12/7/96

Visit to Russia on Collaborative Research on Dangerous Pathogens
(November 21-30, 1996)

PURPOSE OF THE VISIT

The NAS/IOM team had two tasks: (1) the identification of
potential initial research projects at Russian institutions;
these projects are to be supported using currently available
funds provided by DOD of up to $500,000, which includes up to
$85,000 for American collaborators and $15,000 for transfer fees;
and (2) the establishment of arrangements for obtaining Russian
inputs into a yet-to-be-developed Plan calling for long-term
bilateral collaboration beginning in FY 1997. Appendix A
identifies the team members. Appendix B identifies the American
officials and Russian officials and specialists who met with the
team.

BACKGROUND OF THE VISIT

In October, the NAS Committee Chairman and Vice-Chairman (Joshua
Lederberg and John Steinbruner) sent jointly signed letters to
Deputy Prime Minister Fortov and Deputy Minister of Defense
Kokoshin advising them of the initiative and seeking their advice
on how best to proceed. Fortov informally advised a Committee
staff member to (a) consult promptly with the Ministry of Defense
(MOD) concerning the activity, and (b) consider placing the
initiative on the Gore-Chernomyrdin agenda. Either Fortov or his
staff then designated Academician Lev Sandakhchiev, Director of
the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (Vector),
to follow up on the initiative with the Committee. Kokoshin
informally advised a Committee staff member through Russian
intermediaries that he was not responsible for the topic and that
the Committee should inform Chief of the General Staff Samsonov
of the activity.

Several days before the arrival of the team in Moscow, the U.S.
Defense Attache forwarded a letter to Samsonov from Committee
Chairman Lederberg requesting that MOD receive the team.
(Unfortunately, the letter had been delayed; and the Russian
translation may have conveyed an erroneous impression that the
Committee was focusing heavily on monitoring of Russian
facilities.) On the eve of the team’s arrival, MOD responded to
the Embassy that such a meeting of the team at MOD was not
necessary and that the Russian Academy of Sciences could invite
specialists from MOD to participate in meetings on the topic if
necessary.

As to Embassy assistance in arranging other visits, the Embassy
requested the President’s Commission on CW/BW Conventions to
receive the team. The Commission declined. According to Russian
colleagues, the Deputy Chairman would have received the team, but
he was in Geneva at the intergovernmental BW review conference
being held at the same time. The Embassy requested a meeting for

the Committee with the appropriate Deputy Minister of Health, and
such a meeting was held. Also, the Embassy arranged meetings for

the team with the Charge d’affaires, the Defense Attache, and the
USAID health specialist.

Just prior to the team’s arrival, the Committee Chairman sent
letters to President Osipov and to Vice President Petrov of the
Russian Academy of Sciences requesting that they receive the
team, and a meeting with Petrov was arranged. Osipov was out of
the city.

Several additional meetings were arranged by the staff of the
Russian Academy of Sciences prior to the team’s arrival, and
other meetings were arranged by Academy staff and by the team
members themselves after arrival.

As to the initial research projects, in October, the Committee
had identified Vector, located in Koltsovo near Novosibirsk, and
the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology in Obolensk in
the Moscow district as the most appropriate sites for initial
projects which could be rapidly launched. These centers have a
history of working with dangerous pathogens in close
collaboration with MOD institutions. Also, in recent years, they
have developed a number of proposals for consideration by western
collaborators, including some which have been given high marks in
peer review competitions. Furthermore, the Director of Vector has
participated in the arms control dialogues involving the National
Academy of Sciences for several years. The Committee staff had
alerted the Directors of the two institutes of the interest in
their activities.

Also, the NAS had requested through the U.S. Department of State
status as a "Partner" of the International Science and Technology
Center (ISTC). ISTC provides a very convenient mechanism for
contracting, financing, and other important administrative
aspects of implementation of projects at Russian research
institutions.

ESTABLISHING THE INITIAL RESEARCH PROJECTS
Criteria for Selection

During the visit, the team developed the following criteria for
considering the merits of proposals for the initial projects:

® The project, or a discrete portion of the project, could be
supported for a maximum of $200-225,000.

® The results of the research should have important public health
implications for Russia, and possibly in other geographical ‘areas
as well.

