REPORTS 
IN REGARD TO THE 
TRANSFER OF THE BUREAUS AND DIVISIONS 
OE THE 
MERCHANT MARINE 
IN THE 
TKEABURY DEPARTMENT 
TO THE 
NAVY DEPARTMENT. 
WASHINGTON: 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1883. Treasury Department. 
Document No. 395. 
Secretary's Office. 
REVENUE-MARINE SERVICE. 
TRANSFER TO NAVY DEPARTMENT. 
REPORT OF CHIEF OF REVENUE-MARINE DIVISION. 
Treasury Department, 
January 27, 1883. 
Sir : I have the honor to submit the following report upon the imp- 
osition to transfer the administration of the Revenue-Marine Service 
to the Navy Department, and the provisions of the bill, H. E. No. 
7157, which yon have placed in my hands: 
The Secretary of the Navy, in his annual report submitted at the 
beg inning of the present Congress, recommends that the Revenue - 
Marine Service, together with other bureaus under the Treasury De- 
partment, be transferred to the Navy Department. 
He gives as principal reasons for the transfer— 
1. That it would afford a useful field for the employ ment of a por- 
tion of the large number of young naval officers who are now borne 
upon the rolls of the Navy, but for whose employment no occupation 
is offered in the legitimate duties of their corps. 
2. That the service of young naval officers upon the revenue-cutters 
would be of direct benefit in their profession, and to the country in 
case of war, giving them a familiarity with the coast and a knowledge 
of local pilotage that would not otherwise be obtained. 
3. That the change would be in the interests of economy, in view of 
the fact that the Government is keeping up a “ Revenue Navy,” con- 
sisting of the present Revenue Marine. 
Some subsidiary reasons for the proposed transfer are also given 
in the report of the honorable Secretary, as— 
(1.) That the service of the cruising-cutters is strictly naval, and 4 
the duties not distinguishable in kind from those of naval officers; 
that the discipline is naval, “as far as naval discipline can be carried 
on outside of the Navy Department.” 
(2.) That the cruising-cutters are armed with great guns and small- 
arms, and that in time of war these vessels “have always been pressed 
into the naval service.” 
(3.) That twenty-three of the cutters, “which may be classed as gun- 
boats, are good vessels for their class, and must always be regarded 
as part of the available naval force.” 
(4.) Further, that “revenue-marine officers would be benefited' by 
the change, as they would receive, in addition to such advantages as 
they enjoy under their present status, the benefits of a permanent 
naval commission.” 
The reasons named are not without weight, and if sustained by the 
facts, and sufficient considerations do not exist why the fundamental 
practice of the Government and legal status of nearly a hundred years 
should remain undisturbed, would deserve the serious consideration 
of Congress. 
Organization and Purpose of the Revenue Marine. 
The Eevenue-Cutter Service was established by act of Congress of 
1790. (Yol. I, U. S. Statutes, p. 175.) Its conception and general plan 
were the work of Alexander Hamilton, who, in organizing the system of 
finance and revenue for the country, deemed the revenue-cutters an 
essential part of the scheme. 
The plan of the Service as originally devised has never been mate- 
rially changed, but the Service has been augmented from time to time 
with the growth of the country in territory and population, and its 
duties have been increased in scope and number with the natural 
development of the commercial and maritime interests, whose protec- 
tion was the object of its origin. 
It has been made by law a part of the available naval force of the 
Government in time of war, (act of March 2, 1799,) and several acts 
have been passed to add to its efficiency. The discipline and man- 
agement of the Service have also been much improved in recent years. 
Under the existing organization, the collectors of customs, who are 
charged with the immediate work of collecting the revenue, have gen- 
eral charge of the cutters and can direct them in the performance of 
any duty involving the protection of the revenue. 
This Service embraces not only the protection of the revenue derived 5 
from imposts on imported goods, but that derivable from all other 
sources upon the waters. It has also been extended to include the 
protection of onr national timber reserves against depredations, and 
onr mercantile shipping against the perils of the sea. 
While the collectors of customs have supervision of the individual 
cutters, as described, the Secretary of the Treasury is charged with 
the immediate control and management of the Service as well as the 
stationing of the vessels and officers. The present arrangement ex- 
ists without confusion or discord and with great public advantage, 
the /-utters fulfilling with entire satisfaction the objects of their crea- 
tion. No complaints of their lack of usefulness or adaptability to their 
duties are received; no allegations of incompetency or general unfit- 
ness. On the contrary, the testimony to their efficiency and value is 
almost universal, both from customs officers and the owners and mas- 
ters of vessels engaged in conducting the floating commerce of the 
country. At one period only of the history of the Service have un- 
ha rmonions relations arisen between the customs officers and those in 
charge of revenue vessels. This was during the period when officers 
of the Navy were detailed to command revenue-cutters, beginning 
about the year 1821 and ending in 1832, and it was on account of the 
complications springing out of this relation that the practice was 
abandoned in the year last named. 
Condition and Effectiveness of the Revenue Marine. 
The effectiveness of the revenue vessels in .the prevention of smug- 
gling is not always apparent, their strict guard upon the coast line 
having long since broken up smuggling by cargo; but whenever an 
exigency has required the withdrawal of the vessels for any consider- 
able time from a stretch of coast line, the smugglers have resumed 
operations. This was well illustrated during the enforced absence for 
several months of the revenue vessel from the coast of Florida, a few 
years since, when two schooners of respectable size began the business 
of smuggling rum and cigars from Cuba, their occupation prospering 
until the return of the cutter. 
At the present time frequent applications for an extension of the 
Service as now conducted are received by this Department, and none 
for its curtailment or discontinuance. 
The amount of work performed by the revenue vessels under these 6 
numerous calls for their services is shown by the following table, ex- 
hibiting statistically the record of the ten years from 1871 to 1881: 
Tear ended— 
Miles sailed. 
Vessels boarded 
and examined. 
Vessels seized or 
reported for 
•violation of 
law. 
Vessels assisted 
in distress. 
Lives saved. 
June 30, 1872 
166,198 
24, 932 
1, 594 
219 
37 
June 30, 1873 
185, 668 
30, 543 
1, 605 
210 
109 
June 30, 1874 
169, 882 
27, 748 
1, 810 
153 
4 
June 30. 1875 
198,117 
22, 225 
1, 245 
195 
81 
June 30, 1876 
194, 261 
23, 686 
1, 225 
195 
45 
June 30, 1877 
196, 036 
25, 396 
1,260 
204 
60 
June 30, 1878 
238, 505 
31, 096 
2, 009 
192 
76 
June 30, 1879 
252,112 
32, 853 
3, 444 
210 
123 
June 30, 1880 
265, 763 
36, 318 
3, 556 
114 
65 
June 30, 1881 
282, 027 
29,101 
3,163 
148 
141 
Total 
2,148, 569 
283, 898 
20, 911 
1, 840 
741 
Average per year 
214, 857 
28, 390 
2, 091 
184 
74 
That this work is satisfactory to the collectors of customs and other 
customs officers immediately associated with the Service, and that it 
is beneficial and gratifying to the general public, numerous testimoni- 
als and letters of commendation on file in the Department abundantly 
attest. 
That the Service is now efficient, and that it is improving from year 
to year, is shown by contrasting with the foregoing table the follow- 
ing statement of the work performed during the period of ten years 
beginning with 1861 and ending with 1870, compiled by calendar years: 
. 
* 
(► 
i 
i 
Total 
0181 
1869... 
1868 
1867 
9981 
9981 
1 
1863 
1862 
1861 
Tears. 
J-* 
5 
r- 
Jl 
o 
j4 
s 
* 
Miles sailed. 
8 
§£5^1 
1 
=; 
$ 
g 
13, 299 
£ 
1 
38, 815 
17, 375 
8, 607 
10, 850 
7, 923 
7, 927 
9. 386 
CO o 
i¥ 
S 
1 
Vessels boarded 
and examined. 
Yessels seized or 
reported for 
violation of 
05 
SS.8SSSS 
S 
is 
law. 
Vessels assisted 
to 
to 
to 
DO 
143 
126 
108 
109 
175 
rs 
2 
-* CO 
-I 4^ 
o 
o 
in distress. 
Lives saved. 
30 
X» 
-I 
£ £3 Cv E W 
o 
z> 
These comparisons show that the Service is now doing its maximum 
of work. 
The following table, giving the expenditures on account of the Eev- 
enue-Marine Service for a series of years ended with June 30, 1882, 7 
shows that the increased amount of work has been effected without 
an increase in the cost of the Service: 
For the fiscal year ended— 
June 30, 1868 
|1, 293, 661 67 
June 30, 1876 
1842, 912 68 
June 30, 1869 
1,185, 702 26 
June 30, 1877 
841,176 31 
June 30, 1870 
1,133, 670 15 
June 30, 1878 
844,001 70 
June 30, 1871 
1,121, 026 43 
June 30, 1879 
844, 527 25 
June 30, 1872 
930, 249 81 
June 30, 1880 
845,333 74 
June 30, 1873 
995, 308 88 
June 30, 1881 
846,791 99 
June 30, 1874 
903,601 83 
June 30, 1882 
846, 423 34 
June 30, 1875 
897, 899 56 
Indeed, the period of the greatest usefulness and efficiency in its 
civil work, if the amount of service rendered affords an index, is 
marked by the lowest annual expenditures, as will be seen by com- 
paring the work and expenditures of the past six years with like data 
for any similar period. 
To the foregoing data is to be added a statement of the relief-work 
of the revenue vessels, which is a most practical evidence of their 
usefulness. During the last six years alone 678 vessels and their 
cargoes, imperilled by the sea, have been assisted by the cutters, 
aggregating in value $16,181,542.80, and averaging $2,696,923.80 per 
annum. But this is not all, for in the same period 642 persons have 
been rescued from drowning. This does not include the persons on 
the vessels assisted. 
The greater number of the revenue-marine vessels have been con- 
structed upon specifications prepared under the particular direction 
of the present management, and under the immediate supervision of 
the officers of the corps. They have been devised with special refer- 
ence to the wants of the several stations and the character of the 
waters to be covered in their cruising. A few exceptions only to the 
rule exist, consisting of steamers acquired during or soon after the 
war, which have been retained in the Service as too costly to discard; 
but, with these exceptions, the cutters are admirably adapted to the 
needs of the Service, and many of them are considered models of their 
size and type. 
The officers are proportioned in numbers to the requirements of the 
Service, and could the places of the superannuated be filled with 
active men, the corps would be unexceptionable as to its personnel. The 
character and habits of the officers are good. Prompt and willing 
attention to duty and zealous pride in their work are the rule. 8 
Special Training Requisite for Revenue-Marine Officers. 
A knowledge of customs laws, of tlie navigation laws, and numerous 
other statutory provisions bearing upon the duties confided to the 
Service, as well as a familiarity with the regulations and decisions 
affecting the varied maritime interests of the country, are essential to 
the skilled revenue officer. Such knowledge is not the acquisition of 
two or three years, but requires a long period’of application and expe- 
rience. The officers of the revenue-cutters give their whole lives, not 
only to the business of perfecting their professional knowledge, but 
in familiarizing themselves with the multifarious and delicate ques- 
tions found in the laws whose enforcement is committed to the Reve- 
nue Marine. 
A glance at the numerous duties of revenue vessels indicates the 
wide scope of information necessary to revenue-marine'offi cers. Their 
primary work is that of protecting the revenue against smuggling; 
but besides this they enforce the law requiring license, enrolment, 
and registry of vessels; the law requiring life-saving appliances, as 
boats and life-jueservers, to be kept on board merchant vessels; the 
laws prohibiting overloading with passengers; those requiring lights 
to be exhibited by merchant vessels; that providing for name and 
hailing-port to be affixed; that assessing a tax for the support of 
marine hospitals; those in aid of the quarantine systems of the States; 
those for suppressing piracy on the seas; those for preserving the 
timber reserves of the United States; they enforce the neutrality 
laws; they prevent unlawful traffic in rum and fire-arms in Alaska; 
they protect the seal-fisheries; they suppress mutinies on board mer- 
chant vessels; they extinguish fire upon merchant shipping in our 
harbors; they carry out the humane enactments of Congress in aid of 
distressed mariners during the inclement season. They form, under 
the law of 1878, an important part of the Life-Saving Service. To the 
duties devolved upon them by law or regulation are added numerous 
others, to which they are detailed from time to time; an instance of 
which is the part borne by the Service in the work of arresting the 
spread of yellow fever in the Southwest the past summer. 
The officers of the Revenue Marine now constitute one of the best 
fitted, most thoroughly trained, most industrious, intelligent, active, 
and efficient bodies of public servants under the Government. 
The cruising of the revenue-cutters when engaged iti the protection 
of the revenue brings them principally into the waters along the coast 
near the shore, thus subjecting them always to dangers of navigation 9 
far greater than are encountered in mid-ocean. But they are, further- 
more, called upon, as noted above, (under the act of December 22, 
1837,) during the inclement and dangerous season to endure the hard- 
ships and perils of cruising in aid of vessels in distress. By such 
practice and experience they become in years as proficient and skilled 
in coastwise cruising as is possible of acquirement, but this perfec- 
tion of training stands for a lifetime of study and toil. 
Radical Impropriety of the Transfer. 
It thus appears that the Bevenue-Marine Service is now, and has 
been for almost a century, an important and essential part of the cus- 
toms service ; that, as at present organized and conducted, it is har- 
monious in its relations to the customs service and other interests 
committed to its care; that it is efficient in the performance of its 
work and has attained the maximum of usefulness; that it is econom- 
ical in the cost of maintenance; that its vessels are well adapted to 
the needs of the Service, and in good condition and properly equipped; 
that its officers are properly qualified for their duties, and perform 
them satisfactorily. 
Congress ought not, under these conditions, to change the status of 
this Service without grave and important reasons. Nevertheless, it 
is proposed to break up the present system and make a startling and 
radical change in the Service by transferring it as a whole to another 
Department of the Government. 
From the facts stated, it could scarcely be hoped that the change 
would better the Revenue Marine or add to its efficiency in any respect. 
We can look, then, only to the reasons given by the Secretary of the 
Navy. It is for the benefit of the Navy that the change is sought; 
and it is not so much for the benefit of the Navy as a whole, as for the 
younger officers of the naval corps, that the subject is now pressed 
upon Congress. 
I do not believe that the measure will meet with public approval. 
Our people, in that impatience of aristocratic rule which is their char- 
acteristic, have always shown a strong dislike to giving the military 
predominance in time of peace. Even during the period of domestic 
war, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was one of the last acts 
prior to the striking down by force of arms of the civil tribunals, while 
one of the first steps in rehabilitating a commonwealth was the re- 
establishment of the civil courts in order that the Government might 
be exercised through the legitimate civil channels. That Americans 10 
detest the bayonet, except as a means of national defence, needs no 
assertion. In organizing a force to protect the revenue, special care 
was taken by the founders of the Government to avoid offence to this 
sentiment. The revenue-marine officers were made officers of the 
customs, and while subjected necessarily to military discipline and 
training aboard ship, discharged all their functions in entire subordi- 
nation to the civil branch. They have been regarded as a national 
constabulary rather than as a naval force. At the same time, Con- 
gress, as if to show more conclusively its intention that the cutter 
system should always remain attached to the civil establishment, by 
the act of 1799 provided for the only exigency in which it need be 
availed of as a part of the naval force, giving the President authority 
to cause its vessels to co-operate with the Xavy when their services 
should be necessary. That was the time, if ever, to attach it to the 
Xavy. Failure to do so at that time argues the purpose of Congress 
to retain it forever as a part of the civil force. 
History shows that no change in existing law is necessary to enable 
the Pevenue Marine to be used for the national defence if demanded. 
Its vessels have participated in every war with signal public advan- 
tage. Its officers have always acquitted themselves well in such ser- 
vice. They have not failed in their duty. Xothiug in their perform- 
ances has indicated that a transfer to the Xavy would make the Service 
more effective in such emergency. 
