THE ETHICS OF OPIUM THE ETHICS OF OPIUM BY. ELLEN N.(LA MOTTE Author of "Peking Dust,** "The Opium Monopoly," etc. THE CENTURY CO. New York and London Copyright, 1924, by The Centuby Co. PBINTED IN U. S. A. But the jingling of the guinea helps the hurt that Honour feels, And the nations do but murmur, snarling at each other's heels. "Locksley Hall" CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I The World's Drug Problem .... 3 II British Possessions: India .... 16 III " " India, Continued . 30 IV " " The Straits Settle- ments .... 50 V " " The Federated Ma- lay States . . 56 VI " " The Unfederated Malay States . 60 VII " " British North Bor- neo .... 69 VIII " " Sarawak ... 76 IX " " Brunei .... 79 X " " Ceylon .... 85 XI " " Mauritius ... 92 XII " " Hong-Kong ... 94 XIII " " Iraq 100 XIV Dutch " The Netherlands East Indies . .105 XV Portuguese " Macao . . . .Ill XVI French " Indo-China . . .117 XVII Siam 123 XVIII Japan 129 XIX China 138 CONTENTS CHAPTEB PAGE XX Turkey 154 XXI Persia 159 XXII The Small Opium Producing Countries: Bulgaria; Greece; the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; and Egypt 165 XXIII The Hague Opium Convention and the League of Nations 173 Appendix A The Hague Opium Convention . .187 Appendix B Treaty of Versailles: Articles Re- lating to Opium 203 Appendix C Per Capita Consumption of Opium in the Far East, Calculated on the Basis of the Chinese Population . . 205 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM THE ETHICS OF OPIUM CHAPTER I THE WORLD'S DRUG PROBLEM AMERICA is confronted with a drug prob- lem-how to stop the illicit sales of dan- gerous, habit-forming drugs, which are peddled and smuggled from one end of our country to the other. No State is exempt; there is no small town or big city in which this danger is not found. We have laws in plenty on our statute-books, laws prohibiting the sale of drugs except on a doctor's prescription, and while these are well en- forced, they are nevertheless unable to check the perpetual peddling and smuggling which goes on underground. While the police are constanly catching these petty peddlers, and the Federal authorities are frequently running to earth big gangs of smugglers, all this has but little effect on stopping the illicit traffic. For one gang caught, dozens operate unhindered. The young people of our country are the ones 3 4 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM sought out by these peddlers, who first teach them the drug habit, and then instruct them as to the tricks and devices they may resort to, in order to reach the underground channels of supply. Once the victim has acquired the habit and learned the ropes through which he can replenish his supplies, the object has been accomplished. A new cus- tomer has been added to the list, a new customer who will never let go, who cannot, even if he wishes, break away. So imperious are his needs, so overwhelming his craving, that he will pay any price to obtain his drug. He will resort to any lengths, or in desperation commit acts of vio- lence, any crime, to obtain money to pay for his daily dose of morphia or heroin, as the case may be. The peddlers well understand the psy- chology of drug addiction. They put any price they like on the drugs they sell. They make their victim pay through the nose, and know that he will pay, has to pay. There is no escape. These drug dealers, large and small, are building up a market for their wares and creating new customers who seldom backslide. Once a cus- tomer, always a customer. No other business is so secure, so certain of its market. It is just a question of increasing the market, bringing in day by day new buyers. It is a business which is WORLD'S DRUG PROBLEM 5 being carried on systematically, from one end of the country to the other. Drug addiction in America is no new thing. It has been going on steadily for years. Nor is the increase due to prohibition. The opponents of prohibition have given tremendous publicity to the spread of drugging, and for this publicity we must thank them. But otherwise the two habits, alcoholism and drugging, have run paral- lel for many years. We have known about al- coholism, for its effects are obvious and apparent. But we have not known about drugging till lately, for that is a secret habit, and the effects are not obvious to the casual onlooker. Had they been, we should have been aroused long ago to the danger in our midst. American statistics show that the majority of people who acquire the drug habit do so in early youth. One third have acquired it under the age of twenty, and one half while under the age of twenty-five. It is these young people, the ignorant and the inexperienced, for whom the drug peddler makes a dead set. Older people are too wary, as a rule, to be inveigled so easily. Older people know, most of them, the danger in- volved by accepting a pinch of white powder at a convivial party. But the young people of our 6 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM country have not the protection of wisdom and experience. Filled with curiosity, with the youthful desire to "try anything once," they be- come easy victims. A pinch of heroin snuffed up the nose is followed by an extraordinary feeling of exhilaration, the dropping of fatigue, or re- lease from boredom. If older people seek this sort of release, it is more or less deliberate. But to young people it is a new and highly exciting game, counterbalanced by no knowledge as to what happens when the game is continued. Therefore it is to the youth of our land that the drug peddler makes his insidious appeal, and these young people cannot be classed with the hardened drinkers whose alcohol supplies have been curtailed by prohibition. It is doubtless true that many older people take to drugs be- cause they have no longer easy access to alcohol. But people of this class are not our concern. It is not the waste material of our country that we would save. It is the fresh, the unspoiled, who need our help. As with America, so with Europe. All Euro- pean countries, large and small, are likewise con- fronted with a drug problem, the illicit under- ground traffic in drugs of addiction. And in Europe, as in America, protective, prohibitive legislation is not able to check the evil. The WORLD'S DRUG PROBLEM 7 European problem, however, is not as acute as ours, for the reason that these countries are not surrounded by vast, sparsely inhabited frontiers, such as our Mexican and Canadian borders. The Mexican and Canadian borders offer admirable facilities for smuggling, which advantages Euro- pean smugglers do not enjoy. Therefore Amer- ica is the happy hunting-ground for the agents of the international drug ring. America also offers a more profitable market. The average American has more money to spend on drugs than the average European. Therefore, unerr- ingly, with a fine nose for scenting profits, the agents of the drug ring bring their wares to the United States. Europe, particularly England, is the great drug manufacturing center of the world, and from the factories of England, France, Switzer- land, Holland, and Germany come the tons of morphia, heroin, and cocaine which provide the smugglers with their supplies. Some of this out- put goes to its proper use, of course, in the prac- tice of medicine, but the greater part of it does not. Japan also is a morphia manufacturer on a great scale. So at one time was the United States, but within the past year or two certain re- strictive legislation has been passed by Congress which has clipped the wings of our manufactur- 8 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM ers, and the output from America is now greatly lessened. We now make enough morphia to satisfy our legitimate medical needs, as permit- ted by our laws, for the use of hospitals and doctors. Formerly our output was so large that we did a thriving export trade, sending morphia in bond to Japan and elsewhere, and this was part of the surplus that filtered back to us through underground channels. Now, with our reduced manufacture and a strict supervision of exports, the chances of being drugged by our own American-made morphia are infinitely less. This particular phase of our problem will need care- ful watching, to see that we import no more opium than we need for legitimate use, and with no wide margin left for export to questionable markets. Our imports of raw opium are now reduced to a minimum, under careful Federal supervision, and our exports of alkaloids are subject to like careful scrutiny. With drugs of European manufacture we still have to contend. These countries go practically full steam ahead, subject to the flimsiest restric- tions. True, they have most of them adopted a system of export and import certificates, so that a manufacturer who wishes to export morphia, etc., must first obtain a certificate from the coun- try to which he sends it, saying that it is needed. WORLD'S DRUG PROBLEM 9 This system has been described by Sir John Jor- dan as one through which the illicit drug mer- chant can drive a coach and four. Nor have all the European countries unanimously adopted this system of export and import certificates, even for what it is worth. Switzerland, for ex- ample, deliberately stands outside, and allows it- self to become a channel through which alkaloids can pour freely. Leaks like this, deliberate and intentional, do not make for world security. Holland, for instance, makes no end of morphia and cocaine, but does not account for her output. She gives no figures as to what she manufactures, and does not have to, under her laws. England, for example, imports a tremendous amount of opium which she makes into morphia, heroin, and codeine. No restrictions whatsoever are placed on the exports of codeine, which for some obscure reason England does not recognize as a danger- ous drug; it is, however, recognized as such un- der the Dangerous Drugs Acts of France, Japan, and the United States. But this partic- ular drug can be manufactured in England and shipped out of the country without let or hindrance. Is it any wonder that the world's drug prob- lem is becoming acute when all these European countries make these powerful alkaloids from 10 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM raw opium, and export them practically at will? Anti-narcotic laws afford but a slight barrier against the danger, a barrier easy to jump, to crawl through, to burrow under, because on the other side of it are-Profits. Profits to the manufacturer, to the merchant, to the exporter, to the middleman, to the smuggler, and to the peddler in the back streets and alleys of the world. A strong chain this, from the most re- spectable and influential, down to the lowest and most despicable. But, bad as it is, the question of manufacture is not the fundamental aspect of the world's drug problem. The fundamental question is produc- tion, the production of raw opium and of coca leaves, from which morphia and cocaine are de- rived. The output of this raw material is the root of the matter. Strike at the root, and the whole thing dries up. Cut down production- or, rather, this excessive over-production, far and away beyond the world's strict medical require- ments-and the manufacturer has nothing to manufacture. Factories cannot turn out mor- phia by the ton if they cannot obtain the opium from which morphia is made. Exporters cannot export if there is nothing to export. Middlemen cannot sell to smugglers if there is nothing to sell. Therefore, the entire question of curbing WORLD'S DRUG PROBLEM 11 the drug problem hinges upon shutting off the supply at the source, i. e., curtailing production. Bringing it down to such limits that there is only enough for the world's actual medical needs, and so abolishing the tremendous surplus which at present is used for drugging. For years now, we have played around on the surface. Our restrictive legislation has made the circulation of drugs more difficult, but it never for a moment stopped it. The legislation has given the manufacturer more trouble in disposing of his products, has made the importer more wary and cautious, and has called into play all the smuggler's ingenuity. But has it for a mo- ment, all this legislation, really impeded the flow? It has dammed it up here and there for a moment, in this country or that, only to have it break out somewhere else. But, however hampered, the circulation of dangerous drugs has gone steadily on. And it always will go on, while production continues. Production, excessive production, must be recognized as the root of the evil. But at this point we meet the most powerful opposition of all, the opposition of the produc- ing countries, the opposition of the powerful rul- ing classes of the producing countries. If America is to fight the opium traffic intel- ligently, we must understand what we are fight- 12 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM ing. We can't go it blind, with no equipment as to facts, no knowledge of the extent and rami- fications of the trade, with no understanding of the financial interests back of it, nor of the psy- chology of those nations that encourage and up- hold it. In our fight against opium we find our- selves pitted against the shrewdest brains of Europe, anxious to outwit us at every turn, and to prove to us, if they can, that we are tilting at windmills which do not exist. It behooves us therefore to know something of the facts of the case, to learn something about the gigantic oc- topus that has the whole world in its coils. The crux of the opium trade lies in the Far East. For over a century opium has been used as a money-getter to swell the revenues of certain European countries with possessions in the Orient. Individuals have grown rich on the pro- ceeds. Colonies have prospered. Labor, the cheap and plentiful labor of China, has been lured by opium to certain colonies where native labor is not obtainable; and however individuals were damaged by this policy of wanton disregard for their welfare, there were always more, by the million, to draw upon. Human life has been ut- terly disregarded. Considerations of public health, of building up a stable, sober community, have never entered in. Nothing is so cheap as WORLD'S DRUG PROBLEM 13 human life in the Orient, nothing so easily re- placeable. And opium has been called upon to waste this human life, by destroying its value and efficiency, in order that Europeans might prosper. This, then, is the real problem before us, the psychology of those nations that encourage the use of opium in their Oriental colonies, and are unmoved by the wastage of human life that this policy involves. They seek safety for themselves, in their own countries, through prohibitive legis- lation, although this safety is illusory. Little by little the consumption of prohibited drugs in- creases, and it will in time threaten the welfare of all countries. Yet these nations hesitate to cut down production, since this production-a large part of it-is for the Orient, where the traffic receives official sanction and support. How can we expect them to curb production for one half the world, when there is no desire to curb it for the other? We have seen enough of the harm done by drugs in America to inake us re- alize the waste and destruction that are now go- ing on in the Far East. And that waste must be stopped. The world cannot tolerate two stand- ards as to the use of opium: one, that it is harm- ful for ourselves, and must be prevented from creeping in upon us; the other, that it is harmless 14 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM for other, more helpless peoples, and can be fed to them by the ton. We can never fight the drug evil successfully while this double standard prevails. If opium is produced for the Orient, the overflow of that output must necessarily filter back into Europe and America. But the thing to be reckoned with is the psychology of those nations that find opium harmless for certain peoples. We cannot coop- erate with them or work in harmony with them while their point of view prevails. We must all think alike on this question. The fight against drugs calls for international cooperation, and that cooperation cannot be whole-hearted and sincere if certain nations are with us on one side of the globe and against us on another. The following pages will show the extent of the opium traffic throughout the Far East, and the countries responsible for it. The part played by Great Britain is very great. Throughout the whole fabric of this indefensible business runs British influence, direct and indirect. The Brit- ish Empire controls one fifth of the world and one fourth of its inhabitants. Such power means equal responsibility. And through her encour- agement of the opium trade, Great Britain has assumed a heavy responsibility through the ex- ample she has set to other countries. The fight WORLD'S DRUG PROBLEM 15 against opium can never be won until she sets an example in the opposite direction. This would happen sooner if the English peo- ple themselves were aware of the facts. As it is, these facts are carefully withheld, and the peo- ple are sedulously kept in the dark. This is a pity, since in consequence the whole nation is ac- cused of indorsing this opium policy, about which the majority of the people know nothing. But they suffer from a Government which keeps them in ignorance, yet jeopardizes their national honor by supporting a thing which is morally inde- fensible. If somehow, by some miracle, Amer- ica could break down this wall of ignorance that shuts her in, we should find a public opinion strong and sound which would not tolerate this double standard. The time will come, eventu- ally, when English opinion will become en- lightened and aroused, and when it does, our two countries can go forward together united in a common cause, a determined effort to hew down this evil tree that bears corrupt fruit. CHAPTER II BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA THE greatest opium-producing country in the world is India, where, under British ad- ministration, the cultivation, manufacture, and sale of opium are conducted as a government monopoly. Every step relating to the control and output is carefully and systematically regu- lated, and has been brought to the highest pitch of efficiency, a model and example to the rest of the world. But to go back a little. The scramble for trade with India began in the sixteenth century, and the Dutch, Portuguese, French, and Brit- ish traders formed their various East India com- panies to carry on trade with India. The "mer- chant adventurers" of Queen Elizabeth's day were incorporated into the East India Company of merchant traders in 1600. In 1686 this com- pany turned its attention to acquiring territorial power, and in 1708 the old company formed a union with its new rival, another such trading company, and then followed further development 16 BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 17 and acquisition of power. One by one the Portu- guese, Dutch, and French were crowded out. The Portuguese fell out first, being unable to compete with their Dutch and British rivals. Be- tween 1795 and 1811, England took all Holland's Indian possessions. In 1760, through a series of wars, the French were dispossessed of theirs, and from that time onward, for all practical pur- poses, the East India Company held the field and ruled India through a series of governors. In 1858 the sovereignty of India was transferred to the Crown, and since then India has formed the most important part of the British Empire. When these various trading companies ar- rived in India in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they found opium already there, indig- enous to the country, but obviously raised in small quantities. How small the production was in those early days may be gaged by the fact that in 1729 the export of Indian opium to China only amounted to 200 chests. China, however, seemed the logical field to which this opium should be shipped; hence production was speeded up. China, by 1729, had forbidden all imports of In- dian opium, and a forbidden thing suggests a demand of some sort; hence the traders made haste to supply this demand. "The business was in the hands of the Dutch till 18 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM 1773. In that year English merchants engaged in the trade from Calcutta, and the importation increased at a more rapid rate. In 1781 the East India Company took the trade into its own hands, and by 1790 the export from India stood at some 4000 chests." 1 This export to China rose to 5000 chests in 1820; 16,877 chests in 1830, 20,619 chests in 1838; and 70,000 chests in 1858.2 The control of India being transferred from the East India Company to the Crown in 1858, the Crown or the British Government itself has carried on the opium business in India from that day to this. The heyday of the China trade lasted until 1907. China was the market for which Indian opium was raised, and that market absorbed it all, very successfully. How China got free-if one can call it that-will be found in another chapter. Suffice it that the China trade began to be shut off in 1907 by an Anglo-Chinese Agreement, which terminated in 1917 by the complete closing of China to further imports of Indian opium. The loss of this gigantic China market was a tremendous blow to the Brit- 1 "The War against Opium," issued by the International Anti- Opium Society of Peking, 1922, p. 3. 2 "China Year Book" for 1923, p. 885. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 19 ish opium interests. In spite of the immense re- duction in cultivation which followed the loss of the trade with China, the production of Indian opium still goes on. It is still a formidable thing to reckon with, even in its present attenuated form-attenuated, of course, only in comparison to its former size. It is large enough to demand serious consideration, and still more important is the spirit which animates and continues it. Public opinion called for the closing of the China trade. English opinion was a powerful factor in bringing this about. But, unfortu- nately, when the China trade ended in 1917 the British public sat back, satisfied, more or less, that the thing was over. It was apparently not aware of the large opium traffic in India and in the various British colonies and in other coun- tries throughout the Far East, any more than it is aware of this traffic to-day. The opium traf- fic as it exists to-day is a closed book to the peo- ple of England, and every effort is made to keep it closed. The production of opium in India is, as we have said, a government monopoly. Every phase of it is under careful supervision and con- trol. The planter who wishes to raise poppies must first obtain a government license, specifying the number of acres to be sowed. If he has no 20 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM money, the Government advances it to him, free of interest, in order to stimulate production. When ripe, a government agent collects the crop and takes it to the government factory at Ghazi- pur, where it is made into opium for the market. The opium thus manufactured is disposed of by Government in the following ways: (a) By public auction at Calcutta for export out- side India. (b) By direct sales for Foreign and Colonial Gov- ernments with which agreements have been entered into for supply at fixed rates (viz., the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong, the Netherlands Indies, Siam, British North Borneo, and Ceylon). (c) By supply to the medical department in India for medical purposes. (d) By issue to the Excise Department in India for local consumption under revenue regulations.1 The output of opium may be placed in two classes: that destined for export to the various opium-consuming countries of the Far East; and excise opium destined for internal consumption in India, where it is retailed to the people through licensed shops. This Indian opium is of low grade as to its i "Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Government of India for the Year 1921-22," p. 76. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 21 morphia value. It contains only 8 per cent mor- phia, as compared to a 10 or 12 per cent morphia content found in the richer opium from Persia and Turkey. Therefore, Indian opium has practically but one use-for drugging, pure and simple. It is used for either eating or smok- ing, as the case may be. It has not even the ex- cuse that it is valuable for medicine, since it is not made into morphia when other opium can be procured. The one purpose for which it is raised is drugging, to cater to a habit which most peo- ple consider harmful. However, while we are repeatedly told that In- dian opium is not used for making into morphia, let us not be too sure of that. It can be used in this way very well indeed when all else fails, and was used in this manner very extensively during the war, when over 10,000 chests were brought to England to be thus manufactured.1 The British Government of India has a morphia factory at Ghazipur, and there is also one in Ceylon. Mor- phia making in the tropics, however, presents serious difficulties because of the heat, the neces- sity for ice, etc.; so these Government morphia factories do not appear to pay. Information i "The Truth about Indian Opium," India Office publication, August, 1923, p. 28. 22 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM about them is very scant and the data " btainable so meager that we cannot discuss the n profit- ably. However, they exist. But let us accept the contention of the India Office that Indian opium is not made into mor- phia and is therefore in no way responsible for the excess of morphia now being smuggled throughout the world by illicit channels. This throws us back on the fact that Indian opium has no other use than that of drugging Oriental peo- ples. In this case we shall emphatically agree with a leader in the London "Times" of April 7, 1923: "In all countries with European civiliza- tions, there are no two opinions as to the physical and moral ruin wrought by the consumption of these so-called 'drugs of addiction.'" ("The Times" was drawing attention to the recrudes- cence of poppy-growing in China, and was dis- tressed over the plight of the Chinese in that country. It made no mention of the plight of the Chinese in certain British colonies that sanc- tion opium indulgence, nor of the physical and moral ruin that might be affecting the people of India.) The following figures show the number of chests of provision opium (for export) made dur- ing the past few years:1 i "The Truth about Indian Opium," August, 1923, p. 7. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 23 1917-18 14,499 1918-19 12,500 1919-20 7,400 1920-21 5,800 1921-22 7,500 1922-23 9,000 (estimated) Each chest contains 140 pounds of opium. Six- teen chests, or 2240 pounds, make a ton. This provision opium supplies the British colonies and other opium-consuming countries in the Far East. It will be noticed that the decrease in the number of chests made for export exactly corre- sponds with a period of severe trade depression experienced throughout the whole of the Far East. The industrial and agricultural industries of these countries were hard hit; there was no demand for tin, for rubber, or other products on which their prosperity depends, and mines and estates closed down, with grave unemployment. As a result, the general revenues in all these countries have fallen off, as will be shown in later chapters, and in each one the opium revenue has decreased in proportion. This was due to a lessened purchasing power on the part of the consumers, for the most part Chinese. The re- turn to prosperity is already indicated in an in- creased demand for opium: "The Budget esti- mate for 1922-23 provided for the sale of about 24 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM 6590 chests of opium for consumption outside India. . . . Owing to a better demand for opium in the Far East than was anticipated in the Bud- get ... it is now estimated that 8836 chests will be disposed of in the current year." 1 As these various colonies and countries return to normal conditions, this "better demand" will doubtless continue. The countries to which Indian opium is ex- ported are as follows; the quantities are given in chests:2 1917-18 1918-19 1919-20 England 3,0511/2 2,400 900 Ceylon Government 0 0 60 Private merchants . . 60 70 0 Straits Settlements Government 4,789 3,961 3,750 Private merchants . . 385 142 275 Hong Kong Government 405 450 450 Private merchants . . 0 51 369 Macao Private merchants . . 450 500 0 Japan Private merchants . . 971 1,930 980 i Government of India, Finance Department, Budget for 1923- 24, p. 94. 2 Statistics British India, Vol. II, Financial, tenth issue, p. 162. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 25 Indo-China 1917-18 1918-19 1919-20 Private merchants . . 3,050 3,490 995 Java Government . . . 1,800 2,400 2,000 Siam Government 850 1,750 1,400 Private merchants . . 800 0 0 British North Borneo Government 20 140 144 Mauritius Government 0 0 12 Private merchants . . 15 42 23 British West Indies Private merchants .. 1 0 0 New South Wales Private merchants . . 5 0 0 Fiji Islands Private merchants . . 1 0 1 Brazil Private merchants . . 0 2 0 Total number of chests Private merchants . . exported: 5,738 6,227 2,643 Colonial and other gov- ernments 7,864 8,701 7,816 Great Britain 3,0511/2 2,400 900 Grand total 16,6531/2 17,328 11,359 It is interesting to see the large number of chests sold to "private merchants," whatever they do with them. The Federated and Unfederated Malay States do not figure on the list of countries 26 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM importing opium, as they obtain their supplies through the Straits Settlements, which accounts for that colony's taking so much. There is a big difference between the number of chests manufactured every year and the num- ber of chests actually exported. There are doubtless large stocks in reserve, to be drawn upon as required. Thus: Number of chests made Number exported 1917-18 14,499 16,6531/2 1918-19 12,500 17,328 1919-20 7,400 11,359 1920-21 5,800 No figures 1921-22 7,500 it it 1922-23 9,000 (estimated) it it In addition to this output of provision opium, for export, the Opium Department produces Excise opium, for domestic consumption in India. The number of chests manufactured to supply the demand in India is, in chests of 123 pounds each, as follows:1 1916-17 8,732 1917-18 8,567 1918-19 8,512 1919-20 7,289 i "The Truth about Indian Opium," p. 8. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 27 1920-21 7,074 1921-22 5,628 Total 45,802 In addition to its own output, the Opium De- partment buys extra supplies from the native Indian states, and from the Malwa states. All this extra opium goes to feed India and is not ex- ported. When the trade with China came to an end, the Malwa states found themselves with some 60,000 chests of unsold opium on their hands, and "in order to ease the position" the Opium Department buys it from year to year, to supplement its own supplies. Thus, in chests of 123 pounds:1 1916-17 5,257 1917-18 4,916 1918-19 5,314 1919-20 59 1920-21 758 1921-22 2,297 Total 18,601 Besides this Malwa opium, "there also has to be taken into account the produce of an area spe- cially cultivated to supply the deficiency in the ^Ibid., p. 7. 28 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM United Provinces output." 1 The output from this special area, as purchased by the Opium De- partment, is, in chests, as follows: 1916-17 2,223 1917-18 2,315 1918-19 1,200 1919-20 1,803 1920-21 6,507 1921-22 8,720 Total 22,768 From these figures it will be seen that the Opium Department buys from other sources almost as many chests as it produces on its own account- 45,802 chests of its own production, supple- mented by 41,369 chests from Malwa and the native states. A grand total of 87,171 chests or 4,786 tons which the Government has fed to India during the past six years. The Indian states, sometimes called the Inde- pendent states, as they rule themselves subject to British advice, also produce opium for their own requirements. While they sell a certain part of their output to the Opium Department, they keep the rest for their own use. No figures are available as to this additional production and i Ibid., p. 7. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 29 consumption. None of the opium produced by the Indian or Malwa states is exported; it is all for domestic use. The only opium exported is that produced by the Opium Department or monopoly itself. The following figures show the acreage under poppy cultivation:1 United Indian Area specially Provinces states cultivated to supply deficiency 1916-17 204,186 46,441 1916-17 14,695 1917-18 207,010 54,341 1917-18 26,479 1918-19 177,124 24,871 1918-19 10,350 1919-20 154,621 56,934 1919-20 30,813 1920-21 116,055 63,004 1920-21 35,866 1921-22 117,930 64,140 1921-22 38,921 1922-23 143,020 (estimated) No figures No figures In these tables the only acreage that shows re- duction is that of the United Provinces, which, in addition to excise opium, produce the pro- vision opium for export. The falling demand for provision opium is reflected in decreased acre- age, but with a "better demand" now coming from these opium-consuming countries, we see the acreage again increasing. The Indian states, and the area under special cultivation to supply "deficiencies," show a marked increase from year to year. i "The Truth about Indian Opium," pp. 7-8. CHAPTER III British possessions: india (Continued) SINCE the attitude of Great Britain toward the opium traffic in India may be considered her attitude toward opium in other British col- onies and dependencies, we may as well try to understand it. Presumably what is considered justifiable in India is equally justifiable else- where where the same sort of thing exists. The same defenses and explanations will doubtless hold good. In 1893, as a result of the activities of a cer- tain section of English opinion, a Royal Com- mission was appointed to go to India, look into the opium traffic, and make a report. This re- port, in seven volumes, appeared in 1895. It found that opium was harmless. There was also a minority report (of one) to the contrary, but that is not spoken of now. The findings of this Royal Commission still hold good, and the gist of these findings, a brief summary, is given in a small pamphlet issued by the India Office in 1922 (a new edition in 1923) called "The Truth 30 BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 31 about Indian Opium." It is interesting to note that in this lapse of twenty-five years since the report of the Royal Commission, official opin- ion has not changed, and has not been brought up to date or to the level of public opinion throughout the world as to the dangers of habit- forming drugs. Yet, curiously enough, during this same period, England itself, for its own pro- tection, has passed anti-narcotic legislation of the most advanced type and equal to that of any other country in the world. Opium or its de- rivatives may not be bought, eaten, or smoked in England, any more than in the self-governing dominions of the British Empire, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. But for countries without the dominion status, that is, in certain crown colonies, protectorates, mandated terri- tories, or the like, the antiquated theories of the Royal Commission still apply. The prohibition of opium-eating in India we regard as impossible, and any attempt at it is fraught with the most serious consequences to the people and the Gov- ernment. We take our stand unhesitatingly on the conclusion of the Royal Commission which reported in 1895, viz., that the opium habit as a vice scarcely ex- ists in India, that opium is extensively used for non- medical and semi-medical purposes, in some cases with benefit, and for the most part without serious conse- 32 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM quences; that the non-medical uses are so interwoven with the medical uses that it would not be practicable to draw a distinction between them in the distribution and sale of the drug; and that it is not necessary that the growth of the poppy and the manufacture and sale of opium in British India should be prohibited except for medical purposes. . . . The great majority of Indian opium-eaters are not slaves to the habit. They take small doses as required and can and do give up the allowance when the need of it is past. Opium is in common use throughout India as the commonest and most treasured of the household remedies acces- sible to the people. It is taken to avert or lessen fatigue, as a specific in bowel complaints, as a prophy- lactic against malaria, to lessen the quantity of sugar in diabetes, and generally to allay pain in sufferers of all ages. The vast bulk of the Indian population, it must be remembered, are strangers to the ministrations of qualified doctors or druggists. They are dependent almost entirely upon the herbal simples of the country, distance and the patient acceptance of hardships stand- ing in the way of prompt access to skilled medical re- lief. In .these circumstances the use of opium in small quantities is one of the most important aids in the treatment of children's sufferings. It is also a fre- quent help to the aged and infirm, and an alleviation in diseases and accidents which are accepted as in- curable. To prevent the sale of opium except under regular medical prescription would be a mockery; to many millions it would be sheer inhumanity.1 i "The Truth about Indian Opium," pp. 8-9. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 33 No one has ever denied that opium is the greatest pain-killer in the world and, as such, the most valuable drug in the pharmacopoeia. But its habit-forming propensities make it so danger- ous that in European countries it is only given under strict medical supervision. Yet the simple millions of India are allowed to prescribe it for themselves. One would have thought that an adequate public health medical service would obviate this necessity. Incidentally, it seems odd that these same simple and ignorant people, with no access to skilled medical attention, should be able to diagnose such an obscure con- dition as sugar in diabetes. Mr. Herbert Anderson, secretary of the Cal- cutta Temperance Federation, differs from the official British view: "It is one of the common- est sights of Calcutta life to see a crowd of pur- chasers standing before the barred window through which drug sales are made, often block- ing the pathway, and pressing upon each other to secure their daily quota of poison." 1 And again he says: "The majority of retail shops are so situated as to afford the most direct temptation to all classes of the community," 2 and he men- i "Excise Administration in Bengal," by Herbert Anderson, Calcutta, 1921, p. 16. 2 "Excise Administration in Bengal," p. 13. 34 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM tions one particular shop from which twenty- five hundred persons bought their daily quota of drugs. This certainly looks more like the drug habit than sugar in diabetes. Mr. Anderson is frankly critical: "The Gov- ernment shelters itself under the delusion of do- ing a legitimate trade, but by that very policy it has fastened the shackles of a habit condemned by Hindu and Moslem authorities alike upon the community at large, and the chain gets longer and stronger every year." 1 There are 6394 opium shops, in which opium may be purchased freely. "Government or 'ex- cise' opium is issued only to licensed wholesale or retail vendors. The wholesale vendor may sell such opium, or opium obtained from a licensed cultivator, only to other licensed vendors or licensed druggists; the retail vendor and the licensed druggist may sell to individuals. . . . He may not sell to any one person at one time more than the quantity of opium which an indi- vidual may lawfully possess. . . . The amount of opium of which an individual may be in pos- session varies according to circumstances in the different provinces, but in most places is either 360 or 540 grains." 2 i Ibid., p. 9. 2 "The Truth about Indian Opium," p. 10. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 35 This seems like a very large allowance. There is nothing, apparently, to prevent an individual from making repeated purchases, at different shops, if he can dispossess himself of it between times. The per capita consumption of opium in India is 26 grains, for a population of 319 millions. The official contention is that by raising the price of opium consumption is held down to a mini- mum. Through this policy of price raising, we find that during the last ten years, ending with 1919-20, "The receipts from opium (consumed in India, not exported) rose from Rs. 1,55,56,000 to Rs. 2,58,90,000, being at the rate of 66 per cent." 1 This price-raising argues a very keen understanding of the psychology and physical necessity of the drug-taker. The victim of the drug habit will pay any price he must to obtain the drug to which he is enslaved. In passing, one may mention that the drug peddler in Broadway likewise charges his customers all that the traffic will bear, and we may thank his tactics that the illicit consumption in America is no greater. This is an Indian opinion on this policy of high prices, or high excise duties: "The policy of taxation seems to be that those drugs to which people are strongly addicted are taxed as high i Statistics British India, Vol. II, Financial, tenth issue, p. 209. 36 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM as possible without fear of diminishing the sale; and those drugs which are not in demand are taxed relatively lightly. The policy is based on strict business principles. Where the sales are certain, the maximum tax is levied, but where the sales are small ... or new articles introduced . . . they are taxed as lightly as possible to in- crease the demand and capture the market." 1 Hassan concludes sadly: "In a word, the Gov- ernment is not above profiting from the sins of the people and trafficking with their weak- ness. . . . The drug policy has tempted the strong and demoralized the weak; it has exploited the rich and the poor; it has ruined both young and old, the strong and the infirm, of all classes and creeds and races." 2 Gandhi's comment on drugging is this: "It will be no defense to urge that the vice has existed in India from times immemorial. No one or- ganized the vice, as the present Government has, for purposes of revenue." 3 However, in spite of the object of price- raising, i. e., to keep down consumption, this policy seems not entirely successful. The opium receipts for 1922-23 exceeded the estimate by i "The Drink and Drug Evil in India," by Badrul Hassan, Ganesh (publisher), Madras, 1922, pp. 124-125. 2 Ibid., p. 132. s Ibid., p. vi. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 37 nearly 100,000 rupees. It was calculated that the opium revenue for that year would be 3,09,30,000 rupees, but it exceeded that amount, and a revised estimate placed it at 3,98,68,000. "The revised estimate for 1922-23 is more than the Budget by 1 lakh, owing to an INCREASE IN CONSUMPTION, mainly in Bombay and Assam." 1 The revenue from opium in India is not large, however, and together with sales and excise duties amounts to only 3 per cent of the total. This seems a trifling amount for a great Government to accept from such a questionable source, an amount so trivial that it might almost be dispensed with. But after all, 3 per cent is 3 per cent, and the present Government is meet- ing heavy weather in the financial seas. The rev- enue of India is large, but there are immense outlays, chiefly on military expenses. Before the war the army expenditure stood at nineteen million pounds; in 1921 it had risen to sixty- seven millions. There are also large salaries to be paid to the viceroy and the various governors of provinces, and pensions for retiring civil serv- ants and others, which means a great and steady drain. Therefore, no source of income is too small to be overlooked. In 1922 the Indian finances got in such a bad i India, Budget for 1923-24, p. 94. (The capitals are ours.) 38 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM way that a special committee was sent out to in- vestigate and to see what savings could be effected, so that the budget might balance. This committee was headed by Lord Inchcape, and its findings were published in the spring of 1923. Every branch of the Indian administration was examined, with a view to possible retrenchments. The Opium Department was found in very satisfactory condition, and but two suggestions were made as to possible economies. One was to abolish the office of director of the morphia fac- tory, as that factory seems not to be successful. The other suggestion was to reduce the price paid to the opium cultivators or planters. "The bulk of the expenditure incurred represents the cost of the opium purchased from cultivators. This expenditure has increased greatly in recent years, owing to competition with other crops as the re- sult of high prices. Prices are now falling, and we recommend that the position be carefully watched, with a view to lowering the price pay- able to cultivators as soon as this can be done without risk of diminishing the area cultivated below normal requirements." 1 The survey of the Opium Department ends with this advice: "Conclusion. Having re- viewed the expenditure under the opium head, i Report of the Indian Retrenchment Committee, 1923, p. 225. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 39 we recommend the possibility of reducing the price paid to cultivators for opium be carefully watched, with a view to reduction. We are in- formed that there will be a reduction of about Rs. 20 lakhs in expenditure for 1923-24, and in view of the IMPORTANCE OF SAFEGUARD- ING THIS IMPORTANT SOURCE OF REVENUE, we recommend no further reduc- tion." 1 This Inchcape report definitely answers two questions: one, that opium is an important source of revenue and must be safeguarded; the other, that the acres devoted to opium can readily be planted with other crops, for which high prices are obtainable. Government must not be too parsimonious in dealing with these cultivators, must continue to pay them good prices, not fall- ing below a certain level; otherwise they will raise other crops, and the opium revenues will be jeop- ardized. The excuse that the suppression of opium would work hardship on the planter seems to have lost its meaning. A few years ago a change in the administra- tion of India took place. By the Reforms Act of 1919 India was granted a form of self-govern- ment, although a rather attenuated one. The administration divided itself into two parts, one i Ibid., p. 226. 40 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM the Central or Imperial British Government, and the other the local or Provincial Government. With this division, the subjects to be dealt with by each government were likewise divided: cer- tain ones were "reserved" for the Central or Im- perial Government, and certain others were "transferred" to the Provincial Government. The "reserved" subjects include defense and everything relating to the army, navy, and air forces; shipping and navigation; posts, tele- graphs, and telephones; customs; cotton excise duties; income tax, and salt, and other sources of all-India revenue; currency and coinage; public debt; savings-banks; civil law; commerce, includ- ing banking and insurance; criminal law and central police organization, also: "21. Control of cultivation and manufacture and sale of opium for export." 1 The subjects transferred to the Provincial Government include local self-government; medical administration and sanitation; education; public works; agriculture; fisheries; cooperative societies; excise; registration; development of in- dustries; adulteration; weights and measures; and religious and charitable institutions. There is no comparison as to the importance between the "reserved" and the "transferred" i "Indian Year Book" for 1923, p. 24. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 41 subjects. The Central or Imperial British Government keeps for itself full control of every- thing vital and essential. We do not question the validity of this, which may be most necessary during this transition period, but we do point out that when the "Government of India" is spoken of it is still the British Government. The chief official, appointed by the king, is the viceroy or governor-general of India. He has his cabinet, or council, and works in connec- tion with two legislative bodies, the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly. The As- sembly consists of 144 members, of whom 103 are elected and the rest appointed. "This Legisla- ture has power, subject to certain restrictions, to make laws for all persons within British India, for all British subjects within other parts of India, and for all Indian subjects of the King in any part of the world. The Governor-General, with the assent of His Majesty . . . may enact certain measures against the wish of the Council and the Assembly" 1 We have put the last few words in italics to further emphasize the fact that India is not yet independent and that Great Brit- ain is the responsible ruling power. The last oc- casion on which the governor-general overrode the wishes of both Council and Assembly oc- i "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, pp. 126-127. 42 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM curred when the salt tax was doubled a few months ago. Mr. C. A. Innes, member of the Council of the governor-general of India, puts the case succinctly: "We have made a consid- erable constitutional advance, and I am glad to say that the Executive Government is assisted by a Legislature which is mostly elected and which has large powers. . . . But even so, every one will recognize that a special measure of responsi- bility rests upon an Executive Government which still does not depend for , its existence on the will of the people as expressed by a Legisla- ture elected by the people." 1 We have gone into this at some length, as there is much misconception in regard to the status of India. Many people believe that India is en- tirely independent, and that it is up to her, rather than to Great Britain, to abolish the opium traffic. Such is not the case. Should Great Britain wish to stop opium, she has but to apply to India the same Dangerous Drugs Act by which she protects the people of England. And should the Indian Legislative Assembly object to this, the governor-general, with the assent of his Majesty, may pass it over their heads, as with the salt tax. Contrariwise, should the Assembly i London "Times," October 3, 1923. Speech of Mr, C, A. Innes before the Imperial Economic Conference, BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 43 itself decide to pass a Dangerous Drugs Act for India, it could be killed by the governor-general, with the assent of his Majesty. In other words, the control of the British Government over the opium situation in India is well nigh absolute. With the establishment of this dual govern- ment, the Central and the Provincial (and the Provincial legislatures are subject to the same re- strictions or glorified veto power which prevails in the Central Government), certain sources of revenue were definitely allocated to each. The Central Government derives its revenues from opium, salt, customs, income tax, tribute, post- office and telegraphs, railways, mint, military services, etc. The Provincial revenues come from excise, land revenue, stamps, forest regis- tration, irrigation, and civil departments. The Provincial Government is also obliged to con- tribute to the upkeep of the Central one by the payment of "certain annual sums which are to be the first charge on their revenue." 1 Opium plays its part in the revenues of both governments. The control of cultivation, manu- facture, and sales for export is a prerogative of the Central or Imperial Government. The opium excise duties go to the Provincial Gov- ernment. And as each province must make a i "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 128. 44 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM contribution to the Central exchequer as the first charge on its revenue, opium excise is important. These excise duties, which go to the Provincial Government, come from the following sources: "Under the head 'Excise' is recorded the revenue from excise duty on the consump- tion in India of alcoholic liquors, opium, and drugs prepared from hemp and coca plants." 1 The hemp drugs are bhang, ganja, and charas, all preparations of Indian hemp, or Cannabis In- dica, a highly intoxicating drug known in some countries as hashish. The coca plant, of course, is that which yields cocaine, and is a plant indig- enous to Peru, Brazil, and other parts of South America. Now, for some reason, it appears to have been introduced into India. "In India the coca plant seems never to have been cultivated on a commercial scale. It has been grown ex- perimentally in the tea districts of Ceylon, Ben- gal and Southern India, and has been found to produce a good quality and quantity of cocaine. As the plant has not been seriously cultivated and as there is no possibility for the present of the drug being manufactured in India, no restric- tions have as yet been placed on its cultiva- i Finance and Revenue Accounts of the Government of India for the Year 1921-22, p. 84. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 45 tion." 1 One wonders why no restrictions have "as yet" been placed upon the experimental cul- tivation of this highly dangerous drug. There seems to be an immense amount of illicit cocaine traffic in India, the cocaine being of European or Japanese make. "The various pro- vincial Excise Reports bear witness to the spread of the 'Cocaine habit.' The consumers of the drug, which is notoriously harmful, are to be found in all classes of society, and in Burma even school children are reported to be its vic- tims. . . . The habit has spread chiefly to those classes which are prohibited by religion or caste rules from partaking of liquor and the well known Indian intoxicating drugs." 2 However, a country which allows its people practically unlimited access to opium and hashish cannot look with special disfavor upon another dangerous drug, especially when it produces ex- cise duties. These are the figures as to excise revenue:3 1917-18 £10,162,000 1918-19 11,558,000 1919-20 12,840,000 1920-21 20,436,000 1921-22 20,334,000 i "Indian Year Book" for 1923, p. 488. 2 Ibid., p. 488. 3 "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 144. 46 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM Unfortunately, no distinction has been made as to the different sources from which this comes, so that we cannot tell how much excise is from liquor, how much from opium, how much from hemp drugs, and how much from drugs prepared from coca plants. In 1919-20 there were in In- dia 17,190 shops for the sale of intoxicating drugs.1 This includes the 6394 opium shops al- ready mentioned. Before the establishment of the dual govern- ments, these were the figures as to India's revenue and expenditure:2 Revenue Expenditure 1919 £123,258,000 £127,078,000 1920 130,407,000 146,176,000 1921 206,157,000 232,166,000 This heavy deficit each year naturally causes anxiety. These are the figures as to opium, the proceeds from which go to the Central Government direct: 3 Opium revenue 1913-14 £1,625,000 1917-18 3,079,000 i Statistics British India, Vol. II, Financial, tenth issue, p. 246, 2 "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 142. s Ibid., p. 144. BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 47 Opium revenue (continued) 1918-19 £3,289,000 1919-20 3,037,000 1920-21 3,534,000 1921-22 3,728,000 1922-23 3,093,000 (estimated) These sums represent the sales of exported opium. Together with the excise duties on opium, the whole opium revenue only constitutes about 3 per cent of the gross revenue of India. The opium consumed in India is usually eaten. The sale of prepared or smoking opium is for- bidden, but any one is allowed to prepare his smoking opium himself, in the back yard so to speak. The Hague Convention calls for the gradual and effective suppression of smoking of opium, but this it is almost impossible to do in India. "There is no difficulty in prohibiting opium smoking in a country where the consump- tion of opium in any form is prohibited except for medical purposes, but the fact that opium eating is allowed in India makes it very difficult to prohibit the actual act of smoking." 1 India, therefore, cannot fulfil this clause of the Hague Convention by reason of the free sale of eating opium, which any individual may convert at will. The truth is, the British Government of India i "The Truth about Indian Opium," p. 13. 