In Re WILLIAM WINTER. 
(THE VALUE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY.) 
BY JOHN ORDRONAUX, 
PROFESSOR OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN THE LAW SCHOOL OF 
COLUMBIA COLLEGE, NEW YORK. In Re WILLIAM WINTER? 
(THE VALUE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY.) 
BY JOHN ORDRQNAUX, 
PROFESSOB OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN THE LAW SCHOOL OF 
COLUMBIA COLLEGE, NEW YORK. 
[From the American Journal of Insanity for July, 1870.] 
It is not as generally known as it should be, that the 
testimony of experts in any branch of science, is the 
least fallible of all the forms of human evidence. In 
fact it is that one which, beyond all others, approx- 
imates most nearly to certainty in judgment, because it 
consists of circumstantial evidence, superadded by way 
of corroboration, to skilled perception. To lawyers in- 
deed, this assertion will seem paradoxical, accustomed 
as they are to summon experts for the express purpose 
of contradicting each other. But it should be remem- 
bered at the outset that it is a rare thing for any skilled 
witness to contradict himself or others on an examina- 
tion in chief, if precisely the same questions be put to 
both. Assuming that the expert testifies without bias, 
* This case arose from a Commission de Lunatico Inquirendo. 
The finding of the jury for the respondent disposed of it abso- 
lutely, and it has never therefore been reported in print. This is 
greatly to be regretted as the testimony of the experts was exceed- 
ingly voluminous, as well as exhaustivo-of-tliesubjects under con- 
sideration. 2 
and that the subject under investigation is one within 
the range of demonstrative knowledge, all the proba- 
bilities are in favor of agreement, rather than disagree- 
ment between experts. 
Of course we cannot undertake to discuss here the 
vexed question of qualifications in experts. That it is a 
very grave one, and the pregnant source of many errors in 
judgment and much consequent condemnation of skilled 
testimony, is every day made painfully manifest. Nor, 
until courts shall more nearly agree in some standard of 
qualifications for such witnesses, can we hope to see this 
evil remedied. But taking the word expert to import 
one skilled by experience, we repeat that there is a logical 
necessity for considering such testimony as the least 
fallible of any. We will admit, nevertheless, that upon 
cross-examination experts are often made to contradict 
themselves and each other. The reason for this can be 
easily given, and it flows from the paradoxical position 
in which they stand before courts. The object of 
cross-examining an ordinary witness is to test his mem- 
ory or veracity. But it is not as readily evident what 
the object (and if he were not called most improperly 
as a witness) where the right can be to cross-examine 
an expert. For, cuilibet in sua arte perito credendum 
est. Certain facts are admitted, and a professional opin- 
ion required upon them. This opinion is founded upon 
a special interpretation of those facts, and the skill and 
experience necessary for that interpretation resides ex- 
clusively in the expert. Now to admit that a man is 
an expert by allowing him to testify as such, and to 
permit his skill to be afterwards questioned, and tested 
by one who is not an expert, seems little else than a 
judicial farce. 
So long however as experts are called by parties 
litigant, this absurdity will continue to be inevitable. 3 
But the worst feature of this is, that it entails upon 
counsel the necessity of endeavoring to invalidate 
such testimony by cross-examination. Consequently 
leading questions are put to experts precisely as to 
ordinary witnesses; propositions are laid down contain- 
ing the most irrelevant premises, and courts permit 
counsel to insist upon categorical answers to such 
questions. It is not difficult to foresee the result. 
When one man can compel another to draw conclusions 
from premises already prepared for him, he becomes 
master of that other's opinions; and when those 
premises are purposely intended to entrap his judgment, 
and though discovered by him, he is still compelled to 
use them in forming his conclusions, he is doubly at 
the mercy of counsel. A man who requires me to look 
through his eyes, and to tell him what I see, asks me 
virtually to see precisely what he does. My person- 
ality becomes practically merged in his, and his judg- 
ment thenceforth overrules mine. Can it be surprising 
then, that experts should appear at times so unable to 
defend their own opinions, as to give rise to the suspi- 
cion that those opinions are based more upon conjecture 
than upon demonstrable truths ? The fault, surely, be- 
longs not so much to them as to the agency of counsel, 
to the variable latitude allowed to cross-examination by 
courts, in many instances, and the unwillingness to per- 
mit experts to explain the value and application of 
technical words. 
All persons daily recognize the fallibility of their 
special senses, as vehicles for transmitting impressions 
to the mind, and when made aware by critical demon- 
stration, of the tendencies to subjective error under 
which those senses lie, in their apprehension of the most 
patent objective truths, are forced inevitably to the con- 
clusion that, without the revising and ex-cogitative 4 
power of the judgment we should become the sport of 
every passing impression. There is a popular saying 
that 11 seeing is believing." It is an aphorism with the 
multitude who give it currency, and who are surprised 
whenever its truth is questioned, believing as they do 
in its axiomatic character. Yet ask the most self-opin- 
ionated witness to assert under oath that an oar which 
is seen propelling a boat is broken, because it appears 
so to the sight, and he will at once contradict the testi- 
mony of his vision. Again, ask him to roll a bullet 
between his crossed finger ends in the palm of the op- 
posite hand and to state what feels there, and he will 
say two bullets. But if required to swear to the truth 
of this impression he will refuse, on the ground that he 
knows better. Now how does he know better? That 
is the point. His own aphorism, or axiom as he has 
been deceived into considering it, is shown to have no 
foundation in fact, (for it is not so,) nor in reason, for 
the judgment will not affirm it. The senses are thus 
proved to be incompetent interpreters, negligent servants, 
and deceitful messengers for translating and conveying 
impressions from without to within us. Deprive them 
of the assistance of that revising, appellate tribunal, the 
judgment, whereby alone we are able to ex-cogitate truth 
from error, and their testimony is wholly unreliable 
and therefore valueless. 
It is in the pari passu march of the senses with 
mental development that lies the difference between the 
infant, who, not being able to judge of distances, grasps 
at the moon or the chandelier, and the skilful en- 
graver, who, by the slightest scratch under a magnified 
vision, perfects the distant points of his perspective. 
The eye which can interpret the mystic symbolism that 
lurks in and distinguishes the paintings of Raphael or 
Titian, from those of Rubens, Correggio or Salvator 5 
Rosa, is not a better physical eye than that of the 
ploughman which detects the blight in the wheat, or 
the mildew in the corn, but it is one illumined by the 
amplified mental vision that not only apprehends, but 
also weighs, analyzes, reviews and corrects before affirm- 
ing or contradicting the physical verdict below. The 
process is, in truth, a purely judicial one, and the judg- 
ment springing from it is the offspring of debate none 
the less close and severe because performed within us. 
It is here, particularly, that is exhibited the difference 
between a narrow and an ignorant mind judging ques- 
tions ex parte and influenced by prejudice alone, or an 
imperial intellect sitting upon some Olympian height 
of its own, far above the range of fear, favor or passion. 
On this turns the difference between a Bacon and a 
Jeffreys-a Marshall and a Bradshaw. 
