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FOREWORD

  
 
   
  
   
    
   
   
  
  
    
  
    
   
   
  
 
 
     
 
  
  

Over the last 45 yedks, science advice to the President has been thé institutionalized within the
White House. The brganizations through which such advice is given have changed over the

years, and different}Presidents have used them in different ways. The original impetus for

establishing a permanent home for science advice within the White House arose because of the
impact that sciencefand technology had in the winning of World War Il, and the focus at the
office at the beginning was on national security and the use of science and technology in all
aspects of the Cold[War.

As the years went gn, while some of the national security issues remained, presidents came

to recognize the importance of science and technology in other policy areas, and added subjects
such as environmemt, science education and research, space, and technology to the list of issues
for which scientifidiand technological expertise inside the White House was desirable. Now, as
described in this mkmorandum, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology directs
the Office of Sciengie and Technology Policy, cochairs the President’s Committee of Advisors on
Science and Technology, and leads the staff of the National Science and Technology Council. In

addition, the Assisfant has a special relationship with the Office of Management and Budget.

Between 1988 and]1993, the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government
studied the way that all branches of government handled decisions on issues affecting and
affected by sciencdand technology. The Commission focused both on institutions (among them,
the Executive Offite of the President, Congress, the Judiciary, the regulatory agencies, the states,
and nongovernmegtal organizations) and on key problem areas (including economic
performance, nati dial security, the environment, science education, and international relations).
The Commission did not examine a number of areas of concern where advances in science and
technology, including the behavioral sciences, can make major contributions, such as health care,
world population and urban issues; other organizations with special expertise are addressing
these issues. {
At its first meeting'in 1988, the Commission members agreed that the first Commission report
should be on the dfganization of the White House to ensure the best possible science and

ito the President. That report was issued shortly after the election. In 1992, a
i) recommendations to the President and Congress had a short chapter on the

organization of th Executive Office of the President for science and technology. This

As this memoranqum makes clear, the overall structure now in place in the White House for
dealing with issues involving science and technology is sound, and can deal with the post-Cold
War issues that nqw face the nation. The changes recommended here are relatively minor, but if
implemented would substantialy enhance the value of the office to the President.

We would like to L
memorandum forft

ank David Z. Beckler and David Z. Robinson, who drafted the
ommission consideration, for their efforts.

Joshua Lederber, o4, William T. Golden
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DRAFT DZB/DZR 11/12/96

Science and Technology and the President
A Report te the Next Administration

   
  
  
  
     
    
 
  
  
  
 
 
   
 
    
 
  

individual agencias and are often imbedded in broader national policy issues. Looking ahead,
there are importar#l issues involving, for example, budgetary allocations for research and
development (whith accounts for a large portion of discretionary expenditures), or the best

oncerned itself with the best ways of providing the President with scientific
(S&T) advice and assistance. The Commission’s first report in October 1988,

Government has
and technological |
addressed to bot |

{ the President establish a group of senior scientific and technical advisors
e government.'

iss national S&T policies. It also recommended that the Federal Coordinating
ye, Engineering, and Technology be convened at cabinet level and that steps be
sechanisms for integrating scientific and technical considerations in White
fulation.

Both Republican 4
these recommendat

President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology was reestablished after a lapse of
fifteen years in order to draw on the expertise of the outside scientific and engineering
community (during the Reagan Administration, a White House Science Council reported to the
President’s sciencé advisor rather than to the President).

President Clinton 4p pointed a President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology
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Paltjen. tia

 
   
  
 
  
   
  
   
  
   
 
 
   
   
    
  
 
  
  
 
    
   
   
   

and further strengthipned decision making for White House science and technology policy by
establishing the Nafional Science and Technology Council (NSTC), chaired by the President and

made up of cabine fofficers, agency heads and senior White House staff members.

By strengthening tHe authority of the science advisor and increasing the policy orientation of
scientific and techraical advice, the steps taken by the Bush and Clinton administrations
inaugurated a new fra for presidential science advising. In particular, the National Science and
i) increased the emphasis on policy formulation.

dosals build on the substantial accomplishments of the past eight years. In
particular, they att@mpt to integrate the various S&T organizations more fully into the operations

of the White Hous@ and the Executive Office and to focus the S&T advice on presidential

THE OVERALL
PRESIDENT

The Commission’; principal recommendation to the next Administration is that the present
organizational styucture for S&T advice in the White House (see Figure 1) —the Assistant
to the President fer Science and Technology, the National Science and Technology Council,
the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the President's Comanittee of Advisors on
Science and Techy ology—be retained and that its operations be fine-tuned.

h ecommends that the Assistant to the President for Science and
id give primary attention to serving the President in a policy advisory role
o ther Assistants to the President.