® The proposal is technically sound and draws on a substantial
body of science.
@® The topic is appropriate for the research institution that will
carry it out, with particular attention to the capabilities of
the personnel and the facilities to support the project.

@® There is a strong likelihood that discernible research results
of significance could be achieved by September 1997, recognizing
that they might only be interim results. This criterion means
that only projects that have already been approved by the
appropriate Russian government agencies would be eligible for
funding as initial projects, since the Russian scientists stated
that the time for Russian approval for new proposals is at least
three months; and approval cannot be assured in advance.

@ The project, if successful, would open up or would lead to an
expansion of a significant area of research with important public
health payoff. Adherence to this criteria would help distinguish
the projects from ISTC-financed projects, which usually are not
designed to lead to future research activities, but rather are
intended to promote discrete short-term projects, thus allowing
future resources to be used in other areas.

@ There is the possibility that MOD scientists could be included
within the project or within follow-on projects. Immediate
involvement of these scientists is very desirable, but
involvement at a later date as the research activity develops may
be more realistic.

Vector (Koltsovo

The Director, Deputy Director, and a senior scientist presented
to the team five project proposals for consideration. The titles
of the proposals are set forth in Appendix C. All of the
proposals had been submitted to ISTC. Therefore, they had the
necessary Russian agency approvals, and work could begin
immediately.

The team noted that the proposal for development of an oral
vaccine for Hepatitis B best fit the above criteria. The Vector
scientists pointed out that the proposal had been submitted to
ISTC two years ago, but it was not supported by the ISTC
Financing Parties at that time due to the lack of preliminary
data concerning aspects of the strains under consideration. In
the absence of such data, there apparently were concerns as to
the viability of the project. These data are now available and
should resolve the concerns, according to the Vector scientists.
They also pointed out that scientists from an MOD research
institute in the town of Sergei Pasad just north of Moscow were
interested in this proposal. If the project were supported,
Vector would submit an amendment to the proposal to the
appropriate Russian agencies in support of including MOD
scientists in the activity. However, this approval process is
expected to take at least three months and perhaps longer; thus
the project would begin without MOD scientists.

The team gave special attention to the proposal supporting
paleovirology investigations of influenza. However, the Vector
scientists noted that this project would have to be a long-term
effort, since only one month each year was suitable for the
expeditions to the north to collect human samples for analysis.
There could be no assurance that appropriate samples could be
obtained in July 1997 and if they were, that they would show
indications of the virus of interest. The team noted that this
project might be most appropriate for consideration with the
framework of the long-term Plan to be developed by next
September.

Having reviewed the candidate proposals, the team then considered
whether a trip to Koltsovo was necessary. The team agreed that
such a trip was important for several reasons. Firstly, members
of the Committee who are experts in virology should visit the
research facilities in Koltsovo to confirm the quality of staff
and facilities that would support the various projects. Secondly,
unanticipated problems with one or more of the proposals or new
opportunities with other proposals might emerge. Thirdly, a visit
to Vector will provide an opportunity to discuss approaches to
identifying projects to be included in the longer term Plan.
Given that Sandakhchiev is probably the most reliable
interlocutor for supporting NAS activities in Russia currently
and that he is knowledgeable about activities of other
institutions as well, these preliminary discussions could cover
ways for considering projects that might be conducted not only by
Vector but by other institutions as well. Fifthly, the American
specialists could begin a dialogue in support of expanded
epidemiologic monitoring given their expertise and experience,
both internationally and domestically, in this key domain.

Institute for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk)

The Institute for Applied Microbiology presented six proposals
for consideration by the team. The titles of the proposals are
set forth in Appendix D. However, only two of the proposals had
the necessary government approvals. The others will not be
considered until March by the State Committee on Science and
Technology which is a key organization in the approval process.

After listening to presentations on the six proposals by the
principal investigators of each of them, and taking into account
the above criteria, the team gave special attention to the
proposal to develop improved "molecular-biologic and immuno-
chemical methods" for analysis of clinical strains of
mycobacteria responsible for tuberculosis and mycobacteriosis.
This proposal has been approved by the Russian agencies. An
attractive aspect of this study is that it is a subpart of a not-
yet-approved larger proposal to address other, highly dangerous
pathogens (e.g. plague, anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis) as well.
According to Russian scientists who participated in the .
discussions, if the more limited proposal were accepted, they
could immediately seek approval for including other pathogens of
interest to the Committee. If their amendment is accepted by the
concerned Russian agencies, the original activity could then be
broadened easily to include such pathogens.
The team decided that another visit to Obolensk prior to the
Committee’s selection of the most appropriate project would not
be necessary.

