A SYLLABUS of PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE WASHINGTON 25, D. C. OCTOBER 1946 A SYLLABUS of PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PROPAGANDA BRANCH, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, WDGS THE PENTAGON WASHINGTON 25, D. C. OCTOBER, 1946 Cover I (lustration The leaflet shown on the cover is an instance of the 4‘civilian - action” type. It was an appeal to Chinese villagers to aid American airmen who might be wounded, to conceal them from Japanese, to facilitate their return to base. Another leaflet in the same series is shown in illustration number 8 on page 36. Note Instructional and informational material concerning psy- chological warfare has been requested in a considerable number of inquiries addressed to Propaganda Branch, Intelligence Division. This SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE has been pre- pared to meet such inquiries until more basic documentation is available. Psychological warfare, sometimes called military pro- paganda, is a subject new to formal American military doctrine; its definition in relation to other military topics will accordingly take special time and care. A field manual, a technical manual, ordnance and air studies and other appropriate documents are in course of preparation, but until they are approved for publication, no book or outline can be represented as expressing the official views and policies of the War Department. This SYLLABUS is designed to serve during the interim and it must be understood to be provisional in character. It will be superseded when the more formal publications become available. This SYLLABUS is designed either for independent reading or for course instruction. It has been prepared by Major Paul M. A. Linebarger, AUS, who is in civilian life a professor at the School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C. Major Linebarger is also preparing a college-level textbook on psychological warfare. He has worked in this field at the old Psychological Warfare Branch, the O.W.I., the CBI and China Theater propaganda facilities and this Branch. The Psychological Warfare Division, G-2, Army Ground Forces has closely cooperated in the preparation of this SYLLABUS for publication. Propaganda Branch issues and endorses this SYLLABUS only to the extent of making it available as an instruc- tional aid. DANA W. /OHNSTON Colonel, GSC Chief, Propaganda Branch Intelligence Division, WDGS Contents Page I. Definitions 2 II. Psychological Warfare, 1914-1918 4 III. Experience of World War II 8 IV. Propaganda Analysis 16 V. Propaganda Intelligence 22 VI. Propaganda Technique 25 VII. Wartime Propaganda Administration 27 VIII. Combat Propaganda Operations 32 IX. Reading List 45 I. Definitions 11. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Psychological warfare has been defined as warfare psychologically waged; that is, military opera- tions carried out with close and studied reference to the politics, opinion, and morale of the rnemy. It is not in this sense that the term has been used in American practice during World War II. Psychological warfare has been, more narrowly, defined as comprising the use of propaganda against an enemy, together with such other operational measures of a military nature as the effective use of propaganda may require. If2. PROPAGANDA. Propaganda may be loosely described as “organized non-violent persuasion/' More technically, it may be defined for Army purposes as follows: Military propaganda consists of the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given enemy, neutral, or friendly foreign group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose. IF3. OVERT PROPAGANDA. Overt or “white” propaganda is propaganda which is officially or otherwise plainly issued from a known source. (See Illustrations #1, #4, or #5., as opposed to #9, which falsely im- plies that it is of American origin.) 1F4. COVERT PROPAGANDA. Covert or “black” propaganda is issued from a concealed or falsified source. (Illustration #9; or a radio station which pretends to be a “freedom station” and is actually operated by one of the belligerent’ powers.) 1F5. STRATEGIC PROPAGANDA. Strategic propaganda is directed at enemy forces, enemy peoples or enemy-occupied areas in their entirety and—in coordination with other strategically planned means—is designed to effectuate results sought over a long period of time. IF6. TACTICAL PROPAGANDA. Tactical propaganda (sometimes called “combat propaganda”) is directed at specific audiences, and is pre- pared and executed in support of combat operations. IF7. CONSOLIDATION PROPAGANDA. Consolidation propaganda is directed toward civil populations in areas occupied by a military force and is designed to insure compliance with the commands promulgated by the commander of the occupying force. IF8. COUNTERPROPAGANDA. Counterpropaganda is designed to refute a specific point or theme of enemy propaganda. 2 19. POLITICAL WARFARE. Political warfare (also called “crisis diplomacy/' or “the war of nerves/' or the “diplomacy of dramatic intimidation") consists of the framing of national policy in such a way as to facilitate propaganda or military operations, whether with respect to the direct political relations of governments to one another or in relation to groups of persons possessing a political character. 110. MEDIA. The devices by means of which the communication is conveyed. (In everyday life, the most common media are the living voice, the telephone, print, and the typewriter. In war propaganda, the most common media are voice radio, wireless in plain code, leaflets and pam- phlets.) 3 II. Psychological Warfare, 1914-1918 111. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR. In the first World War, psychological warfare was employed chiefly by means of political warfare and through combat propaganda which used air- borne and artillery-fired leaflets. Radio was not available. 1112. POLITICAL WARFARE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS AND THE ALLIES. The Central Powers used very old-fashioned political war- fare. They were reactionary monarchies, legitimist in outlook, and were unable to exploit the revolutionary, democratic or autonomist sentiments of the time. Their chief political warfare exploits consisted of inducing Turkey to proclaim a jihad against the Allies; since the Turkish sultan was the titular caliph of all Islam, this seemed promising but was countered by local measures (T. E. Lawrence and the Arab revolt against Turkey, for example) in the Middle East, and of the assistance offered to Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders by the German General Staff. The Germans gave Lenin, a subject of the Czar, transit from Switzerland to Finland in the expecta- tion that Lenin would enter Russia, commit high treason against the Czar, and take Russia out of the war. He did so, but the ensuing wave of Communist revolution contributed to the defeat of Germany as weH. Allied psychological warfare was based preeminently on the political warfare developed by President Woodrow Wilson. The United States entered the war in 1917 with a clear conscience, since the Kaiser's government was plainly the aggressor. Immediately upon participation, the U. S. government strove for the Fourteen Points. These assured both Allies and enemies that the United States sought no new territory as a result of war, that we stood for open diplomacy, that we believed in a “league to enforce peace" which would make further war impossible. They also promised democratic self- government to the hitherto-suppressed nationalities of the Baltic and Cen- tral Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, etc.). This democratic po- litical offensive was propagandized by official government action, but its greatest effect was achieved when it was carried by ordinary news channels all over the world. British political warfare supplemented American effectively. In special cases, the British accomplished even more striking results. Against Turkey they rallied the Arab states, while rallying world-wide Jewish Zionist help to their side by promising the Jews a national home in Palestine (Balfour Declaration). India was quieted, in the face of German, Turkish, and revo- lutionary propaganda, by the Montagu statement and Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Japanese political warfare during World War I was directed at her co-Ally, China. 4 At the end of the war, the Allies faced a serious problem in the revolutionary propaganda of the Russian Communists, who had established a Soviet communist form of state which denied the legitimacy of all other states. The Soviet leaders expected revolution to break out throughout the world. Communist revolts did occur in Hungary, Bavaria, Berlin and else- where. The Allies countered these with military intervention on the side of the Conservatives in Russia and with diplomatic and military aid to the states around Russia (“cordon sanitaire”). The reciprocal bitterness and suspicion which resulted from this clash between Allies and Bolsheviks later provided a line of cleavage which Hitler utilized in preparing World War II. If 14. THE CREEL COMMITTEE. The national propaganda agency of the United States government—the Committee on Public Information, usually known by the name of its chairman, George Creel—was the “Creel Committee/' This was actually an emergency wartime department of the government. It was set up by order of the President and was financed out of his special war funds, later supplemented by congressional appropria- tions. The Creel Committee organized both domestic and foreign propa- ganda. (There was no War Department or General Staff agency charged with the military side of psychological warfare.) Coordination was effected by Mr, Creel himself; he had close access to the President and to the appro- priate cabinet members. If 15. DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA. Internal propaganda within the United States was more difficult than it was to be in World War H. The de- cision to declare war had to be taken by the United States. The Germans had been too clever to unite us, as did the Japanese with their psychological blun- der at Pearl Harbor, by means of an overt attack on American territory. The Creel Committee had the normal problems of wartime morale (slackers, profi- teers, inert people); it also had well-organized groups of Irish-Americans (Ireland then being anti-British), German-Americans and powerful isolationists to counter. The Committee proceeded vigorously on the domestic front. Since there was no radio, it organized “Four Minute Menstandardized public speakers who carried war messages throughout the country. It served- the press by systematizing government information policy. It used posters, ad- vertising, cartoons, civic clubs, the theatre, movies, and women's organiza- tions as outlets for its material. The political warfare—the extent of the promises made for a democratic, war-free, prosperous post-war world— probably contributed to the post-1918 reaction against “propaganda" which continued down to World War II; in retrospect, it appears excessive and certain to have caused post-war disappointment and embarrassment to the government. IT 16. TACTICAL PROPAGANDA. Leaflets were the chief means of battle-front propaganda on the Western front. The Germans threatened to 5 take measures against British airplane pilots who dropped leaflets, so that the British and Americans relied chiefly on mortars and balloons. In Gen- eral Pershing’s headquarters, a section G-2 D was organized for “psycho- logic” warfare, and tactical leaflets were showered on the German lines. These included surrender passes; forms on which Germans could notify their families (that they were safe, pictures of well-fed prisoners of war in American hands; political attacks on Kaiserism and on Prussian control of non-Prussian Germany; leaflets giving the German troops the correct news of the war, when bad; and emphasis on the democratic aims of the Allies. German profiteers and capitalists were attacked. Chief emphasis was on food, however, since the Germans were starving, and on the fact that the Americans had arrived in Europe in large numbers and that millions more were coming. Post-1918 German commentators (including Ludendorff and Hitler) blamed Germany’s defeat on Allied propaganda, and credited the Allies with effective professional propaganda. Part of the German willing- ness to admire Allied propaganda must be discounted, since the German admiration was based in part on an unwillingness to admit loss of the war by military means. Nevertheless, propaganda was a major ingredient of Allied victory in World War I. f 17. THE INTER-WAR PERIOD. The Communists used propa- ganda as a major weapon for achieving and consolidating their rule in Russia, and used propaganda for the attempted subversion of “capitalist states”. This tended to identify propaganda as something which “Bolsheviks” could use, but which established governments could not counter-employ. In tactical psychological warfare, propaganda was the main feature of Chiang Kai-shek's preliminary unification of China; he had studied Russian irregular warfare and psychological warfare in Moscow. 6 Illustration #1. American Combat Leaflet, World War I. Although the leaflet uses the German form of the Feldpostkarte and copies the make-up of the original German, it is not “black” propaganda, since there is no attempt to conceal either source or intent. The postcard is to be handed to the first American officer whom the prisoner sees after he surrenders. By marking out appropriate entries, he can send the message to his family that he is well, well-cared for and getting “beef, white bread, beans, plums, genuine coffee-bean coffee, milk, butter, tobacco. . .”--all of them items unprocurable inside Germany. 7 III. Experience of World War II IT 18. THE NAZIS AS PROPAGANDISTS. In order to gain control of Germany, the National Socialist German Workers' Party, as Hitler called himself and his followers, had to use psychological warfare methods in time of peace. This was made possible by the breach of faith between Left and Right in Germany, each of which had become acutely conscious of propaganda. (The Left, KPD, or German Communist Party, was so propa- ganda-sensitive that all considerations of constitutionalism or internal security had to be reviewed on the assumption that other parties were propaganda-conscious and that every political move was filled with propa- ganda value. This stultified their own effectiveness. The anti-Nazis never united successfully.) The Nazis cynically tried to learn from Communist experience and soon gained a mastery of mass media. They used posters, rumor campaigns, personal intimidation, mass rallies, radio, and a coordinated press. They learned strategic psychological warfare tech- niques--simplicity, clarity, repetition, splitting the opponents, alternate appeasement and intimidation of antagonists--on their way to power with- in Germany. Once in power, they subordinated their politics to propaganda. 1119. EFFECTS OF OVER-EMPHASIZED PROPAGANDA. The Nazis over-did propaganda to the extent that neither the Nazi party members nor, even less, the German people could tell what they really wanted. They could not even find out what Germany as a whole was doing or planning to do. The government controlled all news, entertainment, radio, telegraphs; the mails were not secret; publishing was under license. Opposition had to be violent and illegal (“purges”). Secret police and internal espionage used terror against the home population. This gave the Germans a united country. They did not have to worry about cheap, insincere, or fatuous opposition. They did not have to put up with foreign or private propaganda* But they paid a terrible price for this false security, since they lost all chance of finding out their own true economic, political or legal position. By being too suspicious of outside propaganda, they made themselves the utter, willing dupes of Hitlerite propaganda. Propaganda not only put Hitler into power; it helped to keep him there after all other parties were “unified” into the Nazi party or else suppressed, and after criticism and opposition gave the Germans no further chance to check up on him or to oppose him, except through high treason. The evils of the private press were ended; the evils of a single-party system and a controlled press were greater. If20. THE CONQUEST OF AUSTRIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. After achieving power within Germany, Hitler began applying the same tactics in his foreign affairs. He called the bluff of the Allies by re- 8 militarizing the Rhineland, by making it seem a mere matter of prestige. He bullied Austria into submission; Nazi troops crossed the frontier with- out opposition and reduced the whole country without having to fight. This was accomplished by careful analysis of public opinion in the possible enemy states and by the use of propaganda to scare the victim while assur- ing all other prospective victims that the occasion in question was the last aggression. Hitler used psychological warfare in the broad sense as well as strategic and tactical propaganda. In 1938, with the Munich crisis, he scored his greatest victory in psychological warfare. The Western democ- racies (France, England) agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia in a conference with the Axis (Italy, Germany) while the Russians were excluded from the bargaining. Hitler's propaganda emphasized German claims to the Czech territory in question, and promised no more aggression. Using the threat of force and the manipulation of anti-World War opinion in the democracies themselves, Hitler's propaganda won. A few months later he took the rest of Czechoslovakia and followed that by bullying Russia into a neutrality agreement. The scene was ready for further aggression. Psy- chological warfare had made the victims themselves agree to each single aggression, had made them hope it was the last, and had kept them from forming an alliance to meet the common danger. 1T21. MILITARY THREAT BEHIND THE PROPAGANDA OPERATION, These successes could not have been won if suspicions between Communists and democratic countries had not been high, if anti-war sentiment had not been so strong, if Hitler had been more frank about his ultimate aims. Furthermore, they could not have been won if psychological warfare had not been backed up by a very real threat of armed force. Hitler did not begin his major aggressions until he had a military edge on his opponents, and his propa- ganda made his strength seem greater than it was. Whenever he was not operating he let his army and Luftwaffe seem weak, and encouraged the idea he was unready; but crises were underscored with the threat of real military force. Unless the force had actually been there, the powers of Europe would not have yielded. This demonstrates the axiqm that psychological warfare cannot work purely by itself; it needs force or the very real threat of force to make it effective. (The German General Staff after the war admitted that Germany's bluff could have been called, but Hitler never left the opposition (no way out). He always offered peace as the reward for non-interference in his one particular demand of the time. He never forced all demands at once, so that his enemies could look at the German armed forces, estimate the situation, estimate the cost of war, and make a reasoned decision as to whether beating the Germans or giving in were better.) 1(22. THE BLACK PROPAGANDA OF THE AXIS FIFTH COLUMN. One of Franco's generals boasted as his forces invested Madrid; “I have five columns. Four here. And a fifth column inside the city." From this 9 phrase there derived the term fifth column to designate active clandestine operators. Unlike the espionage agent, the fifth columnist seeks to take an active part in the war. He may perform sabotage, instigate rebellion, launch whispering campaigns, prepare for an uprising. The spy has two main jobs: to find fact; to communicate it. The fifth columnist has one job: to make trouble. Whenever Hitler's war of nerves against the democracies struck at morale, the morale was already readied for his blow. His agents sowed dissension throughout Europe and—to a lesser degree—the rest of the world. One of their main functions was black propaganda. This was not Nazi propa- ganda except in the sense that the Nazis paid for it and expected to benefit by it. It might be any kind of propaganda which heated up the controversies in the anti-Nazi camps. It might take the form of anti-Nazism, provided it did so in such a way as to defeat its purpose. Many of its instruments were unconscious of its Nazi origin. In the early part of World War II, the situa- tion was complicated by the fact that the Communist clandestine operatives had the same short-range goals as the Nazis: discredit of the capitalist democracies, denunciation of the imperialist war, and so forth. With the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the Communist propaganda line shifted over to support of anti-Nazi military operations. The fifth column is considered to have made a major contribution to the fall of France. In Norway, a minority of ultra-patriotic fanatics under Vidkun Quisling helped the Germans occupy the country. The tactics of the fifth column cannot be summarized: they involved cutting communi- cations, telephoning false orders, destruction of bridges, calling of strikes, and anything else which would work certain mischief. (Popular writers, since the invention of the atomic bomb, have predicted that a major duty of future fifth columns will be the concealment of atomic bombs in enemy terri- tory. If these were radio-sensitive, one dash on the right wavelength would send the enemy cities white-hot into the stratosphere.) H23. POLITICAL WARFARE. Political warfare in World War II was more obvious and less effective than in World War I. Many countries had two governments (India, France, Holland, the Philippines); some even had three (Jugoslavia, Poland). Appeals for support of these governments were made by every available propaganda means. The United Nations some- times had the government-in-exile (Norway, Holland, Luxembourg); sometimes the Axis had it (Provisional Government of Free India). The three-cornered character of political warfare arose from the presence of rival democratic and Communist governments, both on the United Nations side. The chief lesson learned by all participants was the fact that when a country is occu- pied, a certain percentage of the population, however small, is going to show improper private ambition and volunteer to serve the enemy; the con- querors, far from having to prepare quisling governments in advance, were almost universally embarrassed by the different cliques of traitors who volunteered to serve the occupying powers. 10 Parce que il* ont compris que cette guerre n'est pat un simple 'conflit enlre nations, mais bien le heart de deux ideologies. D’un cdte, un peuple qui vient d’accomplir to revolution sociale et de I'autre, ('Internationale Judeo-capitaliste qui, non tans angoisse, voit te lever I'aube d'un renouveau qui n'est pat sans danger pour nos intents. Parce que Ms vomissent notre race, la race iuive, et qu'ils veulent la matt re, une fait pour toutes, dans 1'impossibilitd de pourtuivre son oeuvre de corruption et de desegregation. Parce que ils veulent eiiminer ddfinitivement let ploutocrates et autres ~ parasites qui vivent de la sueur du peuple. Parce que ce sont des homines virilt, taint et dynamiquet qui meprisent let dxozouse qui sont le produit d'une societe en pleine decomposition. Parce que Ms ont vu le bolchevitme chez lui et parce qu'ils ne le veulent pas en France; parce qu’ils connaissent la bestialite et ’ effroyable osservissqment de ceux qui vivent sous notre despotisme. Parce que Ns veulent pour leurt travoilleurs le respect ouquol ils ont droit, en mime tempt que ('assurance definitive d'une EXISTENCE OIGNE. Parce que Ms veulent une Europe unie qui ne t'dpuitera plus tout let ~ 25 ant dans une tuerie atroce pour les betoint de notre coffre-fort. Parce que ils veulent pour cette Patrie, 6 laquelle ils ont voud leur vie, ~ une place ac choix dans (‘Europe de demain. Parce que nous sommes des destructeurs et qu'ils appartiennent 6 la race ~ des constructeurs. Parce que tiers de leurt traditions et d'un past* glorieux, ils veulent balayer tout ce qui causa leur mddiocntd et CONSTRUIRE LEUR AVENIR. Parce que leur foL est indbranlable et parce qu'ils ne ddposeront pat les ~ armet avant le triomphe final. Parce que ce sont des soldats hdroTquet, austi humaint dans la paix qu’ils sont courageux au combat. VOILA POURQUOI J'ACCUSE LES HOMMES DE LA WAFFEN-SS. ENGAGEMENTS - RENSEIGNEMENTS ErMtikommando Pronkrtich dar Woffun-SS 24, Avanua du Ractaur-Rolncor* • Park-16* Automation n- Illustration #2. German leaflet attempting counterpropaganda to Allied radio broadcasts beamed at France. 11 If24. RADIO PROPAGANDA. In Europe, especially, the widespread possession of radio sets made it possible for the belligerents to use standard- wave radio broadcasting as a regular means of getting propaganda into enemy territory. The following, in approximate order of importance, were the materials transmitted: a. Official speeches by government leaders. b. Official communiques. c. News of the world, most of it true, but so arranged as to favor one side or the other. d. Special features (regular lectures, debates, “educational programs”). e. Regularly scheduled commentators (either white or black). f. Ostensibly private or independent speakers. g. Black stations (British-sponsored “Gustav Siegfried Bins”; German “Lord Haw Haw”; American “ Operation Annie”). h. Planted or falsified news quoted from its ostensible source by official radio, while the official radio disclaimed responsibility. i. “Ghost” voices or programs, cut in on an enemy wave- length either while enemy radio was on the air or when enemy stations went off because of air raids. Jamming was not found to be successful except as an interference; it never interdicted all listening to the jammed stations. More feasible anti-radio measures were those taken to prevent use of materials heard over the air; listeners were punished or kiHed in Axis Europe. Since radio propagandists on both sides counted on the indirect audience (people who were told what the radio had said), restriction of propaganda to the direct audience (people who actually heard the broadcast) amounted to a definite control. 1125. COUNTERPROPAGANDA AGAINST RADIO. On-the-ground counterpropaganda was attempted. Newspapers on each side were given materials with which to confute radio claims of the enemy. The strength of the democracies showed in that the British and Americans could talk the matter through in their domestic propaganda media, while the Germans and Italians, having made all domestic publishing into propaganda, had no 12 impartial-looking agency to which to carry an appeal against propaganda. The anti-radio measures included poster and leaflet operations. Illus- tration #2 shows a German attempt to refute Allied claims that the Waffen- SS (militarized Hitlerite elite guard) was a gang of thugs and murderers; the German leaflet shows the enemy broadcaster as a Jew saying, “I accuse the men of the Waffen-SSI”--of such things as believing in the future, want- ing to help France, preventing recurrent world wars, being heroic soldiers. 1T26. TYPES OF CIVILIAN AUDIENCES. Civilian audiences for both radio and leaflet propaganda were often divided into five categories: a. The home audience; b. Allies; c. Friendly or impartial neutrals; d. Enemy satellites and hostile neutrals; e. The enemy audience. Different programs had to be worked out in each case. 1127. THE PROPAGANDA OUTPOST. For home, allied, and neutral audience, it was possible for the propagandists to move into the city with the audience, to rent an office, go talk to local newspapermen, make arrangements with local theaters, and carry on through the normal procedures of publicity. The picture exhibit and the “cultural77 enterprise were among the major undertakings. (Things which were not entertaining enough to be called recreation were frequently listed as “culture”—special- ized lectures, exchange of professors, etc.) The propaganda outpost pos- sessed the inestimable advantage of direct contact. When the outpost was in a neutral country, it provided a channel through which material could be given to visiting enemies; or the neutral press, circulating in enemy terri- tory, could be primed with items calculated to do psychological harm to the enemy. H28. NEWS LEAFLETS. For both civilian and military enemies, news was one of the main forms of United Nations propaganda against the Axis and enemy-occupied countries. The free nations had a more open news policy, so that the Germans could not use news as freely in reprisal. For civilian audiences, this took the form of miniature airborne newspapers dropped over the enemy by plane. When the military situation became static, such newspapers were dropped on enemy troops as well (see Illustrations #6 and #10). When great events occurred, it usually was found more im- pressive to get out a special news leaflet summarizing the event. Often these were prepared in advance (D-Day; Russo-Japanese war; fall of Paris); sometimes they had to be worked out at top speed (Roosevelt's death; atomic bomb; Japanese offer to surrender). 13 *29. CIVILIAN ACTION LEAFLETS. Leaflets sometimes quested the civilians to perform a specific function. Leaflets like those shown in Illustration #8 were dropped over Occupied China to deny the Japanese the use of Chinese labor in maintaining his line of communica- tions. Since much of the Japanese logistics depended on local help, this was a major undertaking. The propaganda leaflets from the OWI-CBI, distributed by the 14th Air Force, called for the Chinese to stay away from railroads and the texts told the Chinese that their American friends did not desire to bomb them. This was perfectly true. Coolie transport columns sometimes disappeared overnight after being peppered with such leaflets, leaving the Japanese sitting in the middle of nowhere with more gear than they could carry. The cover illustration is another action leaflet, calling for help to be given downed American flyers. *30. CIVILIAN MORALE LEAFLETS. Leaflets which had neither news nor special action calls often aimed at enemy morale as a whole, to run it downwards, or at allied morale, to keep it up. Morale leaflets, when effective, most commonly exploited some definite enemy weakness, such as lowered rations, the execution of hostages, denial of furloughs to enlisted fathers. *31. BLACK LEAFLETS. Often an enemy situation would arise in which black leaflets could be used. If the enemy issued a complicated new ration card, the dropping of a few million forgeries was certain to embarrass his rationing. Official-looking imitations of enemy documents were dropped, giving “secret” orders to do something highly distasteful to the enemy population. Sometimes an enemy newspaper would be dupli- cated. Handbooks for malingerers were used by both sides. Soviet propa- ganda developed some exceedingly handsome “militarist German” attacks on Hitler and his gang as not being Junker enough. *32. COMBAT PROPAGANDA. Comparable leaflets were used for strategic propaganda to troops. News and morale leaflets were of the same general types; sometimes the same leaflet was used for both audien- ces. Action leaflets, however, were not in most instances applicable to military personnel and civilians both. The commonest action leaflet for troops was, of course, the surrender pass or surrender leaflet. The most famous and effective of these is the Passierschein issued from SHAEF (see Illustration #11). Combat propaganda also made use of loudspeakers. *33. GIFTS AND NOVELTIES. A sensational but minor field of experiment concerned the dropping of matches, chocolate, needles,,salt and other gifts by an air force. Countermeasures to this sometimes con- sisted in dropping duplicates of the enemy gift, but fixing the duplicates so as to make the receivers suspicious of all such gifts (poisoned chocolate, nauseous salt, etc.). 14 IT34. TERROR DEVICES. A still less important range of ex- periment concerned the creation of terror devices—whistles attached to shells, weapon drops to imaginary undergrounds, etc. Though often in- teresting, these played no appreciable part in the war as a whole. The German attacks on Holland, Belgium and France made very liberal use of such methods. This field overlaps in part with orthodox military deception procedures, such as were illustrated in the post-war press photographs of dummy tanks, jeeps, etc., which were made of rubber and could be inflated. H35. SYSTEMATIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. The major development of psychological warfare during World War II may per- haps be summed up in terms of its systematization. The war brought forth few wholly new devices, outside of the use of radio. The novelty consisted of the close integration of psychological warfare with national policy on the one hand and with military operations on the other. All major participants, to a greater or less degree, utilized military propaganda units as aids to field operations. The increased use of air power made possible the dissemi- nation of leaflets, pamphlets and occasional books on a tremendous scale. Fitting all these operations to the national governments, the theater or field army headquarters, all appropriate military echelons, and then coordinating propaganda operations one with the other was a task which could not have been accomplished without the plentiful use of the radio and the duplicating machine. World War n made psychological warfare a continuous, systematic, and purposeful part of the general conduct of war. (See Paragraph 58J f 36. CONSOLIDATION PROPAGANDA. The value of psychological warfare did not end with the cessation of hostilities. Consolidation propa- ganda, carried out under the authority of the military headquarters in charge of occupation, proved invaluable in conveying commands of the occupying power to the populace concerned. By the use of propaganda, cooperation was ensured much more swiftly; greater public interest was aroused; and persons friendly to the occupying power were given a chance to step forward and to assist the occupation. In the case of friendly or dubious areas, con- solidation facilities put local publishing and broadcasting back on schedule and assured the military of a means of getting help from the people. 15 IV. Propaganda Analysis IT37. COLLECTION. Propaganda analysis is valuable to the non-propagandist as a source of news and intelligence. The news or in- telligence is in turn valuable for two unrelated purposes: first, for the indication of national or military policy which the attempted mission of the propaganda itself either forecasts or indicates; secondly, for the in- cidental content of factual material which is used to make up the propa- ganda. In order to analyze propaganda lines and to glean the valuable fact out of the propaganda material, it is necessary to collect the propa- ganda. This depends, in difficulty, on the remoteness of the area covered, and on the controls involved. In peacetime, a great deal of propaganda can be acquired by the process of subscribing or even asking for it. In wartime propaganda collection must be undertaken along with ordinary military in- telligence collection from the enemy home area; from neutral areas, it can be gotten by ordinary means; in one's own territory, the only problem is that of definition. Radio materials can be collected by having a living monitor listen to the programs, writing them down or summarizing them, or by making recordings of appropriate material and processing them at leisure. If38. MONITORING. Since even the non-propagandist cannot use propaganda analysis unless it deals with up-to-date (sometimes up-to-the- minute) materials, good monitoring is essential. Signal Corps receivers require no modification unless recordings are to be made. Monitoring of radio.material simply consists of putting it down in convenient form. If39. SPOT ANALYSIS. The psychological warfare operator takes the most current propaganda materials and prepares a brief summary of the news content and of the probable motive of the enemy for- using that particular propaganda at that time. (See Paragraph 45.) He is then in a position to develop his own propaganda with reference to the propaganda situation as seen by the enemy. Slavish submission to enemy initiative is a bad idea in propaganda. Normally, the sound operative uses the spot analysis for his own information, but he does not necessarily try to confute enemy propaganda point by point. He tries to counter with strong, inde- pendent propaganda lines of his own. If40. AREA ANALYSIS. More systematic propaganda analysis requires the collection of all available propaganda materials from a given area for a specific period of time. These materials are then broken down in terms of media which they employ, and each is searched for the probable 16 motive of the issuer. In a large, free country like the United States, this is a very difficult and complicated task. In a nation which has a dictato- rial or one-party government controlling all media of communication, or in a small nation, it is possible to work out an analysis of the major propa- ganda pressures operating within the country. When a whole nation is too large an area, the area of analysis can be cut down by procurement of materials from a single city, province, or zone. The important point about area analysis consists of getting a repre- sentative sampling (such as all the newspapers published in Rome or Munich or Shanghai on a given day). IT41. TIME OR DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS. In order to find out what a single propaganda source is doing, the source should be covered day by day, week by week, or month by month. The content of the source can be broken down into percentages (of time, for radio; of columns or square inches, for printed material). The emphasis will become plain as Soon as the different percentages are noted on ordinary graph paper. Further study will show what the source is trying to accomplish with each emphasis. H42. STRATEGIC PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS. For generaliza- tions about the over-all opinion of a given national group, it is necessary to count as propaganda everything to which the persons concerned have access. For these purposes, it does not matter whether movies have a propaganda slant or not; the fact that 69 percent may have no propaganda slant will itself be a propaganda factor of prime importance. The propa- ganda presentation consists of all public information to which the persons concerned have access. The propaganda operator must consider the propa- ganda presentation—that is, his own materials and all other public communi- cations, whatever the kind—before he can even guess the success of a given technique. National morale (before, during, and after war) cannot be gauged by a single propaganda .-source, but must include a scheduled appraisal of all the contributing factors to the public opinion of the nation concerned. H43. PROPAGANDA IDENTIFICATION. The propaganda analyst will find that there is no magic formula by means of which he can un- failingly identify propaganda. Human beings are highly communicative and almost all two billion of them talk a great deal of their waking time. Propa- ganda is distinguished from conversation, education, private quarrels, recreation, romance, ordinary monologues, etc., by the fact that it is communicated intentionally. It is not the content of the communication, but the motive which impels it, which distinguishes propaganda from non- propaganda. This is like saying that propaganda is propaganda when it is propaganda; to a certain extent this unsatisfactory definition is correct. 17 However, few communications come from completely unknown sources; when they are, they are often mistrusted. The propaganda analyst must therefore take into account the source, whether ostensible or real, the timing, the people to whom the communication is addressed, and the probable effect which that communication will have on those people at that particular time before he can find the source, if the source is hidden. If the source is not hidden, the whole process is out in the open. (See Paragraph 45.) Thus, even with a hidden source, it is feasible to work back to the probable source by analyzing the probable effect. K44. PROPAGANDA VERSUS TRUTH. Good propaganda does not make use of lies. Good propaganda is truthful, except in very extra- ordinary circumstances. Good propaganda uses the truth selectively. It directs to the audience those truths which will accomplish the results which the propagandist seeks, and withholds those truths which accomplish no particular purpose. To test for propaganda by looking for lies is there- fore impractical and unprofitable. The test for propaganda is a dynamic test. It must consider not only the information, but the life-history of the communication. Where does it come from? To whom is it going? Why now? What for? The statement, “People who work get paid/' can be propaganda or not, depending on who says it to whom, when, why and on whose behalf. (The reader might try to develop this statement into anti- Russian propaganda by Germans, anti-American propaganda by Germans, anti-German propaganda by Russians, and anti-German propaganda by Americans. The timing, the persons to whom it is addressed, the way it is said, what is said with it—these make it propaganda or not.) There is no conflict between propaganda and truth. Good propaganda uses truth. But the highest truth, in a free civilization, not under totalitarian or ideological control, is deemed to be the truth uttered by disinterested per- sons who have no ulterior motive in communicating it. If45. THE FORMULA FOR A SINGLE ITEM. In large-scope propaganda analysis, it is desirable to proceed quantitatively. Only highly experienced personnel should attempt to weight different parts of a given output in order to guess the weighting given by the source. (The Americans may consider the 1000-hours news program the best item off Radio Nirgends; the Nirgenders themselves may not have thought of that program as their best. Hence, qualitative weighting, unless source itself gives very plain clues, such as using a front page or picking a popular listeners7 hour, is dangerous for effective analysis.) When a single item is to be broken down, a careful propaganda analysis formula could be developed on the basis of the following outline; 18 COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF A SINGLE PROPAGANDA ITEM a. Source T: .swen irigiBTiry; (1) True source (“where does it really come from?”) (a) Release channel (“how did it come out?”) if different from true source without concealing true source (b) Person or institution in whose name material originates (c) Transmitting channel (“who got it to us?”), person or institution effecting known transmission--omitting, of course, analyst's own procurement facilities (2) Ostensible source (“where does it pretend to come from?”) (a) Release channel (“who is supposed to be passing it along?”) (3) First-use and second-use source (first use, “who is said to have used this first?”; second use, “who pretends to be quoting someone else?”) (a) Connection between second-use source and first-use source, usually in the form of attributed or unacknowledged quotation; more rarely, plagiarism . noiaal M (b) Modification between use by first-use and second-use sources, when both a*re, known (i) Deletions (ii) Changes in text >g5©w (iii) Enclosure within editorial matter of transmitter (iv) Falsification which appears deliberate , ;0 (v) Effects of translation from one language to another b. Time (1) Time of events or utterance to which subject-matter refers (2) Time of transmission (publishing, broadcasting, etc.) (3) Timing of repetitions (4) Reasons, if any are evident, for peculiarities of timing c. Audience u i0 sqyi alfii io sniliuo he