Re President for S&T wears three hats. Besides being a member of the

aff and cochair of the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and
Technology, the Assistant has statutory responsibilities as Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Polic}. Although these responsibilities overlap, the statutory functions of the OSTP
Director go beyond direct advice to the President. OSTP provides leadership and coordination
of federal R&D pjograms and assists the Office of Management and Budget throughout the
budget development process. These broader responsibilities compete for the time and attention

needed to respond 'to the priority policy concerns of the President. Nonetheless, the Commission
continues to oppdse the fragmentation of the S&T advisory function that would occur if the

positions of Diregtor of OSTP and the Assistant for S&T were separated. The measures
recommended in is report are aimed at reinforcing the policy role of the Assistant for S&T
while allowing hifm or her to continue to carry out essential S&T program and management
functions. ,
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The effectiveness of the Assistant for S&T, like that of other members of the senior White House
staff, depends on his or her access to the President. If the Assistant interacted more intensively
on a day-to-day bags with the President's senior staff and participated in the work of White
House policy coun ils, his effectiveness would be greatly increased. That interaction can occur
naturally, if the Asgistant focusses on the S&T components of Presidential priorities and
initiatives.

THE NATIONAL §CIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL
|
The Commission #ecommends that the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
be oriented and sfrctured primarily as a policy council in accordance with its enabling

Executive Order. |

The establishment bf the NSTC in 1993” was a major step in the evolution of White House S&T
advisory mechanisins. The Executive Order directed the NSTC to:

s Coordinatefthe policy making and implementation process for S&T across federal

 

agencies
e Ensure that/scientific and technical policy decisions are consistent with the President's
stated goalg:
e Ensure thatS&T issues are considered in the development and implementation of federal

e Further intg mational cooperation in S&T

  
   
  
 
  

Like the other presidential councils, the NSTC is a "virtual council," which seldom meets at
Cabinet level. The Assistant for Science and Technology communicates directly with key
individuals and achieves consensus by convening meetings of subcabinet officials directly
involved in particular policy issues. NSTC's advantage over its Bush Administration
predecessor, the Faderal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineenng, and Technology, lies in
its presidential chairmanship and the ability of the Assistant for Science and Technology to
exercise authority (hn behalf of the President and the council through Presidential Decision
Directives (PDDs} and Presidential Policy Reviews.

I:
The Vice President. chairs the new National Science and Technology Council in the absence of
the President and Was taken a deep interest in S&T issues. His working relationship with the
Assistant to the President for S&T has contributed to the Assistant’s effectiveness.

 

The NSTC plays asignificant role in S&T policy formulation’. For example, in FY1995 it
established a Nati¢nal Bioethics Advisory Commission, developed a national security science
and technology stiptegy, prepared a statement of national space policy, reviewed options for
reform of the fed¢ral laboratory system, established a policy to address the global threat of
emerging infectiogs diseases, organized a national partnership in aeronautics research and
technology, and initiated policies for a better federal/state partnership in S&T.
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In practice, the activities of the NSTC have not been limited to priority policy issues. Its staff
estimates that only #0 percent of its activities concern policy. Most of its efforts concern R&D
program and budge} coordination and convening private sector S&T forums and workshops.
Committees and subcommittees have multiplied (there are about sixty), and programs and
projects have accumulated. Some member agencies have become concerned about the amount of
time spent by their fenior administrators in the NSTC process. The Office of Management and

Budget, a key playap, has reduced its participation as NSTC interagency groups have proliferated

    
   
  
   
   
  
  
  
   
    
   
  
   
   
 
    
     
  

bieves that the NSTC could be an even more effective instrument for
al S&T policies and that it should concentrate its resources on a small number
es of concern to the President. Clearly, it is better for policies to guide

Focusing NSTC activities on relatively few priority issues and objectives that involve the
President or Vice President will help ensure the full participation of OMB and cabinet officers
and will reduce the burden on departments and agencies. In the Bush administration, the
Federal Coordinatipg Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology limited its “crosscut”
programs to about #ix, and this number seems reasonable.

i ok to OSTP for leadership in devising alternative arrangements for other
prdination, including mechanisms for reviewing crosscutting programs that
do not require NSTIC auspices. The need for coordination of federal R&D programs is likely to
grow in light of budgetary constraints and the overlapping S&T interests and objectives of
federal department and agencies. For the most part, interagency coordination and interaction

should not regularly require detailed management oversight by the NSTC or OSTP.