It is chiefly in these great essentials of combining 
circumstantial evidence with skilled perception and 
judgment, that lies the preponderating character of 
expert testimony. Necessarily, therefore, it is higher 
than ordinary evidence as to mere facts, and it is higher 
than circumstantial evidence per se, since the value of this 
latter will always depend upon the qualifications of those 
who seek to interpret it. But when circumstantial 
evidence is indisputably interpreted by a skilled judg- 
ment, then human testimony may be said to approx- 
mate to certainty as nearly as it can, since nothing 
higher, in the direction of establishing truth by demon- 
stration can be accomplished by the uninspired intel- 
lect of man. It becomes a moral certainty based upon 
both internal and external evidence. 
The main purpose of ordinary evidence in law, is to 
furnish data whereby conclusions may be drawn. Its 
office is to treat of past facts exclusively, and to link 
them in a chain of mutual dependence which will justify 6 
some a posteriori conclusion. Every ordinary witness 
must testify to facts alone that are within his knowl- 
edge. His duty is simply to exercise his memory in 
acts of a retrospective character. Beyond this he is not 
allowed to go, and can express therefore, no opinions 
upon facts in dispute. He narrates circumstances, but 
does not interpret their value, nor their relations to the 
issue before the court. His functions are ministerial, 
not judicial. Memory, veracity and a belief in moral 
accountability are the only qualifications exacted from 
him. 
To all these prerequisites in an ordinary witness 
there is further and distinctively added in the case of 
an expert, special skill and experience. Armed with 
these, he rises at once from the plane of a simple nar- 
rator of facts, to an interpreter of their value, and a 
judge of their consequences, not only direct and actual, 
but remote and contingent. He does not alone draw 
conclusions from past facts, but must at times reason a 
priori, and thus foreknow, from experience of nature's 
laws, what their inevitable tendencies are, and in what 
way they will accomplish themselves. This is the 
science of prognostics. It is not a mathematical one, it 
is true. It has no equations to express the definite 
value of any of the factors which complicate its results, 
and yet it has a basis in truth, and in experience, and 
may be relied upon, because flowing from the recorded 
operations of laws known to govern the course of im- 
mutable nature In the lower strata of material agencies, 
these laws operate with a precision which belongs to 
the necessities of chemical combination, and the bal- 
ancing of forces that have no choice of action allowed 
them. This is generally enough perceived and admitted, 
but it is not as well known as it should be outside 
of the science of psychology, that the laws regulat- 7 
ing mental action are governed by principles as fixed 
as any in the material world; and although the oper- 
ations of minds under the disturbing influences of bodily 
disease, or moral freedom, are sometimes inscrutable, 
and their future phenomena not positively to be antici- 
pated, there are nevertheless limits within which science 
may foreknow them, with almost the same certainty 
with which she foreknows the probable results of dis- 
ease. 
Hence the value of expert testimony in determining 
whether under a given state of circumstances the prob- 
abilities are in favor of, or against certain results, as in 
the sea-worthin ess of a ship, the surgical treatment of a 
limb, the architectural perfection of a bridge, or of a 
building in relation to bearing a given weight. All 
will admit these to be legitimate scientific problems, and 
every day furnishes proofs of the importance of solving 
them correctly. There cannot of course be equal pre- 
cision in predetermining and foreknowing the manifest- 
ations of mental action. Yet, as before said, laws bind 
and obligate even here. Their orbit is less circum- 
scribed perhaps, but it is not wholly inscrutable on that 
account. Measured absolutely it never can be. But 
relatively, we can see that probabilities are not the 
work of mere chance, and that every mind will be tend- 
ing constantly to act in the direction most consonant to 
its predispositions. This law explains the mystery of 
style in different men, and well shows how impossible 
it is to successfully imitate genius for any length of 
time. It is by a study and faithful observation of these 
rules of mental action, that men learn to acquire ascen- 
dency over each other. Judging the future through the 
law of probabilities they infer what has not yet come 
to pass, and in proportion as they can thus read the 
deeds of time, and travel out of the lanes of prejudice 8 
into the broader highway of philosophy, they become 
statesmen, and shining lights among men. 
The case which we have selected as the basis for these 
remarks affords so full and sufficient a proof of the 
value of expert testimony, even in matters that seemed 
to border on foreknowledge, that none will question 
its right to a place among those leading trials which 
constitute the landmarks of rational jurisprudence. The 
facts upon which it rested, extending as they did over 
a period of more than thirty years, were so patent that 
their uncontradicted establishment should have been 
sufficient to convince any unprejudiced and enlightened 
mind; and yet it is easy to see how, without even the 
mistifying assistance of legal casuistry, jurors ignorant 
of mental physiology, and swayed by crude ideas of 
our moral nature, might be petrified in the belief that 
moral freedom is superior to organization or condition, 
and may rise above it at any time by an act of simple 
volition. It is in the nature of a primary belief with 
most men that they are masters of themselves, forget- 
ful all the while that they are begirt with laws of tem- 
perament, prejudices of education, or locality, and teaz- 
ing hereditary tendencies which perpetually obsess, if 
they do not possess them, and thus abridge the range 
of their independent action. We have called these ele- 
ments of character laws, rather than fetters, despots or 
obstacles, and yet they exhibit traits that belong to all 
three of the foregoing. It is the glory of Revelation 
that it teaches the mind how to conquer, and curb the 
quadruped instincts that energize our material nature, 
and sustain it through the wasting changes of life. 
Nor is this conquest perfect until all the members and 
all the instincts are brought under subjection to the 
mind, in as complete a relation of homage as was that 
of the feudal villein to his lord paramount. Moral 9 
freedom depends wholly upon mental health and men- 
tal power, and it approximates to perfection in propor- 
tion as that power controls our instincts and actions in 
obedience to our unfettered will. 
Turning now to the facts in the case, we will let the 
Record tell its unvarnished tale in the dry, technical 
phraseology of the law: 
SUPREME COURT-City and County of . 
In the Matter 
of 
William Winter, a person of 
unsound mind. 
Affidavit. 
I, , of said city, being duly sworn, do depose and say as 
follows: 
The above-named William Winter, who is a bachelor, was born 
on the 6th of February, in the year 1810, as appears from a record 
or entry of his birth, made by, and in the handwriting of his father, 
in the family Bible, now in my possession. He is the son of the 
late Gabriel and Jane Winter, of ; the former of whom 
died on the 27th day of February, 1862, and the latter on the 19th 
of April, 1862, leaving him their sole surviving child, and leaving 
my two sons, who are the infant petitioners herein, their only grand- 
children. * * * * 
Second. Ever since the autumn of the year 1849 I have been 
well acquainted with said William, who lived with his parents, at 
their residence in , and chiefly under the care and charge of 
his mother, from that date, to about the time of her decease, in 
April, 1862. * * * * 
William was provided for by his father, and lived in the same 
house; but he did not, during any part of this period, take his 
meals with, or live in the same manner as the other members of 
the family. From 1850 to 1857, his meals were prepared for, and 
taken by him upon a small pine table in the kitchen, where much 
of such portion of the time as he spent within the house was passed 
by him in the presence and society of the cook and other servants, 
between whom and himself there were frequent controversies and 10 
quarrels, which occasionally terminated in combats. He assumed 
the government and control of the kitchen, where he ruled in per- 
son, and where his manner, conduct and conversation were gen- 
erally peculiar and eccentric. 
In opposition to the wishes and request of every other member 
of the family, he insisted upon taking, and for several years did 
take, his baths in the kitchen-pantry, where the family crockery 
was kept, nor could he, for a long time, be persuaded to desist from 
so doing. 