The people have always jealously guarded the civil functions from 
the encroachments of the military power, and have shown a desire to 
restrict the Army and Xavy in times of peace to the most limited 
numbers compatible with the manning of the forts, the defence of the 
frontier, and the protection of bur flag in foreign waters. Any attempt 
to induct the Army and Xavy into the civil offices has been met and 
promptly restrained by adverse public sentiment. 
The present system has been maintained for nearly a hundred years, 
whether in peace or war, in prosperity or calamity to the country, and 
has stood the test well; but it is now proposed by the pending bill 
to throw away the experience of years and enter upon the field of 
experiment. Hereafter the Secretary of the Treasury, when desiring 
to hunt down the smuggler or check any infraction of laws whose ex- 
ecution falls under the Treasury Department, must call upon the naval 
force of the United States. True, the bill provides that the vessels of 
the Eevenue-Marine Corps of the Xavy shall, upon requisition of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, be assigned for the x>rotection of the rev- 
enue, but certainly his authority over the Corps would be secondary 11 
to that of the Secretary of the Navy. He would have no control over 
the discipline of the Corps; he could not change the stations or con- 
trol the movements generally of the vessels; he could not even select 
officers for special service or particular duties without an appeal to 
the Navy Department. We should thus have the anomaly of the 
Department charged with the collecting of the revenue, having no 
real control over the force for protecting it, and the Department charged 
with protecting the revenue having no hand in collecting it. 
The Real Motive of the Project. 
What is the excuse held out for introducing this confusion into the 
now harmonious and efficient civil system ? What is the motive for 
inducting the military into the civil offices ? What incentive is offered 
for overturning the practice of a century and reversing the judgment 
of the founders of our national polity? What is the argument pre- 
sented to Congress for legalizing this startling innovation upon the 
traditional policy of the Government? The reply is found in the 
assertion of the honorable the Secretary of the Navy that employment 
must be had for the surplus Navy officers; either this must be done 
or a*large reduction will be made, Congress having at its last session 
inserted the knife into the bud in the matter of reduction, to be fol- 
lowed soon by laying the axe at the root of the tree. 
Is it true that we are asked to build up an aristocracy of naval officers 
in our country ? These young men having been educated by the nation, 
at a cost of many hundreds of dollars for each, while the ordinary 
sons of the people were gaining their education with personal toil and 
sweat, are the people to be now laid under still further tribute for the 
benefit of the favored naval officers, and even the civil force displaced 
in order to afford them continuous tenure ? 
In the civil branches of the Government, when the duties of an 
officer cease, when the occupation is gone, it follows that the office 
itself is abolished and the incumbent relegated to private life. No 
one thinks of asking the continuance of a land office after the public 
lands within its scope are disposed of. Also, when the business of a 
revenue district ceases the collector and his employes are discharged. 
Yet here is a class already favored by a liberal education and gener- 
ous maintenance at the hands of the country, when the legitimate 
business in the line of their training no longer offers, asking the adop- 
tion of a new theory of government, by which may be turned over to 
them, to furnish excuse for their retention in office, the work now being 
well done by a body of the civil officers. 12 
With the fact in view that in the theory of our Government the 
place of the military is in strict subordinacy to the civil power, is the 
recommendation of the head of the Navy Department defensible1? Is 
it not to be condemned as in conflict .with the principles of republican 
government H 
We are told that the Revenue Marine is not naturally connected 
with the Treasury Department; that it does belong naturally to the 
Navy Department; and are left to infer by the Honorable the Secre- 
tary of the Navy, that its transfer would improve its administration 
and x)romote its efficiency. It is true that no defect of management is 
pointed out, and no particular in which it would be improved by such 
change. 
Does the Condition of the Navy Warrant the Change? 
The bald recommendation for the transfer comes, too, upon the 
heels of a dolorous statement of the present deplorable condition of 
the Navy. Out of fifty vessels of war, one only of which is of the 
first rate, but thirty-one are in commission, and all are condemned as 
unfit to cope with the war-ships of other countries. Not one modern 
high-powered cannon is included in their armament, for the excellent 
reason that there is not one such in the whole Navy. Of the eight 
navy-yards, with their immense and costly plant of docks, workshops, 
dwellings, machinery, and toofs, five at least are reported as unneces- 
sary. The Secretary gives a sample-day of their cost, (November 11,) 
for which the total pay-roll at all the yards was $11,319. The enor- 
mous disproportion of fifty-nine officers to every vessel in commis- 
sion is adverted to in the report, coupled with the suggestion of a 
further reduction in this superfluous list beyond that provided for by 
Congress last summer. 
Following these lamentable disclosures, the Secretary touches softly 
upon the system of favoritism that has prevailed regarding assign- 
ments of officers, sadly remarking that if allowed to continue, the 
naval service will soon become fatally demoralized. 
The Secretary might have gone further, and shown that while other 
nations, on an expenditure proportionately far below that of our 
country, have kept abreast with all modern improvements in ships 
and guns, we have steadily deteriorated in both, until practically 
the zero-mark has been reached. 13 
Comparative Statement of the Navies of Six Great Nations. 
Q93S 9 >■ 
i. I “ 
tzj 
§ £• 
p 
3.: 2?. ■ 
g-; g.: : : 
a 
Fi 8; jj 
<1 
o-.® 
!*J ' 
B S 
P'S 
« S' 
cn co m -+- f-r! 
oq ® 
Mffl® g S 
o 
Ms 
—.10 
pT-° 
Number of iron- 
<1 
tap 
clads or ar- 
mored ships. 
CD 
OUOO CO 
1- 
5T 
-SJ- 
o 
o> 
Thickness of 
p 
o o o o o b jj* 
armor. 
4- IP -4 IP O 4^ 
& CO 
P ~ 
tap 
Number of modern 
_ p-- 
war cruisers. 
(0 7)0 0 pi Cl 
Number of officers. " 
OX Cl 
co co eg eg pi .s* 
Number of seamen, 
00 Cl CO -4 Cl 4*. 
boys, and marines. 
IP tp co co eg 
ii 
1C 
1C 
11 
Number of men to 
t£v£ 1 1 + 
each officer. 
4-* I—* Cl CO 4* 
4* ci 
Annual cost. 
O O O O 4*. O 
o p o p p p 
o o o o o o 
* Including officers of marines. 
tßesides many smaller vessels. 
| Four of these are the largest, swiftest, and most heavily armored and armed ships ever built, car 
rying each four 100-ton Armstrong guns 
§Of these only fifty-seven are serviceable, including small despatch vessels, torpedo rams, and the 
monitors for harbor defence. 
II Monitors for harbor defence, including four new ones begun, and three requiring extensive repairs. 
Examining this table, we observe that the United States have 25 
per cent, as many ships, (including the unserviceable,) but only 17§ 
per cent, as many in commission as England. That to man these we 
have 18 per cent, as many men as England, or about the same pro- 
portion of men to vessels, if tonnage were equal, but the ratio of our 
officers to those of England is 41 per cent., or nearly 2£ times greater 
than that of ships or men. 
While Italy has a powerful navy, with forty-nine heavily armored 
modern war cruisers, four of which are equal to any naval ships in 
the world; while she employs nearly a thousand more men to man 
them than we muster, she has less than half the number of officers, 
and spends only about one-half as much annually to carry on her 
efficient and formidable force as we spend upon our insignificant col- 
lection of antiquated hulks. 
A further glance at the table shows that the United States has 
more than double the proportion of officers to men of any nation. 
Could there be a stronger proof that our Navy is top-heavy with 
officers than is shown in this comparison? Even if the United States 
Navy should become in years as strong in ships and guns as. that of 
Italy, half its present number of officers would yet suffice. There 
seems no likelihood that any future exigency will arise which would 
warrant the retention and support of the great horde of idlers now 
on the rolls. Even if a remote contingency would warrant it, the de- 
moralizing effect of idleness meanwhile upon even a willing and able 
body of*men would weigh strongly against such retention. 14 
The most shameful misapplication of means to ends in the manage- 
ment of the Navy is, however, shown in the column of annual ex- 
penditures when considered in connection with the facts in the rest of 
the table; for while the United States have a Navy not worth men- 
tioning- in comparison with that of either of these great powers, the 
statistics show that it is spending yearly a far greater proportionate 
sum upon the floating mass of incompetency known as its Navy than 
any of these nations spends upon its powerfully armed fleet. 
Our Navy expends yearly 291 per cent, as much as England for 
construction and repairs and cost of yards and docks, yet while Eng- 
land includes in this the yearly addition to her navy of 10,000 to 
15,000 tons in new vessels, we include none. 
At our ratio of expenditure we should add 3,000 to 5,000 in new 
tonnage every year. Although we add nothing, yet this ceaseless 
grind of $11,319 a day for maintaining the navy-yards (five-eighths 
of which, according to the Secretary’s report, is unnecessary) goes 
steadily on, and the annual millions for construction and repair con- 
tinue to be swallowed up and leave no monument. 
The figures of the table, although they touch only upon principal 
points of comparison, are full of instruction and significance. Were 
the comparison carried further, to embrace the details of management 
and expenditure, the results would be still more astonishing. 
It would be interesting to inquire how the three hundred and sixty- 
nine millions of dollars which Congress has provided for the Navy 
within the seventeen years since the close of the late war has been 
spent; to learn by what superlative neglect our Navy has dwindled from 
the 075 vessels which it maintained at the beginning of these seventeen 
years to the 139 of all classes it now carries on the list, yet among 
which is not a single effective modern cruiser. It would be interesting 
to ascertain what maelstrom has sucked down this goodly fleet of 530 
ships of the-Navy, their decks strewn with the nation’s gold to the 
tune of more than twenty-one millions a year. 
It would be a further interesting study, in view of the fact that we 
have neither vessels nor ordnance in the Navy, to determine what has 
become of the vast sum of $98,435,875 which has been appropriated 
within the past seventeen years for the construction and repairs alone 
of naval vessels, and of the $12,832,029.23 which Congress has pro- 
vided for ordnance during the same period, not to speak of the 
$32,724,712.48 appropriated for the maintenance of navy-yards, mak- 
ing the towering aggregate of $143,992,617 which the nation has con- 
tributed towards the vessels of the Navy and their armaments since 15 
the last war. Such enormous expenditures of money in ordinary busi- 
ness are expected to produce some fabric, some edifice or structure; in 
this instance the result seems nothing. 
It is not my purpose to charge intentional extravagance or profli- 
gacy upon the Navy; bnt Ido say that the published reports consti- 
tuting the financial history of that Department afford an inviting 
field of inquiry when the Navy seeks the absorption of the civil de- 
partments on the ground of the superiority of the naval methods in 
management and economy. If the school of economy to which the 
Revenue Marine is to be turned over is such as that shown in the 
affairs of the Navy, if such is the management by which the promised 
improvement is to be gained, if the results indicated are such as flow 
from the u superior discipline” of the Navy, it is respectfully suggested 
that Congress pause before trying to improve the civil service by the 
experiment which is invited. 
jßeasons alleged for Transfer not Valid. 
As an argument for the transfer, considerable stress is laid upon 
the benefit to be derived by the younger naval officers in their service 
upon the revenue-cutters, from the practice it would give them in 
handling ships in shoal waters and narrow harbors and the oppor- 
tunity it would afford them of learning pilotage. No one will dispute 
that they need this sort of knowledge, but I venture to suggest that 
they need not be consumed with ungratified ambition in this regard, 
even under present conditions. Furloughed naval officers might now, 
without infringing any law, find employment on merchant steamers 
and ships in the coasting trade, where the facilities for learning pilot- 
age and the handling of vessels would be equal to, if not better than, 
those on revenue vessels, and thus be brought into useful association 
with a class of maritime officers who maintain their character and posi- 
tions through their business energy and the mastery of their profession, 
rather than through advantages of education or social standing. 
It would, indeed, seem creditable, were the 236 naval officers now 
waiting orders (for the payment of whose salaries an aggregate of 
$376,000 is annually drawn from the public treasury) to find some use- 
ful employment by which they might improve themselves in their pro- 
fession, if they are to be retained. 
If to the naval officers waiting orders we add those on shore or 
other duty, we find 880 officers not required to officer the ships, draw- 
ing in salaries annually the total of $1,914,500. This calculation does 
not embrace the officers of the Marine Corps, who receive y early 16 
$174,040. Yet Congress is asked, as a measure of economy, to turn 
over the Revenue Marine, costing only about $850,000 annually, to a 
Department wasting every year upon its surplus officers at least one 
million dollars. 
It is understood that the claim is advanced that the Revenue Ma- 
rine and other kindred branches of the civil administration which do 
business on the water should be turned over to the Navy, because the 
latter is also a floating service. As well might the Array, on the score 
of being a land service, demand that all the work of the Government 
upon the laud be turned over to the War Department. With these 
theories prevailing, we should indeed simplify our form of government, 
for we should need none but military officers to manage the affairs of 
the country. 
The fact is, the business of the revenue-marine officer is as distinct 
from that of the naval officer as one laud service is from another. The 
military drill and instruction of the revenue-marine officer do not 
necessarily make him a naval officer, any more than the present educa- 
tion of a naval officer fits him to manage vessels in harbors and along 
the shoal waters of the coast. It is pertinent to mention here that 
naval officers in command of vessels have been particularly unfortu- 
nate when cruising near the coast. A noteworthy evidence of this is 
seen in the disasters which have befallen their vessels voyaging to 
Alaska and the Northern Pacific waters within the past few years- 
The steamer “ Suwanee,” 746 tons, struck on a rock and was lost in 
Shad well Passage, British Columbia, en route to Sitka, July 9, 1868; 
the steamer “ Saginaw,” 282 tons, was lost while on a surveying mission, 
October 29,1870, on a shoal off Midway Island, Pacific Ocean; and the 
“Saranac,” a steamer of 1,238 tons, struck on a reef and was lost, June 
18, 1875, in Seymour Narrows, British Columbia, en route to Sitka. 
Not a few (comparatively speaking) of the 536 naval vessels which 
have vanished within the last seventeen years may be accounted for 
in like manner. 
These vessels were lost in ordinary cruising. In contrast to these 
losses may be placed the fact that the vessels of the Revenue Marine 
have cruised to Alaska every year since the acquisition of that Terri- 
tory, in 1867, without loss or serious damage to any vessel; singu- 
larly enough, one of the few instances of a cutter touching upon the 
bottom having occurred to the “Corwin” last summer when transport- 
ing to San Francisco the people of the lost naval exploring steamer 
“Rodgers,” destroyed by fire the preceding winter in the Arctic 
Ocean. 17 
The facts presented effectually settle in the negative the question 
of increased economy of management, which it has been claimed would 
result from a transfer of the Eevenue Marine to the Navy Department. 
There is one slender argument yet remaining, that of the revenue- 
marine cadet system. Congress provided for the system only in 1876, 
and in such a modest way that the steps in its conduct so far have 
been necessarily more experimental than otherwise. 
The vacancies in the Eeveuue-Marine Corps average from four to 
five a year. The small number of cadets appointed for these vacan- 
cies are educated on a revenue-cutter without inconvenience. Con- 
gress, in providing for the system, (volume 19, United States Statutes, 
page 107,) made no appropriation for its maintenance, and none has 
ever been asked. The cadets are appointed to places made vacant in 
the grade of third lieutenant, and the vacancies in the latter grade 
are held open until the graduation of the cadets. The pay of cadets 
being but three-fourths that of a third lieutenant, there is a consid- 
erable annual saving from the difference of pay for such places as are 
held in abeyance. Indeed, this saving more than equals all the ex- 
penses of the cadet system. The instruction is given on board a vessel 
fulfilling her regular duties upon one of the stations of the Service at 
a point where a cutter has always had headquarters. The results of 
the trial already had of the system are favorable, although it has some 
defects, one of which is that the course is too short. It should be ex- 
tended to four years. The pay is, on the other hand, too much, and 
should be reduced to about SSOO a year. Under no circumstances can 
the cadet system of the Eevenue Marine ever prove embarrassing or 
expensive even in a small degree as is that of Annapolis in a large 
degree. As to the suggestion that these cadets ought to be educated 
at the Naval Academy, the answer is made that the course of study 
and the methods of instruction at that institution are not suited to the 
wants of the Eevenue Marine. If the attempt were made to instruct 
revenue-marine cadets at the Naval Academy, it would be found neces- 
sary to provide a separate course for them. If the present inexpen- 
sive system of instruction for revenue-marine cadets were to be dis- 
continued, it would be far preferable to return to the old system of 
recruiting the corps of officers by means of competitive examinations, 
open to persons who have already had practical sea experience in the 
merchant service, rather than to draw from graduates of the Annap- 
olis school. The system of admission upon competitive examination 
would not bar out young men in civil life who had been educated at 
Annapolis, but they would have to compete for the places like any 18 
other applicants. The system referred to, as being in vogue up to 
1876, had in it many commendable features; and, while desirous of 
giving the cadet system further trial under such improved conditions 
as have been heretofore recommended, there is no disposition to cling 
to it unless improvements can be added. As before stated, the ser- 
vices differ so widely in their objects and aims as to be practically 
distinct. 