The NSTC should
intergency R&D ca

The Assistant to thé President for S&T, working in close contact with the President and his key
staff advisors, should guide the selection of priority S&T issues for NSTC action that correspond
with the President’$ objectives. These should include broad policy issues with substantial
scientific and tec. ip logical components, as well as policies for S&T. For example, the NSTC
might undertake argin-depth examination of policies to promote technology and national
competitiveness in¢luding the coordination and integration of S&T and related policies across
governments and tle private sector. This would require the development of tools for monitoring
the effect of federal] programs and policies, examination of the impact of technology on
American and foregen companies, design of mechanisms for cooperation among federal
agencies, and promption of new initiatives in government/industry/university relationships.
Such a program wuld require sustained effort, commitment, and follow-up in close cooperation
with the other Whife House policy councils and the federal departments and agencies. Private
industry, universitigs, and state governments would need to be consulted.
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THE OFFICE OF

 
   
   
   
  
   
   
  
 
 
 
      
   
    
       
  

ICIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY

ctions, and operations of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
arly in the next administration by the Assistant to the President for S&T
with a view to sharpening its focus on matters of concem to the President and strengthening its
support of NSTC, FCAST, and the Assistant to the President for S&T. To this end, the
Commission has thyee recommendations.

The organization, fi
should be assessed ip

ecommends that an OSTP chief of staff be appointed in order to
ment and coordination within OSTP, and thus to free up time of the
the duties of Assistant to the President for Science &Technology.

The Commission
strengthen manage

} program, and budget issues rise to the White House level because of their
fer, resource implications, and relationship to presidential goals. As a result,
ave expanded, and professional staff from departments and agencies have been

the NSTC, and P g AST. Besides increasing its staff, more extensive use could be made of the
federally-funded Critical Technologies Institute, which is authorized by Congress to undertake

1

| is a responsibility of the Director. With four associate directors appointed by
lved in different agendas and priorities, it is difficult to achieve overall focus
and concerted effqrt unless there is firm guidance, direction, and incisive decision making by the

Director.

To maintain stroné OSTP leadership and to enable the Director to devote more time to his duties
as Assistant to the President for S&T, the Director needs assistance in two areas. He must now
spend significant amounts of time on general administration, including recruiting, personnel
items, budget, and: general administration. In addition, material coming to the Director should be
checked to verify that there has been requisite internal and external examination and
coordination. A well-qualified Chief of Staff would carry out the administrative duties and
discharge some of'the other responsibilities described above.

 
  
 

The Commission recommends joint staff appointments between the OSTP and the National
Security Counci}:(NSC), the Economic Policy Council (EPC), and the Domestic Policy

Council (DPC).|

i
i

The strength of the S&T advisory apparatus depends on OSTP’s relationships with the other
White House poljcymaking bodies. Of primary importance is the arrangement of joint
appointments of genior OSTP staff members to the staff of other White House policy councils,

not merely for li 4 ison purposes, but with full membership on both staffs and dual reporting
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responsibilities. Syich joint appointments could provide necessary staff support to the Assistant
for S&T, who servgs as a member of the Economic Policy and Domestic Policy Councils and is a
de facto member of the National Security Council.

    
 
   
 
 
  
      

The usefulness of jpint appointments has been demonstrated in the national security area, where
the OSTP Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs has a second
official role as Senor NSC Director for S&T reporting to the Assistant for National Security and
joint appointee brings an S&T perspective to the work of the NSC, keeps the
diated OSTP activities and capabilities, and provides the OSTP director with
aters of primary concern to the NSC.

Ate Director for Science has worked closely with the Domestic Policy Council.
Director for Environment and the Associate Director for Technology also
koncern the DPC, the OSTP Director has not proposed that a single Associate
Director be appoirited to the staff of the DPC. Similarly, all four Associate Directors have
interest in the actigns of the Economic Policy Council. As a result, the EPC and DPC do not
have single pointsjof contact with OSTP. The Director of OSTP should develop an arrangement
with the DPC andJEPC, like the arrangement with the NSC, whereby one Associate Director
would hold a joinfappointment to the DPC and another to the EPC. Those Associate Directors
would represent tHe overall interests of the OSTP in the work of the councils and would involve
other Associate Directors in the business of these councils as necessary.

recommends that OSTP cooperation with the Office of Management and
thened by regular consultation between the OSTP and OMB Directors

morandum of understanding on working relationships between the two

The Commissio
Budget be stren
and by a joint mi
offices

  
   
 
   
   
   
   
    
 
    
 
 

 

OMB is not well
purpose and sho

quipped to evaluate science and technology. It should use OSTP for this

ad encourage it to provide S&T assessments and to propose trade-offs. Since
OSTP is concernéd largely with the success of programs while OMB concentrates on budgets, it
is especially imp@rtant that OSTP manage its participation in the budget process in such a way
that it is seen as representing all the interests of the President, and not simply as an advocate for
increased spendigg on science and technology.

