PRIVILEGED

BW Panel Planning Meeting
Rockefeller University
March 16, 1988

Draft Summary Minutes

The BW panel of the National Academy of Sciences' Committee
on International Security and Arms Control met on March 16,
1988, at Rockefeller University. Present were: Dr. Joshua
Lederberg, chairman; Robert Chanock, Paul Marks, Matt Meselson,
John Steinbruner; Frank Vandiver; Theodore Woodward; and Lynn
Rusten.

The purpose of the meeting was to plan for the upcoming
US/Soviet bilateral meeting on BW to be hosted by the NAS group
May 9-11 in Washington. Everyone introduced themselves. Rusten
then reviewed the general schedule for the May meeting. She
suggested that the first day, Monday May 9, be devoted to the
thorough discussion of the agreed upon agenda items and that
there be a dinner/reception that evening at the NAS to which
outside individuals and government officials be invited. On
Tuesday May 9, the plan is for both delegations to spend the day
at Fort Detrick. A cultural event (jazz, or Kennedy Center
event) will be planned for Tuesday evening. Wednesday a.m. will
allow a few hours of discussion in the morning to follow up on
the Fort Detrick visit and discuss future steps for the
bilateral delegations. Rusten suggested the formal meeting
adjourn before lunch on Wednesday.

At Lederberg's request, Woodward reviewed the state of plans
to take both delegations to Fort Detrick. He reviewed steps
taken to gain approval for the visit and expressed optimism that
the visit would go off as planned. Woodward suggested that the
groups would plan to arrive around 10:00 a.m. on May 10. He
suggested that he, Lederberg, and some invited members of the
Army Science Board would make some introductory remarks. Then
General Russell and Colonel Huxsoll would make some remarks
providing an overview of the research program at Fort Detrick.
This would be followed by a tour of the facility. Following a
lunch break, the groups would reconvene for a scientific seminar
on infectious diseases. Woodward suggested that we ask the
Soviets to come prepared to make two 30-minute presentations on
designated topics. The session would conclude with a general
discussion of the entire day at Fort Detrick, allowing for
informal discussion and questions. The groups would then return
to Washington.

Lederberg emphasized that on the third day of the meeting it
would be appropriate to stress the importance of reciprocity to
lay the groundwork for a visit to an analogous Soviet facility.
He also suggested we invite Col. Huxsoll to be a guest observer
at our discussions on Monday and Wednesday.

Chanock suggested that Alex Shelokov might be a good person
to add to the American delegation. He is a virologist in charge
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of the Swiftwater Army vaccine facility, and is also a native
Russian language speaker. Lederberg agreed to consider this
recommendation.

Lederberg then turned to the substantive items to be
discussed with the Soviets, starting with the nature of the U.S.
BW defense research program. Lederberg observed that, reading
the previously distributed DoD Annual Report on Biological
Defense Research Program Obligations, he did get the impression
that we had entered into a BW arms race. He emphasized that the
research was legal under the Biological Weapons Convention, but
it nevertheless raised the question of how to cope with the
situation. He observed that the acceleration of the US program
had in part been provoked by Soviet obtuseness. Lederberg
reiterated that the problem was the maintenance of a program
that could be broken out of for offensive purposes, and raised
for discussion the question of what could be done about that.

He said the only idea he had was for greater openness about each
side's program, and even that was only a partial solution.

Vandiver reiterated the importance of confidence-building
measures regarding each side's program, which he noted was a
major theme of the first bilateral CISAC BW meeting.

Steinbruner agreed, noting that confidence between individuals
and between the Academies was part of the purpose of this ©
activity. He added that the assumption underlying these
discussions was that neither side as yet has a massive
militarily organized offensive capability.

Woodward said the relationship with the Soviets had to be
developed gradually and in stages. First, there would be
greater openness of discussion, then perhaps programs of
scientific cooperation, and finally, confidence building steps
such as stopping the practice of vaccinating US and Soviet
military troops against smallpox.

Chanock agreed that the fact that the US and Soviet armies
are still vaccinating against smallpox shows a lack of
confidence. He said the only existing stocks of smallpox are in
the USSR and the CDC in the U.S. However, he said that agreeing
to eradicate all smallpox vaccination was not a good idea
because it was useful as a vehicle for enhancing the
effectiveness of other kinds of vaccines. Lederberg said we
could use smallpox as an example of a problem of confidence that
has a technical aspect. Chanock noted that smallpox would not
be a useful BW agent. Lederberg said that was universally
agreed, although there was same question about its effect in
aerosol form. Steinbruner suggested that this kind of issue
would be useful to discuss with the Soviets, without necessarily
coming to a concensus. He said it would be useful to discuss
what is the utility and feasibility of stopping the vaccination
of armies.

Lederberg said it would be useful to have some prepared
discussion papers for the May meeting. He asked Chanock to
prepare something on the vaccination issue, and Chanock later
agreed to do so.
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Lederberg then raised another item for discussion, which was
the impact of the changing political climate in the Soviet
Union. He noted the Soviet acceptance of more intrusive
verification measures in the INF Treaty. Steinbruner predicted
that glasnost would affect the BW area too, and that there may
indeed be substantial opening of these facilities. Steinbruner
said it was his impression that the Soviets had done a lot of
research in this area but that they had not widely developed a
military capability. He observed that scientific collaboration
was an overriding Soviet objective, and he predicted that we
would be surprised by Soviet opening up in this area too.
Lederberg said he would try to impress upon Sagdeev the
importance of greater openness in this area as they have opened
up in other areas.