With but four to six vacancies occurring annually in the Revenue 
Marine, how meagre the argument that the absorption of this Service 
as proposed would afford appreciable relief to the naval corps, whose 
ranks are burdened with nearly nine hundred clamorous idlers! 
Navy Methods Cumbrous and Expensive. 
Were the revenue vessels, now sound, staunch, and seaworthy, 
turned over to the Navy Department, what reason have we to believe 
that they would not soon become worthless under such management 
as has brought the Navy to its present state of degeneracy and ruin'? 
These vessels would be subject-to the navy-yard systems. Their 
repairs must fall under the various heads of bureaus of the Navy De- 
partment. The work now done under one direction or management 
would under naval control be variously parcelled out. Each revenue- 
cutter would pass through some such ordeal as this: The Bureau of 
Navigation would have the assignment to stations of the vessels and 
officers; the Bureau of Construction and Repair would take in hand 
the hull; the Bureau of Steam-Engineering, the boilers and machinery; 
the Bureau of Ordnance would see to the cannon and small-arms; the 
Bureau of Provisions and Clothing would provide for the clothing and 
rations; the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting look after the ves- 
sel’s outfits and the enlistments of the sailors; the Bureau of Medi- 
cine and Surgery see to the replenishing of the medicine-locker and 
place a surplus medical officer in charge. Should the craft become 
utterly dismembered in this circuitous voyaging from one bureau 
to another, she might be turned over to the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks, under whose supervision she could find a resting-place in 
some snug berth where she might decay and drop to pieces undis- 
turbed. Seriously speaking, this bureau system could not but prove 
cumbrous and expensive applied to revenue vessels. Its circumlocu- 
tion would necessarily cause embarrassing delay in effecting the simple 
repairs that are frequently required upon the cutters to keep them in 
condition for active work. Such delays in case of vessels whose ser- 
vice is often valuable only as it can be rendered with promptness 19 
and celerity would be especially detrimental. These detentions would 
prevent a ready compliance with the requisitions of the Secretary of 
the Treasury for vessels for special duty. 
Again, the cost of doing work at the navy-yards is well known to 
be much greater than by contract with private parties. The system 
of labor alone would cause an increase in cost, which would be aug- 
mented by other causes adverted to before. 
It is inevitable that great loss in economy would result from the 
transfer. 
Would Smugglers he good Customs’ Officers 9 
Aside from the question of economy or other administrative reasons 
before referred to, there is another quite important one for withholding 
from naval officers the delicate duty of protecting the revenue. 
withstanding the provision of law (section 1624, United States Revised 
Statutes) that u no person connected with the Navy shall, under any 
pretence, import in a public vessel any article which is liable to the 
payment of duty,7’ from time immemorial one of the most difficult 
kinds of smuggling against which the vigilance of the customs officers 
has been directed, is the introduction of dutiable goods in the baggage 
of naval officers returning upon vessels of the Navy from foreign sta- 
tions. While stringent regulations are maintained and enforced 
against the smuggling of merchandise by passengers of the general 
public arriving at our ports from abroad, not only their baggage 
but even their persons being subject to search by the inspectors, no 
certain means exist of reaching the personal baggage of the naval 
officers returning by their own ships. No oath or certificate is re- 
quired of them that they have not in their effects dutiable goods in 
fraud of the customs revenue. Enjoying such immunity there is no 
check or restraint upon them beyond that imposed by a sensitive con- 
science, Statesmen, judges, tradesmen, and others of the general 
public are not exempted from the search, but naval officers may 
escape it. A casual inquiry into the subject covering only the period 
of five years, beginning with 1878 and ending with December, 1882, 
shows that five naval vessels returning from foreign stations within 
that period have been used by naval officers in violation of section 
1624 of the statutes, as transports for the importation of merchandise, 
and that the attempt was made to land such merchandise without the 
payment of the duties prescribed by law. The value of goods (appraised 
by the naval officers themselves at a nominal price in many cases) 
thus unlawfully imported and landed is over seven thousand dollars. 
The number of officers of the Navy directly concerned in this business 20 
was over fifty. Forty-two packages were seized at the express office 
where they were being shipped beyond the reach of customs officers. 
Some of these packages were addressed to naval officers, others to 
families of naval officers, and others still to private citizens. One 
package, containing two hundred and eighty-eight pairs of kid gloves, 
was addressed to a merchant in New York City. In this connection 
must be noted the remarkable fact that these scandalous infractions 
of law and the naval regulations seem not to have been visited with 
discipline. 
If naval officers, sworn to observe the laws of their country, can 
thus unblushingly violate the law, as well as the duty of good citizens; 
if they are thus recreant to the trusts with which they are charged, 
can they ask to hare other and more delicate duties intrusted to their 
keeping? Would not naval officers commanding revenue vessels be 
tempted to shield their brother officers returning with the “spoils” of 
a foreign cruise, especially since their turn to go abroad might be near 
at hand? Would the naval officer fresh from abroad, his baggage 
plethoric with such peculations, be the proper person to guard the 
coffers of the Treasury ? Would the Department, which by its failure 
to punish these violations seems to wink at plundering the revenue, 
be the proper one to superintend its protection? 
Failure of Former Attempts at Transfer. 
The movement now being made for the transfer of the Revenue 
Marine is not the first attempt of the Navy to absorb this Service. A 
similar attempt was made iu 1843, and met with deserved failure. 
The Hon. Walter Forward, then Secretary of the Treasury, having 
been requested by a committee of the Senate to give his views on the 
proposition, expressed strong disapproval of the plan. He deemed 
that there was manifest propriety in a continuance of the existing 
system; that the change, to use his language, was “calculated to em- 
barrass the operations of this Department in carrying into effect with 
proper energy the legal means placed in its hands for the security and 
protection of the revenue.” He adds, significantly: “ Without intend- 
ing any disparagement of the officers of the Navy, it is not believed 
that the habits and discipline of that meritorious class of men are 
calculated to suit the character of the service to which it is proposed 
to assign them, especially when they must be subjected to the orders 
and directions of the collector of the customs, as provided by the 
ninety-ninth section of the act of 2d of March, 1799, which subjection 
is deemed highly essential, both for the efficiency of the duties to be 
discharged and the better security of the interests of the revenue.” 21 
Referring' to the trial given the employment of naval officers in the 
service upon revenue vessels, but discontinued in 1832, he says: 
“After a short trial it was found necessary to discontinue [it] in con- 
sequence of the difficulties and objections which occurred in the prac- 
tical operation of the measure.” 
The Committee on Commerce of the Senate presented, through Sen- 
ator Huntington, of Connecticut, an adverse report upon the proposi- 
tion of 1843 to hand the business over to the Navy Department. I 
quote from their report some pertinent passages: “ The duties required 
of those who have the command/of these [revenue] vessels are such 
as belong almost exclusively to the enforcement of the revenue laws. 
Hence it seems to be peculiarly appropriate that those employed in 
this service should be under the direction and control of the officer 
who is charged with the execution of the laws relating to customs. 
This was the leading feature of the policy which led to the establishment 
of th is branch of the public service. It has stood the test of time and 
experience and has ‘ worked well.’ To abandon it for the purpose of 
trying a new experiment would be at least hazardous, and is not called 
for by any exigency known to the committee.” 
They add further on; “The committee are satisfied that sound-policy 
requires that the revenue service'and the naval service should be kept 
distinct; * * * and [the former] under the direction of the Sec- 
retary of the Treasury.” 
It is needless to add that the action of the Senate was in accord 
with the report of the Committee on Commerce. It is observed that 
Congress has always looked coldly, not to say with displeasure, upon 
every attempt of the Navy to aggrandize its power by absorbing the 
functions of civil administration. 
Looking back, we find arrayed against this measure Alexander 
Hamilton, the author of our system of finance, and two other eminent 
Secretaries of the Treasury—Louis MoLane, in 1832, and Walter For- 
ward, in 1843. We have also an unbroken line of Secretaries of the 
Treasury, from Hamilton to the present time, whose approval of the 
present arrangement as wise and salutary seems attested by their ac- 
quiescence. It remained for a master in the Navy—whose report is 
appended to the annual report of the Honorable the Secretary of 
the Navy, and upon the statements of which the latter appears to 
have based principally his recommendations for the transfer—to dis- 
cover the incongruities of the system and point out its hidden defects, 
to teach statecraft to statesmen, to roll back the curtain of time and 
reveal the errors of judgment of the founders of the Republic. 22 
The Scheme Impracticable and Costly. 
The Revenue Marine, which has earned a respectable place in the 
nation’s history, would seem to have rights and be entitled to consid- 
eration at the hands of Congress as well as the Navy, yet the propo- 
sition is to wipe it out, to sink its history, to place its officers in 
unequal service with naval officers. If the latter had, with thought 
and enterprise, and by industry and energy, built up some civil branch 
in the Navy Department and now sought legal authority for its con- 
tinuance in the unnatural relation, their demand might seem to have 
some ground of justice, but to come with bold effrontery and ask Con- 
gress to strike down an honorable and efficient branch of the civil 
establishment in order to benefit naval officers may perhaps be char- 
acterized as impudent. It is not often that the national legislature is 
asked to perpetrate so great a wrong for the benefit of a class already 
highly favored. 
It may be said in passing that the defects of the pending bill are 
numerous, and that it presents in a most repulsive light the formula- 
tion of the proposition conclusively shown to be repugnant to fair- 
dealing and public justice. The imperfections of the bill are, however, 
merged in the general objections which surround the whole plan of 
Navy aggrandizement. Nevertheless were the reasons as strong in 
favor of the transfer of this branch of the civil service to the Navy 
Department as they are against it, this bill would still be bad, and its 
passage be hurtful to the public interest. 
A few more words upon the question of economy as involved in the 
proposed transfer. Should naval officers take the place of the Revenue 
Marine, the increased pay alone of the corps would be, at a reasonable 
calculation, $50,000 a year. Were the officers detailed, all holding 
commissions more than five years old, the increase would be exactly 
$04,000; but if some were newly commissioned, the increase would be 
correspondingly less. 
So far from the change being in the interest of economy, the testi- 
mony shows the reverse to be true. The cost of the Service would be 
largely increased in all the items that enter into the expense of its 
operation. 
But more even than the increased cost of management would be the 
incapacity of naval officers for the work, their experience and educa- 
tion all tending in a different direction. Moreover, they would never 
become proficient in the duty. vßy the rules of the Navy Department 
governing details of officers, two years is the usual length of an officer’s 
tour or period of service upon a particular duty or station. Following this rule, a naval officer, after two years’ service upon a revenue-cutter, 
might be expected to go to sea on a naval vessel. If he were sub- 
jected to his fair rotation of duty, he would take the rounds of the 
naval stations, first to one and then to another of the five squadrons 
maintained by the Navy, designated as the North Atlantic, South 
Atlantic, Pacific, Asiatic, and Mediterranean. Completing this round, 
he might be assigned to shore-duty for two years longer, making 
twelve years in all, when he would be again eligible for assignment 
to a revenue vessel. His first limited experience would have been for- 
gotten in the interim. . Under such an arrangement the revenue vessels 
would soon become subject to the same sad train of collisions, stand- 
ings, and other disasters which now beset the naval vessels upon our 
coast, when, as appears by the information recently furnished Con- 
gress, {vide Ex. Doc. No. 26, H. E.,) there are in a single year twenty- 
seven casualties for thirty-two vessels of the Navy in commission. 
Years of patient and industrious application are necessary to enable 
the revenue-marine officer to become proficient and skilled in his 
profession and the duties incident thereto. In the system of shifting 
details to which naval officers are necessarily subjected, if the service 
be impartially administered, it would not be possible for such officers 
to become fitted for the business of revenue officers. 
Forty years ago the Senate said that the Eeveuue Marine had stood 
the test of time, and “worked well.” The same may be now affirmed 
in still stronger terms. 
The good condition and efficiency of the Eevenue Marine, justice to 
its officers, its history, its record, demaud its retention in .the Treas- 
ury. The convenience of the public business, the relations of this 
branch to other civil branches in the Treasury, the natural order, the 
harmony, the fitness of things, demand its retention. The bad condi- 
tion of the Navy, the extravagance in the management, the disregard 
by its officers of law and regulations, their unfitness for the work, for- 
bid the transfer to that Department. 
Finally, it may be said that against the scheme of enlarging the 
scope and power of the Kavy Department by endowing it with a great 
body of civil functions, of which the pending bill is but the entering- 
wedge, are arrayed all the traditions of the Republic, all the prece- 
dents of Congressional action, all considerations of sound public policy. 
The judgment of our country’s founders is against it, the custom and 
practice of years are against it, the voice of the people is agrainst it. 
— ~ -O'- 7 it Jl “ O 
Very respectfully, 
E. W. CLARK, 
Chief Revenue-Marine Division. 
Hon. Charles J. Folger, 
Secretary of the Treasury. UNITED STATES COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY. 
LETTER OF THE SUPERINTENDENT 
ON THE 
PROPOSED TRANSFER TO THE NATY DEPARTMENT. 
U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Office, 
Washington, January 6, 1883. 
Sir: The principal reasons against transferring the Coast-Survey 
Service from the Treasury Department to the Navy Department must 
necessarily be those which led, in 1843, to the adoption of the present 
system of administration, together with the fact that the work has 
been successfully conducted under the same. These considerations 
may be briefly stated as follows: 
The work is one which requires the co-operation of persons specially 
trained in geodesy or spherical surveying, in trigonometrical and 
topographical surveying, in nautical surveying and the science of 
navigation, beside the employment of mathematical computers, skilled 
draughtsmen, engravers, mechanicians, and other persons of special 
attainments. 
It was believed that an organization composed of such various ele- 
ments, including civilians, engineer officers of the Army, and officers 
of the Navy, would be most advantageously placed under a civil 
department, where all difficulties arising from questions of relative 
rank and special privilege would disappear. For this reason, and as 
relating mainly to the commercial interests of the country, the work 
was placed under the Treasury Department, which has charge of that 
part of the public service. 
It is claimed and admitted that this plan has worked well, and 
excellently well. The permanent civil nucleus has preserved unity of 
plan and methods in the work, has fostered its progress and develop- 
ment, and has maintained the necessary strict co-ordination of the 
survey afloat with that of the shore. 
The spare force of the naval, and military service has been utilized 
to advantage. There are not now any officers of the Army employed 
in the work, because their whole force is needed in improvements of 26 
rivers and harbors. In like manner, at times when the Xavy required 
its whole force for war purposes, not a single naval officer was employed 
on the Coast Survey. On the contrary, civilians on the work per- 
formed duty with the fleets. The case is now reversed, and about 
fifty naval officers, mostly of lower grades, find useful employment 
and valuable experience on the Coast Survey. About 250 men are 
furnished with pay and rations, and the total expenditure on the part 
of the Xavy amounts to about $250,000 a year, being 30 per cent, of 
the whole expenditure for the Coast and Geodetic Survey. This is 
made the ground by the Secretary of the Xavy for the claim that 
the work should be transferred to his Department. It is not claimed 
that the officers would not be paid, whether on this duty or not. It is 
possible that the number of enlisted men, although within the whole 
number allowed for the Xavy, might not be employed. We must 
admit, therefore, that the appropriations for the naval service are 
increased by the pay and rations for the men employed on the Coast 
Survey, say, $92,000 per annum, or less than 15 per cent, of the whole 
expenditure for the work. This expenditure is necessary, if the work 
is to be done, whether administered by the Treasury or by the Xavy 
Department. 