As to conditions in Obolensk, the scientific staff is ina
difficult economic position, although probably not as difficult
as the financial plight at many other institutes. During the past
several years the staff has dwindled from over 3000 to 1400.
Since the institute is designated a State Research Center, it
receives special funding from the State Committee for Science and
Technology. Of considerable importance, it has eight projects
funded by ISTC. Also, it has had NASA projects.

Mary Kay Cosmetics has established a significant operation at
Obolensk, attracting a number of specialists with medical
training. Also, there are a half dozen small enterprises with
various types of medical-related products which have spun off
from the Institute, and the US-Russia joint venture Mir is
building a plant to produce generic pharmaceuticals (e.g.
vitamins, anti-biotics) in a corner of the Institute’s property.

ESTABLISHING NETWORKS FOR INPUTS INTO THE COMMITTEE’S PLAN

The MOD Inputs

High priority was given by the team to developing pathways for
MOD inputs into the longer term Plan, given the refusal of MOD to
arrange a meeting involving MOD specialists and the team, at
least during this initial visit to Russia. Several organizations
and individuals expressed interest in assisting in this regard.

@ Both Vector and the Institute for Applied Microbiology have
regular interactions with MOD specialists with whom they work on
specific projects funded exclusively by Russian agencies.

® The representative of Biopreparat--the parent organization for
Vector and the Institute for Applied Microbiology and which in
Soviet times served as the interface between biological defense
requirements and research programs in support of those
requirements in many areas--indicated a readiness to assist in
brokering contacts with MOD. He underscored the long-standing
links between many of the eleven Biopreparat institutes and MOD.
@® The ISTC is prepared to organize one or more workshops that are
likely to include MOD scientists. ISTC has a track record in this
regard having secured participation of twelve MOD scientists in
an ISTC workshop last year, with the specialists from the MOD
research institute in Kirov having presented two or three papers.
(See Appendix E.)

@ An important staff member of the President’s Defense Council
(Sergei Kortunov) expressed a willingness to encourage MOD ,
scientists to participate in workshops in Moscow concerning the
project upon our request for such assistance.

@ An expert of the Duma Defense Committee (Natalia Kalinina)
offered to help broker contacts with MOD scientists.
@ A key official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sergei
Kislyak) agreed to forward correspondence to senior officials of
MOD who are in key positions in the BW-related field.

The team made no commitments as to how the Committee will proceed
in the future. In each case, the team informed Russian colleagues
that the Committee would be back in touch with them.

The U.S. Embassy strongly recommended using as many channels as
possible to encourage MOD scientists to participate in the
planning. The U.S. Charge recognized the political importance of
the program and encouraged strong efforts to put it in place. The
U.S. Defense Attache noted the financial plight of professionals
throughout MOD. He thought that given its many other problems,
MOD would give low priority to other technical justifications of
the proposed collaborative program such as anti-terrorism and
protecting the health of military personnel.

Both the Russian Ministry of Health and the Russian Academy of
Sciences suggested that the team pursue its independent channels
to reach Russian scientists of relevance to the project. Even
though MOD had suggested that the Academy of Sciences could
provide a venue for meetings with MOD personnel, the Academy did
not mention this possibility.

The Gore-Chernomyrdin Agenda

Several Russian officials suggested that the program be put on
the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission agenda. They noted that
endorsement at the highest level would help signal MOD scientists
that the program was legitimate and important. At the same time,
they pointed out that three committees of the Commission had
interests--defense conversion, health, and science and
technology.

In discussing among themselves the possibility of including the
item on the Commission agenda, the team noted that placing it
within the Defense Conversion Committee would encourage MOD as
well as DOD to assume a responsibility for the implementation in
both the short and long terms.

Interests of Other Agencies

Obviously, the Ministry of Health is a key player in any effort
to promote public health. However, newly appointed Deputy
Minister Onishchenko seemed more interested in obtaining
immediate financial support for his institutes than discussions
about long term plans. And he apparently has not embraced the
Biopreparat complex of institutes--including Vector and the ,
Institute for Applied Microbiology--as being important
organizations of the Ministry of Health.