Lederberg said these groups could usefully provide a
technical basis for arriving at cooperative measures.
Steinbruner agreed we should focus on the most constructive
suggestions for first steps.

Chanock said he did not find the DoD report that threatening
because it was obvious that the US program was aimed at
producing vaccines against public health threats. Vandiver said
he thought the report could appear threatening from the Soviets'
perspective.

Meselson then spent some time discussing the visit of three
Soviet scientists whom he is hosting in April. Two are doctors
who were involved in treating and studying the victims of the
1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk. Meselson reviewed the
history of his acquaintance with these individuals and the
questions surrounding the Sverdlovsk incident. This was
followed by a lengthy discussion of arrangements for their visit
and of anthrax in general.

Chanock noted that one point to make was that the Soviets
should routinely publish data about this sort of event, and that
medical surveillance in the USSR is not very good. He said they
have nothing analogous to the CDC's weekly morbidity and
mortality report. He said it would be excellent to send Soviet
epidemiologists to the CDC for several months or a year to see
how it's done here.

Lederberg returned the discussion to the structure and
content of the May meeting. He asked Chanock if he would talk
about the issue of smallpox vaccination. Woodward suggested
there be a workshop on recombinant vaccines sometime in the
future.

Steinbruner said it would be useful to introduce the subject
at a detailed level so the Soviets could think about it and
respond at a future meeting. Lederberg suggested the topic be
enlarged to include the disclosure and exchange of samples for
major vaccine programs. Chanock noted that the USAMRIID openly
discusses vaccines under development. Lederberg said there were
two issues to raise: more open publication and stringent
reporting of vaccine development. Steinbruner agreed we should
raise the question of whether both sides should undertake more
stringent reporting.
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Chanock agreed to be the lead discussant on major efforts on
defensive vaccines at USAMRIID. Lederberg said the point was to
discuss the foundations for mutual disclosure of vaccines to be
produced in some quantity. Chanock agreed and said he could
supply the Soviets with a FDA list of all vaccines in use in the
US and could then ask for the same information from the
Soviets. Woodward said Dr. Jordan, whom he would invite to the
seminar at Fort Detrick, could have a packet of this information
prepared.

Lederberg concluded that a discussion of monitoring
vaccination programs could take about a 4 hour on the agenda.

He said a subset of that could be the question of why are both
sides' militaries vaccinating against smallpox? He said we
could raise the possibility of stopping comprehensive smallpox
vaccination, while allowing the use of the vaccine as a vehicle
for other vaccines and requiring both sides to disclose when
they are so doing. Lederberg stressed the importance of having
on the agenda detailed issues with technical content such as
this one.

Meselson cautioned against making it sound that it was very
important to stop smallpox vaccination. Lederberg observed that
the fact that it wasn't that important meant that the risks of
cheating were relatively small.

Lederberg said that on the final day, Wed. May 11, it would
be appropriate to discuss the structure of the next meeting in
the USSR.

Meselson listed other suggestions he had for bilateral
discussion: 1) vaccines; 2) medical surveillance and reporting
domestically and to international organizations; 3) epizootics,
because animals are important indicators of diseases such as
anthrax. Lederberg suggested for the second item the wording
"structural frameworks for national epidemiology," which he
agreed would be a good agenda item whereby each side could
explain its epidemiology/surveillance network.

Woodward said it would be important to stress the importance
of continuity of membership on each delegation. Lederberg noted
that Sagdeev was very conscious of this in the CISAC
interaction.

Meselson mentioned the importance of reciprocal visits to
sites. He also expressed his interest in getting younger
scientists thinking about these issues.

Returning to the agenda, Lederberg asked Vandiver if he
would be willing to make a 20 minute opening presentation on the
US BW defense program. Vandiver agreed. Lederberg reiterated
that the closing discussion Wednesday a.m. would be devoted to-
discussing reciprocity of visits and future activities.
Steinbruner suggested that reciprocity be broached in terms of
general openness, as opposed to demanding strict reciprocity.

Lederberg suggested we keep on the agenda the issue of the
danger of proliferation and use by third parties.

Meselson noted that the House of Representatives was
currently considering legislation to make illegal the creation
of biological weapon agents by private individuals. This
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apparently would fulfil an obligation of the Biological Weapons
Convention. He said the Soviets already had similar legislation
and that we could asked to see theirs.

Lederberg asked how to approach discussion of the
information exchanged on PIV facilities in conjunction with the
biological weapons convention experts conference. Meselson
suggested the staff write a short comparison/analysis of the US
and Soviet submissions. Rusten agreed to try to enlist the help
of someone at the Institute of Medicine to prepare the paper.

Lederberg noted the suggestion of Robert Mikulak in the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency that the Koltsovo facility in
Novosibirsk or the facility no. 19 in Sverdlovsk would be the
sites most analogous to Fort Detrick for a reciprocal visit.

Vandiver offered to host some of the Soviets at Texas A&M
following the meeting. He agreed to inform Rusten what kind of
scientific program he could arrange so she can convey the
invitation to the Soviets.

Returning to the subject of evening entertainment, it was
agreed that there would be a dinner/reception at the NAS Monday
night, and a cultural activity (jazz concert) Tuesday night.
Rusten collected everyone's suggestions for outside individuals
to invite to the dinner Monday night - additional names should
be conveyed to Rusten.

The meeting adjourned at 3:00 p.m.

Lynn Rusten