[University of Wisconsin]

                                             June 10, 1949


Dr. Hugo C. Wolfe
Administrative Chairman
Federation of American Scientists
1749 L Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

Dear Dr. Wolfe,

.fi
     I have had an opportunity to study, and to a limited extent to
reflect upon, the report of the FAS committee on biological warfare,
which you brought to my attention about two weeks ago.  I was a little
surprised that my reactions were wanted, because I have no special
information on the problem, and my acquaintanceship with it is limited
to a reading of Rosebury and Kabat's review article which appeared two
years ago in the Journal of Immunology.

     To the extent that the report was based necessarily upon
published material, one must have considerable reservations concerning
the possibility of technical advances which might override the
difficulties now seen in certain specific applications of BW.  As a
geneticist, I can see this possibility most acutely in respect to the
development of fungus pathogens, especially rusts, which might become
suitable for military attacks on enemy cereal agriculture.  The
problem of retroaction is not insurmountable because a) it is quite
likely that the technique of in vitro cultivation of rusts will soon
be perfected, if it has not been already, b) the predominant varieties
adapted to climatic conditions of different countries show marked
differences in susceptibility to different races of the pathogen, and
c) it should not be difficult to harvest spores in isolation plots at
seasons (or under glass) when their spread can be controlled.  The
genetics of pathogenicity is better understood in the rusts than in
any other microbe, and the problem of developing pathogens which would
be specifically active against the enemy's agriculture would here most
readily be solved.  Although admittedly this type of attack is not
sufficiently reliable to be used as a primary weapon, the expectation
of success should certainly be high enough that it would justify the
relatively small investment needed.

     With regard to BW against man, the point is rightly made both
here and in the Rosebury-Kabat article, that retroaction may be the
chief consideration.  I have been impressed with the possibility,
however, that in desperation, one country might be willing to assume
the risks of using highly retroactive agents (such as, for example,
pneumonic plague) although such use would make military occupation
impossible.  However, it seems likely that this kind of sterilization
can be effected nearly as efficiently with radioactive poisons.  The
use of BW in this way might therefore be expected to originate from
countries which have been attacked with a preponderance of military
power in the form of atomic weapons, and for whom BW might be the only
recourse.

     I cannot envisage the possibility of effective international
control of BW research.  In contrast to atomic development, BW would
require a minimum of industrial equipment, so that inspection could 
not be possible unless every house in every village, could be
searched.  To hope to restrict the importation of anthropoids seems
no more realistic than an effort to control the agar industry, or the
distribution of embryonated eggs.

     There is no doubt that there is great need for public education
on the problem of BW.  Fortunately, I don't believe that the
sensational publicity has been taken very seriously.  But it could 
certainly do a great deal of good to emphasize the need for expanded
public health services, and the fact that a great deal of research
is undoubtedly being carried on defensive aspects of BW, and that
this work may be of public benefit far beyond its applications to
military security.

     As far as endorsement of a public report is concerned, however,
I cannot help but feel that the military program holds the ace.
Whatever an outside group might say would necessarily be subject to
modification depending on the progress being made in the BW
laboratories.  Would it not be most useful, therefore, to seek an
official endorsement of a report such as this, or to press for a
comparable but authoritative statement from the Secretary of Defense?

                                      Sincerely,
                                      Joshua Lederberg
                              Assistant Professor of Genetics


[discussed with Jim Poupard
to try to locate FAS.  9/98]