His orders to servants were usually given in a loud, peculiar, 
screaming or howling tone, and in a way to alarm nearly every 
person who heard it. He would often insult and abuse the servants, 
by calling them by the worst and most offensive names; and he 
would also frequently seize water-pails, slop-pails, or such utensils 
as were standing in the kitchen, or the kettles of hot water on the 
range, and empty the contents of the same upon the kitchen-floor. 
His continued presence, and his extraordinary and irrational con- 
duct in the kitchen, rendering it very difficult to induce servants 
to remain with the family at any price, about the year 1857 his 
father proceeded to erect, for his special occupation, an additional 
wing to the premises; and, upon the completion thereof, his father 
having prohibited and prevented him from continuing to eat in the 
kitchen, his meals were, thereafter, usually served up to him in his 
bed-chamber. 
He did not often associate with other members of the family, 
seeming most of the time to be morose and desponding, going about 
the house partially clothed in an imperfectly buttoned shirt and 
pantaloons, and often without boots or shoes, thus having a very 
unpresentable appearance. 
His bed-chamber was usually in a very filthy and confused con- 
dition : old moth-eaten, cast-off garments, empty, and filled bottles, 
cans, jars, packages, vials of patent medicines, drugs, segar-ashes, 
boxes, trunks, bundles of newspapers, and sundry parcels and 
chamber-vessels, as well as numerous other articles and utensils, 
being strewed upon the dirty floor. He was in the habit of soiling 
his bed-linen very much, in consequence of which servants often 
objected to washing it. 
In rising and retiring to rest he was very irregular, sometimes 
rising before dawn, and frequently sleeping, or remaining in bed, 
until one o'clock in the afternoon, and sometimes during the whole 
day. He also frequently retired to his bed in the day ; sometimes 
in the forenoon, and sometimes in the afternoon. 11 
His conversations with other members of the'family were seldom. 
He evinced singular distrust and hatred of his nearest relatives, 
and especially of his father, with whom I do not remember ever, 
at any time, to have heard him converse, otherwise than in an abu- 
sive, quarrelsome, or boisterous manner. His conversations, usually 
without much sense, or inconsequential, were mostly confined to 
the subjects of the family property ; expressions of hatred towards 
his relations and especially his father; his disgust of that law re- 
lating to inheritance, which gives to the father the estate of an 
unmarried son dying intestate, and of the Legislature which en- 
acted the law; his fears that his father would make a will, cutting 
him off; his desire for his father's death; remarks upon the ser- 
vants ; very vulgar and obscene expressions; and remarks con- 
cerning the state of his own health, about which he generally 
complained, continually alleging, however, that it was improving. 
About every three weeks, and some times oftener, he would sud- 
denly, and without apparent cause, become very angry, his rage 
being generally directed toward some member of the household, 
but usually his father. On these occasions his conduct was, usually, 
very violent, sometimes terminating by his breaking furniture, or 
other articles in the house, or deluging the kitchen-floor with slops 
or hot water, as hereinbefore stated. During one of these angry 
paroxysms, several years ago, he suddenly overturned the table 
at which the family were sitting at their evening meal, thereby 
breaking the table-lamp and crockery into fragments, as I was in- 
formed by his sister, and verily believe. 
Again, about three years since, he suddenly ran into his father's 
library and seizing the table at which his father was taking break- 
fast, threw it across the room with so much violence as to break 
both the table and the crockery thereon, as I was informed by his 
said father, at the time, and verily believe. On another occasion, 
about four years since, he ran into the room where his father, his 
mother^ myself and sons, were taking tea, seized his father's new 
hat, and thereupon, in our presence, instantly tore it into fragments. 
These exhibitions usually came without previous warning or ap- 
parent cause, and were of short duration, lasting from less than 
one minute to about five minutes. 
From the period of my earliest acquaintance with him, he seemed 
to have conceived the most unnatural hatred of and antipathy to- 
ward his father, whom he did not visit in his last illness, and whose 
funeral he could not be induced to, and did not attend. 
I have frequently heard him, in the lifetime of his father, express 12 
the wish that his father was dead; and I have also heard his father 
express the fear that his own life and that of other members of the 
family was in danger of personal violence from said son, and have 
heard his father express the belief that it would become necessary 
to take measures to have his said son placed under restraint. 
I was informed, by his father and sister, that the mental alien- 
ation of said William, who was a student at Columbia College, did 
not manifest itself until he was about nineteen years of age ; when, 
according to information derived from his sister, it was remarked 
that his mind was becoming affected; that subsequently his con- 
duct became strange, and he wandered away from home, without 
his father's consent, going South and remaining for a considerable 
time; that, on his return from the South, he studied for the law, 
in the office and under the direction of his father, who after several 
unsuccessful attempts to instruct, and render him useful in the 
business of his profession, finally, in despair, abandoned the under- 
taking, having become convinced that his mental condition was 
such as to render him wholly unfit for the transaction of its duties; 
that, after thus giving up the attempt to pursue the law, he turned 
his attention to the study of medicine, for which he also proved 
himself to be equally incapable; that, in or about the year 1845, his 
late brother, Gabriel Henry Winter, perceiving his apparent fond- 
ness for the study of medicine, and desirous he should do some- 
thing for his support, purchased for him a small stock of drugs, 
and having placed the same in a small store, then owned by 
said Gabriel Henry, and procured a competent person to su- 
perintend it, established said William there, in the retail drug 
buiness; but that, after about one month's trial, he was found 
to be wholly incompetent, and the business was therefore 
abandoned. I am not aware than any successful attempt was 
afterwards made to get him to do any thing in the way of busi- 
ness. I know, that after repeated attempts to aid him, his father 
finally became convinced that his mental infirmities were such as 
to render him incapable of any useful occupation, and unfit for the 
transaction of business. 
At no period during my acquaintance with said William, did his 
father, to my knowledge or belief, intrust him with the transaction 
of any business whatever; and his father often stated to him, as 
well as to others, that he was not capable of transacting business. 
His father often expressed the opinion that William was of unsound 
mind, treated him as such, and frequently stated that he did not 
intend leaving him any property he could call his own, for the 
alleged reason that he was not capable of taking proper care of it. 13 
In a letter dated Feb. 15, 1859, written by said Gabriel, to his 
(said Gabriel's) sister, he makes the following statements concern- 
ing said William's mental condition and conduct at that time : 
" William is very bad; exhibits decided symptoms of an un- 
sound intellect. His conduct towards me is not only very abusive, 
but violent. I do not consider myself safe in the house with him ; 
* * * and Mrs. Winter and the servants advise me 
to keep away as much as possible. He says that I shall not come 
there. . . Gabriel Winter." 
In another letter, bearing date "Monday, April 23d, 1860," written 
and signed by said Gabriel Winter, he uses the following language 
concerning said William: 
" With respect to my son, he has not, for some years, been of 
perfectly sound mind ; is hypochondriac, flighty, tampers with his 
health, prescribes for himself, and will not have a physician. His 
nervous excitement is so great sometimes as to border very closely 
upon insanity. . . . Gabriel Winter." 
In another letter, under date Thursday, May 31st, 1860, written 
and signed by said Gabriel Winter, he makes use of the following 
concerning said William: 
. . "Of my son's unsoundness of mind I have long been aware, 
and of the danger of his committing personal violence upon me. . . 
Gabriel Winter." 
