MENTAL INHIBITION, 
OR SELF CONTROL; 
AND 
ITS RELATION TO LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY. 
THE TENTH ANNUAL ADDRESS 
BEFORE THE 
AMSTERDAM MEDICAL SOCIETY, 
BY 
I . ( 
CHARLES STOVER, M. D., 
JANUARY 8tn, 1895 
AMSTERDAM, N. Y. MENTAL INHIBITION, OR SELF CONTROL; 
AND ITS RELATION TO LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY. 
At the outset, let us examine upon what basis the doctrine of 
inhibition rests. The physiologist has determined that the 
functions of different organs of the body are subjected to two op- 
posing influences, transmitted along different nerve tracts from 
special ganglia. These latter have been called the inhibitory and 
accelerator centers. Inhibitory influence upon the circulatory 
system is observed in the act of fainting, whereby the blood ves- 
sels are narrowed to such a degree that the normal blood supply 
to the brain is reduced and paleness of the surface and even faint- 
ing result. The opposite condition is seen in the flushing of the 
face by an emotion, as of rage or of shame, when the blood 
mounts to the surface, and the blood vessels are dilated to the 
verge of paralysis. Perhaps everyone in his own person is fa- 
miliar with a disturbance of the heart's action, at one time a vio- 
lent palpitation that may excite his apprehension, and at another 
time an irregular slowing or skipping of the regular beat. Here 
are again shown the opposing forces of acceleration and inhibi- 
tion. So too we have observed the inhibitory action of mental 
worry in arresting normal digestion. A meal may remain in the 
stomach not only a few hours, but even for a day and the func- 
tions of digestion be almost completely arrested by the inhibitory 
influence of the pneumogastric nerve. The flow of saliva maybe 
excited, through the olfactory nerves by the smell of food; through 
the optic nerves by the sight of it, or the auditory nerves by the 
sounds associated with its preparation. Mental emotion may both 
[Note.] No one can discuss this subject without repeating Clouston ; and the writer 
without apology acknowledges the free use of his pages. 2 
accelerate and inhibit the salivary secretion. [Kirke.] Now, it 
may be observed that many of these phenomena are simple in- 
stances of reflex action, wherein vegetative functions originating 
in the spinal cord and common to all animal life are exercised; 
while others involve mental emotions and are dependent upon 
cerebral action. The act of blushing may be one or the other. 
A man about to suffer the amputation of a finger, clutches firmly 
the arm of his chair, bites upon his unlighted cigar and insists up- 
on the operation being done without an anaesthetic. He never 
once allows his muscles to interfere with its progress. Ordinar- 
ily the pain gives rise to a reflex action that finds expression in 
muscular resistance and audible cries, but these may be kept in 
subjection by the exercise of mental inhibition. If the feet are 
tickled, we can by an effort of will prevent their being drawn up 
by reflex action. The pugilist trains himself to not shut his eyes 
when a blow is aimed at his head, but reflexively, the tendency to 
wink is present. 
These instances might be multiplied indefinitely. They go to 
show that what we call will-power distinguishes an individual both 
by its presence and absence. Probably the strongest will may be 
overcome, as is shown by the incident related by Darwin. He 
placed his face closely against the cobra's cage in the reptile 
house at the Zoological Gardens, and when the snake struck furi- 
ously at the intervening glass, the strongest effort could not pre- 
vent his starting back, although well convinced that no harm 
could follow. Contrariwise, the weak will, so conspicuous in an 
impulsive nature may be strengthened if some stimulus is exerted. 
