ST.LOUIS POST-DISPATCH ST. LOUIS, SUNDAY MORNING. JANUARY 20, 1963 The Washington Post SUNDAY, JANUARY 20, 1963 The Peril of Deterrence Arms Race Held to Be Forcing Both Sides Toward First-Strike Strategy A Letter to the Editor of the Post-Dispatch The threat of first strike nuclear action has nearly become acceptable in crisis confrontations between East and West, and each of the almost an- nual shows of “power becomes more appalling. The success of the ven- ture rests on each government's counting on its opponent to act ra- tionally, and both sides hope that no accident will occur in time of crisis. As with a game of “chicken,” this game of nuclear power may, by the laws of statistics of deadly quarrels, come to the atrocious end for which We now prepare in cold blood. New counterforce deterrent systems are presently advocated and devel- oped. Counterforce policy has been The Mirror spoken of as rela- tively humane be- of cause it relies on weapons systems that are essentially directed against an enemy’s military and missile bases. Our counterforce systems are ineffective, however, once the adversary has fired his missiles and taken his aircraft off the ground. Therefore, if war seemed imminent, military leaders would be sorely tempted to fire them before the ex- pected enemy atlack would occur; that is, to follow a first strike policy. By the same reascning in reverse, most of our own overseas SAC bases, being vulnerable, are only operative as a first strike system, and they may tempt the U.S.S.R. to strike pre- emptively, In both instances, pre- emptive war plans, based on paranoid thinking, are brought back onto the military planning boards. Public Opinion SOME MILITARY leaders claim that counterforce policy, backed by an ar- senal of tactical nuclear weapons, per- mits a “controlled response” in time of war, sparing cities on both sides of the conflict. Even a controlled nuclear war would kill millions and blight fu- ture generations over large areas. If national leaders can plan such de- struction in times of peace, they will not restrain themselves from attack- ing the more vulnerable centers of ae —Past-Dispatch, July 1, 1957, Any Stopping Place Along the Way? the enemy when in the throes of a nuclear war. Having attacked mili- tary installations, the next line of attack is almost certain to be open cities. Military conflicts can be pre- vented from escalation into the holo- caust by turning away from nuclear defense policies. In this connection we also question the feasibility, the wisdom and moral- ity of seccnd strike nuclear retalia- tion against population centers. How many more international crises will test the deterrence by threats of “massive nuclear retaliation” before the final accident occurs? May not the loss of control of command in a crisis situation unleash total nuclear war? Where does a reliance on a policy of deterrence leave us when there will be several nations capable of launching a nuclear attack? Apart from political miscalculations, there is the chance of accidental outbreak of nuclear war—through technological failures or acts of fanatics, insane men or desperadoes, Obviously, every tvpe of nuclear defense system places us in this jeopardy which increases as nuclear weapons fall into more and more hands. In all armed forces for which statis- tics are available. the annual hospitali- zation rate for insanity is about three per thousand. Periodic examinations THE TIGHTER | DRAW THE BOW, THE SAFER | BECOME... SANE NUCLEAR POLICY, INC. by the American armed forces screen cut most of these risks before they can do damage, but the Air Force publicly admits that ‘it is impossible to prevent all unauthorized destructive acts." These, of course, include det- onation of a nuclear weapon by an unbalanced person in the ranks of re- Pair crews or on isolated submarine, surtace or air outposts, An unauthor- ized nuclear explosion would not nec- essarily start a nuclear war, but the likelihood that it would trigger the command decision to launch a nuclear attack is greatest under a counter- force policy which puts a premium on striking first. WHAT DID OUR superior nuclear position in the whole range of deter- rent systems do to keep the arms race from escalating? Achievement of international peace requires accept. ance of the fact that modern weapons of mass destruction have made un- limited national sovereignty obsolete. The basic hope of the world for laste ing security is the development of a workable svstem of world order under the United Nations. As a first step in a change of nu- clear policy, we should leave behind the wild and provocative first strike strategy, ‘“‘Nuclear deterrence” is a secred cow of the push-hutton age while humane responsibility hides be- hind remote control. The policies of nuclear deterrence imply our prepar- edness and willingness to plunge over the brink of war. taking millions of innocent human beings to a fate of suffering savagery and death. Do we still have the moral vigor and courage to turn from this path? William C. Davidon, Haverford, Pa. Jerome D. Frank, Baltimore, Md. Herbert Jehle, Washington, D.C. Stewart Meacham, Philadelphia, Pa. Clarence E, Pickett, Philadelphia, Pa. (Editor’s note: Mr. Davidon is a theoretical physicist: Mr. Frank, a psychiatrist: Mr. Jehle. a physicist at George Washington University; Mr. Meacham, secretary of the Philadel- phia Peace Education Committee; Mr. Pickett, Secretary Emeritus of the American Friends Service Committee.)