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Strengthening the Biological
Weapons Convention

Key Points for the
Fourth Review Conference

Editors

Graham S Pearson and Malcolm R Dando

Department of Peace Studies
University of Bradford
Bradford
UK

September 1996
FOREWORD

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 and its successive Review
Conferences have established an international norm prohibiting completely the development,
production, stockpiling and acquisition of biological or toxin weapons and embracing all
development in microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology. However, over the past
five years since the last Review Conference, there has been less confidence in the Convention
on account of several developments:

* The admission in April 1992 that the Former Soviet Union, although a codepositary
of the BTWC along with the UK and the US, had continued an offensive programme
for 20 years after signing the BTWC up to 1992.

* The disclosure in 1995 by Iraq to the United Nations Special Commission that it had
developed and deployed biological and toxin weapons including over 160 aerial bombs
and 25 Al Hussein missile warheads to four locations by the start of the Gulf Conflict in
1991.

* The report that the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan had been close to completing a
biological weapons capability underlines the importance of States Parties adopting
national legislation to criminalize biological weapons (BW) and thereby deter sub-State
actors from considering the acquisition and use of BW.

With the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 and the
imminent entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), there is a real need
and opportunity to strengthen the BTWC. Additional impetus comes from the world-wide
increased concern about infectious diseases, whether new or re-emerging, as biological warfare
is but the deliberate use of disease to cause harm to humans, animals or plants.

The progress made since the Third Review Conference towards a strengthened BTWC is
greatly welcomed. The Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to consider potential
verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint (VEREX) met twice in 1992 and
twice in 1993 and produced a final report in which 21 measures were identified, examined and
evaluated. This final report was considered by a Special Conference in 1994 which mandated
an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification
measures, so as to draft proposals to strengthen the Convention ina legally binding instrument.
The AHG has thus far held four substantive meeting, twice in 1995 and twice in 1996, and has
made progress. The Fourth Review Conference should give added momentum and impetus to
the work of the AHG by endorsing the core elements of the legally binding instrument and
setting the date for a Special Conference of States Parties to adopt the report of the AHG.

This briefing book is intended to provide quality information to States Parties about the key
issues relevant to each Article of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in a manner
which will aid and inform the preparation by States Parties for their participation in the Fourth
Review Conference to be held in Geneva on 25 November to 6 December 1996. The
Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford, the Quaker United Nations Office
in Geneva, and the individual authors are to be commended for the initiative they have taken in

preparing this comprehensive and informative briefing book.

Professor Joshua Lederberg

Nobel Laureate

Professor of Molecular Genetics and Informatics
The Rockefeller University

New York, USA