The late Dr. Wm. Goodell used to relate the story of an extem- 
pore assistant at an operation of emergency, who was deputed to 
hold a lamp. The lamp was seen to waver, the hand trembled, 
and the face paled. The moment was critical. The Doctor said, 
"Don't you dare drop that lamp. If you do, I'll-I'll-I'll-pick 
you with a pin." The doctor by his vehemence at first aroused her 
freight, and secondly her laughter by the trivial penalty. The his- 
tory of faith-cures all testify to the powerful stimulation of con- 3 
trol centers in the brain. The blind are made to see, the deaf to 
hear, the lame to walk, by means of controlling the mind. Vol- 
umes have been written upon the vagaries of feeble invalids, who 
simulate every known nervous disease, yet who astonish their 
friends by a rapid recovery due to conditions that involve the 
stimulation of neglected ganglionic control centers of the cere- 
brum. So much experimental work has been done during the last 
twenty years in the physiological laboratory, so many clinical de- 
monstrations made by the surgeon, in many instances supple- 
mented by the review of post-mortem examinations, that they have 
settled beyond any question, the precise areas in the cortical grey 
matter of the brain, whereby many of the muscular movements 
and other functions of the body are controlled. Let there be a 
morbid action of the leg, arm, fingers, toes, trunk, head, or of 
speech or facial expression, the surgeon is able to locate the seat 
of the disorder within quite narrow limits. So well are these con- 
trol-centers determined, if the surface of the brain is exposed, a 
faradic current of electricity may be applied here and there to 
develop involuntary muscular movements at the will of the oper- 
ator. 
Now it may be said, that all these illustrations indicate nothing 
more than the reflex responses to external stimuli, different in de- 
gree only from those that characterize the lower animals; and that 
mental inhibition or control involves no spontaneity, such as is 
implied by the principle of legal responsibility. This is a terri- 
tory into whose mazes we will not be beguiled. It is the battle- 
field of metaphysics fought over inch by inch, through 
all the ages, the opposing contestants forever waging war- 
fare, but neither being left upon the field in acknowledged 
supremacy. It is the Arlington of the logicians, dotted by the 
monumental tombs of departed giants in intellect, who have 
evolved much to bewilder, but little to satisfy humanity. On 
the one hand is the contention that the gray matter of the brain 
is simply a tissue, as an hepatic cell is a tissue; that thought is a 
secretion, as the bile is a secretion; that there is no such proper- 4 
ty as consciousness, that we are automatons; on the other hand it 
is claimed that man is in the image of his Creator endowed by di- 
vine interposition with consciousness, a will and a soul. We will 
not discuss these opposing hypotheses. In the search after truth 
let us be ready to acknowledge a limitation to our knowledge, and 
avoid celestial flights toward infinity. 
Metaphysics has too often led captive and enchained to its 
ponderous car the learned professions, to soil the priestly robe 
with the mud of bigotry, to drag the ermine in the dust, and 
ignominiously brand the disciple of the healing art as infidel and 
skeptic. Ecclesiastical superstition has sometimes regarded many 
forms of religious insanity as godly piety, and religious lunatics 
have passed for saints. So far as the safety and comfort of so- 
ciety go, it is necessary that we rest upon the solid ground that a 
man must possess inhibitory power, or self control if he is to be 
considered responsible; and if he does not have this, he must pay 
some penalty because of his irresponsibility. Anything less leads 
to chaos. Medicine and law have not at all timesagreed as to 
the kind of mental perversion that ought to determine responsi- 
bility for crime. Thus, more than a century ago Judge Tracy 
held that unless a criminal was irresponsible as a wild beast he 
should suffer punishment. Lord Mansfield claimed that a knowl- 
edge of "what was right and wrong" ought to be the test. 
Twelve judges decided in McNaughton's case that this knowledge 
of right and wrong should be in relation to the act committed. 
Lord Denman said that the presence or absence of insane delu- 
sion ought to determine legal responsibility. Lord Moncrieff laid 
it down that a man's habit and reputation for sanity among his 
fellow men should settle legal responsibility for any crime com- 
mitted. During nearly three centuries, while judges were laying 
down the law of responsibility for crime, when it was contended 
that the knowledge of right and wrong, or previous good repute, 
were to determine the sanity of an individual, hundreds of men 
were taking away their lives, knowing it to be wrong, and yet do- 
ing it; therefore, they were "criminals." But what motive had 5 
they to commit crime? It was left for a later period and the later 
Judge Stephens in England to declare that the man's power of 
controlling his actions should be the test for responsibility. For 
the first time then the facts of nature were recognized in mental 
disease, and law and medicine brought into harmony. It is 
difficult to understand how any other conclusion can be reached, 
or how it can be reached except as a matter of medical evidence. 
