Date: Wed, 14 Sep 94 22:21 +0400 ru
From: lefed (Lev A. Fedorov) a
To: fax: 1012123278651

Sub ject: from Lev A. Fedorov

Professor J. Lederbeg
New York, USA
FAX: 212-327-8651

Dear Professor Lederberg,
I'd be glad if the message with CW-topic, which I sent to NRC
yesterday, is interesting for you.
Best wishes,
Sincerely yours
Lev A.Fedorov (Moscow)
Phone/fax: + 7-095- 1290596,
E-mail: lefed@glas. apc. org.
Donald L. Siebenaler
Study Director Board on Army
Science and Technology
(National Research Council
National Academy of Sciences)
Washington, USA
September, 14 Fax: 202-334-2620

Dear Mr. Siebenaler,

When visiting the USA in the spring of the current year I
received from you a copy of the last NRC’s document on the
sub ject of Chemical Weapons disposal (Recommendation for the
Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions", 1994). As a whole
this is a very interesting and deep document. However, I would
consider it necessary to inform you of my thoughts connected
with this document and caused after examining the practice of
Russian and USA authorities in the preparation of the real
disposal of Chemical Weapons.

1, Both in the USA and in Russia the main technology of
destruction of chemical agents involves their incineration:
direct incineration of chemical agents (USA) and incineration
of chemical agents after their preliminary detoxication
(Russia). There are no serious scientific data which would
exhaustively characterize the content of the emission due to
the incineration and the toxic influence of microquantities of
accompanying substances unknown yet.

Conclusion: the known risk assessments of the effects of
emission from incinerators of chemical agents or
the products of their detoxication cannot be
regarded as absolutely correct.

2. We do not have data published either by the USA or Russia
about long-term toxic effect on people of microquantites of
known nerve gases (sarin, soman, V-gas). According to the
information passed to us there are no cases of such poisonings
in the USA. In Russia a few thousand people that produced
V-gas_ in Chuvashia in 1972-1987 regard themselves poisoned by
V-gas due to the fact that experiment (possibly, unintentional
one) on the toxic effect of microquantiies of V-gas was
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carried out on them. In this connection the following should
be kept in mind:

a) The authorities have been forced to acknowledge that 170
out of thousands of workers which produced V-gas got
occupational disease. The acknowledgment of the other cases
is the matter of time.

b) Recently Russian authorities had to extend the hazardous
area round the plant producing V-gas in Chuvashia from 2 km to
4okm. This occurred 7 years after the finishing of V-gas
production. Further extension of that area is the matter of
time. *

c) According to the official statement of Russian authorities
the concentration of V-gas during its production in Chuvashia
did not exceed permissible levels.

d) In Russia the requlation of permissible levels of nerve
gases is stricter that in the USA.

Conclusion: In any operation with nerve gases (storage,
transportation, disposal) presently known risk
assessments of their effect cannot be regarded as
absolutely correct.

3. It becomes clear, when considering technologies of disposal
of Chemical Weapons, that so called alternative technologies
are in fact not in equal position with those officially
approved (baseline system). Both in the USA and Russia the
approved technologies have already been attached to the dates
determined by the Chemical Weapons Convention and juridical
documents (decisions of the USA Congress and the government of
Russia). As a result the alternative technologies never were
in equal conditions with those of baseline system.

Conclusion: The main principle of the Chemical Weapons
Convention is violated (article VII.3) - the top
priority of providing safety of people and
environment over the terms, documents,
allocations, etc.

4. These remarks are not the only ones but even they
demonstrate that when carrying the chemical disarmament we
come across a number of difficulties. One of them is the
10-year period of disposal of all stocks of Chemical Weapons.
It is absolutely unreal. At present I sharply write in press
for the quickest ratification by Russia of the Chemical
Weapons Convention but on condition that we will not be
bounded by so strict terms. Ecological safety is more
important than terms, though, not less than the others, we
desire to get rid of Chemical Weapons as soon as possible.

The desire for elucidation of my position had arisen after I
have examined the discord between the Army and some ecological
organizations in USA over the risk assessment presented in the
NRC’s document.

I hope that my thoughts will not seen redundant to you when
working over documents related to such a complicated field of
human activity as disposal of Chemical weapons.

With best regards,
Dr. Lev A. Fedorov
President of the "Union for
Chemical Safety" (Russia),
fax: +7-095-1290596
E-mail: lefed@glas. apc. org