sketch (Grundriss) gr.rhath. - belonging to the Greek Church (griechischrkatholisch) GS - Collection of Prussian laws (Preuss.GesetzsamDlung) GaSchlussel - treble clef H r hydrogen (chem«) (Wasserstoff) H - credit (Baben) ha • hectare (Hektare) HAPAG - Hamburg American Line (HamburgrAmerikaniacherPaket- fahrtaAktien Gesellschaft) Hbf. • Central Station (Hauptbahnhof) h»c* - honoris causa (honorary) hd. • High German (hoohdeutsoh) hfl. - Dutch florin (hollAndischer Gulden) 10 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS Hq - mercury (chem*) (^uecksilber) HOB - comnercial law code (Handelsgesetzbuch) H*H* - University of commerce (Ha nd els choc hschule) HJ* - Hitler youth (Hitler Jugend) hi* - 22 gallons (hektoliter) Holl* - Dutch (hollhndisch) Hptw* - noun; subatantive (Hauptwort) Hr* - Mister hrsg. - edited (herausgegehen) Hs* - manuscript (Handschrift) Hsgbr* - editor; publisher (Herausgeber) HVB1*B - Leaflets of Military Regulations (Part B) (Heeresver- ordnungsbloB* i* - in; in the; into; into the (in; im) I* - your; her; their I.M* - Her Majesty i*A* • by order; on behalf of (im j^uftrage) I*A*A* - International Labor Bureau (Internationales Arbeit- samt) i.allg. - in general; generally speaking (im Allgemeinen) i*b* - in particular (im besonderen) Ibg* - International architectural exhibition (Internationale Baufachausstellg*) i*Durchschn* - on an average (im Durchschnitt) i*e*R* - temporarily pensioned off (im einstweiligen Ruhestand) I«G« - pool; trust (Interessengemeinschaft) FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS I.G.F. - German Dye Stuff Combine i.J. - in the year (im Jahre; anno) I, - Her Royal Highness (Ihre Konigliche Hoheit) Ila - international exhibition of aircraft (Internet.luft- farht Austellgo) imp. - emperor (imperator) inkl. - inclusively; included i.P. - in Prussia i.R. - retired (im Ruhestand) X»R. - Emperor and King (Imperator and Rex) i.V. - on behalf of; by order; by proxy; as a substitute (in Vertretung) J - iodine (chem.) (Jod) JH - Youth Hostel (Jugendherberge) J. - number in daybook (ledger) (Journalnunmer) jun. (jr.) - younger-(junior) Jungdo - Young German Order (Jugdeutscher Orden) (National German Organizat. built up on medieval lines) JW - Weekly Paper of law (Juristisches Wochenblatt) k.(Kais.) - imperial (kaiserlich); royal (kftniglich) K» - chapter (Kapitsl); cape (Kap); potassium (chem) (Kal- ium)| calorie (Phys. ) (Kalorie); Austrian coin (Krone) kath. - catholic kg. - kilogram K«G* (a.A. ) - limited partnership (Komanditgesellschaft) Kgl. - Royal (kbniglich) 12 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS k.J* - of the following year (kommenden Jahrea) k.k.K*K* ) - imperial and Royal (Kaiserlich und KOniglich) k. u. k. ) kl. - small (klein) Kl* - class; form K«L» ) - encyclopaedia (Konversationslexikon) Konv. Lex* ) km* - kilometer k*M« - (of) next month (ktnftigen Monats) kn. - knot (naut*) (Knoten) Komp* - company (mil.) Kompanie Konj* - subjunctive mood (Konjunktiv) kons* - conservative (konservativ) K«P«D* - German Communist Party (Komraunistische Partei) kr* - Austrian copper coin (Kreutzer) Kr« - Scandinavia coin (Krone) KSSCKVO - Decree of War Damage (Krlegssachsch&denverordnung) k. - A 1. (military Fitness) (kriegswerdungsfahig) K Wh* - kilowatt hour (B*T«U«*) (Kilowattstunde) K*Z* - stock-exchange list (Kurszettel) Kazet - Concentration Camp (Konzentrationslager) l. - read (lies); dear (lieb); left (links); litre (liter) 1* - length; longitude (Dfenge); naval airship (Marine- luftschiff) L*sZug - saloon-train (Luxuzug train de luxe) 13 FINAL REPORT. C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS l*a* - according to the rules of the art (Pharm.) (lege art is) landw. - agricultural (landwirtschaf tlich) l.c. - see aboveo in the place quoted (loco citato) \ Ldr* - Louis d*Or French Gold coin; leather (Leder) Ldrb.Ldrr* - leather binding (Lederrtcken) (Lederband) Ifd. - currents present (laufend) Ifg. - delivery; instalments part (Lieferung) Lie. . - licentiate (Lizentiat) Lit. - literature (Literatur) 1*J. - (of) this year (laufenden Jarires) log* - logarithm (Logarithmus) L*S* - long sight or date (lange Sicht) LoS* - instead of a seal (loco sigili) luth. - lutheran (lutherisch) LVBlo - Leaflets of Decrees for Air Force (Luftwaffen- Verordnungsblatt) Lwd. - canvas (Lsinwand) Lwdb* - cloth-binding (Leinwandband) Lw RMBl* - Leaflets of the Ministry of Agriculture (R*M*Blod* landw* Verwaltgo) L Z - airship of the Zeppelin type (ZeppelinrLuftschiff) m« - note (merke); with (mit)s masculine (m&nnlich); meter Mo - mark (Blfcrk)s mile (Meile)s medium kind or quality (Mittelsorte); model (Modell)s month (Monat) M»A« - miniature edition (Miniatur Ausgabe) FINAL REPORT* C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS Mag. - magazine m.A.n. - in my opinion (meiner Ansicht nach) m.a.W. - in other words (mlt anderen Worten) M Bli V - leaflets of the National Ministry of interior (M.Bl.RM. d. Inn.) m.c. - of this month (mensis currentis) M*d.L. - member of the diet of a German state (Mitglied d. landtags) M*d.R. - M.P. member of the German Central Parliament ( M* d. Rei chs t ags ) auE* - in my opinion (meines Erachtens) Mehrz. - plural (Mehrzahl) MER - Middle European Travelling Agency (Mitteleuropftisches ReisebtJuro) MEZ - time of the middle-European zone (Mittoleuropdische 2© it) mg. - milligramme (milligramm) m.G* - gilt edge (mit Goldschnitt) M«G« - machine-gun (Maschinengewehr) mhd. - Middle High German (mittelhochdeutsch) Kin. Bl« - leaflets of the Ministry of Interior in Prussia (M«Bl*f •pr.inn.Vwltg.) Mitropa - Middle-European Society for dining - and sleeping - cars (Mitteleuropaische Schlaf-und Speisewagengesell- schaft) M«K» - meter-candle )Phys.) (Meterkerze, Lux) m.1. - my dear (mein lieber) mm - millimeter (millimeter) sum. - with the necessary alterations (mutatis mutandis) 736384 O—47 17 15 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS mobl* - furnished (mobliert) mol* - atomic weight in grannies (Orammrmolekei) Mol* - molecule (Molekftl) m*R# - my account (meine Rechnung) mo a* - see; compare (man sehe) BJSchr* - monthly (periodical) (Msnatsschrift) Mskr.Ms* - manuscript (ifcnuskript) MV Bl - leaflets of Decrees of the Ministry of Navy (MarineverordgoBlo) mow» - it shall be done (sL.) (machen wir) moll* - so far as I know (meines Wissens) m,Z* - in default of payment (mangels Zahlung) no - after (nach)s new (neu)g next (nfechst) N* - name.(Name)g north (nord)g nitrogen (cherao) (Stickstoff) NoAo - new edition (Neue Auflage) Nachfo - successor (Nachfolger) nachm* - in the afternoon (Nachmittag) Nachno - reimbursements cash on delivery (Nachnahme) natosoz* - National Socialist n*.fi. - northern latitude (n&rdliche Breite) n*Chr* • AoDo after Christ (nach Christi Geburt) ndrd« - Low German (niederdeutsch) NB - Compensation for Joss of Profit (Nutzungs Entscbadigung) NF - new series (neue Folge) 16 FINAL REPORT, CoDoDo ABBREVIATIONS nhd. - New High German (neuhochdeutsch) n«J. - next year (nSchstes Jahr) n.M. - next month (nfcchsten Monat) N.N. - sea-Ieyel (Normal-Null) NoNo • name un-known to me (nescio nomen) no.(ntto.) - net (netto) No.(Nro) - number (Numero) NR -Regulating Loss of Profit (NUtzungsschddenregelung) NS - postscript PoSo (Nachschrift) NSBO - organization oongprising smallest National Socialist groups (in factories* offices* etc.) (Nationalsozial. Betriebszellenorganisat.) N Soh - Loss of Profit (Nutzungsschaden) N Sch AO - Decree of Compensation of loss of Profit (Nutzungsentsch. V.) NSDAP National Socialist - Gennan Workers Party (NationalsoziaL, Deutsche Arbelter- partei) NS Hago - National Socialist Organization for Crafts* Commerce and Trade (Nationalsozialistische Handworks„ HandsIs-und Gewerbeorganiso) n»st. - new style (neuen Stiles) N*T* - Hew Testament (Nsues Testament) HI - North West (Nordwest) 6. - above (oben)j without (ohne) 0« - order (Order)j place (Ort)j east (Oaten)| oxygen (Sauers toff ) 04 - administrative district (Oberamt) 17 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS fc.