The doctor as a psychologist must rigidly study a man by the 
laws of nature, and consider him in all stages of development and 
under diverse conditions of health and disease. He cannot re- 
gard him as a problem in geometry to be studied in a book. The 
clergyman can find his ideal in the Scriptures, the doctor cannot. 
He must regard his subject from the standpoint of physiology, 
psychology and pathology. Let us,as physicians,evince a becoming 
humility when we acknowledge that our art and science fail to leave 
us in possession of all that is essential to a complete understanding 
of this subject. Whatever our philosophical and religious beliefs 
may be in regard to the Ego and the soul, however strongly we 
may feel ourselves pressed upon the horns of the dilemma, on the 
one hand, that to feel implies a personality, and upon the oth- 
er, that as yet physiology has not devised any hypothesis by 
which we can even conceive personality as a brain function-in 
spite of this, we must when we come to treat patients whose men- 
tal functions are deranged, go on the hypothesis that mentaliza- 
tion is a brain function as much as sensation or motion. [Clou- 
ston.] 
To this common understanding law and medicine have come. 
If science has not yet proved that there is a control center in the 
brain to originate mental inhibition, it can be proven that the 
brain does inhibit, and we, therefore, may conclude that there is 
somewhere in the brain such a center. The law, too, has recog- 
nized the necessity for some standard by which to gauge the re- 
sponsibility of individuals, and has been ready to apply a crys- 
tallized medical opinion, as it may have found expression from 
time to time. It is most unfortunate for the medical profession 6 
that the present method of securing expert testimony leads so 
often to a conflict of authorities. So long as it is possible for 
physicians to be retained by opposing sides and paid for main- 
taining the cases of their clients, human nature will assert itself 
and juries will continue to be bewildered by biased evidence. It 
must be said, however, that thus far no other proposed method has 
commended itself as better; and perhaps after all the flashing of 
medico-legal lights from opposite sides the better illumines the 
dark and crooked paths of vice and crime. I say that it is unfor- 
tunate for the medical profession that this is so, for while the 
lawyer may achieve great distinction by the dexterity with which 
he trips up the medical expert by his "hypothtical question"; and 
the court has an opportunity to get a liberal education upon a 
subject the jury cannot fathom and the judge has already de- 
termined; the doctor is apt to come off the stand with the 
consciousness sometimes of not having had half a chance 
to tell the truth, or voice an opinion, and at another time 
of having made confusion worse confounded by talking too 
much. In any event it happens that medical expert opinion 
gains little and loses much in the estimation of the public. 
Spite of all this we have come to agree, that every person 
unless he be either a child, an idiot, or a lunatic is considered 
to have inhibitory power. It may at the same time be con- 
ceded, that every one is moved by impulses prejudicial to 
his own or another's welfare, but it is the ability to control 
these impulses that determines the responsibility of each one. 
In all legislation it is assumed that every free citizen is able 
to do certain acts for the benefit of himself and others and 
likewise to avoid other things that are injurious. It does not 
matter that one can neither read nor write; nor that one may be 
bred in crime and never taught to distinguish between right and 
wrong; the law exacts as much responsibility from such an one 
as from the most highly cultured member of the community. 
Looking at this from a physiological or a psychological view, it 
would seem to be an unfair and unscientific arrangement, but it is 7 
just as fair as the declaration that all men are created free and 
equal; it is as fair as systems of taxation and many social laws. 
It is not supposed that perfect inhibitory power is possessed by 
anyone, nor to an equal degree by all, but a certain amount is ex- 
acted from every responsible person. It may be that there is such 
a thing as an insane diathesis and that some people have an in- 
born tendency to impulsive acts, and never restrain themselves. 