48 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM is in an awkward predicament. Drug taking has been sanctioned and encouraged for so many years that it has probably risen to proportions far greater than is indicated in the optimistic official statements. Any attempt to abolish it would cause endless trouble. To the protests from the thousands of licensed druggists and venders, wholesale and retail, and the legions who make money through the sales, would be added the outcry of the addicts themselves, who must number many millions. To a country thor- oughly addicted to opium and hemp and now rapidly learning about cocaine, curtailment of this sort of "liberty" would produce a great up- heaval and be construed as another example of a malevolent alien rule. On the other hand, the followers of Gandhi and all those who are hon- estly opposed to drugging and who foresee for India a fate similar to that of drug-ruined China find an explanation of the opium traffic in a de- liberate design to destroy the people, to provide them with pills and pipes to take their minds off politics. There is discontent either way and lots of it. The British Government really is on the horns of a dilemma. The more immediate trouble it faces is the indignation that would fol- low abolishment of drugging. The more remote trouble it must eventuallv face is the accumula- BRITISH POSSESSIONS: INDIA 49 tion of an Indian public opinion hostile to a traffic which, as the London "Times" says, brings with it physical and moral ruin; a public opinion that is already noticing discrimination in treat- ment, a Dangerous Drug Act to protect Eng- land, yet no such protection for India. Yet the peoples of both countries are subjects of the same empire. As it is, the Government is trying to maintain an untenable position, to defend what is morally indefensible, to seek shelter behind the Royal Commission report of twenty-five years ago, and to issue broadsides to the effect that opium "in moderation" is harmless, and good for sugar in diabetes. All of which is unconvincing. Bishop Brent was near the truth when he said at Geneva last May: "There are Governments engaged in the opium traffic that regret it. They find themselves caught in a snare set for unborn generations two centuries ago. It falls upon them to extricate themselves from the sins of their fathers, so that future generations may be free from the burden and shame which is our noxious heritage." 1 i Speech before the Opium Committee, League of Nations, May, 1923. CHAPTER IV BRITISH POSSESSIONS: THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS THE opium monopoly does a brisk business in the Straits Settlements, a British crown colony at the end of the Malay Peninsula, just above the equator. The colony consists of Singa- pore, Penang, and Malacca. In 1826 these three settlements were incorporated under one Gov- ernment, which was transferred from the control of the Indian Government to that of the Secre- tary of State for the Colonies-that is, from the India Office to the Colonial Office-on April 1, 1867. The Cocos Islands were placed under the Straits Settlements in 1886, and Christmas Is- land in 1889. In 1906 the boundaries of the colony were extended so as to include Labuan. The total area of these Settlements is about 1600 square miles, with a population (census of 1921) of 881,939. Of this number there are nearly 275,000 Malays, 433,000 Chinese, and 94,- 000 natives of India. The principal city is Singapore, the great port of the Far East, which 50 THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS 51 occupies a tremendously important position both as to trade and for its value as a naval base. "The manufacture, sale and distribution of prepared opium or chandu was made a Govern- ment monopoly from January 1, 1910. The Government has made use of its monopoly since 1910 to discourage the smoking of chandu by gradually reducing the number of licensed opium smoking-room licenses, which in 1922 numbered 211 as against 503 on December 31, 1909, and by successive increases in the price of chandu, wholesale and retail." 1 This effort to "discour- age" the smoking of opium by reducing the num- ber of shops and by raising the price seems not to have had any effect, either on the amount of opium consumed, or on the revenues accruing from that indulgence. Stimulated by "discour- agement" of this sort, we find the following fig- ures in pounds as to the manufacture and con- sumption of prepared opium in the Straits Set- tlements from 1910 to 1920:2 Year Manufacture Consumption 1910.... 323,633 138,163 1911.... 393,635 148,209 1912.... 414,759 141,926 i Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, League of Nations, p. 139. 2 Ibid., p. 140. 52 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM Year Manufacture Consumption 1913.... 382,459 125,338 1914.... 309,065 117,688 1915.... 328,071 121,644 1916.... 353,938 121,551 1917.... 293,444 108,524 1918.... 335,038 131,255 1919.... 359,848 141,728 1920.... 370,688 151,322 The remainder of the opium manufactured is ex- ported to the Federated and Unfederated Malay States and to Brunei. Most of the raw opium imported comes from India, but the richer Persian opium seems to be receiving a certain amount of "discouragement" from the govern- ment monopoly. For 1921 the imports were:1 From India 218,909 kilos " Persia.., 3,491 " The per capita consumption (based on the Chi- nese population) is 2385 grains. Be it remembered, in passing, that the Hague Opium Convention, signed by Great Britain in 1912, called for the "gradual and effective sup- pression" of the use of smoking opium. The Straits Settlements is one of the most im- portant colonies of the British Empire, but, in i Ibid., p. 144. THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS 53 common with all countries of the Far East, it has been undergoing commercial depression since the war. The principal business, rubber, has suffered greatly. A large part of the revenue, nearly half, comes from opium, and we see the opium revenue rising and falling, and following very closely the curve of total revenue or general prosperity. The annual reports, or Blue Books, for the Colony of the Straits Settlements, for 1918, 1919, 1920, and 1921, give us these figures: Revenue Expenditure Opium revenue Percent- age 1918 $23,262,015 $15,966,145 $15,706,741 60 1919 34,108,465 34,901,233 17,511,229 51 1920 42,469,620 39,260,318 19,983,054 47 1921 39,545,735 35,430,899 15,236,538 38 This colony is not running at a loss: the revenue is well over the expenditure. There is not the excuse that a large deficit must be made up. In 1918 the opium revenue practically equaled the entire expenditure. When a large population falls victim to the drug habit, the business is a paying one. It is often asked, what could be substituted for an opium revenue? The Colorial Office List for 19 J3 ^p^re 394 \ when re^ ■' g to the trade of this colony, has a suggestive paragraph: "Trade. The ports are, except in the case of 54 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM petroleum, opium, liquors and tobacco, free from duties on Imports and Exports, nor are tonnage duties levied for general purposes." Dr. Connolly, of Singapore, comments with great frankness upon the degradation of the Eastern peoples by opium. He also shoots to pieces the official British contention that by rais- ing the price the consumption is discouraged. "The British-Malay Government are committed to a policy of gradual suppression of the opium traffic. Official pronouncements are on record of its disapproval, but conscience has been too easily satisfied by public expression of contrition. The Administration and the country benefit by an opium tax, which now exceeds in the Straits Settlements 48 per cent of the total revenue. Like an epicurean ascetic, the Administration derives pleasure from its profession of a virtue, and a profitable revenue from the toleration of a vice. Approximately 14 million dollars is to be collected this year from the Government sales of opium. This represents net profit to the state." Dr. Connolly sadly adds: "Great num- bers of Chinese artizans used no opium when they entered Malaya from China, but contracted the habit under the British flag." 1 i Bulletin of the London Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, April, 1923. THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS 55 The inhabitants of the Straits Settlements, or Malaya, are Malays, Chinese, and Indians. Their welfare is of no particular importance. But what happens in London when one wishes to smoke opium? ''The Times" of July 20, 1923, contained an account of a man, convicted of having opium and opium-smoking implements in his possession, who was given three years in jail. "The Recorder, in passing sentence, said that there was no doubt that the practice of tak- ing cocaine and smoking opium was doing much to demoralize society. Feeling that this was so, Parliament this year increased the personal pen- alty from six months imprisonment to ten years penal servitude. Parliament was determined- and he, in his humble way, was determined to as- sist the Legislature-in excising this moral can- cer from the social system." First-rate sentiments, but not applicable to British possessions east of Suez! CHAPTER V BRITISH POSSESSIONS: THE FEDERATED MATAY STATES THE Federated Malay States comprise Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembiland, and Pahang, situate in the Malay Peninsula. The total area is 27,506 square miles, with a popula- tion (census of 1921) of 1,324,890. Of these, the Malays number 510,821; Chinese, 494,548; Indians, 305,219; and Europeans 5686. The chief industries are the cultivation of rubber and the mining of tin. These Malay States came under British con- trol in the following manner, as given in the Colonial Office List for 1923: "For some years previous to 1874 the anarchy prevailing in some states in the Malay Peninsula, and especially in Perak, was a source of disquiet to the Straits Settlements community, and a hindrance to the prosperity of British traders. In the beginning of that year matters reached a crisis in Perak, and with the approval of the Secretary of State (the British Colonial Secretary) steps were 56 FEDERATED MALAY STATES 57 taken by Sir Andrew Clark to remedy the state of things by the Pangkor Treaty (1874). Later in the year British residents were stationed in several states, to advise their rulers (native) re- specting the collection of revenue and general ad- ministration." Thereafter, for many years, followed a succes- sion of agreements and arrangements, by which British rule became more and more firmly estab- lished, until in 1895 all these states were amal- gamated into a federation. "By this treaty, the rulers of the four States agreed to constitute their countries a Federation, to be administered under the advice of the British Government." At the outset, we see a significant combination, British rule and a large Chinese population, the everlasting excuse for establishing an opium monopoly. And the opium monopoly was set up, as might have been expected. In 1919 these Federated Malay States were in a prosperous condition, tin and rubber doing a big business. But bad times struck the colony in 1920, and these two industries were badly hit. In 1921 it was worse, "a bad year for Malaya- 1921 was black all through." 1 Figures given in the annual reports for 1919, 1920, and 1921 show plain evidence of this depression: i Report for 1921 of the Federated Malay States, p. 21. 58 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM Revenue Expenditure 1919 $72,135,075 $70,676,961 1920 72,277,146 100,433,471 1921 54,449,568 114,386,546 Further indication of hard times is found in the reduction of laborers employed in the mines, the number dropping from 160,395 in 1918 to 99,- 975 in 1921. The number of coolies (Indians, Chinese, and Javanese) employed on the estates also fell off, the numbers being reduced from about 216,000 to 156,000? The opium revenue has kept pace with these hard times. Fewer people employed in mines and on estates has meant less money available for the purchase of opium from the Government. So we see a fall in consumption and a fall in revenue. This decrease cannot be ascribed to an access of moral fervor, to any belated desire to protect these Indians, Chinese, and Javanese from a bad habit. It just means that financial depression has had its effect all round, and that the sales of opium correspond very closely to the curve indicative of hard times. Thus: Sales of opium Revenue 1918 1,783,554 tahils $14,860,541 1919 1,650,936 " 14,099,854 ribid., pp. 11, 14. FEDERATED MALAY STATES 59 Sales of Opium i (continued) Revenue (continued) 1920 1,577,180 tahils 1921 989,168 " Unfortunately, for 1920 and 1921 the opium revenue is not given, though we are told that there has been no change in the selling price per tahil. A tahil equals one and one third ounces. The opium revenue for 1920 must have been in the neighborhood of $14,000,000, while for 1921 it must have been considerably under that amount. The per capita consumption in this colony is estimated at 990 grains. However, every cloud has a silver lining. For, as we are told, "Unless the world (for some rea- son) should cease to require rubber and tin, the country must inevitably recover. It is a question of time, and of endurance and suffering in the interval." 1 Therefore, when this recovery takes place, when the tin and rubber industries revive, and more coolies are employed in mines and on estates, we can look for a corresponding revival in the opium revenues. i Report for 1921, Federated Malay States, p. 21. CHAPTER VI BRITISH POSSESSIONS: THE UNFEDERATED MAT-AY STATES THE Unfederated Malay States are five in number, in the Malay Peninsula, and con- sist of Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengannu. The first of these, Johore, came under British control in the following manner: "The relations of Johore and Great Britain are defined by a treaty dated December 11, 1885, and by an amendment to this treaty made on May 12, 1914, the Sultan agreed to accept and to act upon the advice of a British officer called the General Adviser." 1 As to the other four states, "the rights of suzerainty, protection, administra- tion and control of the other four States were transferred from Siam to Great Britain by the Anglo-Siamese treaty of March 10,1909. In all four States the rulers are assisted in the ad- ministration by State Councils, and by British advisers appointed by the British Govern- ment." 2 i "Statesman's Year Book'' for 1923, p. 184. 2 Ibid., pp. 184-185. 60 UNFEDERATED MALAY STATES 61 British "advice" generally means Indian opium, so that it is not surprising to see each one of these five states drawing a large part of its revenue from the encouragement of smoking. The Malay Peninsula is rich in rubber, tin, cocoa- nuts, and other tropical produce, and the hard- working and industrious Chinese supply a large part of the labor needed for the mines and the estates. And as we have already noticed, the taste of the Chinese for opium is always catered to, whether in their own country or out of it. The prospect of unlimited opium may be an in- ducement to the coolie to emigrate to these coun- tries, where under British auspices he may smoke himself to a standstill. JOHORE Johore, the largest of the Unfederated Malay States, lies at the southern end of the Peninsula, with an area of 7500 square miles. The popula- tion (census of 1921) is 282,244, of which there were 158,144 Malays, 24,278 Indians, and 96,- 888 Chinese. The following figures as to revenue, expendi- ture, and opium revenue are taken from the Blue Books or Annual Reports of the Unfederated Malay States under British Protection for the years 1919, 1920, and 1921: 62 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM Revenue Expenditure Opium revenue 1918 $9,125,694 $5,858,591 $4,227,768 1919 11,002,777 8,223,862 4,789,175 1920 11,838,975 13,231,070 5.005,656 1921 7,689,054 11,159,449 2,975,643 In 1918 the opium revenue supplied 46 per cent of the total revenue and covered 72 per cent of the total expenditure. In 1920 and 1921 the trade depression from which the whole Far East suffered after the war affected the budget unfa- vorably, and we see the opium revenue decline in proportion as the total revenue declines. The consumption of opium in Johore is as fol- lows: Opium consumption Smoking-rooms Selling-permits 1919 538,670 tahils 720 408 1920 583,285 " 900 475 The Blue Book for 1921 is strangely silent as to opium and, except for stating the amount of revenue derived, gives no figures as to consump- tion, or as to the number of selling-permits is- sued or smoking-rooms licensed. KELANTAN Kelantan lies on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, with an area of 5870 square miles. UNFEDERATED MALAY STATES 63 Its population in 1921 was 309,293, most of it of the Malay races, with a Chinese population of 12,799. The following details of revenue and expenditure are taken from the Blue Books re- ferred to: Revenue Expenditure Opium revenue 1918 $ 955,402 $ 899,161 $236,489 1919 1,141,444 1,065,012 268,298 1920 1,328,955 1,403,208 336,140 1921 1,160,262 1,678,432 Not given In the 1919 Blue Book we find this significant re- mark: "The revenue accruing from the sale of chandu [i. e., smoking opium] forms at present a considerable proportion of the total revenue of the State, and if it is intended to abolish the sale at any near date, the results will be serious. Speaking generally, chandu seems to do very lit- tle harm in Kelantan." Trengannu lies on the east coast of the penin- sula, with an area of 6000 square miles and a population of 153,092, which includes 7240 Chinese. TRENGANNU Total revenue Expenditure Opium revenue 1917 $430,195 $326,050 $117,874 1918 626,835 480,315 265,085 64 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM Total revenue Expenditure Opium revenue 1919 762,455 756,977 337,944 1920 970,541 757,645 464,513 1921 547,619 759,054 195,107 Note that the revenue from this colony is considerably above its expenditure. In 1917, for example, there was a surplus of revenue over expenditure of $114,145, the opium revenue for that year being $117,874. Opium was not needed to balance the budget, to make ends meet. One is forced to the conclusion that opium is the bait used to attract Chinese coolies. Also note the steady rise in the opium revenue. This increase is due to the abolishment of the farming-out system and to placing opium under government control. The Blue Book for 1919 comments on this satisfactory arrangement: "How greatly the expansion of revenue, from $166,000 in 1914 to $762,000 in 1919, is due to the abandonment of this system is seen in the in- stance of Opium and Customs Duties; these two items produced in 1916, under the Farm system, a revenue of $80,000; in 1919, under Government control, $360,000." In spite of government control, however, the opium revenue shows a painful falling off for 1921. Perhaps the Government-the same Brit- ish Government which signed the Hague Opium UNFEDERATED MALAY STATES 65 Convention in 1912-had begun to realize the ob- ligations incurred under that convention. A tardy recognition, but better late than never. Alas, our hopes are dashed! The 1921 Blue Book explains the decrease thus: "The con- sumption of chandu during the year was 39,300 tahils, as compared with 60,000 tahils in 1920. The decrease was due to the reduction of Chinese labourers employed in the mines and estates, a result of general trade depression." KEDAH Kedah lies on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. Its area is 3000 square miles, and its population 338,554, chiefly Malay races and Indians, but with 59,000 Chinese. A Chinese population of this size means a brisk opium busi- ness, as we shall see: Total revenue Expenditure Opium revenue 1917 $4,584,180 $3,240,121 $1,902,940 1918 5,058,998 3,785,536 2,201,346 1919 4,941,487 4,089,876 2,330,139 1920 • 6,649,811 4,305,173 2,976,717 1921 5,235,451 5,348,754 1,619,603 Roughly speaking, the total revenue for the past five years is about twenty-six million dollars, with an expenditure of about twenty million. The 66 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM opium revenue during this five-year period comes to about eleven million. This great stimulation of the opium trade is not needed to balance the books. But if the prosperity of the colony de- pends on Chinese labor, and the Chinese will not come if they cannot have opium as an inducement -and will not leave once they get the habit and cannot-one can see the tremendous part played by opium in all these colonial possessions. The decrease in opium revenue for 1921 cor- responds to the decrease in the general revenue, by reason of bad times. Perlis is the smallest of the Unfederated Malay States, lying on the west coast north of Kedah. Its area is 316 square miles, and its population 40,091, of which number there are 3589 Chinese. From the same reliable authority, the Blue Books for 1919,1920, and 1921, we quote the fig- ures for the past ten years, as they are interest- ing: PERLIS Total revenue Expenditure Opium revenue 1911 $131,291 $125,354 $ 51,340 1912 145,026 146,267 56,797 1913 154,985 153,312 66,953 UNFEDERATED MALAY STATES 67 Total revenue Expenditure Opium revenue 1914 172,970 185,552 69,744 1915 182,296 175,924 72,844 1916 224,774 178,593 98,818 1917 264,976 193,776 116,178 1918 305,924 269,027 143,307 1919 294,044 243,885 147,475 1920 443,441 277,993 171,554 1921 341,421 1 337,332 1 125,461 1 From 1911 onward, two years after the British gained possession of this colony, the opium rev- enues mount higher and higher each year. In 1912 the Hague Convention was signed, which called for the gradual and effective suppression of the use of smoking opium. That convention might have been non-existent, for all the atten- tion that was paid to it. During most of this ten- year period the revenue has been well over ex- penditure, and the opium revenue was not sup- plying a deficit. In 1920, the excess of revenue over expenditure amounted to $165,448, and dur- ing that year the returns from opium came to $171,554; without the opium revenue this little colony would have come out even. This again throws us back on the assumption that opium has more than a direct value. It indirectly enhances revenue, in that it attracts labor. What becomes i Estimated. 68 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM of these coolies, when they have deteriorated and become unusable, is of course no one's concern. There are others to take the place of those who fall out, if inducements remain. The consumption of opium in these Unfed- erated Malay States reaches the enormous figure of 17,480 grains per head, calculated upon the basis of the Chinese population. To a person unused to opium, a dose of two or three grains would be fatal. Therefore, since this enormous consumption per head would probably kill off all the Chinese population, one must assume that there is either a great deal of opium taking among the natives as well, or else that there is considerable leakage out of the country. CHAPTER VII BRITISH POSSESSIONS: BRITISH NORTH BORNEO BORNEO is the second largest island in the world, being 290,000 square miles in area, and lies directly across the equator. Three quarters of Borneo belongs to the Dutch, and the remainder to Great Britain. The British part is divided into the states of British North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak, each separately adminis- tered. North Borneo is a Protectorate and is administered by the British North Borneo Chartered Company, which operates under a royal charter granted in 1882. "Thus armed and authorized it took over all the rights, sover- eign and territorial . . . and proceeded to or- ganize a Service for the administration of the territory and the development of its resources." 1 This is on the lines of the old East India Trading Company and others of like character which in the first part of the eighteenth century es- tablished themselves in various parts of the Far East for the purposes of trade. This system of i "Handbook of the State of British North Borneo" for 1921, p. 14. 69 70 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM running a country, this "development of re- sources" by a corporation with full power to make its own laws, establish its own courts, ap- point its own officials, levy taxes and so forth, and carry out every branch of administration at its own discretion, seems like a survival from a past epoch. But, above all things, this chartered company is a business enterprise, with stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange; and the shareholders in this company receive dividends on their investments, which, after all, is the pur- pose for which it was established. In 1922 the publishing firm of Constable & Company of London issued an important book, "British North Borneo, An Account of Its His- tory, Resources and Native Tribes," by Owen Rutter, fellow of the Royal Geographical So- ciety and of the Royal Anthropological Insti- tute, with an introduction by the Right Hon. Sir West Ridgway, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.- S.I., president of the British North Borneo Chartered Company. In quoting from this book, we are quoting from the highest and most trustworthy authority, and in consequence the opinions expressed by these two distinguished writers have an importance all their own. They shed much light on the differences between the English and the American point of view. BRITISH NORTH BORNEO 71 The population of North Borneo is about 258,355, of which there are some 400 Europeans, 38,000 Chinese, all the rest being the various na- tive tribes of the country, together with a sprin- kling of people from the mainland and adjacent islands. Life is easy in North Borneo, and the natives are not inclined to work, so that the great rubber and other estates depend upon imported labor. This is indentured or contract labor, much of it Chinese. "Indeed it is the Chinaman who is the backbone of the non-European pop- ulation. Every class of Chinese is found in North Borneo, from the coolie of the tobacco estates to the rich towseh who is worth more than most Europeans. The Chinese in North Bor- neo, 38,000 in number, fall into five groups-the coolie class; the servants; the farmers and mar- ket gardeners; the small shopkeepers and trad- ers, and the merchants, who may be interested in any venture, from building a row of shops to financing a gambling farm." 1 Financing a gambling farm meets with the ap- proval of the company. "The Company derives its revenue from gambling by giving the gaming rights throughout the state to one Chinese 'farmer' who sub-leases them in turn. In 1920 the amount paid for these rights was 36,000 i "British North Borneo," p. 81. 72 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM pounds. When it is considered that the farmer has to pay for the building, wages and general upkeep and then make a very considerable net profit, it will be seen that a very large sum must be lost in gambling every year for the tender to be worth while. ... If licensed gambling were to be abolished, the resulting loss in revenue would have to be made up somehow, and the only way to do that would be by raising the cus- toms dues." 1 In addition to gambling, from which the Com- pany profits, revenue is also obtained from pawnbroking. The gamblers go broke, and so have occasion to raise a little money by pawning their few possessions at one of the pawnshops licensed by the company. A third source of profit is the sale of opium. "In 1915, the Char- tered Company, at the request of the Colonial Office, took over the opium traffic which had previously been farmed out, and now buys di- rect from India, selling at the same rates laid down in Labuan and the Straits Settlements to licensed dealers. . . . The traffic is carefully su- pervised and the opium is only sold to the Chinese adult population, among whom the annual con- sumption averages 15.2 ounces. Apart from the point of view of persons interested in stamping ilbid., pp. 174-175. BRITISH NORTH BORNEO 73 out opium smoking there is not very much to be said against the Company's trade in the drug." 1 There certainly is not. The more opium smoked, the better the revenue; and the surplus revenue, after running-expenses are deducted, goes to the shareholders in the form of dividends. A per capita consumption of 15.2 ounces is a per capita consumption of something over 7200 grains. Since it is hardly possible that any com- munity could survive so enormous a consumption, we must assume that much of this amount is smuggled out of the country. The Philippines, for example, receive a large amount of opium smuggled in from North Borneo. But to return to the shareholders. "Under the heading of Excise is included the revenue derived from opium, gambling and pawnbrok- ing." 2 Appendix III, page 393, of this same book contains a table showing details of revenue and expenditure for the year 1920. The total revenue for that year was 425,333 pounds ster- ling, of which amount customs produced 105,179 pounds and excise (opium, gambling, and pawn- broking) produced 193,954. The author con- tinues complacently: "It will be seen at a glance that 70 per cent of the total revenue of i Ibid., p. 173. 2 Ibid., p. 173. 74 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM the territory comes under the heading of Cus- toms and Excise. ... It is, from the sharehold- er's point of view, the most important branch of the Service; without it there would be no divi- dends." 1 From this it will be seen that catering to the vices of a community is remunerative-and from the shareholder's point of view imperative; with- out it there would be no dividends. No wonder, therefore, that "apart from the point of view of persons interested in stamping out opium smok- ing, there is not very much to be said against the Company's trade in the drug." The following figures show the revenue and expenditure during the past eight years:2 Revenue Expenditure 1912 $1,508,285 $ 915,690 1913 1,810,259 990,388 1914 1,791,533 1,020,150 1915 2,009,256 1,035,974 1916 2,139,319 1,085,331 1917 2,404,112 1,155,699 1918 2,597,681 1,331,257 1919 2,864,433 1,530,783 1920 3,645,719 1,844,744 At no time has this colony been run at a loss. i Ibid., p. 172. 2 Colonial Office List for 1923, p. 465. BRITISH NORTH BORNEO 75 Every year the revenue exceeds the expenditure by a large margin. Opium money is not needed to make up any budget deficit, however much it may be needed to pay dividends to shareholders. As Bishop Brent said at Geneva in his speech before the Opium Committee of the League of Nations in May, 1923: "It is monstrous for a nation to think it possible to build up an honour- able and righteous commonwealth with revenue gained from the exploitation of the weakness and vice of human beings." CHAPTER VIII BRITISH POSSESSIONS: SARAWAK SARAWAK, a British protectorate, is on the island of Borneo, adjoining British North Borneo and Brunei. Its area is about 42,000 square miles, with a population of some 600,000, including Malays, the various native tribes, some Chinese, and other settlers. It is a country rich in rubber, pepper, sago, coal, and petroleum. The country came under British control in the following manner: The government of part of the present territory was obtained in 1842 by Sir James Brooke from the Sultan of Brunei. Various accessions were made between 1861 and 1890. Under an agreement of 1888 Sarawak is recognized as an independent State under the protec- tion of Great Britain. The Rajah, H. H. Charles Vyner Brooke, son of the late Rajah, born September 26, 1874, succeeded May 17, 1917.1 The revenue is derived chiefly from Customs, the opium, arrack, gambling and pawnfarms, exemption tax payable by Malays, and from Dyak and Kayan revenue.2 i "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 109. 2 Ibid., p. 109. 76 SARAWAK 77 The Colonial Office List gives these figures as to revenue and expenditure:1 Revenue Expenditure 1919 $2,531,239 $1,721,907 1920 2,646,265 2,352,300 1921 2,840,171 2,331,605 It will be noticed that the revenue is well within the expenditure. The Colonial Office List is further explanatory:2 The principal sources of revenue are the opium, gam- bling, arrack and pawnfarms, producing 1919 $682,762 1920 564,576 1921 ... 597,259 Unfortunately, no distinction or classification is made; the revenue from all these monopolies is all lumped together, so that one cannot tell how much money came from gambling, how much from pawnshops, or how much from opium. They constitute, however, the principal sources of revenue, or an average of 23 per cent for the past three years, 1919, 1920, and 1921. It is conceivable-had there been the will to do i Colonial Office List for 1923, p. 474. 2 Colonial Office List for 1923, p. 474. 78 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM so-that the people living under this British pro- tectorate might have been protected from some of their vices without much financial strain on the general resources of the country. Thus, for the three years just mentioned we find: Revenue $8,017,675 Expenditure 6,405,812 Excess of revenue over expenditure .... 1,611,863 Monopolies 1,844,596 The surplus of revenue over expenditure would have almost balanced the income derived from these rather questionable sources, the govern- ment monopolies of opium, arrack, gambling, and pawn-farms. However . . . CHAPTER IX BRITISH POSSESSIONS: BRUNEI Brunei is a state lying between Sarawak and North Borneo. The Sultanate of Brunei was formerly a great and powerful state. . . . The power of the State ap- pears to have begun to decline about the end of the 16th century, and by the middle of the 19th it had fallen hopelessly into decay. The cession of the dis- trict of Sarawak to Sir James Brooke in 1841 was fol- lowed by many similar cessions to Sarawak and to the British North Borneo Company, and the State of Brunei has now been reduced to about 4000 square miles, containing a population of about 25,000? In 1888 an agreement was concluded with the Sultan, under which the control of foreign relations was placed in the hands of His Majesty's Government . . . and a further agreement was made at the end of 1905, under the terms of which a British resident has been appointed to advise and assist in the administration of the State.2 UNDER the supervision and advice of his Majesty's repesentative, the little revenues of this little state have managed to keep well ahead of expenditure, except during the years i Colonial Office List for 1923, p. 401. 2 Ibid., p. 401. 79 80 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM 1920 and 1921, when the trade depression general throughout the Orient appears to have affected the country, like many others. The following figures show revenue and expenditure for the past few years: 1 Revenue Expenditure 1916 $127,615 $113,317 1917 126,301 106,011 1918 125,726 122,958 1919 162,020 138,844 1920 201,250 223,690 1921 161,520 197,469 "The revenue of the State is derived princi- pally from land and mining rents, and from an Opium Monopoly under Government control; from the collection of Customs duties and from purchased Cession moneys."2 Diminutive as the budget is, it would be still smaller without the opium revenue. Apparently there are other monopolies than opium-probably gambling and pawn-farms, as in the case of North Borneo and Sarawak-and the receipts from these monop- olies form the second largest item under the head of revenue. The revenue for 1921, which i Report on the State of Brunei for the Year 1921, p. 1. 2 Colonial Office List for 1923, p. 402. BRUNEI 81 amounted to 18,800 pounds sterling, was derived as follows:1 Customs £6,900 Monopolies 3,100 Licenses 1,400 Land revenue 2,000 Cession moneys 2,300 During the past six years these government monopolies have yielded 18 per cent of the total revenue. Their value is not because of this rev- enue, but for another reason. Everything is on a small scale in Brunei, and the industries are few and poorly developed. They consist of coal-mining; the manufacture of cutch, from mangrove bark; the (so far) vain drilling for oil; and rubber planting. Shortage of labor is the chief cause for anxiety, as the primitive native population is not adapted to systematic, organized work. Therefore outside labor must be imported, and this shortage of labor badly handicaps the rubber estates. "Al- most all the managers refer in their reports to the scarcity of labor, and this difficulty has to be solved if the planting industry is to prosper. . . . The scanty local population provides no field i "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 108. 82 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM for recruitment of labor; the objections to the employment of Brunei Malays (which are ac- centuated by distance) have been mentioned; and with all Borneo clamouring for coolies, these distant and isolated estates offer little attraction to the better class Javanese and Chinese. "A good deal can be done in Brunei, as has been done in British North Borneo, to attract and retain coolies by providing means of recrea- tion." 1 This significant paragraph gives the whole show away and explains the government monop- olies of opium and gambling, a means to attract and retain labor. In British North Borneo this form of attraction has been carried to a high pitch of efficiency; Sarawak, the adjoining state, is also doing pretty well in that line. But Bru- nei still lags behind. "The real crux of the prob- lem is lack of population; and this can only be corrected by encouraging immigration in every way." 2 This is indeed the heart of the matter, and ex- plains the presence of opium in all these equa- torial colonies with a primitive, unusable popula- tion. The estates and mines must be worked, i Annual Report for 1918, State of Brunei, p. 3. a Ibid., p. 4. BRUNEI 83 and in Borneo and many of these remote places the native populations consist of cannibals, head-hunters, sea-gipsies, and shy, wild peoples who live by bow and spear-not usable mate- rial, not in the least adapted to the steady toil that the European requires to make his ventures pay. Therefore, the more highly civilized Chi- nese and Javanese coolie must be brought in, at- tracted by catering to his weaknesses. Human life is cheap in the Orient, cheap and plentiful. Provided an unfailing and steady supply, to re- new the wastage caused by the degradation of opium, the problem, from the European point of view, is solved. There is no necessity to build up a sober and industrious commonwealth. All that is necessary is to renew the loss, to keep re- placing the drainage by tapping the source, the labor supply offered by China's many millions. The opium problem, therefore, assumes a more complicated aspect. Its roots strike deep. We have seen, in studying the budgets of these vari- ous colonies, that the direct opium revenue is hardly necessary, since in most of these countries there is an excess of income over expenditure. But the indirect opium revenue, the development of industrial resources by means of a constant labor supply, is of vital importance. Commer- 84 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM cial greed, together with a wanton disregard for human life and welfare, has made use of opium for its own ends. The extent to which the "attractions" offered by the state of Brunei are being patronized is shown by the following figures:1 Revenue from government monopolies 1916 $21,027 1917 24,732 1918 26,005 1919 32,768 1920 35,481 1921 26,632 The drop for 1921 corresponds to the drop in total revenue because of a very bad trade year- not because of any desire to prevent "the better class of Javanese and Chinese" from giving way to his vices. What is the plain inference? If a country cannot make use of its native labor, if its prosperity depends on the supply of imported labor, and if this imported labor will not come unless lured by the "recreations" of opium and gambling- Well, after all, what is the plain inference? i Annual Report on the State of Brunei for the years 1918, 1919, 1920, and 1921, in each case contained in Appendix A. CHAPTER X BRITISH POSSESSIONS: CEYLON CEYLON is an island in the Indian Ocean, off the southern extremity of India. Its area is about 25,000 square miles, or about equal to the size of Holland and Belgium combined. It came into British possession in 1815. The population for 1921 was 4,504,549, of whom there were nearly 9000 Europeans, the rest being Sinhalese, Tamils, Malays, etc. It is important to note that in Ceylon there are practically no Chinese, only twenty-six males and thirteen females.1 The presence of Chi- nese is always the excuse offered for establish- ing an opium traffic, an excuse which in this case does not exist. Yet an opium traffic exists in Ceylon for the benefit of the native inhabitants. There has been a great agitation against it for many years, however, and in this colony we see a very determined spirit to bring it to an end. "Under various laws dated from 1910 to 1916, the import and sale of opium has been brought i "The War against Opium," p. 73. 85 86 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM under the direct control of the Government. Opium may only be possessed and sold by author- ized persons, and a system of registered opium consumers has been established. Raw and pre- pared (i. e., smoking) opium are sold only to registered consumers for eating and smoking. The price has been raised from time to time, and the consumption of both kinds is decreasing. The number of consumers has been reduced from 24,000 in 1910 to 12,000 in 1920, and the allowances have been diminished. Considerable quantities of opium and opium products are, however, smuggled into Ceylon and used by the natives." 1 A report, a year later, shows a steady im- provement in conditions: 2 "A decrease in sales both of eating and pre- pared opium occurred in 1921, the sales of the former having decreased from 5950 pounds in the preceding year to 5362 pounds in 1921; whilst the sales of prepared opium fell from a total of 713 pounds in 1920 to 675 in 1921. Decrease in consumption has followed upon the reduction in consumers through the death of a certain number of them, revision of the register i League of Nations, Traffic in Opium, C. 171 (1), M. 88 (1), June 1, 1922. 2 Minutes Fifth Session Opium Committee, League of Nations, p. 187. CEYLON 87 of consumers, and the reduction of the amount allowed to be purchased. The total number of persons who use only prepared opium has come down from 780 in 1920 to 690, approximately, in 1921." The number of registered eaters has also fallen to 10,645 in 1921.1 The registration of consumers, both of smok- ing and eating opium, is always the first step in a serious and honest effort to eliminate the opium evil. As the confirmed habitues die off from year to year, the amount allowed for con- sumption gradually lessens; and with no oppor- tunities for other people to form the habit, the effective and gradual suppression is accom- plished. No one expects the opium problem to be closed overnight with a wave of the hand. It is necessarily a slow business. But if there is a sincere desire to end it, as apparently is the case of Ceylon, other countries will find the prob- lem equally capable of solution. Nor does the Government of Ceylon encour- age the use of Indian hemp, more familiar to the Western world as hashish. The dangerous properties of this insidious drug are apparently well recognized. "Stringent measures are taken to put down the use of the hemp plant (Canna- bis indica or sativa), of ganja and of bhang. i Ibid., p. 145. 88 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM The smuggling of ganja from India and the growth and use in Ceylon have received the close attention of this Department." Smuggling of opium and hemp derivatives is naturally extremely difficult, with India so close at hand, where these drugs may be purchased openly and freely. Any sailor may buy a pocketful of either opium or ganja and get rid of it at his next port with small risk of detec- tion. Petty smuggling of this kind must al- ways exist, and no country can protect itself while supplies are constantly available in an- other. The opium question in Ceylon inter- locks with that of all Oriental countries and of the world at large. Prosecution of smugglers, however, is actively conducted in Ceylon. "Excise offenses gener- ally are being strongly repressed. 3980 cases of offenses against Excise law have been de- tected in 1920, of which number 1338 cases were disposed of departmentally." 2 The prose- cutions in courts resulted in fines, forfeitures, and imprisonment. It is worthy of note that in all opium-consuming countries there is an active police service fos tli^ detection of smug- gling, not as in this case and m the cag? of Eu- i Ceylon, Report for 1920, p. 54. 2 Ceylon, Report for 1920, p. 54. CEYLON 89 ropean countries, to protect the community from danger, but to protect the government monop- olies from illicit competition, with loss of prof- its. We are also told that control of the traf- fic by the Government is the best way of safe- guarding a community from excessive indul- gence, which would happen if the smuggler sup- plied its needs. In the last analysis, curtailment of production will dispose of the smuggler. This colony is experiencing the usual after- the-war depression, in spite of its rich output of tea, cocoanuts, spices, rubber, and other tropical produce. The budget does not balance.1 Revenue Expenditure 1918-19 £4,671,396 £4,722,912 1919-20 5,413,361 5,658,885 1920-21 4,707,837 6,117,846 The revenue derived from opium sales in 1920- 21 amounted to 46,085 pounds sterling.2 There is one disquieting factor. In an arti- cle which appeared in the London "Daily Mail," April 26, 1922, entitled "Where Cocaine Comes From," this paragraph appears: "It [cocaine] is made from the leaves of the shrub Eroxy- throlum Coca, which grows in Peru, Bolivia, i "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 114. 2 The Ceylon Blue Book for 1921, p. B 4. 90 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM and Chile, and is now cultivated in India and Ceylon" (The italics are ours.) The Indian Year Book confirms this statement. "It has been grown experimentally in the tea districts of Ceylon, Bengal and Southern India, and has been found to produce a good quality and quan- tity of cocaine." 1 Now, why is the coca plant being grown in India and Ceylon? It is not indigenous to these countries, but comes from South America. Al- ready, in South America, the excessive over- production is causing the spread of the cocaine habit throughout the world, so why add to this over-production, already staggering and unman- ageable? With what object is the cultivation permitted ? Why has this plant been introduced into these countries? Why have no restrictions as yet been placed upon its cultivation? Is this new habit to be allowed to grow, little by little, until it reaches such proportions that a watchful Government will find the time ripe to "control" it as a government monopoly? to license the sales, for the sake of revenue, under the excuse that it is protecting the community from over- indulgence? Already there is official recog- nition of a demand for this drug, new to Far i Indian Year Book for 1923, p. 488. CEYLON 91 Eastern peoples, and in Ceylon a wholesale dealer in cocaine must pay five rupees a year for his license, while a retail cocaine dealer pays ten.1 i The Ceylon Blue Book for 1921, p. A 33. CHAPTER XI BRITISH POSSESSIONS: MAURITIUS MARITIUS is an island in the Indian Ocean five hundred miles east of Mada- gascar. It was formerly a French possession but was captured by an English expeditionary force in 1810, during the Napoleonic wars. By the Treaty of Paris in 1814 it was formally ceded to Great Britain. The area of the island is 720 square miles, with a population (census of 1921) of 385,074. Of this number 265,884 are Indians and 6820 are Chinese. The presence of the Chinese in any colony always suggests an opium traffic. The imports of Indian opium have greatly decreased during the past few years, and it would seem that serious efforts are being made to abolish it. From an import of 120 chests in 1916-17, the imports for the last few years are as follows in chests:1 i Statistics of British India, Vol. II, Financial, tenth issue, p. 162. 92 MAURITIUS 93 To Colonial Government To private merchants 1917-18 0 15 1918-19 0 42 1919-20 12 23 This is a big drop since 1916-17. That the Government imported no opium for two years, or until 1920, was probably because it was draw- ing on stocks already in hand. The import of crude opium for 1921 was nil. Ganja, or Indian hemp, is imported to suit the Indian taste. The price of a half-yearly license fee for a retail dealer in opium or ganja is 150 rupees.1 i Mauritius Blue Book for 1921, p. A 10. CHAPTER XII BRITISH POSSESSIONS! HONG-KONG HONG-KONG was the prize won by Great Britain at the conclusion of the First Opium War with China, a war brought on by China's valiant but vain effort to hold back Brit- ish smugglers and to prevent them from bringing Indian opium into the country. When the war ended and China was thoroughly beaten for her presumption, Hong-Kong was part of the in- demnity the Chinese were forced to pay. The "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923 puts the thing more euphemistically: The Crown Colony of Hong Kong was ceded by China to Great Britain in January, 1841; the cession was confirmed by the Treaty of Nanking in August, 1842; and the charter bears date April 5, 1843. Hong Kong is the great centre for British commerce in China and Japan, and a military and naval station of first-class importance. Hong-Kong is one of a number of islands situ- ated off the southeastern coast of China, at the 94 HONG-KONG 95 mouth of the Canton River. It lies about forty miles east of Macao, the Portuguese colony, and ninety-one miles south of Canton. Its length is about eleven miles and its breadth from two to five miles; and it is separated from the mainland of China by a narrow strait half a mile in width. "The opposite peninsula of Kowloon, on the mainland, was ceded to Great Britain in 1861, and now forms part of Hong Kong. . . . By a convention signed at Peking on June 9, 1898, there was leased to Great Britain for 99 years a portion of Chinese territory, mainly agricultural, together with the waters of Mirs Bay and Deep Bay and the Island of Lan-Tao. . . . Total area of the colony 391 square miles." 1 The popula- tion (census of 1921) is 625,166, of which number 612,310 are Chinese and the rest non- Chinese. Remembering how Hong-Kong became a British possession in the first place, it is not sur- prising to find that opium plays a large part in its history. It is strategically well placed for commerce of this sort, near Canton and Macao. The former offered an illicit and the latter a legitimate market for such Indian opium as could not be consumed in the colony itself. For many years Hong-Kong was a smuggling centre of i "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, pp. 120-121. 96 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM first-class importance, besides doing a big busi- ness on established lines. The system formerly in vogue was that known as the opium farm, by which the monopoly for the sale of opium was leased or farmed out from year to year to a syndicate of merchants. In 1914 this farming system was abolished and a government mo- nopoly established instead. In common with many other colonies in the Far East, Hong- Kong has its own factory for the manufacture of prepared or smoking opium. Under the Hague Opium Convention signed in 1912, the high con- tracting parties agreed not to ship or export pre- pared opium, the object of which agreement was to put a stop to the practice of opium smoking. However, as there was no such ban on raw opium, the high contracting parties now import raw opium simply and manufacture it into smok- ing opium in their government factories, locally established. A neat way of circumventing the Hague Convention! The number of chests im- ported and manufactured into prepared opium is as follows:1 Amount imported Amount boiled by Government monopoly 1916 360 365 1917 420 352 i Legitimate Requirements of Opium in Hong Kong, Minutes Fifth Session Opium Committee, League of Nations, p. 166. HONG-KONG 97 Amount Amount boiled imported by Government monopoly 1918 450 539 1919 540 377 1920 180 228 1921 120 2111/2 1922 150 3111/2 Each chest contains 140 pounds of opium. Six- teen chests make a ton. For several years there has been considerable agitation as to the opium trade at Hong-Kong, and about two years ago the Government agreed to cut down the imports of Indian opium for lo- cal use to ten chests a month. This amount has now been raised to twenty-five chests a month, as the smaller supply was found insufficient. "The measures which are being taken for the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in and use of prepared opium are as follows: The system of raising the selling price of opium; the limiting of purchases to one tael at a time, except in the case of certain regis- tered persons who are allowed to buy three-tael tins; and limiting the amount which an individual may have in his possession to five taels." 1 Now one tael equals one and one third ounces, and there is apparently no limit to the number of times the purchase may be repeated, provided i Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, p. 138. 98 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM the purchaser gets rid of it between times. The leakage afforded by this system is obvious. Hong-Kong is one of the great seaports of the world, with a tremendous come-and-go between Canton, the Philippines, and various cities in the Far East. The temptation to pocket a few ounces of opium, legally obtained, and to sell it at a profit elsewhere, must appeal to many. In addition to this Indian opium imported by the colonial government, Hong-Kong imports large quantities of opium for export. Thus for the year 1920:1 Imports (kilos) from India 65,527 Turkey 6,788 Persia 31,060 Total 103,375 Exports and reexports (kilos) to Great Britain . . . 121 Macao 41,891 Japan 44,818 Total 86,830 For the year 1921: Persia 13,481 India 26,297 Total 39,778 Formosa 13,481 Macao 19,647 Total . . 33,128 Japan, Formosa, Macao, and Hong-Kong keep the Far East pretty well supplied with drugs. i Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, League of Nations, p. 144. HONG-KONG 99 The revenue of Hong-Kong is derived from land taxes, licenses, quarry rent, liquor and tobacco duties, and an opium monopoly.1 The Colonial Office List for 1923, page 227, is a trifle more explicit: "Revenue: About one quarter of the revenue is derived from the Opium Mo- nopoly." Details of revenue and expenditure are as follows:2 Revenue Expenditure Opium revenue Percentage 1920 $14,689,671 $14,489,593 $4,317,970 29 1921 17,728,131 15,739,652 3,938,197 22 The per capita consumption of opium, reckoned on the basis of the Chinese population (in this case, almost the entire population), is 244 grains. There is one ray of hope in this otherwise de- pressing picture. "Hong-Kong is ready and willing to co-operate in the suppression of the traffic, and it will have no hesitation in accepting any financial sacrifice that may be entailed in making suppression effective." 2 i "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 122. 2 Hong Kong Blue Book for 1921, pp. 47, 50, 51. s Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, League of Nations, p. 138. CHAPTER XIII BRITISH POSSESSIONS: IRAQ IRAQ, formerly called Mesopotamia, came un- der British control during the war. It is ad- jacent to Persia and covers an area of 143,250 square miles, with a population of nearly three millions. The value of Iraq lies in its oil-fields, as yet undeveloped. Iraq was conquered by the British and Indian troops during the Great War. The town of Basra was oc- cupied on November 22, 1914, and Baghdad on March 11, 1917. In the Peace Treaty of Sevres, 1920 (which was not ratified), Iraq was recognized as an independent State, to be placed under a Mandatory Power, and the Supreme Council allotted the mandate to Great Britain. . . . On October 11, 1922, the British Government en- tered into treaty relations with the Government of Iraq, the treaty to remain in force for 20 years. ... In all important matters affecting the international and finan- cial obligations and interests of the British Government, the King of Iraq agrees to be guided by the advice of the British High Commissioner.1 i "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 189. 100 IRAQ 101 Now a mandate, according to the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22, seems rather a fine thing. "To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and which are in- habited by peoples not yet able to stand by them- selves under the strenuous conditions of the mod- ern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust to civilization, and that the securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the League of Na- tions." Fine words. Theoretically, a mandate should be a comfortable thing to live under. The Turks had formerly controlled Iraq, and now that con- trol has been transferred to Great Britain. In addition to arranging for these mandates or sacred trusts, the Covenant of the League of Nations included the Hague Opium Convention, already signed by most of the great powers in 1912 and 1914, and now intrusted to the League to carry out and enforce. In signing the Ver- sailles Treaty and accepting the Covenant of the League of Nations, Great Britain thus auto- matically reaffirmed her intention of standing by the provisions of the Hague Convention. One 102 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM would have thought Iraq was doubly insured against harm. But what happened when the British took pos- session of their new territory? They found a good deal of opium-taking there, apparently, for Iraq is on the borders of Persia, one of the great opium-growing countries of the world. Also, there were heavy expenses involved in the ad- ministration of this new acquisition. The temp- tation to "control" opium in the classic manner proved too strong. "Control" is the word that means licensing opium shops and giving the sale of opium government sanction and approval. It also means revenue. The excuse given for this policy is that people are going to get opium any- way, through illicit sources and in large and harmful quantities. Therefore, they had better buy it direct from the Government, which will see to it that the quantities are limited. North Borneo, for example, considers that a consump- tion of 7200 grains per head is a reasonable and sufficiently limited amount. The advocates of "control" consider opium harmless if purchased from a government, but quite deadly if bought from a peddler. It is worthy of note, however, that there is never any question of this sort of government "control" in London; the drug ad- dicts of London have no government shops pro- IRAQ 103 vided for them, to minimize the danger to them- selves, and must continue to get their drugs in the byways of Soho and the East End. Therefore, in spite of the sacred trust assigned to her, in spite of the fact that the well-being and development of peoples unable to stand by them- selves do not call for licensed opium shops, Great Britain established them in Iraq just the same. The League of Nations appears to have made no protest against this incongruity. This viola- tion of a sacred trust, this violation of the Hague Opium Convention, seems to have been accepted without comment. That it was known to the League, however, is recorded in one of the League publications: 1 Iraq (Mesopotamia). The policy of the Govern- ment, as set out in a pamphlet enclosed with the reply to the questionnaire, indicates that a system is being established of small monopolies, to be granted to in- dividuals in districts where opium-smoking is prevalent enough to demand regulation. In other countries this farming system has been found to give rise to serious abuses, and steps have been generally taken to abolish it in favour of a government monopoly. Legislative measures, to bring the law and practice into closer conformity with the Opium Convention, are now being considered. The statistics given are insuf- i "Traffic in Opium," Geneva, June 1, 1922, C. 171 (1), M. 88 (1), P- 17- 104 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM ficient to base any conclusions upon, but fuller statistics are promised in the future. Further information has not been forthcoming as to how opium-farming prospers in Iraq. The more recent League publications on opium make no mention of this country. One can but assume that the opium revenue was needed, as otherwise the system of small monopolies would not have been established. That the traffic is still going on, under government sanction, is shown in a re- port on Iraq Administration, issued about Sep- tember 1, 1923: "The commodities on which ex- cise duties were levied were Liquor, Opium, To- bacco and Salt, and the revenues derived from these sources (including also the proceeds of country-craft registration, which was provision- ally administered by the excise authorities) amounted in 1921-22 to 39.29 lakhs." 1 How to reconcile a sacred trust and the Hague Opium Convention and an established government opium traffic is a puzzle. The pieces of this puzzle don't fit. i Report of His Majesty's High Commissioner on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the 'Iraq, for the period from October 1, 1920, to March 31, 1922, p. 49. CHAPTER XIV DUTCH POSSESSIONS: THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES BESIDES the numerous British possessions, three other European countries own colo- nies in the Far East, and in these colonies a brisk opium trade is maintained under government li- cense and encouragement. India is the source of the opium supply, and these colonial govern- ments have contracts with the British Govern- ment of India to provide them with as much opium as can be profitably absorbed. The Dutch possessions, or Netherlands East Indies, are large and important. They comprise Java, Sumatra, the west coast of Borneo, the Is- land of Celebes, and many smaller islands and archipelagos round about. All these lie on the equator, or a few degrees north and south of it, with an area of 733,000 square miles, and a popu- lation of approximately forty-nine millions. Of this population there are 169,35.5 Europeans, over forty-eight million natives, and 878,986 other Orientals, chiefly Chinese and Arabs. In 105 106 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM 1602, the Dutch created their East India Com- pany, which first conquered and then ruled these islands for nearly two hundred years. After the dissolution of the company in 1798, the Dutch possessions were governed by the mother-coun- try, Holland, whose area is only one seventh of theirs. The Netherlands Indies are extremely valu- able. They produce petroleum, coal, tin, iron, nickel, copper, and other minerals; also tea, coffee, rice, pepper, rubber, cotton, and other tropical products of like character. Like all European colonies, however, they have been hit by a trade depression following the war; and the upset of the world's markets has greatly affected them. Their running expenses exceed the wherewithal on which to run them. The follow- ing figures as to revenue and expenditure, esti- mated in guilders, will show the bad times through which the Netherlands Indies have been passing:1 Revenue Expenditure 1918 .... 395,900,000 505,600,000 1919 .... 537,900,000 711,500,000 1920 ... . 669,800,000 1,011,500,000 1921 .... 692,600,000 865,800,000 1922 . .. . 734,500,000 924,700,000 i Report on the Economic Situation of the Netherlands East Indies to March, 1922, Overseas Trade Department, p. 71. NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES 107 The above data show that the equilibrium of revenue and expenditure has suffered from war and post-war in- fluences, the deficit being attributed to the heavy ex- penditures incurred, firstly, in the maintenance during the war of both the Army and Navy at a strength far in excess of normal requirements; secondly, to the ex- penditure involved in maintaining on Government ac- count a supply of rice sufficient to feed the native pop- ulation in the event of unforeseen difficulties: and thirdly, to the heavy increase in the cost of living and the exorbitant price that had to be paid for all im- ported materials required in order to maintain public services. The prosperity of these Colonies in the years preced- ing the war had warranted the Government's undertak- ing heavy expenses for the improvement of agriculture, lines of communication and the general economic devel- opment of the country. The war, therefore, coincided with the period for which the Government had under- taken heavy obligations which had to be, as far as pos- sible, carried out irrespective of the increase in ex- penditure over estimates based on pre-war conditions. During these hard times, when other sources of income fell away, there has been one source of income that remained steady, namely, the revenue from opium. The Government of the Dutch Indies obtains its revenues from five main sources: taxation; monopolies; the production of agricultural estates, mines, and forests; govern- ment industries; and miscellaneous. The gov- 108 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM ernment monopolies are three: salt, pawnbrok- ing, and opium. The yield from opium in guil- ders is as follows: 11 1920 41,279,130 1921 33,983,110 (estimated) 1922 37,417,870 The estimated receipts from opium for 1923 are placed at 46,546,600 guilders.2 Thus, while the opium revenue has shared the fate of the general revenue and has decreased, we see it picking up again as normal times return. A Govern- ment which derives a large part of its revenue, about 11 per cent, through a vice of this kind, has a very sure asset upon which to reckon. The statistics concerning the Dutch East Indies seem to show that the actual amount of raw opium imported has not only increased, so that in 1920 the imports amounted to 172,932 kilos as against 115,907 kilos in 1916 and against an average for the six preceding years of 132,771 kilos, but an actual increase in the quantity of prepared opium manufactured. This table shows the quantity of prepared (smoking) opium manufactured during the seven years, 1914 to 1920: i Report on the Economic Situation of the Netherlands East Indies to March, 1922, Overseas Trade Department, p. 73. 2 "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 1171. NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES 109 1914 112,990 kilos 1915 86,133 " 1916 82,310 " 1917 105,946 " 1918 84,528 " 1919 86,489 " 1920 126,817 " This gives an increase in 1920 of 54 per cent over the figures for 1916, and of 41 per cent over the aver- age, i. e., 93,066 kilos, for the preceding six years. During the year 1920 the actual consumption of pre- pared opium amounted to 100,665 kilos, as compared with an average consumption during the six preceding years of 92,712 kilos, showing an increase of consump- tion amounting to some 8 per cent.1 The per capita consumption of opium is 1714 grains, reckoned on the basis of the Chinese pop- ulation, or twenty-six grains for the total popu- lation. Holland in 1912 signed the Hague Opium Convention, of which Chapter II, Article 6, reads as follows: "The Contracting Powers shall take measures for the gradual and effective suppres- sion of the manufacture of, internal trade in, and use of prepared opium, with due regard to the varying circumstances of each country con- i Minutes of the Fifth Session, Opium Committee, League of Nations, p. 137. 110 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM cerned, unless regulations on the subject are al- ready in existence." The first part of the above agreement seems rather definite, and it would look as if Holland had rather escaped her obliga- tions. The latter part of the sentence, however, is in the nature of a joker and provides the avenue through which escape may take place. Holland is not the only country that has van- ished through this convenient exit. CHAPTER XV PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS: MACAO MACAO is the Portuguese colony situated at the mouth of the Canton River and about forty miles from the British colony of Hong-Kong. It is an island, which, together with two small adjacent islands, forms a province with an area of about four square miles. The to- tal population is about 75,000, of which about 2000 are Portuguese, 71,000 Chinese, and the rest a mixed lot. The Portuguese obtained per- mission to settle in Macao in 1557, but the Chi- nese exacted a ground-rent for this privilege up to 1886. Small as it is, Macao has a big reputation of a most unsavory character. It exists on its vices, opium and gambling, but as it has nothing much else to exist upon, these vices stand out pretty well unrelieved. Other European colonies in the Far East often make large revenues from the encouragement of opium and gambling, but they likewise have other sources of income, certain agricultural and mineral products to export, so 111 112 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM that the vices of the inhabitants do not neces- sarily occupy the foreground. But with Macao it is different. Macao, therefore, is one of the clearing centers for opium. Its situation for that is handy. It obtains its opium from Hong-Kong, both for local consumption and for reexport. Its budget balances. "Whitaker's Almanac" gives the revenue for 1920-21 as $2,631,981. The privilege of selling opium is "farmed out," that is, sold to the highest bidder. " 'Macao, May 21, 1920. The bidding was very keen today for the Opium Monopoly for the three years com- mencing August first, the first offer being $2,- 500,000 annually. Spirited competition brought the price up to $3,950,000, and the farm was ad- judicated to the Lee Sing Company, Hong- Kong.' Thus Macao, with the help of Hong- Kong, keeps the trade going, and the assistance of Hong-Kong presents a very regrettable al- liance to the injury of China, of which neither Britons nor Portuguese can be proud." 1 From this it will be seen that the purchaser of the opium monopoly must clear at least $3,950,- 000 a year to come out even, and that he expects to clear infinitely more than this accounts for the i "The War against Opium," p. 112. MACAO 113 spirited competition when the "privilege" is put up at auction. The export of Indian opium to Macao, via Hong-Kong, is regulated by an agreement be- tween Great Britain and Portugal dating from 1913. By this agreement the Macao opium mo- nopoly is not allowed to import more than 260 chests a year for local consumption, and the limit fixed for reexport to "countries permitting im- port" is fixed at 240 chests a year. There is, however, a proviso for more than 240 chests for reexport, provided proof is given that the trade is lawful, an agreeable, elastic arrangement en- tered into "in pursuance of the conclusions of the International Opium Convention." The Inter- national Anti-Opium Society of Peking waxes indignant on this subject: "When it is consid- ered that the population of Macao is 78,000, it will be seen that not only is the amount allowed for local consumption to the Macaoese ridicu- lously beyond any medical requirement, but far in excess of what the habitues in the island could use. But what becomes of the excess if it is not smuggled into China by the gang that controls the illicit traffic? The 240 chests for reexport are presumably for the benefit of the South American republics, but it is doubtful whether 114 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM any large amount ever reaches that continent from Macao." 1 This arrangement between the British Govern- ment of India and Portugal for supplying opium to Macao has now come to an end, and a new agreement is under consideration. The terms of the new agreement are not yet known. This question was discussed at the meeting of the Opium Committee of the League of Nations in May, 1923: Mr. Ferreira [Portugal] said he was unable to give Sir John Jordan any information regarding the new agreement with the Government of India. He thought, however, the old contract had been prolonged during the war. Mr. Campbell [India] stated that he could give all the information required, but some of it was perhaps not suitable for putting before the Committee in pub- lic. . . . The Treaty had now been denounced and a new arrangement was at present being negotiated. The amount of opium to be exported was now under dis- cussion between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Portugal.2 The Peking Anti-Opium Society gets heated on the subject of smuggling from Macao: "It i "The War against Opium," pp. 111-112. 2 Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, League of Nationi, p. 48. MACAO 115 is notorious that on one occasion certain chests of opium reexported by the Macao farmer from Macao for Mexico fell into the hands of the Chinese Customs and were found to contain mo- lasses instead of opium, which no doubt had been smuggled by the farmer into China. This is part of abundant proof that the reexport of opium from Macao is lawful only in the sense that there is no international law to prohibit it." 1 The Peking Society simply cannot bear it: "Again, on the 17th of May, 1919, the steamship 'Amherst' cleared from Hong-Kong for Java. On the 4th of June, the Macao Government sup- plied the customary export return showing that 153,600 taels of prepared opium had been shipped in the vessel for Chile on the 17th of May. Three days later the 'Amherst' was com- pelled to put back to Hong-Kong for repairs to the engine, and a careful examination showed that there was no opium on board. The amount, equal to 9600 pounds that should have been sent to Java, had found some other destination, most certainly the nearest port in China into which attendant junks could enter." No wonder the Macao opium farm pays nearly four million dollars a year for the "privilege." Chile, however, seems to have had better luck i "The War against Opium," p. 112. 116 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM in obtaining prepared opium in 1920, for we read, under the head of Macao: "The figures available are those for the year 1920 and show that 20,500 kilos of prepared opium were manu- factured in the Colony, of which 9500 were ex- ported to Chile, leaving available for consump- tion some 10,900 kilos. Of this amount, 10,- 622 were actually consumed during the year in the Colony, whose population is 74,000. This shows the average consumption to be 2266 grains per head." 1 Prepared opium, by the way, is opium pre- pared for smoking, the export of which is strictly forbidden under the Hague Opium Convention. Most of these colonies get around that difficulty by importing raw opium and preparing it in their own factories after they import it. Macao, how- ever, does not bother to keep up appearances. The China Year Book for 1923 (page 996) comments thus on Macao: "The revenue of the colony is mainly derived from gambling and opium. . . . There is unquestionably strong feel- ing in South China regarding the possession by the Portuguese of a colony which derives the bulk of its revenue from sources which have been proclaimed illegal within the territories of the Chinese Republic." i Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, League of Nations, p. 139. CHAPTER XVI FRENCH possessions: INDO-CHINA FRANCE has great colonial possessions and dependencies, chiefly in Africa and Asia. The total area of these extensive territories is roughly estimated at something over five million square miles, with a population of about fifty- three million. A large area of Morocco is also under France as a protectorate. In one of her colonies, Indo-China, she has established an opium monopoly along the usual lines. Indo-China is that large peninsula lying to the south of China proper, over which the French ob- tained control in 1884. It consists of five states: Cochin-China, Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and Laos. The first of these ranks as a colony, while the other four are protectorates. The total area is about 256,878 square miles, with a population of about twenty million. The following figures show the opium con- sumption in kilos during the last eleven years: 1 i Minutes Fifth Session, Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium, League of Nations, p. 138. 117 118 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM 1910 77,741 1911.... 62,728 1912 67,564 1913 68,428 1914 72,842 1915 75,466 1916 140,229 1917 113,461 1918 114,700 1919 57,000 1920 63,000 1921 73,211 Action was begun in 1907 with a view to controlling and eliminating the abuses in connection with the use of opium, and successive measures, of which the decree of 1919 was the last, have been taken to this end. The sale of opium is confined to the opium administration, and stricter supervision is introduced daily. Selling prices of opium have been increased from $88 per kilo- gram in 1907 to $187 in 1920; the sale of opium dross is forbidden; and the suppression of public divans throughout Annam and Tonkin, that is, for more than two-thirds of Indo-China, has been effected. A number of confirmed opium smokers is estimated not to exceed three per thousand of the total population of 20 mil- lions. About 70 per cent of the smokers are Chinese. As a result of these measures it is claimed that consump- tion has been diminished by 45 per cent since 1907. This figure is based on a comparison of the consumption of 111,000 kilos in 1907 and an average of 60,000 for the years 1919 and 1920.1 i "Traffic in Opium," League of Nations, C. 171 (1), M. 88 (1), June 1, 1922, pp. 14-15. INDO-CHINA 119 The figures [of the table above] show a considerable increase in consumption between 1916 and 1918, which at first sight would indicate less favourable conclusions ; but the increase for this period is paralleled by similar increases in other Eastern countries during the same period. In Indo-China this temporary increase is ex- plained by special conditions created by the war, by the unprecedented prosperity due to two exceptional rice crops, by the enormous increase of exports and by the influx of about 50,000 Chinese labourers. The figures for 1916-1918 being regarded as abnormal, it will be seen that steady progress is being made towards sup- pression, and, in considering the results achieved, it is only fair to compare, as has been done, present condi- tions with conditions in 1907, when the Government be- gan its campaign against opium. In short, it is shown that the policy of progressive suppression of opium in Indo-China, followed uninterruptedly though perhaps less vigorously, during the war, but resumed energet- ically by the decree of 1919, now shows signs of being realized. During the last meeting of the Opium Com- mittee of the League of Nations at Geneva, May- June, 1923, the French delegate gave further in- formation as to conditions in Indo-China: "There were about 120,000 smokers in Indo- China, or 4 per thousand inhabitants. The con- sumption in recent years had been as follows: 1915 75 tons 1916 140 " 1921 73 " 120 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM "He desired to give an explanation for the high figures of 1916. . . . The war had entirely dis- located the situation, as it had done elsewhere. . . . The campaign, however, had started afresh in 1919 and new decrees had been promulgated in 1919 and 1920. Consumption had fallen again to half the former figures, and in 1921 consumption had amounted to 73 tons as against 140 tons in 1916. The campaign against opium in Indo- China could be divided into two portions, pre- war and post-war, during both of which con- sumption had been reduced by one half." 1 Later on, figures were given as to the fight against opium in certain French possessions in the South Seas: As regarded the French Indies, the population of Caledonia, Tahiti, the Reunion Islands and Madagascar had been threatened with an outbreak of the opium scourge. The consumption of opium in these ter- ritories had been entirely prohibited since 1922, and the following instance illustrated the effectiveness of this prohibition: The Colonial Ministry had recently re- ceived a request from the doctors in Tahiti for permis- sion to import, as an exceptional measure, a certain quantity of opium for the use of 40 addicts whose state of health was said to be suffering gravely by reason of i Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, P. V. 7, pp. 9-10. INDO-CHINA 121 its complete suppression. The French Government had categorically refused to grant this permission.1 In considering these French statements, we must take into account the French attitude to- ward opium. The French are not hypocrites. They make no defense of opium as being good for people. On the contrary, in speaking of the opium situation they always speak of it as a "struggle"-a struggle against great odds, against an old, well-established custom, against great difficulties with smugglers, but, above all, as a struggle against a harmful and dangerous habit. While we may consider their progress slow, with a dangerous tendency to backslide, and showing a very great backsliding during the war, we must consider the French attitude as sympathetic in this fight against opium, with a thoroughly keen realization of the degrading and deteriorating effects that follow in the wake of drugging. The use of the significant words "an outbreak of the opium scourge" in the South Sea Islands clearly indicates that the French have come to regard drug-taking as a i Ibid., note. The minutes quoted from are the typewritten minutes issued daily, after each meeting, to the members of the Opium Committee. They differ slightly in text from the printed minutes. 122 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM very serious thing. They do not try to hum- bug themselves or others as to the effects of opium. The per capita consumption of opium in Indo-China is 2007 grains, reckoned on the basis of the Chinese population of 546,928. The following figures as to revenue are taken from the Budget General for 1923, issued by the Gouvernement General de 1'Indo-Chine: OPIUM REVENUE 1 piastres 1914 13,118,892 1915 12,985,273 1916 20,681,793 1917 19,069,703 1918 20,993,924 1919 17,984,565 1920 13,321,008 1921 15,099,347 1922 14,900,000 1923 14,900,000* Total Revenue 2 Opium Revenue piastres piastres 1922 71,795,510 14,900,000, or 20 per cent. 1923 70,353,610 * 14,900,000,* or 21 per cent. ★ (Estimated) i Budget for 1923, Government of Indo-China, Chap. II, p. xiii. 2 Ibid., Part II, pp. 12-13. CHAPTER XVII SIAM SIAM, as we remarked before, long ago got caught in the net spread for her by the Brit- ish opium interests, and has not since been able to disentangle herself. In the year 1855, at Bangkok, Siam was forced by Great Britain to sign a treaty of Friendship and Commerce, in which commerce appeared to play the star part. Friendship, if one means by that any regard for the physical, mental, and moral welfare of the Siamese, came out of the small end of the horn. By the terms of this treaty Siam was unable to levy any import duty on opium, and so had no means of taxing it out of the country. The Ori- entals know full well the disastrous effects of opium-taking-none better, alas!-but are often obliged to give way before the commercial ac- tivities of more powerful nations. Such was Siam's predicament. This treaty of Friendship and Commerce holds good to-day, but Siam must deal with the situation as best it can. Im- agine the United States being told by any for- 123 124 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM eign power exactly what commodities she may levy duty on, and what she must admit free! Siam has suffered greatly through the preda- tory instincts of both British and French, or, as the "Statesman's Year Book" euphemistically puts it, "the limits of the Kingdom of Siam have varied much at different periods of its history." They varied a lot after the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904-an outburst of zeal over in- creasing the White Man's Burden-at which time the territory to the west of the Mekong River and the Gulf of Siam were "recognized" by Siam as under British influence, while those to the east passed over to the French sphere. Later on, much more territory was "acknowl- edged" by Siam as belonging to France, and the boundaries of the kingdom were still further "rectified." It was also "agreed" that four ports on the Mekong River should be held by France in perpetual lease. In 1909 a treaty for the "modification" of British extraterritorial rights took place, and the Siamese "ceded" the states of Kedah, Trengannu, and Kelantan to Great Britain. What with one thing and another, the Kingdom of Siam now occupies 194,580 square miles, with a population of just over nine million. "In recent years," remarks the "Statesman's SIAM 125 Year Book," "the results of Western civilization have to a considerable extent been introduced," which is apparently due to the horde of foreign advisers (including one American, the adviser in foreign affairs) who interest themselves in the welfare of the country. "A British officer oc- cupies the position of Financial Adviser, and there are numerous other British officers holding high advisory positions under the Government, more especially in the Finance and Audit, Rev- enue, Forests, Survey, Police, Justice, Customs, Mining, Mint and Education Departments. There are also a number of Europeans in various Departments. The financial position of the Kingdom is favourable, the revenue is steadily increasing, and the expenditure is less than the revenue and well under control." 1 From this it will be seen that Siam is very much indeed under foreign control. Until Siam is able to revise her treaty arrangements with these European countries, France and England, and can obtain full and free jurisdiction over her territory, together with financial autonomy, she will be badly handicapped in her fight against opium. "Smuggling is difficult to prevent, ow- ing to the extended frontiers, and to the extra- i "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 1321. 126 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM territorial rights of foreign nationals, which rights are said to hamper the Siamese Adminis- tration." 1 Until 1908 the opium business had been farmed out. In that year the Government took over the sale of opium and established a govern- ment monopoly, a policy which has nearly doubled the opium revenue. Siam owes a great deal of money to various European Govern- ments, and it may be that she was advised to establish this monoply in order to pay off her debts. From the year 1908-9 onwards the control of the sale of opium has been in the hands of the Government. Raw opium is imported by the Opium Department, prepared for consumption and sold in marked and sealed tubes. The sale is effected through the agency of contractors. Wholesale and retail prices are fixed annually by the Government, and the opium monopoly in each district is put up to public auction. In the pursuance of the policy which led the Govern- ment to concentrate the control of the opium traffic in its own hands, it was decided that, from the year 1915- 16 onwards, the annual import of opium issued for con- sumption in the country should be periodically reduced. The Opium Law of 1920-21 prohibited the smoking of opium except by licensed smokers.2 i "Traffic in Opium," C. 171, M. 88 (1). 2 Statistical Year Book of the Kingdom of Siam, 1921, p. 267. SIAM 127 This is the quantity of opium purchased by the Opium Department in kilos:1 Benares (Indian) Yunan 1917-18 86,485 0 1918-19 96,767 53 1919-20 91,444 29 1920-21 93,742 7,321 "Benares opium is imported and kept in stock by the Customs Department, and purchased by the Opium Department as required. Yunan opium is imported and purchased by the Opium Department of Northern Siam." (Yunan is a province of China, under French influence.) The following figures show the total revenue and the amount of the opium revenue in ticals: Revenue 2 Opium Revenue 3 Percentage 1916-17 82,911,149 19,275,702 23 1917-18 86,494,066 21,179,721 24 1918-19 93,409,470 21,444,418 23 1919-20 96,066,960 23,221,569 24 More recent figures as to revenue are given in the "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923; in this instance the amounts are given in pounds sterling: ■Libia., p. 269. 2 Ibid., p. 35. 3 Ibid., p. 40. 128 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM Revenue Opium revenue Percentage 1920-21 £7,175,464 £1,657,444 23 It is interesting to note that as the total rev- enue increases slightly year by year, so does the opium revenue increase and keep pace with it. The percentage, 23 or 24 per cent, is steadily maintained. The number of licensed opium shops is as fol- lows: 1 1916-17 3111 1917-18 3245 1918-19 1445 1919-20 1071 1920-21 886 This great reduction in the number of shops has had no effect upon the revenue, nor upon the amount of opium consumed. It is very obvious that Siam, much as she may wish it, can make no real progress along the lines of opium reform until she becomes politi- cally and financially independent. With two predatory powers on either side of her, with large foreign debts to pay off, and a swarm of foreign advisers supervising her customs, rev- enue, and finances in general, one may be quite sure that any attempt to lop off a quarter of her revenue will not receive much encouragement. i Ibid., p. 271. CHAPTER XVIII JAPAN JAPAN has committed a crime which is hard to forgive: she has disproved the contention that Oriental races are unfit to govern them- selves. She has also made another blunder, equally momentous: she has disproved the con- tention that Oriental races need opium as part of their daily bread. At the time when the Eu- ropean powers were loading themselves up with the White Man's Burden, Japan was considered too insignificant a burden to be worth picking up. This oversight has had far-reaching conse- quences, the end of which is not yet. For by reason of this omission, this failure to grab Ja- pan while the grabbing was good, Japan has been left alone, more or less, to work out her own salvation without being dominated and with- out being drugged. The result is that to-day Japan is on a plane, from a commercial and military point of view, with the great European powers. Likewise from the ethical point of view. For 129 130 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM Japan has no more conscience about drugging other more helpless peoples than certain great Christian nations from whom she learned the trick. And likewise, like these same powers, Ja- pan protects at home while she exploits abroad. She is as scrupulously careful as any European nation to protect her own people from danger- ous drugs and has enacted strict, prohibitive leg- islation to safeguard them. At the same time her merchants, smugglers, and peddlers distrib- ute these same dangerous drugs to any market they can comfortably attain. The market most accessible happens to be China, and in China we see Japanese drug peddlers at work, unloading morphia (much of it of European make) by the ton. Until the gates of Japan were thrown open, more or less forcibly, by Admiral Perry in 1853, the country was a closed community, living with- in itself, and trying to avoid all contact with the outside world. She was obliged to become west- ernized against her will, but, seeing the inevita- ble in store for her, profited to the utmost. She adopted Western manners and customs, com- mercial, industrial, educational, all the rest of it, good, bad, and indifferent. Unable to discrim- inate, to pick out the really fine things Western civilization has to offer, and to reject the base, JAPAN 131 she took it all in, hook, bait, and sinker. Over- whelmed with the necessity of becoming western- ized in order to hold her own against the en- croachments of the West, she did as they did all along the line. And when it comes to the ooium trade she holds her own with the best of them. We may blame Japan all we like, but at the same time let us remember who taught her. There are no opium shops in Japan, no smok- ing-Tooms or such temptation to her people. Moreover, there are at present about fifteen thousand Chinese coolies at work there; and in European colonies in the Orient the presence of the Chinese is always the excuse for selling opium. Yet somehow, in Japan, the Chinese have to worry along without opium, just as they must worry along without it in England and France. Providing opium for Chinese is not done, when that involves any risk of harming oneself, of injuring one's own people. There- fore, Japan has no licensed opium shops with- in her boundaries, as she considers her own people are worth protecting. This is the Japan- ese opinion of opium: More than sixty years ago, previous to the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese Government had realized how serious an effect opium smoking would have on the na- tion in the future, and, fearing the spread of this bad 132 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM habit among the population, it had prohibited the im- portation of opium, regarding it as a grave danger to the national security. After the political reform known as the Meiji Res- toration, the newly organized Government had taken measures to prohibit strictly not only the use, but also the sale and distribution, of prepared opium, by the infliction of a heavy penalty, and in the penal code of 1880, very heavy penalties had been laid down for of- fenses relating to the smoking of opium. The same principle of strict prohibition had been strengthened in the revised Penal Code of 1907, and every action re- lating to opium smoking, or even the possession of in- struments for indulging in it was punished by heavy penalties. In consequence of this strong policy, which the Japanese Government had followed for more than half a century, the habit of opium smoking was un- known to the Japanese people.1 This is the only Oriental country that has ever been able to enforce its stand on opium. China, India, Siam, every one of them subject to Eu- ropean domination or influence, have had to give way before European standards and to submit to European ideas as to what was best for the Oriental. Japan, however, has a colony, Formosa, where an opium monopoly is established on real Eu- ropean lines. Formosa was ceded to Japan by i Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, League of Nations, speech of Japanese delegate, p. 57. JAPAN 133 China, in 1895, and, although a little late in the day to set up a monopoly, Japan realized that it would pay. The example of the British opium monopoly in India was before her, and British example carries great weight. Japan, however, is now becoming aware of other influences, of the pressure of public opinion which condemns this opium trade. In September, 1897, the opium ordinance of Formosa had been put into force, and a Monopoly system adopted. The importation of raw opium and the cul- tivation of the poppy had been prohibited, except by the Monopoly Bureau of the Government. Opium smoking was to be allowed only to those who had re- ceived Governmental licenses as opium addicts. The distribution of opium among consumers, who were For- mosans or Chinese, was carried out under Govern- ment control, and smokers who did not possess a license were severely punished. As regarded the permission to purchase and use prepared [smoking] opium, new ap- plications for the permit to smoke opium had been re- fused since March, 1909. . . . The policy pursued by the Government in carrying out the above mentioned Monopoly system was not that of immediate suppres- sion, but of gradual suppression. The Government had adopted this policy after carefully considering the wel- fare of the people. The object of the system of mo- nopoly was to obtain strict control and gradual sup- pression of the use of opium. . . . The policy of grad- ual and effective suppression was clearly proved by the 134 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM facts: The number of licensed consumers had de- creased From 169,064 persons in 1900 To 99,982 " " 1910 To 49,031 " " 1920 To 45,832 " " 1921 . . . The average number of deaths among the opium smokers during the last ten years had been about 4000 a year, and it could be assumed that the complete sup- pression of licensed smokers might be effected within, perhaps, fifteen years.1 If Japan holds to her intention and continues at this rate, the end of opium in Formosa would seem to be in sight. The trouble with an opium monopoly is the endless opportunity for doing a little business on the side. For instance, opium is purchased in such amounts as may be disposed of "legiti- mately," that is, through the licensed shops. But if an excessive amount is purchased- through miscalculation-what then ? An amount far greater than can be sold in the shops and dens? The temptation to dispose of this excess, through secret channels, may become very great. Why hold over till next year this excessive, mis- i Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, League of Nations, p. 56. JAPAN 135 calculated supply? When there is a friend to oblige-all that sort of thing? "Perquisites" of this kind are endless, and a business such as opium does nothing to elevate the moral stan- dards of those who sell it, any more than it enhances the physical health of those who con- sume it. All is not well in Formosa, in spite of the re- duction in smoking opium as prepared for sale to the inhabitants. In 1910 the amount of pre- pared opium manufactured was 233,634 pounds. In 1920 the amount prepared was 143,975 pounds. "It may be worth recording that the manufacture of morphia has increased corre- spondingly with the decrease in manufacture of prepared opium." 1 This crude morphia goes to Japan proper to be made into morphia and heroin. Here is where the real trouble lies. Opium of all varieties, Indian, Persian, Turkish, in some form finds its way to Japan, where it is made into morphia. Yet the exports of morphia from Japan are practically nil. The question is, what becomes of all the morphia manufactured? It is not consumed in Japan, nor apparently ex- ported from Japan. What, then, happens to it? Is it merely banked up in warehouses, an ever- increasing hoard? Does the Japanese manufac- i Ibid., 137. 136 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM turer buy opium merely to relieve the glut on the market and to provide employment for his work- ers? This question has yet to be answered. In 1922 the Japanese delegate to the Opium Com- mittee of the League of Nations admitted quite frankly that there was an immense import into Japan and no export whatever, and said that the only explanation was that it had been smug- gled out of the country.1 Another very curious thing is the discrepancy between the exports of morphia from England to Japan as compared with the imports received by Japan from England. Thus:2 British exports to Japan Japanese imports from Great Britain 1916 7,257 pounds 37,898 pounds 1917 1,825 cc 41,509 « 1918 0 « 7,749 a 1919 0 Ci 4,715 cc 1920 1 u 11,741 cc Total 9,083 103,612 No satisfactory explanation has as yet been de- vised to account for these discrepancies. The best that can be said for it is that the morphia from Great Britain was of British origin but not actually shipped direct from England-job 1 Ibid., p. 74. *Ibid., p. 170. JAPAN 137 lots picked up on the Continent, so to speak, or elsewhere. In any event, the system of certifi- cates of export and import designed to control circulation of dangerous drugs appears to have broken down. But as Sir John Jordan once re- marked of this system of certificates, it is one through which the illicit drug merchant can drive a coach and four. The admission as to smuggling made by the Japanese delegate at Geneva, together with perpetual seizures of contraband morphia and opium, leaves no doubt that Japan is the active center for a huge illicit drug distribution in the Far East. This it too bad. All sincere friends of Japan deeply deplore this. Japan, with her great traditions behind her and her responsibility as a great Oriental nation, cannot afford to dam- age her prestige in this manner. She should not imitate nor make herself a willing cat's-paw for the nastiest traffic the Christian nations go in for. CHAPTER XIX CHINA CHINA is the classic example of what hap- pens to a country when it is thoroughly drugged. It is the outstanding example of a nation helpless to protect itself from the on- slaught of Western civilization, when that civ- ilization has once determined to exploit and de- bauch for the sake of the money involved. Right straight down from the golden days of the East India Company until the present moment, China has been the victim of this higher civilization, to- gether with all the ruin and degradation that has followed in its trail. Let us look well into the history of opium in China, for it contains much to enlighten us as to European methods- and ethics. The China Year Book tells us that "the poppy has been known in China for 12 centuries, and its medicinal use for 9 centuries. ... It was not until the middle of the 17th century that the practice of mixing opium with tobacco for smok- ing purposes was introduced into China. This 138 CHINA 139 habit was indulged in by the Dutch in Java, and by them taken to Formosa, whence it spread to Amoy and the mainland generally. There is no record to show when opium was first smoked by itself, but it is thought to have originated about the end of the 18th century. Foreign opium was first introduced by the Portuguese from Goa at the beginning of the 18th century. In 1729, when the foreign import was 200 chests, the Em- peror Yung Ching issued the first anti-opium edict, enacting severe penalties on the sale of opium and the opening of opium-smoking divans. The importation, however, continued to increase, and by 1790 it amounted to over 4000 chests an- nually. In 1796 opium smoking was again pro- hibited, and in 1800 the importation of foreign opium was again declared illegal. Opium was now contraband, but the fact had no effect on the quantity introduced into the country, which rose to 5000 chests in 1820; 16,000 chests in 1830; 20,000 chests in 1838, and 70,000 chests in 1858." This extraordinary rise in importation, in spite of edicts and prohibitions to the contrary, was due to the activity of British traders during the first part of this period, and then to the activity of the British Government of India during the latter part. China was the market for which Indian opium was destined, the market for which 140 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM it was being raised in ever-increasing quantities; and no trifles like Chinese opposition, edicts or prohibitions, should stand in the way. Warren Hastings laid down a principle in 1735, which has been the key-note of the opium trade ever since: "Opium is not a necessary of life, but a pernicious article of luxury which ought not to be per- mitted except for purposes of foreign commerce only, and which the wisdom of the Govern- ment should carefully restrain from internal con- sumption." Guided by this principle, laid down by the first governor-general of India, the British traders of the eighteenth century saw no reason for not dumping Indian opium on China. But the Chinese, alarmed at the habit which was spread- ing among the population, stiffened their resist- ance. The Chinese Government repeatedly ap- pealed to the British Government to stop these exports, this contraband smuggling trade, but to these appeals the British Government turned a deaf ear. India was prospering on this opium trade, and Chinese opposition stood for nothing. Indeed, the position of China in the first half of the nineteenth century was parallel to the posi- tion of America to-day in regard to liquor smug- gling. To-day, off the Atlantic coast, the United States is faoed with a fleet of rum- CHINA 141 runners, mostly of British origin. Mr. James M. Beck, solicitor-general of the United States, describes the American situation thus: "Vast quantities of liquor were taken out of all the British possessions, with a full knowledge that they were to be used to violate the laws of the United States and break down this policy of pro- hibition. Our requests that clearance papers should be refused to notorious rum-runners were denied. This persisted, and wholesale lawless- ness virtually challenged the right of the United States to be master within its own household, for it has never been questioned by any competent authority on international law that each sovereign nation, notwithstanding the comity of nations, has entire right to assert full police power over any foreign merchant vessel within the territorial limits of the sovereign." 1 A situation similar to this prevailed in China in those far-off days, except that instead of liquor it was opium that the Chinese were contending against. British smugglers were challenging the right of China to be master within its own house- hold. The Chinese, however, were a weak and unarmed nation, and they fared badly. Even so, they must have been very active in their resist- i "Britain and the United States: Provocation of Rum-Run- ning," by James M. Beck, "Sunday Times," London, July 15, 1923. 142 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM ance, for in 1839 the British traders found them- selves with twenty thousand chests of unsold opium in their store-ships off Canton. This opium was disposed of in a summary manner by one Lin, a powerful official sent by the Emperor to put a stop to smuggling. Lin had a Boston Tea-Party all on his own. Mr. S. Wells Wil- liams describes it thus: "The opium was de- stroyed in a most drastic manner, by mixing it in parcels of 200 chests, in trenches, with lime and salt water, and then drawing off the contents into an adjacent creek at low tide." This final attempt of the Chinese to enforce their authority and to uphold their own laws was the last straw. War with England followed this episode of Lin's, known generally as the First Opium War. British ships sailed up the river, seized port after port, and bombarded and took Canton. They likewise sailed up the Yang-tse River and captured the tribute junks going up the Grand Canal to Peking, thus intercepting a large part of China's revenue. Peace between the two countries was concluded in 1843, the Chinese being well beaten. As indemnity, the Chinese ceded Hong-Kong to Great Britain and paid that country twenty-one million dollars. In addition, certain Chinese cities were opened up as "treaty-ports"-Canton, Amoy, Fu-chau, CHINA 143 Ning-po, and Shanghai-and into these treaty- ports Indian opium could be imported. Things went on after this for fifteen years, marked by perpetual resistance by China to the flood of Indian opium that kept rising higher and higher. Again a war took place between the two countries, the Second Opium War, which, like the first, ended in a victory for Great Britain and opium. The Chinese were compelled to pay three million dollars indemnity and to open up five more treaty-ports. By the Treaty of Tien- tsin, signed in 1858, the importation of Indian opium into China was legalized. China's strug- gle against opium, to enforce her own laws and to be master within her own household, had been in vain. It was at this point that the Chinese began to raise opium themselves, in order to compete with the Indian opium which they could not exclude. Since they were to be turned into a nation of drug-takers, they would at least grow their own drug and not let all their money be drained out of the country. Thus it came about that after 1858 extensive tracts of land were given over to poppy production. Whole provinces, or parts of provinces, ceased to grow grain and other neces- sities, and diverted their rich river bottoms to the raising of opium. Chinese opium, however, 144 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM never supplanted Indian, being inferior in qual- ity. The country merely had double quantities of the drug, used straight or blended, to suit the taste or purse of the consumer. Thus the demoralization of China proceeded apace for the next half-century. In 1906, how- ever, the incredible happened. The Chinese de- termined to give up opium, to make one final, supreme effort to throw off the shackles. Through the aid and support of the United States, the Chinese entered into a ten-year agree- ment with Great Britain by the terms of which the Chinese were to decrease their poppy pro- duction 10 per cent a year for ten years, while the British agreed to cut down their imports of Indian opium 10 per cent a year for a like pe- riod. No one thought that such a bargain could ever be lived up to. China, with her unnum- bered thousands of drug-takers, her hundreds of individuals growing richer and richer through opium trading, did not seem in a position to carry to a successful conclusion such a gigantic under- taking. Therefore, the first three years of this contract were probation years for China. No one thought that a nation so permeated with drug-taking, so generally lowered in moral tone, so handicapped by a hundred and fifty years of gradual deterioration, could possibly win out. CHINA 145 But, as we have said, the incredible happened. The ten-year contract began in 1907, and by 1910, the end of the three-year probation period, the Chinese had firmly shown their determination to get rid of opium. Therefore, the ten-year contract ran along smoothly till the end, each side keeping faith and living up to its obligations. There was in England at this time a very great public opinion as to the Anglo-Chinese opium trade, which had been pronounced "morally in- defensible"; and this agitation played a most im- portant part in smoothing the way for China's heroic struggle. China was greatly handicapped during these ten years. In the foreign, i. e., European, con- cessions, the prohibitory laws of China did not apply, and in these foreign concessions opium shops were maintained and opium was freely procurable. Thus the Chinese were always able to get a certain amount of opium and were never allowed to lose their taste for the drug. Still, in spite of various difficulties, China won through. April 1, 1917, was the date on which the goal would be reached, the day on which China would be set free. For months in advance it was spoken of as a day fixed for general rejoicing on the deliverance of China from her bondage. The writer happened to be in China during 146 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM the winter of 1916-17, and already, in the autumn of 1916, vague, disquieting rumors were in the air. A syndicate of opium dealers, trad- ers between India and China, known as the Shanghai Opium Combine, had been making re- peated efforts to have the ten-year time-limit ex- tended. They wanted a further extension of nine months, on the excuse that the stocks of opium that they were holding at Shanghai could not be got rid of by April 1. They were hold- ing this opium at such extortionate prices that no buyers came forward to take it off their hands. Therefore, the Shanghai Opium Combine ap- pealed to the various British officials in China, and to the Foreign Office in London for an- other nine months' grace. To these appeals the British Government turned a deaf ear and very honorably refused any further extension of the ten years agreed to. If once this extension had been granted, it would have been pressed for again and again, and the situation prolonged in- definitely. Therefore, finding no help from their own Government, the Shanghai Opium Combine took matters into their own hands soon after the first of the year 1917. They "influ- enced" the Vice-President of China, Feng Kuo- Chang, to buy these stocks from them-three thousand chests of opium-for the sum of twenty CHINA 147 million dollars. Feng bought these stocks in the name ot the Chinese Government and expected his bankrupt Government to issue domestic bonds to pay for them. When the news of the transaction was made known-it took place a few weeks before April 1, when the ten-year agreement was to have ended-the whole country was thrown into an uproar. Mass-meetings of protest were held in every town and province, telegrams from governors and officials poured into Peking, and the contract was denounced and repudiated by the Chinese Parliament; but all to no effect. For some reason, the infamous con- tract could not be broken. The newspapers were rabid, containing pages of denunciation of this betrayal of China by one of her highest of- ficials, and various guesses were made as to the amount of the bribe. Feng's excuse was that he was obliged to conclude the deal for ''diplomatic reasons," whatever that may have meant. Through this betrayal, the Chinese Govern- ment was put in the position of an opium dealer. It had opium to sell. The moral effect of this upon the country was fatal. The heroic ten- year struggle to bring opium to an end, the colossal effort made by a drug-sodden people to free themselves from their vice, the national re- joicings fixed for April 1, 1917, which should 148 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM have been the day of deliverance, all were dashed to pieces in the twinkling of an eye. A corrupt official, "influenced" by a gang of opium dealers, had undone overnight the patient work of ten long years. True, some months later, all this opium was publicly burned, but the damage had been done. Tricked, betrayed, discouraged, the Chinese have now given up the struggle. What is the use? It is not surprising to know that the Chinese have now gone in for opium cultivation again, and on a great scale. How great, no one knows. Va- rious estimates are made as to the extent of this recrudescence of poppy-growing, but reliable figures are not forthcoming. In the present state of lawlessness and anarchy in China, the feeble Government of Peking cannot cope with the situation. The various provinces, which are a law unto themselves, are defiant of the weak central authority, a government in name only. Therefore, opium is raised as a means of paying the soldiers, who exist as roaming armies all over the country. Much of this opium is smuggled out from China and adds to the sum total which makes the world's drug problem. There is talk to-day of establishing an opium monopoly in China on the lines of the opium monopoly of India. This course was advocated in January, CHINA 149 1923, by Sir Francis Aglen, the inspector-gen- eral of the Chinese Maritime Customs, which are under British control. As opposed to this Brit- ish suggestion, we have the opinion of Bishop Brent, given in the course of his speech before the Opium Commission of the League of Nations at the meeting at Geneva in May, 1923: "Pe- king is under temptation to establish a govern- ment monopoly of opium on the specious ground of creating revenue. All around her she sees con- spicuous examples. ... It is playing with fire to establish a Government Monopoly, unless per- haps as a temporary expedient leading up to pro- hibition at a definite date, the nearer the wiser. The greatest service we can render China is to induce her Government to resist all temptation to establish a monopoly, and ourselves to set an example how to suppress over-production other than for medical purposes. It is monstrous to argue that because a country is willing to be de- bauched, therefore it is justifiable to debauch it. Or to maintain that if we do not reap a golden harvest from a nefarious trade, somebody else will and therefore we are foolish not to do it. Or for a nation to think it possible to build up an honourable commonwealth with revenues gained from the exploitation of the weakness and vice of human beings, whether our own nationals 150 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM or not. In the dawning day of cooperation, and protection of the weak, we are forever done with such sophistries as these." And as if all this was not enough for China to have suffered-wars, exploitation, struggle, be- trayal, and now temptation-we cannot close this chapter without speaking of the gigantic extent of the morphia smuggling into that unhappy country. The commercial advantages of mor- phia, as against raw opium, were discovered about fifteen years ago, or soon after 1907, when arrangements had been made to close the China market to Indian opium. Thus, during China's ten-year struggle, which ended in ultimate de- feat, the drug profiteers got busy in another way. Morphia henceforth, not opium, was to be Chi- na's portion. In this debauching of China, nearly every country of the world took a hand. The morphia factories of Ergland, of the Con- tinent, and of the United States worked over- time making morphia for the China market. The Japanese, having learned what's what from the Christian countries, made themselves the obliging middlemen by which most of this smug- gling was accomplished. Tons of morphia, lit- erally tons, have been smuggled into China until to-day the last state of that unhappy country is worse than the first. These are the figures CHINA 151 given by Dr. Wu Lien-Teh in the "Peking and Tientsin Times," April 5, 1920: 1911 5^ tons 1912 71/2 " 1913 11% " 1914 14 " 1915 16 " 1916 16 1917 221/2 " 1918 221/2 " 1919 ..28 " The smuggling is still going on. As with all contraband traffic, it is difficult to come to a pre- cise estimate of the extent and amount. For- tunately, America has been brought to realize her share in the iniquity, and by the passage of the Jones-Miller Bill in 1922 we are no longer ac- complices in the crime. By the provisions of the bill, no British or foreign morphia is allowed to be shipped in bond across our country for reex- port to Japan or elsewhere. We are limiting our own imports of opium to our own domestic needs, to supply us with sufficient morphia for lawful medical use, on doctors' prescriptions. This leaves us with no surplus morphia for ex- port. Any country now buying American mor- phia must demonstrate very clearly that it is needed for medical use. We are making every 152 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM effort to save ourselves from the disgrace of any further share in China's undoing, and how suc- cessful we have been may be judged by this state- ment: "The International Anti-Opium Asso- ciation of Peking wishes to give wide circulation to the fact that in 1922 not one ounce of Amer- ican manufactured narcotics was seized in China. This effective administration of the American narcotic export laws is worthy of emulation by other countries. ... For the encouragement of all who are working in the great anti-narcotic campaign let it be remembered that China is not now being 'deluged with American narcotics' and we trust that such words may never again appear in American print." Much as we regret it, the fact remains that China is now once more a large opium-producing country. She is growing poppies in defiance of her own laws, but growing them none the less; raising opium on what appears to be a very large scale, which fact is heavily dwelt upon and heavily emphasized by certain countries who wish to divert attention from their own traffic in opium. The more public indignation can be centered on China, poor, weak, distracted coun- try, the less indignation there will be to mete out to those stable, more powerful governments that have reduced China to her present plight. CHINA 153 China is utterly discouraged at the futility of her struggle for self-preservation. Therefore, in condemning her backsliding, let us be merci- ful in our judgment. CHAPTER XX TURKEY TURKEY is the third of the great opium- producing countries of the world. The output is small as compared to India but makes up in quality what it lacks in quantity. Turkey has produced opium for many years, and the present output comes from Asia Minor, since most of the provinces of European Turkey in which opium was grown were ceded to Serbia after the Balkan War of 1912. A letter from the American consul-general at Constantinople dated February 10, 1923, contains the following information: Turkish opium has three nomenclatures, each desig- nating a different quality. They are: I. Druggist. II. Soft, and III. Malatia. The Druggist opium is mostly used in the prepara- tion of morphia and other pharmaceutical preparations. It is somewhat harder than the other two qualities, and yields 12% of morphia according to the British Har- rison analysis, which is the equivalent of 11% in Amer- ican analytical measures. . . . 154 TURKEY 155 The Soft quality, as the name implies, is softer than other opiums and has a finer appearance, i. e., a clearer, golden-like colour. It gives a better taste to smokers, and yields from 13 to 15% morphia. . . . Malatia opium is produced in the city of the same name, and yields from 11% to 12% morphia. It is sometimes mixed with Soft and Druggist, with a view to getting a better price, but when unmixed, it is sold at practically the same price as Druggist. During the world war, Germany and Austria ab- sorbed nearly all the Turkish opium output. Soon after the Armistice, Japan monopolized the market by buying over 300 cases of 143 pounds each. United States, English, German, Italian and French buyers appeared in the market late in 1919. Americans bought 1919 $1,308,051 1920 275,424 1921 144,802 The lack of labour and war conditions prevailing in Asia Minor since Turkey entered the European war have considerably decreased the output. Anatolian peasants are now sowing wheat, corn and barley in or- der to keep themselves alive. Local opium dealers, however, are of the opinion that with the advent of normal conditions, Anatolian peasants will find it prof- itable to pay more attention to opium sowing. Sub- joined is a table showing how Turkish opium has been affected by war conditions: 156 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM 1913 10,500 cases of 143 lbs. each 1914 7,000 1915 2,750 1916 3,000 1917 2,400 1918 3,340 1919 3,000 1920 2,000 1921 2,200 1922 2,400 Further information, received through the kindness of the American consul-general at Con- stantinople under date of September 15, 1923, shows the output for 1922 to have been greater than in the table previously given: "It would seem that the total opium production in 1922 of Anatolia was about 2900 cases of 160 to 170 pounds each; that of Macedonia, 600 cases. If one adds old stock estimated at 2000 cases, there probably was available altogether 5500 cases, of which 4500 to 5000 cases were exported as fol- lows, approximately: To Japan ■ 700-800 cases France and Italy 300 " Great Britain and U. S. A. 1000-1500 " Germany Balance As regards 1923, a total output is foreseen of TURKEY 157 not more than 2000 cases from Turkey, and 400 from Macedonia." From these figures it will be seen that the out- put of Turkish opium for 1922 was about 240 tons. The production of Persian opium for 1921 was about 162 tons, while that of India for 1921-22 came to something in the neighborhood of 1450 tons. Turkey has been at war for twelve years or so, and "entered upon the year 1921 under a heavy cloud of commercial depression, which notwith- standing occasional rifts, slowly but surely grew thicker and blacker." The temptation to lighten the load a little by stimulating opium production is always present, and the markets of the world are clamoring for Turkish opium. However, with the signing of the peace treaty at Lausanne, July 24, 1923-which treaty was afterward ratified by the Turkish Parliament- Turkey agreed to accept the provisions of the Hague Opium Convention, which was included in the treaty. Thus, in Part III, Section VI, Article 100: "Turkey undertakes to adhere to the Conventions and Agreements enumerated be- low, or to ratify them"; and this includes: "No. 9. Opium Convention, signed at the Hague, January 23, 1912, and additional Protocol of 1914." 158 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM This will mean a great step forward in the fight against opium. But it remains to be seen how the Hague Convention is interpreted. If the American point of view prevails as to its in- terpretation, i. e., that opium production must be limited to the strict medical and scientific needs of the world, all will be simplified. But if the English point of view prevails, i. e., that opium may be produced for the legitimate needs of the world-as in those countries where drugging is considered legitimate-the difficulties will remain great as ever. In the final analysis, the question is not so much, What is legitimate? as, What is a need? If the "needs" of the drug-takers are to be put on the same plane as the "needs" of those with incurable illnesses or who have under- gone operations-if opium is to be produced ad lib. to fill both these needs-it will not matter much who signs the Hague Convention and who does not. CHAPTER XXI PERSIA PERSIA is one of the three great opium- producing countries of the world, the other two being Turkey and India. Like Turkish opium, the Persian is of a rich quality and con- tains about 12 per cent of morphia, as against an 8 per cent morphia content for the Indian vari- ety. Persian opium, therefore, like Turkish, has a distinct value as a necessary drug in the prac- tice of medicine; it is too valuable to use merely for smoking and eating, the chief use to which Indian opium is put. It is over-produced, how- ever-that is to say, the output is excessive; and much of the morphia derived from it finds its way about the world for illicit purposes. As a country, Persia has had a troubled exist- ence. It is one of the frontiers of India, and as such formed a perpetual bone of contention be- tween the old Russian Empire and the British. Both sought to control it for purposes of their own, and in 1907 an Anglo-Russian Agreement was reached by which each of these two great 159 160 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM Empires came to an understanding as to their respective "spheres of influence." The collapse of Russia left British influence for the moment supreme, and "the Versailles Conference had scarcely adjourned before England announced an 'agreement' with Persia which made that country another British protectorate, in fact if not in name." 1 This secret agreement, which was ratified by an exchange of notes between the two Govern- ments, "was then sprung upon the Persian peo- ple and the world at large as a fait accompli. The result was an almost universal suspicion of British motives . . . and disgust at the conduct of the three Ministers who were accused of sell- ing their country to foreigners." 2 After this unpleasing discovery, the Persian Government dispensed with its British advisers, including the financial adviser, and also with the British officers who had been in charge of cer- tain army divisions. "At the same time they saw that foreign help was necessary to carry out needed reforms, and invited the cooperation of the United States of America. Dr. Millspaugh and his associates arrived during the autumn of 1922." 3 i "The New World of Islam," by Lothrop Stoddard, 1922, p. 62. »"Lost Influence in Persia," London "Times," August 2, 1923. • Ibid. PERSIA 161 Now, although this Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 has been repudiated and fallen through (including a loan from Great Britain of two mil- lion pounds at 7 per cent interest), there are still many ties between Persia and Great Britain. In the first place, Persia is heavily in debt to that country. This is the list of her indebted- ness :1 Loans Original Amount Outstanding 1 Indian 5 per cent loan 4:314.281 16 4 138,744 17 10 2 Imperial Bank of Persia £1,250.000 0 0 1,199,112 9 1 3 British Advances 1912-14 £490,000 0 0 490,000 0 0 4 " " 1915-17 £817,000 0 0 410,000 0 0 5 " " (Krans) 1,000,000 1,000.000 6 " 11 1918-20 (Krans) 92,500,000 92,500,000 The guarantees and securities given by Persia for these loans are the revenues from posts and telegraphs, surplus incomes of customs of the ports, and for the 1912-14 loan (which bears a 7 per cent interest) the revenues of opium and alcohol in the south. British interests, therefore, have a direct stake in, the production of Persian opium. Moreover, who buys this Persian opium? To what country does most of it go? Whose factories make morphia out of this pro- duction? The following figures as to the output of Persian opium (quantities given in British pounds) and the countries to which it is exported i "Statesman's Year Book" for 1923, p. 1222. 162 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM came from the office of the administration-gen- eral of the finance of Persia, Teheran, dated January 24, 1923:1 1917 • England India United States . . Russia Turkey 268,765 85,273 17,760 390,822 3,903 766,523 1918 England 402,087 India 53,412 United States . 19,864 Japan 18,812 Russia 267,087 Turkey 2,044 Omman 12 763,318 1919 England 300,870 China 2,690 India 9,092 United States . . 554 Japan 4,575 Russia 42,554 Turkey 4,348 Muscat 76 364,759 i British Bulletin, Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, April, 1923. PERSIA 163 1920 England 203,571 China 6,652 India 8,965 Japan 67,049 Russia 36^947 Turkey 10,689 333,873 1921 England 272,644 China 12,642 Egypt 1,570 India 11,027 United States 1 Japan 23,523 Russia 32,826 Switzerland 1 Mesopotamia 8,651 362,885 With the output for the last three years given in tons, the amounts sent to England are as follows: Total output Exported to Great Britain Percentage 1919 162 133 82 1920 149 90 60 1921 162 121 75 In addition to the amounts sent to England, we also see India and Mesopotamia (Iraq) buying Persian opium. The British Empire is a good customer. 164 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM Now, British influence in Persia, in spite of the flurry created by the abortive agreement of 1919, is still great. An oil concession has been given to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which com- pany pays royalties to Persia on the petroleum. An interesting table is given in a report on trade and transport conditions in Persia, showing "the preponderance of British commercial interests in Persia during the year 1920-21, compared with those of any other foreign country, or even, in- deed, with those of all other foreign countries combined"; and this table shows that 83 per cent of the trade in Persia is with the British Empire.1 All of which means that British influence in Persia is not negligible. Persia signed the Hague Opium Convention in 1912, though she has never ratified it. It is interesting to note that at about that same time Great Britain (who also signed the Hague Con- vention in 1912), was lending money on the se- curity of the Persian opium revenues. No wonder Persia has not yet ratified the Hague Convention! i "Trade and Transport Conditions in Persia, 1922," Overseas Trade Department, pp. 10-11. CHAPTER XXII THE SMALL OPIUM-PRODUCING COUNTRIES: BULGARIA; GREECE; THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS, AND SLOVENES; AND EGYPT POPPIES will grow wherever planted save possibly in the arctic regions. They pay better when raised in the Orient, as the process of cutting the capsule and scraping off the drops of juice that exude and coagulate is a laborious, time-consuming process, all to be done by hand. Hence, for profit, poppies can only be raised where there is an abundant supply of extremely cheap labor. In certain countries this sort of labor can be found. Hence we find poppies being raised throughout the Balkan states and in Egypt. The production at present does not amount to much, but with the growing demand throughout the world for illicit opium, the small- scale production is increasing. New poppy fields are springing up overnight. These small outputs, now inconsiderable, will grow into larger ones, and the situation, already bad 165 166 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM enough, will be still further complicated. Un- less the double standard can be done away with -anti-narcotic legislation in advanced countries, and government patronage of drugging in others-the smaller countries will feel quite at liberty to follow the latter example and produce opium for whatever markets they can reach. There is only very sketchy information as to Bulgaria, and it is full of discrepancies. Ap- parently, opium has been produced in Bulgaria for some time, and of the best quality. Much of it was used for home consumption before the war, and the rest was sent to Constantinople to be exported as Turkish opium. In 1920 the production was 1700 kilos. During the same year the export from Bulgaria was 2513 kilos. This either means that the production was greater than specified, or that large amounts were left over from previous years, or that there was an export of imported opium, the imports of which were not recorded. "Such trade returns as exist show no import of opium into Bulgaria since 1915." 1 BULGARIA i Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, League of Nations, p. 179. THE SMALL COUNTRIES 167 In 1921 the total export for the first seven months was 7556 kilos. All extremely hazy. "The present production might be put at be- tween 10,000 and 12,000 kilos per annum." 1 So it might. There is little to go on. GREECE The poppy has been grown in Macedonia for a considerable time, the average production of opium amounting to between 130,000 and 150,- 000 pounds. In 1921 the yield was 67,500 to 70,500 pounds. About 30 tons. Ample. However, "the sowings for 1922 were smaller than for 1921, since the farmers obtain a greater profit from tobacco, and the prospects of grow- ing opium appear to be less favourable than formerly." 2 The output for 1922 is estimated as in the neighborhood of 50,000 pounds. KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS, AND SLOVENES The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slo- venes was known as Serbia before the war, but its territorial acquirements have also given it added i Ibid., p. 179. 2 Ibid., p. 179. 168 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM names. It is the largest of the smaller opium- growing countries, and production is on the up- grade. Before the Balkan War of 1912 Serbia pro- duced no opium, but as a result of that war cer- tain provinces belonging to Turkey were ceded to Serbia and became known as Serbian Mace- donia. Under Turkish rule, these provinces had been producing opium since 1865. Serbia con- tinued with the production, and the new King- dom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is also going on with it. What is to stop them? The moral sense of the world? The fact that drug- ging is a danger to public health and well-being? Those sentiments only apply in spots and are not yet universal. The following figures show the approximate production for the past three years in kilos:1 1920 66,350 1921 107,160 1922 107,160 EGYPT It is difficult to classify Egypt, whether as an independent country or as a British possession. The British have been in control since 1883, and i Ibid., pp. 179-180. THE SMALL COUNTRIES 169 during the World War took over Egypt as a protectorate, but this protectorate terminated February 28, 1922, because of intense opposition. The best that can be said is that Egypt's posi- tion is like that of a ball at the end of a rubber band. At times it flies out into space and seems quite "independent"; at other times it snaps back into the controlling hand of Great Britain. But whatever its position in space, the rubber band never quite breaks. In the matter of narcotics, Egypt appears to be "wide open." The Rev. H. E. E. Hayes, of Menouf, Egypt, states that opium is produced in Upper Egypt and threatens to sap the life of the people. Cultivation of the poppy is increasing. Investigation into the methods of illicit dealers produced the opinion of several witnesses that "most people ate opium." Poppy heads from which opium has been extracted are openly sold in the streets. Peasant mothers buy them, and feed their babies with them to make them sleep. Fines are hopelessly in- adequate.1 Mr. Hayes is a missionary in Egypt. He has more to say: "Rev. Herbert Hayes writes us again, under date of February 4, 1922. He says it is really appalling to find the drug every- i British Bulletin, Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, January, 1922. 170 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM where in Egypt. There had been a report that the Government had absolutely forbidden the production and the import, but this proved to be a mistake of the press. He now informs us that the countries whence the drug came in 1920 are as follows: England 64 kilos Greece 52 " Palestine 45 " Persia 1573 " Syria 3825 " Turkey 717 " India 300 " Smyrna 486 " Other countries 21 " The quantity produced in Egypt itself is un- known. There is no official check on statements made by the local authorities, nor is there any control over actual manufacture in the homes of the fellaheen, except a Pharmacy Law of 1904." 1 During this period, of which Mr. Hayes writes so disturbingly, Egypt ranked as a British pro- tectorate. The opium production in Egypt is, however, very small. The total output for 1922 amounted i British Bulletin Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, March, 1922. THE SMALL COUNTRIES 171 to only about 2000 kilos, possibly less.1 Egyptian opium is of such poor quality, contain- ing only about 4 per cent of morphia, that this may account for the limited output. Apart from opium, which in Egypt as in India is usually consumed by eating, there is a large traffic in drugs: "The narcotic industry in Egypt is very large. Cocaine and heroin are used openly and without apparent fear of police activity. The newspapers (for example, the Egyptian Mail of the 26th inst., and the Nou- velle Egypte of last Saturday), describe the method of delivery by automobile to clients of cocaine, in reciting the activities of a chemist on Kasr el Nil, directly adjacent to the Savoy Ho- tel. It is not unusual, for instance, to observe men and women entering this shop from automo- biles in the evening, buy their stuff, and sniff it on the sidewalk." 2 These conditions remain unchanged: "The existing laws are proving utterly ineffectual to stamp out traffic in this drug [cocaine]. A penal code which provides only light fines for illicit traders has no terror for smugglers and vendors, i Minutes Fifth Session, Opium Committee, League of Nations, p. 180. 2 Letter from office of American consulate, Cairo, March 28, 1923. 172 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM who pay the penalties imposed out of the huge profits, and carry on as before. So ludicrously ineffective are existing deterrents that the police have almost lost interest in the traffic, it being mere waste of time to arrest an offender, who will be fined a hundred piastres and set loose to re- sume his trade." 1 Egypt has had a bad start during these years of British control; and when that control tightened into a protectorate, from 1914 to 1922, nothing seems to have been done to improve the drug situation, which appears to have grown steadily worse. Well, Egypt is now nominally free. Free, in many respects, to shape her own destiny without interference. One of her first acts should be to enact stringent anti-narcotic laws, carrying heavy penalties, and to enforce them fearlessly. She will make but poor use of her new independence if she allows her people to become more and more drug-ridden, and takes no steps to prevent it. No nation addicted to drugs can hold its own in the march of civiliza- tion, nor can it compete with those nations that realize the danger and safeguard themselves ac- cordingly. i "The Near East," August 9, 1923, pp. 135-136. CHAPTER XXIII THE HAGUE OPIUM CONVENTION AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS THE first stirrings of public opinion on the subject of opium and dangerous drugs was crystallized at the Shanghai Opium Conference, which was held at Shanghai, China, in February, 1909. This, the first international discussion of this character, was called together by President Taft. In September of the same year the United States Government invited all those nations which had taken part in the Shanghai Conference to go to The Hague with the object of drawing up some sort of international treaty or agreement, based on the preliminary work done at Shanghai. This meeting resulted in that international agreement known as the Hague Opium Convention, the purpose of which was to end the abuse of opium and kindred drugs throughout the world. This convention was signed at The Hague on January 23, 1912, by the following twelve countries: Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Portugal, 173 174 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM Russia, China, Japan, Siam, Persia, and the United States. In addition to these, thirty-four other countries were also asked to sign this con- vention. A second meeting took place at The Hague in 1913, to put some finishing touches to this agree- ment; and a third, for the same purpose, was held in June, 1914. Now, the framing of this international opium convention was not a simple matter. The ini- tiative was taken by the United States, the prime mover being Dr. Hamilton Wright, a distin- guished American physician who had lived in the Far East for a number of years, and who knew the opium situation and its abuses inside out. But while the United States was in earnest about opium, the other nations were not equally keen. That first meeting at The Hague was very rough sledding. It was no earnest gathering of the nations of the world, aroused to a white heat over a great moral issue and determined to put things right. Far from it. From the outset, each country with great financial stakes in the opium traffic was determined to safeguard those inter- ests at all hazards. Every conceivable objection and reservation was made that could be made, and it is not surprising that the resultant treaty leaves much to be desired. The real surprise is THE HAGUE CONVENTION 175 that, whatever its shortcomings, such an interna- tional agreement ever came into existence. As Dr. Johnson says, the wonder is, not that the dog dances badly, but that the dog dances at all. However, the fact that this Hague Opium Convention was finally drawn up, signed, and all the rest of it, was an immense step forward. There was no public opinion back of it. Public opinion on the opium traffic did not exist fifteen years ago. A handful of people felt strongly on the subject, but the world at large knew nothing about opium and cared less. There was noth- ing, therefore, to push the framers of this Hague Convention into building a seaworthy vessel. The vessel, however, such as it is, was finally launched-in itself an achievement. But seaworthy? It leaks like a sieve. More- over, it was meant to leak. And it has come precious near foundering ever since. But as America took a hand in the original building of this craft, it is up to us to see that the various leaks are stopped; also, to stay on board and take our turn at the wheel and steer the curious craft into the port it is supposed to be heading for, the complete suppression of the use of opium and kindred drugs except for medical purposes. Let us mention a few leaks; "jokers" they might also be called. 176 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM In Chapter II, Article 6, we read that "The high contracting parties shall take measures for the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in, and use of prepared opium, with due regard to the vary- ing circumstances of each country concerned, un- less regulations on the subject are already in force." This is vague to a degree. No time-limit is set in which to bring about this gradual and effective suppression of the use of prepared or smoking opium. A time-limit of five or ten years would have put teeth into this clause, but that time-limit was carefully omitted. Further- more, a reduction at the rate of a pound a year might be construed by some countries as mark- ing gradual and effective suppression; a slow business if, as in some countries, the annual con- sumption runs to hundreds of tons. In Chapter II, Article 7, we find that "The contracting Powers shall prohibit the import and export of prepared opium; those Powers, how- ever, which are not yet ready to prohibit im- mediately the export of prepared opium shall prohibit it as soon as possible." Well, that has been neatly circumvented. Prepared or smoking opium is no longer ex- ported from one country to another. Raw THE HAGUE CONVENTION 177 opium is exported instead, and when it is re- ceived by the country that buys it, it is imme- diately "prepared" on the premises. There are factories for this purpose in Hong-Kong, Singa- pore, Saigon, Macao, all over the Far East, wher- ever opium is smoked. By means of this dodge, Chapter II, Article 7, of the Hague Convention is not being violated. The whole Hague Convention can be gone over, clause by clause, and found defective. But on the other hand it could be made a very satis- factory and workable thing if it were the will and intention of the high contracting powers to make it such. Any document, however carefully drawn up, will be found to contain loopholes, should there be a desire to use them. Therefore, the fault lies not so much with the Hague Con- vention as with the signatories thereto. Any in- ternational agreement can be made into a scrap of paper if the signers so choose. If the nations of the world could say to one another, in all sincerity, Let's put down opium, the thing could be done. An honest spirit be- hind those four words could devise ways and means. When the United States came into pos- session of the Philippines, we found an opium trade there, in full swing, left over by the Span- iards. It took no Hague Convention to enable 178 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM us to end the opium traffic in those islands, to close the shops and put down the whole thing. But to go back. The last meeting of the dele- gates to the Hague Opium Convention took place in June, 1914, and the World War came on soon after and opium was forgotten. At the end of the war, when the Versailles Treaty was drawn up, the Hague Convention was tucked into the Covenant of the League of Nations; and to the League was intrusted the task of see- ing that the international obligations incurred under the Hague Convention were carried out. The League of Nations, having assumed through its Covenant the control of the traffic in dangerous drugs, formed an Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium to carry out the work. This is a permanent organization, meeting at stated intervals, and has been able to collect a mass of extremely important material relating to all phases of the drug problem, and is, or should be, a most valuable instrument for carrying out the work. It is, however, but an advisory com- mittee, with no real power except to make sug- gestions or recommendations to the Council of the League; therefore it is the Council, and finally the Assembly itself, that acts on these THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS THE HAGUE CONVENTION 179 recommendations, that accepts or rejects them, as the case may be. But there is one great drawback to the "League," and that is the "Nations." Each one contributes exactly what it possesses in honesty of purpose and idealism, neither more nor less. Some countries bring up the average; others lower it. Some countries with fine, high stand- ards possess but little weight and influence, while the reverse is often the case. The League is often blamed for its many failures and eva- sions, but the League itself, a nebulous, in- tangible ideal, is not at fault. The fault lies with the nations that compose it. We see them, as usual, back at their old tricks. On the opium question they are as restive as under the Hague Convention; they are little in- clined to submit to the authority of the League on that matter as on many others. The first manifestation of this spirit came about in 1921, when at a meeting of the Council the Chinese delegate, Mr. Wellington Koo, offered a resolu- tion that the production of opium should be limited to the strictly medical and scientific needs of the world. In the Assembly this resolution was killed very neatly by altering the wording. At the suggestion of the representative of the British Government of India, opium was to be 180 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM produced for the "legitimate" needs of the world. This change immediately sanctioned opium for eating and smoking purposes, which is the "le- gitimate" or legal usage in certain Far Eastern countries. Unhappily, the Assembly agreed to this alteration. This action, substituting the word "legitimate" for "medical," has changed the entire mean- ing of the Hague Convention. The object of that Convention was to end the abuse of opium, not to sanction it as legitimate. But this clever move on the part of the British Government, speaking through its representative in India, has distorted the whole meaning of the international agreement. The political power of the League becomes a dangerous thing when it can thus change the interpretation of a solemn interna- tional obligation. After this occurrence, the United States asked leave to send a delegation before the Opium Committee of the League, to lay before that body our interpretation of the Hague Conven- tion, and the objects it was meant to attain. We claimed this right as one of the original signatories of the Hague Convention. Therefore, at Geneva last May appeared an American delegation, sent over by the President of the United States, and backed by the approval THE HAGUE CONVENTION 181 of the cabinet and by both branches of Congress. At its head was the Hon. Stephen G. Porter, and his associates were Dr. Rupert Blue, Bishop Brent, and Mr. Neville. Mr. Porter's proposals were brief and to the point. I. If the purpose of the Hague Convention is to be achieved according to its spirit and true in- tent, it must be recognized that the use of opium products for other than medicinal and scientific purposes is an abuse and not legitimate. II. In order to prevent the abuse of these products it is necessary to exercise the control of the production of raw opium in such a manner that there will be no surplus available for non- medical and non-scientific uses. Mr. Porter spoke with the whole weight of American opinion behind him. He asked the Opium Committee to consider this interpretation of the Hague Convention, and if satisfactory, to suggest that it be accepted by the Council and the Assembly. These American proposals, as they were called, raised a heated debate in the committee, and at first none of the nations except China wished to accept them. Finally, however, the opposition was broken down, and all the countries but one agreed to them. That one country was India, which refused to admit that the eating of opium 182 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM was illegitimate under the Hague Convention. It is a great thing, however, to have the British Government of India come out squarely into the open and show from what quarter the opposition comes. Later the Opium Committee recom- mended to the Council and the Assembly of the League that these American proposals be ac- cepted, and both the Council and the Assembly agreed. But the mere acceptance of a principle is not enough. Otherwise, the Hague Convention, which was far more than an acceptance of prin- ciples, would have shown better results. Public opinion must be awakened, in order that pressure may be exerted to see that these principles are put into effect and carried out. Therefore, at the meeting of the Assembly in September, 1923, Mr. Stephen Porter, head of the American dele- gation, asked the League of Nations to call to- gether a world conference on opium and the traffic in narcotic drugs, where the whole ques- tion could be threshed out publicly before the eyes of the world. This the League has agreed to do. After all, the first step toward ending the drug traffic is to expose it, in all its sinister details and ramifications. Full exposure is needed as to the individuals and the nations that uphold and THE HAGUE CONVENTION 183 profit by it. Strong light must be let into dark places. The drug traffic has flourished in secret all these years because practically no one knew anything about it. This period of secrecy is now over. If the League of Nations will give the drug traffic full publicity, through an inter- national conference held on such a scale and in such a setting-London for choice-that public opinion can be thoroughly informed and the whole question laid bare before the moral judg- ment of the world, the League will have accom- plished an object worthy of its highest aspira- tions. APPENDICES APPENDIX A THE HAGUE OPIUM CONVENTION INTERNATIONAL OPIUM CONVENTION; SIGNED AT THE HAGUE, JANUARY 23, 1912 CHAPTER I RAW OPIUM Definition. By "raw opium" is understood: The spontaneously coagulated juice obtained from the capsules of the papaver somniferum, which has only been submitted to the necessary manipulations for packing and transport. Article 1. The contracting Powers shall en- act effective laws or regulations for the control of the production and distribution of raw opium, unless laws or regulations on the subject are al- ready in existence. Article 2. Due regard being had to the dif- ferences in their commercial conditions, the con- tracting Powers shall limit the number of towns, ports, or other localities through which the ex- 187 188 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM port or import of raw opium shall be permitted. Article 3. The contracting Powers shall take measures:- (a) To prevent the export of raw opium to countries which shall have prohibited its entry, and (b) To control the export of raw opium to countries which restrict its import, unless regula- tions on the subject are already in existence. Article 4. The contracting Powers shall make regulations requiring that every package containing raw opium intended for export shall be marked in such a way as to indicate its con- tents, provided that the consignment exceeds 5 kilog. Article 5. The contracting Powers shall not allow the import and export of raw opium ex- cept by duly authorized persons. CHAPTER II PREPARED OPIUM Definition. By "prepared opium" is under- stood : The product of raw opium, obtained by a series of special operations, especially dissolving, boil- APPENDICES 189 ing, roasting, and fermentation, designed to transform it into an extract suitable for con- sumption. Prepared opium includes dross and all other residues remaining when opium has been smoked. Article 6. The contracting Powers shall take measures for the gradual and effective suppres- sion of the manufacture of, internal trade in, and use of prepared opium, with due regard to the varying circumstances of each country concerned, unless regulations on the subject are already in existence. Article 7. The contracting Powers shall pro- hibit the import and export of prepared opium; those Powers, however, which are not yet ready to prohibit immediately the export of prepared opium shall prohibit it as soon as possible. Article 8. The contracting Powers which are not yet ready to prohibit immediately the ex- port of prepared opium- (a) Shall restrict the number of towns, ports, or other localities through which prepared opium may be exported; (b) Shall prohibit the export of prepared opium to countries which now forbid, or which may hereafter forbid, the import thereof; (c) Shall, in the meanwhile, prohibit the con- signment of prepared opium to a country which 190 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM desires to restrict its entry, unless the exporter complies with the regulations of the importing country; (d) Shall take measures to ensure that every package exported, containing prepared opium, bears a special mark indicating the nature of its contents; (e) Shall not permit the export of prepared opium except by specially authorized persons. CHAPTER III MEDICINAL OPIUM, MORPHINE, COCAINE, ETC. Definition. By "medicinal opium" is under- stood : Raw opium which has been heated to 60° centigrade and contains not less than 10 per cent of morphine, whether or not it be powdered or granulated or mixed with indifferent materials. By "morphine" is understood: The principal alkaloid of opium, having the chemical formula Ci7H19NO3. By "cocaine" is understood: The principal alkaloid of the leaves of Erythroxylon Coca, having the formula Ci7H2i- NO4. APPENDICES 191 By "heroine" is understood: Diacetyl-morphine, having the formula C2i- h23no6. Article 9. The contracting Powers shall en- act pharmacy laws or regulations to confine to medical and legitimate purpose the manufacture, sale, and use of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts unless laws or regulations on the subject are already in existence. They shall co- operate with one another to prevent the use of these drugs for any other purpose. Article 10. The contracting Powers shall use their best endeavours to control, or to cause to be controlled, all persons manufacturing, import- ing, selling, distributing; and exporting mor- phine, cocaine, and their respective salts, as well as the buildings in which these persons carry on such industry or trade. With this object, the contracting Parties shall use their best endeavours to adopt, or cause to be adopted, the following measures, unless regulations on the subject are already in exist- ence: (a) To confine the manufacture of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts to those estab- lishments and premises alone which have been licensed for the purpose, or obtain information respecting the establishments and premises in 192 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM which these drugs are manufactured and to keep a register of them; (b) To require that all persons engaged in the manufacture, import, sale, distribution, or export of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts shall be furnished with a license or permit to engage in these operations, or shall make to the competent authorities an official declaration that they are so engaged; (c) To require that such persons shall enter in their books the quantities manufactured, im- ports, sales and all other distribution, and ex- ports of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts. This rule shall not necessarily apply to medical prescriptions and to sales by duly au- thorized chemists. Article 11. The contracting Powers shall take measures to prohibit as regards their inter- nal trade, the delivery of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts to any unauthorized persons unless regulations on the subject are already in existence. Article 12. Due regard being had to the dif- ferences in their conditions, the contracting Powers shall use their best endeavours to restrict to authorized persons the import of morphine, cocaine and their respective salts. Article 13. The contracting Powers shall use APPENDICES 193 their best endeavours to adopt, or cause to be adopted, measures to ensure that morphine, co- caine, and their respective salts shall not be ex- ported from their countries, possessions, colonies, and leased territories to the countries, possessions, colonies, and leased territories of the other con- tracting Powers, except when consigned to per- sons furnished with the licenses or permits pro- vided for by the laws or regulations of the im- porting country. With this object each Government may com- municate from time to time to the Governments of the exporting countries lists of the persons to whom licenses or permits for the import of mor- phine, cocaine, and their respective salts have been granted. Article 14. The contracting Powers shall ap- ply the laws and regulations respecting the man- ufacture, import, sale, or export of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts- (a) To medicinal opium; (b) To all preparations (officinal and non- officinal, including the so-called anti-opium rem- edies) containing more than 0.2 per cent of mor- phine, or more than 0.1 per cent of cocaine; (c) To heroine, its salts and preparations con- taining more than 0.1 per cent of heroine; (d) To all new derivatives of morphine, of 194 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM cocaine, or of their respective salts, and to every other alkaloid of opium, which may be shown by scientific research, generally recognized, to be liable to similar abuse and productive of like ill-effects. CHAPTER IV Article 15. The contracting Powers having treaties with China (Treaty Powers), shall, in conjunction with the Chinese Government, take the necessary measures to prevent the smuggling into Chinese territory, as well as into their Far- Eastern colonies, and into the leased territories which they occupy in China, of raw and prepared opium, morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts, as also of the substances referred to in Ar- ticle 14 of the present convention. The Chinese Government shall, on their part, take similar measures for the suppression of the smuggling of opium and of the other substances above referred to from China to the foreign colonies and leased territories. Article 16. The Chinese Government shall promulgate pharmacy laws for their subjects, regulating the sale and distribution of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts, and of the APPENDICES 195 substances referred to in article 14 of the present convention, and shall communicate these laws to the Governments having treaties with China, through their diplomatic representatives at Pe- king. The contracting Powers having treaties with China shall examine these laws and, if they find them acceptable, shall take the necessary measures to apply them to their nationals resid- ing in China. Article 17. The contracting Powers having treaties with China shall undertake to adopt the necessary measures to restrict and control the habit of smoking opium in their leased territories, settlements, and concessions in China, to sup- press, pari passu with the Chinese Government, the opium dens or similar establishments which may still exist there, and to prohibit the use of opium in places of entertainment and brothels. Article 18. The contracting Powers having treaties with China shall take effective measures for the gradual reduction, pari passu with the effective measures which the Chinese Govern- ment shall take with the same object, of the num- ber of shops in which raw and prepared opium are sold, which may still exist in their leased ter- ritories, settlements, and concessions in China. They shall adopt effective measures for the re- striction and control of the retail trade in opium 196 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM: in the leased territories, settlements, and conces- sions, unless regulations on the subject are al- ready in existence. Article 19. The contracting Powers having post offices in China shall adopt effective meas- ures to prohibit the illegal import into China in the form of postal packages, as well as the illegal transmission through these offices from one place in China to another, of opium (raw or prepared), morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts, and of the other substances referred to in article 14 of the present convention. CHAPTER V Article 20. The contracting Powers shall ex- amine the possibility of enacting laws or regula- tions making it a penal offense to be in illegal possession of raw opium, prepared opium, mor- phine, cocaine and their respective salts, unless laws or regulations on the subject are already in existence. Article 21. The contracting Powers shall communicate to one another, through the Min- ister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.- (a) The texts of the existing laws and admin- istrative regulations respecting the matters re- APPENDICES 197 ferred to in the present convention, or promul- gated in virtue of the clauses thereof. (b) Statistical information as regards the trade in raw opium, prepared opium, morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts, as well as in the other drugs or their salts or preparations re- ferred to in the present convention. These statistics shall be furnished with as many details and within a period as short as may be considered possible. CHAPTER VI FINAL PROVISIONS Article 22. Any Power not represented at the conference shall be allowed to sign the present convention. With this object the Government of the Neth- erlands will, immediately after the signature of the convention by the plenipotentiaries of the Powers which have taken part in the conference, invite all the Powers of Europe and America not represented at the conference, that is to say: The Argentine Republic, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colom- bia, Costa Rica, the Republic of Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, the Republic of Ecua- 198 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM dor, Spain, Greece, Guatemala, the Republic of Haiti, Honduras, Luxemburg, Mexico, Monte- negro, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Roumania, Salvador, Servia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, the United States of Venezuela, to appoint a delegate, fur- nished with the necessary full powers, to sign the convention at The Hague. These signatures shall be affixed to the conven- tion by means of a "Protocol of signature by Powers not represented at the conference," to be added after the signatures of the Powers represented, the date of each signature being mentioned. The Government of the Netherlands will, every month, notify the signatory Powers of each supplementary signature. Article 23. After all the Powers, as well on their own behalf as on behalf of their possessions, colonies, protectorates, and leased territories, have signed the convention or the supplementary protocol above referred to, the Government of the Netherlands will invite all the Powers to ratify the convention with this protocol. In the event of the signature of all the Powers invited not having been obtained on the date of the 31st December, 1912, the Government of the Netherlands will immediately invite the Powers APPENDICES 199 who have signed by that date to appoint delegates to examine at The Hague the possibility of de- positing their ratifications notwithstanding. The ratification shall take place within as short a period as possible and shall be deposited at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at The Hague. The Government of the Netherlands will every month notify the signatory Powers of the ratifica- tions which they have received in the interval. As soon as the ratifications of all the signatory Powers, as well on their own behalf as on behalf of their own colonies, possessions, protectorates, and leased territories, have been received by the Government of the Netherlands, the latter will notify all the Powers who have ratified the con- vention of the date on which it received the last instrument of ratification. Article 24. The present convention shall come into force three months after the date men- tioned in the notification by the Government of the Netherlands, referred to in the last paragraph of the preceding article. With regard to the laws, regulations, or other measures contemplated by the present conven- tion, it is agreed that the Bills or drafts required for this purpose shall be prepared not later than six months after the entry into force of the con- vention. As regards the laws, they shall also be 200 THE ETHICS OF OPIUM submitted by their Governments to the Parlia- ments or legislative bodies within the same pe- riod of six months or in any case at the first ses- sion following the expiration of this period. The date on which these laws, regulations, or measures shall come into force shall form the sub- ject of an agreement between the contracting Powers, at the instance of the Government of the Netherlands. In the event of questions arising relative to the ratification of the present convention, or to the enforcement either of the convention or of the laws, regulations, or measures resulting there- from, the Government of the Netherlands will, if these questions cannot be settled by other means, invite all the contracting Powers to appoint delegates to meet at The Hague in order to arrive at an immediate agreement on these questions. Article 25. If one of the contracting Powers should wish to denounce the present convention, the denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Government of the Netherlands, who will immediately communicate a certified copy of the notification to all the other Powers, informing them of the date on which it was received. The denunciation shall take effect only as re- gards the Power which notified it, and one year APPENDICES 201 after the notification thereof has reached the Government of the Netherlands. Four of the signatories made the following reservations: France: "With the reservation that a sepa- rate and special ratification or denunci- ation may subsequently be obtained for the French protectorates." Great Britain: "With the reservation of the following declaration: " 'The articles of the present convention, if rat- ified by His Britannic Majesty's Gov- ernment, shall apply to the Govern- ment of British India, Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Hong-Kong, and Weihaiwei in every respect in the same way as they shall apply to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire- land; but His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve the right of signing or denouncing separately the said con- vention in the name of any dominion, colony, dependency, or protectorate of His Majesty other than those which have been specified.' " Persia: "With the reservation of articles 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, (Persia having no 202 APPENDICES treaty with China), and paragraph (a) of article 3." Siam: "With the reservation of articles 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, Siam having no treaty with China." FINAL PROTOCOL OF THE INTERNATIONAL OPIUM CONFERENCE The conference further expressed the follow- ing voeux: 1. The conference considers it desirable to di- rect the attention of the Universal Postal Union-/ (1) To the urgency of regulating the trans- mission through the post of raw opium: (2) To the urgency of regulating as far as possible the transmission through the post of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts and other substances referred to in article 14 of the convention; (3) To the necessity of prohibiting the trans- mission of prepared opium through the post. 2. The conference considers it desirable to study the question of Indian hemp from the statistical and scientific point of view, with the object of regulating its abuses, should the neces- sity thereof be felt, by internal legislation or by an international agreement. APPENDIX B TREATY OF VERSAILLES: ARTICI2ES RELATING TO OPIUM Article 295: Those of the High Contracting Parties who have not yet signed, or who have signed but not yet ratified, the Opium Conven- tion signed at The Hague on January 23, 1912, agree to bring the said Convention into force, and for this purpose to enact the necessary legisla- tion without delay and in any case within a period of twelve months from the coming into force of the present treaty. Furthermore, they agree that ratification of the present Treaty should in the case of Powers which have not yet ratified the Opium Conven- tion be deemed in all respects equivalent to the ratification of that Convention and to the signa- ture of the Special Protocol which was opened at The Hague in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Third Opium Conference in 1914 for bringing the said Convention into force. For this purpose the Government of the French Republic will communicate to the Gov- 203 204 APPENDICES ernment of the Netherlands a certified copy of the protocol of the deposit of ratifications of the present Treaty, and will invite the Government of the Netherlands to accept and deposit the said certified copy as if it were a deposit of ratifica- tions of the Opium Convention and a signature of the Additional Protocol of 1914. APPENDIX C PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF OPIUM IN THE FAR EAST, CALCULATED ON THE BASIS OF THE CHINESE POPULATION (Minutes Fifth Session Opium Committee, League of Nations, pp. 57, 58, 177.) British colonies and Chinese population Consumption in grains possessions British North Borneo 37,600 3,360 i Straits Settlements 432,764 2,385 Federated Malay States 494,548 990 Unfederated Malay Slates 180,000 17,480 Hong-Kong 610,368 244 Tsing-Tao 211,000 84 French colonies Indo-China 546,928 2,007 Dutch colonies Dutch East Indies 880,000 1,714 Portuguese colonies Macao 74,000 2,152 Japanese colonies Formosa 3,000,000 333 Siam 1,000,000 1,050 i The figures as to British North Borneo show a much smaller consumption than the estimate given by Mr. Owen Rutter, author of "British North Borneo" (p. 173). Mr. Rutter gives the con- sumption for the male adult Chinese population as 15.2 ounces, or 7,200 grains per head. The opium consumption in India is 26 grains per head, for a population of 319,000,000. 205