September 8, 1987

MEMORANDUM
TO: J. Lederberg, P. Doty
FROM: J. Steinbruner

SUBJECT: CISAC Pursuit of BW Issues

In hopes of encouraging thoughts on the subject to crystallize, let me
try to summarize various conversations we have had since last October about
how CISAC might usefully continue the discussions initiated on biological
weapons issues.

In promoting the initial meeting we had both substantive and procedural
objectives. We wanted to encourage a detailed discussion of the
Sverdlovsk incident and to convey the significance that a credible
explanation would have for the arms control process within the United
States. We also wanted to initiate a process that would involve major
Soviet biologists in a continuing discussion of the general security
implications of biotechnology--a discussion that ideally would deepen over
time to the point that it might offer some assurance against the undetected
presence of a major biological weapons program.

The latter procedural objective has seemed to be particularly
important. Since it is neither desirable nor feasible to restrict the
fundamental science or the medical technology that make weapons
applications technically possible, sustained dialogue with leading members
of the scientific community that would have to be consulted in organizing
any major military effort appears to be an important means of seeking both
constructive influence and early detection of trouble. It is difficult,
however, to be entirely explicit about this purpose and the dialogue
certainly could not be sustained on tuat basis alone. There must: be a
viable and engaging substantive agenda, even if it is not the limat ot
interest.

Our substantive discussions of the Sverdlovsk incident and of possible
topics for scientific cooperation produced a successful meeting in October,
but these do not appear to be subjects that can be repeatedly discussed
with useful effect. Hence we have been struggling to formulate an agenda
that could be sustained, or at least would carry the dialogue for another
round. I think it is fair to say that we have not yet had any compelling
substantive ideas, but we do have reason to be encouraged by the initial
procedural results. In October the Soviets brought forth new participants
‘with relevant scientific backgrounds and briefed them on current policy and
the state of negotiations to an extent that suggests a serious intention to
continue the process and to deepen their involvement.
So far we have identified five topics that might be used to organize a
second special meeting or an extended discussion within the context of a
normal CISAC meeting:

1) The Problem of distinguishing between offensive and defensive
military programs.

Since the Biological Weapons convention allows defensive research, the
distinction assumes major practical significance. It is inherently very
difficult to make even in conceptual terms and even more difficult to
implement with mutural assurance.

2) Issues associated with on-site inspection.

With the principle of challenge inspections accepted in the chemical
weapons negotiations, its extension to biological laboratories and possible
production facilities seems natural. We might review the listing of
facilities, as agreed upon at the review conference last September, and
discuss the degree of information provided about activities at officially
listed facilities, as well as the handling of concerns about unlisted
facilities.

3) Discussion of Soviet allegations that AIDS is an intended or
unintended product of American BW efforts.

Candid objective discussion of this Soviet allegation might be useful
in its own right and would balance the discussion of Sverdlovsk. We would
not want to grant the issue more seriousness than it deserves but it might
serve to illustrate how suspicions can be generated and might be an
occasion for discussing the standards that should govern the public
articulation of concerns of this sort.

4) Review of the magnitude and character of current national BW
efforts.

News accounts have given a basis for describing the U.S. program in a
level of detail that we would like to have about the Soviet program.

5) Review of Vaccine Development.

Discussion can review technical reasons why the activity is not
threatening and can assess the exchange activity that has evolved after
last October’s meeting.

It is my understanding that the Soviets strongly believe that a second
special meeting should be in the United States. We can assume that they
would use that occasion to pursue their strong interest in scientific
exchanges and should be prepared for that. We also might consider the
possibility of visits to Fort Detrich and Dugway that might set up a
reciprocal U.S. visit to the facility at Sverdlovsk.

cc: W. Panofsky
L. Rusten