Seventh. His conduct seems to evince monomania on the subject 
of music, and the purchase of musical instruments; and designing- 
persons have availed themselves of their knowledge of his weak- 
ness in these respects to defraud him of money, by selling to him a 
considerable number of old, and as I believe, nearly worthless 
violins, at exorbitant prices. Although he is incapable of per- 
forming upon a violin, except in a very slight and imperfect man- 
ner, I have counted fourteen violins in his possession, and of which 
he claimed to be the owner. 
Eighth. For many years past said William has been in the 
habit of consuming some of his time in writing in a peculiar man- 
ner, generally using for that purpose refuse-scraps of paper, old 
blank-books, and old cards, as also, to some extent, the doors and 
walls of his room. His manuscripts comprise short quotations, and 
also his own thoughts, and statements of his wrongs and griev- 
ances, real or imaginary. Much of his compositions, evincing but 
little continuity of ideas, containing incongruous juxtaposition of 
fragments, absurd comparisons, rapid transitions and unions of 14 
discordant subjects, relations of imaginary events, very vulgar, 
obscene, and profane sentences and expressions, are interspersed 
with drawings of nude and singular figures and strange objects, 
the whole being jumbled together in disorder and confusion. The 
style of his penmanship is as remarkable as the matter, some of the 
words being written in letters more than two inches long, and 
others on the same line being of the usual size, as will more fully 
appear by some of his manuscripts, marked Exhibit A, No. 1 to 
No. 40 inclusive, hereto annexed.* 
Ninth. Said William Winter, at an early period of his life, be 
came addicted to the practice of the secret vice of onanism, and 
continued the same for many years, as I have been informed and 
verily believe, and as also appears by the evidence furnished by 
his own admissions and statements contained in manuscripts in his 
handwriting, marked Exhibit A, Nos. 2, 5, 8, 14, 39, and 40, and 
also by the extract marked Exhibit E, No. 1, hereto annexed. 
Tenth. His manner when leaving the house was often peculiar; 
he would walk away from the door a few steps, and return, re- 
peating this process several times in as many minutes, and each 
time trying the door, as if to ascertain whether the same be prop- 
erly fastened, as will more fully appear by the manuscript paper, 
in his handwriting, marked Exhibit A, No. 21, and by an extract 
from other of his writings, marked Exhibit E, No. 2, hereto 
annexed. 
Twelfth. His writings and conversation are, for the most part, 
inconsequential; and although he does not seem to possess proper 
reasoning powers, he has a degree of cunning. But his credulity 
and want of judgment are such as to render him incapable, to a 
great extent, of distinguishing what is probable from that which is 
improbable. He evinces fondness for low company, and his man- 
ners are eccentric, and often peculiarly childish. During my resi- 
dence in , in the same house with him, I observed that 
while about the house he was of dirty habits with respect to his 
clothing and room, and manifested a propensity to express himself 
in hyperbolical and filthy language. He generally considered him- 
self to be the especial victim of wrong and oppression. He was 
easily led astray, easily induced to believe the most absurd state- 
ments, yet usually obstinate and unwilling to be advised, except 
when the advice coincided with his own preconceived notions or 
appetites. 
* Of these exhibits, which amount in print to nearly 200 octavo pages, we give a 
few extracts selected at random. 15 
While he was thus residing with me, he was continually ap- 
proached by , an attorney at law, who was a stranger 
to the family, but had, as I am informed and believe, made said 
William's acquaintance about the time of his father's death, and 
who had, since that time, induced said William to permit him to 
act as one of his attorneys, and counsel. 
It soon became apparent that said had obtained a great 
degree of influence and control over said William; and, on or 
about the 4th day of July, 1862, said William left my house, and 
went to reside, and has ever since continued to reside with the 
said , he, said , having, as I am informed and believe, 
given up his former lodgings over his office, where he slept prior 
to, and for several weeks after making said William's acquaint- 
ance, hired a house in this city, to which he removed said Wil- 
liam's personal effects, and in which house he has undertaken house- 
keeping for the express purpose, as I verily believe, of thus getting 
said William to live with him. Said William has recently informed 
me that said had obtained an agreement from him, whereby 
he was to pay him, ( ,) fifteen hundred and twenty dollars a 
year, namely, one thousand dollars for counsel, and five hundred 
and twenty dollars for board. 
Said William has stated to me, and I believe such to be the fact, 
that he had never known or seen said until after his 
father's death, on the 27th of February, 1862. On the 22d July, 
1862, in giving testimony before his Honor Judge Alker, of the 
Marine Court, in an action between John Henry Wright, plaintiff, 
and said William Winter, defendant, being asked, on cross-exam- 
ination, how he became acquainted with , said William tes- 
tified as follows: 
" I became acquainted with by a God-send: it was 
through a heavenly source, and came down from above. He is a 
true friend, and I hope I shall find other like friends.'1'1 
Sixteenth. On the 17th day of March, 1862, upon my applica- 
tion, an order was made, by this Court, at a special term thereof, 
at the City Hall, in the city of Brooklyn, in King's County, said 
William then being a resident of the county of , in such dis- 
trict, that a commission de lunatico inquirendo should issue against 
said William; and on the 26th day of the same month such com- 
mission wyas thereupon issued, directed to . A jury was 
thereupon summoned, by virtue of such commission, for the 31st 
day of March, 1862, on which day the said commissioners, said 
Winter, and , his counsel, met, and without swearing any 16 
jury or taking any other proceeding, than naming a committee, 
consisting of , medical experts, to inspect the said William 
Winter, and examine him, as to his mental condition, by the 
consent of the parties, adjourned to the 7th of April, 1862. The 
said physicians thereupon inspected and examined said William ; 
but, on the 5th of April, 1862, and before they had concluded 
their investigation, I signed a stipulation with said , that 
such proceeding should be discontinued ; and on the 7th of April, 
1862, and before said physicians had made their report, upon 
the consent of both parties to such proceeding, an order was duly 
made and entered, by this Court, at a special term thereof, held for 
the second judicial district, at Brooklyn aforesaid, that the said 
order of March 17th, 1862, should be, and the same was, thereby 
vacated, the said commission superseded and all proceedings there- 
under discontinued. 
Seventeenth. For more than twenty years last past, his mind 
has been, and now is, in a condition of legal unsoundness, as I 
verily believe, and as will more fully appear by the exhibits hereto 
annexed; I verily believe that he is incapable of governing him- 
self or managing his affairs; that he is wholly unfit to manage 
property or protect his own interests; that if left to the manage- 
ment of himself and his affairs, he will become the victim of fraud 
or folly, whereby his estate will be wasted or squandered, or he 
will, in some fraudulent manner, be deprived thereof. 
EXHIBIT A. 
\Being Manuscript in the Handwriting of William Winter.] 
No. 1. 
Enamoured Spiritualist. " Who will show us any Good. ? ? ? " 
Ans. ' My Kingdom is not of this world! '- Christ. ' A Tale just 
one that memory keeps For golden music-' till some ' chance ' Vi- 
brate the chord whereon it sleeps.' The Withering Curse. W P. 
Willis. ' Curse God and Die.' Job. 