We all know these people; they are guided by passion, by desire, 
by taste, are self-indulgent; they do what is to their injury, know- 
ing they are to be damaged thereby; they are hysterical and 
swayed by a disordered imagination or sudden impulses. Are 
these people to be held rigidly responsible for their acts ? This 
endowment of inhibitory power is in close relation to the prin- 
ciple understood as "habit." The frequent repetition of any 
act makes it more and more easy of performance, so much so in- 
deed that it may become automatic, and the resistance to the 
action at one time felt, ceases any longer to be noticed. The 
recognition of this principle leads to the establishment of institu- 
tions for feeble minded children. If the habit has not been of 
too long standing, the cessation of the habit, under favorable 
conditions may follow, and this naturally suggests the value of 
reformatories to eradicate vicious habits and substitute correct 
ones. If the brains of children predisposed by inheritance to 
mental disease can be subjected to the right kind of preventive 
and hygienic conditions, unquestionably we shall have less of 
mental diseases in the world, and if in later life these same brains 
can be made to avoid the exciting causes that lead to these dis- 
eases, they may be still further reduced. We hear of most re- 
markable instances of good men suddenly gone wrong. Later 
events, and a better history demonstrate that the individuals led a 
dual life and one part only was observed. These cases are the 
result of lapses oft repeated, until a habit of wrong-doing is de- 
veloped, or in other words the inhibitory power is lost. Stephen- 
son's "demoniac" is a myth and no alcoholic begun his career as 
is described in that entertaining narrative. Jekyl and Hyde in 8 
their essentials are not unknown among the living, but it is not 
established that any of these characters suddenly blossom out in full 
fruition. Evolution applies to the development of character, and 
growth involves the seed time, culture and harvest. This fact of 
development makes it necessary that the line shall be drawn 
somewhere to determine just where a man ceases to act physiolo- 
gically, and comes to act pathologically. This we insist must 
always remain a medical question. Lawyers will generally push 
hard for a definition to sharply define between responsibility and 
irresponsibility, and crowd the physician to its expression; but 
the latter recognizes no definition that can properly cover all 
cases; he must deal with the individual, even though it be under 
the veil of the "hypothetical question." It ought to be recog- 
nized that laws after all are only artificial restraints based upon 
the laws of nature, and the lawyer and doctor must be ready to 
change these human contrivances as our knowledge increases. 
Perfect law abides not with man, the Infinite alone can de- 
termine it. In one age Joan of Arc is adjudged a sorcerer and 
burned at the stake, in another she is regarded as a neurotic 
enthusiast. At one time Christ is a criminal and malefactor, 
later he is immaculate and deified. In the middle ages the law 
regarded the insane as like the wild beasts of the field, and they 
were put in chains and in the dungeon; at the present time they 
are considered unfortunates, to claim the compassion of their 
fellowmen, and the protection of the state. An alcoholic has 
sometimes been considered a criminal, and sometimes the victim 
of disease, inherited or acquired, and therefore insane. He may 
be the one or the other. It is exceedingly difficult to pronounce 
upon the responsibility of the religious monomaniacs. Are those 
who hold communion with spirits, the dupes of spiritualism, to be 
considered sane or insane ? Is the woman who is convinced that 
Providence has as a result of her prayers put back the ordinary 
course of nature and relieved her of an incurable affection, sane or 
insane ? An eminent judge of this state believed that he had daily 
communication with the departed; was he sane ? (Wood.) So, too, they to commit crime? It was left for a later period and the later 
Judge Stephens in England to declare that the man's power of 
controlling his actions should be the test for responsibility. For 
the first time then the facts of nature were recognized in mental 
disease, and law and medicine brought into harmony. It is 
difficult to understand how any other conclusion can be reached, 
or how it can be reached except as a matter of medical evidence. 
The doctor as a psychologist must rigidly study a man by the 
laws of nature, and consider him in all stages of development and 
under diverse conditions of health and disease. He cannot re- 
gard him as a problem in geometry to be studied in a book. The 
clergyman can find his ideal in the Scriptures, the doctor cannot. 
