NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL
2101 Constitution Avenue Washington, D.C. 20418

March 18, 1997

Ms. Laura Holgate, Director
Cooperative Threat Reduction
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 2D-459

Pentagon

Washington, DC 20301-2600

Dear Laura:

We appreciated the opportunity to report to you and other
officials of the Department of Defense (DOD) on March 6, 1997, on
the substantial progress we are making in establishing contacts
with Russian scientists who participated in the former Soviet
biological warfare research program. The six initial projects
which we have selected for support at Russian institutes are a
significant first step in our program. They are important not
only in uniting the scientific capabilities of the two countries
but also in demonstrating approaches for improving mutual trust
and confidence that pathogens are not being used in ways which do
not conform with the provisions of the Biological Weapons
Convention.

We are looking forward to our roundtable discussion with
colleagues in Moscow in April as another important step in
developing the framework for long-term collaboration that we will
be submitting to you as part of our report in August 1997.
Obtaining the input of Russian colleagues and their support for
the long-term program now will help ensure the success of the
program in the future.

While our initial projects have some characteristics similar to
other projects being supported through the International Science
and Technology Center (ISTC) and through other U.S. funding
mechanisms, we have emphasized the following important aspects of
our cooperative efforts in this field.

@® Each of our projects will have one or more of the
leading American experts in the relevant field directly
involved in monitoring the progress of the project and
contributing to its successful conclusion. These
specialists will be visiting Russian laboratories in
our efforts to improve transparency on a broad front.

@ We are initiating a significant number of projects at-
more than a single Russian institute. Thus, Russian ~
governmental officials as well as leaders of these
institutes recognize that their scientific community is
developing a broad and important relationship with the
National Academy of Sciences that depends heavily for
its continuation on transparency that is developed
through direct and open collaboration among
specialists.

@® As an integral aspect of our current activities, we
are mobilizing a community of leading American experts,
in science and to some extent in industry, who are
committed to assisting Russian colleagues in
redirecting their efforts from defense to important
Civilian applications.

We welcome your interest in our views as to why expansion of
the program during the current fiscal year is important, rather
than simply waiting to initiate new activities until after
submission to you of our recommendations for long-term
collaboration later this year. There are several reasons in
addition to the importance of addressing urgent public health
problems as soon as possible.

@ We have stimulated a surprisingly high level of
receptivity for cooperation among Russian organizations
and facilities which in the past have been difficult to
reach. Given the uncertain political scene in Russia,
it seems prudent to Capitalize on this new Russian
interest while the doors are open.

@ Experience we gain from experimental projects in
additional areas will greatly enhance the development
and early implementation of recommendations for a long-
term sustained effort.

® By demonstrating that our interest extends well
beyond two institutes, we may be able to encourage a
Significant number of Russian researchers of
proliferation concern, who are currently in very
difficult economic straights, to concentrate on
developing projects for collaboration rather than to
leave their institutions and look for new ways to
utilize their knowledge of dangerous pathogens.

In short, we are very much in an experimental phase in
determining how limited financial resources can be most
effectively used in encouraging redirection and transparency. We
have shown that with patience and perseverance useful joint
projects can be developed, at least at two very important Russian
institutes. Most importantly, we have gained a great deal of
momentum and credibility within Russia and support within the
United States. For the reasons set forth above, we suggest that
our activities promptly be expanded to other Russian
institutions, and particularly to those institutes and
laboratories which have not already developed large portfolios of

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international projects, and indeed have been largely hidden from
public view.

If decisions on funding future activities are delayed until the
fall, there will be a gap of nine to twelve months during which
there will be no new project starts. Such a gap in supporting new
projects would be a serious setback for some Russian institutes
which are interested in working with us. For example, we
anticipate that specialists from several Ministry of Defense
(MOD) institutes will present project proposals during the NAS-
ISTC sponsored workshop in Omutninsk in June. It would be very
desirable to begin working with these institutes on specific
project ideas immediately following the workshop, to the extent
that they are receptive to cooperation. (The tentative agenda for
the workshop indicating the involvement of MOD specialists is
attached.)

In considering additional project starts during this fiscal
year, inclusion of specialists from the MOD in new projects is
clearly of high priority. Also, we should seize current
Opportunities to establish collaborative links with important
institutes and laboratories, in addition to the MOD institutes,
that have not been active on the international scene. Such
institutions include institutes within the Biopreparat complex
and anti-plague research laboratories. Finally, new projects
which differ from the initial projects in terms of the modalities
of cooperation and the types of results that are expected would
broaden our base of experience in joint endeavors. By initiating
projects which satisfy the foregoing criteria in the near future,
our Committee believes that we would be in a better position both
to launch an expanded program and to judge the payoff from
different approaches over the long term.