At the age of Fourty four, four months, and seventeen days, I 
resided with my Parents in the Village, and kept constant com- 
pany at Hicks'' '■Pavilion.'' Being in a ' Psychologic state' from 
ill health arising from Acrasy of the Brain or Dementia. 1 " who 
shall show us any Good ? " He shall enter into his House 1 page 
2 "Without our shame; within our consciences-Angels and 
grace eternal hopes and fears. Yet all these fences and their 17 
whole array One cunning Bosom-Sin blows quite away," on 
Title-page of ' E. S.' George Herbert. Fell into the ' Turba' of 
Death: June 23, 1849. 
" There is a Divinity that shapes our Ends Rough-hew them as 
we will." K. " When he that is guilty most thinks him secure 
Heaven's vengeance against him is nearly mature." : ' the under- 
standing (or "Reason") only perceives facts and draws infer- 
ences this induction is completed and after it experiences no 
tendency to Adore the God whom it has discovered." Combe on 
' Veneration! 
EXHIBIT A. 
[Being Manuscript in the Handwriting of William Winter!\ 
No. 4. 
G. The Almighty-there's not much to love about him-and if 
he wants us to Fear (!) he's a Fiend. The Almighty himself is 
Two=faced to wit-the Fire Hidden by Light Spirits -|- Between 
two Fires. " Those that " Use " y Sword Shall Die by the Sword. 
Friendship. Love & Hate are Stimulants of Life. God-as a 
Ruler-is a Disgrace to Himself. Ed. Eglee. ' Why havn't you 
been over our way ? ' Winter. i oh, it was an accident ' (!) Ed. E. 
' I hope yoti won't Die by an ' Accident '! ' Why ?' Because I 
want you to die a natural Death, and ink. Edward Eglee, (and 
not ' out of Common = course) : ' Turba takes it-and makes a 
figure of it! ' does Behmen say so. K. and in the very same con- 
versation spoke of mine being an ' unnatural Father'! (such a man 
as that is ! Burling P. Wright, &c) and also in the very same 
conversation made use of the words 'we're never satisfied! ! D 
" Search the Scriptures." : " The Spirits searches thro' all things: 
even y Deep things of God." Spiritual Raps" St Paul. A 
" God is the great-out=worker who by his works-shows his 
attributes "Revd. Dr. Bethune " on Works & Labor." N. Y. Tri- 
bune of Jan. 19 | 54. 9. "For we shall here describe a very earn- 
est matter: -viz. (Duality of God): : " De not deceived, God is 
not mocked" : he has in his Power Heaven & Hell "(order" and 
dis" order") or Harmonious Dischor. 'Particular Hell!': 23. 
Behmen. Ques. 30 on tomb=rstone : nail in Sure place " or Goad 
(God) : For from the History of the (of the Bible none 
should take upon him to \ be a master (or call himself a knower 
of the Essence of God-but from the Holy=Ghost (which ap- 
peareth in another Principle: viz., in the Third: for none can find 18 
God,, without the Holy Ghost: Behmen's Works, p. 7. call Bible : 
" I never could get the-sense o' that " (viz: the ' Harmonious Dis- 
chord)" Harry Vale. Harry French Little Catskill er at Howards. 
"Salus Populi Supremalex." We-The people-will put Hell to 
any man that does not come up to the chalk=line of Duty (to his 
father) 23F3 There was a whole ' Posse ' of them ! ' Squire Wil- 
lets ' I'll set the Hounds on to you ! B. A. 
EXHIBIT A. 
[Being Manuscript in the Handwriting of William Winter.] 
No. 5. 
' A victim of Sensuality and Paralysis of mind the following 
morning I remained late in bed: the following reflections there 
came across my mind, to wit, that ' The Sensual life has always 
proved to be a blind delusion and a bitter disappointment. Its 
realizations are widely different from its flattering promises, &c. 
82. A victim of Sensuality and consequent Paralysis of Brain 
Mind, the following morning I remained late in bed. Biondetta, 
you know not what you are about, ' in the day that you eat of my 
body I shalt surely die!Genesis 166. A victim of "disguised 
selfishness" it laid me open defenceless to my enemy, who abused 
his power and made Errata, for Paralysis of Mind-but Paralysis 
of Brain-see above. 
When our repast was ended, they proposed taking a walk to' 
wards y Ruins of Gehenna. We immediately set off 'Arrived. 
56 He was sitting on the side of his bath, placidly gazing in a 
mirror, whether or no it was y ' Mirror of the Graces ' we are at 
present utterly unable to determine. You had evoked the adver- 
sary of souls, and supplied him by a long series of indiscretions. 
I had no sooner spoken the word than the Earth opened just out- 
side the circle and swallowed the dog; and from the chasm thereof 
issued a sulphurous flame, which though more ' blue ' in its tint, 
yet rivalled in majesty the rays of the noon=day sun. The earth 
closed the flame was extinguished, when, as soon as my eyes had 
recovered their vision, I beheld a woman in the place the dog had 
just occupied, might ennoble my essence: with inward pain my 
heart=strings sound, I groan with fiendish spite Horror and fear 
beset me round 223 Among the Shades of Night how could 
I hesitate long, to adopt those measures by which I might ennoble 
my Essence and become another Principle. 19 
When I had ended nay story, he collected himself a little and 
said: ' Your Guilt is all your mm ; you had evoked the Destroy- 
ing Angel throughout the whole course of your life, and supplied 
the Prince of Darkness-by a long series of indiscretions-but 
more particularly that of Portici-with the various disguises that 
might. 
Shortly after the discontinuance of the proceedings 
under the above Commission de Lunatico in April, 
1862, Winter went to reside with his self-appointed 
guardian, the lawyer heretofore alluded to; and having 
received moneys from tune to time from his father's 
estate, evidently disposed of it for the benefit of others 
more than himself. From April, 1862, to January, 1863, 
a period of nine months, he received $2,150, of which 
he gave the following account: 
Expended at his home, (for what not stated,) - - $283 
Paid on account of law proceeding, (meaning the Commis- 
mission de Lunatico^ which it will be remembered 
never sat nor came to a trial,) - - $375 
Paid Mr. 's allowance (his counsel,) - - 500 
Purchase of family articles at auction, - - - 104 
Outlay for iron safe, and other articles, - - 300 
Personal expenses, ... . . 200 
Board, - . . - . . 260 
$2,022 
I owe , (mentioning foui' lawyers by name, 
and others,) ..... $500 
Recalling the fact that this man had voluntarily lived 
on the same plane as his father's servants, or even lower, 
so far as dress or wages were concerned; that no change 
in his habits occurred from April to December, 1862; 
that he was a bachelor, and boarding at as cheap a rate 
as a mechanic, and that no legal proceedings occurred 
during that time to which he was a party, except the 
Commission de Lunatico, which Commission, issued on 20 
the 19th of March and discontinued April 7th, never 
came to a final hearing-recalling these things, it 
will be seen that the expenditures in superfluous fees 
to counsel, the first one of whom was immensely over- 
paid, and the four others, unnecessary in every sense- 
all exhibited an utter ignorance of his real condition; an 
incapacity to use money prudently, or to protect himself 
against imposition and undue influence; and lastly, 
mental weakness in submitting himself and his property 
to the dictation of an unprincipled lawyer. 