He must regard his subject from the standpoint of physiology, 
psychology and pathology. Let us,as physicians,evince a becoming 
humility when we acknowledge that our art and science fail to leave 
us in possession of all that is essential to a complete understanding 
of this subject. Whatever our philosophical and religious beliefs 
may be in regard to the Ego and the soul, however strongly we 
may feel ourselves pressed upon the horns of the dilemma, on the 
one hand, that to feel implies a personality, and upon the oth- 
er, that as yet physiology has not devised any hypothesis by 
which we can even conceive personality as a brain function-in 
spite of this, we must when we come to treat patients whose men- 
tal functions are deranged, go on the hypothesis that mentaliza- 
tion is a brain function as much as sensation or motion. [Clou- 
ston.] 
To this common understanding law and medicine have come. 
If science has not yet proved that there is a control center in the 
brain to originate mental inhibition, it can be proven that the 
brain does inhibit, and we, therefore, may conclude that there is 
somewhere in the brain such a center. The law, too, has recog- 
nized the necessity for some standard by which to gauge the re- 
sponsibility of individuals, and has been ready to apply a crys- 
tallized medical opinion, as it may have found expression from 
time to time. It is most unfortunate for the medical profession that the present method of securing expert testimony leads so 
often to a conflict of authorities. So long as it is possible for 
physicians to be retained by opposing sides and paid for main- 
taining the cases of their clients, human nature will assert itself 
and juries will continue to be bewildered by biased evidence. It 
must be said, however, that thus far no other proposed method has 
commended itself as better; and perhaps after all the flashing of 
medico-legal lights from opposite sides the better illumines the 
dark and crooked paths of vice and crime. I say that it is unfor- 
tunate for the medical profession that this is so, for while the 
lawyer may achieve great distinction by the dexterity with which 
he trips up the medical expert by his "hypothtical question"; and 
the court has an opportunity to get a liberal education upon a 
subject the jury cannot fathom and the judge has already de- 
termined; the doctor is apt to come off the stand with the 
consciousness sometimes of not having had half a chance 
to tell the truth, or voice an opinion, and at another time 
of having made confusion worse confounded by talking too 
much. In any event it happens that medical expert opinion 
gains little and loses much in the estimation of the public. 
Spite of all this we have come to agree, that every person 
unless he be either a child, an idiot, or a lunatic is considered 
to have inhibitory power. It may at the same time be con- 
ceded, that every one is moved by impulses prejudicial to 
his own or another's welfare, but it is the ability to control 
these impulses that determines the responsibility of each one. 
In all legislation it is assumed that every free citizen is able 
to do certain acts for the benefit of himself and others and 
likewise to avoid other things that are injurious. It does not 
matter that one can neither read nor write; nor that one may be 
bred in crime and never taught to distinguish between right and 
wrong; the law exacts as much responsibility from such an one 
as from the most highly cultured member of the community. 
Looking at this from a physiological or a psychological view, it 
would seem to be an unfair and unscientific arrangement, but it is just as fair as the declaration that all men are created free and 
equal; it is as fair as systems of taxation and many social laws. 
It is not supposed that perfect inhibitory power is possessed by 
anyone, nor to an equal degree by all, but a certain amount is ex- 
acted from every responsible person. It may be that there is such 
a thing as an insane diathesis and that some people have an in- 
born tendency to impulsive acts, and never restrain themselves. 