(osterr*) - Austrian (&sterraichisch) o.a. - or something similar (oder ahnliches) o.B* - without findings (med*) (ohne Befund) Obb* • South Bavaria (Oberbayern) od* - or (oder) OEZ - time of the Bast-European zone (Osteuropftische 2eit) OG - local branch (Ortsgruppe) OHL - Supreme Command (Oberste Heeresleitung) o.J. - no date (ohne Jahr) OWN - Supreme Command of Wehrmacht (Forces) (Oberkommando d. Wehrmacht) o«l. • east longitude (Sstlicher Iknge) o. - without place or date (public*) (ohne Ort und Jahr) O.P*D. - board of directors of the General Post Office (Oberpostdirektion) org. - organic(ally) (oiganisch) Ostpr* - East Prussia p. - by; for (per; par; pro) P* • phosphorus (Phosphor); papers; bills (Papier); Minister (pastor); father (pater) pa. - first-class (prime) p.A. * care of (per Adresse) p.a. - pro anno (for the year) part* - street level (parterre) Pb. - lead (chem*) (Blei) p.c. - per cent (Prozent) FINAL REPORT, C.DoDo ABBREVIATIONS p.Chr* - post Christum* A*D* pf• - German copper coin (Pfennig) Pfd. - pound (Pfund) Pfd.St. - pound sterling (pfund Sterling) Pg* - fellow-member of a party (Parteigenosse) p*m* - after death (post mortem); per thousand (pro mills) P.O. - political organization (Politisohe Organisation) p*p. - by procuration (per procura) P.P* - premising what is to be premised; omitting all titles; Sir; Madam; (on business letters) (der p*p. Mailer) (the said Stiller) pr* - press (presse); Prussian (Preussisch) Praes.RVG- - Comments of President of National Administration Court concerning War Damage (ltltteiIg.P*R*Vwltg*Geriohts KriegsachschSden) Pred* - preacher or sermon (prediger Oder Predigt) progr* - programme (Programm) Prof. - professor (Professor) "Prof.ord* - (ordinary) Professor (Professor Qrdinarius) prow* - prowince (Provinz) PS - horse-power (Pf erdestdrke) P Sch VO - Decree of personal Damage (Personenschftdenverordnung) p*t* - for the time being (pro tempore) p. - omitting all titles (praemissis titulis) q. - square (quadrat) qcm* • square centimeter (quadratzentimeter) 19 FINAL REPORT, CoDoDo ABBREVIATIONS qktno - square kilometer (quadratkilometer) qmo » square meter (quadratmeter) r« - round (rund) Ro ° Reaumur? right angle (rechter Winkel)? calculation bill (Rechnung) HA « Decision of the National Board of World War Damage (EntschdgodoReichsausschusses f. Weltkriegschfeden) RAo ® solicitor (Rechtsanwalt) Rabo ■» discountg rebate? reduction (Rabatt) RABl« - National Labor Leaflets (Reichsarbeitsblatt) RADVGo-Mo - law of Welfare and Maintenance for the National labor Service (Reicharbeitsdienstversorgungsgesetz) RADVGo-WJo - Ditto » for female youth (Weiblo Jgd«.) RAfP - National Board of Control of Insurance-Business (Reichsaufsichtsamt flir Privatversicherung) RA GeboO ® Scheme of Fees for lawyers RAM - Minister of Labor (Reichsarbeitsminister) R Anz • Official Government Publication (Reichsanzeiger) RAO - Scheme of National Taxes (Reichsabgabenordnung) RAO - Order of the Red Eagle (Rota Adler Orden) RBB - Government-Gazette of National Household (Wages; Economy? etco) (Reichshaushelt-und-besoldungsblatt) RdoErlo - Circular (Runderlass) Rd«RN - Periodical "The Right of Food-Producers" ("Recht do NAhrstandes") RoDoTo - National Federation of German Technical Firms (Reichabund Deutscher Technik) 20 FINAL REPORT, C,DoD<. ABBREVIATIONS Hefo - rapporteur (at meeting) (Referent) RegosBez. - administrative district (Regierungsbezirk) Rel« - religion (Religion) Rep« - handbook (Repertorium) Repko - reparation-commission (Reparationskommission) respo - respectively (respektive) RFM (Hd.Fo) - Minister of Finances (Reichsminister der Finanzen) RfPro - National Commissary for Price Control (Reichskomm<.f» PreisbiIdung) RCBl - German official journal (Reichsgesetzblatt) rglm* - regular(ly) (regelmfessig) HGZ - Decisions of the Supreme Court in Civilian matters (Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen) RGRK - Commentary of Civilian Law by Judges of the Supreme Court (Kommentar zun B«GoB» von Reichsgerichtsrfeten) Rho <=> Rhinej Rhenish (Rheinj rheinisch) RJF - National Headquarters of German Youth Organizations (Reichs jug enftlhrung) RJM - Minister of Justice (Reichsjustizminister) HKA - National Office of War Damages (ReichskriegsscMdenamt) RoLo - National Headquarters (Reichsleitung) RLG - National Compulsory Service-Law (Reichsleistungsgesetz) run - cubic meter (Raurameter) RM (Rmko) - Reichmark (German coin about 24 cent) RMBlo - National Ministerial Gazette (Reichministerialblatt) RMd.I* - Minister of the Interior (Reichsminister dolnnern) 21 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS RMfBuL - Ministry of Food and Agriculture (R.Minist.f.Ernfthrung u. Ldwschft.) r6m# - Roman (rtbmlsch) Rp. - (Swiss) centime (Happen) Rpf • - Reichspfennig (1/100 of one Rmko) RStBl* - Leaflets of National Taxes (Reichssteuerblatt) Rthlr. - Reichsthaler (about ?2 cents) RV - German Constitution (Reichsverfassung) RVersBl* - Leaflets of National Welfare (Reichsversorgungsblatt) RVG - Supreme Court of National Administration (Reichs- verwaltungsgericht) R7M - Minister of Transport (Reichsverkehrsminister) RVO - National Assurance Regulations (Reichsversicherungord- nung) RWB - Economical Regulations for National Offices (wirtschafts- bestimmungen flir die Reichsbeh&rden) RWM - Minister of National Economy (Reichswirtschaftsminister) RWMBl* - Leaflets of Ministry of National z (Min*Bl.d.RWirt- sch.M«) s. - see (siehe) S - page (Seite); Saint (Sant(a)); South (Suden); Schilling (Austrian currency); sulphur (Schwefel) s.a. - see also (siehe auch) Sa, - total (summa) SA - storm-troop (Sturmabteilung); SA-Mann*Storm-trooper, brownshirt sSchs. - Saxon (sachsisch) 22 FINAL REPORT. C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS s*B« - Southern latitude (sudlicher Breite) Sb* - antimony (chem.) Antlmon SBBo - Swiss Federal Railways (Schweizer Bundesbahnen) Sch. - unit of photographic sensitiveness (Scheinergrad) Sohupo - police force (Schutzpolizei) schw# - weak (schwach) Schw. — sister; nun; nurse (Schwester) s.d# - see above (siehe dies) S.Sr. - His (Seine(r)) sel. - deceased; late (selig) seq. - following (sequens) Ser# - series (Serie) Sipo - Safety police (Sicherheitspolizei) SKH - His Royal Highness (Seine konigliche Hoheit) Skt. - Saint (Sankt) s*l* - to his dear (in dedications) (seinem lieben) SM * nautical mile (Seemeile) S#M# - His Majesty (Seine Itejestat) S#M»S# - His Majesty's Ship H*M>S* (Seiner Majestat Schiff) Sn. -tin (ohenu) (Zinn) n SO - southeast (Sudost) s#o# - see above (siehe oben) sog. - so-called (sogenannt) Soz. - socialist (Sozialdemokrat) 23 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS spr. - pronounce (spricn, SS - National Socialist Bodyguard* Blackshirts (Schutzstaffel) S. - summer term (Soranersemester) SSCHFVO - Decree of Material Damage Confirmation (Sachsch&denfest- stllg.y*) SSchVO - Decree of Mat.War Damage in Navigation (Kriegssachschd. V.Seeschf.) st. - strong (stark) St. - piece (Stuck); stem (Stamm); saint (Sankt); style (Stil) s.t. - punctually; sharp (sine tempore) Stde. - hour (Stunde) StGB - penal code (Strafgesetzbuch) StPO - Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) Str. - street (Strasse) s*u. - see below (siehe unten) s. - as much as (so viel wie) SW - South-West s*z. - in due time; at that time (seinerzeit) t. - 1000 kilogrammes (Tonne) T. - pocket-edition (Taschenausgabe) Tb.(T.B.) - pocket-book (Taschenbuch) Tel.Adr. - telegraphic address (Telegrammadressc) teilw. - partly (teilweise) term.techn. - technical expression (terminus technicus) T.F* - pocket-size (Taschenfomat) 24 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS T.H. - technical university (Technische Hochschule) Th. - subject (Thema) Thir. - dollar (Thaler) Tit. - title (Titel) T. - pocket-dietionary (Taschenw&rterbuch) u. - and (und); among (st) (unter) U. - hour; o*clock (Uhr) u.a. - amongst other things (unter anderm); and others (und andere) u.a.m. - and others; and other things besides (und andere mehr) u.a.m. - and the like; and such like; and more of the kind (und lihnliches mehr) u.A.w.g. - an answer is requested (R.S.V.P.) (urn An two rt wind gebeten) fibers. - translation; translated (Ubersetzung; ubersetzt) U*Boot - submarine (Unterseeboot); U«Boothebeschiff - submarine salvage vessel H H u.d.a. - and similar things (und dem ahnliche(s)) u.dgl.(m.) - and more of the same kind (und dergleichen mehr) u.d.M. U.deM* below above the sea-level unter ueber dem Meeresspiegel) u.E. - in our opinion (unseres Erachtens) u.e.a* ' - and some others (und einige andere) Ufa - Universal Film Company (Universal Film Aktiengesellschaft) u.ff. - and following (und folgende) ult. - (of) last month; on the last day of the month (letzten MOnats; am Letzten dieses Monats) 25 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS unbest* - uncertain (unbestinmt) unr*(eg) - irregular (unregelmssig) u.o. - and oftener; and in other places (und ofter) UoRo - to be returned (unter Ruckerbittung) n urspr* - originally (ursprunglich) usf.(usw.) - and so forth; and so on; etc. (und so weiter) UoU. - perhaps; possibly (unter Umstenden) u.tuV. - with the usual reserves (unter tiblichem Vorbehalt) u.v*a. - and many others (und viele andere) u.W. - so far as we know (unseres Wissens) u.zw* - namely; and what is more (und zwar) v* - by; from; of (von; vom) V - volt (Volt); volume (Volumen) YA - watt (Vo1tampers) v*Chr*G« - B*C» (vor Christi Geburt) YEA - association for the protection and promotion of German life and culture abroad (Volksbund fur das Deutschtum im Ausland) v*d.H* - on the slopes V.D»I* - Association Of German Engineers (Verband Deutscher Ingenieure) Y*D«St« - Association of German Students (Verein Deutscher Studen- ten) verb. - improved (verbessert) Verf.