Lv
ow FEB NT 1987 D 10

Questionnaire
I. Verification (Part 1)

 

 

The panel (N = 19) gave the following responses to the question,
“Do you think that it is possible for the United States to monitor the
development, production, or stockpiling of microbial agents in another
country?
, YES NO NOT ANSWERED
Development: ~- 5 ll 3
Production: 8 8 3
Stockpiling: 8 9 2
Your response to this question was: Net Net
Development: No Production: Arnweerd Stockpiling: prswered

 

 

 

The following reasonable measures were specified by the panel as
a means to monitor development, production, or stockpiling of
microbial agents in another country. Please place an *x* In the space
provided to indicate your judgment of the effectiveness of the measure
for monitoring development, production or stockpiling.

 

Note: E = effective, NE = not effective, ? = do not know.

 

EFFECTIVENESS OF MEASURE FOR MONITORING
DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTION STOCKPILING

 

MEASURES E NE ? T = NE | ? Et NE| ?

 

a) open-inspections
(international teams,
L on-site, & on demand)
) intelligence gathering y ~

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

c) monitoring of research “| “ — _
id) defectors w ” a
je) sampling (technical means "

to detect microorganisms) w A ve i
£) self-inspection Y. ” 7
9) international cooperation] ” 1! "|

 

Please reconsider and respond to the question: "Do you think that
it is possible for the United States to monitor the development,
production, or stockpiling of microbial agents in another country?

Development? Production? ~ Stockpiling?
Yes No 7 Yes No Yes No

2?

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Ia. Verification (Part 2)

The panel (N = 19) gave the following responses to the question:
Do you think it is possible to monitor an incident of BW use?

 

YES: 14 NO: 4 NOT ANSWERED: 1

Your response to this question was Yes .

 

The following reasonable measures were specified by the panel as

 

 

a means to monitor an incident of BW use. Please place an "x" in the
space provided to indicate your judgment of the effectiveness of the
measure for monitoring BW use. Please indicate if you believe the

measure would be effective for monitoring small scale and large scale
use of BW.

Note: E = effective, NE = not effective, ? = do not know.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EFFECTIVEN
. MEASURES FOR MONITORING BW USE
SMALL SCALE USE LARGE SCALE USE
MEASURES : E ‘NE ? E NE ?
a) epidemiologic — —
investigations
Ib) medical examination
of casualties — MK“
jcy site inspections < ral
dj) sampling (technical
means to detect organisms v —
at a site)
e) analysis of organism A Wa
and "vehicle" ZL =>
= > : ~~
) international committee am
g) intelligence gathering —
) international inspection ~~ 4
teams |

 

 

 

 

 

Please reconsider and respond to the question: Do you think it is
possible to monitor an incident of BW use? Yes No

 

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amen nk fess oeceas 6 Suaprteng otee

 
II. Secrecy (Part 1)

The issue of secrecy in BW research in the United States arose
from the first questionnaire. When you answer questions in this
Survey regarding secrecy in BW research, are you assuming a) the U.S.
does conduct secret BW research, or b) the U.S. does not conduct
secret BW research? Does Does not .

The following statements were made by panelists in the first
round questionnaire. Please indicate (by placing an "x" in the space
provided) if you agree or disagree with each statement.

 

AGREE DISAGREE

 

1. There is no secret research
on BW in the U.S..
2. Secrecy may increase the potential Lo
for violations of the 1972 BW Convention.
3. Secrecy may increase the potential
for violations of the 1972 BW Convention ae
ie
_—

 

 

in other countries but not ‘the U.S..

4. Secrecy is probably perceived by the
Soviets as necessary for national security.

2. Secrecy is not necessary for U.S. national
security.

6. Secrecy is necessary only for offensive, not a
defensive research.

7. The U.S.S.R. will not comply with plans

 

 

 

 

 

for increased exchanges of information WkiTAWVt- fo
on BW.
8. The U.S. Department of Defense does —

not sponsor any secret BW research.