We all know these people; they are guided by passion, by desire, 
by taste, are self-indulgent; they do what is to their injury, know- 
ing they are to be damaged thereby; they are hysterical and 
swayed by a disordered imagination or sudden impulses. Are 
these people to be held rigidly responsible for their acts ? This 
endowment of inhibitory power is in close relation to the prin- 
ciple understood as "habit." The frequent repetition of any 
act makes it more and more easy of performance, so much so in- 
deed that it may become automatic, and the resistance to the 
action at one time felt, ceases any longer to be noticed. The 
recognition of this principle leads to the establishment of institu- 
tions for feeble minded children. If the habit has not been of 
too long standing, the cessation of the habit, under favorable 
conditions may follow, and this naturally suggests the value of 
reformatories to eradicate vicious habits and substitute correct 
ones. If the brains of children predisposed by inheritance to 
mental disease can be subjected to the right kind of preventive 
and hygienic conditions, unquestionably we shall have less of 
mental diseases in the world, and if in later life these same brains 
can be made to avoid the exciting causes that lead to these dis- 
eases, they may be still further reduced. We hear of most re- 
markable instances of good men suddenly gone wrong. Later 
events, and a better history demonstrate that the individuals led a 
dual life and one part only was observed. These cases are the 
result of lapses oft repeated, until a habit of wrong-doing is de- 
veloped, or in other words the inhibitory power is lost. Stephen- 
son's "demoniac" is a myth and no alcoholic begun his career as 
is described in that entertaining narrative. Jekyl and Hyde in their essentials are not unknown among the living, but it is not 
established that any of these characters suddenly blossom out in full 
fruition. Evolution applies to the development of character, and 
growth involves the seed time, culture and harvest. This fact of 
development makes it necessary that the line shall be drawn 
somewhere to determine just where a man ceases to act physiolo- 
gically, and comes to act pathologically. This we insist must 
always remain a medical question. Lawyers will generally push 
hard for a definition to sharply define between responsibility and 
irresponsibility, and crowd the physician to its expression; but 
the latter recognizes no definition that can properly cover all 
cases; he must deal with the individual, even though it be under 
the veil of the "hypothetical question." It ought to be recog- 
nized that laws after all are only artificial restraints based upon 
the laws of nature, and the lawyer and doctor must be ready to 
change these human contrivances as our knowledge increases. 
Perfect law abides not with man, the Infinite alone can de- 
termine it. In one age Joan of Arc is adjudged a sorcerer and 
burned at the stake, in another she is regarded as a neurotic 
enthusiast. At one time Christ is a criminal and malefactor, 
later he is immaculate and deified. In the middle ages the law- 
regarded the insane as like the wild beasts of the field, and they 
were put in chains and in the dungeon; at the present time they 
are considered unfortunates, to claim the compassion of their 
fellowmen, and the protection of the state. An alcoholic has 
sometimes been considered a criminal, and sometimes the victim 
of disease, inherited or acquired, and therefore insane. He may 
be the one or the other. It is exceedingly difficult to pronounce 
upon the responsibility of the religious monomaniacs. Are those 
who hold communion with spirits, the dupes of spiritualism, to be 
considered sane or insane ? Is the woman who is convinced that 
Providence has as a result of her prayers put back the ordinary 
course of nature and relieved her of an incurable affection, sane or 
insane ? An eminent judge of this state believed that he had daily 
communication with the departed; was he sane ? (Wood.) So, too, 9 
there comes up for our judgment, the responsibility of the dipso- 
maniac. When a drunkard is at his best estate-after a few weeks 
compulsory deprivation of his brain poison, he is so like the rest of 
the world in all essential things, that it is most difficult to see 
how laws can be framed in the present state of public opinion and 
medico-psychological knowledge to deprive him of his liberty. 
Yet when he is at his worst, he is readily recognized to be entirely 
without self-control, and fit only to be placed under the care of 
others, in other words he is insane. Let us take a case like this. 
Here is a man who knows if he drinks liquor, that he will become 
maniacal, and do some criminal act. He realizes that fully, never- 
theless, he gets drunk and kills someone. The question arises, is 
he responsible, is he insane, or a criminal ? 