(Vf») - author (Yerfasser) Yerf Richtl - General Directions of Procedure in Reconyensation-Caaes (Richtlinien fur das Yerfahren in Entschei Igungssachen) FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS I verfl.J. - (of) last year (y erf loss enen Jahres) verk* - abbreviated (verkurzt) Verl. - publisher; publishing fim (Verleger; Verlag) verm* - enlarged; increased (vermehrt); married (vermilhlt) verl* - extended, lengthened (verlangert) versch. - different (verschieden) verst. - dead; deceased; late (verstorben) Vertr.d.RInt - Representative of National Interest (Vertreter d.Reichs- interesses) Verw* - related (verwandt) vgl.o. - compare (see) above (vergleiche oben) v.g.u* - read; confirmed; signed (vorgelesen; genehmight; unter- schrieben) v.R. - per cent (vom Hundert) viell* - perhaps (vielleicht) v.J. - (of) last year (vorigan Jahres) Vjso - quarterly (magazine) (Vierteljahrschrift) v*M« - (of) last month (vorigen Monats) V«0* - Decree (Verordnung) v.Oo - from the top (von oben) vor* - last; late (vorig) Vorben.NR - Preface of Regulation of loss of Profit (Verbemerkung zur Rebelling von NutzungaschSden) Vors. - chairman (Vorsitzender) v.R.w. - by right(s); according to the law (von Rechts wegen) 27 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS VSchVO - Decree regarding Damage of Germans in incorporated areas in the East (Poland) (Verordnung uber Volkstum- schlden in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten) v#T* - per thousand (vom Tausend) ▼•u. - from the bottom (von unten) % WG - Law of Insurance Agreements (Gesetz uber den Versicher- ungsvertrag) W. - standard (Wahrung); bill (of exchange); (Wechsel); watt (Watt); west (Westen); verst (Russian measure); tung- sten (Wolfram) (chem) Wl - please turn over (Bitte wendenJ) Wbl. - weekly (Wochenblatt) weil* - formerly (weiland) Westf* - (Westphalen; Westfalen) WEZ - time of the West European zone (Westeuropaische Zeit) (Greenwich time) WFVG - law of Welfare and Maintenance for the Forces (Wehr- ma cht sfursorgeges et z) Wirkl.Geh.Rat - acting privy counsellor (wirklicher Geheimer Rat) w.L, - (of) west longitude (westlicher lange) ( • w.Oo - as above (wie oben) W0« - regulation relating to bills of exchange (Wechselordnung) WoSo - winter term (Wintersernester) WoS«g«u. - please turn over P0T0O0 (Wenden Sie gefalligst uml) WTB - Wolf telegraphic agency (Wolffsches Telegraphenburo) wlirtt. - wkrttemberg WV* - list of words (Worterverzeichnis) 28 FINAL REPORT* C.D.D. ABBREVIATIONS Wwe - widow (Witwe) z. - to; to the; by; per (zu; zum; zur) Z. - number (Zahl); line (Zeile); time (Zeit) ZAkDR - Periodical of the Academy of German Right » z*B* - for instance (e«g.) (zum Beispiel) z.b.V. - detailed for special work; unattached (zur besonderen Yerwendung) ZoD* - on the unattached or reserved list; on half pay (zur Disposition) ZoH* - care of (c/o) (zuhanden) ZPO - Civil Procedure Code (Zivilprozessordnung) z.s* - of the navy (zur See) z.s.Z* - at its time (zu seiner Zeit) (in due time) z.T« - partly Ztgo - newspaper Ztr. - hundredweight (cwt.) (Zentner) Ztschr. - periodical (Zeitschrift) Ztw. - verb (Zeitwort) Zus. - together (zusammen) Zszga - compound (Zusammensetzung) zuw. - sometimes (zuweilen) zwo - between (zwischen) z.Z* - at the time; at present; now; acting (secretary, etc.) (zur Zeit) 29 FINAL REPORTo C»D*Do XXXXo LIST OF FIE ID REPORTS 736334 O—47 18 FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. LIST OF FIEID REPORTS I* COLOGNE Field Report* Dates of field team surrey* 2? April 1945 - 14 May 1945* 2* BONN Field Report* Dates of field team surrey* 27 April 1945 • 14 May 1945* 3* HANOVER Field Report, Dates of field team surrey* 16 May 1945 - 7 June 1945* 4. HAMBURG Field Report, Dates of field team surrey* 8 June 1945 “ 27 June 1945* 5» BAD OIDESIDE Field Report, Dates of field team surrey* 24 June 1945 - 26 June 1945* 6* AUGSBURG Field Report, Dates of field team surrey* 29 June 1945 - 6 July 1945* 7* Special Field Report on Reception Areas in BAVARIA, Dates of field team surrey* 26 June 1945 - 11 July 1945. FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. XXXo EXHIBITS FINAL REPORT, C.U.D. EXHIBIT A NOTES ON INTERROGATION OF COLONEL.ARTHUR LENSCH, FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF IN THE AIR PROTECTION DIREC« TION STAFF OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE (Luftwaffe) JML REPORT, C.D.D* EXHIBIT A NOTES ON INTERROGATION OF COLONEL ARTHUR LENSCH, FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF IN THE AIR PROTECTION DIRECTION STAFF OF THE LUFTWAFFE interview took place at GSTADT am CHIEM3EE from 1430 hours to 1630 hours on 6 July 1945* 1° Biographical Note* a* Colonel Lensch* a native of HAMBURG* now age fifty-three (53)® served in the last war as an officer and retired with the rank of lieutenant* He was a resident in HAMBURG from 1913 to 1937 (when not on war service) and was a merchant with an export and import business in chemicals* b. In 1937# he was recalled to the military forces and was appointed on the staff of Section I (a) Op 3 the air command number III at DRESDEN (luftkreiskommando* later reorganized at Luftflotte) where he served from March* 1937* to March* 193®* From March* 193®* to March* 1939* he was with the same section of air zone command (Luftgau- kommando) XVII and from March, 1939* to August, 1939* he was a lecturer on air protection at the Reich Institute for Air protection in BERLIN* It was here that he first became associated with Colonel Ehrhard, who was also at that time an instructor at this institute* From August* I939* until its reorganization in March, 1945* he served with the air inspectorate number 13 of the German Air Ministry* He was on the staff and subsequently in charge of department number 1 of this inspectorate and concerned with organizational and operational aspects (he confirmed and previously know organization of this inspectorate into three depart- ments* the first dealing with the organization and operation* the second with administrative and the third with technical subjects)* The inspect orate was first established at WANNSEE, later in TANGERmBnDS* where it was finally dissolved in March, 1945* and his section came under Colonel Ehrhard as «Chef IS der OKL"« He had come with the section to GSTADT where he had been captured and after some time in a POW camp had been released* Like Colonel Ehrhard, he had returned to GSTADT to collect his personal effects and was without any home, occupation or news of his family* Co Although in appearance Colonel Lensch was a typical and slightly rotund German businessman* he* like his chief* Colonel Shrhard* impressed one with his detailed knowledge of the subjects for which he was responsible* and by his clear-cut ideas on civilian defense organi- zation and operation* Apart from a slight deafness resulting from a recent severe attack of influenza, he seemed physically very fit and active* and was now preparing to return to his commercial career* This, he stated* would involve starting afresh* as everything he had had been destroyed* including his premises and business connections in HAMBURG* FINAL REPORTo CoDoDo EXHIBIT A (Cont'd) 2* Organization of the Air-Protection Directing Staff of the Luftwaffe.. Colonel Lensch confirmed the information given earlier that same day by Colonel Ehrhard concerning the organization of the air-pro- tecting directing staff of the Luftwaffe (Chef L3 der CKL) and stated that he, Colonel Lensch, was primarily concerned with the organization of the mobile forceso He considered the former organization of the air inspectorate number 13 to be clumsy and over-staffed* By the reorganiza- tion they had succeeded in reducing the number from three hundred (300) in the old inspectorate to ninety-six (96) in the staff of the Chef IS* In the new organization he was chief of staff and head of Section I, dealing with all organizational and operational matters* 3« Organization of the Motorized Air-Protaction Battalions of the luftwaffeo Colonel Lensch gave the attached chart (see inclosure) of the organization of a motorized air-protection battalion® From his position and the detailed information which he unhesitatingly gave about these unitso one may assume that this is the most authoritative chart yet ob- tained® He admitted that there had been considerable variation in the actual organization between one battalion and another, but the chart shows what the organization was planned to be in the last stage® It had been recently reduced by about twenty-five percent (25#) from a rather higher establishment owing to the shortage of manpower and equipment® It will be noted that the only important discrepancy between the table and that given by Oberfeldwebel Meyer is in the disposition of the train of reserve vehicles® Meyer includes the train in the battalion staff, making the total personnel of that staff fifty (50), whereas Lensch dis- tributes it among the companies, thereby reducing the battalion staff to twenty-seven (2?)® Again, Meyer puts the establishment of a battalion at four hundred and thirty-five (433)* whereas Lensch»s figures work out at four hundred and ninety-eight (49®)° It would seem, therefore, that both informants were obviously extremely well informed on the subject, as Meyer was giving the figures of his own battalion. Number 431 which no boubt had been reduced in strength by the attrition of war, whereas Lensch was giving the latest table of organization and equipment as laid down by the OKL® Lensch, moreover, admitted that internal organiza- tion of a battalion varied to some extent at the discretion of the bat- talion commander® 4* Total Strength of the Units in the Reich* Lensch stated there were fifty-three (53) battalions organized under eight (8) regimental staffs, with one (1) regimental staff in each air zone command* 5® Review of War Experience of the Air-Protection Organization* a0 When asked what recommendations he would make now0 in the light of his experiences o had he to reorganize civilian defense afresh, Colonel Lensch strongly recommended the necessity of a unified comnand® He stated that throughout the war the organization at the top had been over-complicated and overstaffede while the operational responsibility was divided among too many semi “independent organizations, resulting in confusion and loss of efficiency** FINAL REPORT9 C.D.D. EXHIBIT A (Cont°d) bo Another factor had been the keenness with which the Party organizations and other bodies