Accordingly, we would like you to consider supporting the
following new activities during fiscal year 1997:

(1) A new project at Vector to evaluate a number of glycyrrhizic
acid (GA) compounds for antiviral activity against filoviruses
(Marburg and Ebola). Some DOD officials have expressed an
interest in the possibility of including this project among our
initial activities at Vector. While not involving MOD personnel,
this project will break new ground in providing insights into
Russian capabilities and interests regarding several of the most
dangerous pathogens. Also, it should provide the opportunity to
leverage investments from the pharmaceutical industry directly in
NAS activities. The involvement of U.S. industry in the long-term
program seems highly desirable, and this project could provide us
with many lessons as to the potential and limitations of such
involvement. (A discussion of the merits of the project is
attached.) The estimated cost for this project is $55,000.,iIn
addition, we would cover the costs of the American collaborators
from our existing contract.
(2) Three or four additional projects at MOD institutes if
possible or, if not possible at this time, at Biopreparat
institutes where MOD specialists would work ona temporary basis.
The criterion for selecting the non-MOD institutes would be the
extent of proposed involvement of MOD specialists. We have been
informed by the Director of Vector that they are ready to proceed
immediately with one joint project with an MOD institute and that
if money began to flow to MOD scientists, the reluctant attitude
of the MOD leadership in participating in such projects would
change quickly. Experience in addressing the on-the-ground issues
encountered in working with MOD institutes and/or personnel would
provide very useful insights of central importance for realistic
long-term planning. The estimated cost of initial projects in
this area is $250,000 plus $50,000 for the American
collaborators, for a total cost of $300,000.

(3) A survey of capabilities of Russian institutions which are
known to have participated in BW-related activities, but which
have not been significantly involved in international activities,
coupled with the commissioning of pilot projects at several of
the most important institutions. Candidate institutions include
(a) Joint Stock Company Omutninsk Scientific Experimental and
Industrial Base which will probably be the host for the June
workshop, (b) Joint Stock Company Biochimmash which has
approached ISTC for possible support, (c) Volgograd Anti-Plague
Research Institute which will probably be represented at the June
workshop, (d) Stavrapol Anti-plague Research Institute which will
probably be represented at the June workshop, (e) State Research
Institute of Biological Instrument Making which, at least during
1996, received MOD funding for biological defense research, and
(f£) the Berdsk biotechnology plant which appears to be ready to
enter into joint projects with Vector. Such visits would be an
important aspect of our efforts to develop a long-term program
which does not exclude any important Russian facilities. At the
same time, an NAS presence at such institutions--even during
survey visits--could be important in retaining important
personnel who might otherwise lose hope as to future funding and
leave for the commercial sector, and perhaps dangerous pursuits.
The estimated cost of the visits and five pilot projects is
$400,000.

(4) A joint U.S.-Russian assessment and associated feasibility
study of the establishment and operation of expanded electronic
communications capabilities at about a dozen research institutes
of MOD and Biopreparat, with particular attention to strengthened
capabilities for communications with Russian civilian institutes
and for access to the Internet. We recognize that improved
communications capabilities might enhance Russian capabilities to
coordinate their military-related activities and improve their
access to western data on dual-use technologies. But our
preliminary view, which will be examined during the assessment,
is that the positive aspects of the contributions toward

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transparency will outweigh such concerns. One specific proposal
from Vector is to install a satellite dish and also to expand
land lines to the research community in the Novosibirsk area at
an estimated cost of $200,000. This suggestion along with other
plans will be considered in the feasibility study. Electronic
communications will probably be an important aspect of the long-
term plan. Therefore, we should understand the technical issues
and the cost constraints as soon as possible. We estimate the
cost of this assessment and feasibility study, which would
examine the requirements at each facility in detail, as well as
the dual-use implications, to be on the order of $150,000, with
completion within twelve months.

(5) Two technical workshops in Russia on topics of considerable
interest to scientists from the MOD and Biopreparat. They would
logically follow the workshop in Omutninsk but would be more
focused. Candidate topics suggested by our Russian colleagues are
molecular epidemiology, diagnostics, treatment, vaccine
development for viral and bacterial infections, application of
entomophagenic viruses and bacteria for plant protection against
insects. While these topics require considerable refinement, they
provide a good point of departure for identifying areas of mutual
interest. ISTC-sponsored workshops in Russia have shown that they
are an effective means of attracting previously unknown
scientists to the table of international cooperation. The
estimated cost is a total of $150,000 which includes workshop
proceedings.

(6) One workshop in the United States to discuss the following
topics which are important aspects of redirection of biological
research activities over the long term: registration of high
hazard laboratories, maintenance and control of data banks of
strains of pathogens, and procedures for controlling the movement
of pathogens within a country and among countries. Cooperation in
all of these areas is an important aspect of transparency and
confidence building, and a workshop in the United States would be
designed to make Russian colleagues more comfortable in
addressing these topics forthrightly and constructively. This
workshop would help structure a realistic approach to joint
efforts in these fields. The cost of the workshop, together with
carefully structured visits by the Russian visitors to selected
U.S. facilities, is estimated at $75,000.

(7) Increased administrative capabilities to support the
development and implementation of the foregoing activities. We
estimate that the additional staff, travel, and other costs to be
incurred by NAS in carrying out activities beyond those envisaged
in the original contract would be on the order of 15-20 percent
of the project costs, although this percentage will vary
considerably depending on the type of activity.

We greatly appreciate your interest in our views concerning

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expansion of our current efforts. We look forward to receiving
your reaction to these suggestions. If you are prepared to
Support some or all of these suggestions, we will of course send
you a formal proposal with additional information, including an
appropriate budget.

— /

Joshua Lederberg ICF{ Jghn Steinbruner (ce
Committee Chair ommittee Vice-Chair

Sincerely,

   

  

Attachments:
Tentative agenda for NAS-ISTC workshop in Omutninsk
Discussion of proposed Ebola/Marburg project at Vector

cc: Roland Lajoie, CTR
Joan Demey, DSWA
Doug Denning, NRC/OCG