One difficulty about considering him insane is that, even though 
he may have a brain predisposed by heredity, he-has brought this 
condition upon himself by not exercising self-control when he had 
the power to do so. On the other hand, as has been said pre- 
viously, oft repeated acts develop a habit, the control power of 
the brain is lost, and the brain tissue, always so fine, so delicate, 
so subtile working, with functions so inconceivably varied and 
high, is subjected to the degenerative changes of slow poison, and 
then no doubt we have a disease-an insanity. Where the re- 
sponsibility ceases and where the opposite begins, the physician 
may be called upon to decide. [Clouston.] The law has in the 
past, with great wisdom and clear foresight, insisted that volun- 
tary drunkenness is never an excuse for crime; it likewise clearly 
exacts deliberation and premeditation to constitute murder in the 
first degree. The subject has some interesting phases when 
viewed from a medico-legal standpoint. How does this subject 
bear upon the question of capital punishment? The opposition 
of able physicians, whose lead the medical profession has deemed 
it an honor to follow, has been directed against capital punish- 
ment. They seem ofttimes to not recognize such an attribute as 
spontaneity of action; but more particularly to be influenced by 
hesitancy to assume the responsibility of pronouncing upon the 10 
legal status of a criminal, when by that act they may determine 
the sacrifice of of a life; or to put it another way, they fear that 
a mistake may be made and an innocent man be hung. No doubt 
errors have been made; indeed so long as affairs are adminis- 
tered by human beings, errors will continue to be made, but, it is 
probable that the law more often errs in saving lives than in sac- 
rificing them. There are more men unhung, who ought to be 
hung, than are hung who ought to be unhung. No system of 
penalogy can be contrived that will eliminate human fallibility. 
While necessarily the question that will arise bearing upon the 
legal responsibility of murderers, must be largely determined by 
medical evidence, the final disposition of a legally adjudged mur- 
derer, (such as is recognized by the law of this state, as of the first 
degree) belongs to society. At this point it passes beyond the 
special science of any profession, and comes to be a question for 
the people to solve. Does not the community need protection as 
well as the criminal ? There is a good deal of the brute yet left 
in human nature. There are frequent instances of reversion to 
primitive types. So long as these aberrant specimens do injury 
to themselves alone, they may be regarded as cranks, freaks, sui- 
cides perhaps, or whatnot, and left to work out their own salva- 
tion or destruction, under certain restrictions; but when the lives 
of others are involved in theirs, and endangered by them, when 
they are moved by neither the fear of evil nor the love of good, 
they should be exterminated like reptiles, excised as foul ulcers, 
amputated as gangrenous limbs, they are a curse to all who have 
to do with them, a pest and danger to society and propagators of 
a bad breed. They are as much the enemy of the sane as the 
wild beast is the enemy of man. [Gray.] Salus populi, suprema 
esl lex. It has been considered that the voluntary sacrifice of one 
life for the good of the many, when done deliberately, is worthy 
of being characterized as heroic, sublime, godly. We may ask, if 
the sacrifice of a worthy life can be justified upon the ground 
that it is for humanity's welfare, must it not be conceded that 
there is equal right to rid the earth of a life that is worthless and 11 
dangerous to humanity. The safety of the people is the highest 
law. No lifetime confinement satisfies this demand. Naught but 
total annihilation can. 
Let us construct and liberally provide for the maintenance of 
homes for the fatherless and the motherless; let us endeavor to 
fan into a kindling blaze the feeble spark of intellect that glim- 
mers in the brain of the idiot; let us encourage the state care of 
the epileptic, until lately not recognized as having a claim upon 
our charity; let us tenderly guard and support the homes for the 
old and indigent, to smooth the pathway to the grave; let us jeal- 
ously watch over the multiplying hospitals for the insane, even 
though the treasury of the state be taxed to its utmost limit for 
their support; let the sentimentalists also, if they choose, waste 
their fine feelings and fat fortunes in fostering societies for the 
protection of cats and dogs, in opposing vivisection, in organizing 
anti-spanking crusades, in hysterical condemnation of corporeal 
punishment in reformatories; let us mingle mercy with justice, 
patience with sternness, reformation with penalties in the seclusion 
of criminals that crowd the state prisons, and consume the state's 
wealth; but, after having done all these, let us not forget that 
normal man is also entitled to some protection.