9. In the U.S., it is the right of
microbiologists to conduct secret research | —
if they so choose. (EW dp deSiow ef (au,

MI@. It is reasonable to expect microbiologists to

"avoid" secret research, but not realistic.

 

 

 

 

 

li. Secrecy in defensive BW work is not justified. —
2. Secrecy excludes the opportunity for critical _—
scientific review by the scientific community.
13. High quality peer review is still possible ——

 

 

 

within secrecy restrictions.

 

 

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Secret fs cEFEengy VE Re nema
II. Secrecy (Part 2)

Your response and the responses of the panel (N = 19) in the
first round questionnaire are indicated after each of the following
questions. Please indicate how you would answer the same questions in
light of the previous page and the responses of the panel.

1. Do you think the secrecy Surrounding some BW research has a
Significantly adverse effect on the quality of the research?

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 7 No: ll Not Answered: 1
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE: Yes Yes No Not Answered
YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes No

 

2. Do you think secrecy increases the potential for violations of the
1972 BW Convention?

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 11 No: 7 Not Answered: 1
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE: Yes Ne No Not Answered
YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes = No

 

3. Do you think secrecy in BW research is necessary for national

security?
PANELISTS RESPONSES: . Yes: 9 No: 2 Not Answered: 8
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE: Yes No . Not Answered xX

YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes No

4. The 1986 Review of the BW Convention resulted in agreements for
1) sharing of BW information, 2) scientist exchange programs and
publication of BW research. Do you think that these measures

fii signi icantly decrease secrecy in BW research?

 
   
 
  

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 4 No:13 Not Answered: 2
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE: Yes No Not Answered xX
YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes — No

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5. Do you think it is reasonable to expect microbiologists to "avoid"
secret research? Please cite the main reason for your answer.

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 3 No: 6 Not AnSwered: 19
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE: Yes No Not Answered Xx
YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes No

 

 

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III. BW Research

The following key elements were suggested by the panel in the
round 1 questionnaire to DISTINGUISH offensive BW research from
defensive BW research. The elements listed here may or may not be
measurable. Please indicate (by placing an "x" in the space provided)
if you believe the element is effective or not effective for
distinguishing offensive from defensive BW research, and if you
believe the element is measurable or not measurable.

INSTRUCTIONS:

CHOOSE ONE: (E) - Effective for distinguishing offensive from
defensive BW research
Not effective for distinguishing offensive °

from defensive BW research 5 sn 2 —

CHOOSE ONE: (M) Measurable (can be observed externally)
(NM) - Not measurable

(NE)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHOOSE ONE CHOOSE ONE
KEY ELEMENTS
E NE M NM
wit.
1. Research design criteria “ a
2. Extremes of research aA a
3. Purpose in the mind of researcher “ —
4. Observation that BW agents wy
have been made into weapons (ie. ty
Placed into delivery systems) |
SB. Evidence that research is to protect ~
against BW
-]6. Evidence that research is to i - Z
produce vaccines
7. Quantity of BW agents —“ —
8. Form of BW agents It a —
9. Evidence that research {is to
increase virulence and length of — —
survival of organisms
18. Evidence that research is designed uo
to increase infectivity
li. The degree of secrecy involved uw —
i2. A committee using hindsight to
determine the purpose of the
research
13. A neutral third party to make a (
judgment to distinguish Ua $ >
offensive from defensive BW Peed
research A
14. An evaluation of the purpose a
of the research, after an incident | .
of BW use ”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PLEASE WRITE ANY ..COMMENTS ON THE BACK OF THIS PAGE.
IV. Prophylactic, Protective and Peaceful Purposes (Part 1)

The following examples of Prophylactic, Protective and Peaceful
the space
CLEARLY
A CLEAR

Purposes were generated from the round 1 questionnaire. In
provided, Please indicate if you believe the example
represents a prophylactic, protective or peaceful purpose.
example would be a purpose that could not be construed
Prophylactic, non-protective or non-peaceful.

as

non-

 

CLEAR EXAMPLE OF A
PROPHYLACTIC, PROTECTIVE OR PEACEFUL PURPOSE?

 

NO DO NOT KNOW

 

la. To prevent or study a disease.