had shown® as soon as the war broke out* to play a part in civilian defense, whereas* when Lensch himself started in 1937® it had been impossible to arouse any interest or secure any funds to develop civilian defense© Once the war was on their organization had been hampered by the intervention of all and sundry* The first es- sential was to secure a small and efficient directing staff at the top who could maintain tight discipline throughout a unified organization. It did not matter so much whether the control was to be placed finally in the hands of the Air Minister or Minister of the interior® but the essential thing was that it would be unified. Nevertheless® he felt that where a country was to be subjected to the scale of attacks which GERMANY had recently experienced* none but a military organization* with its tradi- tions and discipline® could effectively handle the problems and control the large forces which would be required to cope successfully with the situation. c. While not admitting that this was a German problem* but quite objectively a recommendation to any country which felt itself liable in the future to air attack® he thought it essential to spend money well ahead of hostilities in organizing not only the civilian defense serv- ices but structural precautions and buildings likewise to avoid the worst effects of bombing on towns. There ia no use*, in his view® of trying hurriedly once the attack had started to ca?ry out such defensive meas- ureso He recommended® for example* that all large structures such as blocks of offices* hotels® stores® etCo® should be planned with heavily protected underground storage space which could serve in time of war as shelters. These would be extremely costly but the total would be but a fraction of the losses which air attack involved© The elimination of readily combustible materials in building practice® and particularly from roof structures* the spreading out of buildings to create natural fire breaks® and similar measures should also be planned but this was a long term policy and could not be improvised at the last minute. 6o Some Weaknesses of the German Organized lone a© When asked what were the major weaknesses encountered in the German system of civilian defense® Colonel Lensch said that first and foremost was the lack of adequate preparation beforehando He took the shelter policy as an examples the collar shelter® planned before the war* had proved entirely inadequate and it was only by the con- struction of the large "Bunker* type shelter that great loss of life had been avoided** This policy* however® was developed too late* when materials and labor were getting short® with the result that but a small fraction of the accomnodation required had ever been completed' bo Again® whenever the British or American air forces used a new type of bomb® hurried investigation and research was made to evolve counter-measures*. Executive plans then had to be made® approval secured at all levels up to the highest and by the time practical action had Fm REPORTo CoDoDo EXHIBIT A (Cont^d) been taken this weapon was superceded by a new and more powerful missile and the whole operation had to start over againo As a result „ through- out the war they had been trying to overtake events and had never caught up» As a final example of this weakness,, he cited the case of the motor- ized air-protection battalionso m November,, 194°o he recommended that eighty (80) such battalions be formed to cover the whole Reicho This proposal had been rejected and only twenty (20) battalions were author- izedo As attacks multiplied they constantly increased the number of battalions throughout the war9 but at every stage they had fewer troops than the current scale of attack demandedo It was a primary principle of war that the defense must be planned ahead of the attack if it was to be successful* and in this the German civilian defense had lamentably failedo owing to the inability of the high command to realize the import- ance of civilian defense and its requirementso Co As regards the operational aspects„ their greatest weakness had been in the leadership of the mobile forces„ since they were never able to secure a first-class body of officerso Formed originally from the security and assistance service0 which had been organized originally with part-time civilian personnel,, they found extreme difficulty when the battalions came under the «Iuftwaffe" tc furnishthem well-trained and com- petent officer personnel When the motorized battalions were first formed from the security and assistance services the police had offered them,, but had not supplied the best officers availableo When they were taken over by the «ljuftwaff e« an appeal was made to other services„ such as the anti-aircraft and ground forces of the "luftwaffe«„ for officer person- nel® Again the same thing happened - units put forward officers they wished to get rid of rather than those who were experienced and able® Colonel Lensch observed that unless one started with suitable material,, all the training in the world would not produce a really first-class corps of officers® Toward the end they had succeeded in getting up from the rankso particularly from the best NC0s„ reasonably good junior officers* but at no time were they able to secure the class of battalion and company commanders upon whom the efficiency of a unit ultimately depends® do Another operational experience in the early days was the difficulty facing units* coming in as reinforcements„ in finding their way to the target area and avoiding blocking the routes of ingress to the towno This difficulty had been overcome by organizing rendezvous points* or pilot stations as the Germans call them* on the approaches to target citieso These pilot stations were clearly sign-posted and staffed with trained personnel to guide units to their areas of operation© Strict march discipline had also to be enforced on the incoming units© eo Although incident control was operated in GREAT BRITAIN and contemplated in the UNITED STATESe it was not practiced in GERMANY® The problem had been dealt with to some extent by putting the senior officer at an incident in charge of all operationso FINAL REPORT , C.D.D. EXHIBIT X (Cont’d) f® Although Lensch did not mention it, a great deal of frict- ion between police and *Luftwaffe* officers occurred over this question of command, as is evidenced by the many circulars and instructions issued throughout the war on this subject, and studies made in various cities® Colonel Lensch thought It would have been difficult to organize incident control on British lines, owing to the shortage of manpower. The police, for example, were always being drawn upon for fresh recruits for the armed forces so that all that remained were extremely aged men or young recruits who had insufficient experience or knowledge of the town. Himmler, moreover, moved the police from one town to another so that few had any extensive local knowledge® 7* Shortage of Fuel and Souiiiiient. Colonel Lensch. considered that the civilian defense services had never had as much equipment as was nec- essary (Colonel Shrhard also expressed this view, although until he had seen recently some of the American army equipment, it had apparently not occurred to him how far behind the Germans were, particularly in debris clearance appliances such as bulldozers, heavy cranes, etc0)0 A deter- mining factor in the last few months of the war also had been the extreme shortage of fuel, gasoline and diesel oil. Fire appliances extinguished the fires, in a sense, with gas, as every pump was either gas or diesel driven® Cases occurred where appliances had to cease work while fresh supplies of fuel were fetched from a distance. Colonel Lensch did not think that blocked streets had ever been a determining factor as the mobile forces were trained to clear the roads and their fire appliances were quite capable of surmounting considerable plies of debris® PINAL REPORT, C.D.D. EXHIBIT B NOTES ON INTERROGATION OF COLONEL EHRHARD, HEAD OF THE AIR PROTECTION DIRECTION STAFF OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE HIGH COMMAND FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. EXHIBIT B NOTES ON INTERROGATION OF COLONEL EHRHARD (Chef IS des OKL) (Head of the Air Protection Directing Staff of the Luftwaffe High Command) Interview took place from 1000 to 1215 hours on 6 July 1945 at the Hotel Klein on the Fraueninsel in the CHISMSEE, BAVARIA, GERMANY. 