OSTP’s enabling statute directs it to advise the President on S&T considerations with regard to
federal budgets, tp assist OMB with an annual review and analysis of funding proposed for R&D
in agency budget, and to aid OMB throughout the budget development process.

Close cooperation between OSTP and OMB is essential if OSTP is to carry out this mandate.
According to so ne OSTP participants, there has been an unprecedented degree of productive
cooperation in di ent years, with OMB and OSTP staff working together daily. The view from
the OMB is mor} circumspect. There appear to be differences between OSTP and OMB in
philosophy and

sbjectives in dealing with budgetary matters.
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In the case of individual agency projects and programs, OSTP staff participate in "stovepipe”,
ie, agency by age y, budget reviews by OMB. There has been uneven involvement of the
OSTP Director and staff in OMB higher-level "horizontal" reviews. OMB is perceived by some
OSTP staff to lack |nterest in government wide interagency R&D crosscuts, particularly in
extending them beyond a small number of high-prionty national programs. On the other hand,

there is concern within OMB about the number of "priority" programs pressed by the OSTP.

Partnership betwe¢n OSTP and OMB is essential in providing leadership throughout the whole
budget process. Régular consultation between the OSTP and OMB Directors can help resolve
differences in apprpach to program and budget issues and pave the way for agreement on ways
P-OMB interaction. During the Bush administration, there was a written

een OSTP and OMB on their working relationship. OMB offered incentives
(and disincentives} to agencies to encourage them to conform to agreements on priority
crosscutting proprdms. Presidential objectives would be better served by a formal arrangement

between OMB and OSTP.

THE PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The Commission kecommends that the financial and staff resources of the President's
Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) be substantially increased to
enable it to meet frequently and to undertake in-depth studies on S&T issucs of importance
to the President. |

 

The history of sciénce advisory committees to the President extends back more than forty years.
They made particularly important contributions in the 1950s and 1960s when issues of national
security, arms control, and space exploration were the principal S&T issues on the President's
mind. Today’s S&T policy challenges and needs are as great as they were during the Cold War,
and the value of irfipartial S&T advice to inform the presidential decision-making process is no
less. National sech ity issues involving S&T remain vitally important, and there is increasing

concern about ecopomic and environmental issues.

   
   
 
   
  
  
   
  
    
 
    
  

When the Presidegt wants outside S&T advice, PCAST can be an important resource, and indeed
the President appdars to welcome PCAST's advice. Although PCAST is one of many channels
for outside S&T alivice to the President, its closeness and access to the President give it a unique
responsibility andfopportunity. Successful matching of PCAST’s advice to the needs of the
President dependgion the Assistant to the President for S&T in his role as cochair of PCAST.

(One of the differgnces between the present PCAST and previous committees is that the
chairmanship of HCAST is shared between the Assistant to the President, and an outside
cochair. Having gn outside cochair who is personally known to the President can strengthen the
relationship betwéen the President and PCAST.) The President looks to his Assistant for S&T
to identify the isswes and depends on the Assistant to request the advisory committce to report to
the President. Tht Assistant is indispensable in formulating an agenda for PCAST based on an

intimate knowledge of present and emerging issues confronting the President and of the views
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of the President ang key members of the President's staff,

     
 
 
 
  
     
     
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  

S&T advisory comfnittees to federal departments and agencies can also contribute to the White
House policymaki he process. Examples of such committees are the National Science Board, the
Defense Science Bpard (and the armed services S&T advisory committees), and S&T advisory
diof the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the

has met with the Vice President on a number of occasions, it has met with

nly once since the 1994 elections. A direct relationship with the President is
essential for the Committee to have a first-hand understanding of the President’s interests and
concerns, would give the President a degree of familiarity with and confidence in the
committee's memlfers that can only be instilled by personal contact, and would stimulate and
fPCAST members.

I
That an external cémmittee of S&T advisors to the President can play a vitally important role in
presidential policymaking was powerfully demonstrated by the 1995 detailed report of a PCAST
panel on U.S.-Rusgian cooperation to protect, control, and account for weapons-useable nuclear
materials. The chgir of the panel personally presented the report to the President, Vice President,
White House Chief of Staff, and National Security Advisor. The briefing served as a catalyst for
, President Clinton and President Yeltsin calling for accelerated and expanded

bre and account for nuclear materials.