The leading considerations which I would urge in opposition to the 
proposed transfer may be summed up in the following propositions: 
1. The present system, perfected nearly forty years ago, has proved 
thoroughly efficient, economical, and satisfactory to the country. It 
is wise to hold fast to that which has been proved to be good. 
2. It affords to the Xavy all the advantages that can be legitimately 
claimed. It employs as many of its officers in service afloat as can be 
advantageously used in hydrography. The employment of a larger 
number, in the event of a transfer, would result in training naval officers 
to be geodesists, topographers, chiefs of technical bureaus, and in with- 
drawing their interests and habits from the naval service proper. 
3. The efficiency of the Service would suffer by the loss of ambition 
and emulation, which exist at present in a high degree, but which 
find no stimulus in a service where no positions of responsibility and 
direction are open to civil experts, however great their attainments 
and devotion to the public service. 
Yours, respectfully, 
J. E. HILGAED, 
Superintendent Coast a?id Geodetic Survey. 
Hon. Chas. J. Eolgee, 
Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. G. 27 
U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Office, 
Washington, January 20, 1883. 
Dear Sir: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from the 
Secretary of the Treasury, dated the 17th instant, addressed to you, 
in which he transmits, for consideration and such reply as the subject 
demands, a printed report by Commander Charles D. Sigsbee, U. S. N., 
received from the Secretary of the Navy, in which certain considera- 
tions are presented in favor of the transfer of the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey from the Treasury to the Navy Department. 
For the last forty-seven years the organization of the Coast Survey, 
composed of civilians and Army and Navy officers, has been under 
the control of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the ground that the 
Survey was for commercial purposes, and that only under a neutral 
Department, or civil chief, could the desired co-operation of the three 
different branches of the Service be propely secured. In this connec- 
tion, and for the reason that the past has its lessons, a short synopsis 
of the history of the Survey would not be out of place. 
SYNOPSIS. 
At the commencement of the present century the want of accurate 
charts of our coast was seriously felt. They were absolutely neces- 
sary for the encouragement of foreign and domestic commerce. Ac- 
cordingly, on February 10,1807, Congress passed a law “to provide for 
surveying the coast of the United States,” the execution of which was 
left entirely to the President, Thomas Jefferson* 
The scientific principles and methods which were recommended by 
Prof. F. E. Hassler for the conduct of such a survey were adopted by 
the President and by Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, and 
approved by the leading scientists of the day. The work was at that 
date naturally assumed to belong to the Treasury Department, and 
hence Secretary Gallatin, with the approval of the President, ap- 
pointed Prof. Hassler the Superintendent of the Survey. 
Owing to the war with Great Britain and to the condition of the 
national finances after the war, little progress was made by Prof. 
Hassler beyond collecting the necessary instruments for the survey 
and illustrating in the field the methods he had proposed. 
In 1818 the law was changed so as to exclude civilians and to con- 
fine the execution of the work to Army and Navy officers. 
The result was that disconnected surveys were made, and on this 
subject the Hon. Samuel L. Southard, Secretary of the Navy, in his 
annual report to Congress, 1827, states, “nor can such surveys be made 28 
without the aid of the means contemplated by the act of 1807, 
alluding to the employment of scientific persons. 
In 1828 the Committee on Naval Affairs addressed a letter to the 
Secretary of the Navy asking for information in regard to the survey 
of the coast, and whether such a survey ought to be made. 
Secretary Southard replied to the latter inquiry “that upon this 
point no doubt is entertained,” and adds, in regard to the detached 
surveys made under his Department, “ that for the reasons given by 
me [him] they were unsafe, and in many instances useless and per- 
nicious.” 
In July, 1832, the law of 1807 was revived, Prof. Ilassler was reap- 
pointed Superintendent, and the employment of “astronomers and of 
other persons as the President shall deem necessary” was again 
authorized. 
In March, 1834, the survey was transferred to the Navy Department, 
and in 1836 was transferred back to the Treasury Department. 
In 1843 Congress directed that a board should be organized, to be 
composed of civilians and Army and Navy officers, whose duty it 
should be to reorganize the Survey, and that the plan agreed upon by 
the majority of the board should be carried out by the President of 
the United States. 
The board, consisting of the Superintendent and two of his civil 
assistants, two experienced naval officers, and four officers of the 
Topographical Corps of the Army, concurred unanimously, and as a 
finality, in adopting the following resolution, which was approved by 
the President: 
u Resolved, That inasmuch as the object and purpose of the survey of 
the coast refer principally to the commercial interests of the country, 
and as all laws of Congress in relation to the same contemplate the 
employment of civilians and officers of the Army and Navy upon said 
works, it is the opinion of this board, and they do hereby respectfully 
recommend, that it should be under the control and considered a part 
of the Treasury Department.” 
Again in 1850 and 1851 the Secretary of the Navy suggested in his 
annual reports for those years that the Survey be transferred to the 
Navy Department. 
In 1851 the Senate passed a resolution directing the Secretary of 
the Navy to report to the. Senate the reasons why such a transfer 
should be made, and also the Secretary of the Treasury to report why 
it should not be made. A report from each Secretary was presented, 
and both were published by order of Congress.* The subject of the 
transfer was fully and thoroughly discussed in the Senate and by 
*Ex. Docs. 35 and 36, Senate, 2d session, 31st Congress. 29 
the scientific associations and chambers of commerce of the country. 
The recommendation was not adopted. The reasons against the 
transfer are stronger now than then. 
In 1871 Congress authorized the extension of the triangulation to 
the interior States as a basis for their State surveys, and also the con- 
nection by triangnlation of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. 
The report of Commander Sigsbee makes no specific charge against 
the efficiency, economy, or scientific accuracy with which the Survey 
has been conducted, nor does it impeach its management or the emi- 
nence it has attained in comparison with other national works of the 
same character. 
The transfer has been emphatically opposed by those in our own 
country who are interested in commerce and in the advancement of 
science, while abroad the results of the present organization have been 
most favorably received. 
Capt. H. W. Smyth, royal navy, president of the Geographical 
Society, London, says, in reference to our survey : “ I have studied 
the question closely, and do not hesitate to pronounce the conviction 
that though the Americans were last in the field, they have, per saltum, 
leaped into the very first rank.” 
On the same subject Sir E. I. Murchison may be quoted: “The 
systematic co-operation of able surveyors of the naval and military 
service, combined with and subordinate to a central system of direc- 
tion in the Treasury Department, and superintended by astronomers, 
could not fail to make this (the Coast Survey) one of the most perfect 
exemplifications of applied science of modern times.” 
The report refers extensively to the fact that the purely geograph- 
ical surveys of the coasts of Europe have been executed by naval offi- 
cers. This is undoubtedly true, but the question arises whether better 
results would not have been secured by the system of co-operation 
as it now exists under the Secretary of the Treasury. Admiral Beau- 
fort, R. jST., a distinguished hydrographer, and other British authori- 
ties state that the progress and character of the hydrography of Great 
Britain have severely suffered from want of co-operation with the 
ordnance or land survey. 
The proposed transfer, however, carries with it not only the hydrog- 
raphy, hut the survey of the coast in the literal sense of the term— 
that is, the following operations : 
Geodesy: 
Keconnoissance. 
Base-lines and standards of length. 
Triangulation and instruments 30 
Time. 
Azimuth. 
Latitude. 
Lougitude. 
Arc measures and local deflection of plumb-line. 
Geographical positions and projections. 
Hypsometry: 
Spirit-levelling. 
Trigonometric and barometric heights. 
Surveying-: 
Topography. 
Physical Hydrography: 
Tides, currents, and winds. 
Gulf stream. 
Deep-sea soundings and temperatures. 
Terrestrial Magnetism: 
Astronomy. 
Absolute and differential gravity. 
No government in Europe has ever committed such delicate opera- 
tions to its marine or naval department. This was tried by the 
United States between 1834 and 1836, and failed, whereas the present 
organization has been an eminent success. To transfer only the hy- 
drography would be, in the light of the past, an act of disorganiza- 
tion, and in this connection it may be added that since the date of 
the last similar recommendation by the Secretary of the Navy, thirty- 
two years ago, a large portion of the needed hydrography has been 
completed, while, on the other side, the scope of the geodetic work 
has been extended. 
In addition to the above operations, the construction of the stand- 
ard weights and measures of the United States, being intimately con- 
nected with the Survey, has been always under the charge of its Super- 
intendent, and belongs entirely to the Treasury Department. Shall 
this duty be also transferred? If not, must not a separate bureau, 
with a specially qualified chief at its head, be established in the Treas- 
ury Department for this particular work? Would this be in the line 
of economy? 
Another objection urged against the present organization is, that 
u naval officers, while attached to the Survey, are independent of the 
control of the Secretary of the Navy, which is a disadvantage.” In 
reply to this it may be simply stated that the- Secretary details these 
officers,' that he can recall them whenever their services are needed 31 
for strictly naval purposes, as has been done heretofore; and that 
while performing duty in the Survey they are under a chief naval 
officer, the hydrographic inspector, and are governed by naval regu- 
lations. The Chief of the Survey simply assigns them to the locali- 
ties where the necessary land operations have been finished and the 
hydrographic work is most needed, exactly as would be the case under 
the Navy Department. 
Before 1861, Army and Navy officers were attached to the Survey. 
At the breaking out of hostilities some few resigned their commis- 
sions, while all the others were recalled to their professional duties. 
Nevertheless, the Survey was continued in all its branches until the 
close of the war, principally in special surveys on land and water for 
the immediate use of the Army and Navy. 
The Hydrographic Office of the Navy Department has been com- 
paratively lately established. It is stated in the report as an argu- 
ment in favor of the transfer that two bureaus of the Government, the 
Coast Survey and the Hydrographic Office, are publishing duplicate 
charts. No charts published by the Hydrographic Office are pub- 
lished by the Coast Survey, and if the former finds it advisable to use 
the regular charts of the coasts of the United States in its different 
compilations, the duplication is on the part of the Hydrographic 
Office. Nor can it be seen, even in this case, what difference it would 
make whether such charts were made under the general authority of 
the Treasury or of the Navy Department. The hydrographic office 
of the British board of admiralty republishes all the principal charts 
issued from this office, and gives it due credit therefor. 
The yearly and aggregate amounts appropriated for the Coast and 
Geodetic Survey are given in the report with considerable prominence, 
in connection with the expenditures for the same purpose paid from 
naval appropriations. If the sums appropriated for the Survey are 
intended as an argument in favor of the transfer, it should be clearly 
shown that they were injudiciously expended, and that strict economy 
and accountability have not been practised, or that the work could 
have been executed more cheaxdy, more quickly, and with greater 
precision under the Navy Department. 
The survey of the coast, upon comparison, has cost less than similar 
operations in Europe.* 
* 
The Navy, through its officers attached to the survey of the coast, in 
accordance with the law of Congress, has contributed largely and 
creditably to the success of the work. Would, however, the employ- 
ment of ten officers per annum entitle the Navy Department to the 
*Ex. Doc. !No. 6, Senate, 2d session, 35th Congress. 32 
control of the Coast and Geodetic Survey ? Or would the recommenda- 
tion to that effect he strengthened on the ground that the Depart- 
ment can spare sixty officers to-day and perhaps none to-morrow? 
The pay of officers and crews employed on hydrographic duty in 
the Survey must, whether they are attached to the Survey or not, be 
paid almost entirely from naval appropriations. It is a mistake, how- 
ever, to suppose that such payments cover the entire expense of the 
hydrography. The vessels, over twenty in number, belong to and 
were built or purchased by the Survey. Their repairs and mainte- 
nance, including equipment, instruments, and running expenses, are all 
paid from the appropriation for the Survey. These expenses amounted 
in 1882 to about $BO,OOO. 
The advantage to be gained by the transfer in obtaining depots for 
storage and supplies are'somewhat illusory. No “buildings are pur- 
chased or rented for depots.” The size of the surveying-vessels ranges 
from fifty to three hundred and fifty tons. So soon as the season is 
over, many of the smaller class are laid up at the nearest harbor and 
town until the resumption of operations next season. In this way the 
expense and risk are saved of a trip to and back from a navy-yard or 
naval depot. 
The organization of the civil staff, which is limited in number, and, 
in fact, is being gradually reduced, is, and ever has been, based on 
merit. No one can be admitted except to the lowest grade, that of 
aid, and then only when the applicant is a graduate of a college or of 
some scientific school, and after passing a satisfactory examination 
at the office. Promotion or increase of pay depends solely on merit, 
or the amount and excellence of the work executed, and not upon 
seniority. Such a civil organization, in combination with Army and 
Navy officers detailed for the Survey from time to time, and for com- 
paratively short periods, has produced unequalled results. 
Whether the transfer of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the great 
national scientific work of the country, from the Treasury Department 
to the Navy Department would increase its efficiency, or insure 
greater economy and progress, or improve its management, or give a 
higher value to its results, or better satisfy the demands of commerce 
and science, or, finally, add to the reputation of the Survey at home 
or abroad, is a question which may be safely left to the same tribunals 
which decided it in 180 V, 1832, 1843, and 1851. 
Yours, respectfully, 
EiCH’D D. CUTTS, 
Assistant in Charge of Office and Topography. 
J. E. Hilgaed, 
Superintendent U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey. MARINE-HOSPITAL SERVICE. 
TRANSFER TO MYY DEPARTMENT. 
REPORT OF THE SUPERVISING-SURGEON GENERAL 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 
Office Supervising Surgeon-General, 
United States Marine-Hospital Service, 
Washington, January 5, 1883. 
“Is it not the man-of-war’s man’s way 
To'take all things, hut nought to pay?” 
Dugald Graham. 
Sir : Referring to your reference to the annual report of the Secre- 
tary of the Navy, and of the hills (H. R. Nos. 7157 and 7158) for the 
transfer of certain duties from the Secretary of the Treasury to the 
Navy Department, and particularly so far as this office is affected 
thereby, I have to respectfully report that no officer or employe of this 
Service would be transferred to the Navy Department by the bill 
(H. R. No. 7157) entitled “An act to transfer the administration of the 
Revenue-Cutter Service to the Navy Department;” but there would 
be a diversion from the marine-hospital fund of the amount of forty 
cents per month which is now paid by each officer and employe of that 
Service. 
As regards the bill (H. R. No. 7158) to establish a Bureau of Mercan- 
tile Marine in the Navy Department, it is believed that its provisions 
would transfer this Service to the Navy Department, as in section 1 it 
is stated that “from and after the passage of this act, the Secretary of 
the Navy shall have charge and supervision of the execution of all laws 
relating to the mercantile marine of the United States.” This clause 
seems to be independent of that which follows, and which states: 
“And shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties that are 
now by law or by custom exercised or performed by the Secretary of 
the Treasury in relation to the registry, enrolment, and license of 34 
vessels, the regulation of steam-vessels, and the shipment of seamen,” 
&c. The next clause excepts the accounting officers of the Treasury 
Department from the transfer. Section 4 provides that the chief of 
the proposed Bureau of Mercantile Marine u shall perform, under the 
direction of the Secretary of the Navy, all executive duties relating to 
the mercantile marine which are or which may be hereafter placed 
under the supervision of the Navy Department.” If it be construed 
that the first clause of section 1 of this bill does not necessarily 
transfer this Service to the Navy Department, I would still deem it 
my duty to lay before you certain facts in relation to the transfer of 
the Service aforesaid, for the bill can only be explained by the printed 
recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy in his last annual report, 
and I cannot, therefore, view the transfer of kindred services to that 
Department without concern, believing it to be the entering-wedge by 
which all branches of the civil service are eventually to be placed 
under the control of the Military Establishment of the United States. 