In view of these circumstances, a second Commission 
de Lunatico was issued upon the petition of his relatives 
in January, 1863, and upon the trial of the issue therein 
raised, all the allegations set forth in the affidavit here- 
inbefore quoted were verified and corroborated by a 
large number of witnesses who had personally known 
Winter for many years. It is here that the chief in- 
terest in the case centres so far as the testimony of 
experts is concerned, and it is here also that the question 
will naturally suggest itself whether a Commission in 
Lunacy, without a single psychological expert upon it, 
deserves to be considered in law as a competent tri- 
bunal. 
The composition of every court is always understood 
to be related to the nature of the subject matters with 
which it deals. Wherever these matters greatly differ 
in their essential character it has been found not only 
expedient but necessary to create correspondingly dif- 
ferent courts to adjudicate upon them. Hence, the origin 
of separate tribunals with separate jurisdictions; hence, 
the origin of Courts of Common Law, of Equity and of 
Admiralty; courts with and courts without juries, 
Courts of Nisi Prius and Courts of Appeal. As a rule 
of practice based upon the necessities of qualification, 
and universally recognized as most equitable to all 21 
parties in interest, the same judge never presides in two 
courts of essentially different jurisdiction. The wisdom 
of this course is too obvious to require comment, and 
the rule is in itself the best test of a high civilization. 
In the course of a trial counsel are often called upon 
to demur to the jurisdiction of a court. This plea will 
always be listened to if offered at a proper time. But 
courts are not equally ready to have their composition 
questioned, because it is an undoubted reflection upon 
their competency or impartiality, and the point in con- 
sequence is seldom raised. 
Nevertheless the fact remains patent, that in a special 
tribunal created to try a special issue like insanity, some 
degree of special acquaintance with that issue should be 
represented in the composition of the court. It is not 
like an ordinary Nisi Prius trial, where insanity is in- 
troduced as an interlocutory plea, whose validity is to 
affect the general issue. There the question must be 
adjudged according to the rules of the forum in which 
it is raised. For it is part of a system of pleading, 
though subordinate always to the main question under 
discussion. The court therefore must decide it in situ, 
and under the best light it can obtain from experts 
summoned for that purpose. It is different however 
with Commissions of Lunacy. They are tribunals 
created for a specific purpose, and for no other. They 
have no discretionary powers outside of the field of 
their appointed duties, and those duties are purely in- 
quisitorial. Hence, they differ legally as much from 
any other tribunals as these do among themselves; and 
though derivative in character, and their judgments 
without legal value until affirmed by a superior court, 
they are still entitled to be constituted with some rela- 
tion to the subject matters coming before them. 
It should not therefore require any argument to 22 
show that, upon the simplest principles of analogy and 
justice, a Commission of Lunacy can never be a com- 
petent tribunal to try such an issue where one or more 
experts are not members of the court. Nor can we see 
how the presence of a jury adds aught to the compe- 
tency of the tribunal, or the illumination of its inves- 
tigations. Certainly, the summoning of experts is a 
virtual confession of the want of light by some one, 
and inasmuch as the jury are to be the final triers of the 
issue, it is plain that it is more on their account than 
that of the Commissioners that experts are called. In 
other words, in enlarging the court, we have diminished 
its competency. The conclusion which follows is inev- 
itable. If a judge can sit in equity without a jury, and 
administer justice impartially, simply because he is 
both competent and honest, by parity of reason a Com- 
mission of Lunacy properly constituted can as justly, 
in the same way, determine an issue of insanity. Num- 
bers by themselves can add nothing to the competency 
of a tribunal, where one branch of it is notoriously be- 
low the level of the other in judicial capacity. Nor, 
because insanity is an issue of fact can a jury of laymen 
decide it better than expert commissioners, or, even be 
of any assistance to the latter in helping them to a con- 
clusion. It is always seen that experts have to be 
summoned for the purpose of illuminating the minds 
of the jury, because, although the latter are judges of 
the facts, they are not able to pass upon them until 
they have first first been taught how to read and inter- 
pret their value. The competency of a lay jury to de- 
cide an issue of insanity is thus shown to owe its origin 
solely to the agency of experts. In the presence of 
these facts, we are forced to the conclusion that the in- 
troduction of a jury into an Inquisition of Lunacy is 
superfluous, and more of a hindrance than a help to the 
discovery of truth. 23 
It is generally thought, upon a superficial view of the 
elements out of which a Commission of Lunacy should 
be formed, that, by placing a physician upon it, the 
medical qualification of the court is sufficiently secured. 
But any physician is not qualified, virtute officii, to 
supply the court with that measure of light upon the 
subject of insanity which it needs in forming its delib- 
erations. The fact that the Commissioners may sum- 
mon to their aid experts is not sufficient, either, in itself 
to supplement this deficiency of special knowledge in 
the court. Its judgment, as a rational exposition of the 
relations of allegations to proofs in the determination 
of an issue of insanity, can only be properly pronounced 
by those who are professionally habituated to inquiries 
of this kind. The law of truth springing from con- 
traries is nowhere more signally exhibited than in in- 
vestigations of this class, and as between a non-expert 
physician and a lawyer sitting to examine witnesses, 
the lawyer would have the superior advantage in elicit- 
ing facts, even though at the same time, neither he, nor 
the ordinary physician could set their proper value upon 
such facts, or apply them with the greatest scientific 
accuracy to solving problems compounded of physical, 
mental and moral manifestations. Both would simply 
be in the condition of Milton's angels, who 
" reasoned high, 
Of Providence, foreknowledge, will and fate, 
Fix'd fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute, 
And found no end, in wandering mazes lost.'1'1 
Winter's case was tried with extreme care and fair- 
ness. The issue was too plain in presenti to afford 
much ground for special pleading. A score of ordinary 
witnesses substantiated the allegations set forth in the 
affidavit heretofore quoted by us, and the numerous 24 
volumes of distempered and incoherent compositions in 
Winter's own handwriting, dating back a score of years, 
were an unanswerable proof of mental weakness, such 
as has no necessary connection with simple eccentricity. 
The point to be decided was one relating, not to his 
present, so much as to his future capacity. It was a 
point which rested upon past and present facts, and 
which, assuming the laws of nature to be immutable, 
was, ex hypothesi, demonstrable by the experience of 
experts in this, their habitual and therefore legitimate 
field of inquiry. The circumstantial proofs sustained 
the allegations of the petitioners, and the experts not 
only expressed their opinions corroboratory of these 
statements, but in giving their opinion of future capa- 
city were sustained by legal presumptions as well as 
by their special experience. 
Divested of all adventitious coloring, the issue was 
simply this, " Whether a man who, for thirty years had 
shown all those traits of character which belong to imbe- 
cility, and had shown no other, was competent to take 
personal charge of a large estate, having never had any 
experience whatever in business, nor been accustomed to 
handle any but the smallest sums of money f Of course 
this was, in the eyes of laymen, a pure question of fore- 
knowledge bordering upon prophecy, and the experts 
introduced by the petitioners labored under the disad- 
vantage of being compelled to assume that, which they 
could not bring proofs absolute to support. In every 
ordinary proposition, something is always omitted, be- 
cause understood to be generally conceded. Every 
conclusion of judgment, implies antecedent though 
latent premises. As for instance, if we say " the sun 
will rise to-morrow at six," it is understood that we 
mean, "provided always the economy of nature con- 
tinues as in the past." This is not prophecy, but log- 
ical inference, susceptible of demonstration. 25 
From the very first it was seen that the dfficulty of 
establishing the fact of future incompetency would arise 
from two causes, viz., first, the inability to prove acts of 
wantom extravagance in the past, and second from that 
delusive creed of the multitude, that no one knows what 
will occur in the future. Between these two horns of 
the dilemma the petitioners were compelled to take 
their position. On the first point indeed they could 
adduce some proof, as for instance the many violins 
purchased, and the unnecessary employment of counsel. 