1. Biographical Not a* Colonel Ehrhard was a native of COLOGNE, age fifty-two (52), who served as a Marine officer in the 1914-18 war. Subsequently he was a police officer, serving in BERLIN and DUSSELDORF. In 1933 he was trans- ferred to the "Landes-Polizei", which, as he explained, was the under- cover regular army then being formed. In 1935 he was appointed to the air protection staff of the "Luftwaffe". b. He began his air protection career while still a police officer in 1931, being the specialist air-protection officer of the police in DUSSELDORF, On transfer to the "Luftwaffe" he served first with Air Zone Command No. 6, at MUNSTER, from 1935 to 1938, when he was in charge of Section I (a) Op, 3, the section responsible for air pro- tection. From 1938 to 1939, he was an instructor on air-protection tac- tics at the Reich Air Protection Institute in BERLIN. c. On the outbreak of the war he became liaison officer between the directing staff of the "Luftwaffe" High Command (OKL), Section 1(a) Op 3, and the chief of the Air Protection Denartment of the Reich Air Ministry, situated at WANNSS1, then headed by Dr. Knipfer, The OKL was at this time at WERTHE. \ - * d. In March, 1940, he joined Dr. Knipfer*s staff (then known as Arbeitsstab L.S.), serving in Section I under Ministerialrat Dr. Grosskreutz, who was at that time head of Section I. Dr. Grosskreutz retired about a year ago. This staff was divided into three sections; I - Organization and formation of units; II - Administration, clothing, pay and rations of personnel, accommodation and the legal department, III - Technical Section under Ministerialrat Lindner), e* In June, 1943, he was appointed head of Section I (a) Op 3, of Air Fleet 3 in PARIS, where he was responsible for the supervision of the organization of civilian defense in FRANCE, BELGIUM and HOLLAND. f. After the withdrawal from PRANCE, he was appointed to the Command of Air Protection Regiment No. 5 in VIENNA, serving there from November, 1944, to February, 1945. Dr, Knipfer*s "Arbeitsstab L.S." had been renamed earlier in the war; Air Inspectorate (Luft Inspektion) No. 13, Dr. Knipfer remaining at the head until he resigned in October, 1944, after a severe rebuke from the Pfthrer. (NOTE: According to FINAL REPORT * C*B*D<, EXHIBIT J3 (ContM) information supplied later by Colonel Lensch* the Fuhrer was enraged be- cause of a bad shelter incident at FRANKFURT* where a • Bunker* had been penetrated by a boob and all the occupants killed* Knipfer was appar— ently tactless enough to point out that this * Bunker* was built to stand- ards which Hitler himself had approved*) go In Marcho 1945» the inspectorate was dissolved and a new organization established* particulars of which have been already given by Lindner (see report of interrogation circulated by AoLoIoK**)* Un- der the new arrangement the general direction and control of air-pro- tection policy was vested in the so-called "Chef LoS** of the Luftwaffe High Command and Colonel Shrhard was appointed to this office* The headquarters were first at TANGSRMUnUE (where Lolo 13 had been evacuated from BERLIN) * and on 14 April were transferred to GS.TADT am GBEBB8S0 ♦ Into Sr, M0H0S0 paper 13U/212 30*4*45 » ho Colonel Shrhard submitted the attached copy of a letter dated 8 May 19450 addressed to the commander of the American forces at MiNICH* which shows he was captured with his staff and several of the% motorized air-protection battalions of the * Luftwaffe* on 4 May 1945® Colonel Shrhard also stated that before the- collapse*-a section of his staff under Colonel Gaatz* who was inspector of the motorized battalions, with ten (10) to twelve (12) of his officers* had been sent to the norttk of GBFMANYo A. number of their records had been sent direct from TANGSB-. M&NDS to the research station at SHRA4-S3SIEN* io After being taken to the prisoner of war camp at FSIDITRCHEBIo and later transferred to the camp at FURSTSNFS1DBHIJGK0 he was finally re- leased and returned to GSTADT towards the end of June* Like other offi- cers in bis position* he is; completely cut of touch and has no news of his wife and family and had returned to GSTADT merely because his personal effects were there* He expressed surprise that no one had previously shown any interest in him* although he was the head of civilian defense in GERMANY and had concluded it was because the Americans were not in- terested in the subject* Colonel JShrhard is of medium height* with a keen and alert manner* and looked physically very fit© From the way in which he answered questions put to him* it was obvious that he had a clear grasp of all aspects of the German organization with which he bad been so long associatedo The information which ha gave is set out below* 20 Organization of the Air Protection Sffl. a* The office of the Chef L*S* had a staff of about one hundred and twenty—five (123) officers* officials and clerks* Section I dealt with operations and policy and was under the control of Colonel Lansch* who also acted as chief of staff to Colonel Shrhard* b* The operational side of Section I was in charge of Lt* FINAL RBPQHTo C®D®D® 8XEHBET B (Catted) Colonel Saha® with, a staff of three (3) majors and three (3) captains® Section I (a)s organization® was under Major Bsutnerg and I (c), deal- ing with press and propounds* under Major Weinneckeg Section XX0 deal- ing with the warning service® was under Major Light- ing,*. decoy sites and camouflage were the responsibility of Hauptmann Dr® Knothe and a staff of four (4) or five (5) officers® (Comments Dr® Khothe was a well-known German of the German mission which attended ARP exercises in LONDON in June* 1938®) Hie was last heard of in the POW camp at FURSTSKFSIDffJUCKo Co Colonel Gaatz (see par® 1 h above) ® besides being inspector of the motorized battalions® was responsible for the smoke troops who operated the smoke screens* and for smoke policy® The commandant of the research station at SHBA=LBS3IBN was Colonel Lukasader® who had Baurat Schmidt as technical advisor® d® Another officer (name not given) maintained liaison with the Reich Industrial Group through the air zone commands to the factory air-protection regional offices (Bereichssfallen)9 and dem® through their area offices (Bezirkssteller) ® to the individual factories® A further section of the staff was responsible for supervising air-pro- tection military premises and in the Reich organizations (railways* posts and telegraphs® inland waterways® etc®)® e® Use directing staff (Section HI) cams directly under Col- onel JShrhard® It was concerned with general policy and laid down the principles upon which air protection was to be organized throughout the Reich® Colonel JShrhard stated that the reorganization which toe* place in March® 19450 vreL3 on the lines for which he had been pressing for seme years® as he considered the previous organization of Air Inspectorate No® 13 to be too complicated and unwieldy® He succeeded in getting his way after much argument at the highest levels and had secured the control of policy by a small and efficient directing staff® fo It was clear from, his remarks that he and the other “Luft- waffe0 officers did not think highly of acme of the civilian officials and particularly of MinisteriaIrat Lindner® There bad probably been a good deal of friction in the previous organization between these two groups® 3» The Motorized Mp-ErotectxQB. Battalions of tho Luftwaffe. a® Colonel Shrhard admitted that he did not have the exact fig- ures in his head® but estimated the total strength of the motorized bat- talions at forty thousand (4000C0) man® organized in eight (8) regiments® with, battalions numbered from 1 to 5O0 but with gaps® He thought there were about thirty-five (35) battalions in all® When it was pointed out to him that thirty-five (35) battalions® at about five hundred (500) men per battalion® would account for only seventeen thousand five hundred (17®500) ® he was unable to reconcile this with the -orty thousand (4Pj>000) FINAL REPORT* C®D®D® EXHIBIT J (Coat'd) quoted above© Colonel Sbrhard stated, however, that Colonel Lensch knew more of this matter than he did and when Colonel Lensch was inter- rogated later the same day, be put the number of battalions at fifty- three (33)* (Commenti Lindner gave the figure as about sixty (60) and Meyer (see above) fifty-eight (38)0 On this point, Lensch, being the head of the staff section responsible, is likely to be correct*) b* Regiments and commanders, as far as could be remembered, were as followst Regiment Number Si tua ted Xjrftcau 1 VI MUNSTER 2 • 21 HAMHJBGr 3 Lt» Colo Hainert HI BERLIN 4 (This regiment should have been in V STOTTGAHT STUTTCART but was not formed) 5 Colonel Jacob im VIENNA. o Colonel Schneider XIV WIESBADEN 7 - VII MUNICH 8 a> Somewhere in - ' Eastern GERMANY* • Probably in I KfeUGSBSRG or VIH ffiESLAUo 4o Location of Battalions* Toward the end of the war, several bat® talions had been moved down to the SJLLMQHG-fiOSS'IHSIM area as the Ameri» can forces advanced* Their task, among other things, was to cover the area© Battalions which Colonel Sbrhard could remember were* Battalion Number Commander Location. 