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85   A- Weapons Must Be Limited
     If Used in South Vietnam
     The Washington Post  Saturday, February 17, 1968

     "The enemies of science alternately abuse its exponents for being
deaf to moral considerations and for interfering in ethical problems
which do not concern them.  Both of these criticisms cannot be right."

     I was reminded of this quotation from J.B.S. Haldane by a 
telephone call I received a few days ago from Dr. Owen Chamberlain, a
professor of physics at the University of California at Berkeley and
a 1959 recipient of the Nobel Prize.  He referred to insistent rumors
that President Johnson was contemplating the use of tactical nuclear
weapons to save the situation at Khesanh.

     He was deeply alarmed at this prospect and, anticipating that I
might share that alarm, asked me to join in a group statement about
it to the President and to the press.

     I had to reply that the scientists' consensus on the danger of
progressive escalation resulting from any use of nuclear weapons had
been widely advertised for the last 22 years.  In particular, Dr.
Chamberlain's opinion in such a crisis was quite predictable and had
probably already been anticipated and discounted in the President's
analysis of public reaction.  Besides, does an academic physicist--
not to mention a geneticist such as myself--have any special wisdom
or politically relevant information on this subject?

     The answer is, "probably not."  For a few years after 1945, 
scientists did have a particular foresight as to the ultimate 
destructive potential of nuclear warfare, and worked hard and  
successfully to communicate this information to the public.  No one now 
doubts that existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons are capable of 
destroying human civilization.  That scientists knew this first is no
proof that any of us knows best how to keep it from happening.

     The President might argue that the U.S. had to be ready to use 
tactical nuclear arms in the gravest emergencies in order to sustain
the credibility that we would ever use them.  In turn, the stability
of the nuclear stalement rests on the visible likelihood of an 
irrational and vengeful response by either side to a sufficiently 
provocative attack.  But we must remain in a dilemma about advertising, 
even knowing, what our threshold of provocation will be.  Otherwise
we invite (and ourselves engage in) probing actions just beneath that
uncertain ceiling.

     Will tactical use lead to prompt escalation of nuclear war?

     The sheer unpredictability of the answer is the most alarming
element of the proposal.  The scientists' propaganda that escalation
is inevitable helps make it so.

     In order to prevent indefinite escalation, we must quickly 
mobilize the discussion needed to establish a consensus on carefully 
staged levels of reaction.  In desperation, let us suggest one such 
level now: defensive use of tactical nuclear weapons within the  
boundaries of South Vietnam and only with the support of its recognized
government.

     I have not yet heard my physicist friends speculate on what I 
foresee as the worst of the predictable consequences of tactical 
deployment: the breakup of our Atlantic and other regional defense   
organizations. 

     The military use of nuclear weapons of any size carries an 
emotional impact which may not be rational but is surely real.  If they
are used by the U.S. without consultation, how will any European
government justify to itself or its constituency the vital faith 
that the U.S. will not in future adopt an equally independent policy
on strategic weapons when its own survival is at stake?

     A scientist's comment on such matters should be evaluated on its
own merits (as should the President's).  His right and duty to comment
is no less than that of any other  citizen's.  His zeal to comment is
certainly sharpened by his sense of moral responsibility for the way
in which his technical contributions are put to human use.

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