A HAND-BOOK ....ON THE.... ANNEXATION OF HAWAII BY "" LORRIN A. THURS|TjQK nWvF; If; IMJ 1. Shall Hawaii Be Annexed? . . . . / . • . 1 2. Arguments in Favor of Annexation i . . ' . 3 3. A Brief Description of Hawaii, its People, Govern- ment, Laws, Commerce, Finances, Educational System and Resources . . . . . .20 4. Twenty Objections to Annexation and Replies thereto . . . . . . . . .27 5. A Digest of the Official Opinions of American Presidents, Secretaries of State, Ministers, and Military and Naval Officers concerning the Annexation or Control of Hawaii . . . -47 6. President Harrison’s Message to the Senate Ad- vocating Annexation . . . . . -49 7. President McKinley’s Message to the Senate Ad- vocating Annexation . . . . . -50 8. Report of Secretary Sherman to President McKinley Advocating Annexation . . . . . -59 9. A Digest of the Acts of Congress and of Hawaii concerning American Control or Annexation of Hawaii ......... 74 10. Text of the Hawaiian Annexation Treaties of 1854, 1893, and 1897; and of the Reciprocity and - Pearl Harbor Treaties of 1875 and 1887 . . -77 Map showing the portion of the Pacific within which Hawaii is the only Supply Station. Within the space surrounded by the heavy black line connecting the numbered stations, there is but one spot which can furnish wood, water, and coal to a passing vessel, and that spot is Hawaii. Gallapagos, near Callao, and Juan Fernandez, near Valparaiso, cannot be depended on, and are so near the American coast as to be practically a part of it. Midwav Island, a thousand miles west of Honolulu, belongs to the United States. An attempt was made in 1867 to establish a naval station there, which failed, and no supplies are now available there or on any of the small islands between there and Honolulu. MAR No. 1. CJ2 jMap showing the Relative Size of the Pacific and the Atlantic. GOvTap4^togs*>i and 2 are drawn to the same scale. MapJJtrl^shows, more particularly, that portion of the Pacific within which Hawaiiisjthe only Supply Station, such portion being within the numbered stations by th • heavy black line. Maprijlo. 2 snows the earth's surface from San Francisco to India. Superimposed thereon is a heavy black line enclosing a space of the same size and shape as fhe portion of the Pacific within which Hawaii is the only supply station, the relative position on such line occupied by Hong Kong being superimposed upon San Francisco. If the shores of the Atlantic were pushed back so as to make it as wide as the Pacific, the distance from New York to Gibralter would be as great as it now is from San Francisco to Persia. MAR No. 2. INDEX PAGE Alexander, Gen’l on strategic value of Hawaii 33, 70 Aleution Islands, distance from con- tinent 30 Alaska, annexation of—27; No popu- lar vote on annexation 37; Popu- lation of at time of annexation 30 American currency standard in Ha- waii 31 Competition with Japanese 7 Interests endangered by Hawaiian independence 18 Interests in Hawaii, 5, 8, 31, 33, 44. 65, 69 Ministers, opinions on Hawaii 61 to 70 Shipping, (see Shipping) Annexation of Hawaii, (see Protectorate) Advocated by President Pierce 47; Johnson, 48; Grant. 48; Arthur. 48; Harrison, 49; McKinley, 50; Sec- retary Marcy 54; Seward, 56; Fish, 56; Blaine. 57-8; Foster, 58; Sher- man, 59; U. S. Minister Sever- ance. 62; Gregg, 63; McCook, 64; Pierce, 65: Stevens, 68; Mahan, 71-2; Schofield, 72; Belknap, 73; Turpie and Butler, 75. American and Hawaiian laws relat- ing to 37, 38 Asiatics acquire no new rights un- der 32 Constitutionality of 27 to 30 Decisions of Supreme Court on con- stitutionality of 28 Effect on commerce 14 Shipping 14 to 17 Hawaiian population 14, 38, 58 Grant’s confidential message con- cerning 48 Hawaiian constitution provides for 37, 76 Incidental only to U. S. Hawaiian policy 35 Objections to, and replies thereto 27 to 46 Of Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Cali- fornia. Alaska, Guano Islands and Midway Island 27 Population of territories when an- nexed 30 Question of long standing, 1, 2, 51, 67, 75 Reasons in favor of 1 to 19 Reciprocity intended to promote 2,48, 56, 68 Resolutions by Hawaiian legislature in 1851-76, in 1896 77 Sugar Trust, not beneficial to 41 Treatv of 1851, 62, 63, 67, 76; of 1854 54, 55, 77; of 1893, 80: of 1897 82 Will not be precedent for other an- nexations 35 Will not necessitate fortifications or navy 35 Will prevent international friction 17, 18 Annexation treaties negotiated by U. S. 27 Area of Ha waii 35 PAGE' A ssets 42 Australian ballot system in 31 Asiatics (see Chinese and Japanese) Australasia, growing power and claims of 18 Beet sugar, annexation not injurious to 39 Belknap’s opinion of strategic value of Hawaii 33, 73 Bonded debt, amount of Hawaiian and where held 23, 24 Buchanan, President, opinion con- cerning Hawaii 47, 52 Blaine, Hawaii within scope of Mon- roe Doctrine 36 On annexation 57, 58 Cable, attempt of England to get an island for 6 California, annexation of 27 No popular vote 37 (see Pacific Coast) Census of Hawaii (see Hawaiians) 24 China, distance from California 4 Chinese immigration prohibited by Annexation Treaty 8, 61, 83 Number (see Census) Character of in Hawaii 32 Gain no rights by annexation 32 Citizens, Asiatics in Hawaii cannot be 7 Clayton, Secretary, opinion con- cerning Hawaii 53 Climate of Hawaii 21, 22 Coal, value of Hawaii as a base for war ships 34 Coffee, importance of as a Hawaiian product 22 Commerce, Hawaiian, statistics 9 to 16, 35, 66 Per capita 14 Under annexation 14 Importance to U. S. shipping 14 to 16 To U. S. interests 45, 46 Congress, Acts of. concerning annex- ation 27, 28 Resolution concerning Control of Hawaii 74, 75 Constitution of Hawaii provides for annexation 37, 60, 76 Constitutionality of annexation, con- struction by Executive 27 Congress 27 Supreme Court 28 Non-contiguous territory 29 Non-homogeneous people 30 Courts, number and character of Ha- waiian 25 Common Law (see Laws) Currency, U. S. standard in Hawaii 31 II PAGE ■Customs Revenue, amount of Ha- waiian 23 Customs Union, objections to 60, 69 Davis. Senator, report to Senate on Hawaii 75 Debt, schedule of Hawaiian and where held 23, 24 Less than public assests 42 Distance of Hawaii from principal ports (see Map on cover) 20 Dolph, Senator, report to Senate on Hawaii 75 Dole, President, description and char- acter of 25, 41 Education in Hawaii 22, 31 Emigration, rate of from Japan 6, 7 Treaty gives U. S. control of 8, 83 England (see Foreign Powers), at- tempt to get island for cable 6 Colonial influence in Pacific 18 Distance from California 4 Influence in Hawaii 64 Joint action with, refused by U. S. 50 Seizure of Hawaii 17, 61, 66 Treaty with France concerning Hawaii 66 Electorate, qualifications of Hawaiian 25 Everett, Edward, opinion concerning Hawaii 61 Expenses and revenue of Hawaii, statistics 23 Exports, Hawaiian 9, 16, 22 Per capita 14, 31 Fillmore, President, opinion con- cerning Hawaii 47 Financial status of Hawaii 23, 42 Fish, Secretary, opinion in favor of annexation 56 Florida, date of annexation 27 Population 30 No popular vote 37 Foreign Powers, opinions concerning occupation of Hawaii by—Tyler. 47; Fillmore, 47; Pierce, 47; Buch- anan, 47, 52; Johnson, 48; Harri- son, 49; McKinley, 50; Webster, 52-3; Legare, 52. Danger of to U. S., 4, 34, 47, 52 to 58, 64, 66, 68, 72. 73. Opposition to annexation 18, 40 Seizure of Hawaii during war 44, 66 Troops landed in Hawaii 17, 66 Fortifications, annexation does not necessitate 34, 35 Foster, opinion on annexation 58 Protectorate 59 Treaty negotiated by 80 France (see Foreign Powers), distance from California 4 Seizure of Hawaii by 17, 34, 53, 61, 62, 66 Frye, Senator, report to Senate on Hawaii 75 Gadsden Purchase, New Mexico and Arizona 27 PAGE Germany, refusal of joint action, by U. S. 50 Government, present Hawaiian 24-5 Future form left to Congress 33, 51, 60, 83 Grant, President, opinion favoring annexation 48,56 Gregg, negotiation of annexation in 1854, by 63 Guano Island legislation, authorizing annexation 27, 28 Harrison treaty 80 Messages 49 On a protectorate 39, 49 Hawaii, area islands 20, 35 A sovereign state 42, 59 American state 75 Climate 21 Danger to U. S. of foreign control (see Foreign Powers) Distance from (see Map on cover) Description of 20 to 26 Decrease of population, problems raised (see Population) Issue in, is Eastern vs. Western civ- ilization 8 Foreign control inevitable 5, 58, 65 Drifting Japanwards 7 Why called “Key of Pacific” 5 Necessity for action by U. S. 5 Official acts concerning annexation 76 Products 22 People (see Population) Physical character of 21 Strategical value of (see Strategic Value of Hawaii) Seizures of 17,44 Policy of U. S. concerning, (see U. S. Policy) Steamship lines stopping at 4 Within scope Monroe Doctrine, (see Monroe Doctrine) Hawaiian constitution (see Constitu- tion) Commerce (see Commerce) Debt (see Debt) Form and character of government 24, 25 Character of officials 41 Legislative ratification of annexa- tion 76, 77 Law (see Laws) Population (see Population) Tariff’, present and under annexa- tion 14 Treaties of annexation (see Annexa- tion treaties) Voters (see Voters) Hawaiians, decrease of, question rais- ed by 5, 57, 65 Effect of annexation on 38 Will not emigrate to U. S. 45 Holidays, IT. S. observed in Hawaii 31 Honolulu, population and description of 21 House of representatives, resolution by Hawaiian (see Resolutions) Immigration laws objected to by Japan 31 Imports. Hawaii 9, 11 to 13, 16 III PAGE Income and expenditures of Hawaii 23 International friction diminished by annexation 18, 19 Japan, distance from California (see Map) 4 Change of emigration policy 6 Hawaiian immigration laws object- ed to by 6, 7, 31 Increased strength and control in Hawaii 6, 7, 18 Opposition to annexation 40 Japanese, (see Census) Character of in Hawaii 32 Claims and aggressiveness in Ha- waii 7 Immigration and rate of 6 U. S. Treaty controls emigration to U. S. . 8 Annexation confers no new rights on 32 Not eligible to citizenship in Ha- waii 7 Johnson, Pres., favored annexation 48 Joint resolution, Texas and Hawaii (see Resolution) Jury, trial by in Hawaii 26 Kalakaua election riot 68 Labor (see Wages) Laws, character and foundation of Hawaiian 25, 31 Lands, (see Public Lands) Legare, Secy., advo°ated force to keep European powers out 52 Legislature, Hawaiian, how constitu- ted 25 Leprosy in Hawaii 42 Liliuokalani (see Monarchy) Louisiana, Annexation, 27; Population 30 No popular vote 37 Mahan on strategical value and an- nexation of Hawaii 20. 33, 36, 71, 72 Marcy, instructions negotiate annexa- tion 54 Disapproval of a protectorate 55 Annexation Treaty negotiated under 77 Messages, Presidential, concerning Hawaii, Tyler, 47; Johnson, 48; Grant, 48; Harrison, 49; Mc- Kinley, 50. Military value (see Strategic Value of Hawaii) Military and naval officers on strate- gical value of Hawaii, McCook, 64; Schofield, 70, 72; Alexander, 70; Brown, 71; Wiltse, 71; Mahan, 71; Belknap, 73. Ministers (see American Ministers) Midway Island, Annexation and loca- tion of 27, 28, 30 Monroe Doctrine, applies to Hawaii 36, 73, 75 Morgan, Senator, on landing troops 43 On U. S. Hawaiian policy 74, 75 Monroe Doctrine 36 Monarchy, date and cause of abroga- tion 24 PAGE Not overthrown by U. S. troops 42 Overthrow predicted in 1873 67 Overthrow is final 8 Harrison on restoration 49 Why supporters oppose annexation 37 McBryde, Minister, on English in- fluence in Hawaii 64 McCook, on strategic value and an- nexation 64 McKinley, Pres., annexation message 50 Treaty 82 National debt, Hawaiian (see Debt) Native Hawaiian (see Hawaiians) Naval ofiicers, opinions of [see Mili- tary, etc.] Naval stations in Pacific, necessity of 66, 70, 71 At Midway Island 27 Navy, annexation does not require increase of 34, 35 Foreign must possess Hawaii to at- tack Pacific coast 34, 72 New Mexico and Arizona, annexa- tion of 27 Nicaragua canal, value of Hawaii in connection with 5 Objections to annexation and replies thereto 27 to 46 Pacific coast, importance of Hawaiian commerce to 9 to 14 [see Strategic Value of Hawaii] Pacific ocean, size compared with Atlantic 3, 4, 33, 44 Steam ships stopping at Hawaii 4 Peace, international, annexation will promote 17 Pearl Harbor, report of Schofield on military value of 70 Treaty concerning 74. 76, 80 Pierce, Pres., favored annexation 47, 54, 55 Treaty of 1854 77 Minister favored annexation 65 Policy, U. S. Hawaiian [see U. S. Policy] Popular vote, no precedent for in case of annexation 37, 38 Population, Hawaiian— Blaine’s opinion effect of annexa- tion on 57, 58 Capacity of Hawaii to support 14 Census of 24 Character of 31, 32, 33 Constitutionality of annexation of non-homogeneous 30 Effect of on U. S. under annexa- tion 31, 33, 44, 57, 58 Past and future of 33, 58, 65 Questions raised by decrease of na- tive 5, 57, 58, 65 Territories at time of their annexa- tion 30 Post Office revenues, Postal Savings Bank deposits 23 Portuguese, number 24, 32 Character 32 Porter, Admiral, opinion on strategic value of Hawaii 33 Precedent, Hawaiian not a, for future annexations 35 Former annexations, legal require- ments 37, 38 IV PAGE None for popular vote on annexa- tion 37 Presidents of U. S„ opinions of, con- cerning Hawaii 47 Provisional Government, why es- tablished 24 ('haracter of 41 Products of Hawaii 22 Protectorate, why impracticable 8, 39 < Ipiuions of Pres. Pierce on, 55: Har- rison, 49; Sec.Foster, 59; Marcy, 55; Sherman. 60; Minister Stevens, 68. Public debt [see Debt] Lands—area, value, character, laws 24 Schools [see Schools] Railroads, whence imported 31 Rainfall 22 Reciprocity, effect of 5, 9 Why no longer sufficient 5, 6 Intended to lead to annexation, statements of Johnson, Grant, Seward, Pierce 48, 56, 68 Political provisions of 74, 76 Text of Treaty 79 Resolutions, Hs. Representatives and Senate in re Hawaii 34, 35, 74 Hawaiian Legislature in re annexa- tion 77 Joint, annexing Texas 37 Revenue and Expenditures of Hawaii 23 Royalists, why opposed to annexation 37 Russia development in Pacific 17, 18 Distance from California 4 Seizure of Hawaii 17 San Domingo, annexation treaty 27 San Francisco (see Pacific Coast) Schofield, Gen’l. Strategic value, an- nexation of Hawaii 33, 70, 72 Schools (see Education) Secretaries of State, opinions concern- ing Hawaii, Webster 52-3; Legare 52; Buchanan 52; Clayton 53; Mar- cy 54; Seward 56; Fish 56; Blaine 57; Foster 58; Sherman 59. Senate Resolutions [see Resolutions] Report Com. Forg'n Affairs on Ha- waii 74 Seward, Instructions to negotiate in re. annexation 56 Sherman, Secy, annexation treaty ne- gotiated by 82 Opinion, annexation only satisfac- tory solution 60 Opposing protectorate 60 Report to Senate on Hawaii 75 Shipping, American, annexation will increase 16, 17 Number entering Hawaiian ports 1, 9 Number entering U. S. from ports of the world and from Hawaii 15 Hawaiian commerce carried by 16 Steam, stopping at Hawaii 4 Soil, character of Hawaiian 21 •Spain, Nearest territory to U. S. in Pacific 4 Statehood, not asked or granted 33 Not practical question 45 Steamships [see Shipping] Stevens, Minister, Opposed protect'ate 68 Statem’tin re-overthrow monarchy 43 Senate report concerning 74 Strategic value of Hawaii, reasons for 3, 33 to 36, 43, 44, 45 PAGE Opinion of McCook, 64: Mahan, 20, 71 Schofield, 72; Belknap, 73. [See Presidents. Opinions of] [Secretaries of State, Opinions of] Seizures of Hawaii [see Hawaii, Seiz- ures of] Sugar, annexation not injurious to beet 3!) Area cultivated aud amount ex- ported 22, 30 Consumption of Pacific Coast and of U. S. 39, 40 Obstacles to cultivation of 39, 40 Sugar Trust, annexation not benefi- cial to 41 Supreme Court, Hawaii, how consti- tuted 25 U. S. Decisions supporting annexa- tion 28,'29 Taxes. Hawaiian, amount and method of levy 23 Territory of Hawaii, location and area of 20 Treaty provides Hawaii shall be 33,82 Texas, annexation of 27 No popular vote 37 Population of 30 Procedure in annexation of 37 Treaty [see Annexation and Recipro- city] Treaties, Hawaiian, abrogated by an- nexation Treaty 61, 83 Troops, foreign in Hawaii 17, 66 Monarchy not overthrown by Ameri- can 42, 43 Turpie, report to Senate on Hawaii 75 Turrill, Consul, protest against French seizure of Hawaii 62 Tyler, Pres, opinion concerning Ha- waii 34, 47 Unalaska, distance from Tahiti 4 [See Map] Unconstitutionality of annexation [See Constitutionality] United States Hawaiian Policy, what it is and reasons for 1, 5. 34, 35. 36, 45, 47, to 61, 63 to 75. Annexation only incidental to 35 How best enforced 35 Why past means of enforcement no longer effectual 5 Vancouver, not a base of operations against U. S. 34 Voter, qualifications of Hawaiian 25, 37, 38 Vote, popular, annexation valid with- out 37 Wages paid in Hawaii 40 War, probability of by U. S. 44 Gen’l Schofield's opiuion naval sta- tion should be secured in Hawaii before 71 Belknap’s opinion should annex at hazard of 73 Webster advised hazard with France 34 [See Strategic Value of Hawaii] Webster, advised exclude France from Hawaii by force 34, 54 Opinions in re. Hawaii 52 to 54 Willis, Minister, on character Prov. Govt, officials 41 Wiltse, Capt., on landing troops 43 On Annexation 71 Shall Hawaii be Annexed ? For two generations the relations existing between the United States and Hawaii have been unique. The usual attitude of one friendly nation towards another is that of keen business rivalry and enlightened selfishness. The attitude of the United States toward Hawaii has been more that of an indulgent and protecting elder brother toward a little sister, than the usual formal courtesies and treatment accorded the other nations of the world. Hawaii, on the other hand, early recognized this spirit, and has reciprocated with an unwavering confidence and faith in her great neighbor, such as has never been exhibited by one independ- ent nation toward another. There is no mystery about the reasons for these mutual relations. Hawaiian Christianization, civilization, commerce, education and development, are the direct product of American effort. Hawaii is, in every element and quality which enters into the composition of a modern civilized community, a child of America. Hawaii is the one “American Colony” beyond the borders of the Union. Honolulu is the one port of the world where the stars and stripes float over more ships than all other flags combined. Out of all this has grown a sentimental feeling toward Hawaii which does not measure its regard in dollars or material advantage. Entwined and interwoven with this sentiment, 'which brings the cause of Hawaii so close to the heart of America, are material advantages, incidental to the possession and control of Hawaii, which have appealed still more strongly to the heads and sound business and political judgment of the statesmen who have con- troled the destinies of America for fifty years. The recognition of the strategic value of Hawaii’s geograph- ical position, and the determination that under no circumstances should it pass under the control of any other foreign people, con- stitute one of the most conspicuous examples of consistent and persistent foreign policy in the international history of the United States. That policy has always been directed toward the exclusion of other powers and the drawing closer of the bonds which bind Hawaii to the United States, with ultimate incorporation into the Union as the destined end. With this end in view special commercial privileges have been granted to Hawaii in exchange for exclusive material and politi- cal privileges secured to the United States. American influence, power, ownership and control have been fostered and increased. Many times annexation has seemed at hand. The present is the fourth treaty which has been negotiated by the government of Hawaii, transferring the sovereignty of that country to this. The natural progress of events, under the fostering influences of this far-seeing policy has brought this country to the point where it must now decide whether or not the fruits of fifty years of statesmanship are to accrue to its honor and glory and pro- gress, or whether they are to be spurned and rejected. For nearly five years Hawaii has stood at the door of the Union, asking to come in. Delay has not lessened her confidence in the American people, and she still awaits their decision to know whether she can cross the threshold; or whether the door is to shut in her face. She offers all that she is, has and hopes to be. She asks no guarantees in return, but volunteers to share in the de- fence of the flag which she already honors co-equally with her own, and to bear her proportion of the obligations and burdens incident to the conduct of the general government. The diplomatic, naval and congressional records of the United States contain thousands of pages concerning Hawaii. Scores of magazine articles and tens of thousands of columns of newspaper matter have been devoted to the subject. But the material is scat- tered and not easily available. This pamphlet is designed to digest and concentrate for the information of the busy man, the principal arguments for and against annexation; the replies to objections thereto; and to furnish a brief description of the people, laws, finances, educational system, resources and civilization of the country proposed to be annexed, and such documentary evidence as is necessary to the full under- standing of the issues involved. Lorrin A. Thurston. 2 3 Reasons in Favor of the Annexation of Hawaii. FIRST REASON IN FAVOR OF THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. It will prevent the establishment of an alien and possibly hos- tile stronghold in a position commanding the Pacific Coast, and the commerce of the North Pacific, and definitely and finally secure to the United States the strategical control of the North Pacific, there- by protecting its Pacific Coast and commerce from attack. The question is frequently asked, how the possession of Hawaii, 2000 miles distant from the continent, will secure control of the North Pacific; and why Hawaii is any more necessary to the Pacific Coast than are the Azores, which are about the same dis- tance off the Atlantic Coast, necessary to the protection of the United States on the Atlantic side? The reasons why Hawaii is essential to the protection of the Pacific Coast, and why the Azores are not necessary to the protec- tion of the Atlantic, are as follows : In the first place, the distance across the Atlantic is approxi- mately 3000 miles. The distance across the Pacific is from 7000 to 9500 miles. Second : All of the Great Powers of Europe lie, or have coal- ing stations, within steaming distance of the Atlantic Coast of the United States. On the other hand no nation, European or Asiatic, lies, or possesses a coaling station, near enough to the Pa- cific Coast to be practically available, as a base of hostile naval operation against that Coast or its commerce. British Columbia is not a material factor in this connection; for, in case of hostilities between England and the United States, all Canadian territory would be so speedily overwhelmed by in- vasion from the United States that its ports would not cut any material figure as hostile bases of operation for any considerable length of time. Third : On the Atlantic there are scores of islands which can be used as bases of naval supply and repair. There are not only the Azores, Madeira, Canary, Cape Verde, Bermuda, New- foundland, and the Bahamas, but the vast number of West India Islands. On the other hand; in the whole Pacific Ocean from the Equator on the South, to Alaska on the North; from the Coast of China and Japan on the West, to the American Continent on the the Blast, there is but one spot where a ton of coal, a pound of bread, or a gallon of water can be obtained by a passing vessel, and that spot is Hawaii. The immensity of this area of the earth’s surface is compre- hended by but few. 4 The distance from Hong Kong, through Hawaii to Panama, is 9580 miles. This distance is as far as from San Francisco east- ward across the continent, across the Atlantic, across the Mediter- ranean, and across Turkey to the boundary of Persia. The first supply station north of Hawaii is at Unalaska in the Alention Islands, and the first similar station on the south is Tahiti, a French Colony. The distance between Unalaska and Tahiti is 4400 miles; as far as from the southern point of Greenland to the mouth of the Amazon river. The Atlantic is, comparatively, so narrow, that way stations are not absolutely essential; while the islands in the Atlantic north of the Equator, capable of use as way stations are so numerous that it is practically impossible for the United States to absorb them all. On the other hand, the width and size of the North Pacific is so great that no naval vessel in existence can carry coal enough to cross the Pacific from any of the existing or possible foreign naval stations, to the Pacific coast of the United States, operate there and return, without recoaliug. A modern battleship without coal is like a caged lion—magnificent but harmless. One of the first principles in naval warfare is, that an operat- ing fleet must have a base of supply and repair. Any country in possession of Hawaii would possess a base of operations within four or five days steaming distance of any part of the Pacific Coast. Without the possession of Hawaii, all of the principal coun- tries possessing interest in the Pacific, are so far away that the dis- tance is practically prohibitory of hostile operations against the Pacific Coast. For instance, the nearest English station is forty- six hundred miles distant from San Francisco. The nearest French station is thirty-six hundred miles distant. The nearest Spanish station is forty-seven hundred miles distant. Russia is forty-seven hundred miles away; Japan forty-five hundred miles, and China fifty-five hundred miles. The United States, in possession and control of Hawaii, will thereby, by simply keeping other nations out, afford almost abso- lute protection to her Pacific Coast and commerce from hostile naval attack. On the other hand, Hawaii, in possession of any foreign country, will be a standing menace against, not only the Pacific Coast, but against all of the Ocean-bound commerce to and from that Coast, and all American commerce on or across the North Pacific. The Importance of the relation of Hawaii to the commerce of the Pacific is demonstrated by the fact that of the seven trans- pacific steamship lines plying between the North American Conti- nent and Japan, China and Australia, all but one make Honolulu a way station. 5 It is for the reasons above set forth that Hawaii has for the last fifty years been currently known to Statesmen and Naval Authorities as “The Key of the North Pacific,” and that American Statesmen, regardless of party, have consistently and persistently maintained the policy that the United States could not allow any foreign government or people to colonize or control Hawaii. (See appendix of opinions of American Statesmen concerning Hawaii.) Upon the opening of the Nicaragua or Panama Canal, prac- tically all of the shipping bound for Asia, making use thereof, will stop at Honolulu for coal and supplies. SECOND REASON IN FAVOR OF ANNEXATION. The conditions are such that the United States must act NO IP to preserve the results of its past policy, and to prevent the domi- nancy in Hawaii of a foreign people. For over fifty years, beginning with President Pierce in 1842, Presidents, Secretaries of State, American Ministers to Hawaii, and successive Congresses have had to deal with Hawaii, and have continuously enunciated the principle that no other for- eign nation can be allowed to possess, control, or dominate Hawaii. Up to a recent time the simple announcement by the United States of its policy has been sufficient to make it effective, at least for the time being. Later a combined commercial and political treaty, known as the “ Reciprocity Treaty,” was negotiated, de- signed to secure the exclusion of other nations. For a time this treaty accomplished the desired result. The time has come, however, when neither the simple declaration nor the treaty is sufficient to effectuate the time honored policy of the United States nor retain the advantages already secured. Through causes unnecessary to discuss, the native race has decreased until there are now only thirty odd thousand of them remaining, constituting less than a third of the population of the country, and the decrease is continuing. The day when the abor- iginal Hawaiian alone should own and control Hawaii has gone and gone forever. It is no longer a question of whether Hawaii shall be controlled by the native Hawaiian, or by some foreign heople; but the question is, “ What foreign people shall control Hawaii." Through the medium of the reciprocity treaty, American dominancy in Hawaii has been maintained, and American interests have increased to such an extent that Americans now own, ap- proximately, three-fourths of all the property in the country; con- sume 98 per cent, of their exports; furnish 75 per cent, of their imports and carry 75 per cent, of their foreign trade in American bottoms. By this treaty x\merican goods are admitted free while other nations pay a duty, and Hawaii is prohibited from granting the same privilege to any other government. The United States are granted the exclusive use of Pearl Harbor, the best in the 6 Pacific, as a naval station, and Hawaii is prohibited from granting any lien, lease or special privilege in any of her ports or territory to any other government. It is said by some, Why is not this enough ? Why not let well enough alone ? There are two answers : First: This treaty is terminable by either party upon a year’s notice. The uncertainties of politics may at any time bring into power in Hawaii a party inimical to American interests, who can at once terminate all special privileges and powers now held in Hawaii by the United States, and transfer them to one or more rival nations. Such action would be entirely legal; and that other nations stand ready to avail themselves of the opportunity is evidenced by the fact that three years ago the English and Cana- dian Governments sent special agents to Honolulu to obtain the cession or lease of one of the Hawaiian Islands as a cable station. The proposition is still being urged, and all that has stood in the way of its consummation has been the Reciprocity Treaty and the unflinching determination of the little Republic to keep its terri- tory intact, its government free from other foreign alliances and its face turned Americawards until the annexation question was definitely settled. Second : Whether the Reciprocity Treaty is continued or not, conditions have developed within the past few years which will as certainly evict American interests and control from Hawaii as though it were accomplished by abrogation of the Treaty or by hostile guns. The awakening of Japan has introduced a new element into the politics of the world, and more especially of the Pacific. Until Vithin a few years, emigration from Japan was prohibited. Japan has now reversed this policy, and emigration, particularly to Hawaii, is encouraged. So rapidly have the Japanese come to Hawaii that in 1896 they numbered twenty-five thousand; the adult Japanese males outnumbering those of any other nationality. During the latter part of 1896 and the early part of 1897 they came in at the rate of 2000 a month. If this rate of immigration had continued for a year, they would have numbered one-half of the population of the entire country, and before the end of five years would have outnumbered all of the other inhabitants put together, two to one. The rate at which they were entering Hawaii, is, as compared with the population of the United States, as though a million Japanese a month were entering San Fran- cisco. It has been well said that “ this was not immigration but invasion.” Hawaii has attempted to stay this invasion by adopting legis- lation against contract laborers and paupers, identical with that of the United States, and has thereby become involved in its present controversy with Japan, the latter country refusing to recognize 7 the validity of such legislation and practically claiming the abso- lute right of emigration, by her people, to Hawaii. Even though the Hawaiian legislation referred to is sustained, still immigrants who do not come within the terms of the restrictive legislation are free to enter Hawaii, to such an extent as will soon give Japan an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the countrv. Under the existing constitution of Hawaii, the Japanese are not citizens and are ineligible to citizenship ; but it goes without saying, that an energetic, ambitious, warlike, and progressive people like the Japanese can not indefinitely be prevented from participating in the government of a country in which they be- come dominant in numbers, and the ownership of property. Already the Japanese in Hawaii are restless under the restric- tions imposed upon them, and it needs no gift of prophecy to demonstrate that, with their growing wealth, commerce and num- bers, it will be impossible for any local independent government in Hawaii to much longer withhold from them the full privileges which they demand. Even though political privileges may for some time be with- held from them, their commercial men are active and progressive, and are rapidly establishing themselves in Hawaii. Long experience has shown that in Hawaii, as elsewhere, blood is thicker than water. The American merchant buys all that he can in the United States, and what he cannot get there he buys elsewhere. The Japanese merchant naturally buys all that he can in Japan and gets elsewhere what can not be advantageously obtained from his own country. Much of the advantage heretofore obtained by the United States in Hawaii has been by reason of the strong Ameri- can commercial representation in the Islands. The new Japanese commercial element is in a position to compete and does destruc- tively compete with the American merchants in Hawaii, in an ever accelerating degree. Regardless of the declarations or political intentions cf the Japanese government, as a government, Hawaii has, against the will and efforts of its government and people, drifted Japan-wards during the past two years; and unless radical action is taken to stay the process there can be but one logical result, viz : the ulti- mate supremacy of the Japanese, and thereby of Japan, in Hawaii. This has progressed and will be accomplished in the teeth of the American policy of exclusion of foreign control in Hawaii, and with no tangible overt act on the part of the Japanese government. It may be claimed that Europeans and Americans can hold their own in competition with the Japanese. The reply to this is, that experience has demonstrated that there can be no competition between Europeans and Americans on the one side and Japanese or Chinese on the other. The only possible result is the absolute 8 substitution of the Asiatic in the place of the white man, by reason of the fact that the Eastern standard of civilization and living is so much lower than the Western, that the Asiatic can exist and prosper on a margin of profit which means starvation and destitution to a man who attempts to feed, clothe and educate a family in accordance with the American standard. The issue in Hawaii is not between monarchy and the Repub- lic. That issue has been settled. There are some persons who do not recognize this fact. There are never lacking those who set their faces backward ; who mourn every lost cause and vainly hope for the restoration of abused and forfeited power. The issue in Hawaii today, is the preliminary skirmish in the great coming struggle between the civilization and the awakening forces of the East and the civilization of the West. The issue is whether, in that inevitable struggle, Asia or America shall have the vantage ground of the control of the naval “ Key of the Pacific,” the commercial “ Cross-roads of the Pacific.” All that has held, and that is now holding, Hawaii for the United States, is the indomitable will and pluck of the men in Hawaii, of not only American, but of Hawaiian and European blood, who against heavy odds, are doing and will contiue to do all that is within the bounds of possibility to prevent Hawaii from retrograding into an Asiatic outpost, and to hold the country to that destiny which American statesmen have for fifty years, regard- less of party, outlined for it. But there is a limit to their strength, and if help from the great Republic is to come in time it must come soon. While the tendency of events in Hawaii is against American interests they have not progressed so far that they can not be arrested, if the United States will take radical action for its own protection. Annexation will accomplish such a result and nothing else will. A protectorate is suggested by some. The reasons why a protectorate will not meet the requirements of the case are given in full elsewhere herein. It is sufficient to say here that the alternative of “ annexation or protectorate ” has success- ively been presented to Presidents Pierce, Harrison, and McKinley, and Secretaries of State Marcy, Foster, and Sherman, in 1854, 1893 and 1897, and has each time been decided in favor of annex- ation ; for the reason that a Protectorate imposes upon the United States responsibility without power to control; while Annexation imposes practically no more responsibility but is accompanied with the full powers of ownership. Under annexetion the United States prohibition of Chinese immigration will apply to Hawaii, and the new treaty with Japan gives the United States full power to control the emigration of laborers. Annexation can be consummated now with little or no fric- tion. Events are moving rapidly in the Pacific and no one can predict what the developments and changes of even a year may bring forth. 9 THIRD REASON IN FAVOR OF THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. It will increase many fold and secure to the United States the commerce of the Islands. Only those who have been brought directly into contact with the commercial relations between Hawaii and the United States realize its volume or importance. Prior to the negotiation of the Hawaiian Reciprocity Treaty in 1876, the commerce of the Islands was inconsiderable, and was in a languishing condition. Population, exports, imports, and shipping—all were steadily decreasing as the following figures show: Table Showing Condition of the Hawaiian Trade for Six Years prior to Reciprocity Treaty. Year Imports Domestic Exports Customs Receipts Merchant Vessels Entered. Whaling Vessels Entered 1869.- 12,040,000 $1,743,000 $215,000 127 102 1870 _ 1,930,000 1,514,000 223,000 159 118 1871 _ 1,625,000 1,733,000 221,000 171 47 1872 1,746,000 1,402,000 218,000 146 47 1873 - 1,437,000 1,725,000 198,000 109 63 1874 1,210,827 1,622,000 183,000 120 43 From the day the Reciprocity treaty went into operation the island trade, in all its branches, increased rapidly, and today Hawaii is the best customer which the Pacific coast has,—the largest consumer of United States products of any single country bordering on the Pacific. The following table shows the change wrought since the treaty : Table showing Improved Condition of Hawaiian Trade for the last Five Years, the Result of the Reciprocity Treaty. Year Imports Domestic Exports Customs Receipts Merchant Vessels Entered 1892._ $4,684,000 $8,081,000 $494,000 262 1893 5,346,000 10,742,000 545,ooo 3i5 1894 _ . 5,713,000 9,591,000 524,000 350 1895 - 5,714,000 8,358,000 547,000 318 1896 7,164,000 I5,5I5,ooo 656,000 386 STATEMENT SHOWING IMPORTANCE OF HAWAIIAN TRADE TO PACI- FIC COAST. While the United States as a whole is benefited by Hawaiian trade, the Pacific coast finds it one of the most profitable in which it engages. 10 The figures for the full year 1896 showing the trade of the Pacific coast are not yet available. The following figures are from the published statement of San Francisco’s commerce for the year ending November 30, 1896. Table showing comparative importance of San Francisco exports to Hawaii, and to some other countries, for the year ending November 30, 1896. Australia ■ $3,932,000 Hawaii 3,588,000 All of Central America 3,440,000 China 2,989,000 Japan 2,270,000 Mexico 1,469,000 All Europe except Great Britain *. 1,446,000 All of Asia and Oceanica, except China and Japan 1,298,000 New Zealand, Samoa, Marquesas, Cook, Fiji, Friendly, Marshall, Caro- line and all other Polynesian islands combined 684,000 British Columbia 431,000 All of South America 294,000 STATEMENT SHOWING COMPARATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SAN FRAN- CISCO EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL ARTICLES TO HAWAII AND SOME OTHER COUNTRIES. WINE. Hawaii is San Francisco’s second best foreign wine customer. Central America is the only country which took more of San Fran- cisco’s wine than Hawaii, and the only thing that prevents Hawaii from standing first on th'e list is that all the Central American re- public’s are grouped and treated as one country in the statistics. Hawaii took wine to the amount of $78,000 Mexico took wine to the amount of 64,000 England took wine to the amount of 44,000 Japan took wine to the amount of 20,000 All of South America todk wine to the amount of 18,000 China took wine to the amount of 7,000 Siberia took wine to the amount of 1,400 All of the Pacific islands (except Hawaii) took wine to the amount of 12,000 New Zealand took wine to the amount of.; 565 Australia took wine to the amount of 7 SAI.MON. Hawaii is San Francisco’s third best purchaser of salmon, hav- ing purchased to the amount of $59,379- The only countries that bought more than Hawaii were Aus- tralia and England. Other countries took the following amounts : New Zealand $43-594 All of Europe 9>°&9 All of Asia and Africa, including Japan I5,9°7 Mexico, Central and South America 12,395 All of Oceanica and Polynesia I5,I34 In other words, Hawaii bought more salmon from San Fran- cisco in 1896 than all the rest of the countries of the world added together, leaving out England, Australia, and New Zealand. 11 BARLEY. Hawaii was the third largest consumer of barley exported by San Francisco, having taken barley to the amount of $139,000. The only countries which took more barley than Hawaii were England and Belgium. St. Vincent is credited with more, but that is only a port of call at which to receive orders as to where to deliver the grain. Australia took barley to the amount of only .. $52,000 Africa took barley to the amount of only 6,000 All of the Pacific islands (excluding Hawaii) took barley to the amount of only 2,907 All of Central America took 3.°°4 Japan took 280 Mexico took 56 China, South America, and British Colombia took none. FLOUR. In the consumption of flour Hawaii stood sixth, flour having been exported there to the amount of $164,000. England took flour to the amount of only $333.ooo Or barely twice the consumption of Hawaii. The export to Japan was 123,000 To all of South America -• - 96,000 To Mexico — 31.000 To all of Africa, Polynesia, Oceanica, and Asia (excepting Japan, China, and Siberia) the export of flour amounted to only — 114,569 The above statistics do not include the large shipments being made to Hawaii, direct from Washington and Oregon, by the three lines of steamers and many sailing vessels running from there to Honolulu. TABLE SHOWING VALUES OF PRINCIPAL ARTICLES IMPORTED BY HAWAII DURING 1896. Hawaiian imports amounted during 1896 to $7,164,561, of which $5,464,208, being 76 per cent, came from the United States. The infinite variety of the exports to Hawaii indicates the widespread participation which the residents of the United States have in the business. There is not an industry in the United States which is not benefited by Hawaiian trade, and which would not be injured by abrogation of the treaty, or diversion of Hawaii’s trade elsewhere. The following statement shows the value of some of the prin- cipal articles imported by Hawaii during 1896: Ale, beer, cider and porter $ 74>82o 65 Animals 5T>633 37 Building materials 120,638 78 Clothing, boots and hats 292,558 82 Coal and coke 135.846 85 Crockery, glassware, lamps and lamp fixtures 47>552 58 Drugs, surgical instruments, and dental material 68,192 06 Cottons 311,891 21 Linens 12,633 94 Silks 20,953 16 Woolens 69,368 27 Mixtures 10,932 59 Dry goods. 12 Fancy goods, millinery, etc 101,285 So Fertilizer, bone-meal, etc 332,238 71 Fish (dry and salt) 60,564 21 Flour 156,999 29 Fruits, fresh 14, J54 97 Furniture 9L637 73 Grain and feed 273,75271 Groceries and provisions 520,884 69 Guns and materials 16,046 42 Gunpowder, blasting, etc 7,526 68 Hardware, agricultural implements, and tools 278,267 03 Iron, steel, etc 38,94° 7° Jewelry, plate, clocks 25,341 89 Leather 4L549 28 Lumber 255,241 64 Machinery 343,104 69 Matches 15.58732 Musical instruments, etc 21,456 82 Naval stores 47,92 2 34 Oil—cocoanut, kerosene, whale, etc 107,418 94 Paints, paint oils, and turpentine 53.410 86 Perfumery and toilet articles I7.I49 48 Railroad material, rails, cars, etc 32,977 22 Sadlery, carriages, and material 95.°°7 74 Shooks, bags, and containers I99>°96 78 Spirits 65,947 20 Stationery and books 92,614 67 Tea 30,860 26 Tin, tinware, and materials 10,925 67 Tobacco, cigars, etc 194,835 82 Wines, light 161,360 54 Sundry personal and household effects 24,765 12 Sundry merchandise not included in above 227,897 01 TABLE SHOWING HOW MANY AND HOW MUCH OF CERTAIN ARTI- CLES WERE IMPORTED BY HAWAII DURING 1896. An enumeration of the numbers and amounts of articles im- ported will convey a better idea to some, of the importance of the Hawaiian trade to the farmers and manufacturers of the United States. The following items taken at random from the Hawaiian table of imports for 1896 indicate the wide range of their business. This list can be indefinitely extended, but it is sufficient to show that no narrow interest is subserved by the Hawaiian trade: 33 Bulls and cows. 246 Horses. 1,583 Hogs and pigs. 555 Mules. 2,223 Blinds. 110,872 Bricks. 5,016 Doors. 22,281 Barrels lime. Tons of coal. 140,000 Bottles and vials. 7,400 Lamps. 7,500 Lanterns. 52,000 Lbs. of acids. 11,000 Lbs. Epsom salts. 134,000 Pounds soda ash. 189,000 Prs. boots, shoes and slip- pers. 18,960 Cravats and ties. 27.600 Boys’ felt and wool hats. 6,300 Ladies’ hats. 38,000 Straw hats. 55.600 Undershirts. 194,600 Prs. socks and stockings. 350,000 Cartridges. 22.500 Pounds rope. 31,000 Pairs butts and hinges. 321,000 Pounds fence wire. 40.500 Files and rasps. 20,000 Galvanized buckets. 1,600 Kegs horseshoes. 271,000 Yards brown cotton. 488,000 Yards denim. 79,000 “ drilling. 94,000 “ dress goods. 90,000 “ duck. 48,000 “ flannelette. 179,000 “ gingham. 84,000 Cotton handkerchiefs. 24,000 Yards muslin. 1,657,000 “ cotton prints. 521,000 “ sheeting. 103,000 “ shirting. 49,000 Silk handkerchiefs. 12,000 Pairs woolen blankets. 20,000 Yards embroidery. 569,000 Needles. 20,000 Pieces of ribbon. 304,000 Pounds cod fish. 4,000 Barrels salt salmon. 644,000 Pounds and 550 barrels and cases of other kinds of salt fish. 11,500 Barrels and boxes of fresh apples, grapes, peaches, pears and other fruits. 11,000 Chairs. 39,000 Rolls wall paper. 575 Sets parlor and chamber furniture. 970 Tables. 18,635,000 Pounds of barley. 12,500,000 “ “ bran. 565,000 “ “ corn. 2,155,000 “ “ middlings. 65,000 Bales of hay. 3,548,000 Pounds of oats. 85,700 “ “ meal cake. 876,500 “ “ wheat. 23,000 •* dried apples and apricots. 63,000 “ bacon. 1,100,000 “ beans. 264,000 “ hard bread. 120,000 “ butter. 45,000 “ butterine. 51,000 “ candles. 107,000 “ cheese. 197,000 “ and 16,000 tins of cakes and crack- ers. 225,000 “ liams. 322,000 “ lard. 477,000 “ onions. 38,000 Tins canned oysters. 53,000 pounds split peas. 632,000 “ potatoes. 21,000 “ prunes. 145,000 Tins canned meats. 477,000 Pounds salt. 193,000 “ and 10,000 cases of soap. 637,000 “ refined sugar. 49,000 Gallons vinegar. 2,932,000 Gun caps. 6,709 Window sashes. 5r,ooo Feet rubber hose. 26.800 Hoes. 23.800 Butcher and pocket knives. 36,000 Pounds and 8,000 kegs and boxes nails. 343,000 Nuts and bolts. 4,300 Picks and mattocks. 400,000 Feet iron pipe. 2,000 Razors. 18,500 Pots and kettles. 330 Plows. 260 Refrigerators. 30,000 Pounds iron and copper rivets. 4,000 Saws. 15,000 Pairs scissors and shears. 4.500 Shovels and spades. 2,900 Stoves. 100,000 Feet wire cloth. 26,000 Paint and other brushes. 3.500 Clocks. 3,100 Watches. 19,197,000 Feet northwest pine lum- ber. 800,000 Laths. 64,000 Fence posts. 4,100,000 Feet red-wood lumber. 42.600 Railroad ties. 21,000 Feet belting. 1.500 Boiler tubes. 246,000 Pounds packing. 937 Sewing machines. 58 Type-writing machines. 600 Guitars. 79 Pianos and organs. 24,000 Yards canvas. 52,000 Pounds ship chains. 220,000 Pounds rope. 130,000 Pounds and 38,000 feet wire rope. 64,000 Cases kerosene. 110,000 Gallons lubricating oil. 620 Barrels tar. 31,000 Gallons linseed oil. 493,000 Pounds and 9,000 gallons paint and varnish. 363 Bicycles. 132 Carriages. 300 Sets Harness. 1.200 Horse combs. 1,560 Saddles. 4,000,000 Sugar bags. 1,500,000 Paper bags. 11,000 Printed books. 4.200 Blank books. 41.600 Packs playing cards. 2,321,000 Envelopes. 96,000 Lead pencils. 1,427,000 Cigars. 5,827,000 Cigarettes. 320,000 Pounds tobacco. 869 Cases and 136,000 gallons California wine. 28,800,000 Pounds fertilizer. 14 COMMERCE WIEL BE GREATLY INCREASED UNDER ANNEXATION. The astonishing commercial results shown above have result- ed from affording to Hawaii a free market for, practically, only three of her products, viz : sugar, rice and bananas. Under annexation, the country would have a free market for all its products, and, with the exception of the three products above named, the resources of the country are practically untouched. With a population of only 109 thousand, Hawaii in 1896, had a foreign trade of over $208 per capita for every man, woman and child in the country; a record almost unparallel in the history of the world. Less than a hundred years ago, Hawaii supported a population of four hundred thousand souls with the crude methods of culti- vation then known. Artificial irrigation in its most advanced methods, is now practiced in Hawaii, bringing thousands of acres into cultivation that have heretofore been waste. There is no reason why Hawaii cannot support a population of a million as easy as it does a hundred thousand. Islands of less area, and no greater resources than Hawaii, in both the East and West Indies are supporting populations of sev- eral millions each. It requires no mathematical ability to demonstrate that an in- crease of the population of Hawaii to even a million will place its commerce in the front rank of American export trade. Under existing conditions, the Hawaiian general tariff of 10 per cent has allowed about 25 per cent of Hawaiian imports to come from countries other than the United States, and if annexa- tion does not take place an increasing proportion of Hawaiian im- ports will come from other countries. If Hawaii becomes American territory, the American protec- tive tariff of approximately 50 per cent will give to Americans practically all of its present foreign trade, and an immensely larger trade which will spring into existence as the Islands develop un- der the stimulating influences of a stable government, fertile soil and a free market. FOURTH REASON IN FAVOR OF THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. It will greatly increase and secure to the United States the shipping business of the islands. To those who refer to the Hawaiian Islands, as “Dots in the Pacific” this may appear to be an absurd reason. It is absurd to those only who do not know the facts. Hawaii is today, the main stay of the American merchant marine engaged in deep-sea-foreign trade. TABLE SHOWING NUMBER OF AMERICAN VESSELS ENTERING AMERI- CAN PORTS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE AMERICAN CONTINENT, DURING THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1896. (Compiled From U. S. Treasury Records.) Countries cleared from. Number of Vessels Austria None ] Belgium .. . — 16 Denmark _ None France _ 2 Gibraltar. — 2 None J- All of Europe _ ..30 Ships. Italy 5 Netherlands — -- - None Portugal None Russia _ None Spain 5 Sweden and Norway . - None i China .... __ 14 30 All of Asia .. 98 Ships. Japan 29 East Indies. . . _ — 23 Russia 2 Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, 30 All of Australasia . 30 Ships. All other Pacific Islands (except Hawaii) 30 All of Africa. ... 22 United Kingdom . _ 88 Hawaiian Islands _ _. - 191 To summarize further, the number of American vessels entering American ports during the year ending June 30, 1896, were : From the United Kingdom *--- 88 From Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and Oceanica combined... 210 From Hawaii r9r Or, in other words, Hawaii furnished cargo for 191 American ships, and all the world besides, outside of the American continent, furnished cargo for only 298 American ships. Hawaii is the banner country for promoting American shipping and spreading the American flag to the breeze, and it is submitted that she should be allowed to carry on and extend the good work. The following tables also show the extent to which American shipping is dominating the Hawaiian foreign trade, and that Hawaii is the only foreign country in the wide world in which American ship- ping is not only holding its own, but increasing : 16 TABLE SHOWING NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF VESSELS ENTERING THE PORTS OF HAWAIIAN ISLANDS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR THE YEARS 1890 TO 1896, INCLUSIVE. Year American Entered. Hawaiian Entered. Other Nations Entered. Total Entered. < O to O 73 * 2- 73 h 0 3 (O 0) £8 • ru 5T H 0 3 to C n> '/3 0 73 * 0) 73 0 to ■ <; O 73 ’ fD m h 0 3 to 1890 1891 1892 227 224 204 221 250 219 247 150,676 173,891 154,007 178,120 182,I76 l82,'876 243,983 34 25 9 23 17 28 26 42,229 28,077 5,009 15,759 13,844 22,592 25,049 34 61 49 66 73 71 113 37,215 82,187 79,606 126,115 140,388 132,349 208,965 295 310 262 310 340 318 386 230,120 284,155 238,622 319,994 336,408 337,817 477,997 1893 1894 1895 . T896 Total 1,592 1,265,729 162 152,559 467 806,825 2,221 2,225,113 Total vessels entering, 2,221 ; tonnage 2,225,113. Total American and Hawaiian vessels entering, 1,754; tonnage, 1,418,288. Total all other nationalities, 469 ; tonnage, 806,825. Note—Nearly all the Hawaiian vessels engaged in foreign trade are owned by Americans. TABLE SHOWING THE VALUE OF IMPORTS TO AND EXPORTS FROM HAWAII FOR THE YEARS 1892 TO 1896, INCLUSIVE ; THE PER- CENTAGE OF TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND PERCENTAGE CARRIED IN AMERICAN VESSELS. Per cent, carried in vessels of other nations. CO N Q w to GO CN O' W e considered in reference to the policy or expediency of annexation, but it is submitted that both on principle and precedent there is all the constitutional power necessary to accomplish annexation in any case where annexation is deemed to the interest of this country. The fact that territory is contiguous or non-contiguous can have no bearing upon the constitutionality of its acquisition; but simply goes to affect the value of the territory proposed to be annexed On general principles, if it is contiguous, it is more easily governed and defended. But whether this is so or not depends upon circumstances. In these days distance is not a matter of miles, but of hours. When California was annexed, it was two months distant from the center of civilization in the United States. Honolulu today lies only ten and a half days from Washington. 30 As to the arguments presented in favor of the unconstitutionality of the annexation of non-contiguous territory, it is submitted that be- cause our forefathers of 1776 did not discuss or contemplate any given proposition, is no reason, constitutional or otherwise, why their chil- dren should not discuss and contemplate any and every problem which is presented to them in 1897, upon its merits, whether their ancestors ever heard of such subject or not. It is further submitted that the precedents in United States history are all against the unconstitutionality of the annexation of non-contig- uous territory. Alaska is separated from the United States by a vast foreign territory. Midway Island is approximately three thousand miles from the American coast. The Aleutian Islands, reaching almost to the Asiatic coast, extend twelve hundred miles west of Alaska, and the guano islands are scattered all over the Pacific and the Carribean Sea. THIRD OBJECTION. It is unconstitutional because its inhabitants are not homogeneous with the people of the United States. This is another of the alleged “implied prohibitions.’’ The same reasoning applied to the last objection applies to this one, to wit, that there is no constitutional feature involved, but it is simply a fact to be taken into consideration when the advisability of annexing any given territory is under consideration. Is it conceivable that, regardless of the advantages of annexing any given territory, the people of the United States are absolutely pro- hibited from annexing such territory, simply because its inhabitants may not be up to the full American standard ? Again, it is submitted that the precedents are all opposed to the view advanced in the objection under consideration. For example, when Louisiana was annexed, its population consisted of a few thous- and Frenchmen and several hundred thousand Indians, reaching from the Gulf of Mexico to the Oregon coast. To say nothing about the Indians, the Frenchmen were governed by the civil law of France, and to this day the foundation of the law of Louisiana is the civil law. and not the English common law. Florida had a population of a few Spaniards and Indians. Texas, prior to the great influx of Americans, had a population solely of Mexicans, Spaniards and Indians. At the time of its annexation, California had an American population consisting of only a few traders and a military post, the great bulk of the population consisting of Mexicans and Indians, with a sprinkling of Spanish priests. Alaska had a few hundred Russians and some thirty or forty thousand Arctic Indians. Were these homogeneous populations? Were they up to the American standard of citizenship ? If not, and if it is unconstitu- tional to annex territory unless the inhabitants of such territory are up to the American standard, then such annexations were void, for if this is a constitutional principle, it cannot be varied by circumstances. It is submitted that there is no principle, direct, or implied, in the Constitution of the United States, which makes the title of the United States to the territories enumerated, depend upon the quality of the people living therein at the date of annexation. FOURTH OBJECTION. Whether the annexation of a non-homogenous people is constitutional o> not, the population of Hawaii is unfit for incorporation into, and willbe dangerous to the American political system. Whether the Hawaiian population is unfit for incorporation into the American system, depends upon two things. First, the existing facts; and second, the outlook for the future. First, as to the existing conditions in Hawraii. The foundation of Hawaiian law is the common law of England. The general .statutes, court procedure and legal methods of Hawaii are as much like those of Illinois as those of Illinois are like those of Massachusetts. The laws of Hawaii are based upon—many of them copies of—those of the United States. The two statutes, for example, which Japan is now objecting to, as limiting Japanese immigration, are almost exact copies of the United States immigration laws restricting the immigration of contract laborers and undesirable persons. All legal documents are modeled on those in use in the United States. Most of the lawyers and judges are either from the United States or educated therein. The public school system is based upon that of the United States. There are one hundred and eighty-seven of them, taught by four hundred and twenty-six teachers, and containing 12,600 pupils, all taught in the English language. More than one-lialf the teachers are Americans. English is the official language of the schools and courts, and the com- mon language of business. The railroads, cars, engines, waterworks, waterpipes, dynamos, telephones, fire apparatus, are all of American make. United States currency is the currency of the country. All Government and private bonds, notes and mortgages are made payable in United States money. Practically manhood suffrage among all Hawaiian citizens has existed since 1852. The Australian ballot sys- tem has been in operation since 1890. All American holidays, Wash- ington’s Birthday, Decoration day, Fourth of July and Thanksgiving day are as fully and enthusiastically celebrated in Hawaii as in any part of the United States. This is not the growth of a day, but of two generations, so that even to the native Hawaiian it appears to be the natural order of things. The people of Hawaii as a whole, are energetic and industrious. They are annually producing and exporting more per capita than any other nation in the world. Moreover their chief export, sugar, is an article which has to compete in the markets of the world on the small- est possible margin of profit, and can be produced only by a combina- tion of industry, economy, and keen business ability. No people who are leading the world in the per capita export of manufactured products can be truthfully characterized as lazy, worth- less or unreliable. As a matter of fact there are no poor-houses, paupers, beggars or tramps in Hawaii. To take the different nationalities up in detail: The Native Hawaiians, only 33,000 in number, are a conserva- tive, peaceful and generous people. They have had during the last twenty years, to struggle against the retrogressive tendencies of the reigning family; but in spite of that, a very large proportion of them have stood out against such tendencies, and are supporters of the Re- public and of annexation. The majority of the present House of Representatives, the first under the Republic, consists of pure-blood native Hawaiians, and the Speaker of the House is a native Hawaiian. The Hawaiians are not Africans, but Polynesians. They are brown not black. There is not, and never has been any color line in Hawaii as against native Hawaiians, and they participate fully and on an equality with the white people in affairs political, social, relig- ious and charitable. The two races freely intermarry one with the other, the results being shown in a present population of some 7000 of mixed blood. They are a race which will in the future, as they have in the past, easily and rapidly assimilate with and adopt Ameri- can ways and methods. The Portuguese have frequently been spoken of as being a bad element, and are even spoken of as not being Europeans. This is un- just and incorrect. Seven thousand of the so-called 15,000 Portuguese of Hawaii, are Hawaian born, and all of them have been educated in the public schools, so that they speak English as readily as does the average American child. The criminal statistics show a smaller per- centage of offenses committed by this class of Hawaiian population than by any other nationality in the country. They are a hard-work- ing industrious, home-creating and home-loving people, who would be of advantage to any developing country. They constitute the best labor- ing element in Hawaii. The Chinese and Japanese are an undesirable population from a political standpoint, because they do not understand American prin- ciples of government. The Asiatic population of Hawaii consists largely, however, of laborers who are temporarily in the coun- try for what they can make out of it. As soon as they accumu- late a few hundred dollars they return home. Shut off the .source of supply, and in ten years there will not be Asiatics enough left in Ha- waii to have any appreciable effect. Moreover, most of them are making as much or more money in Hawaii than they can in the United States, and they have no object in trying to come to this country. This is evidenced by the fact that prior to the passage of the Chinese exclusion act by Congress, there were as many Chinese in Hawaii as there now are, but practically none came to California. The Japanese are now free to come to California from Honolulu, but none come. The treaty of annexation prohibits any further Chinese immigra- tion from the date of the ratification of the treaty; prohibits emigration of the Chinese now in Hawaii to any other part of the United States, and the treaty with Japan, which goes into effect in 1899, allows the United States to regulate the immigration of Japanese laborers. Individually, the Chinese and Japanese in Hawaii are industrious, peacable citizens, and as long as they do not take part in the political control of the country, what danger can the comparatively small num- ber there be to this country ? They are not citizens, and by the Con- stitution of Hawaii, they are not eligible to become citizens; they are aliens in America and aliens in Hawaii ; annexation will give them no rights which they do not now possess, either in Hawaii or in the United States. 32 33 The remaining inhabitants of Hawaii are some seven or eight thousand Americans, English and Germans; strong, virile men who have impressed their form of government upon the much larger popu- lation living there, and have acquired the ownership of more than three-fourths of all the property in the country. If they were able to do this against the hostility and in the face of an unfavorable mon- archy, why is there is any reason to believe that they will be any less strong under the fostering influence of the republican Government of the United States ? No territory of the United States was ever annexed with so strong a leaven of Americanism in it as exists today in Hawaii. As to the Future Prospects. Within a hundred years Hawaii possessed a population of 400,000 people, who were supported by the lax methods of cultivation then in effect. With the advanced methods of today, and the irrigation of the heretofore barren plains, there is no reason why Hawaii cannot support a population of a million as easily as it now does 100,000. With stability of Government will come im- migration, development and growth, which will as certainly take place in Hawaii as it has in all the other territories heretofore annexed by the United States. FIFTH OBJECTION. We do not want Hawaii as a State with two more Senators. The treaty does not provide for Statehood. Hawaii does not ask for it, and the United States does not grant it. The treaty of annexa- tion provides that Hawaii shall come into the Union as a territory, and leaves the form of such territorial government absolutely in the hands of Congress. What more could Hawaii give or the United States ask ? It is recognized that Hawaii does not now possess the population or the wealth to warrant Statehood, and there is no probability that it will possess such qualifications for some time to come. It will be a ques- tion for our successors and not for us to settle. They will be dealing with their own fortunes and fates, and not with ours. Can we not perform the duty of the hour as it is presented to us, and leave the future to our successors in the faith that they will be as wise and as patriotic as we are ? SIXTH OBJECTION. Hawaii is an outlying territory and in time of war it will be a soioce of weakness to the United States. Whether outlying territory is a source of weakness depends upon circumstances. When England owned territory in France, it was a source of weakness to her. Her ownership of Gibralter is a source of strength. This objection involves somewhat of a technical military question. All of the military and naval authorities of the United States who have expressed themselves upon the subject, Generals Schofield and Alexander; Admirals Porter, Walker, Belknap, and Captain Mahan have declared that Hawaii would be a source of strength to the United States in case of war. They do not base their opinion upon any occult reasoning, only known to themselves, but upon a plain demonstration of facts, viz : The distance from Hongkong on the west of Hawaii to Panama on the east, is 9,580 miles, as great a distance as from San Francisco across the American continent, across the Atlantic, across the Medi- terranean and across Turkey to the Persian border. The distance from Unalaska, the first port north of Hawaii, to Tahiti, the first port on the south, is 4,400 miles, a distance as great as from Greenland to the Amazon river. In all this vast territory there is only one spot where a ton of coal, a pound of bread or a drink of water can be ob- tained, and that spot is Hawaii. The great powers having interests in the Pacific are so far distant from the Pacific coast of the United States that not one of them can operate against it with a naval force, unless they have a base of opera- tions nearer than any which they now possess. The navies of today are all steamers with limited coal-carrying capacity. There is not a wrar vessel in existence which can steam from any of the ports belonging to England, France, Russia, Spain, Japan or China to the Pacific coast and back again without renewing its coal supply. Hawaii is only four days steaming from San Francisco. In possession of Hawaii, any of the great powers mentioned would be within easy striking distance of the Pacific coast and its commerce. Shut out from Hawaii, all of them are forced back the entire width of the Pacific—a distance practically prohibitive of naval operations against the Pacific coast or its vicinity. Hawaii in the possession of any foreign power would be a menace and a danger to the Pacific coast and its commerce. With foreign countries barred out of Hawaii, the Pacific coast and its commerce is almost absolutely safe from naval attack. Vancouver has not been mentioned in this connection, for the reason that it is taken for granted that any foreign possession which can be reached from the mainland by United States troops would be taken in case of wrar, within a very short time after the commencement of hostilities. 34 SEVENTH OBJECTION. It will necessitate heavy expenditures and a navy in order to protect Hawaii in time of war. War between the United States and any foreign country may or may not require the fortification of Hawaii. But this question depends not in the remotest degree upon annexation. It depends upon whether the United States is to continue its policy of the past fifty years, to- wit, the barring out of all other nations from Hawaii. This policy was initiated by President Tyler in 1842, when he said that “it could not but create dissatisfaction on the part of the United States at any attempt by another power to take possession.’’ It was reiterated by Daniel Webster a short time thereafter, when, upon being informed that the French were contemplating taking possession of the islands, he said : “ I trust the French will not take possession; but if they do, they will be dislodged, if my advice is taken, if the whole power of the Government is required to do it.’’ This policy has been reiterated by Presidents and Secretaries of State and other American statesmen during almost every Administra- tion from that time to the present day. In 1894, the House of Representatives formally adopted a resolu- tion declaring that “intervention in Hawaii by any foreign power will not be regarded with indifference,” while the Senate adopted a resolu- tion containing stronger language, to the effect, that such intervention “will be regarded as an act unfriendly to the United States.” This is the policy which will have to be defended. Annexation is only incidental to the policy of exclusion. The policy can be defended either by guns or arguments. If it can be defended by arguments now, it can likewise be so defended after annexation. If it is to be defended by guns, annexation will facilitate such defense. Having long ago decided that its policy concerning Hawaii should be to keep other countries out, the question now to be decided is, can that policy best be subserved by vesting the legal title in the United States, or by leaving Hawaii as an independent country ? If the title is vested in the United States, all possibility of future international complication will be a an end; and if the United States at any time hereafter decides that its policy of exclusion of other countries can be best be subserved by guns it can immediately proceed to fortify Hawaii. If, however, the title to Hawaii remains in a foreign Gov- ernment, it is certain that in the future, as in the past, Hawaii wall become involved with foreign countries, and continue to be a fertile source of international complications; and if the United States in the course of time should deem that its time-honored policy required the fortification of Hawraii, there might be found in control in Hawaii a Government inimical to the United States, which would prohibit forti- fications. Annexation does not necessitate fortification, but if ever fortification is required, title will be an essential. Title can be obtained now. What the future may bring forth no one can tell. 35 EIGHTH OBJECTION. It will be a forerunner and form a precedent for a policy of unlimited annexation of territory. Any party in the United States which may in the future desire a precedent for annexing any country whatsoever, will in the past his- tory of the country find ample precedent for so doing without referring to Hawaii. The United States has annexed all kinds of territory, from the coral reefs and cocoanut groves of Key West to the icy barrier of northern Alaska; territories bordering on the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific and the Arctic ; islands of the Pacific and the Carribean Sea. Its possessions extend as far west of San Francisco as Maine is east of San Francisco, and as far north of Chicago as Florida is south of Chicago. So far as precedents are concerned, nothing more is required. It is submitted, however, that the annexation of Hawaii will, if it is accomplished, forever stand unique. The area of Hawaii, approxi- mately 7,000 square miles, is not inconsiderable. It is nearly as large as Massaschusetts, and considerably larger than Connecticut and Rhode Island combined. But if it did not contain a hundred square miles, its value to the United States would remain practically the same. Its foreign commerce is wonderfully large for a country of its size. It amounted to $22,000,000 for the year 1896. But if it had no com- merce, its value to the United States would be practically the same. 36 Its value to the United States consists in its unique position in the Pacific ocean. It is the one and only point which can be made a naval base of operations against the Pacific coast. As Captain Mahan has said, “it stands alone * * * having no rival, and admitting of no rival.” In the Atlantic, on the other hand, there are a hundred islands scattered around the United States coast, any one of which can be made a base of operations. In order to secure immunity from attack on the Atlantic, all of these islands must be secured by the United States. In order to secure like immunity on the Pacific, Ha- waii alone needs to be secured. If there were numerous other islands in the Pacific, as there are in the Atlantic, then the annexation of Hawaii would offer a precedent for further extension of territory. As it is, the annexation of Hawaii will not be for the purpose of securing additional territory or additional commerce, but will simply be the securing of a strategical point for the protection of territory which the United States already owns. It will come precisely within the same principle that would be invoked did the Farallone Islands, thirty miles off the Golden Gate; or Long Island, off New York harbor, belong to some foreign country, and were they now proposed to be secured by the United States. NINTH OBJECTION. It is contrary to the Monroe Doctrine to acquire territory beyond the boundaries of the American continent. This objection is made by those who do not understand what the Monroe Doctrine consists of. The Monroe doctrine is a limitation on European Powers, excluding them from participation in the affairs of the American continent and its outlying islands, but it places no limita- tion upon the United States. Instead of Hawaii lying beyond the purview of the Monroe doctrine, there is no territory to which the Monroe doctrine more directly applies than to Hawaii, and in no other case has there been such continued insistence on the part of American statesmen of the ap- plication of the doctrine as in the case of Hawaii. In addition to the immense number of general statements by American statesmen concerning American control over Hawaii, the following quotations are directly in point : In 1881, Secretary of State Blaine, in writing to United States Minister Comly, at Honolulu, says : “The situation of the Hawaiian Islands, giving them strategic control of the North Pacific, brings their possession within the range of questions of purely American policy, as much so as that of the Isthmus itself.” In 1894, Senator Morgan of Alabama, in a report to the Senate concerning the Hawaiian Islands, says : “Observing the spirit of the Monroe doctrine, the United States, in the beginning of our relations with Hawaii, made a firm and dis- tinct declaration of the purpose to prevent the absorption of Hawaii or the political control of the country by any foreign power. TENTH OBJECTION. A large portion of the Hawaiian voters have been disfranchised: 37 No vote has been taken in Hawaii upon the question of annexation; and it is un-American to annex a ter7itory without a popular vote of its inhabitants. It will be noted that this is the argument most resorted to by the ex-Queen Liliuokalani and her supporters. Their objection is not based upon opposition to the American Republic, but upon opposition to any Republic. They are selfishly seeking the restoration of the Monarchy for their own benefit, and as long as Hawaii remains inde- pendent, they hope for some internal discord or foreign complication which will restore them to power. The reply to the objection is that no Hawaiian voters have been disfranchised, and that it is not un-American to annex territory without a vote of the inhabitants. Whether it is un-American to annex territory without a popular vote, depends upon w hat has been done upon like occasions in the past. In the cases of the annexation of Louisiana, with its colony of intelli- gent Frenchmen; of Florida, wfith its Spaniards; of California, New Mexico, Arizona and Alaska, there was no semblance of a vote, and there is no indication that the subject was even so much as discussed by either of the contracting parties. All that wras done or lawfully re- quired to be done, wras the agreement of the tvro Governments, and the act was complete without reference to either the people of the United States or of the territory proposed to be annexed. The case of Texas is sometimes referred to as a precedent sup- porting a popular vote, but it is not. Texas was first proposed to be annexed by a treaty negotiated in 1837. After it failed of ratification, the same method was followed in 1843. In neither treaty was any vote of the people provided for. In 1844 a bill was introduced into the Senate, providing for the annexation of Texas and for the taking of a vote of her people, which bill was defeated. Shortly thereafter a joint resolution was introduced to effect the annexation of Texas, in wdiich no mention was made of a popular vote, but which contemplated the completion of the annexation upon the acceptance of the terms of the joint resolution by the Texan Government. Immediately upon receiv- ing the news of the passage of this resolution, the Texan Legislature accepted the terms of the resolution and the annexation was complete. Several months thereafter, the people of Texas adopted a State Consti- tution, which incidentally ratified the annexation. But such ratifica- tion was not necessary, as that had already been completed months be- fore by the Legislature. There is, therefore, no precedent, in any of the annexations of the past, for taking a popular vote upon the subject. Why, then, is it un-American to annex Hawraii without a popular vote? There is less reason for taking a popular vote in the case of Hawaii than in any instance in the past, for the reason that there is not now and never has been any Hawaiian law requiring that a treaty of an- nexation should be submitted to the people; but, on the contrary, there is specifically incorporated into the Constitution of the Republic an article authorizing and directing the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, to negotiate and conclude a treaty of annexation with the United States. Again, wdiy in logic is there any more reason for requiring a popu- 38 lar vote on the part of the citizens of Hawaii than by the citizens of the United States? The citizens of the United States, as well as those of Hawaii assume responsibilities and obligations by reason of annexa- tion. Why should the citizens of Hawaii be individually consulted, and those of the United States ignored ? Incidentally, however, as in the case of Texas, there has been a practical vote in Hawaii upon the subject of annexation, for every person who is now a voter in Hawaii has taken the oath to the Consti- tution of Hawaii, thereby ratifying and approving of annexation to the United States. In support of the statement that no Hawaiian voter has been dis- franchised, I would state that every person who was a voter under the monarchy has the privilege of voting under the Republic, with the sole difference that whereas under the monarchy he took an oath to support it, under the Republic he renounces the monarchy and takes an oath to support the Republic. There has been no disfran- chisement of voters in Hawaii. The only persons who could vote un- der the monorchy and who cannot vote now, are those who have disfranchised themselves by refusing to accept, the Republic. The situation then is : 1. Neither the Constitution nor laws of the United States nor of Hawaii require a popular vote. 2. During fifty years, there have been four annexation treaties negotiated by Hawaii with the United States, viz.: in 1851, 1854, 1893 and 1897, in which, neither under the Monarchy, Provisional Govern- ment, nor the Republic, has any provision been made for a popular vote, either in the United States or Hawaii. 3. Six annexations of inhabited territory by the United States, during the past one hundred years, have been made without a popular vote being taken. 4. The Constitution of the United States, in general terms, and of Hawaii specifically, authorizes the respective Presidents and Senates to conclude a treaty of annexation. Under these circumstances, what basis is there for claiming that an annexation treaty cannot be legally concluded except by popular vote ? If it is admittted that the legal right exists, and that the objection is based on a sentimental regard for the native Hawaiian, the native Hawaiian may well pray “deliver me from my friends”! America has given him a taste of American liberty and civilization. America- wards lies the full freedom and the proud status of republican citizenship. Unless annexation take place, the only future for the native Hawaiian is retrogression to the status of the Asiatic coolie, who is already crowding him to the wall. If the theoretical philantropists of America who are lifting up their voices against annexation through sympathy for the native Hawaiian could descend out of the clouds long enough to ascertain the facts, they would learn that every native minister of the gospel; most of the better educated natives ; almost without exception, all of the white ministers of the gospel; the representatives of the American Board of Foreign Missions; the Hawaiian Board of Missions ; the practical educators ; those who have for years contributed their time, 39 their money and their lives to the Hawaiian people ; who feel that their welfare is a sacred trust—all of these are working, hoping and praying for annexation as the one last hope of the native Hawaiian. ELEVENTH OBJECTION. A protectorate will secure to the United States all the advantages which will accrue under annexation, without involving the country in the respo?isibilities of ownership. This is one of the problems which has confronted every Ameri- can statesman who has been compelled to practically consider how best to maintain American control in Hawaii. It was the problem which faced President Pierce and Secretary of State Marcy in 1854; President Harrison and Secretary Foster in 1893, and President McKinley and Secretary Sherman in 1897. In each case, the alternative of protector- ate or annexation was presented, and in each case, after full delibera- tion, the decision was against a protectorate and in favor of annexation. The reason is, that under a protectorate, the independent government of Hawaii would still be free to get into troubles with other govern- ments, thereby creating international complications for the settlement of which the United States would be responsible; while under annexa- tion, no international complications would arise, except such as might be created by the United States itself. The difference between a pro- tectorate and annexation is, that under a protectorate, the United States would assume all the responsibilities, incident to ownership, without the power of control; while under annexation, it would assume no more responsibilities, and would acquire absolute control. Under a protectorate, Hawaii would still remain an incubator of international friction. Under annexation, it would be removed absolutely from international politics, as much so as is California or Florida. twelfth objection. It will be injurious to the beet sugar industry, as Hawaiian sugar will compete with beet sugat raised in the United States. The only way in which Hawaiian sugar can injure beet sugar is by being produced in such quantities as to supplant the beet product of the United States, or by cutting the price so as to lower the price of beet sugar to its producers. Hawaii can never produce enough sugar to supplant the beet or any other sugar in the United States. The sugar consumption of the United States was approximately two million tons during 1896, which consumption is rapidly increasing year by year. During 1896, Hawaii produced a little over two hundred thousand tons, or approximately one-tenth of the consumption of the United States. This is the high- est output ever made by Hawaii, and is the best it has been able to do after twenty years of encouragement, under the reciprocity treaty with the United States. All of the natural cane lands of Hawaii are already under cul- tivation. The only remaining lands which can possibly be cultivated with sugar cane are those now dry and barren, which can only be cultivated by artificial irrigation, by pumping water to an elevation of from one 40 hundred and fifty to six hundred feet. It goes without saying that such irrigation must be limited in area and problematical in profits. As to Hawaiian sugar cutting the price, sugar is a world product, and its price is determined by the world’s price, which is fixed in New York and London. If the Hawaiian crop were cut off entirely, or doubled, it would not raise or lower the price of sugar in the United States one mill. It is sometimes suggested that Hawaiian sugar may more than equal the consumption of the Pacific coast, and that Hawaiian planters would lower their price rather than send it to New York. The reply to this is that the Pacific coast’s consumption is only about seventy-five thousand tons per annum, and long ago the Hawaiian pro- duct far exceeded this. About one-third of the Hawaiian product for 1896-97 was sent to New York, and probably more than one-half of the crop of 1897-98 will be sent there. Again, the Hawaiian cane sugar planters suffer under many disad- vantages which the beet sugar producers do not. It takes from eighteen to twenty-two months to grow a crop of sugar cane in Hawaii, during the entire period of which it must be irrigated on most of the plantations every week or two. It takes the beet sugar planter only about six months to make a crop. The cane sugar planter has to employ his laborers all the year around; the beet sugar planter discharges his laborers when the crop is made. The cane sugar planter of Hawaii pays now somewhat less wages per month than does the beet sugar planter, although not as much less as is generally supposed, the average laborer in Hawaii costing the planter from fifteen to eighteen dollars per month. Under atinexation, the Asiatic supply of labor will be cut off, and this slight advantage will be eliminated. Again, it costs the Hawaiian cane planter approximately ten dol- lars a ton to get his sugar from the plantation to its market, while the beet sugar planter has his market at his door. Taken all in all, the cane sugar planter of Hawaii stands on no more favorable basis than does the beet sugar planter of the United States, and there in no reason why their interests should clash, any more than do the interests of the corn planter of Kansas clash with those of the corn planter of Nebraska. THIRTEENTH OBJECTION. It will exdte the jealousy of, a?id create complications with, foreign governments. When the annexation treaty of 1893 was negogiated, no protest was made by any foreign country. None has been made now, except by Japan, and the reasons assigned by Japan for her protest are absolutely inconsistent with the traditional policy of the United States, that they shall control Hawaii. The rapid development of Japanese pretensions in Hawaii since 1893 is a signal illustration of the danger of further postponing that which all American statesmen agree must at some time be done, viz : definitely and finally secure to the United States the control of Hawaii. This can never be done with as little friction as at present, and if it is further delayed, the increasing importance of the Pacific and the interests of other nations therein, may at an early date cause other nations than Japan to also assume an attitude of hostility toward an- nexation. There is danger in delay. There can be little danger of foreign complication if immediate action is taken. FOURTEENTH OBJECTION. The government of Hawaii consists of foreign adventurers, who have no authority or jurisdiction over the country. This was an objection made when the Provisional Government was first formed, and when its members were unknown to the world. The history of the Provisional Government and the Republic of Hawaii and its dealings with the world have refuted this charge. If anything more were needed as proof in the matter, it is furnished by a report from Minister Willis to Secretary Gresham, when he was in the midst of his attempt to restore the ex-Queen, and it was feared that the attempt might be forcibly resisted by the citizens of Honolulu. Mr. Willis wrote : “Fortunately, the men at the head of the Provisional Government are acknowledged by all sides to be of the highest integrity and public spirit. It is sufficient to say further, that of the so called “Foreign popu- lation,” nearly 10,000 were born in, and are natives of Hawaii, with as much right to speak for Hawaii as the American born white man has to speak for the United States; That the other so called “foreigners” have made Hawaii the land of their adoption; have acquired property, homes and political rights; have built up the country and made it what it is, and have as much right to speak for Hawaii as the multitude of European born American citizens who occupy every official position throughout the land, save that of president, have to legislate and speak for the United States; That the President, two members of the Cabinet, the Chief Jus- tice, and a very large number of the leading officials of the Govern- ment, were born and have always resided in Hawaii; and that the other members of the Government are, almost without exception, old residents; while, without exception, the members of the Government are the leading business and professional men of the country; who have temporarily taken on the cares of public office until the Gov- ernment can be established on a permanent basis, when they will only too willingly hand over its conduct to others. It would seem suffi- cient to meet the charge that they are adventurers seeking their own private benefit, to show that they are, by every means within their power, advancing a treaty which by its terms will legislate them out of office. FIFTEENTH OBJECTION. Annexation will be beneficial to the Sugar Trust. No one has advanced any theory showing how the sugar trust will be benefited by annexation. As a matter of fact, no sugar refiner in the United States will be benefited by annexation, for the reason that it will place just so much more sugar upon the American market free of duty, to come into competition with the product of the American sugar re- finer. There is no probability that a large quantity, if any, sugar will 42 be refined in Hawaii; but entry to other portions of the United States for high grade raw sugars will enable the sugar planters of Ha- waii to place in the markets of the United States a light colored whole- some raw sugar which can compete with the refined product of the sugar trust. This Hawaiian sugar will be limited in amount to be sure, but to the extent to which it goes, it will compete with the product of the trust, with no compensating advantage to that organization. SIXTEENTH OBJECTION. Under the proposed treaty of annexation, the United States assumes the Hawaiian public debt without receiving in return the means ot piop- erty with which to pay it. This statement can only be made by one unfamiliar with the prop- erty and resources owned by the Hawaiian Government. The present net debt of the Republic of Hawaii is approximately $3,900,000, and the schedule of its saleable property, exclusive of the public streets and roads, upon which not less than a million dollars have been ex- pended, amounts to $7,938,000, leaving a clear net profit to the United States in property acquired, of approximately $4,000,000; all of the property owned by Hawaii being transferred by the terms of the an- nexation treaty to the United States. This does not include the revenues from customs, rents, postoffice etc. which largely exceed cur- rent expenses. SEVENTEENTH OBJECTION. There is leprosy in Hawaii. This is, unfortunately, true. Nothing in the climatic conditions of Hawaii, however, caused the disease. It was brought from China about thirty years ago, and has attacked a large number of the natives, it being confined almost exclusively to them. There are not, however, as many lepers in Hawaii as there are in Norway, nor do there begin to be the numbers that there are in Japan, China, India and other Eastern countries. Moreover, Hawaii is the one country in the world dealing with the subject which rigorously segregates the victims of the disease. No cases are seen at large, and all of the patients are most carefully cared for by the local government. Moreover, I have yet to learn that the political relations existing between two countries will in- crease the danger arising from diseases existing in either. The local government of Hawaii will continue in the future, as in the past, to care for its own unfortunates, with no more expense nor danger to the people of the United States than there now is. EIGHTEENTH OBJECTION. The monarchy was overthrown through the agency of American troops' This accusation is ancient history. If it were true, which is not admitted, it would have no more effect today upon the status of the Hawaiian Republic than does the fact that French troops assisted Washington to overthrow the British monarchy in America have any effect upon the present status of the American Republic. Regardless of its origin, the Republic of Hawaii is today recog- nized by every sovereigh government of the world as an independent nation, with all the rights and powers of any other sovereign or inde- 43 pendent nation, and this with the full knowledge that its constitution contains an article providing explicitly for annexation to the United States. Concerning the truth of the charge mentioned, we have the posi- tive statements of United States Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse of the United States Navy, who were on the ground at the time, that the American troops were not landed for such purpose, and did not take any part in the overthrow of the Monarchy. There has been a vast amount of controversy upon the subject, and in 1894, the United States Senate appointed a committee for the express purpose of investigating this very point, Senator Morgan, of Alabama, a Democrat, being the the chairman of the committee. The committee made an exhaustive examination of the subject, and made a report to the Senate covering over two thousand pages of fine printed matter. The conclusion of the committee upon this point, formulated by Senator Morgan, is as follows : “The committee, upon the evidence as it appears in their report (which they believe is a full, fair and impartial statement of the facts attending and precedent to the landing of the troops) agree that the purpose of Capt. Wiltse and of Minister Stevens wrere only those which were legitimate, viz.: the preservation of law and order to the extent of preventing a disturbance of the public peace, which might, in the absence of troops, injuriously affect the rights of the American citizens resident in Honolulu. ’ ’ History will vindicate Minister Stevens and prove, what those who knew him best already know, that the United States never possessed a truer officer or a more patriotic citizen or one wTho more fearlessly met difficult and unexpected conditions and did his duty to his country. NINETEENTH OBJECTION. It is unlikely that the United States will go to war with any othe> tountry. But if it does, and it then wants Hawaii, there is time enough to take it. , It is idle to discuss whether the United States will again go to war. It is a matter of opinion. Judging the future by the past, the chances are strongly that it will. Its might is not an insurance against war. Rome ruled the world, but war came. The intervening sea will not prevent it. England, the one isolated nation of Europe, has as many wars as all the rest of Europe put together. The certainty that the United States would probably conquor in the end, is no guarantee against it. Small boys frequently fight big ones, expecting to be whipped. There can be no doubt concerning the ultimate result of a war with Spain; but it seems probable that Spain might welcome war with the United States, as the method by which she can get out of Cuba with the least injury to her national dignity and prestige. There is no certainty that there will be war; but on the other hand there is no certainty that there will not be. Human nature has devel- oped but has not radically changed. The nations of the world never spent more time or money in preparation for wrar than they are doing to-day. 44 It is not wise for a man to leave his doors unlocked when burglars are around, simply because none have been to his house. They may come when least expected. Wars come nowadays, suddenly and unexpectedly. The nations are in such a state of preparation that they can accomplish in a week what formerly took months. The Austro-Prussian war was finished, and Austria prostrated, in six weeks. No sooner was war declared than Germany over-ran France and was victorious within four months. Japan opened the war on China with an attack which destroyed a ship and a thousand men, and made formal declaration at her leisure. Turkey and Greece each began hostilities without notice. Any nation which attacks the United States by way of the west, will, as a military necessity, first occupy Hawaii as a base of operations. The first intimation of war which the United States will have, may be the seizure of Hawaii; and, with its natural defensive possi- bilities, any strong maritime nation once entrenched in Hawaii can be evicted therefrom, if at all, only by vast expenditure and tremendous effort. Gibralter is a century long lesson of how much easier it is to let a warlike nation in, than is is to get it out of, a strong position. TWENTIETH OBJECTION. The United States already has enough territory, people and problems. We want no more of them. Let well enough alone. It has already been stated above, that the chief reason for the an- nexation of Hawaii is to secure a vantage ground for the protection of what the United States already owns. It is not primarily to secure new territory, promote shipping and increase commerce ; but as a measure of precaution to prevent the acquisition by a foreign, and perhaps in the future, hostile power, of an acknowledged military stronghold, possessing peculiar strategic relations toward the territory and com- merce of this country. In comparison with the benefit and advantage to the country of securing control of this .strategic stronghold, what do the disadvantages amount to ? Even if all the people of Hawaii are not up to the highest ideal American standard, how can they harmfully affect the American peo- ple or government ? They number 109,000. No more than are some- times landed in New York in a single month. About one-tenth of one per cent, of the present population. Can any one seriously maintain that this insignificant, fractional addition of people, without the powers appurtenant to statehood—with only such limited territorial form of government as Congress pleases to grant—can to any appreciable ex- tent injuriously affect the political life and fortunes of the American people ? Can such claim be urged in good faith, when the dominant element in Hawaii, politically, socially and financially, is, and for years has been, so strongly American in its business, financial and political methods as to have converted an alien land and people into what is universally recognized as being ‘ ‘ the most American spot on earth.” 45 As to problems, what problems that the United States does not now have; will it have after annexation ? None arising from the people of Hawaii coming over here. If they wanted to come to America they could come now. But they have no reason for coming. They are more prosperous now than the people of the United States, and after annexation they will be more prosperous still. The movement of population is already to, and not from, Hawaii, and annexation will greatly accelerate it. The people of Hawaii will remain in Hawaii, and will themselves settle locally the local problems arising out of local conditions, with no more effect upon the political life and principles of the general government, than has a town election or local option agitation in Arizo?ia. As a territory, Hawaii will have no vote in national affairs ; and with the trend of existing feeling against admitting new states, the time for discussing statehood is so far in the future that it is beyond the domain of practical life. Financially, no problem will be created. Hawaii is more than self supporting. Internationally, no problems will be created. On the contrary, an international problem which has made demands upon the time and attention of American statesmen for two generations—the problem of “ How to keep other nations out of Hawaii”—will be solved and written off the books. From a military standpoint no problems wall be created. On the contrary the military situation will be simplified. Military experts, American and foreign, unite in acknowledging that Hawaii is a strate- gical point of the first importance, ranking with Gibralter and the Suez canal. If it is ever deemed essential to American interests to fortify Hawaii, it will certainly be far easier to do so if it belongs to and is already occupied by the United States, than if it belongs to another, and possibly hostile government. This objection is made by those who think that the United States is sufficient unto itself. That it does not need to take a part in affairs beyond its borders, and that danger lies in every direction beyond them. The day when the United States can, hibernating, live off itself, has passed. In this end of the nineteenth century a ‘‘hermit nation” is no longer possible. The United States resurrected Japan from that status, but it cannot assume the role itself. No man lives unto himself, neither can a nation. No nation can stand still. It must either progress or retrograde. For a number of years the apparent paradox was seen of the Uni- ted States, growing and developing faster than anything known in history, while paying but slight attention to her international relations, either political or commercial. The manifest reason was that it possessed a vast undeveloped area which afforded within its borders, full scope for all surplus energy and capital that, in the kindred country of England, has spread itself over every quarter of the globe, That condition no longer exists. The unoccupied territory has been taken up, and while much remains to be done, the creative energy 46 of the American people can no longer be confined within the borders of the Union. Production has so outrun consumption in both agricul- tural and manufactured products that foreign markets must be secured or stagnation will ensue. Foreign trade means foreign interests which must be protected. It means rivalries and jealousies with other exporting nations in which the American citizen must have the support of his government. The day has gone by when the United States can ignore its inter- national relations, privileges and obligations. Whether it will or no, the logic of events is forcing the American people and their govern- ment to take their place as one of the great “ international nations,” and incidentally thereto, to adopt such means as are necessary to sustain the position. 47 Opinions of Presidents of the United States Concerning the Control or Annexation of Hawaii. JOHN TYLER. United States Opposition to Foreign Coni) ol. On December 31, 1842, President Tyler sent a special message to the Senate, relating to the Hawaiian Islands, from which the following extracts are made. After speaking of the development of the Island Government and the importance of the islands to shipping, he continues : “ It cannot but be in conformity with the interest and wishes of the Govern- ment and the people of the United States that this community * * * should be respected, and all its rights strictly and conscientiously regarded. * * * Far remote from the dominions of European Powers, its growth and prosperity as an independent state may yet be in a high degree useful to all whose trade is extend- ed to those regions, while its near approach to this continent, and the intercourse which American vessels have with it—such vessels constituting five-sixths of all which annually visit it—could not but create dissatisfaction on the part of the United States at any attempt by another power, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to take possession of the islands, colonize them, and subvert the native gouernment.” (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 847.} MILLARD FILLMORE. President Fillmore reiterated this sentiment in stronger language in 1850-’1. See dispatches of Secretaries Clayton and Webster quoted below. FRANKEIN PIERCE. Approval of Annexation. President Pierce desired the annexation of Hawaii, and authorized the negotiation of the treaty of annexation of 1854. See treaty in full, hereunder. (See dispatch of Secretary Marcy to U. S. Minister Gregg, April 4, 1854. Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., con- cerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 929.) First Attempt at Reciprocity. A treaty of reciprociy was negotiated between the United States and Hawaii under President Pierce, but was not confirmed by the Senate, (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 944.) JAMES BUCHANAN. Foreign Control Highly Injurious to United States. President Buchanan, in his dispatch as Secretary of State, Sep- tember 3, 1849, quoted below, stated that English or French control of Hawaii would be “ highly injurious” to the interests of the United States. 48 ANDREW JOHNSON. Reciprocity Advocated as Leading to Annexation. The following is an extract from the annual message of President Johnson to the 40th Congress, December 19, 1868 : “ I am aware that upon the question of fruther extending our possessions it is apprehended by some that our political system cannot successfully be applied to an area more extended than our continent ; but the conviction is rapidly gaining ground in the American mind that, with the increased fa< ilities for intercommuni- cation between all portions of the earth, the principles of free government, as em- braced in our Constitution, if faithfully maintained and carried out, would prove of sufficient strength and breadth to comprehend within their sphere and influence the civilized nations of the world. ‘ ‘ The attention of the Senate and of Congress is again respectfully invited to the treaty for the establishment of commercial reciprocity with the Hawaiian Kingdom, entered into last year, and already ratified by that Government. The attitude of the United States towards these islands is not very different from that in which they stand towards the West Indies. It is known and felt by the Hawai- ian Government and people that their institutions are feeble and precarious ; that the United States, being so near a neighbor, would be unwilling to see the islands pass under foreign control. Their prosperity is continually disturbed by expecta- tions and alarms of unfriendly political proceedings, as well from the United States as from other foreign powers. A reciprocity treaty, while it could not materially diminish the revenues of the United States, would be a guarantee of the good will and forbearance of all nations until the people of the islands shall of themselves, at no distant day, voluntarily apply for admission into the Union." (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 954.) U. S. GRANT. The annexation of Hawaii was favored by President Grant. (See dispatch Sec’y State Seward to Minister McCook, Sept. 12, 1867, quoted hereunder.) Question of Annexation Submitted, to Seriate. In February, 1871. Mr. Pierce, American Minister to Honolulu, wrote, recommending the subject of annexation to the attention of the President. President Grant thereupon sent to the Senate a confiden- tial message, accompanied by Mr. Pierce’s statement. The message is as follows : To the Senate of the United States : “ I transmit confidentially, for the information and consideration of the Sen- ate, a copv of a dispatch of the 25th of February last, relative to the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, addressed to the Department of State by Henry A. Pierce, minister resident of the United States at Honolulu. Although I do not deem it advisable to express any opinion or to make any recommendation in regard to the subject at this juncture, the views of the Senate, if it should be deemed proper to express them, would be very acceptable with reference to any future course which there might be a disposition to adopt. “U. S. GRANT. “Washington, April 5, 1871.“ (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 824.) Note—The dispatch from Mr. Pierce is given hereafter under the heading, “Statements of American Ministers at Honolulu,” &c. CHESTER A. ARTHUR, President Arthur was in full sympathy with the Americanizing of Hawaii. See Secretary Blaine’s dispatches of December i, 1881, quoted below. 49 BENJAMIN HARRISON. Annexation Treaty Negotiated and Advocated. In February, 1893, President Harrison caused an annexation treaty to be negotiated with Hawaii. The following is the message accompanying the treaty upon its transmission to the Senate for con- firmation : 11 To the Senate : “ I transmit herewith, with a view to its ratification, a treaty of annexation concluded on the 14th day of February, 1893, between Hon. John \V. Foster, Sec- retary of State, who was duly empowered to act in that behalf on the part of the United States, and Eorrin A. Thurston, W. R. Castle, W. C. Wilder, C. L,. Carter, and Joseph Marsden, the commissioners on the part of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands. “The treaty, it will be observed, does not attempt to deal in detail with the questions that grow out of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. The commissioners representing the Hawaiian Government have con- sented to leave to the future and to the just and benevolent purposes of the United States the adjustment of all such questions. “ I do not deem it necessary to discuss at any length the conditions which have resulted in this decisive action. “It has been the policy of the administration not only to respect, but to en- courage the continuance of an independent government in the Hawaiian Islands so long as it afforded suitable guarantees for the protection of life and property, and maintained a stability and strength that gave adequate security against the domination of any other power. The moral support of this Government has con- tinually manifested itself in the most friendly diplomatic relations, and in many acts of courtesy to the Hawaiian rulers. “ The overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Gov- ernment, but had its origin in what seems to have been a reactionary and revolu- tionary policy on the part of Queen Eiliuokalani, which put in serious peril not only the large and preponderating interests of the United States in the islands, but all foreign interests, and, indeed, the decent administration of civil affairs and the peace of the islands. “ It is quite evident that the monarchy had become effete and the Queen’s government so weak and inadequate as to be the prey of designing and unscrupu- lous persons. The restoration of Queen Liliuokalani to her throne is undesirable, if not impossible, and unless actively supported by the United States would be accompanied by serious disaster and the disorganization of all business interests. The influence and interest of the United States in the islands must be increased and not diminished. “ Only two courses are now open ; one the establishment of a protectorate by the United States, and the other, annexation full and complete. Ithink the latter course, which has been adopted in the treaty, will be highly promotive of the best interests of the Hawaiian people, and is the only one that will adequately secure the interests of the United States. These interests are not wholly selfish. It is essential that none of the great powers shall secure these islands. Such a possession would not consist with our safety and with the peace of the world. “ This view of the situation is so apparent and conclusive that'no protest has been heard from any government against proceedings looking to annexation. Every foreign representative at Honolulu promptly acknowledged the provisional government, and I think there is a general concurrence in the opinion that the deposed queen ought not to be restored. Prompt action upon this treaty is very desirable. “If it meets the approval of the Senate peace and good order will be secured in the islands under existing laws until such time as Congress can provide by leg- islation a permanent form of government for the islands. This legislation should be, and I do not doubt will be, not only just to the natives and all other residents and citizens of the islands, but should be characterized by great liberality and a high regard to the rights of all the people and of all foreigners domiciled there. 50 “ The correspondence which accompanies the treaty will put the Senate in possession of all the facts known to the Executive. “BENJ. HARRISON. “ Executive Mansion, February 15, 1893.” (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 1005.) The Treaty of Annexation is hereinafter contained. william mckinley. Annexation Treaty Negotiated and Advocated. On June 15, 1897, President McKinley caused an annexation treaty to be negotiated with the Republic of Hawaii. Message to the Senate. The following is the message accompanying the treaty upon its transmission to the Senate for confirmation: “ To the Senate of the United States: “ I transmit herewith to the Senate, in orr’er that, after due consideration, the constitutional function of advice and consent may be exercised by that body, a treaty for the annexation of the Republic of Hawraii to the United States, signed in this capital by the plenipotentiaries of the parties on the 16th of June instant. “ For better understanding of the subject I transmit in addition a report of the Secretary of State, briefly reviewing the negotiation which has led to this import- ant result. Annexation Necessary Sequel of Historical Events. The incorporation of the Hawaiian Islands into the body politic of the United States is the necessary and fitting sequel to the change of events which, from a very early period in our history, has controlled the intercourse and prescribed the association of the United States and the Hawaiian Islands. The predominance of American interest in that neighboring territory was first asserted in 1820, by send- ing to the islands a representative agent of the United States. It found further expression by the signature of a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with the king in 1826—the first international compact negotiated by Hawaii. It was signally announced in 1843, when the intervention of the United States caused the British Government to disavow the seizure of the Sandwich Islands by a British naval commander, and to recognize them by treaty as an independent state, re- nouncing forever any purpose of annexing the islands or exerting a protectorate over them. Cession of Hawaii in 1851. “ In 1851 the cession of the Hawaiian Kingdom to the United States was for- mally offered, and although not then accepted, this Government proclaimed its duty to preserve alike the honor and dignity of the United States and the safety of the government of the Hawaiian Islands. From this time until the outbreak of the w’ar in 1861 the policy of the United States toward Haw'aii and of the Hawaiian sovereignty toward the United States was exemplified by continued negotiations for annexation or for a reserved commercial union. Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 and 1884. The latter alternative was at length accomplished by the reciprocity treaty of 1875, the provisions of which were renewed and expanded by the convention of 1884, embracing the perpetual cession to the United States of the harbor of Pearl River in the Island of Oahu. Refusal of Joint Action with Germany and Great Britain in 1888. % “ In 1888 a proposal for the joint guaranty of the neutrality of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States, Germany and Great Britain was declined on the an- nounced ground that the relation of the United States to the islands was sufficient for the end in view. 51 Continuous Policy Exclusion of ate Foreign Influence. In brief, from 1820 to 1893 the course of the United States toward the Hawaiian Islands has consistently favored their autonomous welfare with the exclusion of all foreign influence save our own, to the extent of upholding eventual annexation as the necessary outcome of that policy. Annexation a Consummation, Not a Change. “ Not only is the union of the Hawaiian territory to the United States no new scheme, but it is the inevitable consequence of the relation steadfastly maintained with that mid-Pacific domain for three-quarters of a century. Its accomplishment, despite successive denials and postponements, has been merely a question of time. While its failure in 1893, may not be a cause of congratulation, it is certainly a proof of the disinterestedness of the United States, the delay of four years having abundantly sufficed to establish the right and the ability of the Republic of Hawaii to enter, as a sovereign contractant, upon a conventional union with the United States, thus realizing a purpose held by the Hawaiian people and proclaimed by successive Hawaiian governments through some twenty years of their virtual de- pendence upon the benevolent protection of the United States. Under such cir- cumstances, annexation is not a change ; It is a consummation. Details of Form of Government Left to Congress. “ The report of the Secretary of State explains the character and course of the recent negotiation and the features of the treaty itself. The organic and adminis- trative details of incorporation are necessarily left to the wisdom of the Congress, and I cannot doubt, when the function of the constitutional treaty-making power shall have been accomplished, the duty of the national legislature in the case will be performed with the largest regard for the interests of this rich insular domain and for the welfare of the inhabitants thereof. “WILLIAM McKINLEY. “ Executive Mansion, Washington, June 16, 1897.” [Secretary Sherman’s report to President McKinley accompanying the Treaty is hereinafter contained.] 52 Opinions of Secretaries of State of the United States concerning the Control or Annexation of Hawaii. DANIEL WEBSTER. First Public Statement of Superior Interest of United States in Hawaii. Upon application of the Hawaiian Government for recognition by the United States, Secretary of State Webster replied on December 19, 1842, that the matter had been submitted to the President (Tyler) and ‘‘The President is of opinion that the interests of all the commercial nations require that that government (Hawaii) shall not be interfered with by foreign powers. *• * * The United States * * * are more interested in the fate of the islands and of their gouernment than any other nation can be, and this considera- tion induces the President to be quite walling to declare, as the sense of the Government of the United States, that the government of the Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought either to take possession of the islands as a conquest or for the purpose of colonization, and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing government, or any exclusive privileges or or preferences in matters of commerce.” (Appendix 2 For Rel. of the U. S., 1894, p. 44.) Webster’s views were elaborated in 1851, hereafter quoted. H. S. EEGARE. Advocated Force to Keep European Powers Out. June 13, 1843, Secretary of State Legare sent a dispatch to Edward Everett, U. S. Minister at London, in which the relations of the United States to Hawaii are mentioned, by reason of the then recent seizure of the Islands by England. In this connection he says : “ It is well known that * "x' * we have no wish to plant or to acquire colonies abroad. Yet there is something so entirely peculiar in the relations between this little commonwealth Hawaii and ourselves that we might even feel justified, con- sistently with our own principles, in interfering by force to prevent its falling into the hands of one of the great powers of Europe. These relations spring out of the local situation, the history, and the character and institutions of the Hawaiian Islands, as well as out of the declarations formally made by this Government during the course of the last session of Congress, to which I beg leave to call your particular attention. “ If the attempts now making by ourselves, as wTell as other Christian powers, to open the markets of China to a more general commerce be successful, there can be no doubt but that a great part of that commerce will find its way over the Isthmus. In that event it will be impossible to overate the importance of the Hawaiian group as a stage in the long voyage between Asia and America. But without anticipating events which, however, seem inevitable, and even approach- ing, the actual demands of an immense navigation make the free use of these road- steads and ports indispensable to us. * * * It seems doubtful whether even the undisputed possession of the Oregon Territory and the use of the Columbia River, or indeed anything short of the acquisition of California (if that were possi- ble), would be sufficient indemnity to us for the loss of these harbors.” (Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, Vol. 2, p. 921.) JAMES BUCHANAN. Occupation by England or France Highly Injurious to United States. On the 3d of September, 1S49, Secretary of State Buchanan sent a dispatch to the U. S. Minister resident at Honolulu, TenEyck, con- cerning the relations between Hawaii and the United States, in view 53 of the then threatening conduct of the French against Hawaii, in which the following words are used : “ We ardently desire that the Hawaiian Islands may maintain their independ- ence. It would be highly injurious to our interests if, tempted by their weakness, they should be seized by Great Britain or France ; more especially so since our recent acquisitions from Mexico on the Pacific Ocean." (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 897.) JOHN M. CLAYTON. United States Could Never Allow Hawaii to be Controlled by Any Other Power. In a dispatch from Secretary Clayton to U. S. Minister Rives at Paris, July 5, 1850, referring to the differences between the French and Hawaiian Governments, he made the following statement : “ The Department will be slow to believe that the French have any intention to adopt, with reference to the Sandwich Islands, the same policy which they have pursued in regard to Tahiti. If, however, in your judgment it should be warranted by circumstances, you may take a proper opportunity to intimate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France that the situation of the Sandwich Islands, in respect to our possessions on the Pacific and the bonds commercial and of other descriptions between them and the United States, are such that we could never with indifference allow them to pass under the dominion or exclusive control of any other power." (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 895.) DANIEL WEBSTER. Action by France Would Seriously Disturb Friendly Relations with United States. Upon receipt of a communication by Mr. Severance (quoted below under the heading “Opinions of American Ministers at Honolulu,” &c.), Secretary of State Webster on June 18, 1851, again addressed U. S. Minister Rives at Paris instructing him to immediately inform the French Government that the further enforcement of the French demands against Hawaii— “ would be tantamount to a subjugation of the islands to the dominion of France. A step like this could not fail to be viewed by the Government and people of the United States with a dissatisfaction which would tend seriously to disturb our existing friendly relations with the French Government.''' Reparation Requested for Hazvaii, Indieating U. S. Claim of Right to Protect Hawii. And he is further instructed to make such representations to France— • ‘ ‘ as will induce that Government to desist from measures incompatible with the sovereignity and independence of the Hawaiian Islands, and to make amends for the acts which the French agents have already committed there in contravention of the law of nations and of the treaty between the Hawaiian Government and France." (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 905-6.) Declaration of Policy.—United States can never Consent to Occupation by, or Hostile Demands of ’ European Powers. Secretary of State Webster, replying to U. S. Minister Severance at Honolulu, on July 14, 1851, says, after reciting that the demands of France were improper and “could only end in rendering the islands and their Government a prey to the stronger commercial nations of the world : ’ ’ "It cannot be expected that the Government of the United States could look on ■a course of things leading to such a result with indifference. “ The Hawaiian Islands are ten times nearer to the United States than to any of the powers of Europe. Five-sixths of all their commercial intercourse is with the United States, and these considerations, together with others of a more general character, have fixed the course which the Government of the United States will pursue in regard to them. The annunciation of this policy will not surprise the governments of Europe, nor be thought to be unreasonable by the nations of the civilized world, and that policy is that while the Government of the United States, itself faithful to its original assurance, scrupulously regards the independence of the Hawaiian Islands, it can never consent to see those islands taken possession of by either of the great commercial powers of Europe, nor can it consent that demands manifestly unjust and derogatory and inconsistent with a bona fide inde- pendence, shall be enforced against that Government." (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 908.) Copy Furnished Diplomatic Corps at Washington. A copy of the above letter from Secretary Webster to Minister Severance was, simultaneously with its dispatch, furnished to all the members of the Diplomatic Corps in Waahington, in circular form, wdiich caused offense to the French Government, but they nevertheless acquiesced in its terms, and desisted from the course of aggression wdiich they had been following. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. 011 For, Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 913.) Force Advocate to Keep France Out, At this time the French vTere so threatening in Hawraii that the Hawaiian Government requested the American consul, E. H. Allen to go personally to Washington and represent the state of affairs, which he did. Upon making his statement to Secretary Webster the lat- ter replied : "I trust the French will not take possession; but if they do, they will be dis- lodged, if my advice is taken, if the whole power of the government is required to do it." 54 W. E. MARCY. Inevitably Hawaii must be Controlled by the United States. Secretary of State W. E. Marcy addressed a communication on December 16, 1853, to Mr. John Mason, U. S. Minister to France, in which he states that during the recent disturbances in Hawaii— “ the question of transferring the sovereignty of these islands to the United States was much discussed.” He further states that the British and French Ministers had both called upon him (Marcy) and tried to induce him to agree— ‘‘that this Government would take no measures to acquire the sovereignty of these islands or accept it if voluntarily offered to the the United States. * * * Their ministers, particularly the Minister of France, labored to impress me with the belief that such a transfer would be forcibly resisted. * * * Annexation For shadowed. “ fhe object in addressing you at present is to request you to look into this matter and ascertain, if possible, * * * what would probably be the course of France in case of an attempt on the part of the United States to add these islands to our territorial possessions by negotiation or other peaceable means. ‘‘I do not think the present Hawaiian Government can long remain in the hands of the present rulers or under the control of the native inhabitants of these islands, and both England and France are apprised of our determination not to allow them to be owned by or to fall under the protection of either of these powers or of any other Europeon nation. “ It seems to be inevitable that they must come under the control of this Gov- ernment:, and it would be but reasonable and fair that these powers should acquiesce in such a disposition of them, provided the transference was affected by fair means.” (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 914.) Instructions of Marcy to Negotiate Annexation Treaty. On the 4th of April, 1854, Secretary of State Marcy sent a dis- dateh to David D. Gregg, U. S. Minister at Honolulu, giving special instructions on the subject of annexation, viz : “In your general instructions you were furnished with the views of this Government in regard to any change in the political affairs of the Sandwich Islands. The President was aware, when those instructions were prepared, that the question of transferring the sovereighty of those islands to the United States had been raised, and favorably received by many influential individuals residing therein. It was for seen that at some period, not far distant, such a change would take place, and that the Hawaiian Islands would come under the protectorate of or be transferred to some foreign power. You were informed that it was not the policy of the United States to accelerate such a change ; but if, in the course of events, it became unavoidable, this Government would much prefer to aquire the sovereignity of these islands for the United States, rather than to see it transferred to any other power. If any foreign connection is to be formed, the geographical position of these islands indicates that it should be with us. Our commerce with them far exceeds that of all other countries ; our citizens are embarked in the most important business concerns of that country, and some of them hold important pub- lic positions. In view of the large American interests there established and the inti- mate commercial relations existing at this time, it might be well regarded as the duty of this Government to prevent these islands from becoming the appendage of any other foreign power. “ It appears by your dispatches lately received at this Department that the ruling authorities of the Hawaiian Government have been convinced of their ina- bility to sustain themselves any longer as an independent State, and are prepared to throw themselves upon our protection or to seek incorporation into our political system. Fears are entertained by those who favor such a measure that if the United States should manifest a disinclination to receive the proffered sovereignty of this country, the people would seek elsewhere a less desirable connection or be given over to anarchy. “ The information contained in your last dispatch, No. 10, dated the 7th of February, renders it highly probable that the ruling powers of that Government will have presented to you, as our diplomatic agent, an offer of the sovereignty of their country to the United States. The President has deemed it proper that you should be furnished with instructions for the guidance of your conduct in such an emergency. With this dispatch you will be furnished with a full power to treat with the present authorities of the Hawaiian Government for the transfer of the Sandwich Islands to the United States. This can only be done by a convention or treaty, which will not be valid until it is ratified by the Senate of the United States. Protectorate Disapproved. “ No intimation has ever been given to this Government as to the terms or conditions which will be likely to be annexed to the tender of the sovereignty. It is presumed, however, that something more than a mere protectorate is contem- plated. A protectorate tendered to and accepted by the United States would not change the sovereignty of the country. In that case this Government would take upon itself heavy and responsible duties for which it could hardly expect compen- sating advantages. “ I understand that the measure proposed by the people, and that in which the present rulers are disposed to concur, is ‘annexation’ as distinguished from pro- tection ; and that it is their intention that these islands shall become a part of our territories and be under the control of this Government as fully as any other of its territorial possessions. In any convention you may make it is expected that the rights to be acquired by the United States should be clearly defined. 55 56 “ Should the sovereignty of these islands be transferred to the United States, the present government would, as a matter of course, be superseded, or, at least, be subjected to the Federal authority of this country.” Annuities to the amount of $100,000 per annum were authorized to be paid to the King and chiefs. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For Rel., concerning Hawaii, p. 929.) Discussion of Terms of Annexation. On January 31, 1855, Secretary Marcy wrote to Mr. Gregg that the President did not approve of Hawaii immediately becoming a State, but thought it should come in as a Territory. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 941.) WILLIAM H. SEWARD. Annexation Overtures to be Confidentially Received. In reply to a dispatch from U. S. Minister McCook, suggesting the possibility of the annexation of Hawraii, Secretary Seward wrote to him, July 13, 1867 : “You are at liberty to sound the proper authority on the large subject men- tioned in your note (annexation) and ascertain probable conditions. You may confidentially receive overtures and communicate the same to me. “ I will act upon your suggestion in that relation in regard to a party now here. (The Hawaiian Minister at Washington.)” (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 948.) Annexation Deemed Desirable by U. S. Government. In a dispatch to U. S. Minister McCook at Honolulu, of Septem- ber, 12, 1867, Secretary Seward says : “ Circumstances have transpired here which induce a belief that a strong interest, based upon a desire for annexation of the Sandwich Islands, will be active in opposing a ratification of the reciprocity treaty. It will be argued that the reciprocity will tend to hinder and defeat an early annexation, to which the people of the Sandwich Islands are supposed to be now strongly inclined. * * * Second. You will be governed in all your proceedings by a proper respect and courtesy to the Government and people of the Sandwich Islands ; but it is proper that you should know, for your own information, that a lawful and peaceful annexation of the islands to the I'nited States, with the consent of the people of the Sandwich Islands, is deemed desirable by this Government; and that if the policy of annexation should really conflict with the policy of reciprocity, annexation is in every case to be preferred. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 951.) HAMILTON FISH. Control of Hawaii Discussed. In a dispatch from Secretary Fish to the American Minister at Honolulu, March 25, 1873, the following occurs : “ The position of the Sandwich Islands as an outpost fronting and command- ing the zuhole of our possessions on the Pacific Ocean, gives to the future of those Islands a peculiar interest to the Government and people of the United States. It is very clear that this Government cannot be expected to assent to their transfer from their present control to that of any powerful maritime or commercial nation. Military Surveillance by Bermuda must not be Repeated in the Pacific. “ Such transfer to a maritime power would threaten a military surveillance in the Pacific similar to that which Bermuda has afforded in the Atlantic—the latter 57 has been submitted to from necessity, inasmuch as it was congenital with our Gov- ernment—but we desire no additional similar outposts in the hands of those who may at some future time use them to our disadvantage. Consideration of Hawaii’s Future Forced on United States. “ The condition of the Government of Hawaii and its evident tendency to de- cay and dissolution force upon us the earnest consideration of its future—possibly its nearfuture. “ There seems to be a strong desire on the part of many persons in the islands, representing large interests and great wealth, to become annexed to the United States. And while there are, as I have already said, many and influential persons in this country who question the policy of any insular acquisitions, perhaps even of any extension of territorial limits ; Policy of Wise Foresight to Acquire Hawaii. there are also those of influence and of wise foresight who see a future that must extend the jurisdiction and the limits of this nation, and that will require a resting spot in mid-ocean, between the Pacific coast and the vast domains of Asia, which are now opening to commerce and Christian civilization. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 827.) JAMES G. BEAINE. Hawaii the key of the American Pacific. In 1881, the British Government having made certain demands upon the Hawaiian Government, arising out of the reciprocity treaty with the United States, negotiated in 1876, Mr. Blaine, in a dispatch dated December 1, 1881, to U. S. Minister Comly at Honolulu, used the following language : “This Government firmly believes that the position of the Hawaiian Islands as the key to the dominion of the American Pacific demands their benevolent neu- trality, to which end it will earnestly co-operate with the native Government. And if, through any cause; the maintenance of such a position of benevolent neutrality should be found by Hawaii to be impracticable, An avowedly American Solution. this Government would then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by seeking an avowedly American solution for the grave issues presented." (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 831.) In a further dispatch he said ; “The government of the United States * * * has always avowed, and now repeats, that under no circumstances will it permit the transfer of the territory or sovereignty of these islands to any of the great European powers. It is needless to restate the reasons upon which that determination rests. It is too obvious for argument that the possession of these islands by a great maratime power would not only be a dangerous diminution of the just and necessary influence of the United States in the waters of the Pacific, but in the case of international difficulty it would be a positive threat to interests too large and important to be lightly risked. ’, Hawaii's Relations to the United States. In a confidential dispatch to U. S. Minister Comly at Honolulu, December 1, 1881, Mr. Blaine says; Early Extinction of Natives—Transfer of Power to Others. “ In my formal instruction of this date I have reviewed the general question of the relationship between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands, and the position of the latter, both as an integral part of the American system and as the key to the commerce of the North Pacific. As that instruction was written for communication to the Hawaiian secretary of state, I touched but lightly on the essential question of the gradual and seemingly inevitable decadence and extinc- tion of the native race and its replacement by another, to which the powers of Government would necessarily descend. THOMAS F. BAYARI). The Reciprocity treaty with Hawaii was negotiated in 1875 under Secretary Fish. An extension of the treaty was negotiated by Secre- tary Frelinghuysen, and finally carried into effect under Thos. F. Bayard, Secretary of State in Mr. Cleveland’s first administration. In an interview published in the Philadelphia Ledger, February 1, 1897, Mr. Bayard discusses the objects and intent of these treaties. Among other things he states that he was “ greatly impressed with the special advantages which our exclusive rights in the Islands gave us, and woidd have preferred to extend the period of its duration so that our commercial interests there woidd have ample time to develop, and American control of the Islands, in a perfectly natural and legitimate way, would be assured by the normal growth of mercantile and political relations.” He further states that the British Minister re- quested that the United States join England and Germany in a guaranty of the neutrality of Hawaii, which Mr. Bayard declined to do, February 15, 1888. Continuing, Mr. Bayard says : ‘1 I held that there could be no comparison between our rights in the Ha- waiian Islands, as secured by the treaties of 1875 and 1887, with those of other nations, and I would not consent that the United .States should be put upon an equality with them * * * We had an interest in Hawaii that no other country could have. A political union would logically and naturally follow, in course of time, the commercial union and dependence which were thus assured. * * * It 7uas my idea that the policy originating in the Fish treaty of the Grant adminis- tration in 1875 should be permitted to work out its proper results. The obvious course was to 70a if quietly and patiently and let the Islands Jill up with American planters and American industries until they should be wholly identified in busi- ness interests and political sympathies with the United States. It was simply a matter of waiting until the apple should ripen and fall. Unfortunately, nothing 70 as done by Congress in pursuance of this easy, legitimate and perfectly feasible process of acquisition." * * * 58 'A single glance at the census returns of Hawaii for half a generation past exhibits this alarming diminution of the indigenous element, amounting to per cent per annum of the populaiion. Meanwhile the industrial and productive de- velopment of Hawaii is on the increase, and the native classes, never sufficiently numerous to develop the full resources of the islands, have been supplemented by an adventitious labor element, from China mainly, until the rice and sugar fields are largely tilled by aliens. The worst of this state of things is that it must inevit- ably keep on in increasing ratio, the native classes growing smaller, the insulur production larger, and the immigration to supply the want of labor greater every year. [Hawaii Commercially a District of California. ‘ I have shown in a previous instruction how entirely Hawaii is a part of the productive and commercial system of the American States. So far as the staple growths and imports of the islands go, the reciprocity treaty makes them practically members of an American zollvercin, an outlying district of the State of California. So far as political structure and independence of action are concerned, Hawaii is as remote from our control as China. Perpetuity of Natives Basis of Independence. “This contradiction is only explicable by assuming what is the fact, that thirty years ago, having the choice between material annexation and commercial assimi- lation of the islands, the United States chose the less responsible alternative. The soundness of the choice, however, entirely depends on the perpetuity of the rule of the native race as an independent Government, and that imperiled, the whole framework of our relations to Hawaii is changed, if not destroyed. “The decline of the native Hawaiian element in the presence of newer and sturdier growths must be accepted as an inevitable fact, in view of the teachings of ethnological history. And as rcstrogression in the development of the Islands, can- not be admitted without serious detriment to American interests in the North Pa- cific, the problem of a replenishment of the vital forces of Hawaii presents itself for intelligent solution in an American sense—not in an Asiatic or a British sense. Annexation Would Cause American Colonization. “ There is little doubt that were the Hawaiian Islands, by annexation or district protection, a part of the territory of the Union, their fertile resources for the growth of rice and sugar would not only be controlled by American capital, but so profita- ble a field of labor would attract intelligent workers thitherfrom the United States. “Throughout the continent, north aud south, wherever a foothold is found for American enterprise, it is quickly occupied, and this spirit of adventure, which seeks its outlet in the mines of South America and the railroads of Mexico, would not be slow to avail itself of openings for assured and profitable enterprise even in mid-ocean.” (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 977.) JOHN W. FOSTER. Secretary of State Foster made a report accompanying the treaty of annexation negotiated by him February 15, 1893, in which he says : “The policy of the United States has been consistently and constantly declared against any foreign aggression in Hawaii inimical to the necessarily paramount rights and interests of the American people there, and the uniform contemplation of their annexation as a contingent necessity. But beyond that it is shown that annexation has been on more than one occasion avowed as a policy and attempted as a fact.” (Ib., Vol. 1, p. 136.) Duty of the United States to Annex. In an address to to the National Geographic Society, March 26, 1897, Mr. Foster said : “It is, in my opinion, the plain duty of the United States to annex Hawaii to its territory. And in a matter which involves the interests and destiny of a great 59 nation of 70,000,000 people no mere technical questions of procedure should be al- lowed to embarrass our action. * * * Annexation Presents no Difficulties—Frotectorate Impracticable. “To my mind annexation presents no political or administrative difficulties. * * * I do regard the suggestion of a protectorate as practiable. We cannot as- sume it without becoming responsible for the goverment of the islands and we should not become responsible for the government unless we can * * * con- trol its management. Such a system would bring no end of complications with foreign powers and in domestic affairs. Either Annex or Let Alone. “We must either annex the islands or leave them free to make such other al- liance as they may choose or as destiny may determine.’’ JOHN SHERMAN. Report Accompanying Annexation Treaty of 189J. Secretary of State Sherman made a report to the President accom- panying the treaty of annexation negotiated by him June 15, 1897, as follows: “ The President : The undersigned, Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the Presi- dent for submission to the Senate, should it be deemed for the public interests to do so, a treaty signed in the city of Washington on the 16th instant by the under- signed and by the duly empowered representatives of the Republic of Hawaii, whereby the islands constituting the said republic and all their dependencies are fully and absolutely ceded to the United States of America forever. “It does not seem necessary to the present purpose of the undersigned to review the incidents of 1893, when a similar treaty of cession was signed on Feb- ruary 14, and submitted to the Senate, being subsequently withdrawn by the Pres- ident on the 9th of March following. The negotiation which has culminated in the treaty now submitted has not been a mere resumption of the negotiation of 1893, but was initiated and has been conducted upon independ- ent lines. Then an abrupt revolutionary movement had brought about the de- thronement of the late Queen and set up instead of the heretofore titular monarchy a provisional government for the control and management of public affairs and the ■protection of the public peace, such government to exist only until terms of union with the United States should have been negotiated and agreed upon. Thus self- constituted, its promoters claimed for it only a de facto existence until the purpose of annexation in which it took rise should be accomplished. REPUBLIC EVOLVED FROM PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. “ As time passed and the plan of union with the United States became an un- certain contingency the organization of the Hawaiian commonwealth underwent necessary changes, the temporary character of its first government gave place to a permanent scheme under a constitution framed by the representatives of the elec- tors of the islands, and the government, administered by an executive council, not chosen by suffrage, but self appointed, was succeeded by an elective and parliamentary regime, and the ability of the new government to hold—as the Republic of Hawaii—an independent place in the family of sovereign states, preserving order at home and fulfilling international obligations abroad, has been put to the proof. REPUBLIC OF HAWAII A RECOGNIZED SOVEREIGN STATE. “Recognized by the powers of the earth, sending and receiving envoys, en- forcing respect for the law and maintaining peace within its island borders, Hawaii sends to the United States, not a commission representing a successful revolution, but the accredited plenipotentiary of a constituted and firmly established sovereign State. However sufficient may have been the authority of the commissioners with whom the United States government treated in 1893, and however satisfied the President may then have been of their power to offer the domain of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, the fact remains that what they then tendered was a territory rather than an established government, a country whose administration had been cast down by a bloodless but complete revolution, and a community in a state of political transition. 60 HAWAIIAN CONSTITUTION AUTHORIZES ANNEXATION. “Now, however, the Republic of Hawaii approaches the United States as an equal, and points for its authority to that provision of Article 32 of the Constitu- tion promulgated July 24, 1894, whereby the President, with the approval of the Cabinet is expressly authorized and empowered to make a treaty of political or commercial union between the Republic of Hawaii and the United States of Amer- ica, subject to the ratification of the Senate. simple commercial union impracticable. “ The present negotiation is, therefore, as has been said, not a mere renewal of the tender of Hawaiian territory made in 1893, but has responded to the pur- pose declared in the Hawaiian constitution, and the conferences of the plenipoten- tiaries have been directed to weighing the advantages of the political and the commercial union alternately proposed, and relatively considering the scope and extent thereof. “ It soon appeared to the negotiators that a purely commercial union on the lines of the German Zollervein could not satisfy the problems of the administration in Hawaii and of the political associations between the islands and the United States. Such a commercial union would on the one hand deprive the Hawaiian government of its chief source of revenue from customs duties by placing its terri- tory in a relation of free exchange with the territory of the United States, its main market of purchase and supply, while on the other hand it would entail upon Hawaii the maintenance of an internal revenue system on a par with that of the United States or else involve the organization of a corresponding branch of our revenue service within a foreign jurisdiction. “ We have had with Hawaii since 1875 a treaty of commercial union, which practically assimilates the two territories with regard to many of their most impor- tant productions, and excludes other nations from enjoyment of its privileges, yet, although that treaty has outlived other less favored reciprocity schemes, its per- manency has at times been gravely imperiled. Under such circumstances, to enter upon the radical experiment of a complete commercial union between Hawaii and the United States as independently sovereign states, without assurances of permanency and with perpetual subjection to the vicissitudes of public sentiment in the two countries, was not to be thought of. POLITICAL protectorate impracticable. “ Turning then to the various practical forms of the political union, the sev- eral phases of a protectorate, an offensive and defensive alliance and a national guaranty were passed in review. In all of these the independence of the subordi- nated state is the distinguishing feature, aud with it the assumption by the para- mount state of responsibility without domain. This disparity of the relative inter- ests and the distance separating the two countries could not fail to render any form of protective association, either unduly burdensome, or illusory in its benefits, so far as the protecting state is concerned, while any attempt to counteract this by tributary dependence or a measure of suzerain control would be a retrograde move- ment toward a feudal or colonial establishment alike inexpedient and incompatible with our national policy. annexation only satisfactory solution. “ There remained, therefore, the annexation of the islands and their complete absorption into the political system of the United States as the only solution satis- fying all the given conditions and promising permanency and mutual benefit. The present treaty has been framed on that basis, thus substantially reverting to the original proposal of 1893, and necessarily adopting.many of the features of that arrangement. As to most of these, the negotiators have been constrained and limited by the constitutional powers of the Government of the United States. ORGANIC POVISIONS OF GOVERNMENT RESERVED FOR ACTION OF CONGRESS. “As in previous instances, when the United States has acquired territory by treaty, it has been necessary to preserve all the organic provisions for the action of Congress. If this was requisite in the case of the transfer to the United States of a part of the domain of a titular sovereign, as in the cession of Louisiana by France, of Florida by Spain, or of Alaska by Russia, it is the more requisite when the act is not cession, but union, involving the complete incorporation of an alien sov- ereignty into the body politic of the United States. “. For this the only precedent of our political history is found in the uncom- pleted treaty concluded during President Grant’s administration. November 29, 1869, for the annexation of the Dominican Republic to the United States. “ Following that example, the treaty now signed by the plenipotentiaries of the United States and the Republic < f Hawaii reserves to the Congress of the United States the determination of all questions affecting the form of government of the annexed territory, the citizenship and elective franchise of its inhabitants and the manner in which the laws of the United States are to be extended to the islands. HAWAIIAN TREATIES ABROGATED. “ In order that this independence of the Congress shall be complete and un- questionable, and pursuant to the recognized doctrine of public law, that treaties expire with the independent life of the contracting state, there has been intro- duced, out of abundant caution, an express proviso'for the determination of all treaties heretofore concluded by Hawaii with foreign nations, and the extension to the islands of the treaties of the United States. “This leaves Congress free to deal with such especial regulation of the con- tract labor system of the islands as circumstances may require. There being no general provision of existing statutes to prescribe the form of government for newly incorporated territory, it was necessary to stipulate, as in the Dominican precedent, lor continuing the existing machinery of the government and laws in the Hawaiian Islands until provision shall be made by law for the government, as a territory of the United States, of the domain thus incorporated into the Union ; but, having in view the peculiar status created in Hawaii by laws enacted in exe- cution of treaties heretofore concluded between Hawaii and other countries, only such Hawaiian laws are thus provisionally continued as shall not be incompatible with the Constitution or the laws of the United States, or with the provisions of this treaty. PROHIBITION OF CHINESE IMMIGRATION. “ It will be noticed that express stipulation is made prohibiting the coming of Chinese laborers from the Hawaiian Islands to any other part of our national terri- tory. This provision was proper and necessary in view of the Chinese exclusion acts, and it behooved the negotiators to see to it that this treaty, which in turn is to become, in due constitutional course, a supreme law of the land, shall not alter or amend existing law in this most important regard. “JOHN SHERMAN. “ Department of State, Washington, June 15, 1897.” Opinions of American Ministers at Honolulu, London and Paris Concerning the Control or Annexation of Hawaii. EDWARD EVERETT. English Seizitre of Hawaii Prevented French Occupation. Edward Everett, U. S. Minister at London, sent a dispatch to the U. S. State Department, relating to the seizure of Hawaii by the Eng- lish, and their subsequent restoration thereof. In the course of the dispatch lie says: “There is now reason to think that the occupation of the islands by Lord George Paulet was a fortunate event, inasmuch as it prevented them from being taken possession of by a French squadron, which (it is said) was on its way for that purpose. Had France got possession of the islands she would certainly have retained them. England’s Recognition of Hawaii due to Ignorance of Seizure. Had intelligence been received here of Lord George Paulet’s occupation of them before her promise was given to recognize them, England, I think, would not have given them up. As it is, an understanding between the great European powers, amounting in effect, if not in form, to a guaranty of their independence, is likely to take place. This is the only state of things with which the United States could be content. As it will be brought about without involving us in any compacts with other powers, * * * (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 926.) 62 J. TURRILL. Protest Against French Aggression. On August 18, 1849, the French Admiral Tromelin made demand for settlement of certain alleged grievances against the Hawaiian Government, with a threat to use force if not complied with. Mr. Turrill, U. S. Consul at Honolulu, thereupon addressed a communication to him, in which he used the following language : “ The demands which have been made upon this Government are, in my judgment, in direct opposition to the plain provisions of the treaty, and the en- forcing them in the manner indicated would be a palpable violation of the law of nations. ‘'As the course you have advised me that circumstances may induce you to pursue must of necessity seriously affect the great American interests connected with these islands, it becomes my imperative duty, as a representative of the Uni- ted States, to interpose my solemn protest against it, which I now do, and I shall lose no time in communicating to the President of the United States the facts and circumstances attending this case.” Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel,, concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 884.) French Admiral Replies, None of United Stales' Business. To this Admiral Tromelin replied, expressing surprise at the com- munication received, saying : ‘‘The policy of the American Government made it your duty to not interfere officially in our affairs with the administration of His Majesty Kamehameha III, for vou know as well as I do that the United .States of America has made it to themselves a law of not mixing ever in the affairs of other nations, and especially those of France.” {Ibid., p. 884.) French Action Injurious to American Interests. To this Mr. Turrill replied : “You are right in supposing it not to be the policy of the United States to mix in the affairs of other nations. But when a case like the one under consider- ation occurs, and I clearly see that the course military power is to take against this weak nation must greatly injure my countrymen and seriously embarrass the extensive American commerce connected with these islands, it becomes my duty so far to interfere officially as to interpose my protest; and in doing so I doubt not my course will meet the entire approbation of the President of the United States.” {Ibid., p. 885.) LUTHER SEVERANCE. Provisional Cession of Hawaii io United States. The French aggressions in Honolulu being renewed in 1851, the King, on the 10th day of March, 1851, executed a document reciting his inability to withstand the aggressions of the French, and placing the country- “ under the protection and safeguard of the United States of America until some arrangements can be made to place our said relations with France upon a footing compatible with my rights as an independent sovereign, * * * or, if such arrangements be found impracticable, then it is our wish and pleasure that the protection aforesaid under the United States of America be perpetual. “ And we further proclaim as aforesaid that from the date of publication here- of the flag of the United States of America shall be hoisted above the national ensign on all our forts and places and vessels navigating with Hawaiian registers.” This was delivered to U. S. Minister Severance. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel.. concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 897.) 63 Annexation Desired by Hawaii. In a dispatch from Mr. Severance to Secretary of State Webster, dated March nth, 1851, giving at length a statement concerning the situation, Mr. Severance says : “ * * * the King, with the approbation of his chiefs, and I believe nearly all the principal officers of the Government, have it in contemplation to take down the Hawaiian flag and run up that of the United States, 1'hey contemplate annex- ation to our Republic and have already consulted me about it. * * * “The popular representative body recently elected by native votes is for the most part composed of natives of the United States, and so is the executive part of the Government, as well as the judiciary, at least in the high courts. * - * Three-fourths, at least, of the business done here is by Americans, and they already own much, of the real estate. * * * If the action of the French should precipi- tate a movement here, I shall be called on, perhaps, to protect the American flag. I?vas indeed requested to go and see the Ring on Monday night, and in the presence of the council to give him assurance of protection should he raise the American flag instead of his own ; but I preferred to keep away, so as to avoid all appearance of intrigue to bring about a result which, however desirable, and as many believe ultimately inevitable, must still be attended with difficulties and embarrass- ments.” * * * After referring to the French and their possible further attack, he continues : “ The natives look upon them as enemies, and if they come again on a like errand we shall be again appealed to for protection and the subject oj annexation will come up again luith added force." (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel. co’ cerning Hawaiian Islands, pp. 897-8.) Referring to the document executed by the King, above referred to, Mr. Severance continues that he has not committed himself other than to say— “that if the King cedes the islands to the United States and puts up the American flag, I will do what I can to protect it for the time being, until the pleasure of my Government shall be known. Leaning upon us as they do, and sympathizing with them under aggravated wrongs and repeated insults, I could not tell them we should reject their proffered allegiance, and stand passive while they, with the American flag in their hands, should be trampled under foot by the French.” Distance 110 Objection to Annexation. Continuing, Mr. Severance says that arrangements are being made for steam navigation with San Francisco : * “With these steamers and a telegraph from San Francisco to Washington we can communicate with you in about a week; so I hope you will not object to a politi- cal connection on account of distance. Nor are we so far from the centripetal force of our Republic as to be in danger of being thrown off in a tangent. We must not take the islands in virtue of the '•manifest destiny' principle, but can we not accept their voluntary offerf Who has a right to forbid the bans f" (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 903.) DAVID L. GREGG. Treaty of Annexation Negotiated. Acting under instructions from Mr. Marcy, U. S. Minister Gregg negotiated a treaty of annexation with the Hawaiian Government. It was completed ready for signature, August 7, 1854, but before it was signed the King, Kamehameha III, died, and his successor, Kamehameha IV, declined to ratify it. 64 This treaty of annexation and the dispatches concerning it are tc be found in— Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 935. It is hereinafter contained. JAMES McBRIDE. English Control would be Injustice to Americans. In a dispatch from U. S. Minister McBride, at Honolulu, to Sec- retary Seward, dated October 9, 1863, he sets forth the growing power of the English, and the tendency of the King and Government of Hawaii to Anglicize everything in connection with the Government, and the danger that the country would come under British control. Upon this subject he says : “It would be a flagrant injustice to American citizens, after they have labored for the good of these islands for the last forty years, after they have brought these people out of barbarism and taught them civilization, science, and religion; in a word, made them an intelligent and Christian nation and have done all that has been done in the development of the resources of the country, and given it a world- wide popularity, to be either driven out or so treated and harassed as to make it necessary for their interests to sacrifice their property and leave, which is believed would be the case provided the English obtain greater influence with the King than they now have; which influence it is the desire of Americans here and for the interests of the American Government to avert. Some merchants and planters are contracting their business, so that they may not suffer so heavy a loss in the event of the change which seems probable at no very distant day.” (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 943.) EDWARD McCOOK. Hawaii Absolutely Necessary to United States in Case of War. In a dispatch to Secretary Seward, dated September 3, 1866, U. S. Minister McCook, at Honolulu, after giving a general resume of conditions of the Islands, says : “Geographically these islands occupy the same important relative position to- wards the Pacific that the Bermudas do towards the Atlantic coast of the United States, a position which makes them important to the English, convenient to the French, and, in the event of war with either of those powers, absolutely necessary to the United States. Destitute of both army and navy, the Hawaiian Government is without the power to resist aggression, to compel belligerents to respect the neu- trality of her ports. Equally destitute of financial resources, they are without the means of indemnifying those who may suffer through their weakness. Spirit of Country Wholly American and Favorable to Annexation. “The spirit of this whole people is heartily republican and thoroughly Ameri- can. The King, his half dozen half-civilized nobles, as many cabinet ministers, and the Lord Bishop of Honolulu (Staley) constitute the entire aristocratic element of the country, either in fact or in feeling. And when this dynasty ends, as end it will probably within the next year, I am sure that if the American Government indicates the slightest desire to test in these islands the last Napoleonic concep- tion in the way of territorial extension you wrill find the people here with great un- anmity ‘demanding by votes, freely expressed, annexation to the United States. (Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., Vol. 2, concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 947.) Annexation Favored. A reciprocity treaty was in process of negotiation between Hawaii and the United States, under President Johnson, in 1867. U. S. Min- ister McCook at Honolulu, June 7, 1867, writes to Secretary Seward : 65 “Should the treaty be ratified, I will feel that I have possibly accomplished all I can accomplish in my present position, and will probably wish to return to my home in Colorado, unless you should favor the absolute acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, in which event I would like to conduct the negotiations. I think their sovereignty could be purchased from the present King, and feel sure that the people of the United States would receive such a purchase with universal acclamation." (Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., Vol. 2, concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 947.) HENRY A. PIERCE. The Dispatch Concerning Annexation which Grant Submitted for Confidential Consideration of the Senate. On February 25, 1871, Mr. Henry A. Pierce, then U. S. Minister at Honolulu, wrote to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish a dispatch concerning annexation, which, upon reference to President Grant, was deemed by him so important that he forwarded it to the Senate, ac- companied by a confidential special message recommending it to the consideration of the Senate. The dispatch from Mr. Pierce is as follows : Annexation Ultimate Destiny of Hawaii. ‘ ‘Impressed with the importance of the subject now presented for considera- tion, I beg leave to suggest the inquiry whether the period has not arrived making it proper, wise, and sagacious for the United States Government to again consider the project of annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the territory of the republic. That such is to be the political destiny of this archipelago seems a foregone conclusion in the opinion of all who have given attention to the subject in this country, the United States, England, France, and Germany. ‘•A majority of the aborigines, creoles, and naturalized foreigners of this coun- try, as I am credibly informed, are favorable, even anxious for the consummation of the measure named. “The event of the decease of the present sovereign of Hawaii, leaving no heirs or successor to the throne, and the consequent election to be made by the legisla- tive assembly of a king, and new stirps for a royal family, will produce a crisis in political affairs which, it is thought, will be availed of as a propitious occasion to inaugurate measures for annexation of the islands to the United States, the same to be affected as the manifest will and choice of the majority of the Hawaiian peo- ple; and through means proper, peaceful and honorable. “It is evident, however, no steps will be taken to accomplish the object named without the proper sanction or approbation of the United States Government in approval thereof. American Sentiment in Hawaii. “The Hawaiian people for fifty years have been under educational instruction of American missionaries, and the civilizing influence of New England people, commercial and maritime. Hence they are Puritan and democratic in their ideas and tendencies, modified by a tropical climate. Their favorite songs and airs are American. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has made the project of annexation to our Union more popular than ever, both here and in the United States. Decrease of Natives. “The native population is fast disappearing; the number existing is now esti- mated at 45,000, having decreased about 15,000 since the census of 1866. The number of foreigners in addition is between 5,000 and 6,000, two-thirds of whom are from the United States, and they own more than that proportion of the foreign capital, as represented in the agriculture, commerce, navigation, and whale fisher- ies of the kingdom. Foreigners to Succeed. If not Americans, Who? “ This country and sovereignty will soon be left to the possession of foreigners, ‘to unlineal hands, no sons of theirs succeeding.’ To what foreign nation shall 66 these islands belong if not to the great Republic? At the present, those of foreign nativities hold all the iniportant offices oj Government, and control legislation, the judiciary, etc. Well disposed as the Government now is toward the United States and its resident citizens here, in course of time it may be otherwise, as was the case during our civil war. Points Which Should Influence U. S. Policy. “I now proceed to state some points of a mere general character, which should influence the United States Government in their decision of the policy of acquiring possession of this archipelago; Necessity as Naval Depot. their geographical position accupying, as it does, an important central, strategical point, in the North Pacific Ocean, valuable, perhaps necessary, to the United States for a naval depot and coaling station, and to shelter and protect our commerce and navigation, which in this hemisphere is destined to increase enormously from our intercourse with the 500,000,000 population of China, Japan, and Australia. Hum- bolt predicted that the commerce on the Pacific would, in time, rival that on the Atlantic. A future generation, no doubt, will see the prophecy fulfilled. “The immense injury inflicted on American navigation and commerce by Great Britain in the war of 1812-1814, through her possessions of Bermuda and other West India Islands, as also that suffered by the English from French priva- teers from the Isle of France, during the wars between those nations, are instances in proof of the necessity of anticipating and preventing, when we can, similar evils that may issue from these islands if held by other powers. Commercial Value. Their proximity to the Pacific States of the Union, fine climate and soil, and tropical productions of sugar, coffee, rice, fruits, hides, goat-skins, salt, cotton, fine wool, etc., required by the West, in exchange for flour, grain, lumber, shooks, and manufactures of cotton, wool, iron, and other articles, are evidence of the com- mercial value of one to the other region. European Powers May Seize in Time of War. “Is it probable that any European power who may hereafter be at war with the United States will ref rain from taking possession of this weak Kingdom, in view of the great injury that could be done to our commerce through their acquisi- tion of them ? Palmerston’s View of Destiny of Hawaii. “Prince Alexander and Lott Kamehameha (the former subsequently became the fourth Hawaiian King and the latter the fifth) and Dr. G. P. Judd, my inform- ant, visited England in 1850 as Hawaiian commissioners. “Lord Palmerston, at their interview with him, said, in substance, ‘that the British government desired the Hawaiian people to maintain proper government and preserve national independence. If they were unable to do so, he recommend- ed receiving a protectorate government under the United States or by becoming an integral part of that nation. Such,’ he thought, ‘was the destiny of the Hawaiian Islands arising from their proximity to the States of California and Oregon, and natural dependence on those markets for exports and imports, together with pro- bable extinction of the Hawaiian aboriginal population and its substitution by im- migration from the United States.’ That advice seems sound and prophetic. Historical Foreign Aggressions. ‘ ‘The following historical events in relation to these islands are thought worthy of revival in recollection : “February 25, 1843.—Lord George Paulet, of Her Britannic Majesty’s ship Carysfort, obtained, by forceful measures, cession of the Hawaiian Islands, to the Government of Great Britain, July 31, 1843. They were restored to their original sovereignty by the British Admiral Thomas. “November 28, 1843.