But to both these allegations a rejoinder might be, and 
was made to the effect that the former argued simple 
eccentricity through love of music; the latter might be 
due as much to the wishes of counsel askino- for as- 
o 
sistance, as to the weakness of mind of the defendant. 
In any event the point was not considered pivotal, nor 
one determining anything in relation to his future con- 
duct. Seven physicians examined on behalf of the 
petitioners, agreed substantially in their diagnosis of 
imbecility, and several among them, well recognized as 
experts in insanity, unhesitatingly pronounced that it 
was unsafe to entrust a mind as weak as Winter's with 
the charge of a large estate. Judging by analogy from 
the case of a child, whom all would agree was not com- 
petent to handle large sums of money, however sane he 
might otherwise be, we should say that this opinion of 
experts relating to a man of fifty, with a mind never 
advanced beyond that of childhood, was an opinion rest- 
ing as much upon common sense as upon scientific skill 
and circumstantial evidence. To all men who are will- 
ing to see, this judgment seemed inevitable from the 
premises. It was the only one which could be logically 
defended under the light of positive demonstration. 
The problem as stated to the jury upon uncontradicted 
evidence was simply this: Given a man proved to have 26 
continued an imbecile for thirty years, and what is the 
inference as to his future capacity to manage a large 
estate ? 
To be sure it would have seemed like arrogant pre- 
sumption in the experts to aver that they hnew his 
future incapacity. They did not undertake however to 
speak as prophets nor absolutely in relation to the cer- 
tainty of this fact, but simply as to their belief in the 
premises, for they spoke only as men of science, and 
science does certainly possess the faculty of prevision. If 
science be worth anything it is precisely for the reve- 
lation it makes to us of fundamental laws, under whose 
government the world of matter exists. Nor, because 
of our inability to trace the operations of the mind, 
are we authorized to infer that it is above the reach of 
analogical laws specially adapted to its own character. 
The acceptance of this proposition as a necessity flow- 
ing out of our moral freedom would force us at once 
into a domain of chaos, where education becomes an 
absurdity, and all is left to chance or miracles. 
It is unquestionably true that we can legally prove 
little or nothing relating to the causes of mental manifes- 
tations. Remembering this embarassment in matters 
belonging to the present, it would seem to follow that 
the perplexities of the problem must increase with the 
length of the perspective. But in reality this is not so. 
For, we can as little infer what will happen a minute 
hence as a century hence; and contrariwise, what should 
happen under a recognized system of laws an hour 
hence, should, under similar circumstances, happen a 
century hence. All that is necessary to prove is estab- 
lished and immutable laws, whence must flow the corol- 
lary of similar effects from similar causes. The weak- 
ness of Winter's mind was proved, and although there 
was some quibbling over the term imbecility as applied 27 
to its condition, it remained an uncontradicted fact that 
he had made a foolish and injudicious use of the little 
money received by him, which fact when taken in con- 
nection with the state of mind in which he had been 
for thirty years, justified the experts in asserting their 
belief in his future incapacity to handle large sums of 
money. 
To all these propositions the defence argued speciously 
that what seemed weakness of mind in money matters 
was nothing more than any man might exhibit, who, 
never having had any experience in financial operations, 
begins his acquaintance with them by committing errors. 
When the best financiers in Wall Street, with the ripe 
experience of a life time before them, occasionally missed 
their mark and were ruined, was it to be wondered at, 
or unexpected, that a novice should err in his first use of 
money ? And after all how did men ever acquire pru- 
dence except by the experience of loss ? To argue that 
a man was unfit to control a large estate because he had 
never previously done so, was to say that no man should 
ever be allowed to acquire more means than he had: 
that he should never undertake what he had never be- 
fore done, and finally, that we must all stand still until 
we had first learned to walk. 
In reference to the opinion of the experts, other 
physicians were called to show that they did not con- 
sider the respondent absolutely incompetent to transact 
business. They thought him an eccentric and weak 
man, but they had seen others as weak as he transact 
business, and they could not pronounce him less com- 
petent to manage a large estate than any similarly 
inexperienced person. Under this light counsel argued 
that it was impossible to foreknow what a man would, 
or would not do, under varying circumstances; and 
as every one was entitled to do with his own what- 28 
ever he pleased, so long as no one was injured thereby, 
the respondent was at least entitled to a trial, and 
if found squandering his property and unable to man- 
age it, then it would be time enough to restrain him 
in its control. The jury were also told that experts 
can only interpret the present and actual, but never the 
future and potential. That in these latter respects they 
are on a footing with other men, and their opinions of 
no greater consequence. How, for instance, could any 
man foreknow how another would act under circum- 
stances not yet in existence? And if we could only 
judge of the future from the past, how could it be said 
that a man not only was, but was to be incompetent in 
the future who had never been tested in the present ? 
If Winter had never managed a large estate, how could 
any one know that he was not competent now, or would 
not be in time ? His previous life was treated simply 
as that of an eccentric man whose pride had been 
wounded by an unkind and parsimonious father, and 
who had acquiesced from necessity in the position of 
dependence and social inferiority occupied by him. 
These points, founded in sophistry, yet appealing to 
popularly accepted ideas of the legitimate range of 
human knowledge, produced their desired effect upon 
the minds of the jury. Prognosis to laymen is simply 
absurd, if not unintelligible. They believe, indeed, 
that, somehow or other, by figures mixed with guess- 
work, an astronomer foretells an eclipse, because every 
year affords recorded proof of this fact. But when it 
comes to human conduct, there is a superstitious haze 
surrounding incentives, causes of action and powers of 
self-control, which, with the multitude serves to obscure 
the intellectual vision, and the man who undertakes to 
pierce through these mental cobwebs and apply sys- 
tematic laws to the government of this interior realm, is 29 
considered to be somewhere between a fool and an 
atheist. Yet the wonders of transmutation daily ef- 
fected by modern chemistry so far transcend the wildest 
dreams of mediaeval experimenters that this age, rather 
than theirs deserves to be called the age of romance, as 
well as the age of positivism and law. The inquisition 
which condemned Galileo would have made an auto da 
fe of Sir Humphrey Davy, Faraday or Morse. A man 
who could convert a dung-heap into the most fragrant 
extracts for the toilet; or obtain from sooty coal-tar the 
most brilliant and variegated colors; or make a messen- 
ger-boy of the lightning, would, in the early colonial 
days of our own country, have been punished as a sor- 
cerer. 
It is true that the triumphs achieved by physcholog- 
ical medicine within the same time, may not have been 
as glittering to the eye, or as exciting to the imagina- 
tion as those accomplished by chemistry, but they have 
been so magnificent of their kind, as shown in the 
greater number of recoveries, and the general ameliora- 
tion of all the conditions of the insane, that the treat- 
ment of insanity to-day is, in the largest proportion of 
acute cases, one which give as logical foundations for 
forming a correct prognosis, as in most bodily diseases. 
In fact the rules of recovery as between acute and chronic 
cases are found to be analogous to those regulating other 
diseases. These laws are familiar to experts. They 
cannot be known of course to the world at large. 