 

Pa. Epidemiologic or immunologic research.

 

a. Any defensive measure except
retaliation.

 

fa. Study of organisms that occur
naturally.

 

NA dN 8

a. Working with organisms for the
purpose of education

 

Research or development on:

nN. Rapid detection systems

 

Dp. Vaccines

 

- Drugs

 

4. dvreatment

 

 

mh. Protective devices

   

 

ysical protection

 

 

Antibiotics

 

Serum monoclonal antibodies _

 

Counter agents ( on Cannon

 

 

Shelters and decontamination
methods

 

fl. Detection and microbial
identification systems

 

#2. Blocking the entry of released
organisms into target population

 

Fe InduStrial applications
4.

 

Food Production

 

nS. Assay systems

 

6. Impeding an organisms spread

 

 

7. Immunoaugmentative Immunomodulation

 

.- Defensive measures

>

 

9. Nitrogen fixers for plants

 

8. Improving the health of a population

\ VINA SY, \ NE SAIN NINN

se,

 

 

 

 

 

 

PLEASE WRITE ANY COMMENTS ON THE BACK OF THIS PAGE.
IV. Prophylactic, Protective and Peaceful Purposes (Part 2)
Your response and the responses of the panel (N = 19) in the
first round questionnaire are indicated after the following question.

Please indicate how you would answer this same question in light of
the previous page and the responses of the panel.

Do you believe that clarifying the concepts of “prophylactic,
protective and peaceful purposes" would weaken or strengthen’ the
perceived strength of the 1972 BW Convention.

PANELISTS RESPONSES:

Strengthen: 9 Weaken: 1 Neither: 5 Not Answered: 4

YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE: Not Ansucred

YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE (Please check one):

Strengthen
Weaken
Neither

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The tone ten jo ca 0) ot houges
V. BW and Recombinant DNA Technology (Part 1)

Your response and the responses of the panel (N = 19) in the
first round questionnaire are indicated after each of the following
questions. Several comments made by panelists regarding each question
are listed. Please indicate how you would answer the same questions in
light of these comments and the responses of the panel.

The following comments are based on responses of panelists.

~Existing organisms are sufficient.

-Recombinant DNA technology will increase the chance of BW being
used in the future, especially if the engineered agent will
weaken the enemy and not kill.

~The inability to guarantee the safety of one's own personnel
has been a disincentive to BW use in the past, therefore the
availability of increased defenses against BW, provided by
recombinant DNA technology, will increase the chance of BW being
used in the future.

-It is not necessarily a disadvantage that genetically
engineered organisms do not survive well in the environment.

PLEASE RECONSIDER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND INDICATE YOUR SECOND
ROUND RESPONSE IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.

1. Do you think that the capability of designing organisms to the
specifications of military planners will increase the chance of BW
being used in the future?

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 10 No:6 Not Answered: 1 Do Not Know: 2

YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE s
YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSET S35 No Do Not Know

2. Do you think that the availability of increased defenses against
BW, provided by recombinant DNA technology, will increase the
chance of BW being used in the future?

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 6 No: 1@ Not Answered: 1 Do Not Know: 2
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE 0
YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes No a Do Not Know

3. Do you think BW agents produced by recombinant DNA technology offer
any significant advantage over conventional agents in a conflict
situation?

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 9 No: 6 Not AnSwered: 1 Do Not Know: 3
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE No
YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes “No “ Do Not Know

(Codey)
V. Recombinant DNA Technology (Part 2)

4a. Do you think that genetically altered organisms survive well in
the environment?

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 1 No: 18 Not Answered: 2 Do Not Know: 6
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE °
YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes No ~ Do Not Know

4b. If you answered “no" in 4a. above, do you think this trait can be
easily "overcome" by genetic selection? (N = 18)

PANELISTS RESPONSES: Yes: 4 No: 6 Not Answered: 4 Do Not Know: 4
YOUR ROUND 1 RESPONSE Yes

YOUR ROUND 2 RESPONSE: Yes vw No Do Not Know

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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS