Northern California Branch

AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR MICROBIOLOGY

President Vice-President Secretary-Treasurer Councillor
Alvin J. Clark Robert J. Heckly W.G. Wu Herman J. Phaft
Dept. of Molecular Biology Naval Biological Laboratory Dept. of Biology Dept. of Food Science and
University of California Naval Supply Center San Francisco State College Technology
Berkeley, California 94720 Oakland, California 94625 San Francisco, California 94132 University of California

Davis, California 95616
7 February 1°68

Mr, R. W. Sarber

Editor, AS News

11S Huron View Boulevard
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Dear Editor,

Biological warfare and the ASM's Committee Advisory to the lS Army
Biological Laboratories have been subjects of recent discussion (AS?!
News August 1967 pp. 12, 17, 20-21). In that light we think it appro-
priate to inform you of a special meeting of the Northern California
Branch held November 11, 1967. Participating as panalists were.

Gen. J. H, Rothschild, (US Army ret.), Pr. James Moulder, Dr. Joshua
Lederberg, Dr. “illiam P. Romig, Dr. Allen G. “arr, and Pr. Alvin J. Clark.

Biological warfare is the use of microorganisms or their toxic
products "intentionally disseminated to recuce the military effectiveness
of man. It also includes the defense against these things," said
Gen. Rothschild. He continued: "There's no question of the ability to
infect men with biological agents which are released miles avay from
then. The only cuestion which has not been determined by large scale
tests is what proportion of the target personnel would te infected.”
The agents may have lethal or incapacitating effects. In general
microorganisms when used militarily differ from their toxic products
or chemicals in that the symptoms they cause are relatively tardy in
appearing, cause a relatively lonser period of disability, and can be

disseminated over relatively larger areas (i.e. "tens of thousands of
square miles"). Microorganisms, their toxic products and other chemical
agents are relatively humane if compared with explosive or trauma.
weapons in that, exclusive of the lethal agents, they cause less
suffering, a smaller nercentage of long-term disability, and a lower
mortality.

Criticizing the implication that policies on research and develovment
of biological and chemical weapons should be similar, Dr. Lederberg rointed
out the special hazard to the human species of microorganisns as weapons
by saying that "...the calculated grevth of the canacity for biological |
warfare is inherently a suicidal activity on the part of human beings.

Its exactly in opposition to what so much of our scientific and technical
and human effort has been for the control of pestilence, to try te brirg
about ways in which [pestilence] can he systematically disseminated."
(emphasis added) As one illustration of the hazard, he mentioned the

use of an orgenism which normally possesses a marginal degree of incavaci-

cs for

fate

tation and has been rendered resistant to sunlight or antitiot
military purposes, Such an organism when disseminated on a large scale
might evolve to the point of creating a decimating nandemic.

Gen. Rothschild maintained that civilian advisory groups, like the
ASM Advisory Committee, operating within the limits of military secrecy,
review policies and procedures adequately and thereby reduce the dangers
of escalating the effort in biological warfare. Dr. Lederberg argued
that civilian review should ke performed by the scientific cormunity
as a vhole with exception verhans to be made only uvorn proof ty the
military of the need for secrecy. Small committees onerating within the
strictures of secrecy are limited not only by the particuler competence:
of their members but also by the very narrov realm of criticism considcred

appropriate by the military.
The ASM's Advisory Committee was described hy Dr. Moulder as "a
panel of once-a-year, hopefully expert consultants who are consulted on
basic scientific programs at Fort Detrick and professional protlems
related to microbiologists at Fort Petrick. To my knowledge, and again
[Dr. Romig] may correct me, [the Committee has] not been consulted or
general policy and the Committee has not been consulted on the develop»
ment of specific biological weapons." (emphasis added) Dr. Romig agreed
in the main with Dr. Moulder's description but indicated that akout one-
third of the time spent by the Committee concerns security matters and
that this is reflected in their report to the Scientific Director of
Fort Detrick.

The description by Dr. Romig and Dr. Moulder of the limited activities
of ASM's Advisory Committee contrasted with the role implied for the
Committee by Gen. Pothschild's remark that civilian advisory committees
were given "complete disclosure of everything we have'' and were well-
briefed to be influential in policy matters. Gen. Rothschild stated that
Fort Detrick has civilian advisory committees other than that from the AS‘.
"Some of these committees meet alot more often....For instance one of our
major committees...met about every other month,' he said.

Since other committees provide the bulk of the scientific advice to
Fort Detrick, the function of the AS committee was questioned. Dr. Moulder
commented that the Committee "is merely the instrument that is served to
remind us of our own personal involvement as scientists, microbiologists,
as person, [and] the involvement of the Society in all the protlems arising
from the clear possibility of infectious agents being used as weapons."

He also commented: "I think almost all microbiological research has some -

thing to do with biological warfare because unfortunately all the nroblems
of biological warfare are intertwined in a very complex way with the

problems of understanding and controlling infectious disease."

Dr. Lederberg also commented on this subject: "Most of us did not go

into science with the expectation of Supporting munitions activities....

[many biclogists] feel that they had not elected to go into a line of

work that would contribute to the destruction of other people, whether it
or

is less ## more humane than other techniques."

During the general discussion it was suggested that the Advisory
Gommittee be retained to express ASM policy decisions. This idea was
regarded as unrealistic by Dr. Moulder and Dr. Marr who thought that
policy advice was misdirected when aimed at Fort Detrick.

Another suggestion was that the present Advisory Committee be retained
to offer technical advice and that some other instrument of AS” decisions
on biological warfare policy be established. This idea met several
objections, one being that the Army would continue to exploit the AS’ by
using the Society's link with Fort Detrick to lend the Fort a sense of
acceptahility and hence to fend off protests of biological warfare research
by US citizens. It was pointed out that the ASM has no legal obligation to
advise the US Army and that the international character of the AS"! made
it possible for a link with the Army to prove embarrasing if the “'exican
or Brazilian Armies asked the ASM for advice in biological warfare efforts
through the Mexican or Rio de Janeiro ranches. Also retention of the
present Advisory Committee would not meet the most frequently heard objections
that only ASM members deemed accevtable to the Scientific Rirector of the
US Army Biological Laboratories and able to obtain security clearance are
eligible for membership on the Advisory Committee and that the conclusions
of the deliberations of the Advisory Committee are not made available to

the ASN membership.
Still another suggestion was to promote international agreements on
a policy of non-secrecy in microbiological research perbans through the
Pugwash Conference. Dr. Lederberg indicated that such efforts could he
successful because as yet biological weapons are not major weapons and
our national security does not depend crucially on secrecy of our activities
in biological warfare.

Finally it was suggested that the AS" should foster and stimulate

open discussion of biological warfare policies and procedures.

Own F Chark
OLlem G. Murr gare)

Alvin J. Clark

Allen G. Marr