Specifically, Onishchenko complained that he had not been
consulted as to the initial projects. As to providing inputs to
the long term plan, he seemed disinterested even though the
Sanitary Epidemiological Service (SanEpi) which he still heads is
the key organizations for epidemiologic monitoring within Russia.
He did refer to his collaboration with CDC as important, however.
Following the meeting, his staff called the American Embassy to
say that the meeting should have been conducted at a lower level
since there were no decisions for the Deputy Minister to make.

Petrov of the Russian Academy of Sciences received the group.
However, he did not seem prepared to be helpful. He stated that
while the inter-Academy agreement called for the Russian Academy
to cooperate in activities such as the one being proposed, the
Russian Academy had not made a decision whether it would play a
"key role," possibly reflecting the fact that he had not had an
opportunity to discuss the program with President Osipov. He
raised concerns over the definition of "monitoring" which he
apparently interpreted to mean monitoring of facilities. Also, he
requested that the title of the project be changed to include
"basic research" which was the purview of the Russian Academy of
Sciences. He said he would await more details from NAS until
taking any further steps. At the same time, he encouraged the
team to develop its own channels to relevant agencies and
institutions. The team indicated it would follow this advice,
thus discouraging Petrov from seeking a role for the Russian
Academy as a coordinator of Russian inputs into the Plan.

At the Academy of Medical Sciences, a group of apparently
impoverished institute directors greeted the team. They were
ready to cooperate in any field of interest, and they claimed
considerable relevant expertise. The team agreed that they had
much to offer. While not presenting specifics, the directors made
it clear that they were in very difficult strai¢gwts; and they had
no funds for collaborative activities. Indeed, they were
desperately searching for foreign funds.

The State Committee for Science and Technology welcomed the
initiative, and they were pleased that the NAS would use the ISTC
for which the State Committee had developed an appropriate review
system. They considered the NAS selection of Vector and the
Institute for Applied Microbiology as sites for the initial
projects to be a validation of the State Committee’s selection of
these institutes as State Research Centers. They stated that they
could be helpful in efforts of the NAS to bring institutes from
many organizations into the consultation process although they
did not mention MOD specifically.

It is also worth noting that during a team member’s call at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a key Russian official (Kislyak)
stated that "reciprocity" should be an important aspect of the
program, specifically including exchanges of working scientists
between biological defense facilities of the Ministry of Defense
in Russia nad the Department of Defense in the United States.
NEXT STEPS

The team considered the following next steps:

Launching the Initial Projects

After the visit of the second team to Vector in mid-December, the
Committee should be asked to approve the recommendations for the
initial projects. The recommendation for the project at the
Institute for Applied Microbiology would be based on the visit to
Obolensk as discussed above, and the recommendation for the
project at Vector on the basis of the preliminary screening by
the first team in Moscow and the visit to Koltsovo by the second
team.

Once the Committee agrees on the projects, the ISTC would be
asked to take the necessary steps for signing the project
agreements and for promptly launching the projects.

An important question that still remains is the identification of
the American collaborators for each project.

Development of the Plan

One aspect of the Plan will presumably be a long-term research
program based at a number of Russian institutions, and
particularly those that have been involved in research on
biological defense. As a step in developing this aspect of the
Plan, a workshop should be held in February to obtain Russian
reactions and inputs to a tentative research program outline
prepared by NAS/IOM. Biopreparat/Vector could be asked to take
the lead in organizing the workshop, with other organizations
also invited to send specialists to the meeting. Outreach to MOD
specialists would be highlighted in this activity.

One approach might be to prepare a straw-man "Call for Proposals"
which could be issued if the second phase is implemented. This
straw-man could provide the document for consideration at the
workshop. In preparing such a Call for Proposals, all the
critical issues, including selection criteria, must be addressed.
Also, the Russians are very familiar with the Call for Proposals
approach which has been used by a number of western organizations
in Russia in recent years.