—Joint convention of the English and French Govern- ments, which acknowledged the independence of this archipelago, and reciprocally promised never to take possession of any part of same. The United States Gov- ernment was invited to be a party to the above, but declined. “August, 1849.—Admiral Tromelin, with a French naval force, after making demands on the Hawaiian Government impossible to be complied with, took unre- 67 sieted possession of the fort and government buildings in Honolulu, and blockaded the harbor. After a few weeks’ occupation of the place, the French departed, leaving political affairs as they were previous to their arrival. 11January, 1851.—A French naval force again appeared at Honolulu, and threatened bombardment and destruction of the town.” Deed of Cession to United States. “The King, Kamehameha III, with the Government, fearing it would be car- ried into effect, and in mortal dread of being brought under French rule, similar to that placed by the latter over Tahiti, of the Society Islands, executed a deed of cession of all the Hawaiian Islands and their sovereignty forever in favor of the United States of America.” * * * (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 825.) Annexation tinder Discussion in Hawaii. In a dispatch to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, February 17, 1873, U. S. Minister Henry A. Pierce, at Honolulu, writes as follows: “ Annexation of these islands to the United States and a reciprocity treaty between the two countries are the two important topics of conversation and warm discussion among Govenment officials and foreign residents. “ A large majority of the latter favor the first-named project, while the former advocate reciprocity. All are convinced, however, that some measure should be taken by the Hawaiian Government to effectually stay the decline in the prosperity of the country, evidenced in decreasing exports, revenue, population, whale fish- ery, and an increasing public debt. Overthrow of Government, Estabeishment of Repubeic and Annexa- tion Foreshadowed. “ Annexation of the islands to the United States will never, in my opinion, be adopted or presented as a Governmant measure, however much the people as a whole may desire it. The glitter of the crown, love of power, and emoluments of office have too many attractions to prevent it. Should the great interests of the country, however, demand that ‘annexation' shall be attempted, the planters, mer- chants, and foreigners generally will induce the people to overthrozv the Govern- ment, establish a republic, and then ask the United States for admittance into its Union. My opinion has recently been frequently asked in regard to probable success of the two measures proposed. I have said that if annexation or a reci- procity treaty is proposed on the part of Hawaii to the United States, that the subject will, in either case, be profoundly considered and decided upon. King Wieeing to Seed out. “Those favoring the former measure think it can be carried if the King’s con- sent thereto is first obtained (and endeavors will be made to that end), provided the United States will, for and in consideraton of said cession, pension off His Majesty and all the chiefs of royal blood with the aggregate sum per annum of $1 25,000, and pay off the Hawaiian national debt, now amounting to about $250,000, and bestow upon the cause and for the benefit of education, public schools, and the nation’s hospitals (three of the later in number) the proprietorship and revenues of the crown and public lands. The value of said lands is at present estimated at about $1,000,000. It includes, however, the public buildings, waterworks, wharf property, fish ponds, etc. The income of the crown lands, now inuring to the sovereign, amounts to about $25,000 per annum. The public, or Government, waterworks give about $15,000 per annum, wharf property about the same, not- withstanding the free use of them granted to steamship lines. U. S. Government Shoui.d Declare its Policy. “ Many persons are lukewarm on the subject of annexation to the United States solely for the reason that they fear repulse by the United States Government. / think the latter should declare its policy and object in regard to this important subject. This nation is bewildered and suffering to some degree, not knowing how to shape its own policy in connection with its hopes and expections in regard to the United States.” (Vol. 2. Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 961.) 68 The Kalakaua Election Riot. In a dispatch to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, U. S. Minister Pierce describes the riot in Honolulu, at the time of and consequent upon the election of Kalakaua as King, which was suppressed by United States troops. American War Vessels Should Always be Maintained at Honolulu. He concludes: “Hereafter a United States vessel of war should always be stationed at these islands under a system of reliefs. A time may arrive when the United States Government will find it necessary for the interests of our nation and its resident citizens here to take possession of this country by military occupation." (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 970.) Reciprocity Urged to bind Hawaii to the United States. Mr. Pierce, to Secretary Fish, urges the negotiation of a treaty of reciprocity between the two countries, and concludes: “ In view of the best interests of the United States in their relations with these islands, I take the liberty to express the hope that a liberal commercial treaty may soon be inaugurated by the two countries, feeling confident that such act would result to the equal benefit of both nations in a pecuniary sense, and, moreover, be the means of binding this archipelago to the United States by the chains of self- interest, never to be severed. ’ ’ (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 971.) JOHN E. STEVENS. Increase of Annexation Sentiment i)i Hawaii. U. S. Minister John L. Stevens, at Honolulu, on February 8, 1892, says in a dispatch to Secretary of State Blaine, after describing the situation in Honolulu : “ There are incetasing indications that the annexation sentiment is growing among the business men as well as with the less responsible of the foreign and native population of the island. The present political situation is feverish, and I see no prospect of its being permanently otherwise until these islands become a part of th“ American Union or a possession of Great Britain. The intelligent and responsible men here, unaided by outside support, are too few in numbers to con- trol in political affairs and to secure good government. There are indications that even the ‘ Liberals,’ just beaten at the election, though composed of a majority of the popular vote, are about to declare for annexation, at least their leaders, their chief newspaper having already published editorials to this effect. New Departure Necessary—Protectorate Impracticable—Annexation only Remedy. “ At a future time, after the proposed treaty shall have been ratified, I shall deem it my official duty to give a more elaborate statement of facts and reasons why a ‘ new departure * by the United States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity, that a ‘protectorate* is impracticable, and that annexation must be the future remedy, or else Great Hu tain will be furnished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on these islands which will cause future serious embar- rassment to the Uniteed States. “ At this time there seems to be no immediate prospect of its being safe to have the harbor of Honolulu left without an American vessel of war. Last week a British gunboat arrived here, and it is said will remain here for an indefinite period.’* (Yol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 9S9.) 69 Revolutionary Movement for Annexation. On March 8, 1892, U. S. Minister Stevens, in a dispatch to Secre- tary Blaine, states that there are indications of a revolutionary attempt to overthrow the Queen and establish a republic, with a view of ulti- mate annexation to the United States, and asks for instructions (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 990.) Note.—(The revoluion indicated was not by the persons who afterwards carried out the revolution of 1893, but was being gotten up by an almost exclusively native combination, under the leadership of a half-white, Wilcox. They were politically hostile to the persons organizing the successful revolution of 1893, and since 1893 have been rabid royalists.) Superior Interests in Hawaii the Avowed Policy of the United States. Mr. Stevens sent a dispatch to Secretary of State Foster, Novem- ber 20, 1892, in which he states: “An intelligent and impartial examination of the facts can hardly fail to lead to the conclusion that the relations and policy of the United States toward Hawaii will soon demand some change, if not the adoption of decisive measures, with the aim to secure American interests and future supremacy by encouraging Hawaiian development and aiding to promote responsible government in these islands. It is unnecessary for me to allude to the deep interest and the settled policy of the United States Government in respect to these island, from the official days of John Quincy Adams and of Daniel Webster to the present time. In all that period, we have avowed the superiority of our interests to those of all other nations, and have always refused to embarrass our freedom of action by any alliance or arrangement with other powers as to the ultimate possession and government of the islands.” (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 996.) Analysis of Conditions. He then proceeds to give an analysis of the situation, referring to the commercial and naval importance of the Islands, its Government, existing business status, and recommends that: Either Annexation or Customs Union. “One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed, either bold and vigorous measures for annexation, or a '■customs union,' an ocean cable from the California coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the islands. Reasons Why Annexation Preferable. I believe the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more advanta- geous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end fo> the United States. If it was wise for the United States, through Secretary Marcy, thirty-eight years ago, to offer to expend $100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly cannot be chimerical or unwise to expend $100,000 to secure annexa- tion in the near future. Today the United States has five times the wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger than they were then. * * * A perpetual customs union and the acquisition of Pearl Harbor, with an implied protectorate, must be regarded as the only allowable alternative. This would require the continual presence in the Harbor of Honolulu of a United States vessel of war and the constant watchfulness of the United States Minister while the present bungling, unsettled, and expensive political rule would go on, retarding the development of the islands, leaving at the end of twenty-five years more embarrassment to annexation than exists today, the property far less valuable, and the population less American than they would be if annexation were soon realized. * * * 70 “Objections to Customs Union. “To give Hawaii a highly favorable treaty while she remains outside the American Union would necessarily give the same advantages to hostile foreigners, those who would continue to antagonize our commercial and political interests here, as well as those of American blood and sympathies. * * * Besides, so long as the islands retain their own independent government there remains the possibility that England or the Canadian Dominion might secure one of the Hawaiian harbors for a coaling station. Annexation excludes all dangers of this kind. Decision Shourd be Made as to Which Poricy to Forrow. “Which of the two lines of policy and action shall be adopted our statesmen and our Government must decide. Certain it is that the interests of the United States and the welfare of these islands will not permit the continuance of the exist- ing state and tendency of things. Having for so many years extended a helping hand to the islands and encouraging, the American residents and their friends at home to the extent we have, we cannot refrain now from aiding them with vig- orous measures, without injury to ourselves and those of our ‘kith and kin,’ and without neglecting American opportunities that never seemed so obvious and press- ing as they do now.” (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, pp. 1002-3.1 Opinions of U. S. Military and Naval Officers Concerning the Con- trol or Annexation of Hawaii. GEN. J. M. SCHOFIELD AND GEN. B. S. ALEXANDER. Report on Defensive Capabilities of Hawaii in Case of War. On June 24, 1872, Secretary of War Wm. W. Belknap issued con- fidential instructions to Generals Schofield and Alexander to go to Honolulu and investigate its defensive capabilities, in the event of war between the United States and some other maratime nation. Their report is lengthy and contains the following : <•**-* We ascertained from the officers of the U. S. Navy, from maps and from seafaring men that Honolulu is the only good commercial harbor in the whole group of the Sandwich Islands. “An enemy could take up his position outside of the entrance to the harbor and command the entire anchorage, as well as the town of Honolulu itself. This harbor would, therefore, be of no use to us as a harbor of refuge in a war with a bowerful maritime nation. Pearr River onry Harbor that can be Protected in Time of War. “ With one exception there is no harbor on the islands that can be made to sat- isfy all the conditions necessary for a harbor of refuge in time of war. This is the harbor of Ewa or Jyeart River, situated on the Island of Oahu, about 7 miles west of Honolulu. “ Pearl River is a fine sliaet of deep water extending inland about six miles from its mouth, where it could be completely defended by shore batteries. The depth of water after passing the bar is ample for any vessel. “ Pearl River is not a true river ; it partakes more of the character of an estu- ary. It is divided into three portions called ‘locks’—the east lock, the middle lock, and the west lock, the three together affording some 30 miles of water front, with deep water in the channels. * * * Easiry Defended—Water—Land—Provisions. “ If the coral barrier wTere removed, Pearl River harbor would seem to have all, or nearly all, the necessary properties to enable it to be converted into a good harbor of refuge. It could be completely defended by inexpensive batteries on 71 either or both shores, firing across a narrow channel of entrance.. Its waters are deep enough for the largest vessels of war, and its ‘locks, ’ particularly around Rabbitt Island, are spacious enough for a large number of vessels to ride at anchor in perfect security against all storms. Its shores are suitable foi building proper establishments for sheltering the necessary supplies for a naval establishment, such as magazines of ammunition, provisions, coal, spars, rigging, etc., while the island of Oahu, upon which it is situated, could furnish fresh provisions, meats, fruits, and vegetables in large quantities. * * * If Made a Naval Station Jurisdiction Should Be Transferred to the United States. “ In case it should become the policy of the Government of the United States to obtain the possession of this harbor for naval purposes, jurisdiction over all the waters of Pearl River, with the adjacent shores to the distance of 4 miles from any anchorage, should be ceded to the United States by the Hawaiian Government. I ‘ This would be necessary in order to enable the Government to defend its depots and anchorages in time of war by works located on its own territory. Such a cession of jurisdiction would embrace a parallelogram of about 10 by 12 miles. * * * Action Must be in Advance of War. “ It is to be observed that if the United States are ever to have a harbor of refuge and naval station in the Hawaiian Islands in the event of w7ar, the harbo> must be prepared in advance by the removal of the Pearl River bar. II When war has begun it will be too late to make this harbor available, and there is no other suitable harbor on these islands.'' (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, pp. 963-6.) GEO. BROWN. Hawaiian Sentiment in Favor of Annexation. Admiral Geo. Brown, September 6, 1892, in a dispatch to Secre- tary of the Navy Tracy, says : “ There is a strong sentiment existing in Hawaii, among the native Hawaiians as well as among the Americans and Germans, in favor.of a change in the form oj government, looking toward the ultimate annexation of the islands to the United States. * * * “ It is thought that the Queen will consent to abdicate in favor of a republican form of government if she can be assured that a suitable provision will be made for her in the way of a permanent pecuniary settlement.” * * * (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 991.) G. C. WIETSE. Growing Annexation Sentiment. Capt. G. C. Wiltse, October 12, 1892, in a dispatch to Secretary of the Navy Tracy, says : “ There is a large and growing Sentiment, particularly among the planters, in favor of annexation to the United States, but I am informed that the leaders do not think an opportune moment will arrive for some time to come. However, everything seems to point toward an eventual request for annexation." (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 993.) CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN. Favors Annexation. (Id., Vol. i, p. 113, and the Forum, Mar., 1893:) “ The United States finds herself compelled to make a decision * * * whether we wish to or no, we must make the decision. * * * 72 “ To any one viewing a map that shows the full extent of the Pacific, * * two circumstances will be strikingly and immediately apparent. He will see at a glance that the Sandwich Islands stand by themselves in a state of comparative isolation, amid a vast expanse of sea ; and, again, that they form the center of a large circle whose radius is approximately the distance from Honolulu to San Francisco. * * * this is substantially the same distance as from Honolulu to the Gilbert, Marshall, Samoan, and Society islands, all under European control except Samoa, in which we have a part influence. * * * Remarkable Strategical Position of Hawaii. “ To have a central position such as this, and to be alone, having no rival and admitting no rival, * * * are conditions that at once fix the attention of the stratagist. * * * But to this striking combination is to be added the remarkable relations borne * * * to the great commercial routes traversing this vast ex- panse. * * * “Too much stress cannot be laid upon the immense disadvantage to us of any maritime enemy having a coaling station well within 2,500 miles, as this is, of every point of our coast line from Puget Sound to Mexico. Were there many others available we might find it diffcult to exclude from all. There is, however, but the one. Shut out from the Sandwich Islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown back for supplies of fuel to distances of 3,500 or 4,000 miles—or between 7,000 and 8,000 going and coming—an impediment to sustained maritime operations well nigh pro- hibitive. * * * ft is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defence of a coast line—of a sea frontier—is concentrated in a single position, and the circum- stance renders doubly imperative upon us to secure it if we righteously can." STATEMENT OF GEN. SCHOFIELD. Failure to Annex Would be a Crime. “ ‘ I went to the Hawaiian Islands 20 years ago. The annexation question was up then. My business was to look the question over from the military point of view. I made a report that while I regarded annexation as inevitable, and but a matter of time, the conditions were not ripe for it then. * * * “ 1 There can be no doubt now about the time for annexation, or that it should be the outcome of the present negotiations. Annexation may not be the imme- diate step; but it is near at hand and is a foregone conclusion, whether it is put off a little while by a protectorate or until a commission further ascertains the con- ditions favorable to it.’ “ In regard to the question of suffrage, the General said there would be no trouble. If annexed, all those who are citizens now would of course become cit- izens of the United States. The Chinese and Japanese, who are not citizens there now, would be excluded. * * * “On thing is plain enough, the Hawaiian people must have protection from some quarter. If they cannot get it from the United States, they will have to reach out for it in some other direction. * * * To fail those people now would he a crime. ’ ’ (N. Y. Tribune, March 15, 1893, p. 2.) In 1875 General J. M. Schofield, then commanding the Division of the Pacific, gave his views to Congress, through Mr. Luttrell, con- cerning the reciprocity treaty, then pending before Congress as follows: “ The Hawaiian Islands constitute the only natural outpost to the defences of the Pacific coast. In possession of a foreign naval power, in time of war, as a depot from which to fit out hostile expeditions against this coast and our commerce on the Pacific Ocean, they would afford the means of incalculable injury to the United States. If the absolute neutrality Jof the islands could always be insured, that would suffice; but they have not, and never can have, the power to maintain their own neutrality, and now their necessities force them to seek alliance with some nation which can relieve their embarrassment. The British Empire * * * stands ready to enter into such an alliance, and thus complete its chain of naval stations from Australia to British Columbia. We cannot refuse the islands the lit- tle aid they need and at the same time deny their right to seek it elsewhere. The time has come when we must secure forever the desired control over those islands or let it pass into other hands. The financial interest to the United States involved 73 in this treaty is very small, and if it were much greater it would still be insignifi- cant when compared to the importance of such a military and naval station to the national security and welfare.” ADMIRAL, BEDKNAP. Overthrow oe Monarchy Expected. “ The revolution in the Hawaiian Islands, resulting in the deposition of the Queen and the establishment of a provisional government, is an event not unex- pected to diplomatic, naval, and consular officers who have had any acquaintance or familiarity with the course of affairs in that island Kingdom for the past twenty years. Annexation oe Momentous Interest and Vitae Importance. “To the people of the United States the present situation is of momentous in- terest and of vital importance. Indeed, it would seem that nature had established that group to be ultimately occupied as an outpost, as it were, of the great Repub- lic on its western border, and that the time had now come for the fulfillment of such design. “A glance at a chart of the Pacific will indicate to the most casual observer the great importance and inestimable value of those islands as a strategic point and commercial centre. Situtated in mid-north Pacific, the group looks out on every hand toward grand opportunities of trade, political aggrandizement, and polyglot intercourse.” “ The group now seeks annexation to the United States; the consummation of such wish would inure to the benefit of both peoples commercially and politically. Annex the islands, constitue them a territory, and reciprocal trade will double within ten years. Let the islanders feel that they are once and forever under the folds of the Amercan flag, as part and parcel of the great Republic, and a develop- ment will take place in the group that will at once surprise its people and the world. Faieure to annex Woued be Foeey. “Not to take the fruit within our grasp and annex the group now begging us to take it in would be folly indeed—a mistake of the gravest character, both for the statesmen of the day, and for the men among us of high commercial aims and great enterprises. “ Our statesmen should act in this matter in the spirit and resolve that secured to us the vast Louisiana purchase, the annexation of Texas, and the acquisition of California. The administration that secures to the United States the ‘coign of vantage’ in the possession of those beautiful islands will score a great measure of beneficent achievement to the credit side of its account.” Should Annex Even at Hazard oe War. “ We want no joint protectorate, no occupation there by any European power, no Pacific Egypt. We need the group as part and parcel of the United States, and should take what is offered us, even at the hazard of war. “ Westward the star of empire takes it way. Let the Monroe doctrine stay not its hand until it holds Hawaii securely within its grasp. “In this matter the undersigned speaks from personal knowledge, gained through official visits to the islands in 1874 and 1882. ” * * * (Sen. Com. of F. R. on H., Vol. 1, p. 169, and Boston Herald, January 31, 1893-) 74 Acts of the United States Congress Concerning the Control or Annexation of Hawaii. The Grant Reciprocity Treaty, 1874. A Reciprocity Treaty was negotiated by Secretary Fish under President Grant. The Political Clause. The vital feature of the Treaty to the United States is in article IV, which provides that so long as the treaty exists, Hawaii— “ will not lease or otherwise dispose of or create any lien upon any port harbor or other territory * * * or grant any special privilege or right of use therein to any other government” * * * nor make any reciprocity treaty with any other Government. The Pearl River Clause. A renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty for seven }Tears was concluded November 9, 1887, by President Cleveland. The extended Treaty also gives the United States : * * “ The exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end the United States may improve the entrance of said harbor and do all things needful to the purpose aforesaid.” (The full Treaty is printed in Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., relating to Hawaii, p. 978-9, and hereunder.) Resolution of U. S. House of Representatives. (February 7, 1894.) “Resolved, * * * That foreign intervention in the political affairs of the (Hawaiian) Islands will not be regarded with indifference by the Government of the United States.” (Cong. Record, 53d Cong., 2d Sessn, p. 2001.) Resolution of U. S. Senate. (May 31, 1894.) “Resolved, That * * * any intervention in the political affairs of these islands (Hawaii) b}r any other government will be regarded as an act unfriendly to the United States.” (Cong. Record, 53d Cong., 2d Sessn., p. 5499.) Report of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Concerning Hawaii. The Senate Committee of Foreign Relations was, by resolution of the Senate, instructed to enquire into and report upon matters arising out of the revolution in Hawaii of January, 1893. On February 26th, 1894, an elaborate report was filed by the Chairman, Senator John T. Morgan, from which the following extracts are made : Hawaii an American State. “ Hawaii is an American State, and is embraced in the American commercial and military system. “ This fact has been frequently and firmly stated by our government, and is the ground on which is rested that peculiar and far-reaching declaration so often and so earnestly made, that the United States will not admit the right of any foreign government to acquire any interest or control in the Hawaiian Islands that is in any way prejudicial, or even threatening, toward the interests of the United States or her people.” * * * (Report Sen. Com. on For. Rel. on Hawaii, Vol. i, p. 2.) Within The Scope oe the Monroe Doctrine. “ Observing the spirit of the Monroe doctrine, the United States, in the begin- ning of our relations with Hawaii, made a firm and distinct declaration of the purpose to prevent tlie absorbtion of Hawaii or the political control of that country by any foreign power. “ Without stating the reasons for this policy, which included very important commercial and military considerations, the attitude of the United States toward Hawaii wyas, in moral effect, that of a friendly protectorate. “ It has been a settled policy of the United States that if it should turn out that Hawaii, for any cause, should not be able to maintain an independent govern- ment, that country would be encouraged in its tendency to gravitate toward polit- ical union with this country.” * * * (/£., p. 20.) * ‘ Annexation is a question of longstanding w’hich has been under favorable consideration by the kings and people of Hawaii and the government and people of the United States for more than fifty years. “ It is well understood, and its importance increases with every new event of any consequence in Hawaii, and with the falling in of every island in the Pacific Ocean that is captured by the great maritime powers of Europe.” * * * (lb., p. 28.) Senators Sherman, Frye, Dolph, and Davis, of Minnesota, added to this report the following words : ‘ ‘ We are in entire accord with the essential findings in the exceedingly able report submitted by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.” But they proceed to set forth certain points wherein they differ from him and elaborate others. In this connection they say : “ The question of the riglitfulness of the revolution, of the lawfulness of the means by which the deposition and abdication of the queen were effected, and the right of the Provisional Government to exist and to continue to exist was conclus- ively settled, as the report so forcibly states, against the queen and in favor of the Provisional Government, by the act of the administration of President Harrison recognizing such Provisional Government; by the negotiation by that administra- tion with such Provisional Government of a treaty of annexation to the United States ; by accrediting diplomatic representation by such administration and by the present administration to such Provisional Government.” * * * (/6.,pp. 33, 34.) Senators Turpie and Butler, of South Carolina, added to the report the following words : * * * “ I am heartily in favor of the acquition of those islands (Hawaii) by the Government of the United States ; and in the proper case and on an appropriate occasion I should earnestly advocate the same. ” * * * (/£., p. 36.) 75 76 Official Acts of Hawaii, concerning the Control or Annexation of Hawaii to the United States. Cession of Hawaii to United States. Kamehameha III executed and delivered to the American Minis- ter in Honolulu a provissional cession of Hawaii to the United States, on March io, 1851. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaii, p. 897.) Ratification of Cession to United States. June 21, 1851, a joint resolution was passed by the two Houses of the Hawaiian Legislature, authorizing the King, in his discretion, to place the Kingdom under the protection of some foreign state. This was in confirmation of the provissional cession of the country to the United States, above quoted, which was dated the iothof March, 1851. (Vol. 2, Rep. Sen. Com. on For. Rel., concerning Hawaiian Islands, p. 934.) Annexation Treaty Negotiated. A formal treaty annexing Hawraii to the United States was nego- tiated in 1854 by Kamehameha III and U. S. Minister Gregg, under the instructions of Secretary Marcy. The draft was agreed to, but the King died before the final copy was signed. (Ib., p. 932-5-) The Reciprocity Treaty. In 1875 Hawaii made a treaty with the United States never to cede any port or territory to any other government as long as the treaty of reciprocity lasted. fThe treaty is hereinafter contained.'I \lb., p. 972-) The Pearl River Treaty. November 9, 1887, Hawaii granted to the United States the exclusive use of Pearl Harbor for a Naval and Repair Station. ("The ireaty is hereinafter contained.) (Ib., 978.) Hazvaiian Constitution Providesfor Annexation. The Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii, adopted July 4, 1894, provides, Article 32, that— "The President, with the approval of the Cabinet, is hereby expressly author- ized and empowered to make a treaty of political or commercial union between the Republic of Hawaii and the United States of America, subject to the ratification of the Senate.” (President’s Message, Senate Ex. Document No. 156, p. 13, 53d Congress, 2d Session.) 77 Hawaiian Legislature Unanimously Votes for Annexation. The following Joint Resolution was unanimously adopted by both the Senate and House of Representatives of the Legislature of the Republic of Hawaii, May 27, 1896 : “Whereas it has heretofore been the announced policy both of the Provisional Government and of the Republic of Hawaii to advocate the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States of America; and “Whereas the Legislature of the Republic of Hawaii is now in regular session assembled, and will soon adjourn for a considerable period ; and “ Whereas it is fitting that the elected Representatives of the people should place themselves on record as to the present state of feeling among themselves and their constituents on this subject; “ Be It Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives, that the Legislature of the Republic of Hawaii continues to be, as heretofore, firmly and steadfastly in favor of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States of America, and in advocating such policy they feel assured that they are express- ing not only their own sentiments but those of the voters of this Republic. ” “ Approved this 27th day of May, A. D. 1896. (Laws of the Rep. of Hawaii, 1896, p. 274.) Treaty of Annexation of Hawaii, Negotiated in 1854, Under President Pierce, Secretary of State Marcy. His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, being convinced that plans have been, and still are, on foot hostile to his sovereignty and to the peace of his Kingdom, which His Majesty is without power to resist, and against which it is his imparative duty to provide, in order to prevent the evils of anarchy and to secure the rights and prosperity of his subjects, and having in conscientious regard thereto, as well as to the general interests of his Kingdom, present and future, sought to incorporate his Kingdom into the Union of the United States, as the means best calculated to attain these ends and perpetuate the blessings of freedom and equal rights to himself, his chiefs, and his people; and the Government of the United States, being actuated solely by the desire to add to their security and pros- perity and to meet the wishes of His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, and of his Government, have determined to accomplish by treaty objects so im- portant to their mutual and permanent welfare. Article I. His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, acting in conformity with the power vested iti him by the constitution of his Kingdom, and with the wishes of his chiefs and people, and of the heads of every department of his Government, cedes to the United States his Kingdom, with all its territories, to be held by them in full sovereignty, subject only to the same constitutional prov:sions as the other States of the American Union. This cession includes all public lots and squares, Government lands, mines and minerals, salt lakes and springs, fish ponds, public edifices, fortifications, barracks, forts, ports and harbors, reefs, docks, and maga- zines, arms, armaments and accounterments, public archives, and funds, claims, debts, taxes and dues existing, available, and unpaid at the date of the exchange fo the ratifications of this treaty. Article II. The Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands shall be incorporated into the American Union as a State, enjoying the same degree of sovereignty as other States, and ad- mitted as such as soon as it can be done in consistency with the principles and re- quirements of the Federal Constitution, to all the rights, privileges, and immuni- ties of a State as aforesaid, on a perfect equality with the other States of the Union. Articles III. His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, his chiefs and subjects of every class, shall continue in the enjoyment of all their existing personal and private right's—civil, political, and religious—to the utmost extent that is possible under the Federal Constitution, and shall possess and forever enjoy all the rights and privileges of citizens of the United States, on terms of perfect equality, in all re- spects, with other American citizens. 78 Article IV. The decision of the board of land commissioners made and not appealed from, at the date of the final ratification of this treaty, shall be and remain forever valid and undisturbed, and all titles to real estate which are now, or shall have then been declared valid under the laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom, shall be held to be equally valid by the United States, and measures shall be adopted by the United States for the speedy and final adjudication of all unsettled claims to land in con- formity with the laws and usages under which they may have originated. Article V. All engagements of whatever kind, affecting the rights of corporations or indi- viduals, validly contracted, and lawfully incumbent upon the King’s Government or the Hawaiian nation to pay and discharge, shall be respected and fulfilled in as prompt, full, and complete a manner as they would have been respected and ful- filled had no change of sovereignty taken place Article VI. The public lands hereby ceded shall be subject to the laws regulating the pub- lic lands in other parts of the United States, liable, however, to such alterations and changes as Congress may from time to time enact. The grants of land for the promotion of education heretofore made by the Government of the King of the Hawaiian Islands shall be confirmed by the United States, which in addition there- to, shall grant afld set apart for the purposes of common schools, seminaries of learning, and universities so much of the public lands and of the proceeds thereof as may be equal proportionally to the grants for such purposes in any of the States of the Union. Article VII. The laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom, so far as they are compatible with repub- lican institutions and conformable to the Constitution of the United States, shall be and remain in full force and effect until modified, changed, or repealed by the legislative authority of the State contemplated by this treaty. Article VIII. In consideration of the cession made by this treaty, and in compensation to all who may suffer or incur loss consequent thereon, the United States shall pay the aggregate sum of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) as annuities to the King, the Queen, the crown prince, those standing next in succession to the throne the chiefs, and all other persons whom the King may wish to compensate or reward, to be apportioned as may be determined by His Majesty the King, and his privy council of state, which amounts to be apportioned as aforesaid, shall be paid rata- bly without deduction or offset on any ground or in any shape whatever, to the parties severally named in such apportionment, at Honolulu on the first day of July of each successive year so long as they may live. It is, however, expressly agreed upon that on the demise of His present Majesty the annuity of the immediate heir to the throne shall then be increased to the same amount before allowed and paid to the King himself. As a further consideration for the cession herein made, and in order to place within the reach of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands the means of education, present and future, so as to enable them the more perfectly to enjoy and discharge the rights and duties consequent upon a change from monarchical to republican institutions, the United States agree to set apart and pay over for the term of ten years the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars per annum, one-third of which shall be applied to constitute the principal of a fund for tha benefit of a college or uni- versity, or colleges or universities, as the case may be, and the balance for the sup- port of common schools, to be invested, secured, or applied as may be determined by the legislative authority of the Hawaiian Islands, when admitted as a State into the Union, as aforesaid. Article IX. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty the President of the United Stated shall appoint a commissioner, who shall receive in due form, in the name of the United States, the transfer of the sovereignty and territories of the Hawaiian Islands; also all public property, archives, and other things herein- before stipulated to be conveyed, and who shall exercise all executive authority in said islands necessary to the preservation of peace and order, and to the proper execution of the laws, until the State contemplated in this treaty can be duly or- 79 ganized and admitted as such State; and until the arrival of such commissioner, all departments of His Majesty’s Government shall continue as now constituted. Article X. This treaty shall be ratified by the respective high contracting parties, and the ratifications exchanged at the city of Honolulu within eight months from the date hereof, or sooner, if possible, but it is agreed that this period may be extended by mutual consent of the two parties. In witness whereof, we, the undersigned, plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands and of the United States of America, have signed three originals of this treaty of annexation in Hawaiian and three in English, and have thereunto affixed our respective official seals. Done at Honolulu this day of , in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four. SEPARATE AND SECRET ARTICLE. Whereas it is desirable to guard against the exigencies declared in the pream- ble to the foregoing treaty, and to secure the King of the Hawaiian Islands, his chiefs and all who reside under his jurisdiction from the dangers therein referred to and expressed, it is hereby provided and expressly agreed that at any time be- fore the final exchange of the ratifications of said treaty, if the same shall be duly ratified on the part of His Majesty the King and satisfactory notice thereof given to the commissioner of the United States, it shall be competent for His Majesty, by proclamation, to declare his islands annexed to the American Union, subject to the provisions of such treaty as negotiated; and the commissioner of the United States, for the time being, shall receive and accept the transfer of the jurisdiction of the said islands, in the name of the United States, and protect and defend them by the armed forces of the United States, as a part of the American Union, holding the same for and in behalf of his Government and exercising the jurisdiction provided for in said treaty, with the understanding, however, that in case the said treaty is not finally ratified, or other arrangement made by the free consent and to the mu- tual satisfaction of the contracting parties, the sovereignty of the islands shall im- mediately revert, without prejudice, to His Majesty, or his immediate heir, in the same condition as before the transfer thereof; and it is further understood and agreed that this article shall be as binding for all the ends and purposes herein ex- pressed as if it formed a part of the foregoing treaty. Reciprocity Treaty of 1875* Article I. For and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands in the next succeeding article of this convention, and as an equivalent therefor, the United States of America hereby agree to admit all the articles named in the following schedule, the same beiug the growth and manufacture or produce of the Hawaiian Islands, into all the ports of the United States free of duty. (schedule.) Article II. For and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted by the United States of America in the preceding article of this convention, and as an equivalent therefor, His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands hereby agrees to admit all the articles named in the following schedule, the same being the growth, manu- facture, or produce of the United States of America, into all the ports of the Hawaiian Islands free of duty. (SCHEDULE.) Article III. The evidence that articles proposed to be admitted into the ports of the United States of America, or the ports of the Hawaiian Islands, free of duty, under the 80 first and second articles of this convention, are the growth, manufacture, or produce of the United States of America or of the Hawaiian Islands, respectively, shall be established under such rules and regulations aud conditions for the pro- tection of the revenue as the two Governmeuts may from time to time respectively prescribe. Article IV. No export duty or charges shall be imposed in the Hawaiian Islands, or in the United States, upon any of the articles proposed to be admitted into the ports of the United States or the ports of the Hawaiian Islands free of duty under the first and second articles of this convention. It is argeed, on the part of His Hawaiian Majesty, that, so long as this treaty shall temain in force, he will not lease or otherwise dispose of or create any lien upon any port, harbor, or other territory in his dominions, or grant any special privilege or rights of use therein, to any other poiver, state, or government, nor make any treaty by which any other nation shall obtain the same privileges, relative to the admission of any articles free of duty, hereby secured to the United States. Article V. The present convention shall take effect as soon as it shall have been approved and proclaimed by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, and shall have been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the Government of the United States, but not until a law to carry it into operation shall have been passed by the Congress of the United States of America. Sucli assent having been given, and the ratifications of the convention having been exchanged as provided in Article VI, the convention shall remain in force for seven years from the date at which it may come into operation; and further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, each of the high contracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of seven years, or at any time thereafter. Article VI. The present convention shall be duly ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Washington City, within eighteen months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries of the high contracting parties have signed this present conventiou, aud have affixed thereto their respec- tive seals. Done in duplicate, at Washington, the thirtieth day of January, iu the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five. PEARL RIVER CLAUSE. (On the 9th of November, 1887, the Reciprocity Treaty was extended for seven years aud the following clause added to it.) “ His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the Government of the I nited States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States, and to that end the United States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other things needful to the purpose aforesaid.” Treaty of Annexation of Hawaii, Negotiated in J893, under Presi- dent Harrison, Secretary of State Foster. The t nited States of America and the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, in view of the natural dependence of those Islands upon the United States, of their geographical proximity thereto, of the intimate part taken by the citizens of the United States in their implanting the seeds of Christian civilization, of the long continuance of their exclusive reciprocal commercial relations whereby their mutual interests have been developed, and the preponderant and paramount share thus acquired by the United States and the citizens in their productions, industries and trade of the said Islands, and especially in view of the desire expressed by the said Government of the Hawaiian Islands that those Islands shall be incorporated into the United States as an integral part thereof ar.d under their sovereignty, in order to provide for and assure the security and prosperity of the said Islands, the High Contracting Parties have determined to accomplish by treaty an object so im- portant to their mutual and permanent welfare. * * * Article I. The Government of the Hawaiian Islands hereby cedes, from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, absolutely and without reserve to the United States forever all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, renouncing in favor of the United States every sovereign right of which as an independent nation it is now possessed; and henceforth said Hawaiian Islands and every island and key thereunto appertain- ing and each and every portion thereof shall become and be an integral part of the territory of the United States. Article II. The Government of the Hawaiian Islands also cedes and transfers to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public, government or crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, fortifications, military or naval equip- ments and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining. The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition : Provided, that all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil, military or naval purposes of the United States ofmay be assigned to the use of the local Government, shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educa- tional and other public purposes. Article III. Until Congress shall otherwise provide, the existing Government and laws of the Hawaiian Islands are hereby continued, subject to the paramount authority of the United States. The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen- ate, shall appoint a Commissioner to reside in said Islands who shall have the pow- er to veto any act of said Government, and any act disapproved by him shall thereupon be void and of no effect unless approved by the President. Congress shall, within one year from the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, enact the necessary legislation to extend to the Hawaiian Islands the laws of the United States respecting duties upon imports, the internal revenue, com- merce and navigation; but until Congress shall otherwise provide, the existing commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands both with the United States and for- eign countries shall continue as regards the commerce of said Islands with the rest of the United States and with foreign countries, but this shall not be construed as giving to said Islands the power to enter into any new stipulation or agreement whatsoever or to have diplomatic intercourse with any foreign Government. The Consular representatives of foreign powers now resident in the Hawaiian Islands shall be permitted to continue in the exercise of their consular functions until they can receive their exequaturs from the Government of the United States. Article IV. The further immigration of Chinese laborers into the Hawaiian Islands is here- by prohibited until Congress shall otherwise provide. Furthermore, Chinese per- sons of the classes now or hereafter excluded by law from entering the United States will not be permitted to come from the Hawaiian Islands to other parts of the United States, and if so coming shall be subject to the same penalties as if en- tering from a foreign country. Article V. The public debt of the Hawaiian Islands, lawfully existing at the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty including the amounts due to deposi- tors in the Hawaiian Postal Savings Bank, is hereby assumed by the Government of the United States; but the liability of the United States in this regard shall in no case exceed three and one quarter millions of dollars. So long, however, as the existing Government and the present commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are continued as hereinbefore provided, said Government shall continue to pay the interest on said debt. Article VI. The Government of the United States agrees to pay to Liliuokalani, the late 82 Queen, within one year from date of the exchange of the ratification of this Treaty the sum of twenty thousand dollars, and annually thereafter a like sum of twenty thousand dollars during the term of her natural life, provided she in good faith submits to the authority of the Government of the United States and the local Government of the Islands. And the Government of the United Stares further agrees to pay to the Princess Kaiulani within one year from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty the gross sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, provided she in good faith submits to the authority of the Government of the United States and the local Government of the Islands. Article VII. The present Treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the one part, and by the Pro- visional Government of the Hawaiian Islands on the other, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Honolulu as soon as possible. Such exchange shall be made on the part of the United States by the Commissioner hereinbefore pro- vided for, and it shall operate as a complete and final conveyance to the United States of all the rights of sovereignty and property herein cedei to them. Within one month after such exchange of ratifications the Provisional Government shall furnish said Commissioner with a full and complete schedule of all the public property herein ceded and transferred. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the above articles and have hereunto affixed their seals. Done in duplicate at the city of Washington this fourteenth day of February, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-three. Treaty ot Annexation of Hawaii, negotiated in 1897, under President McKinley, Secretary of State Sherman* The United States and the Republic of Hawaii, in view of the natural depend- ence of the Hawaiian Islands upon the United States, of their geographical prox- imity thereto, of the preponderant share acquired by the United States and its citizens in the industries and trade of said islands and of the expressed desire of the government of the Republic of Hawaii that those islands should be incorpora- ted into the United States as an integral part thereof and under its sovereignty, have determined to accomplish by treaty an object so important to their mutual and permanent welfare. To this end the high contracting parties have conferred full powers and authority upon their respectively appointed plenipotentiaries, to-wit : The President of the United States, John Sherman, Secretary of State of the United States. The President of the Republic of Hawaii, Francis March Hatch, Lorrin A. Thurston, and William A. Kinney. Articee I. The Republic of Hawaii hereby cedes absolutely and without reserve to the United States of America all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies; and it is agreed that all territory of and appertaining to the the Republic of Hawaii is hereby annexed to the United States of America under the name of the Territory of Hawaii. Article II. The Republic of Hawaii also cedes and hereby transfers to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public, government or crown lands, public buildings, or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipments, and all other public property of every kind and description, belonging to the Government of the Ha- waiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining. The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition. Provided that all reve- nues from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil, military or naval purposes of the United States, or may be assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely for the 83 benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes. Article III. Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands all the civil, judicial and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing government in said islands shall be vested in such person or persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct; and the President shall have power to remove said officers and fill the vacancies so occasioned. The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations shall forth- with cease and determine, being replaced by such treaties as may exist, or as may be hereafter concluded between the United States and 6uch foreign nations. The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this treaty nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States, nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine. Until legislation shall be enacted extending the United States customs laws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands, the existing customs relations of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States and other countries shall remain un- changed. Article; IV. The public debt of the Republic of Hawaii, lawfully existing at the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty, including the amounts due to depositors in the Hawaiian Postal Savings Bank, is hereby assumed by the Government of the United States, but the liability of the United States in this regard shall in no case exceed $4,000,000. So long, however, as the existing government and the present commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are continued, as hereinbe- fore provided, said government shall continue to pay the interest on said debt. Article V. There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States, and no Chinese by reason of anything herein contained shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands. Article VI. The President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of whom shall be residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as soon as reasonable and practi- cable, recommend to Congress such legislation for the Territory of Hawaii as they shall deem necessary or proper. Article VII. This treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the one part; and by the President of the Republic of Hawaii, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, in accord- ance with the Constitution of said Republic, on the other; and the ratifications hereof shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible. In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the above articles and have hereunto affixed their seals. Done in duplicate at the city of Washington, this sixteenth day of June, one thousand, eight liundred and ninety-seven. JOHN SHERMAN. [seal/ FRANCIS MARCH HATCH, [seal/ LORRIN A. THURSTON. [seal. WILLIAM A. KINNEY. [seal/ A. B. Morse Company, Printers and Binders, St Joseph, Michigan, V. S. A. HAWAII MAU I MOLOKAI LANAI; urQAlI U MAP OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS KAUAI NIIHAU THE PACIFIC OCEAt> Showing the relation of ' NAVAL STATIONS and principal ports I HAWAIIAN ISLANDS HAWAIIAN STATISTICS. AREA, 7000 SO. MILES . POPUL A T/0N-/896, 109,000 EXPORTS-1896. *15,515,000. IMP0RTS-I896, *7,164,000 REVENUES-1896, *1,975,000 EXPENSES-1896, *1,904,000. NET DEBT-1897. *3,889,000