From the foundation of this Government there has seemed to be a 
desire on the part of that Establishment to absorb and admin- 
ister all the civil offices of the Government. It is but a short time 
since that bills were introduced into the House to transfer the Con- 
sular Bureau of the Department of State and the direction of the 
consuls to the Navy Department, the consuls themselves to be detailed 
from the Navy. In the year 1862 a determined and persistent effort 
was made by the Navy Department to absorb the Light-House Service, 
which was only defeated by a report of that Board setting forth the 
facts. The report itself is Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 61, 
37th Congress, 2d session. Later I find that an attempt was made to 
assume executive direction of the Life-Saving Service—in the year 
1878. At the last session of Congress the Bevenue-Marine Service 
was attacked, and the bill (H. B. No. 7157) for the first time formulates 
their proposition. It had been recommended in 1843. The medi- 
cal officers of the Navy had expressed their desire to obtain control 
of the marine hospitals. Some even volunteered to serve as detailed 
officers in this Service, apparently thinking thereby to obtain a foot- 
hold, and now they openly recommend the transfer of this Service to 
that Department. I propose, briefly, to show what a transfer means, 
and, having thus stated the general disposition and desire of the Navy 
Department to control the, civil service, I deem it unnecessary to 
further advert to that topic. 
In examining the question of the proposed transfer, it is necessary 
to glance at the history of the Service. I find that the Marine- Hospital Service of the United States originated in a petition to Con- 
gress by the Marine Society of Boston, Mass,, in the year 1791, but, 
although favorably reported at that time, the law was not passed until 
July 16, 1798. There was then no thought of this Service belonging 
to the Navy. It was created on the petition prepared and signed by 
men whose sole interest was in the commercial marine of the United 
States, and it was for their benefit alone. A year later we find the 
act of 1799 extending the benefits of the original act to the Navy. 
This was done at the request, and upon the recommendation, of the 
Executive Department. Medical officers of the Navy were not detailed 
to serve in marine hospitals, but a civilian appointment was made, 
and civilian appointments have continued to be made to fill vacancies 
in the marine hospitals from the foundation of the Service down to 
the present time. In the year 1811 the Secretary of the Navy recom- 
mended the separation of the two services, it being stated that the 
Navy desired their own hospitals; that they desired to be separate 
and distinct from merchant seamen. Naval seamen, when placed in 
marine hospitals, frequently deserted, and it was thought it would 
be desirable to employ the wives ami widows of seamen in the Navy 
as attendants in the hospitals. A law was then passed separating 
the establishments. It was not claimed that the several marine 
hospitals should be transferred to the Navy. There was at that 
time a healthy public opinion which would have disposed of any 
such movement. Although the law was passed so early, yet no 
naval hospital was actually built until the year 1827, and naval 
seamen were treated in the hospitals of the Marine-Hospital Ser- 
vice of the United States. During the period of the war with 
Great Britain in 1812, the marine hospital at Charlestown, Mass., 
Boston harbor, was filled to its utmost capacity with British prisoners 
and seamen from the Navy of the United States, in addition to the 
sick of the merchant service. Notwithstanding this, the hospital was 
directed and controlled by civil officers. The surgeon of the hospital, 
Dr. David Townsend, received his appointment in 1809, and remained 
in his capacity of resident surgeon until 1829, when he died, in office. 
There has never been any complaint that the hospitals were ineffi- 
ciently managed, except for a short period just following the war of 
the rebellion, when the interior commercial marine was at its lowest 
ebb. I find upon examination that there are naval hospitals in con- 
nection with each navy-yard, but there are none on the interior rivers 
of the United States. These hospitals have been located with especial 
reference to the wants of the seamen and employes of the navy-yards, 36 
and not with reference to the commercial marine. Before going into a 
comparison of the respective services I desire to invite your attention 
to the fact that in the last annual report of the Secretary of the Navy 
he says: 
“If it should be deemed advisable to establish a Bureau of Mer- 
cantile Marine in the Navy Department, [which the bill H. E. No. 
7158 attempts to do,] the Marine and Naval Hospital Services would 
naturally be united. Obviously the Department with which the 
Service is naturally associated is the Navy Department—a Depart- 
ment which now has the physical care of 8,250 seamen—a Department 
to which the Service is akin, to which it is of the greatest importance 
to foster, by every means at its command, that very class whom, the 
Service is designed to relieve, and in which there is a bureau specially 
charged with the care and comfort of seafaring men. Valuable facts 
and statistics upon the subject of marine and naval hospitals have 
been collected and arranged by Midshipman Philip E. Alger, and are 
herewith transmitted.” 
I have tried vainly to obtain a cox>y of the valuable facts and sta- 
tistics which have been arranged by Midshipman Philip E. Alger, 
a letter of the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of the 
Navy having failed to bring the document np to this date, and on 
two separate occasions I sent to the chief clerk of the Navy Depart- 
ment requesting a copy of the report. I presume the report of this 
midshipman on hospital service was not purposely withheld; but it is 
certainly a hardship that the bureaus affected by this bill and by the 
declarations of the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy have not been 
able, except in a single instance, to see the reports prepared upon 
them by naval officers, and to which they have had no opportunity to 
make a single statement in explanation or remark of any kind. 
I pass over this part of the subject, and shall not at this time make 
an inquiry into the reason for the detail of a midshipman to report 
on hospitals—a subject which, at first blush, would seem to be some- 
what foreign to the regular duties of a midshipman. I presume, how- 
ever, that the Honorable Secretary has taken pains to ascertain that 
the particular midshipman referred to was an expert in medical 
knowledge and hospital construction, and in all details relating to 
hospitals in general. Not having access to this report, as before 
mentioned, it is obvious that this letter cannot, in any sense, be con- 
sidered a reply to it; but as it is stated that the statistics have been 
collected and arranged from the published reports, &c., I shall avail 
myself of such public reports as are accessible to me. 
I find by the last report of the Surgeon-General of the Navy, which 
is contained in volume 6, 1880, page 11, that there were admitted to 
all the naval hospitals during the year 1,236 persons. As the force of 37 
the Navy during that year was the same as in subsequent years, or 
nearly so, it may fairly be taken as a sample of the amount of business 
done at those hospitals. There are eight hospitals, namely: Annapolis, 
Brooklyn, Chelsea, Mare Island, Norfolk, Pensacola, Philadelphia, 
and Portsmouth, N. H. There is also a hospital at Yokohama, Japan, 
which I presume is included in the estimate of seamen treated in hos- 
pitals. The Secretary of the Navy states that there are 8,250 men 
subject to treatment in the Navy, and therefore the services should be 
united under the care of a bureau in that Department. It cannot be 
that the Secretary of the Navy supposes that there is a larger clieut- 
elage subject to treatment in naval hospitals than there is in marine 
hospitals, for it is well known that there are about 165,000 men sub- 
ject to admission to the marine hospitals; at least that is the number 
of men paying hospital-dues. There were actually treated by the 
Marine-Hospital Service in the last fiscal year 36,184 patients, of 
whom 13,048 were treated in the marine hospitals; so that either the 
Secretary of the Navy has been misinformed as to the relative im- 
portance of the services, or he must consider that the care and com- 
fort of a single naval sailor is equal to nearly thirty sailors who do 
not wear the naval uniform. Is it possible that in America we have 
a chief officer of the Government openly favoring a special class— 
in effect saying that the buttons, the trappings, and the other things 
“that doth hedge” a man in the service of his Government makes 
that man more an object of care and solicitude than thirty com- 
mon men who are not naval sailors? It seems to me that this is 
subversive of all the principles of republicanism and true democracy, 
or of government by the people, “Obviously,” says the Secretary, 
“ the service should be in that Department which now has the care of 
8,250 men.” The Secretary of the Treasury might say, with much 
greater propriety, “ obviously the little force that is now treated in 
naval hospitals might be treated in the Treasury hospitals, which have 
under their care 165,000 men.” But I shall not extend this letter to 
an undue length by pursuing this topic, but desire to touch upon its 
economical bearings. Admitting that none of the patients mentioned 
in this report of the Surgeon-General of the Navy has ever been 
treated in the hospital at Yokohama, the 1,236 men were treated at a 
cost of—what? We find in the estimates for hospitals, made by the 
Surgeon-General in that year, (Report, page 6,) $181,500 is recom- 
mended for the care of the service; $45,000 only of this sum is for the 
medical department in general, which, it is stated, is for surgeons’ 
necessaries, for vessels in commission, navy-yards, naval stations, 38 
Marine Corps, and Coast Survey. This, then, leaves a balance of 
$130,500 for the support of the 1,230 men treated at the naval hos- 
pitals of the United States. It should be remembered, however, that 
the salary of the medical officers is not included in the above, mileage 
for medical officers travelling under orders is not included, and it is 
impossible from any published report to ascertain the exact cost of 
the medical establishment of the Navy, the pay being included under 
the general term of pay of the Navy, travelling expenses under that 
of mileage for the Navy. We shall hud thus that each person treated 
in naval hospitals has cost the Government $110.43, exclusive of the 
salary and emoluments of the large and expensive medical staff of the 
Navy. The expense of the persons treated in the Marine-Hospital 
Service of the United States for the same year was $16.80 per man. 
It cannot be, then, that this transfer is recommended on the score of 
economy. It must surely have been, as before suggested, that it 
was supposed the Government was more interested in the care of 
one naval sailor than it was in the thirty who are not in the naval 
service. If there are more medical officers in the Navy than can be 
given employment, why not discharge some of them, as would be 
done in the civil service? Is it possible that the u aristocraticn 
element in this country, fostered and pampered by annual appropria- 
tions, must be provided with employment at the expense of all other 
people? 1 will only point to one fact. At the marine hospital at 
Chelsea, Mass., when I served there some years ago, we had in our 
hospital a daily average of from thirty to fifty patients. At the same 
time we had a dispensary at the custom-house in Boston. We hadr 
to manage this hospital and dispensary, one surgeon, (myself,) one 
assistant surgeon, and eight attendants of all sorts. At the same 
time at the foot of the hill was a naval hospital. They had, at the time 
I visited them, ten (10) patients. They had a steward and some eight 
or ten civilian employes, one medical director, (with the rank of cap- 
tain,) a surgeon, a passed assistant surgeon, and an assistant surgeon. 
They had no dispensary in the city or any other duties than those 
performed at the hospital. It is evident that the transfer of the pa- 
tients of the naval hospital to the marine hospital would not have 
materially added to our work. In this office, for example, under the 
law one surgeon of the Service is detailed to serve as a member of 
the National Board of Health, an institution of whose utility I will 
not now speak; but that is the law, and the officer is so detailed. In 
order that this Service should suffer no loss, that officer has been as- 
signed to duty as chief of the purveying division of this office, and 39 
is kept constantly employed. The acting chief clerk of the office is 
a medical officer detailed from the general service. He daily visits 
patients of tins Service at Providence Hospital, averaging from five to 
fifteen per day, attends to patients at the dispensary, in addition to 
the duty of supervising the clerical force of the office. There is in the 
Navy Department one medical director detailed to serve as a member 
of the National Board of Health, who performs no other duties One 
surgeon is detailed to serve in the Smithsonian Institution, a medical 
officer detailed in charge of records and files of the Navy Department, 
three or four medical officers are detailed to investigate various sub- 
jects connected with hygiene at the naval laboratory in this city. I 
do not know how many other medical officers of the Navy are on duty 
in this city at the present time. There are, however, a sufficient num- 
ber to organize and maintain a flourishing medical society, of which 
society Medical Director is president. There is also a board 
of medical officers detailed as a permanent board to examine appli- 
cants for admission into the Navy. They remain on duty during the 
entire year, and, so far as the public is advised, they perform no other 
duty. In the Marine-Hospital Service, on the contrary, a board of 
examiners is ordered when there are vacancies to fill, and ox>en com- 
petition is held for all appointments. The examining board remains 
in session a week, and when their duties are finished the officers com- 
posing it resume their stations and their usual duties. These facts are 
mentioned as probable addenda to Midshipman Alger’s statistics. 
The conclusion to be drawn from these facts would indicate that 
the proper policy of the Government, in case sentiments of pity pre- 
vent the discharge of supernumeraries, would be to stop appointments 
in the medical corps of the Navy until it shall have been brought 
down to a working basis. 
Finally, I desire to submit the fact that, so far as known, the marine 
hospitals are economically and properly managed, and the sailors are 
skilfully and carefully treated by the officers having charge over them. 
There is no special provision of nature by which the medical officers of 
the Navy have a monopoly of scientific knowledge, or an essential and 
inborn right to have charge of sickness occurring among steamboat- 
men and other sailors. It is not presumed that the common sailors 
entering hospitals ought to be subjected to the rigors of naval disci- 
pline, or that they should be put to bed at the point of the bayonet, and 
there is, therefore, no reason why the military should have especial 
and peculiar charge of this matter. 
In conclusion, permit me to invite your attention to the fact, con- 40 
elusive in itself, that the Service has extensive operations in a region 
where no naval vessel ever floats—the interior waters of the United 
States—the Mississippi from its month to its source, the Missouri from 
its mouth to its source, and the Columbia river, on the Pacific coast, 
and the various tributaries thereof; also the Hudson river above tide- 
water, and the additional fact that during the war of the rebellion 
every marine hospital in the possession of the Government was utilized 
by such of the sick and wounded of the volunteer forces of the Union 
as could bear transportation without prejudice and with convenience. 
This shows that landsmen as well as sailors are treated in these hos- 
pitals in emergency, and gives an additional reason why the claim of 
the Navy to the exclusive right to manage the Service is without 
foundation. 
I have no desire to treat any portion of this matter with undue 
levity, or in a manner unbecoming the gravity of the case. On the 
contrary, if the facts presented have seemed ridiculous, it is in the 
nature of the facts themselves, and it is simply by presentation in this 
way that the absurdity of such a recommendation as that of the Sec- 
retary of the Navy becomes apparent to every man ever reared on 
American soil, and in whom is instilled the principles of a freeman. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
JOHN B. HAMILTON, 
Supervising Surgeon- General. 
Hon. Chas. J. Forger, 
Secretary of the Treasury, Wash ington, I). C. 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 
Office Supervising Surgeon-General, 
United States Marine-Hospital Service, 
Washington, January 11, 1883. 
Sir: Referring to my previous letter relative to House bill No. 
7158, establishing a Bureau of Mercantile Marine, and particularly to 
the recommendations of the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy in 
regard to the same, I have to respectfully suggest for consideration 
the following proposition: 
That the Treasury Department has already the machinery for carry- 
ing into effect most of the suggestions of the Secretary of the Navy, 
which are embodied in the bill referred to. 
I suggest, if it be deemed expedient so to do, that the commercial 
bureaus and divisions of the Treasury Department be reorganized so 41 
that they shall all fall under the general supervision of one Assistant 
Secretary. Then quarterly or monthly meetings of the bureaus could 
be held in the office of the Assistant Secretary, who should preside. 
Such questions as would seem to be for the further interests of the 
commercial marine in this country could then be carefully considered, 
and finally, after adoption, embodied in the report of the Secretary. 
No authority of law would be needed, for the Secretary already has 
abundant authority to call on his bureau officers for an opinion or 
report. The bureaus of the Merchant Marine under the supervision 
of the Secretary are— 
1. The Light-House Establishment. 
2. The Coast Survey. 
3. The Bureau of Statistics. 
4. The Steamboat-Inspection Service. 
5. The Life-Saving Service. 
6. The Marine-Hospital Service. 
The divisions coming under the rule would be Revenue-Marine 
division, and Tonnage and Navigation division. 
If the amendment to the shipping bill passed on yesterday becomes 
a law, it will be necessary that some bureau or division be specially 
charged with the instructions to collectors relative to the shipment 
and discharge of seamen. This office has heretofore made recommen- 
dations in regard to shipment and discharge of seamen, some of which 
were incorporated as amendments into the bill on this subject. 
The plan here proposed would involve no expense to the Govern- 
ment, except the mere printing of an additional circular of reorgani- 
zation of the Department. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
JOHN B. HAMILTON, 
Surgeon-General, M. 11. S. 