When all these facts are taken into consideration, no 
one will be surprised that a jury of laymen placed be- 
tween the difficulties of intricate scientific problems, 
and the incapacity of those frequently undertaking to 
expound them, should, at times find themselves led 
into realms of mystification where all the roads seem to 
cross each other, and all the guide-boards speak in a 
foreign tongue. 30 
As has been doubtless anticipated, the jury found for 
the respondent's competency. In doing this they im- 
agined themselves protecting an innocent man against 
the cupidity of relatives. The sequel shortly proved 
that their verdict placed this unfortunate imbecile not 
only pecuniarily in the power of those who surrounded 
him, but that even his person was subjected to restraint 
and sequestration by them. A few brief lines will 
suffice to complete this dismal epic. Soon after the de- 
feat of the Commission de Lunatico, Winter executed a 
deed of trust to an unprincipled lawyer, who there- 
upon took charge of his property. He himself disap- 
peared from public view, and once or twice in the 
interval of several years was seen clad in his usual 
slovenly way, and exhibiting the same traits of incura- 
ble imbecility. 
Meanwhile his trustee giving evidence of a wealth 
somewhat rapidly accumulated, some two years ago 
proceedings were sought to be instituted against him 
in Equity, by Winter's relatives, for the statement of 
an account, and on attempting to make service of papers 
upon the cestui que trust, and to have him unite in the 
proceedings, his locus in quo could not, after many 
months of fruitless search, be ascertained. There is no 
doubt that he was kept concealed either voluntarily, by 
being told that another commission was impending, or 
perhaps involuntarily, and through coercion, without 
sanction of law. This virtual restraint of his person 
has continued for several years, and may, for aught 
that we know, still continue. This is not the place to 
inquire what remedy exists in our jurisprudence for 
such a wrong. Under the general maxim, Ubi jus ibi 
remedium there doubtless is one. But he to whom 
this remedy primarily belongs, either cannot, or will 
not move in the premises, and in order to invoke the in- 31 
tervention of a court of equity, wrongful acts must be 
shown, which it may be difficult to prove absolutely, 
balancing as they do between torts and breaches of trust. 
Our motive in commenting upon this most instructive 
case was mainly to show that the value and precision of 
skilled testimony is generally underrated because not 
understood. We have endeavored to show the found- 
ations upon which it rests, and the causes which render 
it less fallible than ordinary testimony. Nor do we 
think the differences of opinion occasionally occurring 
between alleged experts any refutation of our doctrine. 
There are, and can be, no true oppositions in science. 
The Apostle Paul properly stigmatized such ideas as 
errors, because " falsely so-called." It must be remem- 
bered also that many men are called experts ex comitate, 
who are not so in fact when critically examined. We 
cannot tell from a man's opinions what his competency 
is, until we examine the evidence upon which those 
opinions are formed. Sir Matthew Hale writing the his- 
tory of the Common Law, is a different man, mentally, 
from Sir Matthew Hale presiding at the trial of witches. 
In both instances he judged from circumstantial evi- 
dence, but in the one he saw its import clearly, in the 
other darkly and as through a glass. 
All men are not equally trained in the art of sifting 
evidence, and until the law of antinomies be mastered, 
how few there are who acquire experimental knowledge 
of the fact that truth springs from contraries. Without 
this experimental test any man can find refutation at the 
end of every universal proposition; for when modal con- 
ditions are excluded from particular instances, the point 
is soon reached where affirmation and negation meet. 
This is the quicksand in which experts sink who attempt 
to justify their opinions to others by too much amplifi- 
cation of application. They lose themselves midway of 32 
similarity and identity, and being thus readily confuted 
in their conclusions, the idea arises of a practical disa- 
greement between them, when in fact it is only a differ- 
ence in the angle of vision under which the subject is 
viewed. 
To obviate this tendency, which springs from the 
dialectic necessities of an oral examination, let the in- 
terrogatories be propounded in writing, and agreed 
upon between the parties as in commissions to take 
testimony, and we feel sure that differences toto coelo 
between experts will become in future so rare as to be 
considered exceptional, instead of usual. It is more often 
counsel that force experts to disagree than any virtual 
difference of opinion between them. When, therefore, 
the expert is allowed that freedom of mental action in 
which no conclusions are forced upon him by premises 
of another's selection, but only by those of his own, 
then he will cease to be treated as a party witness, and 
stand where he belongs as an amicus curiae, whose 
opinion is in itself a judgment to guide as well as to 
inform the court. 
CHEMICAL EXPERTS. 
We cannot bring this discussion to a close without 
anticipating the refutation which may be offered by the 
citation of disagreements between a class of experts, 
whose labors are performed in the field of molecular 
physics. We allude now to chemical experts, partic- 
ularly when engaged in making qualitative analyses. 
But the fact of a disagreement does not necessarily 
imply a positive contradiction, nor is it unsusceptible 
of explanation, or even reconciliation, with the theory 
under discussion. Chemistry per se is one of the most 
precise of sciences, being in fact a branch of positive 
mathematics. Her results can be expressed in written 33 
formulae, having definite numbers representing ratios of 
equivalent combination. No error can occur in her 
laws, because nature never contradicts herself. The dis- 
agreements of experts can only arise from want of skill 
in laboratory manipulations or dishonesty. With the 
latter, as a purely moral question, we have nothing to 
do, since it is beyond the purview of our inquiry. As 
to the former, it is sufficient to say that, no man can be 
considered a chemical expert who is not a proficient in 
laboratory manipulations. The presumption of this 
proficiency must be sought for in general reputation no 
less than habitual occupation. If a man be truly an 
expert and honest, then the charge of paucity of tests, 
or inferiority of instruments employed in a given re- 
search, can never be laid at his door, because of the 
necessary number of the former, or quality of the latter 
he must ever remain an acknowledged and competent 
judge. . 
Again, when it comes to the question of whether 
all possible means of discovery in analysis have been 
exhausted, it may be said that whatever is universally 
regarded as a characteristic test is as absolute proof in 
itself, as though that one test had been multiplied into 
fifty others; and while, relatively to the • importance of 
a subject like the search for a poison in a case of homi- 
cide, it is eminently proper that an expert should dupli- 
cate and triplicate his proofs, he should not be com- 
pelled to go beyond a reasonable point even in this 
particular. Cumulative evidence indefinitely collected 
gathers no additional value from the fact of its extent. 
The fall of one apple proves the law of gravitation just 
as indubitably as a shower of meteorites. Where, there- 
fore, an expert of unquestionable skill finds a substance 
by two or more characteristic tests, it is not a disagree- 
ment in fact, if another expert could not find it short of 34 
ten or twenty, and would not have been able to recog- 
nize it through the fewer tests employed by the first 
experimenter. For, if an indestructible substance exists 
in combination with any given body, there is a greater 
presumption that a chemical expert will be able to dis- 
cover it, than that he will not; and if no such substance 
be there present, there is a greater presumption of his 
discovering this fact, than there is of his producing 
such a substance in the course of his manipula- 
tions, and mistaking it for an original constituent of 
the body under examination. These presumptions 
flow from that law of disjunctive judgments, in which, 
to quote the very terse words of Sir William Hamilton, 
" a plurality of judgments are contained, and which 
stand in such a reciprocal relation, that the affirmation 
of one is the denial of the other."*