That experience was not the norm. PCAST, as currently funded and operated, is limited in its
ability to performfhe in-depth analyses needed to provide the President with such timely advice.
1AST budget and staff are seriously inadequate and bring into question whether

there is a strong White House commitment to call on the advice of an external S&T advisory
committee (its anual operating budget for meetings and studies has ranged between $60,000
and $80,000).

PCAST meets onhh three or four times a year, and usually submits brief letter reports or

i

memoranda after Jeach meeting. The President and Vice President reportedly read these

ants with interest. However, the White House could take much greater
advantage of PCAST's potential as an extraordinarily thoughtful, talented, experienced, and
if individuals. Responsible reports on complex S&T policy issues require in-

depth examination, and PCAST must have the resources to convene multidisciplinary task forces

  
  
  
    
  

The outside S&Tjadvisors ‘can be most effective when dealing with problems the White House
- wants them to tale on. This includes taking initiative when the issue is of likely concern to the

President and he nay be interested in calling on the outside S&T advisors for help.

There has been c bicem that the public openness requirements of the Federal Advisory

Committee Act 4nd the Freedom of Information Act might impair the ability of PCAST to
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advise the Presider. Although there are conflicts and trade-offs between openness and
confidentiality, PCAST does not appear to have major problems in this regard. Classified
national security information is protected as are certain privileged presidential policy
deliberations. On fhe other hand, briefings and factual information presented at PCAST
meetings and the r#lated discussions are open to the press and general public.

   
   
   
 
   
   
  
 
  
  
   
  
   
     

LONG-RANGE |
| -ecommends that the White House S&T advisory mechanisms pay more
#-range goals for science and technology.

The President andi is staff need to understand the longer-term implications and impacts of S&T
policies, as well ag the effects of other federal policies on future national S&T capabilities.
There is a fundamental mismatch between the short time horizon of the political process and the
inherently long tise horizon for advances in S&T and their application. Early attention to the
opportunities prespnted by advances in S&T and the impediments to such advances, ranging
from industrial competitiveness to the quality of science education or the environment, can have
a substantial impagt on the long-term health and prosperity of the nation.

The President co } d call on the National Science Board (NSB) to monitor and assess the long-
term effects on the nation’s research universities of changes in federal policies and programs for
support of university research and graduate education. The NSB has concemed itself primanly
with oversight of fhe programs of the National Science Foundation, although its original
statutory mandatd
research and edu

‘gives it the responsibility to consider national policies for the promotion of
tion in science and engineering.

*

   
 
 
 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

International issugs involving science and technology are increasingly important to the President,
both in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives and in responding to S&T-related developments
outside the Unite States. This is illustrated by the report of the NSTC Committee on
international! Science, Engineering, and Technology (CISET) on the global health threat of
emerging and re-¢merging infectious diseases. The report emphasized the need for U.S.
leadership to establish international coordination of infectious disease prevention efforts and
build:a global infectious diseases network. The CISET working group included representatives
of more than 17 different government agencies and departments.

Although the White House should take the lead in dealing with international issues of direct
concer to the Pgesident, the S&T capabilities of the Department of State should be substantially
strengthened to garry out its responsibilities for furthering international S&T cooperation and for
integrating S&Tfin the formulation of foreign policy. Measures should be explored to reverse

hii, tea

rio. ba
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the decline of the

CARNEGIE CORPORATION + LEDERBEFG NO.b69 Polo O11

ate Department’s S&T capabilities in international affairs, including the

desirability of a Sckence and Technology Counselor.and an outside S&T advisory committee
Teporting to the Seqretary.

CONCLUSION

The structure for advising the President on issues involving science and technology has been in

place and modifi

over the last fifty years. The present structure appears to be sound, and the

additional modificdtions suggested are aimed at enabling it to be more responsive to presidential
needs and prioritie#: This calls for more emphasis on policymaking functions, a more selective
approach to priority problems and issues based on presidential concerns, and for greater
involvement of the best scientists and engineers from outside government to help deal with the

issues.

NOTES AND REHERENCES

1. Science & Technology and the President, Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government (October

1988)

I
2. A Science and Technology Agenda for the Nation, Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government

(December 1992)

3. Executive Order 14881, November 23, 1993.

 

4. Summary of Accomplishments in FY 1995: OSTP, NSTC, PCAST, available from OSTP.

10
White House Organization for Science and Technology

 

President

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PCAST
CoChairs*
j \ |
Domestic Policy Eoonomic Policy National Security NSTC OSTP OMB
Council Council ___ Council Assistant for S&T* Di a — Directo
Assistant for Assistant for Assistant for Sistant for S trector ‘
Domestic Palicy Economic Policy National Security

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

* The Assistant to the President for S&T also serves as Director of OSTP and Co-chair of PCAST.