Hon. Chas. J. FoIGtER, 
Secretary of the Treasury. LIFE-SAVING SERVICE. 
TRANSFER TO NAVY DEPARTMENT. 
REPORT OF THE GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT. 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 
Office of General Superintendent 
United States Life-Saying Service, 
Washington, 1). C., January 20, 1883. 
Sir : I have the honor to request your attention to a part of the 
report of the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy in which, recom- 
mending the transfer of the He venue Marine to the Navy Department, 
he regards the transfer of the Life-Saving Service as logically sequent 
upon that of the service first named, and a measure in itself highly 
desirable, although desirable, as he would seem to admit, simply on 
the ground of utilizing the large surplus of idle naval officers. 
It appears proper for me to remark, as one officially interested in 
this proposition, and as having had a long and intimate experience in 
life-saving matters, that it would probably be extremely difficult, not 
to say impossible, to find another reason for the transfer than that so 
frankly suggested by the Secretary of the Navy. The attempt to 
transfer the Service was made, and vigorously made, in 1878, and it 
is certain that at that time neither in Congress, nor by the press, nor 
by the advocates of the measure was there a single fact produced in 
its support, nor even a single argument that was not shown to rest 
upon the merest figments. The nearest approach to an even plausible 
reason for the change at that time, appealed to the vague idea enter- 
tained by many, that the Life-Saving Service and the Navy were in 
natural affinity, inasmuch as both had dealings with the sea, and ad- 
vanced the assumption that a surf-fisherman and a man -of - war ’s- ma n 
were of the same professional species, both, it was said, being used 
to the management of boats, and therefore, it was argued, equally 
competent to head a life-boat to the rescue. But all this, which con- 
stituted the gravamen of whatever argument could be adduced at 
that time, was even absurdly untrue. It was forgotten at the outset 
that the surf and the sea indicate two distinct varieties of action in 
ocean water, and that the navy sailor, masterful over the long undu- 
lations of the deep, even in the stress of the ocean storm, as the mid- 44 
sea cruises of the Huron illustrate, is powerless in the tierce cataracts 
of the breakers on a lee shore, as the loss of the Huron illustrates. 
It was also forgotten, or not noted at that time by the advocates of 
the transfer, that this very case of the wreck of the Huron on the 
coast of [North Carolina carried with it the suggestion of the essen- 
tial distinction between surfmeu and sailors, a distinction which will 
forever practically prevent their respective functions from being made 
interchangeable. There was on board the unfortunate vessel a balsa, 
or life-saving raft, such as was then at many of the life-saving sta- 
tions, capable of being used like a surf-boat, though probably infe- 
rior thereto in efficiency. Had there been among the sailors of the 
Huron a single superb surf-fisherman from the coast before them, it 
is beyond question that, with such an appliance in his control, he 
would have carried a line from the vessel to the shore, established 
the requisite communication, and saved every soul on board. Yet of 
all the able sailors in the crew there was not a man to do this, 
although the storm was not extraordinary, nor the surf beyond the skill 
of surfing men to ride. Of all the gallant company, officers and men, 
on board the vessel, matchless in their ability to man a ship’s boat 
for a rescue in any sea in which a boat could live, so that it be only 
in mid-ocean, there were but two that even dared the task, at which 
a surfman would have smiled, of carrying that balsa with a line 
through the breakers for the sake of their comrades. How little 
competency for the task their desperate courage gave them was shown 
by the sequel. Capsized repeatedly, torn again and again from their 
hold upon the upset appliance they could not manage, they were 
flung at last upon the beach without it, half-drowned, and having 
failed to bring ashore the line, which was the last hope of their ship- 
mates. How differently surfmen, either on ship or shore, could have 
done in such an emergency is shown by the case of the sloop-of-war 
Kansas, at Greytown, Nicaragua, in April, 1872, where, after four 
boats, containing thirty-eight men, had been successively capsized in 
fine weather, broad day-light, and an ordinary surf, in the endeavor 
to land, and two of the officers and four of the men had been drowned, 
the natives rowed out in their common boats through the breakers, and 
saved the remainder. But the natives were surfmeu and those they 
rescued were sailors. The difference is essential; surf is not sea, nor 
is the mastership in floating among breakers shown by surf-fishermen, 
shared in any measure by men-of-war’s-men. The practical tasks of 
coast rescues cannot, therefore, be equally discharged by the Life-Saving 
Service and the Navy. Per contra to such dashes at argument and such 
scant show of reasons as were made by the advocates of the transfer in 45 
1878, it was shown then that in every country in the world and in every 
age, from China in her antiquity to the last century in Europe, when occi- 
dental coast rescues by system began, the life-saving had been a civil ser- 
vice in its inception, the only example to the contrary being in Russia, 
where the navy started life-boat work, but soon handed it over to 
civilians as being beyond the naval province. It was also shown that 
with the single exception of a cork life-belt, got up by an English 
naval officer, all the life-saving appliances in this and every other 
country—life-boat, surf-boat, life-car, breeches-buoy, wreck-gun, boat- 
carriage, line-rocket, Coston light, life-boat compass, and everything 
else—were invented or devised outside of the navy or navy inspirations. 
In short, it was shown in the debate of 1878 that the entire modern 
life-saving system in its history, development, modus operandi, and 
aims, bore no relation to the particular creative energy which pro- 
duces navies. 
The case has not grown better, but worse, since 1878 for the advo- 
cates of transfer. The Xavy comes into court through its most skilful, 
most adroit, and able advocate, the Secretary, who descants with 
earnest eloquence upon the melancholy ruin presented at this time by 
naval affairs, and pleads for several provinces of civil service to add 
to this dilapidated empire. It is Scripture precept that only those 
who have been faithful over a few things should be made rulers over 
many things; and it is not easy to see why, on general grounds, hands 
that have brought a small Xavy to the condition the Secretary so 
eloquently deplores, should be intrusted with the further government 
of large departments of public affairs, to be wrested, moreover, for 
their use from the civil service. Is it a rule in public prudence that 
officers who have brought the Xavy to confusion and decay are thereby 
qualified to try their skill upon the TreasuryJ? To add to the initial 
grotesqueness of the proposition, it must be considered that the Life- 
Saving Service, like others of the Treasury bureaus to be swept into 
this naval annex, has attained, under the careful nurture of Congress, 
a perfection of organization and a degree of efficiency which have won 
for it the respect and admiration of the country and of foreign nations; 
that the large result of its protection to surf-imperilled life and marine 
property is effected by an annual expenditure less than the frequent 
cost of putting the engines into a single naval vessel; that the valor 
and sea-craft of its crews make the seaboard ring year after year with 
great exploits tff rescue, and invest it in the public regard with pas- 
sionate and romantic interest; and that all this has been effected 
wholly and solely by civilians under civil management, and through 46 
the labor of ten years, without the slightest aid or furtherance from 
a single member of the military marine. Because a service has grown 
useful and splendid under the management of the Treasury is a sorry 
reason for transferring it to the Navy, where the result of the man- 
agement, according to the report of the Secretary, has been neither 
useful nor splendid. 
Among the numerous reasons why the proposed transfer should not 
be made, the following appear to me decisive: 
1. Because it involves the revolutionary innovation, contrary to the 
spirit of our Government and the traditions of our past, of enlarging 
the military establishment by giving it control over civil interests. 
The Navy is simply the national military marine, a defence in war, a 
reserve of martial power in peace. Naturally unrepublican through 
its rigorous discipline, its requirement of unquestioning obedience, and 
its habit of absolute domination—doubly so from its exotic character, 
being an imitation of the British navy, which is an organic outgrowth 
of the feudal monarchy—it might prove a dangerous enemy to the 
public liberty if elevated from its useful subordination as a military 
arm of the nation to practical control of the civil service of the country, 
of which the proposed transfer would be the beginning. 
2. The transfer would be objectionable because it is absolutely 
essential to the success of our life-saving system, which rests upon 
the skill and experience of professional experts, grown gray in the 
problems and labors of salvage, that the service should remain unin- 
fluenced by politics in the choice of its agents, and not come under 
the operation of agencies which have long made the management of 
navy-yards a public scandal. It is a matter of proud record, and the 
fact is known to Congress and the country, that never, under what- 
ever pressure, did the officers in immediate charge of the service, nor 
the succession of Secretaries of the Treasury who sustained them, allow 
the Life-Saving Service to be used as a political machine. This status 
it is both desirable and necessary to keep, and there is no reason to 
suppose it would be kept under the management of the Navy. 
3. Another cardinal reason against the proposed transfer is in the 
impossibility of fusing in any unity of action our beachmen with naval 
officers and me n - of- war’ s-men. The ways of the coast population are 
not the ways of the men of the Navy. The coastmen, from whose 
numbers are now formed the life-saving crews, are free, proud, averse 
to any but strictly reasonable discipline, and have the truly Ameri- 
can hatred of masters. They would never submit to serve under the 
iron rule which naturally issues from the despotic habitudes of military 
officers, whether of the army or marine. This is shown by the care 47 
with which they keep out of the Navy, although often forced by 
poverty to go upon the sea or lakes as sailors in the merchant service. 
The existing incompatibility could only have the result of their vacat- 
ing the stations in a body when brought under Navy methods of govern- 
ment. The resort would then be to fill the stations with Navy sailors 
as keepers and crews. It is not necessary to advert to the universal 
discord which the presence of this foreign body upon the coast would 
occasion and keep alive with diabolic energy. But it has already been 
shown that Navy sailors are not surfmen, and life-boat and surf-boat 
work would necessarily fall into singular hands for its performance. 
Furthermore, what has not yet been dwelt upon, the Life-Saving 
Service is mainly a land service, though having an important function 
in the broken water of the bars and beaches, and as such is alien to 
the training and habitudes of men who spend most of their lives on 
men-of-war in foreign ports or in mid-ocean. The long and wearisome 
work of the patrols, the incessant marching and counter-marching all 
night long upon the winter beaches, on the watch for endangered 
vessels, which forms the constant duty of the life-saving crews, is en- 
tirely foreign to the customary duties of sailors. The Life-Saving 
Service is also mainly a land service in the fact that a large part of its 
life-saving operations are conducted upon the beach by methods in 
part peculiar to professional surfmen and wreckers, and in part to 
trained United States life-savers. These operations involve wreck 
gunnery, the art of firing lines over distant and unsteady hulls wallow- 
ing in the breakers; involve the deft setting up of hawsers and haul- 
ing-lines, and their skilful manipulation, to bring in safely numbers of 
people in peril on breaking decks; and afterwards in many instances 
involve the release of wrecks from bars where they have stranded, and 
from the rending action of the surf, and their deliverance, afloat and 
safe, into the hands of masters and owners. All this is also entirely 
foreign to the knowledge or the habits of employment of the personnel 
of frigates, into whose hands, however, in the event of transfer to the 
Navy, the stations and station-work would inevitably fall. The re- 
sult would also be inevitable. Shorn of the veteran surfing science 
and life-saving knowledge and experience of the present race of beach- 
men, the Life-Saving Service would suffer a sea-change into a nonde- 
script condition, the immediate prelude to decadence and ruin. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
S. I. KIMBALL, 
General Superintendent. 
Hon. Chas. J. Folger, 
Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. G. STEAMBOAT-INSPECTION SERVICE. 
TRANSFER TO NAVY DEPARTMENT. 
REPORT OF THE SUPERVISING INSPECTOR-GENERAL. 
Treasury Department, 
Office Sup’o Inspector-General of Steamboats, 
Washington, D. G., January 12, 1883. 
Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of 
the 12th ultimo, in which you call my attention to pages 37 to 39 of 
the report of the Secretary of the Navy for the present year, and that 
you “ wish to be informed if I agree with the arguments there made, or, 
if not, that I should present my reasons for disagreement.” 
In reply thereto, I have the honor to report that I have carefully 
read the report of the Hon. Secretary of the Navy, and particularly 
that portion thereof contained in pages 37 to 39, inclusive, pertain- 
ing to the transfer of the administration of the steamboat laws from 
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury to that of the Sec- 
retary of the Navy. 
In reply to the note sent me, I desire to say that I disagree very 
decidedly with the arguments offered by the Hon. Secretary of the 
Navy. My reasons for disagreement are— 
First, “pro hono publico,” it being repugnant to the sense of the 
American people to intrust the administration of the civil laws of the 
country to an armed branch of the Government, supported and main- 
tained for war purposes only. Even in monarchical Great Britain the 
execution of laws governing commerce is intrusted to civilian offi- 
cers, known as the “British Board of Trade,” and it is the opinion of 
this office that if a serious proposition should be made there to trans- 
fer the duties of the board to the jurisdiction of naval officers, as has 
been done in the report of the American Secretary of the Navy, it 
would create a commotion little short of revolution. 
My second objection is because one of the reasons given for the 
proposed change is an undeserved slur upon the boiler-inspectors of 
the Steamboat-Inspection Service, contained in that part of the Secre- 
tary’s report quoted as follows, the objectionable words being under- 50 
scored: uThe inspection of steam-vessels * * * also finds a place 
in the Treasury Department, with whose ordinary functions it has no 
connection whatever, while there exists in another Department a body of 
officers, the naval engineers, whose daily occupation fits them directly for 
such inspection duty.” 
The assumption of the superiority of naval engineers as inspectors 
of steam boilers and machinery over the civilian officers now per- 
forming that duty is an assumption which cannot be sustained by 
a single fact. Admitting on the part of the naval officers perhaps 
superior educational, theoretical, and technical knowledge, the inspec- 
tion of boilers and machinery is a practical operation requiring prac- 
tical knowledge and experience in the use thereof, qualities in which 
the naval officers are altogether the inferiors of the present civilian 
boiler-inspectors ; and, to speak comparatively, I do not hesitate to 
say that in this respect the latter-named officers are at least twenty 
to one the superiors of the former. 
The practical experience of naval engineers with boilers and ma- 
chinery would be the sum of their experience on sea-duty. In order 
that an exact comparison between the naval and civil officers in this 
respect might appear in this report, at my request the following letter 
was sent to the Secretary of the Navy: 
Treasury Department, 
Office of the Secretary, 
Washington, 1). 0., December 13, 1882. 
Sir : Will yon please furnish, for the information of this Depart- 
ment, the number of steam-vessels of the XL S. Navy now in commis- 
sion, the number of engineer officers employed thereon, also the 
total number of such officers, and their average record of service on 
board ship. 
Very respectfully, 
CHAS. J. FOLGEE, 
Secretary. 
Hon. W. E. Chandler, 
Secretary of the Navy. 
Having waited a full month without any reply to the above letter, 
and in default of the official data asked for, I shall have to depend, 
for the purpose of my argument, upon data obtained from such sources 
as have been open to me to determine, approximately, the experience 
of naval engineers for comparison with that of the officers of this 
service. 
There are, as reported by the Secretary of the Navy, but thirty- 
eight (38) available cruising-ships in the Navy, thirty-one of which 
are in commission, with about three hundred (300) engineers to care 
for their engines and boilers. It would be safe to say that the aver- 51 
age number of vessels that these officers would have experience upon 
in a lifetime would not exceed six (6) vessels, alternating as such 
officers do between sea and shore duty. In the Steamboat-Inspection 
Service there are thirty-seven (37) local inspectors of boilers. The 
experience of these thirty-seven officers now in the service, compiled 
from official data, is as follows : 
Whole number of boilers inspected at annual inspections, (no ac- 
count being made of intermediate inspections,) sixty-one thousand 
seven hundred and eight; (61,708;) total years’ service as boiler inspec- 
tors, three hundred and forty-three, (313;) number of years’ service 
arid experience as engineers, boiler-makers, and machinists, eight 
hundred and seventy-two, (872;) average number of boilers inspected 
by each officer, sixteen hundred and sixty-seven, (1,667 ;) average term 
in office of each inspector, nine (9) years, three (3) months, and fifteen 
(15) days; average number of years’experience in their profession 
previous to their present .appointment, twenty-three (23) years and 
seven (7) months. 
Of the boilers inspected by these officers, only one boiler in each 
thousand has met with accidents involving loss of life, and it is be- 
lieved that in every case of accident such accident occurred a con- 
siderable time after inspection. 