A second aspect is the system for responding to incidents
involving pathogens--in Russia, the United States, and world-
wide. This topic will involve a different cast of players given
the bureaucratic dominance by SanEpi, with the MOD and
Biopreparat institutions having played very minor roles to date.
A possible approach is to work through ISTC in organizing a’
workshop in, say, June which brings together four organizations--
MOD, Biopreparat, SanEpi, and Academy of Medical Sciences, along
with representatives from corresponding U.S. organizations and,
perhaps the World Health Organization--to begin to address
details as to how the operational system in Russia could be
upgraded, including the role of supporting research institutions
when they have the needed expertise. Related efforts of NAS/IOM
concerning response mechanisms in the United States could provide
useful inputs into such a workshop.

The third aspect of the Plan concerns the "regulation" of
activities involving dangerous pathogens. It includes some of the
activities being discussed at the Geneva BW Review Conference.
Possible areas of interest include reciprocal inspection visits,
registries of pathogens, and even licensing of activities. This
aspect involves different Russian specialists than the scientific
aspects and will require different mechanisms for obtaining
Russian inputs into the Plan.

CONCLUSION

The team succeeded in identifying several projects that ona
preliminary basis appear to be excellent candidates for support
during the initial phase of the program. The final selection
should be completed in January, with steps then taken through the
ISTC to support implementation of the projects.

All relevant Russian government agencies and several Academies
and other important institutions have been informed of the
purpose of the overall program. They have been invited to
participate in the development of the long-term Plan. The next
step is to provide these organizations with straw-man documents
which will enable them to provide inputs on the substance of
future activities as well as on organizational aspects.

Successful outreach to MOD specialists and effective interactions
with the Ministry of Health will be of special importance. Once
the initial projects are in place and drafts of sections of the
long-term Plan are available, there seems to be a reasonable
likelihood that these organizations will become seriously
interested in the program, at the policy as well as the research
levels.

POST-VISIT FEEDBACK

Upon return to the United States, the Committee staff was
informed by the Russian Academy of Sciences staff that (a) Petrov
had become more enthusiastic about the proposal, and (b) Kokoshin
had informally discussed the program with Fortov and had urged
Fortov to actively support the program. The Russian staffer
suggested that should the Committee decide to have a workshop in
Moscow in February to obtain Russian inputs on the long-term
Plan, the Russian Academy could make the necessary administrative
arrangements while at the same time the NAS Committee would be
free to use whatever channels it deemed appropriate in arranging
the program agenda and extending invitations for Russian
participants.
For additional comments, contact Glenn Schweitzer, tel 202-334-
2644, fax 202-334-2614
Appendix A

Members of NAS/IOM Team
(Visit to Russia, November 21-30)

Members of NAS Committee

John Steinbruner, Brookings Institution, Vice Chairman of
Committee

Alexis Shelokov, Salk Institute

Matthew Meselson, Harvard University

Staff Members

Christopher Howson, Institute of Medicine
Glenn Schweitzer, National Research Council
Appendix B
Participants in Meetings in Moscow and Obolensk

U.S. Embassy
John Tefft, Charge d’affaires

John Reppert, Defense Attache

Scott Towsley, CTR Officer

John Zimmerman, Science Counselor

Evelyn Putnam, Science Officer

Premilla Nored, Science Officer (Health)

Jane Stanley, USAID Health Officer

Elena Gurvich, USAID Environmental Health Specialist

President’s Defense Council
Yevgeniy Velikhov, Member

Sergei Kortunov, Senior Staff

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Sergei Kislyak, Chief of Department for Disarmament and
Political/Military Affairs

Ministry of Health

First Deputy Minister Gennadiy G. Onishchenko

Viktor M. Lykov, Director, Division of International
Scientific Cooperation

Anatoliy A. Monisov, Director of Department for Sanitary-
Epidemiologic Surveillance

"Biopreparat"

Grigoriy Ya. Shcherbakov, Chief of Section for Science and
Industry

Aleksandr F. Zaitsev, Chief of Section

Russian Academy of Sciences

Rem V. Petrov, Vice President

Sergei S. Markianov, Head of Foreign Relations Department
Yuri A. Osipiyan, Director of Institute of Solid State
Physics and Chairman of CISAC Counterpart Group

Yevgeniy D. Sverdlov, Director, Institute of Molecular
Genetics

Academy of Medical Sciences

Nikolai F. Izmerov, Chief of Department of Preventive
Medicine

Dmitri K. Lvov, Director, Institute of Virology (Ivanovski)

Boris F. Semenov, Director, Institute of Vaccines and Serums
(Mechnikov)

Sergei G. Drozdov, Director, Institute of Poliomylitis and
Viral Encyphalitis (Chumakov)

G. A. Suvodov, Director, Institute of Occupational Medicine

Vladimir Orlov, Chief of Foreign Department

Ludmila Melnikova, Foreign Department

State Committee for Science and Technology

Yuri N. Mshensky, Head of Department for Life Sciences
Aleksei M. Korostelev, Department of Bilateral Scientific-
Technological Cooperation
Yuri P. Fomichev, Economic Adviser

State Research Center "Vector"
Lev S. Sandakhchiev, Director
Sergei V. Netesov, Deputy Director
Dr. Marenkova, Senior Scientist

State Research Center for Applied Microbiology
Nikolai N. Urakov, Director

Aleksei V. Stepanov, Deputy Director
Irina Ye. Svyato, Deputy Director

Eduard A. Svetoch, Chief of Department
Igor G. Shemyakin, Chief of Department
Anatoliy N. Noskov, Chief of Department
Konstantin I Volkovoy, Senior Researcher
Aleksei N. Alekseev, Chief of Department
Ludmila I. Kavyzina, Chief of Department
Nikolay A. Staritsin, Researcher

Duma Committee on Defense
Natalya Kalinina, Expert

International Science and Technology Center

Oles Lomacky, Executive Director
Alain Gerard, Executive Director-designate
Yuri B. Kondratenkov, Senior Project Manager

Officials Who Were Contacted but Meetings Not Held

Deputy Prime Minister Valdimir Fortov

Deputy Defense Minister Andre Kokoshin

Chairman of Presidential Commission on BW/CW Conventions
Syutkin and Vice Chairman Ignatiev

Chief, Directorate for Protection Against Biological Weapons
General Yevstigneev
Appendix C

Projects Suggested by State Research Center
for Virology and Biotechnology “Vector”

1. Creation of a live recombinant vaccine against Hepatitis-B for
oral administration.

2. Sequencing of the genome of monkeypox virus pathogenic for
humans.

3. Search for viable viruses and their genetic elements in
neolithic remains of Gorny Altai and old cemeteries in the
permafrost region of Russia.

4. Experimental studies of antiviral activity of glycyrrhyzic
acid derivatives against Marburg, Ebola, and human
immunodeficiency viruses.

5. Study of the genetic ancd serologic diversity of hantaviruses
in the Asian part of Russia.
Appendix D

Projects Suggested by State Research Center
for Applied Microbiology in Obolensk

1. Identification and investigation of a collection of causative
agents of extremely dangerous infections (plague, anthrax,
tularemia, mallei, tuberculosis, brucellosis) at the molecular
and biological levels, obtained from various Russian regions.

2. Molecular-biological and immuno-chemical analysis of clinical
strains of Tuberculosis and Mycobacteriosis.

3. Construction and investigation of molecular plague vaccine
preparations which can provide early protection.

4. Development of bivalent live recombinant vaccines against
brucellosis and anthrax.

5. Development of methods for specific immunotherapy of chronic
melioidosis.

6. Cloning of Pseudomonas pseudomallei nucleotide sequences
useful for the development of diagnostics.
Appendix E
MOD Presentations at ISTC Symposium

December 11-16, 1995

1. “Evaluation of Therapeutic Activity of Quinolone Group
Preparations in Treatment of Severe Infections," N. T. Vasiliev,
v. B. Kalinsky, B. A. Levchuk, S. M. Kuznetsov of the Research
Institute of Microbiology of the Ministry of Defense of the
Russian Federation, Kirov.

2. "Experimental Justification of Chemotherapeutical Methods for

Plague Treatment at the Stage of Endotoxic Shock," N. T.
Vasiliev, V. E. Romanov, V. A. Shabalin of the Research Institute
of Microbiology of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian

Federation, Kirov.

3. "Studies of the Development Problems of Specific Prevention
and Treatment Means of Hemorrhagic Ebola Fever," A. A. Makhlai,
Vv. V. Mikhailov, I. V. Borisevich, Center of Virology, Research
Institute of Microbiology of the Ministry of Defense of the
Russian Federation, Kirov.

MOD Participants from Kirov in ISTC Symposium

Vv. B. Kalinsky, I. D. Kravets, A. A. Makhlai (Director of
Virology Center), N. V. Mikhailov, V. E. Romanov