13 (O PALLING 17 •» LINZ AREA 31 Major Silbersdorf MISS BACH 36 e 3ALZHJBG 42 O LINZ (formerly VTSNNA 43 Lto Colo Kleinau GST4DT (or 34) Lto Colo Steinauer cf 0 in paro 7 App0 C) MffiCSRS statement 3* Qperatifigtat Crm a* Colonel Shrhard confirmed statements from earlier witnesses as to the control of these battalions by air zone commands (L3K) through regimental headquarters* He added, however, that they were generally ear marked to protect special targets such as vital factories or key plants, certain large towns likely to become targets«> Toward the end of the FINAL REPORT o C©D©D® EXHIBIT J (Canted) war the protection of oil refineries and oil storage depots had been a primary concern* He denied* however* that any priority was given to other premises or establishments of the "Luftwaffe* o b» Since the regimental headquarters and the air zone commands were in close touch with the aircraft reporting and warning service, they were able to plan the moves of the battalions ahead in the light of the air situation as it developed* Ihree warnings were issued by regimental headquarters to battalions a the first warning meant that the battalion had to stand byi on the second warning they hid to form their vehicles into a convoy* and on the third warning they were dispatched to their target* On arrival at the target they came under they orders of the local air-raid-pro taction leader (chief of police) and would usually be allotted special areas 5 inside these areas the battalion commander was responsible for his own dispositions* c» Should an air zone command find itself unable to meet all the demands made upon it from its own resources* reinforcements frcm another air zone would have to be sought through the headquarters of the air fleet (in the last few months this would mean applying to Luftflotte Reich)* 6* fffrysonnel Accommodation* Men were recruited originally from the motorized security and assistance service* but throughout the war the younger men had been continually drafted into the •Wehrmachtf or to vital industry* and the age groups at the end had been from forty (40) to sixty (60) * with a final stepping-up to forty-four (44) and over* The units were accommodated at the beginning in barracks* but in recent months chiefly in schools and other large buildings* 7<> Ccmmunicati ana o a<> Corammication between air zone command and regimental com® mand was by land line or radio0 Radio could also be used from regiment to battalion* flhere distances were small * wireless telephone could be used® but where distances were too long it was necessary to employ Morse signals * bo Comnami cation from battalion to companies was by land line and motorcycle dispatch riderQ field telephones and field cable equip- ment were also carried by battalions for coonunication with companies where land lines were cut* Between regiments and battalions* radio was used only when several battalions were engaged in the same target area0 otherwise it was found quicker to use dispatch riders* This was partly due to the lack of experience of the personnel in operating radio* Co Recentlyo woman radio operators had been introducedo Ihe number serving with a battalion varied* however* and as in other oases of manning and equipment0 depended largely upon the energy which the battalion commander displayed in securing reinforcements and supplies* FINAL REPORT, C.D.D. EXHIBIT B (Cont»d) 8. Detailed Organization of a Battalion. Colonel Shrhard sketched out the table of organization. He admitted, however, that he was not very sure Mmself of the later organization wMch had been evolved after many changes in the light of experience. He suggested that Colonel Lensch would- be able to give more accurate information on tMs point. 9* Organization of the Air Protection Staff at an Air Zone Compand. Air protection matters in the air zone command were handled by section I (a) Op‘3 (is. *944 renamed I (a) L»So), with a staff of twelve (12) to fifteen (15) officers. Colonel fihrhard considered this section over- staffed and wished to reduce it to a total of four (4) officers, includ- ing the head of the section* The allocation of duties was as follows s 1 officer in charge of the motorized air-protection battalions. 1 officer responsible for factory air protection 1 officer acted as liaison officer with the air protection police of the large cities in the air zone. 1 officer dealt with gas protection. 1 officer dealt with smoke screens. 1 officer dealt with the warning services. 1 officer dealt with decoy sites and camouflage. 3 or 4 officers covered structural air protection, splinter 'protection, shelter construction and particularly * Bunker* construction* 10* Assistance from Motorized Fire Protection Police Regiments* Ihe air zone commander could, if necessary, call on the chief commander of the order police in the military defense district (Wehrkreis) for assistance from the motorized fire police regiments* Colonel Shrhard believed that three (3) regiments, each of three (3) battalions, existed in the Reich, one (1) regiment being in VIENNA* 11. Changes Recommended, in the Light of Sxperien.ce o a. Asked what Ms general opinion; was of the operation of the German civilian defense system under saturation attacks„ Colonel JShrhaid stated that in Ms view, once one side had overwhelming air superiority* it was no longer possible for civilian defense to cope with the situation. Had he the opportunity of starting afresh in organizing civilian defense* he would strive for a unified command with a small expert directing staff a Mghly disciplined mobile force which could be directed from stra- tegic points to any city threatened. b. The German system had* he been too sub-divided and lacked unity of control. At no time had they adequate resources to meet the scale of attack and they suffered particularly from the drain on the younger age groups during the later stages of the war. (Comments It is interesting to compare the above statement with that made by Colonel Eckmonn, the Air Protection Staff Officer to the Chief of the Order Police in Wehrkreis X at HAMHIHGo. As a police officer* Eckmann lence* 736334 O—47 19 FINAL REPORT* C*2>»£» EXHIBIT £ (CoatM) criticized the placing of the motorized battalions under •Luftwaffe' control but made exactly the sane comment as Shrhard on the lack of unified control© UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY LIST OF REPORTS The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from the Survey’s studies of the European and Pacific wars. Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be pur- chased from the Superintendent of Documents at the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. European War OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN *1 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Sum- mary Report (European War) *2 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over- all Report (European War) *3 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy AIRCRAFT DIVISION (By Division and Branch) *4 Aircraft Division Industry Report 5 Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Report) Airframes Branch 6 Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau, Germany 7 Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick, German 8 A T G Maschinenbau, GmbH, Leipzig (Mockau), Germany 9 Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany 10 Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany 21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hildesheim, Ger- many 22 Metallgussgesellschaft GmbH, Leipzig, Germany 23 Aluminiumwerk GmbH, Plant No. 2, Bitterfeld, Germany 24 Gebrueder Giulini GmbH, Ludwigshafen, Germany 25 Luftschiffbau, Zeppelin GmbH, Friedrichshafen on Bodensee, Germany 26 Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany 27 Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solin- gen, Germany 28 Lippewerke Vereinigte Aluminium werke A G, Lunen, Germany 29 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Heddernheim, Germany 30 Duerener Metallwerke A G, Duren Wittenau-Berlin & Waren, Germany AREA STUDIES DIVISION *31 Area Studies Division Report 32 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Hamburg 33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Wuppertal 34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Dusseldorf 35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Solingen 36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Remscheid 37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Rombing on Darmstadt 38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Lubeck 39 A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Berlin, Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dort- mund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION *40 Civilian Defense Division—Final Report 41 Cologne Field Report 42 Bonn Field Report 43 Hanover Field Report 44 Hamburg Field Report—Vol I, Text; Vol II, Exhibits 45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report 46 Augsburg Field Report 47 Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany EQUIPMENT DIVISION Electrical Branch *48 German Electrical Equipment Industry Report 49 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germany Optical and Precision Instrument Branch *50 Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Report 11 Messerschmitt A G, Augsburg, Germany 1 Over-all Report Part A Part B Annendices I. II. Ill 12 Dornier Works, Friedrichshafen & Munich, Germany 13 Gerhard Fieseler Werke GmbH, Kassel, Germany 14 Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Neu- stadt, Austria Aero Engines Branch 15 Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke GmbH, Bruns- wick, Germany 16 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha, Germany 17 Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof, Germany 18 Bayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW) Munich, Germany 19 Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany Light Metal Branch 20 Light Metals Industry of Germany Part I, Aluminum Part II, Magnesium 732203—47 Abrasives Branch *51 The German Abrasive Industry 52 Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Germany Anti-Friction Branch *53 The German Anti-Friction Bearings Industry Machine Tools Branch ♦64 Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equipment *55 Machine Tool Industry in Germany 56 Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany 57 Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany 58 Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION 59 The Defeat of the German Air Force 60 V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign 61 Air Force Rate of Operation 62 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Opera- tions in the European Theatre 63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO 64 Description of RAF Bombing 64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Lo- gistics MORALE DIVISION *64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale (Vol I and Vol II) Medical Branch *65 The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care in Germany MUNITIONS DIVISION Heavy Industry Branch *66 The Coking Industry Report on Germany 67 Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A, B, C, & D 68 Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany 69 Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany 70 Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger- many 71 Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf Germany 72 August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany 73 Friedrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Ger- many 74 Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund, Germany 75 Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany 76 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Bochum, Germany Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch *77 German Motor Vehicles Industry Report *78 Tank Industry Report 79 Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany 80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Baris 81 Adam Opel, Russelheim, Germany 82 Daimler Benz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany 83 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Germany 84 Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany 85 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany 86 Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, Germanv 87 Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plauen, Germany 88 Volfcswagenwerko, Fallersleben, Germany 89 Bussing NAG, Brunswick, Germany 90 Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Ger- many 91 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, Germany Submarine Branch 92 German Submarine Industry Report 93 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A G, Augs- burg, Germany 94 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany 95 Deutschewerke A. G, Kiel, Germany 96 Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Ger- many 97 Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany 98 Howaldtswerke A. G, Hamburg, Germany 99 Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany 100 Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany Ordnance Branch *101 Ordnance Industry Report 102 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke A. G Magdeburg Germany 103 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Bochum, Germany 104 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany 105 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany 106 Hermann Goering VVerke, Braunschweig, Hallendoif, Germany 107 Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany 108 Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany OIL DIVISION *109 Oil Division, Final Report *110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix *111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Pro- pellants, War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial Report #1) 112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Ger- many 113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report Team 78 114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals Oil Branch 115 Ammoniakwerke Merseburg GmbH, Leuna, Ger- many—2 Appendices 116 Braunkohle Bcnzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany Wintershall A G, Lcutzkendorf, Germany 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G Farbenindustrie A G, Ludwugshafen, Germany 118 Ruhroel Hvdrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Ger- many, Vol, I, Vol. II 119 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Harburg Refinery, Hamburg, Germany 120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook Refinery, Hamburg, Germany 121 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Wilhelmsburg Refinery, Hamburg, Germany 122 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germanv, Vol. I & Vol. II 123 Europaeische Tanklager und Transport A G, Ham- burg, Germany 124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, Ham- burg, Germany 125 Meerbeck Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil Plant—Vol. I & Vol. II Rubber Branch 126 Deutsche Dunlop Gummi Co., Hanau on Main, Germany 127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany 128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant 129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry Propellants Branch 130 Elektrochemischewerke, Munich Germany 131 Schoenebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose Sprengstoff Werke GmbH, Bad Salzemen, Germany 132 Plants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co, Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Duneberg, Germany 133 Deutsche Sprengchemie GmbH, Kraiburg, Germany OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION 134 Over-all Economic Effects Division Report 184 Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany- 185 Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Germany 186 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany 187 Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany 188 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany 189 Neukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen, Germany 190 Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany 191 Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany 192 Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany 193 Fire Raids on German Cities 194 I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, Vol I & Vol II 195 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany 196 I G Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen, Germany 197 Chemische-Werke, Huels, Germany 198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany 199 Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany TRANSPORTATION DIVISION *200 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Trans- portation 201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass 202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions 203 German Locomotive Industry During the War 204 German Military Railroad Traffic UTILITIES DIVISION *205 German Electric Utilities Industry Report 206 1 to 10 in Vol I “Utilities Division Plant Reports” 207 11 to 20 in Vol II “Utilities Division Plant Reports” 208 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G Pacific War ’ OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN *1 Summary Report (Pacific War) *2 Japan’s Struggle to End The War ♦3 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki CIVILIAN STUDIES Civilian Defense Division 4 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Tokyo, Japan 5 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan *6 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Kyoto, Japan 7 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Kobe, Japan 8 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Osaka, Japan 9 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan—No. 1 *10 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan *11 Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects in Japan Medical Division *12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Serv- ices in Japan *13 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medical Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Morale Division *14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale Gross National Product_ Kriegseilberichte Herman Goering Works. Food and Agriculture Special papers which together comprise the above report 134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION 134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETO) 135 Villacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France 136 Railroad Repair Yards, Malines, Belgium 137 Railroad Repair Yards, Louvain, Belgium 138 Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium 139 Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium 140 Submarine Pens, Brest, France 141 Powder Plant, Angouleme, France 142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France 143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium 144 Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France 145 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France 146 Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France 147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans, France 148 Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Germany 149 Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 150 S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 151 A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 152 V Weapons in London 153 City Area of Krefeld 154 Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany 155 Golden berg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knap- sack, Germany 156 Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, Brau- weiler, Germany 157 Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach, Germany 168 Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany 159 Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany 160 Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany 161 Henschell & Sohn GmbH, Kassel, Germany 162 Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany 163 Hanoraag, Hanover, Germany 164 MAN Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany 165 Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Germany 166 Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick, Ger- many 167 A T G Maschinenbau GmbH, Mockau, Germany 168 Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Mockau, Germany 169 Bayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany 170 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha, , Germany 171 Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Germany 172 Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany 173 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany 174 Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany 175 Ammonia werke, Merseburg-Leuna, Germany 176 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany 177 Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany 178 Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany 179 Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany 180 Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany 181 Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany 182 Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany 183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany ECONOMIC STUDIES Aircraft Division *15 The Japanese Aircraft Industry *16 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Corporation Report No. I (Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) (Airframes & Engines) *17 Nakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd. Corporation Report No. II (Nakajima Hikoki KK) (Airframes & Engines) *18 Kawanishi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. Ill (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha) (Airframes) *19 Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc. Corporation Report No. IV (Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (Airframes & Engines) *20 Aichi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. V (Aichi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines) *21 Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Division Corporation Report No. VI (Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera Seizosho) (Propellers) *22 Hitachi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. VII (Hitachi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines) *23 Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. Corporation Report No. VIII (Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK) (Airframes) *24 Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Company Corporation Report No. IX (Nippon Gakki Seizo KK) (Propellers) *25 Tachikawa Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. X (Tachikawa Hikoki KK) (Airframes) *26 Fuji Airplane Company Corporation Report No. XI (Fuji Hikoki KK) (Airframes) *27 Showa Airplane Company Corporation Report No. XII (Showa Hikoki Kogyo KK) (Airframes) *28 Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company,Ltd. Corporation Report No. XIII (Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (Engines) *29 Nippon Airplane Company Corporation Report No. XIV (Nippon Hikoki KK) (Airframes) *30 Kyushu Airplane Company Corporation Report No. XV (Kyushu Hikoki KK) (Airframes) *31 Shoda Engineering Company Corporation Report No. XVI (Shoda Seisakujo) (Components) *32 Mitaka Aircraft Industries Corporation Report No. XVII (Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (Components) *33 Nissan Automobile Company Corporation Report No. XVIII (Nissan Jidosha KK) (Engines) *34 Army Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots Corporation Report No. XIX (Airframes and Engines) *35 Underground Production of Japanese Aircraft Report No. XX Basic Materials Division *36 Coal and Metals in Japan’s War Economy Capital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division *37 The Japanese Construction Industry *38 Japanese Electrical Equipment *39 The Japanese Machine Building Industry Electric Power Division *40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan *41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant Re- ports) Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division *42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utili- zation of Manpower Military Supplies Division *43 Japanese War Production Industries *44 Japanese Naval Ordnance 45 Japanese Army Ordnance *46 Japanese Naval Shipbuilding *47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry *48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding OH end Chemical Division 49 Chemicals in Japan’s War 50 Chemicals in Japan’s” War—Appendix 51 Oil in Japan’s War 52 Oil in Japan’s War—Appendix Over-all Economic Effects Division *53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan’s War Economy (Including Appendix A; U. S. Economic Intelligence on Japan—Analysis and Comparison; Appendix B: Gross National Product on Japan and Its Components; Appendix C: Statistical Sources). Transportation Division *54 The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941- 1945 Urban Areas Division *55 Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy (Summary Report) *56 Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo- Kawasaki-Yokohama *57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya *58 Effects of Air Attack on Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto 59 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki 60 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima MILITARY STUDIES Military Analysis Division 61 Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan 62 Japanese Air Power 63 Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics 64 The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Logistics 65 Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command 66 The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom- bardment in the War Against Japan (Twentieth Air Force) 67 Air Operations in China, Burma, India—World War II 68 The Air Transport Command in the War Against Japan 69 The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan 70 The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War Against Japan 71 The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan Naval Analysis Division *72 The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols. I and II) *73 Campaigns of the Pacific War *74 The Reduction of Wake Island *75 The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul 76 The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III) *77 The Reduction of Truk 78 The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan 79 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party—Fore- word, Introduction, Conclusions, and General Summary 80 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure A), Kamaishi Area 81 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure B), Hamamatsu Area 82 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure C), Hitachi Area 83 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure D), Hakodate Area 84 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure E), Muroran Area 85 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure F), Shimizu Area 86 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima- Saki Areas 87 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure I), Comments and Data on Effectiveness of Ammunition 88 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure J). Comments and Data on Accuracy of Firing 89 Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments on Japanese War Potential Physical Damage Division 90 Effect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan (a R( port on Eight Cities) 91 The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb o' Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine Incidents) 92 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan 93 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan 94 Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa- nese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents) 95 Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (a Report on Eight Incidents) 96 A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Summary Report) G-2 Division 97 Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence 98 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report 99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part II, Airfields 100 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Plotting 101 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis 102 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part V, Camouflage 103 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping 104 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics 105 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach Intelligence ♦106 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery ♦107 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads 108 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1947 THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY Civilian Defense Division Final Report CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION JANUARY 1947