Comparing the above statement of the present condition of the 
Service with the fact that of the one thousand six hundred and fifty- 
six (1,656) steamers running on the western rivers up to 1849, just 
previous to the enactment of the first steamboat laws, one hundred 
and sixty-eight (168) of them were destroyed by explosions of boilers 
alone, and with the further fact that these laws have been administered 
under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, ought to forcibly 
present to those who suggest, and to Congress, which will have to 
consider the subject, the familiar adage, “never to trade horses while 
crossing a stream,” to which might be added a new one, as follows ; 
“ Xever trade a good horse, however ungainly, for a pretty one whose 
good qualities have never been proven.” 
The Hon. Secretary of the Xavy says, further, that “it is be- 
lieved that a reorganization of the service (and transfer to his Depart- 
ment) such as is suggested, while it would strengthen the merchant 
marine, would incidentally benefit the Navy. ” 
“It goes without saying” that to benefit the merchant marine is a 
most commendable object, but it is difficult to see how the Xavy De- 
partment, if conducted in the future as it has been in the past, on the 
theoretical views and extravagant practices of naval officers, will 
accomplish any good to the Merchant-Marine Service. 52 
It would be more reasonable to believe that to apply the theories 
and practices of the Navy to it would destroy all that there is left of 
the merchant marine of the country. 
What the practice of the Xavy would be may be inferred from 
citing the fact obtained from the last annual report of the Secretary, 
wherein he shows that the cost of repairs, for labor and material only, 
on the thirty-eight available vessels of the Navy was two millions 
nine hundred and twenty-eight thousand three hundred and nineteen 
dollars and sixty-one cents, ($2,928,319.61,) or an average for each 
vessel of seventy-seven thousand and sixty-three dollars, ($77,063.) 
I respectfully assert that to compel the merchant marine to a pro- 
portionate extravagance would bankrupt every owner of a merchant 
steamer in the United States. 
It is but just to say that the Secretary of the Navy himself 
deems these expenditures extravagant. Therefore, it is my opinion 
that, before asking to have his duties increased, he should purge the 
service over which he has now full control, of its many gross evils. 
It is as much to the honor of the United States that its Xavy should 
be respectable in the number of its ships as it is in its personnel, now 
having “the enormous disproportion of I,Bl7naval officers to 31 vessels 
in commission, being 59 officers to each ship.” 
I trust, therefore, that it will not be inappropriate on my part, as I 
am but following an illustrious exampde, if I should, although having 
no connection therewith, advise the Xavy Department of a method 
by which it could, in a few years, become respectable in the number 
of its ships as it now is in its personnel—a method more likely to succeed 
than the present proposition of the honorable head of that Depart- 
ment) and that is, for Congress to enact a law placing the officers of 
the Steamboat-Inspection Service in charge of the construction and 
repairs of naval vessels under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. 
If that were done, with the superior practical knowledge of such re- 
pairs, possessed by the steamboat-inspectors, I am sure that at least 75 
per cent, of the money now extravagantly expended in carrying out 
theories would be saved—a sum sufficient to add to the Xavy a new 
ship annually, with all her armament on board; and lam sure, with 
such evidence of economy before it, Congress would willingly vote 
money to build a duplicate each year, so that in a few years we would 
have a Xavy equal to any in the world. 
Another strong objection to the proposed change from the Treasury 
to the Xavy Department is, that it would subject licensed officers of 53 
steam-vessels to a technical and impractical examination that a large 
number of them could not pass, though having superior practical 
qualifications for the profession they have been following, and having- 
in the past, largely contributed to the support of the inspection 
service. 
Officers of the Xavy are frequently aristocratic and tyrannical when 
dealing with people they deem unequal to themselves in the social 
standing their position gives them ; in fact, I am told, that it is said by 
some of themselves, or at least by female relations, “ that the Xavy is 
the only aristocracy in the United States.” Therefore, to compel them 
to associate in office with common plebeians, such as compose the per- 
sound of the steamboat service as now organized, would be as unjust 
to the naval officers as would be the examination of licensed officers 
of merchant ships by naval officers. 
It is a well-known fact that some of the best pilots and engineers in 
the country, having charge of the finest merchant steamers running, 
are illiterate in everything pertaining to educational or theoretical 
knowledge, though having what is far better for the business their 
licenses authorize them to pursue, namely, an education in practical 
knowledge of their profession probably never yet attained by any 
naval officer educated at Annapolis. Xor could any naval officer 
obtain the position of one of these men upon a merchant steamer, even 
though he should offer to perform the duties for 50 per cent, of the 
salaries these men receive. If it is said that these facts will be 
properly considered by naval officers if they are assigned the duty of 
making these examinations, I need only refer to’ the fact that within 
a few months an eminently well-qualified practical engineer was driven 
from the employment of the civil branch of the Xavy Department by 
a technical and theoretical examination made by a naval officer, not- 
withstanding said engineer had performed his duties in a satisfactory 
manner for ten years and upward. With this fact in view, it is my 
opinion that it would be a crime to subject the licensed officers of the 
merchant steamboat service en masse to the possibility of such mani- 
fest injustice, whereby they would be deprived of the privilege of 
earning a living in a profession they have acquired by long years of 
toil, supporting themselves meanwhile, while the officers who would 
condemn them for lack of the educational qualities possessed by them- 
selves have acquired such superiority at the expense of the Govern- 
ment, with means in part furnished from the hard earnings of the men 
their technical education would condemn to idleness and their families 
to want. 54 
The special case of injustice I have referred to will be found in the 
special report enclosed, marked “A,” dated June 27, 1882. 
In this connection I would make one more suggestion to the Hon. Sec- 
retary of the Navy for disposing of his surplus officers which would be 
more judicious than attaching them to the Steamboat-Inspection Ser- 
vice, and that is, for him to get Congress to enact a law authorizing 
him to furlough indefinitely all officers in turn for whom he cannot 
find employment “in these piping times of peace,” not to be returned 
to duty until they could show at least two years’ service on a merchant 
steamer. In such way they might, if assiduous in their duty, acquire 
at least some of the practical knowledge now possessed by officers of 
the Steamboat-Inspection Service andlicensed officers of steam-vessels, 
The Hon. Secretary of the Navy urges, as one of the reasons for trans- 
ferring this service from the head of the Treasury to that of the 
Navy, that there are certain organic defects in the organization 5 but 
to argue so is equivalent to arguing that because a man’s limbs are 
defective his head should be cut off. 
The defects in the Service treated of by the Secretary, as a matter 
of discovery by him, have been frequently pointed out in the annual 
reports to Congress of the Secretary of the Treasury, and as under 
the direction of the latter officer the Steamboat-Inspection Service 
has reduced the fatalities on steam-vessels in the United States from 
one in each 55,714 persons, carried in 1851, to but one in 1,726,827 per- 
sons, carried in 1882, would seem to be conclusive that if this subject 
should be left to a decision of the people of the country they would 
prefer “ to bear the ills” of the Service under the present head “than 
fiy to others they know not of” under the Secretary of the Navy 
Besides, it would be well for the latter-named officer to bear in 
mind the scriptural quotation, “ Let him not boast who putteth the 
armor on, but him that putteth it off'. ” 
Yery respectfully, 
JAS. A. DUMONT, 
Supervising Inspector-General. 
Hon. Chas. J. Forger, 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
Treasury Department, 
Office Sup’g Inspector-General of Steamboats, 
Washington, D. C., June 27, 1882. 
Sir: On the 14th instant there was referred to this office a letter 
from the Honorable Secretary of the Navy, dated the Bth instant, en- 
closing a communication from W. H. Shock, chief of the Bureau of 55 
Engineering of the Navy Department, dated the Gth instant, reflect- 
ing upon the manner in which licenses are issued to engineers of river 
steamers by the United States local inspectors of steam-vessels of 
the district of Baltimore, and referring particularly to the recent 
issue by them of a license, as chief engineer of river steamers, to one 
J. H. Sentenne, an assistant engineer in the Navy-Department build- 
ing in this city, who, Mr. Shock asserts, “is absolutely ignorant of 
the principles of the ordinary steam-gauge and safety-valves attached 
to steam-boilers.” 
Mr. Shock also expresses the opinion that “if the examination of 
Mr. Sentenne by the local board of steamboat inspectors of Baltimore 
is an exponent of the others, then there should be no surprise shown 
at boiler explosions, or expensive repairs to the machinery of new 
steamers.” 
The above having been referred to this office “for immediate ex- 
amination and report,” by indorsement, dated the 14th instant, I have 
the honor to report that I have made an examination of Mr. Shock’s 
charges, and find that Mr. Sentenne made a written application to 
the inspectors for a license as engineer, in letter dated May 4, 1882, 
(copy enclosed, marked “ A,”) in which he stated, as a part of his ex' 
perience, that he had been an engineer of the United States steam 
transport “Ranger” during the war, and had acted “ in the capacity 
of engineer on other steamers at various times.” These statements 
of Mr. Sentenne, in writing, conflict with the oral statements made 
to Mr. Shock, as reported by that gentleman in his letter. Which state- 
ment is true, Mr, Sentenne alone can tell. 
The law governing the granting of certificates to engineers by the 
local inspectors is as follows, (section 4411, Revised Statutes:) 
“ Whenever any person applies for authority to perform the duties 
of engineer of any steam-vessel, the inspectors shall examine the ap- 
plicant as to his knowledge of steam-machinery, and his experience 
as an engineer, and also the proof which he produces in support of 
his claim; and if, upon full consideration, they are satisfied that his 
character, habits of life, knowledge and experience in the duties of an 
engineer are all such as to authorize the belief that he is a suitable 
and safe person to be intrusted with the powers and duties of such a 
station, they shall grant him a license, authorizing him to be employed 
in such duties for the term of one year # * #.” 
I am informed by Mr. Saville, the local inspector who conducts the 
examinations of engineers in the Baltimore district, that he examined 
Mr. Seuteune thoroughly in regard to his practical knowledge of en- 
gineering, and that he was satisfied with such examination, taken in 
connection with the proof presented, of Mr. Sentenne’s capacity, which 56 
proof consisted, in part, of written evidence of that gentleman’s hav- 
ing been employed during the eight years last past as an engineer 
in connection with the Navy-Department building in this city—five 
years under the Government officers who had charge of the construction 
of the building, and since April 24, 1879, in the employment of the Navy 
Department proper as assistant engineer, an employment he still holds, as 
may he seen hy reference to the enclosed letter, marked “Bf dated since 
the commencement of the present inquiry, and signed hy J. E. Walker, 
Acting Secretary of the Navy. 
The following are some of the names of persons indorsing Mr. Seu- 
tenne’s caiDacity: Thomas Lincoln Casey, Engineer Corps, IT. S. A.; 
B. W. Thompson, late Secretary of the Navy; Bartlett, Bobbins & Co.; 
Otis Brothers & Go., et at. Mr. Saville admits that Mr. Sentenne was 
not examined by him upon the theoretical principles of the steam- 
engine, safety-valves, gauges, &c.; not, however, because he does not 
appreciate the advantages of such knowledge in a steamboat engi- 
neer, but because if such knowledge was to be insisted upon in every 
case before granting a license, it would drive from the service of the 
steam merchant marine of the United States many of its best and 
safest practical engineers. 
In conclusion, I would state, from the evidence presented, it is my 
opinion that Messrs. Lowry and Saville, the inspectors, were justified 
in granting a license to Mr. Sentenne, although I am free to say, and 
have so informed these gentlemen, that it was an error of judgment 
upon their part to grant a chief engineer’s license to an original ap- 
plicant, no matter how high his qualifications, either theoretical or 
practical, or both combined. 
The majority of engineers in the merchant steam-marine service 
obtain their practical knowledge of the steam-engine and boilers while 
working, in many cases, day and night as firemen or oilers on steam- 
vessels, depending upon their wages to support themselves and fami- 
lies, therefore having no spare time to devote to the study of the 
principles and theories of the machinery whose practical workings 
have become to them “familiar as household words.” Under such cir- 
cumstances it cannot be expected of them that they should pass as 
rigid examinations in theories as would be properly required of grad- 
uates of the Naval Academy, who are educated, clothed, and fed at 
the public expense. Yet, judging by the complaint under considera- 
tion, engineer officers of the Navy seem shocked to learn that offi- 
cers of the Steamboat-Inspection Service do not exact, before granting 
licenses to engineers in the merchant service, the same qualifications 57 
required by the Government of the men who have been educated under 
its auspices. When the Government takes upon itself to educate en- 
gineers for the merchant service, supporting them while being edu- 
cated, as it does now for the Navy, this seemingly desirable object 
may be reached. 
Except for dress parade, the practical engineers of the steam merchant 
service of the United States are in no way inferior to their more highly 
educated brethren of the Navy in handling the machinery and boilers 
intrusted to them, both as regards safety and economy; and this, 
notwithstanding Mr. Shock’s remarks, referring to the methods of 
examination of such officers, that “then there should be no surprise 
shown at boiler explosions, or expensive repairs to the machinery of 
river steamers.” 
Very respectfully, 
JAS. A. DUMONT, 
Supervising Inspector-General. 
Hon. Chas. J. Folgker, 
Secretary of the Treasury. LIGHT-HOUSE BOARD. 
TRANSFER TO MYY DEPARTMENT. 
REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE. 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 
Office of the Light-House Board, 
Washington, February 12, 1883. 
Sir: The Light-House Board has the honor to acknowledge the 
receipt of Department letter (E. W. 0.) of January 17, transmitting, 
for consideration and reply, a printed report upon the Light-House 
Establishment received from the Secretary of the Navy, being the 
statement referred to in that part of his annual report containing the 
recommendation that the Light-House Service be transferred to the 
Navy Department. 
In reply, I beg to say that at its session on January IS this matter 
was referred by the Board to a special committee, consisting of Pro- 
fessor Julius E. Hilgard and its two secretaries, for consideration and 
report, and that at its session on February 10 the report of the com- 
mittee was submitted. 
This report, a copy of which is herewith transmitted, was, after 
some discussion, adopted by a majority vote. 
Very respectfully, 
S. C. ROWAN, 
Vice-Admiral, U. IS. NChairman. 
The Honorable Secretary of the Treasury. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 
Office of the Light-House Board, 
Washington, February 9, 1883. 
Sir : The special committee to which was referred the papers rela- 
tive to the proposed transfer of the Light-House Board from the 
Treasury Department to the Navy Department respectfully returns 
them with the following report: 
The paper on the TJ. S. Light-House Establishment, prepared by 
order of the Navy Department, gives a concise statement of its history 
and present organization, mentions briefly the administrative organi- 
zation of the corresponding establishments in Great Britain and other 
countries, and closes with remarks intended to show that it would be 
advantageous to transfer the administrative direction of the Light- 
House Service from the Treasury to the Navy Department. 
It is not alleged that the system is not working well, but rather it 
is claimed that the naval service would be benefited by such change. 
That such would be the case may well be doubted, since there are now 
employed in this service as many naval officers as can well find as- 
signment in it without subverting the fundamental idea of its organ- 
ization, namely, that both the military and naval services should be 
employed on the work according to their several special acquirements. 
In the absence of any specified inconveniences or alleged ineffect- 
iveness arising from the present system, and of any argument tending 
to show how such evils, if they existed, would be remedied by the 
proposed transfer, the Board contents itself with reaffirming the 
opinion expressed by it in February, 1862, namely, that the Lig'ht- 
House Establishment “is properly placed under the direction of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, since its object is the promotion of com- 
merce, the legitimate duty of this officer, and since it is only under a 
neutral department that the members of the Army and Navy can 
harmoniously co-operate.” 
The report here quoted (Mis. Doc. No. Cl, Senate, 37th Cong., 2d 
Sess.) was adopted unanimously at a meeting of the Light-House 
Board, at which were present the following-named officers: 
On the part of the Navy—Commodore Shubrick, Chairman. 
On the part of the Army—General J. G. Totten and Major A. A. 
Humphreys. 
Civilians—Professor Bache and Professor Henry. 
This report is an exhaustive exposition of the constitution and 
working of the establishment, submitted in response to a request from 
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Honorable S. P. Chase, for the 61 
opinion of the board in relation to the transfer of the establishment 
to the Navy Department, as proposed in a bill then (February, 1862} 
before the Senate, “to reorganize the Navy Department.” (Mis. 
Doc. No. 61, Senate, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.) The final conclusions of the 
Board were expressed as follows: 
“In conclusion, the board respectfully suggest that so far from see- 
ing any reason why the proposed change should be made, they see 
many causes to apprehend that such a change would derange the 
present system, diminish its efficiency, and increase the expense. 
“1. The Light-House Establishment is intended principally to pro- 
mote the commerce of the United States, and is consequently appro- 
priately placed in charge of the Secretary of the Treasury, who has 
the direction of all other operations connected with this branch of the 
executive duty of the Government. 
“2. The officers of the Navy and Army can best and most harmo- 
niously co-operate under a neutral department like that of the Treasury. 
“3. We do not hesitate to say that no officer of the Army or Navy 
possesses in himself the requisite amount of knowledge to properly 
direct all this service, and that he would be obliged to depend upon the 
advice and assistance of irresponsible agents; that although a proper 
person might acquire in time the requisite information, yet this would 
be at the expense of dear-bought experience, and that a recurrence 
of changes, such as is proposed, would deprive the system of all sta- 
bility, and introduce a vacillating policy alike detrimental to efficiency 
and economy. 
“ 4. With regard to economy of superintendence there can certainly 
be gained nothing on this score, since the members of the board re- 
ceive no extra compensation for their services, the officers of the Army 
and Navy being employed upon it in the intervals of Other duties.” 
It is needless to repeat the general arguments leading to these con- 
clusions, since they are available in a printed form and hold good, 
with equal force, at the present time. The only material change 
which has taken place since then in the practical working of the estab- 
lishment is in the fact that many more naval officers are now employed 
as light-house inspectors—a fact which is ascribed by the writer of 
the report to the Secretary of the Navy here under consideration to a 
“ process of natural selection.” If this phrase is meant to imply that 
it is the result of the development of a superior fitness on the part of 
naval officers, the board must take exception to the statement, and 
even consider it disingenuous, the simple fact being that there were a 
great many more naval officers available for shore-duty, while the* 62 
services of tlie Army engineer officers were urgently demanded for the 
superintendence and construction of other public works, in particular 
those of the improvement of rivers and harbors, to which the lighting 
and buoyage is an important and necessary adjunct. There are other 
errors of inference and statement in the paper under consideration 
which need not be specially adverted to, and are explicable from the 
fact that it was prepared by an officer having no personal knowledge 
of the working and requirements of the service, and was intended to 
constitute the basis of an argument for the proposed transfer. 
Respectfully submitted. 
J. E. HILGARD, 
Chairman of Select Committee. 
To the Chairman of the Light-House Board. BILL TO TRANSFER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REVENUE- 
CUTTER SERVICE TO THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. 
FORTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION.—H. R. 7157. 
In the House of Eepresentatiyes. 
January 2, 1883.—Read twice, referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, and or- 
dered to be printed. 
Mr. B. W. Harris introduced the following bill: 
A BILL to transfer the administration of the Revenue-Cutter Service to the Navy 
Department. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and Rouse of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after the thir- 
tieth day of June, eighteen hundred and eighty-three, all the powers 
now exercised and duties performed by the Secretary of the Treasury 
in relation to the revenue cutters, their officers and crews, shall be 
exercised or performed by the Secretary of the Navy, and said cutters 
shall form a part of the Navy of the United States: Provided, That 
the Secretary of the Navy shall, upon the requisition of the Secretary 
of the Treasury, assign cutters to duty in the ports and along the 
coast, as may be necessary, and the collectors of customs shall con- 
tinue, as heretofore, to direct the movements of vessels so assigned to 
their respective districts, under the supervision of the Secretary of 
the Treasury: And provided further, That nothing in this act shall be 
so construed as to affect or impair the powers conferred or duties de- 
volved by the laws of the United States upon the accounting officers 
of the Treasury Department in relation to the adjustment and control 
of accounts and disbursements in the Revenue-Cutter Service. 
Sec. 2. That the Secretary of the Treasury shall, at the close of the 
current fiscal year, transfer from the Treasury Department to the 
Navy Department all clerks and other persons employed in the office 
of the Revenue-Marine Division, together with the records appertain- 
ing thereto; and he shall cause to be transferred, in like manner, the 
vessels of the Revenue-Cutter Service, their appurtenances, and of all 
depots, stores, and other things belonging or pertaining to the said 
service. Sec. 3. That the officers and enlisted men of the Revenue-Cutter 
Service shall form a part of the Naval Establishment of the United 
States, and shall be subject to all the laws governing the same; and 
such laws shall apply to the said officers and enlisted men in the same 
manner as to the officers and enlisted men of the Navy; and said 
officers and enlisted men shall be entitled to all benefits and privi- 
leges conferred thereby, but said officers and enlisted men shall be 
additional to the number now allowed by law in the Navy. 
Sec. 4. That from and after the thirtieth day of June, eighteen 
hundred and eighty-three, the commissioned officers of the Revenue- 
Cutter Service shall form a corps in the Navy, to be known as the 
Revenue-Marine Corps; and the provisions of section twenty-seven 
hundred and fifty-one of the United States Revised Statutes are hereby 
extended to include assistant engineers among the said commissioned 
officers. And all commissions issued prior to this date to said officers, 
in accordance with law, shall be deemed commissions in the Revenue- 
Marine Corps of the Navy: Provided, That the pay and allowances 
and the relative rank of officers of the several grades on the active 
list of the Revenue-Marine Corps of the Navy shall remain the same 
as are now established by law for officers of the same grade in the 
Revenue-Cutter Service: And provided further, That the relative rank 
of said officers shall not be a bar to their retirement after having- 
reached the prescribed age or performed the prescribed service. 
Skc. 5. That cadets Avho complete their two years’ probationary 
course in the year eighteen hundred and eighty-three shall, upon 
passing the usual examination, be appointed third lieutenants in the 
Revenue-Marine Corps of the Navy; but no appointments shall there- 
after be made to said grade, nor shall any appointments be made to 
a higher grade, except by promotion from the grade below. 
Sec. 6. That cadets who have completed one year of the required 
probationary course may be admitted to the third class at the Naval 
Academy as naval cadets, after passing a suitable examination, but 
no appointments shall hereafter be made of cadets in the Revenue- 
Marine Service. 
Skc. 7. That the officers transferred to the Navy by this act shall 
bo credited with the sea-service and other duty heretofore performed 
by them in the service of the United States, and shall receive all the 
oenefits of such duty, and of the length of their continuous service, 
in the same manner as if they had been officers of the Navy during 
such service. 
Sec. 8. That the number of officers in each grade of the Revenue- 65 
Marine Corps shall he the number existing at the date of the passage 
of this act 5 but no appointments shall hereafter be made to said 
corps, except as provided in the fifth section of this act. 
Sec. 9. That as vacancies occur at the foot of the list in the Rev- 
enue-Marine Corps, the number of officers now allowed by law in the 
corresponding grades of the line of the Navy and of the Engineer 
Corps of the Navy, respectively, shall be increased in proportion, so 
that for each unfilled vacancy in the list of third lieutenants of the 
Revenue-Marine Corps the number of ensigns in the Navy shall be 
increased by one; and for each unfilled vacancy in the list of second 
assistant engineers in the Revenue-Marine Corps the number of assist- 
ant engineers in the Navy shall be increased by one, and so on through 
the higher grades, whenever the grade below shall become exhausted; 
and thereafter the Secretary of the Navy shall be authorized to detail 
officers of the said grades in the line and engineer corps of the Navy 
for duty on board the revenue cutters. 
Sec. 10. That all contracts entered into by the Secretary of the 
Treasury for the maintenance of the Revenue-Cutter Service, or for 
the construction or repair of the vessels thereof, in force on the thir- 
tieth day of June, eighteen hundred and eighty-three, shall remain in 
force in the same manner as if made by the Secretary of the Navy in 
accordance with the provisions of this act. 
Sec. 11. That all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act are 
hereby repealed. BILL TO ESTABLISH A BUREAU OF MERCANTILE MARINE IN THE 
NAVY DEPARTMENT. 
FORTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION.—H. R. 7158. 
In the House of Representatives. 
January 2, 1888.—Read twice, referred to the Committee on Commerce, and or- 
dered to be printed. 
Mr. B. W. Harris introduced the following bill: 
A BILL to establish a Bureau of Mercantile Marine in the Navy Department. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after the pas- 
sage of this act the Secretary of the 'Navy shall have charge and super- 
vision of the execution of all laws relating to the mercantile marine of 
the United States, and shall exercise all the powers and perform all 
the duties that are now by law or by custom exercised or performed 
by the Secretary of the Treasury in relation to the registry, enroll- 
ment, and license of vessels, the regulation of steam-vessels, and the 
shipment of seamen: Provided, That nothing in this act shall be so 
construed as to affect or impair the powers conferred or the duties 
devolved by the laws of the United States upon the accounting officers 
of the Treasury Department in relation to the adjustment and control 
of accounts and disbursements. 
Sec. 2. That from and after the passage of this act the Secretary of 
the Navy shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties 
which are now exercised or performed by the circuit courts of the 
United States in relation to the appointment and removal of shipping 
commissioners and to the regulation of shipping offices. 
Sec. 3. That from and after the passage of this act there shall be 
established in the Navy Department a Bureau of Mercantile Marine. 
Sec. 4. That the chief of the Bureau of Mercantile Marine shall be 
appointed from the list of officers of the Navy, not below the grade of 
commander, in the same manner and under the same provisions as 67 
other chiefs of bureaus in the Navy Department. He shall perform, 
under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, all executive duties 
relating to the mercantile marine which are or which may be hereafter 
placed nnder the supervision of the Navy Department. 
Sec. 5. That the Secretary of the Treasury shall transfer from the 
Treasury Department to the Navy Department such clerks in the 
office of the Secretary of the Treasury as perform the duties over 
which supervision and control is given by this act to the Secretary of 
the Navy, as also the clerks and other persons employed under the 
laws of the United States in the several bureaus or offices which are 
transferred by this act to the Department of the Navy, as well as the 
records appertaining to the said offices or bureaus. 
Sec. 6. That the annual statement of vessels registered, enrolled, 
and licensed under the laws of the United States, prepared in accord- 
ance with section three hundred and forty of the Devised Statutes of 
the United States by the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, shall here- 
after be prepared by the Chief of the Bureau of Mercantile Marine, 
under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy. 
Sec. 7. That there shall be attached to the office of the Secretary of 
the Navy a board, to be known as the mercantile marine board, which 
shall be composed of the following persons: the Chief of the Bureau 
of Mercantile Marine and the Supervising Inspector-General of Steam- 
boats ex officio; five civilians, to be appointed by the President, 
among whom there shall be one experienced seaman and navigator, 
one ship-builder skilled in designing and constructing vessels of wood 
and iron, one scientific man of eminent attainments, and two persons 
of special experience in commercial and maritime affairs; and three 
officers of the Navy, likewise to be appointed by the President, among 
whom there shall be one naval constructor, one chief engineer, and 
one line officer, the last-named to act as secretary of the board. 
Sec. 8. That the Secretary of the Navy shall be ex officio president 
of the mercantile marine board. 
Sec. 1), That the Chief of the Bureau of Mercantile Marine shall be 
chairman of the board in the absence of the Secretary of the Navy. 
Sec. 10. That the mercantile marine board shall meet for the trans- 
action of business on the first Mondays in March, June, September, 
and December; but the Secretary of the Navy may convene the 
board whenever in his judgment the exigencies of the service may 
require it. 
Sec. 11. That the mercantile marine board shall consider and in- 
vestigate the condition of the mercantile marine of the United States, 68 
and shall advise and assist the Secretary of the Navy in making rules 
and regulations for executing the laws in relation to the merchant 
marine. 
Sec. 12. That the mercantile marine board shall make a report of 
its investigations each year to the Secretary of the Navy, who shall 
forward said report to Congress, together with the testimony taken in 
the course of the inquiry, and such recommendations thereon as he 
may deem necessary. 
Sec. 13. That no naval or civil officer assigned to duty by the Navy 
Department under the provisions of this act shall receive any addi- 
tional salary therefor, except the legal allowance for mileage or trav- 
eling Or other expenses, but members of the mercantile marine board, 
not otherwise connected with the public service, shall receive as com- 
pensation ten dollars per day while actually employed, and their 
necessary traveling expenses. 
Sec. 14. That the powers and duties relating to the registry, en- 
rollment, or license of vessels and their admeasurement for tonnage, 
now exercised or performed by the collectors and surveyors of cus- 
toms, shall hereafter be exercised or performed by the local inspectors 
of steam-vesselss and all records relating to said registry, enroll- 
ment, and license, or to the sale, transfer, or hypothecation of vessels, 
now required to be kept in the offices of the collectors of customs, 
shall hereafter be kept in the offices of the local inspectors. 
Sec. 15. That the fees paid to local inspectors for the performance 
of the duties specified in section fourteen shall be the same as those 
now allowed by law to the collectors and surveyors of customs; but 
the fees for the measurement of vessels for tonnage shall not exceed 
five dollars for any vessel which the local board is required to inspect, 
or ten dollars for any other vessel. 
Sec. 1(>. That so much of section forty-four hundred and five of 
the United States Eevised Statutes as provides that the supervising 
inspectors and the Supervising Inspector-General shall assemble to- 
gether as a board, and'shall establish rules and regulations, and all 
other acts or parts of acts relating to the meetings of said board, 
are hereby repealed; and from and after the passage of this act the 
meetings of the said board shall be discontinued. 
Sec. 17. That the Secretary of the Navy shall hereafter appoint all 
local inspectors and assistant inspectors, special inspectors of foreign 
steam-vessels, and clerks to local boards; and he shall likewise appoint 
in each collection district on the seaboard and the great lakes where a 
local board of inspectors is now established by law, an additional in- 69 
spector, to be called an inspector of navigation, who shall be a mem- 
ber of the local board of inspectors, and who, from his experience in 
sea-going vessels and his knowledge of navigation, shall be qualified 
to report on the strength and sufficiency of the equipment of vessels, 
the completeness and efficiency of the navigating instruments and 
charts supplied to the same, and to Examine into the fitness of any 
applicant for the position of master, mate, or pilot of any vessel. 
Sec. 18. That the inspectors of navigation shall receive the same 
compensation, respectively, as is now allowed by to other in- 
spectors in the same district. 
Sec. 19. That when the inspection of a vessel is completed and the 
inspectors approve the vessel and her equipment throughout, they 
shall make and subscribe a certificate to the Bureau of Mercantile 
Marine, the same as is now required by law to be made to the col- 
lector of customs; but all such inspections shall include, in addition 
to the examination now required by law, an examination of the ves- 
sels’ equipment, and of her navigating instruments and charts. 
Sec. 20. That the original certificates of the inspectors shall be 
retained on file in the Bureau of Mercantile Marine, which shall 
furnish three certified copies thereof to the master or owners of the 
vessel therein named. 
Sec. 21. That the inspection of passenger vessels now made by 
inspectors of customs in accordance with section forty-two hundred 
and sixty-four of the Revised Statutes of the United States, shall 
hereafter be made by the local inspectors of steam-vessels, who shall 
sign such reports as are now required to be signed by the collectors 
of customs. 
Sec. 22. That any qualified commissioned officer of the Navy may 
be detailed or appointed as supervising inspector-general, supervis- 
ing inspector, local inspector, or assistant inspector of steam-vessels, 
or special inspector of foreign vessels, whenever a vacancy may occur. 
Sec. 23. That at all places where local boards of inspectors are au- 
thorized by law marine offices shall be established, under the direction 
of the Secretary of the Navy, and such offices shall be occupied by the 
local inspectors and shipping commissioners; but no expense shall be 
incurred, nor shall any person be employed in any marine office, ex- 
cept with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy.