A REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT; f c« A ‘ BERLIN SECTOR. FROM JULY 1.19« TO SEPT.l,134fe il rpTiuji v i!/\ i{ IE IE IP CD IETF OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT U. S. SECTOR, BERLIN JULY 1, 1945 - SEPTEMBER 1, 1949 Printed by Deutscher Verlag, Berlin TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 7 Civil Administration and Political Affairs 13 Allied Kommandatura Berlin 25 Air Lift to Berlin * 29 Communications 33 Economics 41 Trade and Industry 43 Food and Agriculture 4G Fuel 48 Transportation 49 Building and Housing 51 Legal Affairs 53 Public Health 57 Public Safety G3 Information Services 71 Press and Publications 72 Film 76 Radio 78 Monuments and Fine Arts 80 Finance 81 Property Control 87 Public Welfare 91 Education 101 Public Works and Utilities 107 Manpower 115 Liaison Activities 121 Personnel Attached to OMGBS, 1945-1949 125 Published by Public Relations, Statistical and Historical Branch, Office of Military Government, Berlin Sector BERLIN; 1945 5BERLIN, 1949 FRANK L. ROWLEY came to Berlin on July 1, 1945, leading an American Military Government detach- ment of some 300 officers and men. Since that date, as U. S. Commandant and Director of Military Government, he has worked in close, continuous contact with the top officials of three other nations, seeking together to administer and revive the battered former capital of Germany. This four-power city, where a second World War ended and a third could have begun, has for four years been a crucial area of clash for the opposing ideologies of West and East. And much of the success of America's stand in Berlin can be credited to the energy, the leadership, and the decisiveness of Brig. Gen. Howley. . v The Berlin assignment was, and has remained one without precedent in history. An international Kommandatura, at which unanimity was the rule, administered the city. A degree of autonomy was retained, however, by each of the four Commandants for intra-sectoral problems. The city was physically shattered, having been the target for 75,000 tons of bombs during the war, and the scene of vicious, no-quarter street fighting during the closing days of the Nazi regime. Its population was undernourished, epidemic-ridden, and demoralized. A twelve-year tradition of National Socialism had to be deracinated and in its place planted new spirit which would permit a democra- tic Germany once again to join the family of nations. To the monumental job of U.S. Commandant, Howley, now 46, brought a broad background of leadership and practical experience. He was educated at New York University and at the Sorbonne in Paris. During the depression years he built a Philadelphia advertising agency into a nationally-known business. He entered the Officers Reserve Corps in 1932 and eight years later was called to active duty. His first assignment was as Captain and Commanding Officer of an Air Corps ground school. In 1941, he became Operations Officer of the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, Kansas. With the Third Cavalry Regiment at Camp Gordon, Georgia, he was assigned Executive Officer and promoted to Lieut. Col. A maneuvering accident forced his transfer to Civil Affairs. In 1943, in England, he was given command of the British-U.S. Civil Affairs Detachment, Al-Al. During the invasion of Normandy, the detachment accompanied combat troops across Omaha Beach. While the Ninth Division pushed the Germans out of Cherbourg and strong fighting was still in progress in the city, Colonel How- ley’s group re-organized the local government and resuscitated the stunned city administration. The Cherbourg Civil Affairs operation was subsequently de- scribed by Allied observers as ‘efficient beyond all expectations". His next assignment was in Paris, where he headed a combin- ed British-U.S.-French detach- ment of 136 officers and 300 enlisted men, and entered the French capital with the first combat troops. In Berlin, Brig, Gen. Howley has conferred more than 2,000 hours with the Russians, British, and French. The retiring U.S. Commandant will not be soon forgotten in Ber- lin, where, with a team of top- flight specialists, he symbolized for four years America’s stand against Soviet pressure, threats, and siege. Behind him in Berlin, Brig. Gen. Howley leaves the extraordinary appreciation and gratitude of its German population, whom he has been instrumental in guiding towards the ideals of a truly de- mocratic and responsible society. Part of the OM.G-BS Staff which Served During the Soviet Blockade Mr. A. W. Moran Deputy Director and Berlin Air Lilt Coordinator Colonel William T. Babcock Deputy Director and Deputy Commandant Berlin's first post-war winter was cold, hungry. The tasks of Mili- k.tary Government were immense. . Ml ince our arrival in Berlin the impact of Western Military Government policies upon the Germans has been tremendous. By unanimous vote we have succeeded in giving the City of Berlin a complete school reform which is the basis for the end of class distinction in the city. We have created a city constitution and held city-wide elections under Four-Power supervision. Nazis were removed from all levels of public influence. The list of accomplishments is long. Any comments which are made in this report are not comments of those who have failed completely in quadri- partite matters, but of those who have come closer to succeeding than any other agency which has yet been tried. The number of agreements at the Allied Kommandatura Berlin exceeds 1,200 and even includes agreed loans to Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish churches. We have succeeded in reviving the social and political life of the city. We have guided Berlin Germans to a con- cept of democracy similar to our own. We have not succeeded in reaching agreements in those fundamental con- flicts between Russian communism and western democracy. In Berlin, as elsewhere in the world, the aims of the Communist Party, called .the SED (Sozialislische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), have been to get complete control of the economic and political life of the city. The German Communist Party in this struggle has been aided, advised, directed, and supported by the Russian occupying troops and by the Russian Military Administration. It is impractical to separate the missions of the Soviet Military Administration and the Communist Party. Before our arrival, on the first of July, 1945, the control of the city was entirely in the hands of the Soviet Administration and the Communist Party. The government had been set up with certain "non-party" front men, but ffTTmJifflL? vT i ■ sli 3 Wnl'-jfl fTT77l'/?< K* ul/ # f sgf 7 INTRODUCTION the real power was in the hands of such persons as Deputy Oberhurgermeister Maron, of Chwalek, Jendretzki, and Schlimme in control of trade unions, Markgraf for police, Mittag of the Magistral as head judiciary. (His background was that of locksmith.) Education was under Wildangel. Control of labor for the government was under Schmidt. These leaders and other key individuals were all Moscow-trained German com- munists. From an economic point of view, the city had been stripped, particularly the western sectors. Everything movable of real value — from the equipment of the American-owned Singer Sewing Machine Company plant to the power equipment of the modern Berlin- West Power Plant had been removed. There also was a tremendous amount of personal, as well as organized looting, by way of the Soviet printed “Allied invasion currency”. Upon the arrival of the Western Military Governments all actions which had been taken by the Soviet Military Administration and its appointed city government were confirmed by us. In fact, by a sweeping order of the Allied Kommandatura Berlin, we approved all orders which had been issued by the Soviets and the Soviet-appointed city government. We tried to understand and to sympathize with the type of economic and political set-up which we found here on the basis of its being reasonable in the light of the circumstances. We were determined to “get along” with our great war-time friend. We did, however, insist upon early elections, so that the people would have a chance to choose for themselves the type of government they wanted. The elections held on October 20, 1946, resulted in an emphatic rejection of the Communist Party. It received less than 20% of the votes throughout the city. Both the economic and political control of the city began to slip from the hands of the Communist Party and the Soviet Mil- itary Administration. Their efforts to hold and increase those controls have been the basic cause of Allied friction in Berlin. The Western Comman- dants on their side have simply insisted that agreements be lived, up to and that both the political and economic control of the City of Berlin be a mutual re- sponsibility with all four occupying powers sharing in that responsibility. The first step taken after the October, 1946 elections by the Soviets and the Com- munist Party was that of pressure upon the elected officials to force coalition action with the communist minority. The impeach- Three hundred thousand Berliners, in a demonstration before the Reichs- tag, protest Soviet Sector terror. Communist mobsters, displaying Nazi-era gesture, invade City Hall to "elect" a new Magistral. 8 INTRODUCTION merit of OberburgermeisleT Ostrowski re- sulted. A greater leverage grew out of the fact that all legislation and all acts of the city government had to be approved unanim- ously in advance at the Allied Kommanda- tura Berlin. Therefore, the Soviet represent- ative, by means of the veto, was able to give the German government communist minority reflected veto power over the actions of the majority. When the elected city government re- fused to acquiesce to various indirect threats and pressures, direct action was taken against the elected government by the Soviets. Organized communist mobs hauled to the scene in Russian tanks and trucks used violence against the elected democratic city officials, while Soviet con- trolled police stood by refusing protection. Even so, the city government refused to capitulate. It moved to the western sectors for protection. Outstanding proof of the people's support was given when more than 300,000 Berliners walked to the Reichstag area in the British Sector and in a mass demonstration publicly proclaimed their belief in the government which they had elected. When the German government and the Berlin people refused to capitulate, it was natural that pressure should be directed against the Western Powers to drive them from the city. It was recognized by all that, if the Western Powers were not in the City of Berlin, the Germans would have no choice except to bow to a one-party communist system and to Soviet economic exploitation. The squeeze to drive the Western Powers from Berlin began intensively the first week in March, 1948. First the Allied Kommandatura Berlin had its effectiveness ended by the Soviet Com- mandant, his deputy, and committeemen. This was coupled with a violent news- paper and press campaign, blaming the Western Powers for what the Russians were themselves doing. The Soviet press campaign was also designed to make the Western Allies unpopular with the German popu- lation. The final act was the blockade of Berlin, carried out by the Russian Army and sup- ported by the Communist Party. First, the Western Powers were refused the use of the only main road into Berlin from the West—the Autobahn. The reason given was that the bridge (which inciden- tally had been built by American engineers) was in need of repairs. Vehicles were sub- jected to driving miles down a poor road to cross over the Elbe by a hand ferry. The mvER a hi* WlM ifTi 11 11*1 f KTHIb f H K-! r77j Giant Air Lift cargo-carriers supply West Berlin and nullify the Soviet blockade. 9 INTRODUCTION reason for cutting off the canal traffic from the West was given as "need of lock repairs", and finally, when on June 22, 1948, the railroad was com- pletely shut off, Marshal Sokolovski's excuse was "technical difficulties". The plan was very obvious. Nearly two and a quarter million persons, along with the Allied families and troops in Berlin, were to be starved out of the city. It was believed that the people would rise up in their suffering and ask us to leave so that they might live. That a Berlin "horror story" did not take place was not due to any Soviet change of heart. It didn't happen, because we Westerners prevented its Happening. As eanly as March, the Western Commandants began to stock food, coal, and medical supplies in the western sectors in anticipation of just, such an emergency. We refused to believe that our "Ally" would do this, but as military men we were compelled to think of the possibility in view of the growing Soviet hostility and in view of the unguarded remarks which were reaching us by way of German political, social, and religious leaders. The job ot reconstruction, both physical and moral, has been a tremendous one. When the Russian-imposed blockade struck, the Western Powers had thirty-six days’ supply of food, thirty days' supply of coal and other items of vital importance. These stocks gave us time to think and to plan. In Berlin, the three Western Commandants met with their experts and calculated the minimum tonnage which would be necessary to keep the western sectors alive. It was no small task to condense the requirements of over two million persons from 20,000 tons of imports a day to a maximum average of 8,000 tons a day. Meantime, at higher levels calculations and plans were being made. On June 26, 1948, the American Headquarters for Germany informed me that the small Air Lift which had been bringing in supplies for the military garrison would be increased immediately to bring in essential stocks for the German population. There were those in the Berlin tripartite discussions who felt that the population of Berlin could not be maintained by air. They felt that the population would desert their newly-acquired democratic ideas and would, for the sake of avoiding personal privations, swing their loyalities to the East. Even some of the leading German officials were uncertain of the population. We in OMGBS never questioned that the vast majority of Berliners would stand by their newly-acquired independence. Within two weeks the calculations were agreed to by the three Western INTRODUCTION 10 Commandants in Berlin. The first big cut in tonnage came in food—all food became dehydrated, starting with potatoes. When the planning was made in the summer of 1948, in the back of everyone’s mind was the fear of a cold winter. We had had such a cold winter in 1946/47 when, even with road and railroad facilities available to bring in coal, hundreds of persons froze to death in this city, which is as far north as Labrador. It is a great tribute to the courage of the Western Powers and to the technical knowledge of the experts that successful plans were prepared to cover the period of July, 1948, to the first of March, 1949. The West Berliner has vis ibfy profited from the ex perience of seeing demo cracy at work. All of these calculations were worked out on a tripartite basis at Berlin level and coordinated into schemes at higher levels, including the meshing in with the British and American Air Forces. One year of Air Lift has been completed, facilities for handling goods by air have reached up to 12,000 tons per day. The Russian blockade completely failed to drive the Western Powers from Berlin and failed to drive the German people into the arms of communism. The counter-blockade measures of the Allies were strongly felt by the Soviet-controlled areas. Furthermore, the propaganda value in Europe of the Air Lift to counter the continuous din in the communist press of the economic and moral collapse of the western democracies was tremendous. Today, the US and its Allies, Great Britain and France, enjoy a prestige in Berlin greater than at any time since the war. Berlin looks forward to an opportunity to continue its progress along the path of democracy. In the Office of Military Government, Berlin Sector we have followed a business-like policy of realism in dealing with our Allies, with the Russians and the German people. This report tells how each of the branches of U.S. Military Government in Berlin played its part. Since July 1, 1945, the individuals have changed. (The turnover of personnel on this back-breaking job has been approximately 300°/o). We have never faltered in our deter- mination to make no compromise of American principles. 11 INTRODUCTION ELECTORAL PROCEDURE Dr. Rojek 5 SPD 2CPU 2FPP legal CDU * Edith Krappe S SPD 2CDU 2 FDP STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OF GREATER BERLIN FROM THE BERLIN CONSTITUTION: "The Stadtverordneten-Versammlung Is constituted on ground ol general, equal, direct and secret election by the inhabitants ol Berlin, who are entitled to vote according to the principles FROM THE BERLIN CONSTITUTION, Greater Berlin and represents Greater Berlin externally The FINANCE Or. Haas CDU LEGAL POLICY Dr Friedrich Lueht 5 SPO*2CDU*2FOP STATUTES ( Geschbftsordnungl & SPD 2CPU 2FDP COAL MINING ECONOMICS SPD ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ECCLESIASTICAL BURGERMEISTER DR. FRIEDENS BURO CDU RESTITUTION Lucia KrUger IOSPD 4COU 4FOP APPLICATION a COMPLAINT Dr Rojek & SPD 2COU 2 FOP MAIN OFFICE FOR OVER-ALL PLANNING FOOD PUUiae* SPD HOUSING* Niekllta SPD I Verkehr « Betnebe I Erich Lueck lO SPD 4CDU 4 FDP YOUTH Kurt Mattick 5 SPD 2COU 2 FDP PRICF CONTROL L-Jlrnsr PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION SPD CITY ASSEMBLY (STAOTVERORDNETEN -VERSAMMLUNG) CHAIRMAN DR. OTTO SUHR (SPD) DEPUTIES- RAUSCH (CDU), MARKEWITZ (FDP) 130 ELECTED ASSEMBLY MEMBERS MAGI STR AT BANKING & INSURANCE DEPARTMENTS OF MAIN ADMINISTRATION OBER BURGER ME I STER ERNST REUTER SPD MUNICIPAL CHANCELLERY V, Broich — Oppert POST 8 TELEGRAPH FDP PUBLIC EDUCATION Kurt Landsberg lO SPD 4 CDU 4 FDP FOOD Jeanette Wolff 5 SPD 2COU 2 FDP POLICE Or. Slumm AUDITING BOARD] «« « E|| e e?| " Curt Swot insky IOSPD 4CDU 4 FDP PUBLIC HEALTH Etta Kay S SPD 2COU 2 FDP LIAISON TO THE ALLIED CONSTITUTION Or. Su hr IOSPD 4CDU 4PQP SOCIAL AFFAIRS Ida Wolff 9 Members 5SPD 2CDU 2FDP burgermeister LOUISE SCHROEDER SPD PUBLIC EDUCATION Dr. May SPD FROM THE BERLIN CONSTITUTION: The whole ol Ihe German citizens ol Greater Berlin express fh«ir will through their elected representative bodies." FROM THE BERLIN CONSTITUTION, "The members o< the Magistral will be elected by the Stadt- verordnefen -Versammlung lor the period ol Ihe election term.” YOUTH EUa Kay TOTAL OF 18 DEPARTMENTS AUTHORIZED BY CONSTITUTION WOMEN'S AFFAIRS] SOCIAL AFFAIRS CDU Or Suhf lO SPD iCDU 4FDP LABOR I Arbeit » 5 SPD 2CDU 2FOP PUBLIC HEALTH Or. Conrad POP 18 COMMITTEES • EXECUTIVE COUNCIL I tfltestenral ) 5 SPD ’ 2COU 2 FOP BUILDING a HOUSING Rudolf Markcwlt* 6 SPD 2CDU 2LPDP LABOR SPD CIVIL ADMINISTRATION 12 Berliners voted overwhelmingly against Communist policies and methods in the 1946 city elections CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS Political developments in Berlin, as shaped by the Allied Occupation since Germany's collapse, fall roughly into four major phases: Exclusive Soviet Occupation (May, June, 1945), Quadripartite control on a relatively smooth basis (July, 1945—October, 1946), Soviet obstruction and deterioration of Allied re- lations (October, 1946—June, 1948), and Blockade and post-blockade period with increasing German legislative responsibility (June, 1948—). During the initial per- iod, the Soviet Military Administration installed communists, communist- sympathizers, or figure- heads whom they thor- oughly controlled in practically all important offices in the Magistral and in the twenty borough administrations. Although this initial Soviet Occupation period was characterized by many verified instances of rape, looting, and var- ious other acts of terror, these events were merely coincidental to Soviet po- litical plans to impose a totalitarian system on all of Berlin like that now established in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Berliners were shocked and apathetic following the city's surrender and were concerned almost ex- clusively with problems of food and shelter. During their two months alone in Berlin, the Soviets took full advantage of this apathy, and were extremely active in establishing new political parties, in the formation of a city-wide, communist- dominated trade union (the Free German General Trade Union), and various communist-front or- ganizations, such as the so-called Kulturbund. The four political par- ties authorized by the Soviets on June 10, 1945, included the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The program and aims of the overt Communist Party require no comment. The SPD stood for evolu- tionary socialism by de- mocratic means (the bal- lot), had strong trade union affiliations, and was largely a working class party. The CDU was moderately conservative, anti-Marxian, had strong ties with bothCatholic and Functions of the Civil Administration and Political Affairs Branch 1) Supervision of the operations of govern- ment in the U. S. Sector of Berlin and represen- tation of U. S. policy in supervision of city- wide government and city officials. The hand- ling of elections, census, and supervision of political organizations. 2) Representation on the Local Government Committee (later changed to Civil Administra- tion Committee) of the Allied Kommandatura and advice to U. S. representatives on quadri- partite (later tripartite) bodies in connection with politics and governmental affairs. 3) Advice and planning in connection with the operation of political parties and the necessary liaison with political leaders and political agencies, together with a continuing study of the political situation. 4) The preparation of reports and analyses pertaining to political operations, the political situation, and municipal administration. 13 CIVIL ADMINISTRATION Protestant (Lutheran) groups, and may be called a “middle class party”. The LDP (whose name changed to Free Democratic Party early in 1949) stood for private enterprise and the restoration of church and state and it, too, has been a middle class party. The second phase of political development in the city, from the inception of the quadripartite control of Greater Berlin on July 11, 1945, until the autumn of 1946, was characterized by a relatively smooth working, on the surface at least and with minor exceptions, of the Allied Kommandatura and its various constituent committees. Explanation of this era of seeming “good feeling" lies in part at least in the fact that the British, French, and U.S. representatives, in the spirit of good will and mutual trust, agreed to accept as valid all decrees and administrative acts of the Soviets during the two-month period preceding the establishment of quadripartite control. These in- cluded, as mentioned, the installation of communists or other persons controlled by the Soviets in virtually all key positions in the city government. for city-wide elections which, in turn, necessitated the prior drafting of a constitution. The Soviets advanced a number of arguments against popular elections—that it would be years before Berliners were sufficiently advanced poli- tically, that an extensive census would have to be undertaken, and so on—but in the end they agreed to an election to be held on October 20, 1946, after the matter had been referred to the Allied Control Authority. Temporary Constitution Approved A. temporary constitution for Berlin was approved by the Allied Kommandatura on July 19, 1946, on the basis of a draft submitted by the Magistral that was similar to the Berlin Constitution of 1920 and the amendments of 1931. Differences in national concepts had to be adjusted and compromised at the various meetings of that committee in rewriting the Ma- gistral's draft, many essential features of which were retained. Among other things, the constitution provided for a City Assembly of 130 members, elected for a two-year term, as the legislative body, a Magistral headed by the Oberbilrgermeister, as the executive, and also set forth the powers and responsibilities of both bodies. The Allied Kommandatura's letter of August 13, 1946, signed by the four Commandants, which accom- panied the new constitution to the Oberburgermei- ster, stressed that it was a temporary document in- tended to restore political freedom and to place it in the hands of the people of Berlin. Article 36 of the temporary constitution of Berlin, however, contained a stipulation that all legislative enactments of the City Assembly, as well as ordinances and instructions of the Magistral and the appointment and discharge of leading officials of the administration or resignation of the Magistral or any of its members, required the sanction (ap- proval by unanimous vote) of the Allied Komman- datura, in order to become effective. This article, it later developed, was misused by the Soviet de- legation to obstruct and virtually disrupt the city administration. Communists Trounced in 1946 Elections The first democratic elections in Berlin in 14 years were held on October 20, 1946. Extensive prepara- tions were made by the Local Government Com- mittee of the Kommandatura, serving as a quadri- partite election committee, to provide quadripartite teams carefully briefed to ensure free and fair elections. • The election campaign was characterized, how- ever, by terror tactics on the part of the Soviet- sponsored SED against the SPD, coupled with out- bursts of vituperation by the Soviet-controlled press, which were calculated to intimidate the electorate, but which definitely boomeranged, as shown by the election results. Everything went smoothly on election day, how- ever, and there was considerable international interest in the outcome, as far as it was indicative "TO THE BERLIN MAGISTRAT: T/E FEEL THAT THE RESTORATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE CITY OF BERLIN IS A HISTORIC OCCASION. IN FORWARDING THIS DOCUMENT TO THE MAGISTRAT...THE OCCUPATION FORCES REIT- ERATE THEIR PURPOSE TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE IN BERLIN AND TO RESTORE TO THE PEOPLE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETER- MINATION IN THEIR GOVERNMENT. "BERLIN FOR THE FIRST TIME RECEIVED A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITU- TION IN 1920. BUT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE NAZI REGIME, POLITICAL LIBERTY DETERIORATED UNTIL THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND i GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY OF THE CITY BECAME MERELY A TOOL IN THE HANDS OF THE FASCIST POWER. "THIS CONSTITUTION OF IS A TEMPORARY rv'" ED TO RESTORE POLITICAL FREEDOM AND PT *'— THE PEOPLE OF BERLIN. IT PLACF" IN THE HANDS OF THE ELF'"'"' REQUIRES THESE ft-' INTO A 00"' Commandants' letter which accompanied approval of Berlin's temporary constitution. Consequently, the Soviets directly or indirectly exercised a very great degree of influence on all phases of municipal administration in Greater Berlin, until a new administration was chosen by elected representatives of the people in the fall of 1946. In the second half of 1945 and in early 1946 the Soviets made a great effort to strengthen and expand the position of the Communist Party by attempting to form an Anti-Fascist Unity Front with the other three parties, in which the Communist Party would be the “coordinator”. This scheme failed. Nevertheless, the Soviets managed to engineer the “merger” of a small group of SPD functionaries and central board members with the Communist Party in mid-April, 1946, to form the so-called “Socialist Unity Party” (SED), although in a referendum on March 31, 1946, the SPD rank and file in the three western sectors had voted overwhelmingly against merging with the KPD. (The referendum was banned in the Soviet Sector by the Soviet Military Admini- stration.) In view of the unrepresentative character of the Soviet-appointed Magistral city administration and its declining popularity, the U. S. delegation at the Allied Kommandatura early in 1946 began pressing CIVIL ADMINISTRATION 14 of an ideological and a political test of the Berlin electorate. The SED apparently did not foresee the degree of its defeat at the polls, and the showing by the SPD was greater than had been an- ticipated. The election results on October 20, 1946, were as follows: In striking contrast to the attitude towards the city government which the Soviets had appointed in May-June, 1945, the Soviets employed every possible means to hamper and obstruct the demo- cratically elected city government that arose from the October 20, 1946 elections. This third phase of Berlin's political and municipal development under Allied Occupation continued from the October, 1946 elections until the Soviet im- position of the road, rail, and water blockade of Berlin on June 24, 1948. The period was marked by a steady deterioration of Allied relations (i. e., U.S.S.R. vs. Western Allies) and the withdrawal of the Soviets from both the Allied Control Council and the Allied Kommandatura. New Civil Administration Problems A new Magistral of 18 members, headed by Dr. Ostrowski (SPD) as Oberburgermeister, was chosen on December 5, 1946, by the recently elected City Assembly (Stadlverordnetenversammlung). This action immediately precipitated a bitter dispute in the Allied Kommandatura, because the Soviets persisted in the untenable claim that, according to Article 36 of the temporary constitution (discussed above), elected officials of the city government required prior approval by the Allied Kommandatura before they could take office. Party Popular Vote 0 o of Total Assembly Seats SPD 1,015,609 48,7 63 CDU 462,425 22,2 29 SED 412,582 19,8 26 LDP 194,722 9,3 12 Qualified voters totalled 2,307,122, of whom 2,128,677 (or 92.3%) cast ballots. Invalid votes numbered 43,339 (or 2%). The participation per- Communist Party propaganda Hooded the city during the 1946 election campaign. Campaign poster on right reads: "Fascist terror robbed us of our freedom. But it did not break our spirit." Below: East Sector police banner proclaims: "The Soviet Union is Germany's best friend." All but two of the eighteen elected Magistral members finally received Allied Kommandatura ap- proval, however, but the Soviets continued to use Article 36 to prevent the removal by the elected Magistral of any of the large number of Soviet- appointed leading officials of the city adminis- tration, the greater number of whom were not poli- tically in sympathy with the newly elected city government, but rather strongly opposed to it. This meant that Magistral heads of departments, such as Economics, Labor, Finance, Food, Public Welfare, and so on, were saddled with deputies or other leading officials upon whom theycouldnotrely. Moreover, the Soviet delegation systematically abused the veto right, also under Article 36, requir- ing Allied Kommandatura approval of all legisla- tive acts of the city government, in order to obstruct legislation not in line with Soviet plans. In contrast, the U.S., British, and French delegations endeavored to give the city administration a high degree of genuine self-government. centage of total eligible voters greatly exceeded that registered in all the Berlin city-wide elections held during the Weimar Republic. Although the poor showing of the SED was in part an expression of disapproval by the Berlin electorate for the Soviet Military Administration, which more or less openly backed the SED, the con- clusion was obvious that the people of Berlin were dissatisfied with the municipal administration uni- laterally imposed on them by one power at the out- set and that they wanted a change. 15 CIVIL ADMINISTRATION Ernst Reuter The Mayor of Berlin and his Deputies Nonetheless, Dr. Ostrowski, the new SPD Ober- burgermeister, soon realizing that Soviet intransi- gence was practically making the proper function- ing of the city administration impossible, made a deal with the Soviet-sponsored SED in February, 1947. This was promptly discovered by the SPD, and his action was disavowed in the City Assembly on April 11, 1947, by 80 votes against 20 SED votes in opposition. The Soviets then tried unsuccessfully to block the acceptance of Dr. Ostrowski's resignation, and vetoed on June 27, 1947, the election of Professor Ernst Reuter (SPD) as Oberburgermeister, who had been chosen by a City Assembly vote of 89 to 17 and against whom they were unable to produce any derogation of a factual nature. Reuter Unanimously Elected Mayor On the contrary, Professor Reuter was an exper- ienced and capable municipal administrator of con- siderable reputation, but the Soviets objected be- cause he had been secretary general of the KPD for a very brief period following World War I and had then become a Social Democrat. Frau Louise Schroeder (SPD) then continued as Acting Burgermeister until December 7, 1948, two days after the West Berlin elections, when Professor Reuter was unanimously elected Oberburgermeister. The Allied Kommandatura, after months of dis- cussion and argument in its Local Government Committee, authorized in a regulation issued on March 22, 1947, the formation of non-political organizations, but the Soviet delegation, it later developed, would agree to authorize practically none of the specific applications filed for this purpose. Fortunately, there was an escape clause in the regulation, providing for sectoral authorization, under which approximately 300 non-political organ- izations (clubs and associations of various kinds) were approved in the U.S, Sector by the spring of 1948. During this period only seven non-political organizations were reported authorized in the Soviet Sector. Political organizations could be authorized on a city-wide basis only in an Allied Kommandatura regulation of January 23, 1947, and here again the Soviets were very reluctant to act favorably on applications other than communist-front organ- izations, such as the Free German Youth (FDJ) and Democratic Women's League (DFB). In exchange for the U.S., French, and British agreement to authorize the two organizations named, the Soviets had to pay the distasteful price of authorization for corresponding genuinely demo- cratic groups sponsored chiefly in the west sectors. Fundamental differences between the Soviets and Western Allies were reflected in the many hours of heated debate in the Local Government Committee end at higher levels of the Allied Kommandatura on the Socialization of Industry Bill and the Im- plementing Regulation submitted by the city govern- ment in March and September, 1947, respectively. The Bill and Implementing Regulations were vague, ambiguous, and indefinite as to compensation and certain other essential features. But the Soviets steadfastly refused to agree to a correction of these defects up to the time they walked out of the Kommandatura on June 16, 1948. Vicious Soviet Press Attacks Accelerated political activity by the Soviets was evidenced toward the end of 1947 and early 1948 after the abortive outcome of the London Conference in December of 1947. The Soviet-licensed press in Berlin became more vituperative in its attacks on the Western Allies, especially the United States, and on non-communist German political leaders. U.S.-licensed publications were repeatedly confis- cated in the Soviet Zone and Soviet Sector in violation of Allied Control Authority Directive No. 55. The city government held an impressive centen- nial celebration of the German revolution of 1848 at the Stddtisches Opernhaus on March 18th. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION 16 A special session of the City Assembly was also held on the same date in the presence of the West Berlin Commandants. The so-called Volkskongress (People's Congress), a communist-controlled group presuming to repre- sent the people of Germany, met in Berlin at the Staatsoper on March 17-18, 1948, attended by some 2,000 "delegates". The Soviet-inspired group, in- cluding its consultative organ, the so-called Volksrat (People's Council), has apparently not lived up to expectations. When Marshal Sokolovsky walked out of the Control Council two days later, March 20, 1948, he declared, among other things, that the Volkskongress should draw up a new constitution for a German republic, in order that the Control Council might be replaced as soon as possible. A new draft constitution for Greater Berlin was passed by the City Assembly with an 80 percent majority vote (only the SED opposed it) and was submitted for approval to the Allied Kommandatura on April 28, 1948. Judged by modern legal standards, the new constitution represented advanced liberal thinking, with the rights and security of the individual comprehensively defined and emphasized. It met with strong Soviet opposition in the course of several Local Government Committee meetings prior to the Soviet withdrawal on June 16th, although the U.S., British, and French were prepared to accept the new draft in principle. The new draft constitution contained no veto provisions corresponding to those of Article 36 of the temporary constitution of 1946, which the Soviets had invoked so frequently to harass and stymie the elected city government. Heated Debates in Kommandatura The Soviets intensified their efforts to discredit and paralyze the conduct of quadripartite control activities. On May 28, 1948, a meeting of the Com- mandants at the Allied Kommandatura was charac- terized by fifteen hours of vilification and abuse on the part of the Soviet delegation. At a subsequent Commandants' meeting on June 16th, almost as long and equally abusive in tone, the Soviet delegation walked out on the pretext that the U. S. Commandant had been dis- courteous in leaving the meeting (see page 26), although the Chairman (French) had given per- mission for the U.S. deputy to take over. A communist-inspired riot occurred at the City Assembly meeting on June 23, 1948, in which some of the Assembly members were beaten up. This was the first of the SED mob demonstrations at the City Hall which later necessitated a shift of the City Assembly from the Soviet to the western sectors. The increasing travel and transport restrictions imposed by the Soviets on traffic between Berlin and Western Germany, beginning on April 1, 1948, culminated in the complete rail, water, and road blockade imposed on June 24, 1948, in the final effort to force the Western Allies out of Berlin, so that the entire city would be in Soviet hands. Soviets Violate Finance Agreement Concurrently, the Soviet Military Administration on June 23, introduced unilaterally the new East Mark as sole currency for Greater Berlin in violation of quadripartite control agreements. This led to the introduction of the West Mark as a supple- mentary currency in the west sectors, but the Soviets banned it in their .sector. This Soviet unilateral action in the financial field had severe political and governmental reper- cussions, not to mention the economic and financial effects on the life of Greater Berlin, as described in this history under Finance. When the Soviets imposed a complete land blockade on West Berlin, the reaction of the citizenry showed a more alert and conscious attitude than ever before in regard to their political liberties. The three democratic parties—the SPD, CDU, and LDP (now FDP)—held a number of joint demonstrations. One held at the Schoneberg Borough Hall on July 11, 1948, was especially noteworthy, since Oberbiirgermeister Reuter condemned the Soviet blockade in very sharp language and reiterated the unshakable will of the Berliners to resist an attempt to starve them into political submission. In a courageous resolution adopted by the City Assembly (meeting at its regular place in the Soviet Sector) on July 29, 1948, the immediate cessation of the blockade was demanded and its instigators were charged with perpetrating a "crime against humanity". . Inasmuch as the City Hall, housing the Magistral and City Assembly, was located within the Soviet Sector, it was anticipated that attempts would be made shortly after the blockade began to stage a communist "putsch" against the city government. Leading Political Figures in West Berlin Jacob Kaiser (CDU) Walter Schreiber (CDU) Franz Neumann (SPD) Otto Suhr (SPD) Carl Schwennicke (FDP) 17 CIVIL ADMINISTRATION The SED mob demonstration at the City Hall on June 23rd had already been a preview of such action. Stumm Appointed Police Chief The first split in the city government took place in the police department on July 26, 1948, when Paul Markgraf, Soviet-appointed police president, who had for several weeks defied the Magistrate demand for his resignation, was suspended from office and Dr. Stumm (SPD) appointed Acting Police President. The Magistrat had requested the Allied Kommandatura to approve Markgraf's dismissal in March, 1948, on account of insubordination, but the Soviets had blocked quadripartite action until their withdrawal from the Kommandatura. The Soviets refused to recognize Markgraf's suspension by the Magistrat, although it was approv- ed the following day by the U.S., British, and French, and although formally and technically the suspension (as distinguished from discharge) did not require Allied Kommandatura approval. Shortly afterwards, the West Berlin police headquarters were set up under Dr. Stumm. A similar split occurred in the Central Food Office headed by City Councillor Fullsack (SPD), due to direct Soviet interference in the management of that office. This in turn necessitated a physical removal of the Central Food Office to West Berlin, which was officially announced on August 10. city's financial administration. Salary payments to city employees were frequently in arrears. Other departments of the Magistrat were also more or less split, including those of Post and Tele- communications, Labor, Traffic and Municipal Enter- prises, and Economics. The heads of the last two, City Councillors Reuter and Klingelhofer, respec- tively, were "dismissed" by the Soviets in mid- November, 1948, but were accorded a vote of full confidence by the City Assembly shortly afterwards. During this period, however, more than 1,000 city employees, mostly in the borough administrations, were dismissed in the Soviet Sector for political reasons at the instance of the SED or, in some cases, directly by the Soviet Military Administration. Five Thousand Communists Attack City Hall As a sequel to the SED mob demonstrations at the City Hall on June 23, some 5,000 SED demon- strators, many transported in trucks bearing Soviet license plates, converged on the City Hall in the early afternoon of August 26, wTiere the City Assembly was scheduled to meet. They carried red banners and signs denouncing the Magistrat, de- manding “unity", and displaying other communist slogans. The City Assembly chamber was broken into. Karl Litke, Co-Chairman of the Berlin SED, told the assembled crowd that a session would then be held with the SED faction and the masses, that the other Assemblymen had fled, and that it was time to install a new city government. On the same day, in front of the former Reichstag building, a counter-demonstration of some 10,000 participants against the Soviet-inspired attack on the City Assembly was held at 5 o'clock under the sponsorship of the three democratic parties. In- spiring and vigorous speeches were made by the various political leaders, and the size of the meeting was considered a success in view of the short notice given. Continuing Soviet-Inspired Violence On August 27th, Dr. Suhr (SPD), Chairman of the City Assembly, wrote to General Kotikov, the Soviet Commandant, requesting adequate protection for the meetings of that body in the City Hall, but at midnight of the same day he received a cynical and evasive reply. A City Assembly meeting, scheduled for August 31st was called off when communist demonstrators again gathered in front of the City Hall. In a final test to see if the City Assembly could function at its seat in the Soviet Sector, unmolested by communist mob violence, a meeting was set for September 6th. Again the mob demonstrators assembled. But this time they were better organized and directed than previously and were supported by some 200 Soviet Sector German police. On the morning of September 6th the mob crashed the gates of the City Hall and occupied the Assembly chamber and other parts of the building. These incidents aroused great indignation in Berlin and made it unmistakably clear that the Soviets would no longer tolerate the functioning Communist mobs storm the City Hall in September, 1948. While there was no formal split in the Finance. Department until November 30, 1948, the action of the Soviets in blocking the city reserves after currency reform, in prohibiting disbursements for certain purposes in West Berlin, and in other high handed measures, led to a critical disruption of the CIVIL ADMINISTRATION 18 realization that the SED would be roundly defeated in a free democratic election, an event occurred which made the split of the government of Greater Berlin final. SED Spawns Illegal Magistral This was the establishment, on November 30, 1948, of a puppet "City Magistral" in the Soviet Sector, headed by Friedrich Ebert, jr. Ebert was "unani- mously elected" by a group of SED representatives and persons from various communist-front organ- izations, including the "Democratic Bloc", claiming to act as the legal City Assembly, who met in the Staalsoper (State Opera House). This action was a direct violation of the Berlin Constitution (approved by the Soviets) and of quadripartite agreements pertaining to Berlin. General (then Colonel) Howley, U.S. Sector Com- mandant, released a communique on the same day to the press, pointing out that the meeting was "an arrogant action ... in flagrant violation of the existing constitution of Berlin and of all quadri- partite agreements pertaining to the city." While the eventual establishment of a separate administration in the Soviet Sector was anticipated, the timing of this particular operation was unex- pected. It was generally thought that the Soviets would not move in this direction until after the December 5th elections in West Berlin and would then try to place the blame for splitting the city administration on the Western Allies when the new Magistral took office. On October 5th the three Western Sector Com- mandants approved the Election Regulations (Wahl- A plenary session of the legally-elected Berlin City Assembly before it was split by communist mob violence. of the popularly elected City Assembly in their sector. Consequently, the City Assembly moved to the British Sector the same day and held its scheduled meeting there, in the course of which it set the date for new city-wide elections for No- vember 14th (later changed to December 5, 1948). Mass Anti-Soviet Demonstration Three days later—on September 9th—the biggest democratic demonstration in Berlin's political history was held at the Platz der Republik in front of the former Reichstag in the British Sector with approximately 300,000 participants. Although sponsored by the three democratic parties and UGO (the West Berlin general trade union), this vast assemblage of protesting Berliners from all walks of life was directed against the communist attempts to take over the city govern- ment and against the Soviet blockade attempt to starve the city into submission. The morale of the West Berlin population appeared to be higher in September and October than in August, because many Berliners had then had misgivings as to what might result from the Four-Power dis- cussions initiated on Berlin, particularly in regard to the currency—a fear that the East Mark might be adopted as sole currency, which in turn would mean Soviet financial control. The strong stand of the Western Allies in Paris and, in part, the announced increase in rations, together with the increasing capacity and technical performance of the Air Lift, were among the factors accounting for this psychological upswing. On September 3rd, the so-called "Democratic Bloc" was formed by the 26 SED Assembly members, the spurious Soviet Sector CDU und LDP splinter groups, and a few SPD renegades. Little attention at the time was given to the formation of this Soviet-inspired political faction, except for some speculation that it might be designed to supplant the City Assembly or Magistral, or otherwise bolster the waning political strength of the Soviet- controlled groups. With the election campaign in full swing in West Berlin for the December 5th poll, but with elections banned in the Soviet Sector because of the Soviet Two young Red Army soldiers on guard at a blockade street-barrier on Potsdamer Platz in the center of Berlin. 19 CIVIL ADMINISTRATION ordnung) and the holding of Berlin elections on De- cember 5th, as proposed a week earlier by the City Assembly and Magistral. The Soviet Sector Com- mandant waited until October 20th to reply to Dr. Friedensburg, the Acting Oberbiirgermeister in an evasive letter making fantastic charges of "terrorism, political persecution, and Fascist war propaganda" in the three west sectors. Consequently, the election regulations were amended to suspend election preparations in the Soviet Sector until such time as free, democratic elections would be possible there and to hold over for inclusion in the new City Assembly the 32 members (16 SPD, 11 SED, and 5 CDU) chosen from that sector in the October, 1946 elections. To the average Berliner the issues involved in this election were crystal clear in contrast with many past elections involving a multiplicity of party programs. This time it was simply a choice between two fundamentally opposed political systems— ernment. This was coupled with SED-inspired rumors that the polling lists, bearing the names of voters checked off, would later fall into Soviet hands following the early evacuation of Berlin by the Western Allies. To add plausibility to this and other rumors in the whispering campaign designed to frighten the Berliners into keeping away from the polls, the Soviet occupation organ, Tdgliche Rundschau, on the day before elections carried an ADN (Soviet- licensed news agency) dispatch on its front page with the banner headline, "The Western Powers Will Leave Berlin in January." Another Election Victory for Democracy On election day, however, the Berliners turned out in great numbers and the polling was conducted in a fair and democratic manner. There was no disorder at the polls (contrary to SED threats), and only a few minor incidents were noted. Voting participation by the qualified electorate on December 5th reached 86.3 percent, a higher participation than many Berlin political leaders had anticipated. The election results by party, with comparative figures for the three western sectors in the October, 1946 elections indicated in parentheses, were as follows: Party Popular Vote % of Total Assembly Seats SPD 858,461 (674,209) 64.5 (51.7) 76 (63) CDU 258,664 (316,205) 19.4 (24.4) 26 (29) LDP 214,145 (133,433) 16.1 (10.2) 17 (12) Eligible voters totaled 1,586,461 in the three wes- tern sectors, of whom 1,369,492 (or 86.3 percent) cast ballots. Of these, 38,222 (or 2.7 percent) were invalid, or only 0.8 percent more than in the 1946 elections, despite the SED exhortation this time to cast spoiled ballots as a vote against the democratic parties. Two days after the December 5th elections, theCity Assembly still in office elected City Councillor Ernst Reuter as Oberbiirgermeister to replace Acting Oberbiirgermeister Louise Schroeder (whose place had been taken by Biirgermeister Dr. Friedens- burg during her long illness). Frau Schroeder reverted to her status as Biirgermeister. The newly elected City Assembly convened for the first time on January 14, 1949, to elect the New Magistral. Oberbiirgermeister Reuter was reelected and the remaining members of the Magistral were elected four days later, including Frau Schroeder and Dr. Friedensburg as mayors. The new Magistral's "State of the City" message, outlining a general program for its two-year tenure, was presented to the City Assembly on February 1st by Oberbiirgermeister Reuter. It reaffirmed the le- gality of the Magistral as government of the whole of Greater Berlin and set forth a plan for complete coordination and simplification of Western Berlin's 12 borough administrations. The message also stressed the necessity for certain economic and financial measures, especially the Defeated in every fair election held in Berlin, the communists have had to seek control ol the city by mob incitement and flamboyant, meaningless propaganda. totalitarianism supported by a police state devoid of any basic civil rights for the individual, and Western-World democracy, where the traditional constitutional safeguards of individual rights and political liberty prevail. In view of this, the election campaign by the three democratic parties—the SPD, CDU and LDP— was not conducted along strictly party platform, lines, but more against totalitarianism and its Soviet- sponsored standard-bearer, the SED, together with related front organizations. The SED refused to let its party's name appear on the ballot, because it had supported the Soviet blockade and dared not face the Berlin electorate in a free election. The SED and the Soviet-licensed press indulged in the most bitter vituperation and invective against the democratic party leaders and the legal city gov- CIVIL ADMINISTRATION 20 future for the maintenance of free democratic government processes in Germany. Greater Powers for the Berlin City Government The Occupation Statute agreed to in Washington on April 9th by the Foreign Secretaries provided for the exercise of broad powers by the forthcoming Federal German Republic, when the latter comes into existence after the August 14th Western Ger- many elections to the Bundestag. This broad grant of federal authority is subject only to such reserved powers by the Military Governors as are necessary to ensure the fundamental aims of the Occupation. When the Basic Law, the constitutional basis of the Federal German Republic, was approved by the Military Governors on May 12th, they reaffirmed their position that Berlin could not for the present be included as a Land in the initial organization of the forthcoming Federal Republic, but could send a small number of advisory delegates to the federal legislative bodies. On the other hand, the Foreign Secretaries agreed in Washington that the provisions of the Occupation Statute should be applied to Berlin as far as practicable. On May 14, 1949, two days after the lifting of the blockade, the Allied Kommandatura forwarded to the City Government the document commonly refer- red to as the "Little Occupation Statute", but offi- cially entitled "Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin." In a covering letter the Western Commandants stated that it had been decided to apply, as far as possible, the same liberal measures to Berlin which the Occupation Statute will apply to the German Federal Republic, reserving only such additional powers "as are necessary in the present exceptional circumstances, in order to ensure the security, the good order, and financial stability of the city." Under the Statement of Principles any amendment to the temporary constitution, any new draft The first truck-load of fresh vegetables reaches Berlin from Western Germany after the 11-month Soviet siege is lifted. introduction of the West Mark as sole legal cur- rency, inclusion of Berlin as the twelfth state (Land) in the forthcoming Federal German Republic, and the hope that control of the police and judiciary would gradually be transferred completely to the city administration. The Blockade Is Ended The Soviet-imposed blockade of almost 11 months duration had affected the life of virtually every Berliner directly or indirectly. Consequently, the announcement of the Lake Success agreement to lift the blockade on May 12th was received in Berlin with great relief, coupled with a degree of scepticism as to how the agreement would work out in actual practice on the Soviet side in the light of Russian unreliability in the past. The Russian agreement to lift the blockade in return for Western Allied agreement to end the counter-blockade and to discuss the German problem at a Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris was considered a victory for the city government and the steadfastness of the population, which had been made possible by the Air Lift and other forms of Western Allied support. The City Assembly held a spe- cial ceremonial meeting on the morning of May 12th to mark the lifting of the blockade. The Western Military Governors and Commandants were honored guests, together with delegates from the Bonn Parliamentary Council. General Clay, then U.S. Military Governor of Germany, in farewell words to the City Assembly and the people of Berlin, referred to the severe test that they had successfully withstood during the blockade, which gave promise that Berlin would stand firm in the Over 200,000 West Berliners gather at a mass meeting outside the Schone- berg City Hall to celebrate the end of the blockade, another Red defeat 21 CIVIL ADMINISTRATION to Berlin and, least of all, in the political field. There was no great disappoint- ment at this outcome, however, because there had been little ex- pectation that the Soviets would substantially modify their general position on Germany, and on Berlin in particular, in the course of the negotiations. Oberbiirgermeister Reuter de- clared in a radio address on the evening of June 20th that Ber- liners would soon see if the mean- ing of the Paris agreement was actually to be realized in practice, and he warned that their struggle for freedom was by no means over. Political Struggle for Berlin Continues Berlin was a focal point in the East-West "cold war’’ conflict during the Soviet-imposedblockade, and will likely continue in that role, as long as Germany is divided politically and economically and as long as one occupying power strives to impose a totalitarian ideology and police state system on the German people. Berlin has been a crucial testing ground for the fundamentally opposed East-West ideologies in the course of the past four years. In the free, democratic elections of October, 1946, and of December, 1948, the Berlin elec- torate unmistakably indicated its choice between the two basically opposed political systems. Despite threats, intimidations, and blandishments of various kinds by the Soviet-sponsored SED and related front organizations, the Berlin population, the leaders of the three democratic parties, and the democratic- ally elected government stood firmly and courage- ously together during the Soviet-imposed blockade, which is now known to have been calculated to coerce the city into political submission by starvation. Western Berlin stands today as a symbol of political and social freedom to a great many Ger- mans living in the Soviet Sector and Soviet Zone who are politically disfranchised in terms of modern democratic standards and are subject to arbitrary arrests and even confinement in con- centration camps, or worse. Under the wide grant of legislative, executive, and judicial powers through the Statement of Principles of May 14th, it is expected that the people of Western Berlin and their democratically chosen administration will make further rapid progress in the development and maintenance of the democratic processes of government. And there is good reason to hope that West Berlin will serve as a symbol and inspiration to Western Germany and the forthcoming German Federal Republic. ALLIED KOMMANDATJRA BERLIN SUBJECT: Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship Between the Allied Kom- mand atura and Greater Berlin 1. (a) Greater Berlin shall have, subject only to the limitations set out in this statement, full legislative and executive and judicial powers in accordance with the Temporary Constitution of 194-6 or with any subsequent Constitution adopted by the City Assembly and approved by the Allied Komxnand atura in accordance with the provisions of this statement; (b) Article 56 of the Temporary Constitution of Berlin will be held in suspense and BK/O (4.7)54 and BK/0(4?)56 which were issued in implementation of that article, will be annuli ed, 2, In order to ensure the accompli Sment of the basic pur- pose of Occupation, powers in the following fields are spe- cifically reserved to the Allied Kommand atura, including the right to request and verify information and statistics need- ed ty the Occupation Authorities. (a) Disarmament and demilitarisation, including r*- lated fields of scientific research, prohib- and restrictions on industry and civil aV (b) Restitution, reparations, decarteliza* non-discrimination in trade matters Berlin and claims Berlin (c) Relations with authorities ah' (d) Displaced persons and the (e) Protection, prestige ?' deoendants, emoloyee Over 500 Kom- mandatura orders were can- celled by the State- ment of Principles which turned over sweeping legisla- tive powers to the city authorities constitution or amendments thereto, and legislation in the field of reserved powers require express approval by the Allied Kommandatura before becom- ing effective. All other legislation submitted by the City Government, however, becomes effective 21 days after official receipt, unless previously disapproved by the Allied Kommandatura, provisionally or finally. Moreover, such legislation will not be disapproved by the Allied Kommandatura, unless it is considered inconsistent with the constitution in force, legislation or directives of the Occupation authorities, or the provisions of the Statement of Principles, or unless such legislation is considered a grave threat to the basic purposes of the Occupation. In order to bring the nature and extent of the controls exercised by the Allied Kommandatura into harmony with the Statement of Principles, the West Berlin Commandants approved the document, "Revised Procedure of the Allied Kommandatura Berlin," effective June 8th. The number of committees was then reduced from 18 to 7, and they now act chiefly as advisory bodies to the Commandants instead of also having executive powers as formerly, except those speci- fically given them by the Commandants or Deputy Commandants. The Paris Conference and its Aftermath General political reaction in Berlin, except in communist circles, was that the final communique of the Paris Conference on June 20th indicated little in the way of positive, tangible results in regard CIVIL ADMINISTRATION 22 CALENDAR OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN BERLIN 2 May 45 Soviets complete conquest of Berlin. 14 May 45 Soviets appoint Magistral controlled by Communists flown in from Soviet Union. All major Magistral offices are situated in what was to be the Soviet Sector. 11-26 Jun 45 Foundation of political parties (KPD, SPD, LDP, CDU) and trade unions (EDGE) in Soviet Zone and Berlin. I Jul 45 U.S. troops occupy southwest quarter of Berlin. 11 Jul 45 First session of Allied Kommandatura. Agreed that all ordinances previously issued by Soviets remain in effect. 21 Apr 46 Merger of Soviet Zone and Soviet Sector KPD and SPD. Form SED. 13 Aug 46 Allied Kommandatura forwards Tem- porary Constitution to Lord Mayor. 20 Oct 46 First free elections give SPD 48.7%, CDU 22.2%, SED 19.8%, LDP 9.3%. 26 Nov 46 First meeting of elected City Assembly. 5 Dec 46 Magistral elected. Ostrowski (SPD) Lord Mayor. Temporarily prevented from taking office through coor- dinated action of old Magistral and Soviets in Allied Kommandatura. 11 Apr 47 Ostrowski forced to resign by his own party because he signed working agreement with SED. 24 Jun 47 Reuter elected Lord Mayor. Soviet veto subsequently prevents his ap- proval by Allied Kommandatura. 20 Mar 48 Soviet delegation leaves session of Control Council. 1 Apr 48 Soviets demand right to control Allied traffic between Berlin and western zones. Traffic discontinued. II Jun 48 Both Allied and German rail traffic between Berlin and Western Ger- many interrupted for two days. 12 Jun 48 Elbe bridge of Autobahn "closed lor repairs". 18 Jun 48 Currency Reform in West Zones. 23 Jun 48 Introduction of West Mark in western sectors. Beginning of almost com- plete blockade of West Berlin. Communist demonstrators before and in City Hall temporarily prevent City Assembly session and attack Assem- bly members. 26 Jun 48 Air Lift begins. 29 Jun 48 City Assembly resolves appeal for inter- vention to UN. SED abstains from voting. 1 Jui 48 Soviets declare that four-power ad- ministration of Berlin by the Allied Kommandatura has ceased to exist. 26 Jul 48 Suspension of Police President Markgrat by Magistral. Police split. Soviets notify Magistral that "Soviets will supply food for whole city". 2 Aug 48 First meeting of Western envoys at Moscow with Stalin to discuss Berlin problems 26 Aug 48 SED attempts to overthrow Magistral and replace it with a city-Soviet. 31 Aug 48 Four Military Governors meet for first time since March, 1948, to seek com- promise on the basis of Moscow talks on Berlin. 6 Sep 48 A communist mob in City Hall prevents session ol the City Assembly. Soviet Sector police arrest western sector police. Their immediate release, pro- mised by Soviet Commandant, is not effected. City Assembly holds hrst British Sector session. 9 Sep 48 300,000 protest Soviet Sector terror at Platz der Republik meeting. One per- son killed. Red Hag hauled from Brandenburg Gate. Democratic leaders march to ACA Building to submit memo on untenable Berlin conditions. 29 Sep 48 Western Powers submit notes on Berlin problem to UN Security Council. 20 Oct 48 Soviet Commandant Kotikov rejects holding of elections demanded by temporary constitution "until demo- cratic conditions prevail again in the western sectors". 30 Nov 48 SED faction of City Assembly calls a meeting of "Democratic Bloc" and "representatives of the mass organi- zations" to 'elect' a "Magistral of Greater Berlin". 1 Dec 48 City Assembly proclaims a "political emergency". All Magistral offices are moved to western sectors. 5 Dec 48 Elections in West Berlin give SPD 64.5%, CDU 19.4%, LDP 16.1%. Parti- cipation is 86.3%. 21 Dec 48 Allied Kommandatura resumes work without Soviet Delegation. 18 Jan 49 Beginning of counter-blockade. 18 Feb 49 UGO (Independent Trade Union Or- ganization) recognized by Western Commandants. 20 Mar 49 Introduction of West Mark as sole legal currency in western sectors. 11 Apr 49 The millionth ton is flown into Berlin by Air Lilt. 27 Apr 49 The U.S. requests Soviet statement regarding conditions under which blockade would be lifted. 4 May 49 The U.S., Britain, France, and the Soviet Union resolve in New York to lift blockade and counter-blockade on May 12, 1949. 12 May 49 Blockade lilted. Military Governors and delegation of Parliamentary Council attend extraordinary session of City Assembly. 14 May 49 Allied Kommandatura promulgates the "Statement of Principles Governing the Relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin". 21 May- S-Bahn strike (Western Berlin resident 28 Jun 49 S-Bahn workers strike for West Mark wages). 7 Jun 49 Allied Kommandatura adopts a revised internal procedure based upon and in accordance with the "Statement of Principles..." It reduces the number of AK committees and makes them advisory bodies only. 1 Aug 49 Air Lift begins to taper off as surface transport again becomes normal. 23 CIVIL ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE OF THE ALLIED KOMMANDATURA BERLIN (Following the Devolution of Authority to the Magistrat on May 14, 1949) COMMANDANTS DEPUTY COMMANDANTS CHIEFS OF STAFF (U.S. BR. FR.) ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHN. STAFFS OBERBURGERMEISTER MAGISTRAT CITY ASSEMBLY COMMITTEES CIVIL ADMIN. ECONOMIC LEGAL FINANCE PUBLIC SAFETY INFORM. EDUC. 8r CULT. AFFAIRS AIRLIFT CO-ORDI- NATION DEPARTMENTS OF MAGISTRAT KOMMANDATURA 24 The Allied Kommandatura Berlin is a modest ad- ministration building in the southwest corner of the former German capital, a building which for the past four years has witnessed—on a down-to-earth level—the most crucial effort at international cooperation since the end of the war. For here representatives of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States have sought together to administer and to revivify the battered city of Berlin. And here has been played out in close focus the world-wide struggle for dominion of widely contrasting ideological concepts. It was on July 11, 1945, while fires still smoldered and many of the war dead were still unburied, that the Four-Power Commandants first met, and two weeks later the Allied Kommandatura Berlin was formally established in its permanent head- quarters. At their first meetings the Commandants agreed that the basic functions of Military Govern- ment—problems of communications, of food and fuel supply, transportation, education, and public health—would be handled by quadripartite com- mittees within the Kommandatura. Sectoral Autonomy Retained Gradually the number of committees was ex- panded to more than twenty, covering nearly all aspects of Berlin life. The Kommandatura was concerned, however, only with problems common to all four sectors of Berlin. Questions peculiar to one sector were handled by the Sector Commandant without consultation with his colleagues. Committees were obliged to obtain unanimous agreement on all problems, and in the event of disagreement the subject was referred up to the Deputies or to the Commandants. Unless the Commandants could reach unanimity, the paper was withdrawn, or—in the case of problems with ramifications beyond the city level—the Commandants could refer the problem to the Allied Control Authority, the highest governing body in Germany. The Kom- mandatura worked well during its first months of existence. It was not difficult to reach agreement as to the restoration of railroads and repair of essential buildings, the quantity of food to be rationed to the Germans, the security and public health measures to be taken. Soviets Force Political Issues As the months passed, however, political aspects of the Kommandatura's work began to take on a ORDER of the Inter-Allied Military Kommandatura of the City of Berlin 11 July 194-5 Berlin The Intei^Allied Konraandatura has today as- sumed control over the City of Berlin. Until special notice, all existing regulations and ordinances issued by the Commander of the Soviet Anny Garrison and Military Commandant of the City of Berlin, and by the Geman administra- tion under Allied Control, regulating the order and conduct of the population of Berlin, and also the liability of the population for the violation of such regulations and ordinances, or for unlaw- ful acts against Allied occupation troops, shall remain in force. First of nearly 1,200 quadripartite orders to the Magistrat. 25 K O M MAN DATURA Bitter wrangling increased mon th by month at Commandants' and Deputies' meetings as the Soviets used every trick to gain com- plete control of Berlin by quasi- legal tactics. Sessions which had previously lasted 5 or 6 hours now lasted deep into the night. deeper tone. It became increas- ingly apparent that the Soviets intended to pattern Berlin political life as much as possible after that existing in Russia. The colonizing of German city departments with puppet commu- nists, the retaliatory measures taken against Germans who did not follow the communist "party line,” the strident propaganda campaign undertaken against the Western Allies in the Soviet-sponsored press and radio—these and other tactics more and more characterized the attitude and activities of the Russians in Berlin. In the Kommandatura itself dilatory and harass- ing techniques were increasingly employed by the Soviet delegation. Meetings, which previously had lasted from ten o'clock in the morning until three or four o'clock in the afternoon, now continued until midnight and beyond. It became clearly evident that the Russians, having failed to achieve their total aims in Berlin, were seeking an excuse to bring to an end the entire Allied Kommandatura. Soviets Walk Out On the night of June 16, 1948—when rumors were circulating that the Western Allies would shortly institute a currency reform in the western zones of Germany—the Soviet delegation abruptly withdrew from the Commandants' meeting. The meeting had been wrangling all day and there had been success in reaching agreement on only one minor subject. Towards midnight, Colonel Howley stated that he was tired, would ask to be excused, and would leave his deputy to carry on, Although it was perfectly proper procedure for a deputy to replace his commandant, the Soviets— after hasty consultation with their political commissar—decided to take offense at Colonel Howley's action. The Soviet Commandant, Major General A. G. Kotikov, de- clared that his group would not return until Colonel Howley had apologized for his actions, and, to a man, the Soviet group walked out of the meeting. Quadripartite committees continued to function for nearly a fortnight, although the Soviet member did not appear at all scheduled meetings. On July 1, 1948, (nearly a week after the Soviet blockade had been imposed on West Berlin), the Soviet Chief of Staff announced that his delegation would no longer participate in the quadripartite meetings on any level. A Soviet clerical staff remained in the build- ing until August 1, gradually moving out its files and equipment. On that date, the red flag was pulled down and the four-power Kommandatura ceased to exist. From the Soviet defection onwards, the three Western Commandants continued to hold unofficial meetings in the offices of their headquarters. Committees carried on their usual activities without their fourth member. Instead of issuing Berlin Kommandatura orders, however, the Commandants issued unilateral orders, each to his own sector, but simultaneously and in accord with each other. Committee meetings also developed into heated exchanges of strongly opposing views. Four-Power agreement, towards the end, became difficult on even simple technical matters. K O M MAN DATURA 26 This state of affairs continued until November 8, 1948, when it was decided that the committees would resume their work at the Allied Kom- mandatura. The Commandants and their Deputies followed them shortly after. Since that time, the Allied Kommandatura has operated as before, despite the absence of its fourth member. During the Soviet-imposed blockade of Berlin, from June 24, 1948, until May 12, 1949, the character of 1948-49. An increasing sense of responsibility on the part of elected officials and the people’s growing consciousness of their role in the government made it possible on May 14, 1949, to alter considerably the relationship of the Kommandatura to the Berlin City Government. Sweeping Powers To City Government On that date, the Kommandatura issued a "State- ment of Principles Governing the Relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin”. That declaration devolved great legislative authority to the Berlin City Government, cancelling more than half of the orders issued by the Kom- mandatura during the previous four years and retaining only a minimum of reserved powers for the Allied military governments. The procedure of Kommandatura administration was revised. Commandant voting, which previously had to be always unanimous, was now to be on a majority basis, except in the case of reserved powers. Moreover, legislation passed by the German City Assembly, which was formerly required to have Kommandatura approval before becoming law, now automatically became operative twenty-one days after its submission to the Kommandatura, unless specifically disapproved. In accordance with the four-power Paris Agree- ment in June, 1949, the four Commandants of Berlin met on July 12th to discuss a modus vivendi for the city. The meeting was short and not especially Kotikov scowls at a French proposal during one of the last quadripartite sessions ol the Berlin Kommandatura. of the work at the Allied Kommandatura changed considerably. It was no longer possible to sit at committee tables and to work solely for the re- habilitation of the city. It was necessary during this critical period to maintain the basic life of the city on a minimum level of subsistence, and to counteract the repeated efforts of the Soviets to wean the German population from the ideals of western democracy to those of Russian communism. Firm Tripartite Cooperation During Blockade Cooperation between the three Western Allies, on all levels of the Kommandatura reached a new high. Disagreements were infrequent, but the strain of anticipating Soviet moves and of preparing counter-measures in time became very great. Shortly after the blockade was imposed, the Air Lift Coordination Committee (see page 31) was added to the Kommandatura, and it became for the duration of the emergency one of the most im- portant committees. Commandants’ meetings, which formerly had been held on a regularly scheduled basis, were now called on very short notice as one crisis arose after another. During this period also, the Commandants came into increasingly closer relationship with the elected German city officials. When, for example, the question of outlawing Soviet Zone currency in the western sectors was agreed upon, German officials were informed in advance and were asked to make suggestions to the Kommandatura Finance Com- mittee. When the question arose as to whether Berliners should have more food or more coal, a German opinion proved valuable. The population of the western sectors remained solidly behind the moves taken by the Western Commandants, even through the long, cold winter The Soviet member of the Allied Kommandatura guard —and the Soviet flag—have been absent since July, 1948. successful. The three Western Commandants asked the Soviet representative why, for example, truck transport was not moving normally into Berlin, as had been required by the Lake Success order ending the blockade. The Soviet Commandant disclaimed any knowledge of such a situation and displayed the same specious tactics of evasion, quibbling, and equivocation as a year earlier. It is thus still impossible to determine whether the Rus- sians have any desire to cooperate in solving the problems of a split city. 27 KOMMANDATURA Celle SsE?yet Goto* Hampel hof Idieshtmer? Rhein-Mam U,s. "OPERATION The aerial supply arteries to _ blockaded Berlin. 28 A third Berlin airfield was built by night and day shifts to receive more of the giant cargo-carrying C-54s. AIR LIFT TO BERLIN On June 22, 1948, the Soviet Military Administra- tion announced the closing of the railroad and highway between Helmstedt in the British Zone and Berlin, locking off the last means of surface access to the international island city over 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain. Victory Through Starvation A ruthlessly cold-blooded attempt was thus begun by the Soviets to force the three Western Allies to evacuate Berlin and to starve the city's western population of over two millions into political sub- mission. The reason for the total Soviet failure is already well-known. It was the creation, almost overnight, of the boldest and most spectacular aerial supply operation in the history of aviation: the British and American Air Lift to Berlin. The history of the Air Lift—"Operation Vittles" to the U.S. Air Force, and "Operation Plainfare" to the British—has already been told in the world's press, radio, and film. This report, therefore, shall be limited to describing in light detail the role of Berlin Sector experts, technicians, and economists in helping to make the incredible enterprise possible. Its beginnings were improvised, hasty, precarious. A handful of war-time C-47s—"Gooney Birds" their pilots called them, for they were tired, old planes— were rushed into service from military airfields in the western zones of Germany. Each carried, in a two-hour flight, about 2Vi tons of supplies for the occupation forces and the civilian population of Western Berlin. Quickly the British and American operations were coordinated; most of the C-47s were replaced by giant U.S. C-54s (carrying a ten-ton payload) and by British Tudors, Yorks, and special tanker planes. As evidence of the effectiveness of the C-54 in this type of operation, it is significant that these U.S. planes flew to Berlin 77°/o of the net tonnage for the German civilian economy, as against only 23°/o carried by British planes. Of the total number of flights made by both British and U.S. planes, how- ever, U.S. aircraft accounted for 68°/o and British 32°/o. Tanker Planes Used To solve the problem of handling and shipping liquid fuels, the British authorities contracted for commercial tanker planes and supplied the needs of the three Western Allies and the Berlin civilian economy with all requirements of gasoline, diesel oil, and kerosene, succeeding even in building up sizeable reserves of these products. The world's most modern radar apparatus was set up on the Berlin airfields of Gatow (British Sector) and Tempelhof (U.S. Sector) to guide the supply planes at night and in bad weather. A third airfield, at Tegel in the French Sector, was constructed out of marshlands. The land was cleared, dikes levelled, and water drained; and two runways were laid down to handle the largest aircraft. This feat, carried out by the U.S. Engineer 29 AIR LIFT Corps, assisted by thousands of German laborers, was accomplished in record time. The other two Berlin airfields were extensively improved: runways were reinforced and lengthened; turn-around, loading, and unloading aprons were built, as well as a myriad of ramps, platforms, and other elements, to increase the delivery tonnage. Moreover, nearly all equipment for this work, including massive bulldozers, cranes, dredges, etc., had to be flown to the city as part of the Air Lift’s initial cargoes. Within short weeks the new airfield had been completed. Up to 20,000 German civilians had assisted the work and, conscious of the importance and the urgency of the job, labored night and day under the direction of U.S. Army Engineers. Turnover Techniques Refined The Transportation Corps of the three Western Allied Armies in Germany were made responsible for loading and unloading the planes at the bases of both departure and arrival. This developed, as the Air Lift expanded, into a tremendous operational and planning job, requiring the constant refinement of techniques, as experience proved the need. An idea of the efficiency of the operation lies in the fact that a plane was only thirteen minutes on the airfield from the time it stopped; it was com- pletely unloaded of its 10-ton cargo, swept out, and ready to leave again. On October 20, 1948, the efforts of the two Air Forces were integrated into the Combined Air Lift Task Force, with Maj. Gen. Tunner (U.S.) as Com- manding Officer, and Air Marshal Williams (Br.) as Deputy Commander. After this integration, additional fields were pro- vided in the British Zone, with the result that the The first war-weary C-47s arrive atTempelhol an4 the Air Lift to Berlin is begun. Air Lift operated eventually from eight landing fields in the zones. U.S' groups operated from Rhein-Main (outside Frankfurt-am-Main) and Wiesbaden in the U.S. Zone and from Fassberg and Celle in the British Zone. British squadrons operated from Wunstorf, Ltibeck, FuhlsbiitteL and Schleswig Land, all in the British Zone. Intricate Logistical Job At the outset of the operation, it was obvious that a very careful logistical job would have to be undertaken and that planning would have to be controlled by a single central source. This planning entailed the three western military authorities' determination of the daily tonnage needs for each of Berlin's three western sectors, for the support of occupational personnel on an austerity basis, and for the maintenance of minimum stock piles for the civilian economy. Because of the need for conserving every possible ton of Air Lift space for the German civilian economy, luxury and other non-essential items were excluded from the requirements of the occupational personnel and items of lesser essentiality were kept to a bare minimum. Responsibility for effecting this extensive and detailed planning—to meet the needs of some 2,100,000 Germans and over 20,000 Allied troops and civilians—was vested in the three western sector Comman- dants; Brig. Gen. Howley (U.S.), Maj. Gen. Herbert (U.K.), who was suc- ceeded early in 1949 by Maj. Gen. Bourne, and General de Division Ganeval (Fr.). With the information supplied by a staff of experts, the three Com- mandants determined the minimum rates of consumption of each re- quired commodity to maintain the life of the city, the minimum amount of transport that had to be operated (subway, trolley, and bus), the mini- mum ration of gas, electricity, and food, the quantities of medicines and pharmaceuticals, the tonnages of raw materials, semi-finished goods and component parts required for Brig. Gen. Howley and Tempelhof air base officials greet the last of 1,383 Air Lift flights to arrive on the record-smashing day when 12,849 short tons of supplies were flown to Berlin for the German civilian economy. AIR LIFT 30 maintaining the essential industries, and the mini- mum needs of all kinds of essential consumer goods. It was agreed by the Commandants that a minimum stock-pile of not less than 21 days' supply had to be maintained in each of the essential commodities, mainly food and fuel, which represented about 80°/o of the total Air Lift tonnage. Central Coordination Set In order to avoid conflicting orders from the various units engaged in supplying the needs of both German civilians and occupational personnel in Berlin, the Military Governors requested the Western Sector Commandants to establish a central agency for ordering all required commodities and materials. For these purposes, an Air Lift Coordinating Committee was established in the Kommandatura. Each month the committee received from the Air Task Force an estimate of its forecast of daily average tonnages for the ensuing month. Based upon needs and the stocks on hand, the committee apportioned these tonnages among the various claimants according to commodities. Counterpart committees were formed in the Western Zones to accept delivery directives from AIR LIFT PLANES INTO BERLIN Combined U. S.—British Average Daily Landings the Kommandatura group and to apportion each commodity to the appropriate zonal airfield. The Zone Coordinating Committee was also responsible that both the military authorities and the West Zone Germans would deliver the required commodities in the correct amounts to the proper airfields on schedule. The work of the committees was outstanding. Despite the unpredictability of the weather, the performance of the air- craft—and, not least, the constant in- terference by Soviet fighter planes in the Lift corridors—there was not. a single day when there was insufficient supplies of the goods reaching the city over each aerial artery, nor ever any undue tie-up of either road or rail facilities because of excessive deli- veries. Midwinter Crisis In general, from the beginnings of the Air Lift through December, 1948, deliveries to Berlin did not reach fore- casted estimates, and it was only by the most stringent conservation and control of consumption that West Berlin was maintained through the winter. The foggy weather in November and December was in part responsible for the situation. This did not alter the fact, however, that, when in early January coal stocks had dwindled to only a 19-day supply, drastic steps be- came necessary. Utilities cannot operate effectively with less than a 14-day supply on hand, and on the basis of receipts, it appeared that that point would be reached within a week or ten days. Food stocks, however, approximated a 31-day supply. In the hope of a break in the weather and a consequent better flow of deli- veries, it was determined to have coal WEATHER VLESABEN and RHEIN MAIN Partly cloudy with scatter- ed ohcwara, Max. 74, Min. 46; TEKPE1HOF and GATOn - Partly cloudy «lth scatter- ed ahem era. Max. 68, Min. 48; FAS3EHG and CELLS . BULLETIN OF THE COKBINHJ AIRLIFT TA3t FCRCE AIRLIFT COMMERCE OUTWARD BOUND CALIF MARKS SE LIFTING 8,939.1 T« IN 1,011 FLIGHTS ( HQ C.UTF, April 25 — Mai the Combined Airlift Task P biggest 24-hour period, end 939.1 tons of "Vlttle.s" was of 1,011 flights. The record tonnage, secern of 1,398 flights air] BIST 6P EXCEEDS APRIL LIFT QUOTA RHEIN MAIN, April 25-Tha 6lst TC Gp hare has axoeoi- ad it's monthly tonnage quota ahead of schedule for the fourth consecutive month, group official® said today. A 53rd TC Sq f]o* by Capt Frank C, Stay #• piloted by 1st Lt Hansen, and crewer Sgt Marvin E, Ridf5 the 32,280th to** on April 22 the assigned of the grr Of fid tl*t ta r nr BERLIN' S OUTGOING TONNAGE la loaded on a waiting Wiesbaden AfB lift nlane outside TampeLhof1 a Hangar 6, Bows a shown on the forklift are displaying the Berlin manu- facturer's symbolic new 'stamp1. The Berlin bear, white on black and yellow back- ground, Is breaking the chains of the blockade. The stamp reads "Bade in Blockaded Berlin — Berlin works — A blockaded city helps itself." The new stamp, appeari- on all outgoing Berlin airlift shipments, is the inwention of the Industrie I, sohuas West, emergency industrial ooiwiilttee for Western Berlin. Life-pulse of Blockaded City Beats to Airl;' Shipments of Industrial Materials, Finish? BERLIN, April 25-A large rata of approximately 100 errt oarta- orate a tanned with a Prank short tone daily. Each Telefur furt mSdress and bearing a ton's value la estimated ectrlca" blaok and yellow sticker at 10,000 DM. Huron reading "Made in Blockaded Without this continuous Bri4 Berlin" is hoisted aboard flow from Berlin, factor- a' a C5A outside Tempelhof* ■ iaa in Western Germany Hangar 6* would have to change thai' In two hours the C5A machinery or methods lands at Wiesbaden AFB and production, for in B the cargo, transferred to are the factories a freight train, ie soon for years have a a alalia ted into the aeon- them with tool' and industry of Europe instrument a. This shipment by air of For examp’ Berlin's critically-needed ran* Co. commodities is unlike ary Sector commerce in history. 1,000 Without such connerce, onl- JThe miracle ol ganization that the Air Lilt did jlect even the oi a daily news o the thousands mics and auxil- iormed on the cedented opera- d efforts by the If by exporting 31 AIR LIFT May, June, and July, 1949, aerial deliveries con- tinued at the rate of between seven and eight thousand tons daily. At the beginning of August, however, when several months' stocks of all major commodities and fuel had been built up—and the possibility of a reimposition of the blockade had diminished—the giant air operation was slackened off. By the end of the month, there was only the occasional roar of single C-54s arriving at one of the three airfields. Total Net Receipts German Civilian Supplies The planes were unloaded into 10-ton trailers, which were hauled to distribution and storage points in Berlin. deliveries made at. the expense of food, rather than to reduce further the extremely low levels of ser- vices and rations of gas and electricity. This action caused food stocks to dwindle to a 27-28 day level, but served to hold coal stocks at the 19-20 day level. Shortly afterwards the bad weather ended, and from that point onward deliveries climbed regularly. By constantly improving techniques the Air Force was able to increase the number of flights and the number of cargo tons to Berlin. Nine Tons a Minute The Lift's record day was on April 16, 1949, when, in 1,383 flights, 12,849 short tons of supplies arrived at the city's three airfields. On that day one plane landed in Berlin every 63 seconds! Even before the blockade was lifted on May 12, 1949, deliveries had increased to such an extent that .TOTAL RECEIPTS -COAL ■FOOD -MISCELLANEOUS Though its airfields and installations are being maintained against another emergency, the Lift will soon be a matter of history, for supplies are now regularly reaching the city by surface transportation. The Air Lift will not be soon forgotten by the citizens of Western Berlin, however. It will not be forgotten by the people who for more than a year heard the unceasing roar of four-engined cargo planes overhead, who know that 70 British and American airmen and paissengers were killed in the operation, and who witnessed at first hand the determination of the Western Allies to stand by their commitments against any bluff, pressure, or threat from the East. Monthly Air Receipts As Compared to Forecasted Deliveries REQUIREMENT RECEIPTS it was possible to permit larger consumption and higher ration levels, and still build stocks against the next winter's needs. The Air Lift did not stop with the ending of the blockade, though the pressure was off. Through Grateful Berliners renamed one of their main squares at Tempelhof “Air Lift Plaza" and feted British and American flyers at an inaugural ceremony on June 25,1949. AIR LIFT 32 COMMUNICATIONS New, modern switchboard systems have replaced the war-battered equipment of, the West Berlin Telephone Exchange On the arrival of U.S. Military Government in Ber- lin on July 4, 1945, the communications picture of the city was very disheartening. Of the 28 tele- phone exchanges in the U.S. Sector, none was in operation due to bomb damage or the physical removal of their equipment by the Russians. All post offices were closed and mail service could not be resumed until the Allied Komman- datura had authorized a new series of stamps. Transportation of the Reichspost was non-existent. Many former post office employees, in both tech- nical and postal fields, had either fled before the Russians or were considered nominal Nazis and, therefore, could not be employed. Thus, the communications of the largest city in Europe were completely paralyzed. The initial job given the Communications Branch was to re- establish communications in sufficient quantities to meet the demands of the city government and essential industries for maintaining the bare nec- essities of life in Berlin. POSTAL SERVICE In the initial stage of the Occupation, postal facilities in the U.S. Sector included a large parcel post office (SW 77, located in Schoneberg) and eight branch post offices, which could be put into imme- diate operation. It was then necessary that the Reichspost be reorganized for the resumption of postal service in the city. Designs of a temporary “Stadt Berlin" postage stamp were approved by the PTT Com- mittee of the Allied Kommandatura. On August 2, 1945, postal service was inaugurated within the city. This service was limited to post- cards and unsealed letters. On October 15, 1945, a further step was made to expand the postal services of the city. The Allied Kommandatura on this date authorized postal service to be resumed between Berlin and the Soviet Zone of Occupation. Interzonal Service Begun On October 24th the Allied Control Council authorized the inauguration of interzonal postal service to all four zones of Germany, permitting postcards and letters up to 500 grams to be accepted and delivered. Thus, by the end of 1945 postal services were beginning to operate on a limited scale, meeting the minimum necessities of the city. As this extension of service to all four zones of Germany was made effective, the volume of mail increased steadily, with the greatest portion of mail being handled between Berlin and the Soviet Zone. As the Reichspost neared the end of its first year of operation, the postal department found itself beginning to function in a smooth and efficient manner and, consequently, was able to handle an average of 250,000 outgoing letters daily, as well as receive some 200,000. Physical Problems Hamper Work Internal difficulties at this time in the physical delivery of mail, as well as its collection, however, were beginning to interfere seriously. The post 33 COMMUNICATIONS GERMAN LETTER MAIL V/est Sectors (Monthly) Soviet Obstruction Tactics The PTT Committee of the Allied Kommandatura had achieved an exceptional record of unanimity with regard to postal services until this time. However, it became obvious that the comparative harmony of the committee was coming to an end. The Soviet delegates became more and more persistent in placing matters on the agenda such as a request for a special issue of stamps for the “Women's Congress for Peace", a communist or- ganization, and a proposal to turn over all un- deliverable gift parcels to the Central Welfare Organization, which had Soviet zonal implications and, therefore, was communist-dominated. This was the beginning of the political invasion of the Reichspost and the PTT Committee of the Kommandatura. Such efforts were to become more and more intense as time went on. In November, 1947, the Soviet military authorities issued an order blocking the accounts in the post- check office, located in the Soviet Sector, of many banks in the U.S. and British Zones. The immediate loss to the Reichspost amounted to some 17 mil- lion Reichsmark. At this time also, the Reichsbahn under the control of the Soviet Military Administration office had a total of 175 vehicles at this time. Of this number, nearly one-third were without tires. The remaining 125 were operating on an allocation of 4,500 liters of gasoline per month. This amount constituted approximately one-half of what was considered necessary. Consequently, delays in the delivery of mail to and from the western zones amounted to some 30 days, while the delivery of local mail was often delayed six or seven days. In January, 1947, the Control Council open- ed gift parcel service to all of Germany that permitted a large vol- ume of overseas gift parcels, which were being held in the port of Bremen, to be deli- vered to Berlin. Parcel post service in general had grown by this time to a point where the Berlin post office was handling approximately 30,000 parcels daily. The question of stamps, however, was beginning to cause considerable trouble, as the postage stamp being used by the Berlin Reichspost was a tem- porary one and the question of a perma- nent stamp was still under consideration by the Control Council. On March 1, 1947, a permanent issue of stamps was approved by the Control Council and placed on sale. BERLIN STAMP ISSUES COMMUNICATIONS 34 refused to provide necessary rail cars to transport parcels to the West, resulting in a continuing backlog of parcels which by April, 1948, amounted to some 450,000 parcels held in SW 77 Post Office, pending shipment to the western zones. These parcels at the beginning of the Berlin blockade were still retained by the Berlin Reichspost. Parcel Post via Air Lift The Allied Kommandatura at this time instructed the PTT Department to deliver parcels to Tempel- hof and Gatow airports to be airlifted to the western zones. By the end of July, 1948, the parcel backlog had been cleared and deliveries of parcels to the western zones were made daily via the Air Lift. The Soviet military authorities during this period established a parcel post office within the Soviet Sector and in press announcements informed the Berlin population that their parcels could be posted there to the Soviet and western zones. Pilferage and censorship,however, as well as delays of sometimes 35 to 40 days, convinced the Berliners that no confidence could be placed in the Soviet postal administration of the east sector and zone. Postal service from the western zones to Berlin, nonetheless, was becoming extremely difficult. The counter-blockade by the western zone administra- tions prohibited the forwarding of parcel post or first-class mail through the Soviet Zone. This resulted in the suspension of parcel post service to Berlin from the West. First class mail was flown to Berlin by an Amer- ican commercial airline after having been surcharged for air postage in the western zones. This situation continued until approximately May 25, 1949. At that time the blockade was lifted and service by rail was resumed temporarily. ' Rail Strike Blocks Deliveries As the subsequent Berlin railway strike pro- gressed (see Manpower), the Reichsbahn refused to accept postal cars from the Reichspost for dispatch to the western zones. This constituted in effect a resumption of the blockade in so far as postal matters were concerned. On July 1, 1949, at which time the Berlin railway strike was settled, postal services could not be resumed by railway. Until the present time parcel post, as well as first class mail, has been carried via Air Lift to the western zones. This situation, however, will be changed, in order that the Air Lift burden be reduced to a minimum. POSTAL SERVICE Types, of Service in Effect 1938 Service limiMion Itpfo : Services to Soviet Zone Nowin Effect Service LimiMict Effective dote opened Services to Western Zones Now in Effect Service Umifaha Effective > Dote opened International . Services Now in Effect service imi folia Effective < Dofe opened Letters /OOOq letters SOOq 2.8. V5. *5. tO. NS. Letters /oodf /OOOq /O. ArS. ts . 2. 47 letters POg t. O 06. Postcards Postcards 2. 8. 45. Pos/ccrrc/S tooog 20 /0 05- 9 SOOg i. 2. 77. Printed Matters 500g Printed Matters soog !5 ./O. if 5 Printed Matters SOOg 20 . iO OS Picture Postcards >5. 6. 07 (Tinted Matters (60 Hr) SOOg Printed Patters (Strip) /. 3.07. (Minted Matters (Su/k) /. 3.07 Business Correspondence /S. 6. 07. (Tinted (toper& Samp/es soog Sroi/le Skq. Braitte /OOOq /5. /■ h7 Bro/Ue rooog iS. t 07 Broiile /Correspondence) SOOg iS. s. 07. * Skg. ps. 3. (7 Skg. 25. 3 07 e Other Matter Skg !2. 6. 07 Cornmerc/ai Papers . SOOg ts. 10 ks 10. It 05 Samp/es SOOg Somptes SOOg /S. io. OS. Samp/es SOOg 24. !0. 45 letters 2kg. /5. 7: 07. Grouped Ar/ictes SOOg Grouped Artr ctes Soog /5. iO. OS. Grouped drtic/es SOOg 20. 10. 05 5 mat I Pactrets 2Pq Srr?o// Ptoc/rp/s 2 kg /& 5. 06 Smatt Pockets SOOg IS. 5. 07 Peg/stered Matt /. /. 08 Porcets 2bkg Parceis 5kg /6 5. 00 ‘ /OOOg ts. 2. 07 Porcets / /eg i. P 08 • dkg /5 5. 07 Parcels 7kg. /S. 5 . 0 7 Urgent Parrets 20kg. Pegtstered Mot/ #eyts/eroat Mr// fs ac/mt/fro «? i ft Register el Mai! is admitted 2. B. 05 /nsrc/rec/ Mo// Mcl/m/'/s /nsc/rec/ Mo// tOOOg /COO err- S. 7. 46. Ensured Matt •OOO 9 1. 1. kS Money Orefers /0008 ft- Money Orc/ers /0OO-#tf 22. k. 95. 7efeg/r3/>h Money Orders ortC/'nv/ea (bstot Cottect/ng Orders /OOCP-rRf Pasta / Catted/ng Orders /OOP-kh ts. /O. OS C.O.D /DOOM cop. tOOO-fiA /S. /O. 45y Po/hyay letters tOOOg (BarttroysA/eospropers 20kg Meirspopers POkg. /O. //. OS is. 3. n (Pstot Tear. Checks 2500-or With the exception of some Express Mott (/press Mart 2S. id 05. letters eiti> Mice of De/irery /OOOg letters ertb Pecetpt tOOOg <5 /O. OS. letters /nth kece/pl. tooog 20 7. 06 international services, most Ad rices of fetirery of (drees ofBe/ireryof (bree/s Adrtces ofDettrery of (torce/s] lacilities (tone/s insured*. kegrs/erec/Moii. tOOOg Peg/stered Mail J iS. to OS insuredskogntered Matt , tO. 2. 07 pre-war postal Pneun>at/c-7lrbe Mot/ r*r aert/rs 20q Air Mat/ un/imi/eot tie/rspapers handed Veespopers /jonafec/ over/o (pP/br Deyoet/ch lin. The bulk of restoration over to the Postsfor/Mpod. Post for Despatch t kg. t. it. OS NewS/OOpers /nrxfec/ oyer /e) /S. 9 Oy Pos/o/ CbecfSerr/co Poslat Check 5v. 7. j. oe was carried out during the 1 1 1 on/fm/eaf I first two years oi the Allied (bymeets by fiO. Order ctn/tpDt/ro 1 /s. 0 os Transfers from one (tos/ot / Occupation. Ctec/r Jccoirr?/ ) (w/fm/Zect Va/uab/e, letters Vo/uab/e let/ers t kq. 5. 7. 06 ko/uabte letters 500.-kM /. /. 08 and /OOO-PM Orff fhreets Or ft Porcets /Okq /s. 0. 07 35 COMMUNICATIONS TELEPHONE SERVICE Upon the arrival of Military Government in Ber- lin, the immediate problem of the provision of telecommunications to military organizations and the Military Government Headquarters located in Berlin was pressing. Military equipment designed for use under com- bat conditions could no longer care for the increased requirements placed upon these organizations. Therefore, the Reichspost was instructed to estab- lish a telephone exchange to be used solely by the Occupying Powers. circuits to the western zones in limited numbers were authorized and installed. The Fernamt building, which had been utilized for the past several months as a military switching central for telecommunications terminating in Ber- lin, was in very bad condition due to bombings and, therefore, a major reconstruction program was necessary to place this building in condition for operations. In July, 1946, the Allied Kommandatura con- sidered a general reconstruction program for tele- phone service, in order to provide a minimum amount of communications necessary for the efficient operation of the city. This amounted to an increase of some 20,000 telephone installations and simul- taneously a general rehabilitation of the city's tele- phone cable network. Special Dial Exchange Installed As of July 1, 1947, there were approximately 100.000 telephones installed in the city, of which some 45,000 were located in the U.S. Sector. At this time, due to the need of expanding civilian communications facilities, the U.S. Army installed an internal dial telephone network in the form of four small dial exchanges, thus permitting the service to the Berlin population to be expanded by 6.000 additional telephones. During the remaining part of the year 1947, tele- phone service in Berlin remained fairly constant in that no additional interzonal trunk circuits were provided and, therefore, interzonal services could not be expanded. Local services continued to ex- pand as a result of deliveries of telephone instru- ments by manufacturing firms in the city. This state of comparative harmony was upset about January, 1948, when the Soviet communications office authorized all subscribers within the Soviet Sector equal priority with those of the three western sectors for placing interzonal telephone calls. This superimposed a great burden on the already overcrowded long-distance office, and thereby paved the way for a split in the city's interzonal service. During 1948, telephone service in general progress- ed very smoothly and the Reichspost was able to An empty telephone power room, stripped by the Russians ol its generator and power board tor reparations. Another pressing problem presented to Military Government was one of providing telephone com- munications to a city of 3,500,000 people scattered over an area of 880 square kilometers. The Reichspost was instructed to begin immediate work upon the five remaining intact dial units in the U.S. Sector that could be placed in operation with a minimum of delay. A priority list of those persons to receive the service was established by the Allied Komman- datura, This relatively crude priority list was used as a yardstick for the processing of telephone applications, of which thousands were received daily. By the 1st of January, 1946, there was a total of 5,000 telephones installed in the U.S. Sector, as compared to approximately 200,000 telephones installed in 1939 in the same area. Interzonal Service Prepared Interzonal telephone service at this time was under discussion by the Allied Control Council, and the civilian long distance central office located in the U.S. Sector was being prepared for operation. Pro- posals for interzonal telephone circuits to all four zones of Germany had been forwarded to the Control Council for consideration. Interzonal telephone service from the Berlin Fern- amt was actually opened to the Berlin population on February 7, 1946. The first circuits established led to the Soviet Zone. Immediately afterwards, GERMAN TELEPHONE INSTALLATIONS U. S. Sector COMMUNICATIONS 36 LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE SERVICE In 1947 about half of the pre-war long distance tele- phone lacitities were restored in Berlin. The loi- lowing year inter- national service was resumed. INLAND-/- over Ferna ND ABQOA. Service Co Soviet Zone. Now in Effect mt 0 Si ■ffect/ve Date opined Berlin TeU ?/?V/C£ Service to Western Zone. Now in Effect Mr OC Effective dote opened ) International Effective Services Hole Now in Effect opened Speciai Con versaf/ons Special Conversation. Special Conversations U/oer/t Stole (bnrersat/ons iST) Urgent Stark Conversations 26. II. 47 Oraent State Calls 26 //. ¥7 International le/eohone ' Service ’ ' (AD) * Jervtcp * * 26 //. 47 Service t. E. 4S ("w/Vh t\ eepfon of S/som and Jopop) ' Air • • (L ) • Air • 26 It. Lt 4motd>r) Calls 26 //. 47 Is S < Orahr/orv Service Conrersatrons srrrvr drohnarv Seryffp Canversof/ons 25 2 46 Order// cor/versot/ons Oraen/ conrersaV/ons & /. ¥7 ConrersaWons 3. /. ¥7 'conversation w/VV? doc/bte cticwge) (con versa Won w/Vh double charge, fconvers&Won mV/? ctocblrc/apy K Exorpss cat/s T&tiU) (conversation H/th tenfold charge X P-ca/t C>.o fetch) a person) XH -carl/(to/e/ct? Ot person) 26 II. 47 XW>~ CO VV fVo fetch o person) 26 II. 47 V ' CO/is f nre -boo/tine) V - cotts fpre-beotoKf canter- 26 II. 4 7 V - colls fern -h ootf/ng cor? w persons) r 26 II. ¥7 Converse/V/ons w/VV? cerVo/n persons) saVio/75 with cer/a/n persons) sa/ions util certo/r f? -calls f ooirino of /he charge f? - Col is ffiory/nq of the charge 9 1.47 of the chon) '<7/ietd /br) r 3. I ¥7 by /he subscriber co/tec/ for) by Vhe subscriber co/Veot for) by the subscriber Calls at f leet time fspeotr/nq at a time fried before) A/ - CO/Is f (o/nrr?t/r)/coV/cns Vo post -post V/ons etc forposs/ng TELEGRAPH SERVICE Atontti - colts (arrangement of connection study at the same h me, to be booted at least_/oronemn// Week-calls (some os month - calls. SooAtng for seven successive days or mo/V/p/e of //.) Hour -CC?//s rduroV/or? of /he Con versa/Von oVVeas/ one hour) Wrre/ess-CO/ls (With travelers on stops ancV a/r/oVanes) Tetev/ ston - cotts Aeon verso tr im between Vhe VeVev/s/ 'on-Ve/ephenes Ser/tn Vetpz/g/ Mcinct/er? onat Wurnbery (sVcpoeU Wur/ng wort/mej Types of Service in Effect /938 Soviet Zone Types of Services in Effect Now Effective Vote opened Western Zones Types of Services in Effect Now Effective Date opened !hternotiona/ Service , rffedwe Date opened gert/rj Pneumatic Tube Inlerna/tenal Te/egrophServ &r^f/Jyt?t/ / /T 47 Secondary Telegraphs only bus/ness te/egrams 'ETopon Specroi Telegraphs orprepo/d obraod Rr/rote Te/egnaphs Private TeVegrOf?/?s 2¥. /C. ¥5 et/CSic Tefe/ype ne/worW Sab. T*/e/ype Sv.fr* -r*W*vrA-, S/ng/e Ti/iate Te/egroms t. 4 4S EV&Ve - Te/eg/roms State - Te/egrams /£.//. ¥7 S/a/e - Te/egrams /S. //. ¥? In urge/// coses m/h Telegraph Serr/ ce for local service S. /O 45 appro no/ of Sector - Express Te/egrams from oii Sectors 22 //. 45. Com rr?r7r?fyor?f Urgent Te/egrams Urgr-nV fe/rgrams / 6. 47 Urgent Telegrams 5 6. 47 Ordinary Telegrams Orai nory Te/rgrams d /O 45 Press Te/egroms / rrom F? Sector \ ( » a// Sectors J 22. //. h6 Press Telegrams /5 //. 47 Telegraphic Money Orders •* Ahyrmrmf Cords fMw/) Money hraters * /kayment Carols fry off 24.10.45 Urgent Mess Te/egrams VS. // ¥7 Weather a Water ievef hmmOc/r) chmenis Weather A water Zero/ Pr?r>o eynremCnts /S. //■ Wy Deferred Te/ergrams Letter 7e/egrc*ms A Oec/uceef fates Most of the pre-war telegraphic facilities have been restored in Berlin. Private picture telegrams , however, are still only a memory. Serr/ophur Te/egrom •Sernaphor Telegram) /.5. //■ 47. 1 1 1 1 Picture Te/egroms P/ctore letter Te/egram Te/earams *v/th AWe/aO/at fefd/y TeVeyroms n/Vh ftepo/cf Wcp/y IS. /. 47 Tetegronis w/h V/epatat ffep/y IS. / 47 Express Messenger Pbrd Express Messenger Po/d /5. //. *7 Express Messenger PaVof VS./V ¥7 Reply x Messenger Paid Reply & Messenger Paid /5. //. ¥V Reply,1 Messenger Po/d /S // ¥7. Telegram Vo Seve/ot VPea'p/t Telegram lo Several fieu'pien/s tf. /. ¥V Te/eyrom to Severalttecjb/ents t£. / ¥7. Afu/V/ple hdressed TeVeyroms /7u/V/pVe vidrpssed Te/egroms IS /. ¥7 Mu/hy/e Aa/ressed Te/ey/oms /S / ¥7. Te/egrom s vith Catection Telegrams with Co//ec//or? Telegrams /vttb ZeipraeMc ffeve/p Te/egra/es u/tt> Tetcg/Ofih/c Peat- t 26. //. 47 \ 1 1 | 1 Tedgrorm with hln/Ver? Woce/pV 26 II. 47 Pdste Pes/orte Paste Reston/p 26. II. 47 Paste Pestor/tp 26. U. 47 Paste Res/on/e 26. U. 47 Ornament TeteyramsfMandSr Vo be for wo red 37 COMMUNICATIONS protests have been made by the Western Allies regarding this arbitrary act. As of this date, however, the situation has not altered. The removal of these circuits from use by the western sectors has, moreover, deprived the Berlin Reichspost of approximately 20 million Marks yearly. TELEGRAPH SERVICE The Main Telegraph Office for Berlin is located in the Soviet Sector and is directly controlled and supervised by Soviet communications officials. In 1945 this office was instructed to carry out ex- tensive preparations for the resumption of telegraph service to the four zones of Germany. In October, 1945, telegraph service within Berlin was resumed, permitting telegrams to be filed at post offices or by telephone. In February, 1946, interzonal telegraph service was authorized by the Allied Control Authority. As the main telegraph office was located in the Soviet Sector, delays in handling telegrams increas- ed, due to Soviet censorship which required an average of three to five hours. Despite numerous delays and inefficient operation, an average of 105,000 messages over some 75 tele- graph circuits were processed daily. Telegraph service from this time until November, 1948, pro- gressed very satisfactorily. Workmen repairing one of the nine telephone exchanges in the U.S. Sector damaged by war-time bombing. carry out an extensive program of the cable repair of the city's bombed and shattered network. Also during this period reconstruction of buildings took top priority and, consequently, by the end of the year 1948 the post office recovered so sufficiently that it was able to make capital investments to the extent of 10% of its gross income. The Soviet blockade of the city did not in any way affect telephone communications. However, in anticipation of interruptions of com- munications to the western zones, the U.S. Mil- itary Government installed several radio telephone links to provide against the event of emergency. On April 12, 1949, the Soviet Military Ad- ministration re-routed all telephone circuits between the Berlin Fernamt and the Soviet Zone. Numerous Switchboard operators wrapped themselves in heavy blankets during the first post-war winters, for the walls were often half-demolished from bombing and shelling. New international services were installed and negotiations between the Soviet Zone officials and each of the Western Military Governments were carried out at intervals. The U.S. Military Gov- ernment has continued a program of attempts to align telegraph service in Berlin with that in the western zones. This would include the extension of "sender keep all" agreements to the western sectors. These agreements would permit the re- duction of personnel necessary for maintaining accounts and records and, therefore, increase the net profits. As of this date, however, this extension has not been completed and negotiations are continuing. Underground cables required extensive repairs after the aerial and land pounding Berlin had undergone. COMMUNICATIONS 38 PERSONNEL In 1945, the Communications Branch of OMGBS inherited the tremendous problem of denazifying some 30,000 employees of the Reichspost. Of the initial 3,422 employees processed, 106 were out approximately 2,800 employees who refused to sign communist pledges. This situation has gradually righted itself through the pensioning of employees and the expansion of services. Denazification has been completed; the schools of the Reichsposl have been expanded and modernized; a new pension plan of the city has been placed in effect; and the post office is now able to compete with private industry on an equal footing in the procurement of intelligent and qualified per- sonnel. Thus, in the past four years of operations the Berlin Reichspost has progressed from an almost totally destroyed communications network, postal service of the "horse and buggy" type, and very little telegraph service, to resume its status as a center of European communications with one of the most modern networks on the continent. Progress Towards Pre-War Standards In 1939, the Berlin Reichspost had a total of 600,000 telephones in the city and today has some 120,000 telephones re-installed. Letter mail service now is almost as great as that handled by the postal de- partment in 1939. However, the one serious set-back the Reichspost has suffered, is that in 1945 the Berlin Post Office was placed in trust of the City Magistral and has not yet been permitted to participate in a national organization. In no country of the world is the postal department subject to such control and super- vision by a local city administration as the Berlin Reichspost. The establishment of a central ad- ministration for the whole of Germany is not foreseeable, however, due to the political impli- cations involved. The Reichspost of Berlin has progressed steadily toward its goal of a general rehabilitation of com- munications and postal services. Denazification procedures in Berlin eliminated only a small percentage of the city's communications personnel. discharged, two were arrested, and 21 demoted to the level of ordinary worker. Because of the quadripartite nature of denazi- fication, the task proceeded very slowly as a result of insufficient personnel for maintenance of service and as a result of disagreements with the Soviet authorities regarding the appropriate methods of completing this work. In general, the quality of personnel in the Reichspost left much to be desired. Approximately 80% of all male employees were over 40 years of age and 5% of all employees were over 60. Conse- quently, the Reichspost faced a very difficult and trying period in attempting to: 1. establish an adequate pension plan for pen- sioning all old employees who no longer were capable of rendering efficient service, and 2. establish schools for the instruction of new employees, as well as the converting of many postal employees into technicians. However, by February 1, 1947, the Reichspost had established a post school for postal and tele- communications workers and was graduating stu- dents at the rate of some 1,300 a year. The Reichspost had also employed from private in- dustries some 4,000 new workers that could be utilized immediately without being passed through the post school. The personnel situation became quite satisfactory in this respect and by January 1, 1948, the Reichs- post was able to discharge incompetent personnel and retire many aged employees under a pension plan which provided small amounts of pension benefits. Soviets Purge Postal Workers In November, 1948, however east sector officials initiated a purge of Reichspost employees, forcing Berlin postal delivery service, though increasingly effi- cient, is still carried out in trucks of pre-war vintage. With progress continuing at its present rate, another five years should see very little difference in the general appearance or physical structure of the Berlin Reichspost, as compared to that existing in 1939. 39 COMMUNICATIONS Value Of Export Freight Air Lifted From Western Berlin To West Germany During The Soviet Blockade MILL WEST-MK. "A Blockaded City Helps Itself." The spectacular Air Lift was not a one-way operation. Not only were precious tons of food, fuel, and medicine brought in to supply over two million people, valuable cargoes were flown out of the city. Finished goods, including much-needed electro-technical equipment, were exported westward from Berlin by air during the 11-month siege. Nearly a quarter billion West Marks were thus earned from export by the industry of the blockaded city. 40 ECONOMICS Berlin's industrial and commercial Hie had to be rebuilt from war debris such as these typesetting machines. ECONOMICS Four distinct periods mark the economic history of Berlin from the initial efforts to revivify and reconstruct the shattered city in 1945 to the present phase of assigning responsibility to the Germans and ending Military Government controls. Major emphasis during the first months—which may be called the Reconstruction Period, from July, 1945, to August, 1946—was placed on the urgent tasks of feeding, housing, and clothing the popu- lation and on rekindling the completely prostrate Berlin economy. All policy and operational control during this time was in the hands of Military Gov- ernment. The Berlin Magistral merely carried out orders and directives received from the Komman- datura or the individual Sector Commandants. During the second period, from August, 1946, to June, 1948, although Military Government con- tinued to revive German industry, the first indepen- dent operational responsibilities were turned over to the Magistral. Initially, this meant only permitting the Magistral to consolidate industrial reports and to grant operating licenses to business enterprises. Under this guidance, industry gradually expanded its production. Increased Responsibilities for Germans By June, 1948, the German authorities had assumed responsibility for practically all activities, with the exception of those under Law 43 (restricted and prohibited industries), Law 25 (scientific re- search) and the disposition of captured Axis war materials, U.S. Army surplus, rationed commodities, interzonal trade, and trade with foreign governments. The third phase, from June, 1948, to May, 1949, took place during the Soviet blockade and Allied counter-blockade. Because of prevailing emergency conditions in the city, Military Government was forced to resume a much larger share of operational supervision over the Magistral and Berlin industry than would otherwise have been necessary. Immense Logistic Job for Air Lift The first characteristic of this period was defen- sive, and was marked by intense activity on the part of Military Government and the western sector Germans to build up the Air Lift supply of Berlin (see page 29). This involved many new demands on the Economics Branch. Its sections were called on to determine requirements for Berlin compatible with the increasing limits of Air Lift freight, to secure local materials for the construction of a new air- field and the expansion of two others, and to arrange with the German authorities internal transport fa- cilities for moving Air Lift freight from the airfields to the warehouses. During this period also, however, the veto powmr of the Soviets was no longer felt in the Kom- mandatura. It was thus possible to make important progress in reviving trade associations, chambers of commerce and industry, cooperatives, and other economic organizations—progressive group- ings which the Soviets had steadfastly opposed, because they interfered with the Russian concept of monopolistic control. Private industries during the blockade maintained skeleton staffs and produced an average of only 41 ECONOMICS Non-strategic items could be exported to the Soviet area of control upon specific approval of the Sector Military Government when the transaction was to the advantage of West Berlin's economy. The future of Berlin industry now depends on the reduction of production costs, and on an exten- sive sales campaign at competitive prices in the west zones. There is good reason to believe that Little over a tenth of the city's pre-war industrial capa- city was intact in 1945. The remainder had been bombed or was carried off by the Russians as war reparations. 50°/’o of their pre-blockade quotas. Because much of West Berlin's production had formerly been sold to the Soviet Sector and Zone, and because this was largely blocked during the siege period, a great effort was made to increase export to the west of Germany. Millions of dollars of finished products were in fact exported from W'estern Berlin to the three western zones—flown out in Air Lift cargo planes— and each crate or package was stamped ''Made in Blockaded Berlin", as part of a large-scale advertis- ing campaign. The Western Allies soon took the offensive and imposed a stern counter-blockade against the Soviet Sector of Berlin and the Soviet Zone. Orders from the Military Governments absolutely prohibited the export of certain strategic commodities from Berlin to the Russian areas of control, commodities criti- cally needed by the Soviets. Travel in Berlin was at first a severe trial amidst bomb- cratered streets, torn bridges, and mountains of debris. Berlin could and should become a great trading and processing center between Western and Eastern Europe. Semi-fabricated products from the West should be processed here and sent to the East. Raw materials from the East should, in turn, be fabricated in Berlin and sent to the West in exchange. Berlin skills and rationalized factories should permit the city to be completely self-supporting by supplying items in the electro-technical, pharma- ceutical, and clothing fields to all of Europe, both East and West. A stable political scene, however, is indispensable to this achievement, as well as the availability of long-term capital (some 200—500 mil- lion Marks) to provide for efficient modem tools. With the ending of the blockade, housewives once again could buy as much as their purses could afford. Retail shops did a land-office bus- iness during the first reckless days of rejoicing. ECONOMICS 42 “Made in Blockaded Ber- lin"—slogan of a city under siege which, thanks to the Air Lilt, was able io fly its products to Western Germany and the outside world. TRADE AND INDUSTRY As much as 85°/o of production facilities in the highly industrialized metropolis of Berlin had been destroyed, dispersed, or looted by the time American Military Government assumed control of the city's south-western quarter in July, 1945. The former heart and industrial nerve center of Germany had suffered some forty devastating air bombardments (and scores of lighter raids), had witnessed days and nights of the heaviest and most desperate street-fighting in the history of war, and had been ruthlessly plundered by its Red Army conquerors. capacity back towards normalcy. But. many factors have impeded progress, and there remains a long way to go. A large, though indeterminate, amount of pro- ductive equipment has been re-established in the U.S. Sector. But, although repairs have given the productive potential of this area a large portion of its pre-war capability again, the efficiency of the existing facilities is extremely low, founded as it is on a heterogeneous accumulation of obsolete machinery, much of it resurrected from scrap. Berlin's Pre-War Dominance Before World War II, the industries of Berlin exer- cised a large measure of dominance in the electrical equipment and clothing manufacturing fields and in the printing trades. In most instances, however, the plants were not completely self-sufficient, but were an integrated part of the industrial complex com- prising the entire city and the semi-urban area of Land Brandenburg surrounding Berlin. The progressive Soviet blockade of Berlin, which reached total force in June, 1948, began as early as March of that year, as far as industry was concerned. For it was in that month that the Soviets claimed jurisdiction over all shipments leaving the western sectors. From then on, the industrial position of West Berlin became progressively more critical. Pro- duction decreased sharply due to lack of power, fuel, and raw materials, and also to the necessity of establishing West German sources of supply and markets to replace traditional trade connections with the Soviet Zone. With the nominal lifting of the blockade in May, 1949, the inefficiency of industrial production GERMAN INDUSTRIAL AIRLIFT CUMULATIVE IN 16,051 TONS OUT //, 708 TONS Soon after the surrender, however, scattered efforts were begun to restore some degree of in- dustrial productivity. Firms began at once a program of rehabilitating the machinery of pro- duction; raw materials and some equipment began to flow into the city from Western Germany. Other equipment was salvaged from battlefield material and war surplus. The rehabilitation program during the past four years has progressively brought Berlin's industrial 43 ECONOMICS methods, and equipment in the U.S. Sector, depen- dent as they were on old methods and old tools, was sharply pointed up in the extreme sales difficulties encountered in the buyers' market of Western Ger- many, which was in competition with the completely modern and efficient plants operating there. War Materials Serve Peace-time Needs In common with other highly industrialized cities in Germany, Berlin had been a heavy producer of war materials for the former German Reich. Although the productive machinery was in large measure destroyed or looted by the beginning of the U.S. occupation in 1945, large stocks of finished and semi-finished war materials were stocked in Berlin factories. Considerable quantities of battle-field equipment also remained in the city following the fighting which preceded its surrender. In March, 1948, a quadripartite agreement was reached by which all combat equipment abandoned by either German or Red Army forces in the U.S. A few spinning mills were almost undamaged in the U.S. Sector, and were immediately set to work. The shortage of clothes, blankets and sheets was a dire one after the war. the city and by pure research establishments. The largest such institute in the U.S. Sector comprised parts of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut. In implementing Allied Control Authority Law 25, about 150 scientific research establishments in the U.S. Sector have been licensed since 1946 after inspection by Military Government officers. Soviets Block Free Economy Commercial trading in Berlin at the end of the war was almost at a complete standstill. Shops and warehouses were destroyed; stocks, records, and office equipment had been wrecked or looted. Yet gradually some order was re-established. Smashed war equipment which littered the city was salvaged for scrap, urgently needed for reconstruction. Sector became the property of the U.S. Army for purposes of demilitarization. The Magistral was ordered to demilitarize, under the supervision of U.S. Military Government, the war equipment in the factories and warehouses and to receive title of the material. Much of it has since been salvaged and converted, and serves to- day for peace-time purposes in Berlin. Looted Industrial Equipment Restored Large amounts of non-cultural objects, principally machinery and equipment looted by the former German Armed Forces in territories outside Ger- many, had been brought to Berlin during the war. Much of this plundered material was in turn looted by the troops of the USSR during the first weeks of their exclusive occupation of the city. A program to restitute the remaining items to the rightful owners has been in progress since 1946 and is now ninety percent completed. Berlin had been a world-famous center of scientific research, sponsored both by the industrialists within Gas masks were converted to ladles and saucepans. Shell casings became stove covers. Conversion industry became an important one in the recent battlefield of Berlin. ECONOMICS 44 Berlin has tried hard to pay its way in the growing competition of post- war commerce. Zeiss Ikon lens and glass industry, above, has helped. Another, in center, is the Lorenz Radio company with a large produc- tion lor both domestic sale and export. Some industries in the western zones depended on Berlin auxiliary plants to finish their finely-turned machinery. During the Soviet-imposed blockade, a part of this two-way operation was retained—with the Allied Air Lilt supplying the transportation by C-54. Slowing the restoration of normal commercial activities was the continued effort of the Soviets to impose their system of planned and regimented economy on the city. Moreover, the Soviet Military Administration had orders to secure as many goods as possible for their unilateral program of reparations, and it purchased heavily in the U.S. Sector with inflated Reichsmarks with which Soviet agents were plentifully supplied. During the blockade period, although strategic and essential commodities were not allowed to be exported eastward, there was nonetheless some commercial activity across the Iron Curtain. Most of such exchanges, however, were on a barter basis, for the East Mark had a value of approximately only one fifth or sixth that of the neighboring West Mark. It could, moreover, be used only for Soviet Sector or Zone purchases. Before the war, Berlin was one of the greatest trading centers of Europe, supplying jobbing and wholesale distributing services to the neighboring area, now constituting the Russian Zone and the former German territories east of the Oder River. Additionally, large trade functions were performed in Berlin as a center for both rail and inland water transport, together with the supply of trade services to the present Polish and Russian territory, formerly the Prussian province of the German Reich. These trade facilities have now almost entirely disappeared. No effective means have yet been found in Berlin for the support of a free enterprise economy dealing with the Soviet economic pattern. While there is, barring a complete reversal in the Soviet policy of totally regimented economy, no possibility of reviving trade and industry in West Berlin in its pre-war pattern, there is no cause for grievous misgiving as to the future of commerce and industry. Continued application of the initiative and energy displayed in this field during the last four years, on the groundwork laid by Military Government guidance, can establish a healthy and vital economy in West Berlin. The present difficulties of lack of capital for modernization of the productive plant and the necessity for development of new purchasing and marketing patterns can be surmounted by the in- dependent actions of German firms and investors themselves. Favorite east-German markets of before the war have been largely cut off. But the toy industry of Berlin has not died; the city itself contains nearly half a million children. Bricks, which once made up the walls of a million Berlin homes, are processed to make well-surfaced new bricks—to build the walls of new Berlin homes. 45 ECONOMICS Even Berlin's daily bread had to come by Air Lilt during the blockade. Only water was available locally. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE The most immediate and basic problem facing Military Government in Berlin—as in any conquered area—was that of supplying food to the civilian population and organizing its distribution. In the destroyed German capital, however, this problem was many times more complex than else- where in Europe. The U.S. Sector of Berlin was nearly three hundred miles from the U.S. Zone of Occupation and was more than a hundred miles behind the Russian Zone- frontier. Access to the city from the zonal hinter- the United States; and at times 90% of the rationed food in Berlin was of American origin. To complicate the problem further, food stocks- in Berlin at the end of the war were in very short supply. The Soviet-imposed rationing system was extremely primitive, irrational, and unfairly dis- criminatory. Responsibility for feeding the civilian population in Berlin has continued to be that of Military Government. Although certain administrative func- tions could be assigned to German officials, it was the task of Military Government to ensure that the people did not go hungry. Berlin civilians, more- over, considered this a logical and necessary concomitant of the Occupation. In the early stages, U.S. troops and civilian per- sonnel physically undertook the distribution of food in their sector. The amount of food furnished to considerable segments of the population was in- sufficient to maintain health for any extended period of time. From then on, progress in feeding the population consisted in improving the transportation, handling, processing, and distribution of food, in the total amount of food made available, and in its equitable and fair rationing among the people. This required planning for an external supply of livestock, the local creation of a small live- stock industry—for the Red Army had driven all herds eastward, when it overran Berlin and adjoin- ing regions—and the provision of food for the livestock. From the beginning, organization of the feeding of Berlin was carried out quadripartitely. This gave the problem a special character and brought about Cattle herds had to be shipped hundreds of miles to Berlin by the Western Allies to replace those seized and taken east by the Russians as reparations on the hoof. land was along a single rail line and a single high- way. Moreover, even the U.S. Zone was a deficit food area, and it was actually necessary to import supplies from the United States to feed the city. The food life-line for the U.S. Sector of Berlin stretched over 3,000 miles to the Atlantic ports of ECONOMICS 46 a series of crises that finally resulted in the blockade of the western sectors. U.S.-Soviet relations in the feeding of Berlin, in fact, make up the history of these crises, beginning almost on the first day, when the Soviets insisted that the U.S. Military Government imme- diately undertake full food responsibility for the population of its sector, and leading three years later to the blockade, when the Soviets bent every effort to prevent U.S. Military Government from doing just that very thing. Between these two events there was a whole series of lesser crises, when the Soviets repeatedly sought to use food as a political weapon. Blitzed areas were levelled with imported American bull-dozers to help West Berliners plant small vegetable gardens and beat the attempted Soviet starvation blockade. During the blockade period the food ration apparatus in the western sectors was put to a .severe test. Its success was manifest, in that ration levels were not only maintained, they were raised and the weights of the population—as determined by Public Health research—actually increased during the siege. At the beginning of the blockade the population received an average of 1,779 calories daily. Five months later this was increased to an average of 1,998 calories daily, or 219 calories more than the pre-blockade ration. Since the end of the blockade, rations and "free" supplies have been steadily increased to permit an average consumption of well above 2,200 calories daily. And it may be expected that in the near future the amount of food consumed by West Berliners will depend almost exclusively on the purchasing power of the individual buyers. Prices are still high in relation to pre-war levels but the essential basis of a plentiful supply has been attained since the end of the blockade. Meat: a precious, closely-rationed, well-guarded Berlin commodity in 1945/46 has now become available in proportion to the amount of money in the shopper's purse. During the food-deficiency period, which only now is beginning to be solved, the population of West Berlin was fed almost entirely from .stocks originating outside Germany and purchased with dollars or sterling. It is estimated that during the four years since the installation of U.S. Military Government in Berlin the following quantities of food have been im- ported from all sources into the U.S. Sector for ration distribution; CONSUMPTION OF RA T/ONED FOOD IN TERMS OF CALORIES PER PERSON PER DAY IN US. SECTOR OF BERLIN. JULY 1945 TO MAY 1949 Flour 434,821 Metric Tons Cereals 70,079 „ Fat 25,061 Meat and fish 64,334 Potatoes, fresh 523,561 „ Sugar 36,862 Coffee ersatz 8,333 „ Milk, dry skim 9,220 „ Milk, dry whole 3,074 Cheese 1,327 Salt 10,575 „ Vegetables, fresh 27,500 „ Fruit juice 441 „ Canned fruits 36 Dried fruits 615 Fresh fruits 645 „ Battle rations 479 n 1,216,963 Metric Tons Note: from the end ot the blockade, on May 12, 1949, it was dihicult to estimate accurately the average caloric intake since—with the great influx of unrationed foods—consumption increased rapidly. 47 ECONOMICS Briquettes, made of press- ed coal-dust, had to be rationed almost by the piece to Berlin's popula- tion against the cold post-war winters. FUEL At one of the first Kommandatura meetings in, July, 1945, it was agreed in principle that the Western Allies would supply two-thirds of Berlin's total requirements of coal and POL (petrol, oil, and lubricants) from their zones, and the Soviets would furnish the remaining third from theirs. In December, 1947, a new agreement was reached between the Western Allies and the Soviets, provid- ing Berlin with increased supplies of coal and electric power. The commitments of the Occupation authorities were based on the population of their respective sectors, i. e., western sectors—63.2% and Soviet Sector—36.8°/«. also fortunate that, as it was late June, coal con- sumption was seasonally declining. On July 7th, the first Air Lift shipments of coal arrived at Tempelhof airfield: 261 tons, loaded in American Army duffle bags. Deliveries to 'the British airfield at Gatow began shortly afterwards. By early September, daily receipts of Air Lift coal equalled daily consumption, and ‘the steady decline in the overall stockpile position was halted. During November, however, bad flying weather greatly curtailed receipts. Coal stocks fell rapidly, until, by the middle of January, alow of 65,000tonshad been reached. Thereafter, good weather—and the as- signing of top priority to coal shipments on the Air Lift—made it possible once again to rebuild stocks. Blockade Coal Thinly Rationed In December, 1948, in the midst of the blockade, an issue of 25 pounds of coal was made to each individual household in the western sectors. An additional 50 pounds were allocated to households having children below school age or sick, incapa- citated, or blind persons. At the same time, an intensive firewood program was undertaken throughout the west of the city. Forests were thinned and many trees were stripped from parks and along streets, so that several boxes of wood could be issued to each household. Everywhere throughout the city during those weeks, Berliners could be seen sawing and chop- ping down trees and chipping at half-buried roots, in order to obtain firewood. Fortunately, the winter was an unusually mild one. By the end of the blockade, coal and POL stocks in the western .sectors were no longer a matter of concern. Actual stocks were equal to or in excess of those existent before it was imposed. With the reopening of rail and barge transpor- tation, daily receipts of coal increased rapidly. During July, average daily receipts approached 15,000 tons, as a program of stockpiling winter requirements got well underway. The city's parks and woodlands were thinned in Berlin for firewood during the unprecedently hard winter of 1946/47, and again during the blockade winter of 1948/49. Immediately, controversy arose in the Allied Kommandatura when the Soviet Authorities sought to interpret the new agreement in such a manner as to obtain unlimited supplies of coal and electric power for their reparation industries. It was fortunate that there were large stocks of coal on hand at public utilities' depots and coal merchants' yards when the blockade began. It was ECONOMICS 48 Five-sixths of all bridges in the U. S. Sector were destroyed or damaged in 1945. Today, nearly all have been repaired or replaced. TRANSPORTATION Transport facilities in captured Berlin were virtu- ally non-existent when American troops entered the city in July, 1945. Railroad centers had been targets for repeated RAF and USAAF heavy bom- bardments and all other forms of surface transport had suffered enormously during the suicidal struggle for the German capital. Subway Flooded, Canals Blocked The underground U-Bahn had in many areas been subjected to artillery fire and flooding, as the Red Army scorched and drowned out the last desperate resistance. Rivers and canals were blocked by blown-up bridges, sunken barges, and a mass of debris. Yet a rehabilitated transport system in the metrop- olis was of the first importance, for the normal life of a modern city depends on the ability of its citizens and goods to move freely and quickly. City-Wide Needs Surveyed The Traffic Department of the Magistral, guided and helped by Military Government, undertook a A scene from the first months: a British Tommy rides the only German taxi available. Only in July, 1949 were car taxis again licensed for civilian use in Western Berlin. city-wide program to repair, replace, and restore transport facilities. An extensive survey was carried out to determine the needs of the municipal trans- port system, and a plan was prepared to provide equipment, rolling-stock, and spare parts both from local production and from factories all over Ger- many. The subway system was pumped dry and cleared. Canals and rivers were dredged, bridges rebuilt. New roadbeds and tracks were laid for the street car and railroad system. Until the blockade was imposed, good progress was thus being made in rehabili- tation. Subways in which the Red Army and the Nazi SS fought out the last bitter battles of the war had to be pumped dry before they could be operated again. Today Berlin U-Bahn service is once again on pre-war schedules. 49 ECONOMIC S- Rail Strike Stagnates Movement Even after the blockade was officially ended on May 12, 1949, transportation difficulties were not solved. An extensive strike of western sector rail- roadmen (see page 119) stagnated the movement of all trains. And persistent Soviet frontier interference with truck and barge traffic continued for weeks after the siege was proclaimed at an end. Moreover, under Allied Control Council agree- ment, the operation of the Berlin railroads had been originally assigned to the Soviets. Rehabilitation of this transport medium has been especially slow, and it has proved to be a constant bottleneck in providing adequate rail facilities in the U.S. Sector. One of Berlin’s main stations, the Anhalter Bahnhof, was a tangled jungle of girders and smashed masonry after the war. Today it finks all Europe by rail. Repair Work Halted by Blockade Then, for one year, progress virtually halted. The Air Lift could not simultaneously supply the needs of 2,100,000 people and provide massive equipment to rebuild the transport system. Hundreds of trucks were pressed into service to serve the city during the railroad strike in May-June, 1Q49. In Berlin today, however, one can see the changes that have been effected since the end of the war. Large numbers of well-equipped trucks and trailers, carrying payloads of 10 to 30 tons, leave the city for all points in Europe. Street-car and bus services are approaching normalcy, and electric buslines are gradually appearing to replace obsolete street- cars. The subway and elevated railway systems are now functioning at approximately their pre-war efficiency, and international trains—to Paris, Brus- sels, Warsaw, and Prague—'are running on pre-war schedules. And the presence of new, sleek cars, handsome busses and train coaches provides visual evidence of the trend towards normalcy at least in the field of transportation. New cars and busses can be seen in Berlin today in al- most as great prolusion as in most other European capitals. Moreover, road and water facilities were im- mediately called upon to form a Berlin support service for the Air Lift. A special railway was established to trans- port coal from the Tempeihof air- field to the main coal yard on the Teltow Canal. There barge trans- ports carried stocks to public utilities. Fleets of trucks—whose gas, oil, and spare parts were flown into Berlin by Air Lift—moved food and industrial commodities from the airfields to warehouses and consumers. Berlin Public Transportation in Operation by Year since 1938. Type of transportation Dec. 1938 Aug. 31 1945 Dec. 1945 1946 1947 1948 July 1 1949 U-Bahn (subway) Passenger motor coaches 625 395 321 349 365 371 394 Trailers 481 323 271 318 313 334 350 Streetcars Passenger motor coaches 1557 511 621 648 458 578 486 Trailers 1266 445 550 707 617 643 629 Busses 655 87 35 25 20 43 106 Taxis 3004 — — — — — 100 ECONOMICS 50 Only one fifth of Berlin's million and a hall dwel- lings remained undam- aged alter the tremend- ous aerial and ground pounding the city under- went during the war. BUILDING AND HOUSING The first operation of Military Government in the field of building and housing was that of requisitioning. Billets were needed for occupation troops and office space for the branches of the U.S. Sector Military Government authorities. In fulfilling this mission, it was often necessary to take emergency action, resulting in 'midnight requisitions’ as they came to be known. This phase ended, however, within a few months after the establishment of U.S. troops in Berlin. Soon the field of this activity expanded to that of ensuring equitable housing facilities for the Ger- man civilian population. The Allied Control Council Law 18 (Housing Law) was predicated on a desire to eliminate the unbalanced distribution of living space that resulted from discriminatory Nazi practices, U.S. Requisitions of Berlin Real Estate Six month periods Real estate requisitioned during period Real estate released during period Total active real estate under requisition 1 Jan.-30 June 47 17 378 2,483 1 July-31 Dec. 47 71 265 2,289 1 Jan.-30 June 48 30 210 2,109 1 July-31 Dec. 48 9 885 1,233 1 Jan.-15 July 49 9 37 1,205 the scattering of the German population, and the destruction of housing and industrial space during the war. It was no easy task. Of the million-and-a-half dwelling units existent in Berlin in 1939, only one- fifth remained undamaged by the summer of 1944, and heavy air bombardments continued for almost a year after that. It was estimated in 1945 that ten trains of fifty cars each could leave the city daily, fully loaded with rubble—and still Berlin's debris would not be cleared for sixteen years. At the rate of the 1927-1937 building boom, it Sometimes a bathtub or a sturdy radiator was left hang- ing crazily in the air. Sometimes a stairway spiralled upward to nowhere. Sometimes there was just nothing- ness: Berlin lost seventy percent of its homes and buildings during the tremendous Allied bombardments. 51 ECONOMICS would take more than twenty years merely to replace its former dwelling units. U.S. Military Government's first consideration, however, was that of available space and its use. German housing authorities were given full re- sponsibility to requisition houses and apartments in favor of three preferential categories of needy individuals: Victims of Facism and the Nazi Niirnberg edicts, Persons having large families and young children, old people, invalids and disabled persons, and Persons whose assignment to suitable housing space was considered to be in the direct interest of the Occupation Forces. One-room shacks could sometimes be seen hidden away in the bomb-shattered wrecks of once big buildings. And window-ledge gardens showed the spirit wasn't dead. indirectly helped in the extensive salvage and re- pair operations which have been going on in West Berlin since the end of the war. Before the blockade, the Magistral was engaged in a program of demolishing all buildings which had been 50% or more destroyed. Salvaged materials were stockpiled, processed, and used in new con- struction or repair. During the blockade this activity was greatly accelerated, as can be seen by a tabu- lation of city expenditures for the program: 1945 RM 25,008,693 1946 “ 40,096,996 1947 " 19,341,783 1948 DM82,578,660 1949 “ 40,734,398 (first six months) By Kommandatura order, Berlin was declared a "closed city" during the early days of the occupa- tion. This status still exists. Exceptions were per- mitted during the past four years to allow certain individuals to return to their original homes and to rejoin their families. Repair work oiten had to start horn the ground up. Germany's Lebensraum problem—a Nazi excuse for aggression—was somewhat intensified during the war. As a matter of policy, members of the Nazi Party and their families were subjected to requisition and/or restriction of their housing space in pro- portion to their contribution to the Nazi regime. Rehabilitation and reconstruction activities have been more than adequate in coping with the increase in the population of the U.S. Sector. Density of room occupation, in fact, has dropped from 1.7 to 1.6 persons per room. But building work has been relatively small because of the distances over which material must be transported from the western zones. During the critical days of the blockade and counter-blockade building activities dropped con- siderably. Stocks of material had never been very high, and during that period they had to be flown to the city by Air Lift or smuggled through the blockade. On the other hand, the blockade —by increasing unemployment and so making labor readily available— Number of Dwelling Units Repaired in Berlin Since 1945 ECONOMICS 52 The U.S. 2nd Judicial District Court in Berlin tries cases ranging from the theft of Allied property to murder. LEGAL AFFAIRS Legal activities in Berlin since the end of the war have passed through three major phases. The first covered that early period of our occupation in Berlin when Military Government was prepon- responsible for practically all activities, with very little supervisory participation by the Germans. By early 1946, the reorganization activities of Military Government had reached a point where, during the second phase, increasing responsibilities could be entrusted to local German officials who had been carefully screened and chosen for various positions in the reconstituted judicial system of Berlin. Soviets Block Progressive Measures This policy of gradually transferring greater re- sponsibilities to the Germans was, however, con- sistently hampered by the Soviet authorities in Berlin, who under quadripartite rules of procedure were in a position to exercise veto rights against many democratic legal measures favored by the three Western Powers. In the third phase, and following the withdrawal of the Soviet authorities from participation in the Allied Kommandatura, many legal measures long stalemated could at last be implemented in the western sectors of Berlin. The program of assigning increasing responsibili- ties to the Germans for the administration of justice in Berlin culminated in the "Statement of Prin- ciples Governing the Relationship Between the Allied Kommandatura and Greater Berlin" on May 14, 1949. In this devolution of authority, the Germans were made responsible for the administra- tion of justice. Allied Kommandatura Legal Committee One of the early accomplishments of the Kom- mandatura Legal Committee was the reorganization of the courts in Berlin, along with prosecution offices and the prison system. Until the publication of the "Statement of Principles" on May 14, 1949, the Legal Committee exercised rather extensive supervisory functions over the administration of justice, formerly the responsibility of the Prussian Minister of Justice. With Germany's defeat, the former Prussian ministries ceased to exist and the Allied Komman- datura assumed its supervisory functions, insofar as Berlin was concerned. Under the general super- vision of the Legal Committee, the highest judicial official (president of the Kammergericht) headed the German courts and the Generalstaatsanwalt headed the prosecution offices and German prisons. All appointments, promotions, or dismissals of judges and prosecutors, admission of lawyers, appointment of referendare and lesser court officials, creation of new chambers of courts, etc., until recently re- quired final approval of the Legal Committee. While under the "Statement of Principles" the Legal Committee was relieved of these duties, which now became the responsibility of the Berlin City Administration, work of a different nature now re- quires much of the time of the Legal Committee. Under the "Statement of Principles”, legislation sub- 53 LEGAL AFFAIRS mitted by the Berlin city govern- ment on non-reserved subjects be- comes effective 21 days after sub- mittal, unless disapproved by the Allied Kommandatura within that time. The Legal Committee now studies a steady flow of enactments passed by the Magistral to the Kom- mandatura for approval. In addition, the Committee super- vises the Spandau Allied Prison, where seven former Nazi leaders, convicted to terms of imprisonment by the International Military Tribu- nal at Niirnberg in 1946, are now confined. Military Government Courts Full preparations had been made in advance for creating a Summary Military Court in each of the six Verwaltungsbezirke (boroughs), one Inter- mediate Military Court, and one General Military Court for the whole sector upon the arrival of U.S. Occupation Forces in Berlin in July, 1945. These courts were established under the provi- sions of Military Government Ordinance 2 and had authority to try violations of Military Government laws, orders, and ordinances, committed by Germans and certain others subject to the jurisdiction of these courts. On the day occupation activities began in the U.S. Sector all summary military courts were ready for operation. Later, during 1946, all of the courts were HO, . DATE NAME AGE CHAKGk(S) SENTENCE \ •'IKE FORFEITURE 1 10/21 BRINK, Irmgard F 19 1) Having unlawful pos session of an autonatic pistol, make MAUSER, cal. 7.65 nm, together with 86 rounds of anraunition fitting said pistol, if) Viol, of ACA CC CRD NO. 2. 1 year - suspended, r ione 1 automatic pistol, male MAUSER, cal. 7,65 mm# 2 10 A1 F1ADE, Willi' i: 39 1) For his own profit concealing 1A sacks each containing ICO lbs, of sugar, which he knew had be on ob- tained by means of an offense, in viol, of SEC 259 of the GERMAN PENAL CODE. . Continued for further hearing. 3 10/iI FISCHER, Erwin K 30 1) Together with other perpetrators stealing one bag containing 52 Ibe, of fresh meat from a 10-ton truck parked at the Tenpelhof Airbase, which meat was brought to ber}in by the Airlift, ip- vipiv of rjQ ] Apr I, SEC 'Q 5 months - 2 months suspended. the District From record, U. S. Court, Berlin. Allied property, and other minor offenses tried in the summary courts, to illegal possession of weapons, illegal manufacture and possession of war material, abduction, and even murder, tried in Intermediate and General Military Courts. This system of courts was replaced in Berlin by the new District Court system on November 2, 1948. The Military Government district courts do not operate under the Directors of Military Government in the Lander (states) and the U.S. Sector of Berlin, but function under the Office of Military Government for Germany. Upon assuming Military Government functions in the U.S. Sector of Berlin early in July, 1945, it was found that the Soviets had already established Amtsgerichte throughout the city. Seven of these were located in the U.S. Sector. These were im- mediately reduced to six courts, one for each Ver- waltungshezirk. The Amtsgerichte established by the Soviet authorities had complete trial jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters, where formerly they had only limited jurisdiction. A Landgericht, which formerly had jurisdiction of the more important cases, had not been re-established. As a court of appeal, the Soviet Military Gov- ernment established what was called the Stadt- gericht, a court previously unknown in the German legal system. Because the Amtsgerichte were endowed with an authority far beyond that given to them under the German law, steps were immediately taken to restrict these courts in the U.S. Sector to the proper jurisdiction. It then became necessary to create a court on the second level, the Landgericht, to try the more important cases and to act as a court of appeal from judgments rendered in the Amtsgerichte. An agreement was reached in principle between the British, Soviet, and U.S. Military Governments to open a Landgericht in each sector. The Land- gericht in the U.S. Sector was opened on August 6, 1945. Establishment of Courts on a City-Wide Basis It was obviously unsatisfactory to have different court establishments in the various sectors of the same city. The Soviet Sector had a Stadtgericht and the Amtsgerichte; the US. Sector had the Land- gericht and the Amtsgerichte; the British and French Sectors had only the lower courts. The four-power prison at Spandau, detention place for war criminals convicted at Niirnberg, is one of the only remaining quadripartitely administered activities in Berlin. gradually centralized in one place for the sake of efficiency and to save personnel. A total of 7,810 cases were tried in the U. S. Military Government courts under the old system, running the gamut of simple cases of theft, of LEGAL AFFAIRS 54 In order to establish the courts on a city-wide basis, a committee of German jurists was selected to draw up a plan for the reconstruction of the German legal system in Berlin as it existed before the Nazi regime. This system comprised the Amtsgerichte, the Landgericht, and the Kammergericht. A plan for the reorganization of the court system on a city- wide basis was prepared and approved by the Allied Kommandatura and went into effect on October 15, 1945. The Landgericht, which originally operated in the U.S. Sector, continued to have the same president and enlarged its jurisdiction to include the entire city. The Kammergericht began its labors with four senates. The Amtsgerichte were reduced in number from 20 to 14, of which 5 are located in the U.S. Sector. German Prisons Under the plan as approved by the Komman- datura, the administration of prisons was created on a city-wide basis under the Generalstaatsanwalt or Chief Prosecutor at the Kammergericht. Also an Anwaltskammer, or Bar Association, was created under this plan. The prison system of Berlin, which had sustained substantial damages during the war, was gradually repaired, until now adequate facilities exist and for- mer overcrowded conditions have been eliminated. Establishment of Administrative Courts The Legal Committee of the Kommandatura designated three former judges of the administra- tive courts to draft a plan for the re-establishment of the administrative courts in Berlin. This plan was submitted, but quadripartite agreement on the re-establishment of administrative courts on a city- wide basis could not be obtained. Therefore, on November 19, 1945, administrative courts were established unilaterally in the U.S. Sector, followed soon after by the British in their sector. These were the first administrative courts to be re-established anywhere in Germany. The period from the beginning of the blockade in late June, 1948 until February 4, 1949 (marking the split of the Berlin court system) was one in which Soviet, non-concurrence with the plans of the Western Powers for creating a democratic German court system in Berlin hampered and throttled the activities of the German courts and prosecution offices, until there was danger that the efficiency of Chambers of the Berlin Landgericht, the higher German court, hear major civil and criminal cases, as well as appeals brought against decisions ol the Amtsgerichte. the city's judicial system might, be seriously im- paired, if not brought to a standstill. The courts suffered from a shortage of judges and prosecutors and there was also a shortage of law- yers, all due to the refusal of the Soviet authorities to permit a re-instatement of persons who had been properly denazified, or to restore to their positions persons who had been erroneously removed because of alleged Nazi activities. Kammergericht Transferred to West Berlin The most important event of the blockade period was the transfer of the Kammergericht Berlin and the Generalstaatsanwaltschait from the Soviet Sec- tor to the western sectors on February 4, 1949, by the German supervisory authorities. This was neces- sary because of continuous interference by the Soviets with the proper functions of these agencies of justice. While this led to a split in the city-wide court system, it also had some decided beneficial results. Freed from Soviet domination, the German courts in the western sectors recovered quickly and the Legal Committee was now able to issue necessary authorizations, so that the situation suddenly became the reverse of that which prevailed prior to Fe- bruary, 1949. That is, instead of a shortage, there was and is now an adequate supply of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. This is due, first, to the fact that many of them moved of their own volition from the Soviet Sector to the western sectors, while others were discharged by the Soviets in the east sector; and, secondly, the Legal Committee, acting tri-partitely, Lower courts in post-war Berlin were initially set up in schools, libraries, and private homes, until adequate accommodation could be found in 1946 for their location. 55 LEGAL AFFAIRS quickly authorized the reinstatement of denazified judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. The rapid recovery and improvement in the morale of the German court system continued until the 'Statement of Principles" was announced, under the terms of which the administration of justice in the western sectors of Berlin was transferred to and became the responsibility of the Berlin city ad- ministration, thus ending direct supervision by Mili- tary Government. In taking over the administration of justice in WesternBerlin, the city authorities have thus farsub- stantially continued the system organized underMili- tary Government supervision and in which German judicial officials had participated from thebeginning. Meanwhile, the Soviet authorities have uni- laterally set up an independent court system in their sector, wholly disregarding the legally constituted court system, now operating only in the western sectors, which had received full quadripartite ap- proval in October, 1945. While the courts established in the Soviet Sector of Berlin carry the same names as those operating in the western sectors, there are many reports that lay persons without legal training have been ap- pointed as "Volksrichter" (People’s Judges) and as prosecutors, thus following the pattern of the German court system reported to exist in the Soviet Zone. Cultural And Re-orientation Activities Under policies which were formulated during the latter phases of U.S. Military Government, activities in Germany, considerable emphasis was placed on developing an effective cultural exchange and re- orientation program. Legal Branch is charged with carrying out in Berlin that part of the cultural exchange and re- orientation program listed in the Inter-divisional Re-orientation Committee publication "Cultural Ex- change Program" (February, 1949), which outlined U.S. policy on this subject. This includes: a) Lectures on constitutional law, international law, and comparative law to the members of the Bench and Bar of Berlin, law students, and the gen- eral public, designed to explain and facilitate the adoption of certain Anglo-Saxon principles, which are the foundation of American democracy, into the legal system of Berlin, so that the newly granted constitutional rights of the citizens of Ger- many may be protected and enjoyed. Additional lectures are being arranged, using not only experts visiting from the U.S.A., but also qua- lified legal personnel employed by Military Govern- ment in Berlin. Questions asked by the German audiences during the discussion following each lecture give valuable clues to the effectiveness of the lectures and to suitable subjects for future forums. b) Selecting and arranging for certain members of the Berlin Bench and Bar to visit the United States for the purpose of observing and studying demo- cratic legal institutions in action. c) Selecting law students and referendare to visit the United States for study at American law schools. Many applications have been received and are being processed. Selections will be made as soon as the number allocated for Berlin has been ascer- tained. Conferences have been held with the faculty and representative students of the Free University of Berlin. d) Selecting and distributing law books to the German judiciary, the law school at the Free Uni- versity of Berlin, and libraries. Good Foundation Laid In considering the legal phases of post-war Berlin in retrospect, it is felt that a strong foundation has been established for the future of the administration of justice. The problems have been numerous and difficult in converting the pre-Occupation Nazi court system into one based on principles of democracy. How- ever, it may be safely said that in the western sectors of the city a person can now be assured of his day in court before an impartial and fair tribunal. Even in the eastern sector, where its judicial system has come under Soviet domination during the past year, one can feel confident that Soviet influence will be negated to a large extent as a result of continued comparison with the judicial system operating in the adjacent western sectors. It is possible that the constructive effects of this comparison may even have an important influence in the surrounding Soviet Zone of Germany. Courthouse in Berlin-Lichterfelde, where U.S. and German courts function simultaneously in the same building. LEGAL AFFAIRS 56 Mass inoculations saved Berlin from epi- demics in the precarious, post-war years. PUBLIC HEALTH Ominous health conditions existed in Berlin when U.S. troops arrived in July, 1945. An epidemic of dysentery—claiming over 2,000 victims and 300 deaths a week—was widespread throughout the city. Hospital bed space was far below the minimum needed and medical supplies of all sorts were in dire shortage. The re-established City Health Department was functioning with a skeleton staff. Reports of com- municable diseases were forwarded to the central office on foot or by bicycle. Motor ambulances were non-existent. Transpor- tation of the sick was effected by hand-stretchers, carts, or im- provised stretchers on wheels. Sick beds, which had reached a peak of 38,000 in 1943 for the entire city, had been reduced to 9,300 by July 1, 1945. Few hospi- tals had anaesthetics, there was a scarcity of narcotics, sulfa drugs, and bandaging materials, and sera and vaccines were in very limited supply and great demand. Public health officers met at the Allied Kommandatura on July 16th for the first time. From then on steady improve- ment can be noted in the complex process of restoring the city’s health services and in protecting the population. COMMUNICABLE DISEASES: Top Priority The control of communicable diseases has been uppermost in the concern of Military Government Public Health Service. It has often been necessary for Allied health officers to initiate comprehensive health programs in the city and to force effective action on the part of the German authorities. In many cases no action was taken by the Germans despite Military Government pressure and despite the fact that existing German health laws were in most cases entirely adequate. This attitude on the part of Berlin health officers, charac- terized by complacent resigna- tion and attempts to rationalize any deterioration of conditions as a sequel to the Occupation, has steadily increased. Nonetheless, there has been but one epidemic of any con- sequence, that of poliomyelitis in the summer of 1947. This outbreak reached true epidemic proportions. There were 2,462 cases reported, of which 220 were fatal, and a high propor- tion of the remaining cases were left with residual para- lysis of varying severity. The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis of America flew a team of specialists to Berlin. Six respirators (iron The Technical Manual for Public Health Officers in Military Govern- ment provides that: “Such action will be taken to con- trol communicable diseases and to alleviate suffering among the civilian population as will ensure success of the Commander’s missions and will prevent medical hazards to the Allied Forces ... "Civilian public health organiza- tions are to be used to the fullest extent possible... “Control is maintained over civi- lian public health authorities to in- sure that such authorities provide the measure of civilian health con- trol necessary for the protection of the Allied Forces ...“ 57 PUBLIC HEALTH POLIOMYELITIS IN BERLIN entire population throughout the country. There is thus a continuing competition between the sick and the well for such supplies. With supply con- ditions gradually normalizing, it has now become the responsibility of the Germans to determine the relative priority of need, and to distribute that which is available as wisely as possible. The problem of isolating open cases of tubercu- losis, which is the immediate and vital step in any program of control, has still not been solved. Berlin has only 0.8 hospital beds per annual death, and the recommendation of American health authorities is 2.5 beds per annual death. Shortages in building materials and workers have hampered the expansion of tuberculosis bed facil- ities, so that at present, facilities are just barely adequate to care for the patients. Tuberculosis continues to be a disease of great import in Berlin. Sub-standard living conditions and the relatively low nutritional status of Berliners is the greatest causative factor and, until these con- ditions are rectified, tuberculosis will continue to be a disease of immediate importance. lungs), several hot pack-machines, and other equip- ment were also flown to the city. The American Women's Club of Berlin generously donated thous- ands of cans of fruit juices, mineral oils, soaps, soups, and other items otherwise unobtainable in the city. A series of lectures by American poliomyelitis specialists, attended by over two thousand Berlin physicians, was held during the epidemic. In succeeding years the incidence of the dread disease never again passed the average stage of poliomyelitis for a city of Berlin's size. Tuberculosis: Continuing Problem Since the end of World War II, tuberculosis has been the leading reportable disease in Berlin. Its control and cure are intimately linked up with the larger problem of a deficient German economy and cannot be viewed separately. Widespread short- ages of supplies and facilities made life especially difficult for patients. Hospitals and sanatoria need many supplies and equipment which are in general demand by the TYPHUS Cases and Deaths in U.S. Sector Typhus Fever Stamped Out As a result of the Typhus Fever Control Program, instituted soon after the arrival of U.S. Forces in Berlin, this disease has been virtually stamped out in the city. Only one case has been reported in the U.S. Sector since June, 1948. There have been two cases reported in the Soviet Sector since July, 1946. Mass Immunization to Combat Diphtheria The mass immunization program effected at the beginning of the Occupation has been continued, and the incidence of diphtheria and its mortality toll greatly reduced. The Kommandatura ordered that all children be immunized against the disease by the end of their second year of life, and that they be re-immunized during the first and last years of school attendance up to 15 years of age, in accordance with existing German laws. TUBERCULOSIS PULMONARY Cases and Deaths in U.S. Sector PUBLIC HEALTH 58 DIPHTHERIA Cases and Deaths in U.S. Sector Mass vaccination with typhoid and para-typhoid vaccines was reluctantly accepted by the German authorities, although there were thousands of cases of the disease when the Allies entered Germany. And Berlin was no exception. During the first six months of the occupation of Berlin, for example, there were over 13,000 new cases of typhoid and para-typhoid fever and over TYPHOID FEVER AND PARA-TYPHOID Cases and Deaths in U.S. Sector The disease incidence was initially high, as com- pared with the United States, but by the early part of 1946 the monthly average fell to 48.3 per 10,000 population, and from then on continued to fall gradually. Credit for keeping the disease to a minimum in- cidence is given to the energetic immunization program, which has achieved great results against a malady that in the past was one of the worst causes of death among children in Europe. 15,000 new cases of dysentery, the latter having a mortality rate of 23.6°/o. It became necessary in the spring of 1946 to order that the entire population, without exception, be immunized. People were then unable to acquire their food ration cards, unless they could prove they had been vaccinated. By April 20, 1946, approximately 83°/® of the population of the U.S. Sector had thus been immunized. The program has since been repeated each year, and persons who were previously vaccinated were given a "booster” shot, or the full series of injections if they could not prove they had been previously vaccinated. SCARLET FEVER Cases and Deaths in U.S. Sector Progress Against Scarlet Fever As can be seen from the above graph, the incidence of scarlet fever has been brought down by 59°/o in the city of Berlin and by 56°/o in the U.S, Sector. Deaths were also reduced by 85% and 75%, respectively. Enteric Diseases Sharply Reduced The remarkable reduction in the incidence of typhoid fever, para-typhoid, and dysentery illustrates the value of preventive medicine. German author- ities had to be convinced of the value of mass immunization programs, however, and the task was not easy. Lakes and swamp areas were sprayed with DDT in 1945 to light the dangerous spread of insect-borne diseases. 59 PUBLIC HEALTH DYSENTERY Cases and Deaths in U.S. Sector emotional frustration of the average young Berlin girl. Unless there is .success in solving the social problem involved, there will be little success in stamping out prostitution. At the present time, for example, approximately 3,000 girls who have been named as venereal disease contacts by either Germans or Allied personnel have not been ap- prehended and treated, because in many cases they have been able to bribe their way clear with money or merchandise. SYPHI LIS Cases in U.S. Sector In regard to dysentery, the problem was more complex, although the incidence of the disease dropped sharply after the first protective measures were undertaken. A widespread educational pro- gram was carried out among the general public as to its dangers, sanitary measures, the importance of having early professional attendance, and isola- tion. Pamphlets based on Army experiences in the Middle-East were distributed to physicians, and quantities of sulfa drugs were distributed to practic- ing doctors. Venereal Diseases: A Social Problem The situation regarding venereal diseases in Berlin has shown remarkable improvement since the early days of the Occupation. The accompany- ing charts illustrate the reduction in the incidence of gonorrhea and syphilis. The incidence of the diseases among U.S. personnel in Berlin is the lowest in the European Command. In spite of this optimistic picture, it must be pointed out that constant vigilance is necessary in Berlin—as, indeed, elsewhere—in the control of venereal diseases. The problem here is perhaps more acute, for prostitution in Berlin is closely linked with the economic situation and the general NUTRITION: Steady Improvement The nutritional state of the population of Western Berlin has steadily improved during the past four years. The ration system in 1945 was broken down into five categories: I — Heavy workers and certain professional workers . . 2,486 Calories II — Moderate workers . . . 1,992 III — Maintenance personnel, janitors etc 1,559 IV — Children under 15 years of age 1,384 V — Remainder of population 1,247 In the fall of 1945, a special Allied Nutrition Survey Team carried out extensive research in the U.S. Sector of the city to determine how the popu- lation was faring on this diet. Its findings may be summarized as follows: a. The general health of the population was quite good, b. There was a generalized weight loss due to the low caloric intake, c. No evidence of an abnormal incidence of nutritional deficiency was found, d. There was some evidence of vitamin and mineral deficiencies. In January, 1946, therefore, the Kommandatura effected certain changes in the food ration cate- gories, raising in general the rations of young people. Several subsequent changes were made in the ration allowances with the aim of gradually raising the nutritional level. The latest increase, in No- GONORRHEA Cases in U.S. Sector public HEALTH 60 vember, 1948, brought the ration categories to the following levels: Category I — 2,609 Calories II — 2,202 III — 1,802 (the lowest adult category) IVa — 1,786 (children aged 0—6) IVb — 1,633 (aged 6—9) IVc— 1,834 (aged 9—15) Free University Medical School opened with more than 300 students in the clinical semesters. To date, however, there are no pre-clinical courses available. Three sectoral medical associations have been separately licensed because of Soviet objections to a city-wide association. Three separate western sector organizations of dentists were similarly authorized in May, 1948, by the Allied Komman- datura. HOSPITALIZATION: Blockade Problems Occupancy of hospital beds in the U.S. Sector is still generally below the safe limit, of 90°/o. A certain tendency to fill general beds with old and chronic cases has been repeatedly observed, but it is most difficult to control. During the blockade, hospitals in the western sectors were beset with great difficulties. The pro- vision of electricity for omly two separate two-hour periods a day necessitated drastic rearrangement of operating and x-ray schedules. A small number of hospitals were fortunately equipped with generators, but additional generators were ordered and flown to the city by the Air Lift for the hospitals which had none. A few hospitals were given extra hours of electricity, and the polio station of the Auguste-Viktoria Hospital received continuous current to operate its iron lungs. The coal shortage during the blockade also caused enormous problems. The heating of certain special hospital departments was authorized on October 25, 1948, and general space heating was authorized at the beginning of November of that year. Hos- pitals were ade- quately heated with few excep- tions, although they did not receive enough heat to accord with normal standards. Doc- tors' and den- tists' offices, however, were barely heated, if at all, during the blockade winter of 1948- 1949. All major ho- spital recon- struction had to be abandon- ed during the blockade but it was possible to achieve the mi- nimum goal of weatherproofing the severely dam- aged hospitals that were not yet repaired. A quota of 45 tons monthly for medical supplies, was brought to Berlin by the Air Lift. While not up to normal peace-time needs, the overall supply of medical materials during the blockade was no worse than at any other time since the end of the war. MEDICAL AFFAIRS: Guidance and Help The Medical Academy in the U.S. Sector was formally opened in July, 1948, after having had to postpone its plans for the construction of a special building in the Behring Hospital, and after diffi- Iron lungs and other modern equipment were flown to Berlin to combat the 1947 infantile paralysis epidemic. culties with the conversion of its 200,000 Mark fund following the currency reform. Several special programs, which included lectures by visiting international experts, have been present- ed to the practising medical profession each month. An extensive program of refresher courses was prepared for the season 1948-49. THE RETURN OF BERLIN BIRTH/DEATH RATES TO NORMALCY 1939 1945 Last C months 1949 First 6 months Death Rates per Thousand Population per Annum 14.3 oo. 4 18.0 Infant Mortality Rate per 100 Live Births 5.9 36.0 10.1 Live Birth Rate per Thousand Population per Annum 15.7 8.6 10.7 Many of the drugs and sera, including penicillin, used in Berlin hospitals were contributed by individuals and organizations in the United States. The medical faculty of the Free University (see also page 104) was opened in November, 1948, and it solved the problem of what to do with the non- communist medical students who had been evicted from the Charite Hospital. Some of the students had previously been engaged as temporary ward assistants in the Auguste-Viktoria Hospital. The 61 PUBLIC HEALTH THE FOUR SECTORS OF BERLIN RELATION BETWEEN POST-WAR POPULATION AND PRE-WAR POPULATION (CENSUS, MAY 1949) BERLIN CITY WESTERN SECTORS US SECTOR FRENCH SECTOR BRITISH SECTOR SOVIET SECTOR PUBLIC SAFETY 62 A revitalized, re-equipped police force is responsible for the steadily de- clining crime rate in West Berlin. PUBLIC SAFETY When the Americans arrived in Berlin in 1945, they found that the police and fire depart- ments then in existence had been recruited by the Soviets almost from nothing. In their recruitment the Russians had placed a hard core of communists in most of the strategic positions, as well as a con- siderable number in the rank and file. Buildings, equipment, transportation, uniforms, weapons, communications, and records were almost non-existent and the newly recruited personnel were inexperienced and untrained. Recruit Training First Task The first two years were devoted to sorting out the mass of raw recruits and training them in their professions. This was a prodigious task. The uni- formed police, for example, numbered 11,000 men and in the first two years there was a turnover of 10,000 in this group alone. Of these 10,000 policemen approximately 25°/o were men who entered the police force, because they needed employment quickly, and they left when they found positions more to their liking. Another 25°/» were discharged, either for misdemeanors com- mitted while policemen or because their previous criminal records were discovered. The remaining 50°/o were discharged because of former participa- tion in Nazi activities. Buildings were found or repaired to house police stations; telephone and teletype systems were in- stalled and expanded; the first real uniforms replaced the original catch-as-catch-can clothing; some (though not enough) means of transportation was obtained. Sufficient pistols to arm the police actually on duty were issued, and gradually the records necessary to efficient police operation were reas- sembled or made. Training was started with short lectures at the stations where the men reported for duty, and it later developed into two schools, one in the Soviet and the other in the British Sector. During this period the basic conflicts between the communist and western ideologies began to appear and to grow. These conflicts were not limited to the Soviets and Western Powers in the Allied Kommandatura, but were also evident within the body of the police itself. Basically, the conflict revolved around the problem of whether Berlin was or was not to become a police state. Since the police headquarters was in the Soviet Sector, the police president (a Russian-appointed officer captured at Stalingrad), and all personnel officers, as well as many of the other top police officials, were communists, the Western Powers found they almost had no control over the police, even in their own sectors. A reorganization of the police department was proposed in the Kommandatura, but agreement could not be reached. A compromise agreement at the Allied Control Council, however, gave the Western Powers on October 4, 1946, control in their indi- vidual sectors through the establishment of sector assistants to the police president. This was closely followed by the city-wide elections in which the Russians and their communist collaborators dis- covered that they polled less than 20% of the votes. 63 PUBLIC SAFETY appointed by the Russians to command the uniformed police. It soon developed that Heinrich was no more palatable to the communists than he had been to the Nazis, and in the late summer of 1945, Heinrich disappeared and has not been heard from since. The vice-president of the police was such an unsavory character that even the Russians agreed to his dismissal without argument. Then came a tug-of-war over the individual to replace the dis- charged vice-president. Tussle Over New Police Deputy Two candidates were outstanding—Dr. Johannes Stumm, the next ranking official (chief of the Prdsidialabteilung), and Hans Seidel, the personnel officer of both the uniformed police and the police presidium. Agreement could not be reached, since the Russians vetoed Stumm and the Western Powers would not agree to Seidel, who had already begun to show his true colors as a communist hatchet man. The Russians demanded a four-power investi- gation of Stumm, which resulted in a unanimous decision that cleared him. The U.S. delegation then brought charges against Seidel, which resulted in four-power agreement that Seidel be discharged and not reemployed by the Berlin police in any capacity whatsoever, though the discharge should not otherwise adversely effect his future. Still the Russians would not agree to Stumm as vice-president. Though later they agreed to pay him the salary of vice-president and he actually performed the duties of that position, he was never given that title. Stumm was another pre-Nazi official The uniformed Berlin policewoman, a post-war novelty to this city, v/orks as hard as her male counterpart. After the 1946 city elections came a six-month period in which the elected city government was getting itself organized and attempting to learn to function under its temporary constitution, in spite of Soviet opposition and the disruptive tactics of the 19.8% elected communists. Also seriously disruptive to the Magistrals work was an over- whelming majority of subordinate officials in almost every branch of the government, holdovers from the government originally appointed by the Soviets (in May-June, 1945), who could not be removed because of the ever-present Soviet veto power. Communists Seek Police Rule Running through these first two years, one can now see the first signs of the Russian-communist deter- mination for absolute control of the police. An old time German police official named Heinrich, who was discharged when the Nazis came to power, was Relation between Population and Area and Police Department Personnel (All figures as of Jan. 1, 1949, unless otherwise noted) Popu- O, Police Dpt.Personnel Area in sq. miles 0/ /o Uniformed Police War Damage to Housing in %*) lation /o Number per Number per totally repair- usable 1000pop. sq. mile destroyed able Steglitz 145,250 15 463 3.2 12.3 15 394 26 29.2 9.9 60.9 Zehlendorf 81,235 8 444 5.4 27.2 34 384 11 8.8 11.8 79.4 Kreuzberg 205,026 20 816 4.0 4.0 5 698 174 39.9 15.1 45.0 Tempelhof 114,861 11 387 3.4 15.6 19 321 19 18.3 19.5 62.2 Schoeneberg 176,633 18 667 3.8 4.7 6 555 92 30.8 16.0 53.2 Neukoelln 277,843 28 659 2.4 17.2 21 543 26 11.8 10.5 77.7 Traffic SQ & Amt — 464 — — — 425 — — — — Auxil. Police 1,015 1,015 — — — US Sector 1,000,853 100 4,915 4.9 81.0 100 4,335 53 21.9 13.2 64.9 US Sector 1,000,853 49 31 4,915 4.9 81.0 24 4,335 53 21.9 13.2 64.9 British Sector 621,410 30 19 3,360 5.4 64.0 19 2,959 46 26.8 8.0 65.2 French Sector 433,537 21 13 1,913 4.4 42.7 12 1,712 40 13.8 7.9 78.3 Western Berlin 2,055,800 100 11,889 5.3 187.7 55 (9,006) 9,214**) 50 Soviet Sector 1,196,555 37 (?) — 155.5 45 — 16.3 7.2 76.5 Berlin 3,252,355 100 16,141***) 5.0 343.2 100 11,882***) 35 | 19.5 9.3 71.2 Note: Population as reported by Magistral Bureau of Statistics, *) Official survey 1946, Berliner Statistik , Heft 3, 1947, pg. 47 **) Including Police Hq. Personnel ***) Latest available figures, 1948, July PUBLIC SAFETY G4 Trend of Crime by Category in Berlin 1946—1948 PERCENT CHANGES IN ANNUAL CRIME RATES US-SECTOR CRIME RATE PRORATED TO CITY TOTAL NOTE : US-SECTOR POPULATION EQUALS 31% OF CITY POPULATION CRIME CATEGORES PRORATED TO TOTAL CRIMES CLEARANCE OF CRIME whom the Russians had reappointed, and they were taking no more chances. With the disappearance of Heinrich in late 1945, another pre-Nazi official, Hans Kanig, was appointed to command the uniformed police. Kanig was a seeker of personal aggrandizement and was neither overly intelligent nor particularly courageous. Certainly he was not a good administrator. Though none of the four powers wanted to support Kanig, the Western Powers were forced to oppose his dismissal, since it was obvious by the time this matter came to a climax in late 1947 and early 1948 that unanimous agreement on a suc- cessor would not be reached and the deputy, an old line communist, would automatically take his place. Finally, in early 1948, Kanig was called to a Russian office and frightened into leaving. Police Chief Attends Kommandatura Sessions During all this period and well into the third year, the Public Safety Committee of the Komman- datura was unique among ail the committees, in that the police president, Markgraf, attended all the meetings of the committee and was given advance copies of the agenda, so that he could come prepared to give advice or answer questions. Only when confidential matters were discussed was he excluded. In early 1947, one of the western representatives suggested that perhaps the police president should be excluded, except when the committee or one of its members specifically asked for him. This suggestion was violently opposed by the Russian member, but early in 1948 the Russians reversed their decision and demanded his exclusion. The Western Powers could only agree, because his presence did not conform to normal practice. There- after, the police president could attend only when summoned by one or more members of the com- mittee through the chairman. This was the first sign of decreasing confidence in their appointee on the part of the Russians and it was brought on because police president Mark- graf seemed gradually to be realizing that it was the western representatives who wanted a democratic police department and increased pay, pensions, and the necessary equipment and supplies to permit the building of a good police force, and that it was always the Russian representative who vetoed improvements proposed by the other committee members. From the very beginning of the Occupation in 1945, people have disappeared from Berlin. How many thousands of these were kidnappings or Teamwork between American MPs and the police of Berlin's western sectors since 1945 succeeded well. 65 PUBLIC SAFETY the police department. The results, when finally announced on June 4th, proved that the commu- nists had not been able to gain control of the in- dividual policemen. Communist Election Defeat Of 233 works councillors elected, 131 were non- communists, 12 of no party, and 90 communists. Only four communists were elected in the western sectors, while 32 non-communists were elected from the central offices in the Soviet Sector. On July 26, 1948, the Oberburgermeisler suspend- ed Markgraf for repeated insubordination and appointed Dr. Stumm in his place. Stumm on July 28th announced he would set up his presidium in FriesenstraBe in the U.S. Sector as of August 2nd and ordered all presidium employees to report there for duty on that date. Approximately 1,500 of the 2,000 persons concerned reported as ordered. The police department was thus the first agency of the city government to be split. Political demonstration: a recurring Berlin police problem. illegal arrests will perhaps never be known. Some, no doubt, were people who felt endangered and simply left, purposely leaving no trace. But so many cases have been traced directly to the Russians and Soviet-controlled po- lice agencies that there can be no doubt that the great majority of the thousands who have disappeared did so on Russian-communist orders, or were abducted. In the past 18 months, numerous attempts at kidnapping have been averted by the western sector po- lice and in several cases the would- be kidnappers have been arrested and sentenced to prison. Without exception they were members of Soviet Sector or Soviet Zone police agencies. The period from mid-1947 to mid- 1948 was notable only for the in- creasingly difficult attitude of the Soviets toward all public safety matters. They refused to agree to better police communications, they attacked all high-ranking police officials who were not communists, and they argued procedural matters for hours in the Public Safety Com- mittee. Less and less progress was made during this period, until finally there was none. The Soviets and the police pres- ident were planning to have the Soviet Sector Assistant resign "be- cause of poor health". The western representatives discovered the real reason to be a previous criminal record of four convictions and cur- rent connections with a gang of criminals. When this was brought out in the committee meeting on May 13, 1948, the Russian delegation walked out of the meeting in anger. In the early part of 1948, works council elections were held within Crime Trend, U.S. Sector, of Offenses Known to Police PUBLIC SAFETY 66 Offenses Reported To Police U. S. Sector 6-Monith Period (J’an.—June) 1946—1949 controlled police, and many of these points during the final months were actually physically blockaded with heavy barriers, it was necessary to place west sector policemen just inside the western borders facing these posts. That there were very few border incidents between these opposing posts is a tribute to the training and level-headedness of the police. The effectiveness of the western counter-blockade in Berlin was also largely due to police watch- fulness. There were numerous occasions when the police had to be on duty around the clock for many days at a time, but on each such occasion their duties were performed in a very commendable manner. UGO Rail Strike: Another Police Problem Hardly had the blockade been lifted on May 12th, when the railroad strike started (see page 119). Since 1945, east sector railway police had patrolled the railway and S-Bahn stations even in the western sectors. In the first three days of the strike there were numerous outbreaks of violence between rail- way police and the strikers. Several of these resulted in shooting by the railway police, during which one person was killed and at least 20 injured. After three days of disorder the western police were ordered to assure the maintenance of law and order on all railway property in the western sec- tors. They moved into all stations on May 24th and ordered the railway police to leave. The latter left peacefully and there was no further violence during the remainder of the strike. Throughout the four post-war years a police de- partment has been built from the ground up. While performing its normal functions of maintaining law and order in abnormal years (a more than full-time CLASS X CRIMES CLASS! CRIMES AGGRAVATED THEFT OTHER THEFT September was marked by communist riots at the City Hall in the Soviet Sector, where the Magistrat and City Assembly were still attempting to conduct their business. Since the Markgraf police made no attempt to control this violence, one of the mayors arranged privately for western sector police to come to the next meeting to provide protection for the city government. The City Hall was surrounded by Markgraf police and Soviet troops, and 47 of the west sector police- men were arrested and held without trial for approximately six weeks. Finally, all but three were released. These three were tried in a Soviet military court, two of whom were sentenced to six months and the third to one year in prison. Heavy Demands On Police During Blockade The blockade of the western sectors was in- creasingly tightened by the Soviets and it made more and more demands on the police. Many unusual events requiring police action occurred during this period, but only a few of the more important highlights are listed here. Throughout the blockade it was the task of the police to prevent illegal actions of the Soviet Sector and zonal police within the western sectors. When the counter-blockade was ordered, it fell to the police to enforce these restrictions, and they did it well. Since almost every street and road entering the western sectors from either the Soviet Sector or Zone was blocked by Soviet soldiers and Soviet- Coid, hunger, despair make a crime-provoking climate. Yet Berlin's post-war record has been as good, per capita, as that of most cities in the United States. 67 PUBLIC SAFETY job for any police department anywhere), the de- partment has been buffeted from all sides and con- fronted with a variety and volume of problems which few police departments have ever faced in so short a period of time. Statistics Record Growing Police Skill That the police were and are today performing their normal functions very well can be seen from available statistics. Records for 1945 are so few and unreliable that no attempt is made to show them. Records for the Soviet Sector have not been available since the split in the police; therefore, only statistics of the U.S. Sector are shown, though the same trends may be assumed for all three western sectors. It should suffice here to mention only one item— total crimes known to the police in the U.S. Sector during the first six months of 1946-1949, inclusive. Total crimes in the U.S. Sector in the first six months of 1946 numbered 24,618; there were 27,028 in 1947; 27,782 in 1948; and 17,950 in 1949. The total for 1949 is 27°/o below 1946 and 35% below 1948. The dread secret Gestapo of the Nazi police state is fading into memory. In its place in Berlin today is the friendly, helpful “corner cop", not very different from the one at Main and Market in Everytown, U. S. A. Relation Between Offenses Known and Offenses Cleared, U.S. Sector Every police recruit now receives three months' training in a special police school in the British Sector before starting regular duty- All those who did not undergo such train- ing before they began their duty in the years 1945-1948 must now complete this course. There are courses of the same length for superior officers, for detectives, and for administrative police. The police in the U.S. and British Sectors have two-way radio patrol cars and these will soon be expan- ded to the French Sector. Other types of communication are almost complete and there is adequate motor transportation and other equipment. The department is com- pletely armed with pistols, and be- fore winter every uniformed mem- ber of the police will have received a complete new uniform. On June 17, 1949, following the assignment of greater authority to the Magistrat in most fields, the Kommandantura also made the city authorities responsible for the main- tenance of the police force. The Allied order pointed out that the police are individually responsible for their actions and are subject to the rule of law, that the force is re- sponsible for its own administration, and, with the Gestapo crimes of the Nazi era in mind, it stressed that there would be "no secret police .... or force of police other than is al- ready in being". The city fire department, while PUBLIC SAFETY 68 not completely equipped as it should be, has adequate manpower and equipment which has, considering conditions in Berlin since 1945, permit- ted it to do a more than adequate job. Two sets of figures will suffice to illustrate both the elimination of fire hazards and the improvement in fire fighting efficiency: The estimated fire losses in the U.S. Sector in 1947 were 4,282,624 Marks, but in 1948 this figure Transport Available to German Police U.S. Sector, Berlin There seemed little left to burn in the bomb- and shell-de- stroyed German capital of 1945, yet the Berlin Fire Depart- ment has since been kept adequately and successfully busy. affected. Complete control of the fire department has been returned to the city government. Denazification Nearing Completion Denazification in Berlin has never been conducted under the same rules as in the zones, because the Soviets at the Allied Kommandatura refused to implement ACA Directive 38. This directive, in the zones, resulted in the passing of the Law for Liberation by the Germans. The amnesties which were granted in the zones were later granted in Berlin. July 31st, approximately, will have seen the com- pletion of all pending appeals except those of approx- imately 3,000 persons in special categories, whose cases are pending before city-wide specialist com- missions. After that date, the residue of denazification will be a matter for the city government to handle. was only 1,548,505 Marks. Deaths from fire in all of Berlin in 1947 were 125 (more than 70 of these died in one restaurant fire), but in 1948 only 10. The tire department headquarters is in the U.S, Sector and, while it also was split as the other government agencies, it was one of the last to be DENAZIFICATION APPEAL CASES AS OF JULY 12, 1949 Borough Commissions level Boroughs of U. S. Sector T otal Cases filed Total Dis De- nied posed Up- held of Cases transf. to Magistral or for file only Back- log Total 48,210 47,596 8,271 39,053 5,272 614* * These will have been completed by approximately July 31, 1949. Sector Commission level Total cases filed Total Di Denied sposed o 1 Upheld j 1 Cases transf. to Magistral or Screening Sub-Section Back- log 3,174 2,656 105 2,401 150 518 Magistral Commission level Magis- trat Comm. Total cases filed Total Dispc Denied >sed of Upheld Trans- ferred Back- log Total 5,245 2,106 49 2,018 39 3,139 Two-way radio patrol cars have improved the speed of operation and the efficiency of West Berlin police. 69 PUBLIC SAFETY Weekly periodicals in Berlin—/haf treat of religion, of politics, and of burlesque—were regularly available on blockade newsstands to inform and divert a besieged population. Paper supplies, as for daily newspapers and books, were flown in by Air Lift. But a free, critical press is one of the underlying purposes of Military Government; so newsprint—along with food, fuel and medicine—was a priority cargo. (Over-printed figures are those of weekly circulation.) INFORMATION SERVICES 70 The Cold War has been bitterly iought in Berlin's East- and West-licensed press. INFORMATION SERVICE* West Berlin is the only place behind the Iron Curtain where the printed and spoken word is effectively free. Hence the high-level priority assigned by Military Government to its reorienta- tion mission. Hence nearly ten thousand tons of air-bridged newsprint to keep the democratic printing pres- ses of the U.S., British and French Sectors of Berlin rolling through the block- ade, in which the throttling of West-licensed press was a collateral objective of the Soviets. Hence the expanding U.S. Information Centers of Berlin with their library, reading room, lecture, and exhibition services for a half-million visitors each year; thousands of miles of motion picture film documenting the Berlin story for the people of all the world. So, too, the strong challenging voice of the American radio station in Berlin, RIAS, reaching further and more effect- ively each year to the still-hopeful, little people behind the Iron Curtain of Soviet silence, party-line half truths, and communist distortion. Berlin Sector possesses the only remaining In- formation Services Branch of U.S. Military Govern- ment in Germany still charged with the full im- plementation of Military Government Regulations, Title 21. Beginning as the Information Services Con- trol Detachment on July 6, 1945, it has evolved through the early occu- pational, denazification, and quadripartite phases of the inevitable mutable mission of Military Gov- ernment in Berlin. Within the last year the Branch has changed its designation from''Informa- tion Control” to "Infor- mation Services”. Its Re- search and Screening Sec- tion which was so impor- tant in the denazification phase was, in the same per- iod, transferred to Public Safety Branch; and its Theater and Music Section to the Education Branch for the same reasons of shifting emphasis in miss- ion, arising out of current developments in Berlin. Excerpts from Mil. Gov. Regulations, Title 21 (Information Services) : "Basic Policy Regulating German Information Services: U. S. Military Government holds that free access to public information, freedom of expression and the free exchange of ideas throughout Germany and between Germany and other nations are essential to the establish- ment of a sound and healthy democratic society in which the individual German, made conscious of his responsibilities as a citizen, is encouraged to express his convictions and to take an active and intelligent part in public affairs . . . "The press will be protected from governmental domination or domination by special interests. "The prerogatives of a free press in obtaining and publishing information of public interest will be guaranteed. "There will be no arbitrary interference by the police or other administrative bodies in the free flow and dissemination of news and printed matter . . . "In addition to establishing and carrying out procedures for effecting the reconstitution, control and guidance of German-operated public informational media, Information Services personnel will plan and carry out certain overt activities designed to further the democratic orientation of Germany, and to foster the assimilation of the German people into the society of peaceful nations through the revival of international cultural relations." 71 INFORMATION SERVICES The past year also marked almost complete liquidation of the Monuments and Fine Arts Section and the creation of a new section charged with daily evidential documentation of the Soviet pressure pattern exerted against Berlin. Because Information Services Branch deals ex- clusively with the minds of a people calloused by totalitarian propaganda for nearly two decades, the detailed story of its evolving functions and mission is highly technical. Newspapermen and public relation specialists, for instance, would find a meaty volume in details of the East-West newspaper war during the Berlin blockade alone. For radio men there is another potential text book in the development of RIAS (Rundtunk im amerikanischen Sektor) and its effect- ive techniques. But for the purposes of this unofficial report the following presentations give at least an outline of the American effort to develop and ensure a free press and radio for the people of the quartered city. PRESS AND PUBLICATIONS By the beginning of July 1946, after one year of U.S. occupation in Berlin, the Press and Publi- cations Section had licensed 26 publishers. These included 14 book publishers, 11 publishers of peri- odicals and one newspaper publisher. At the present time, three years later, there have been 56 licenses issued, and the licensees have pro- duced 851 books and pamphlets, are publishing 65 periodicals, and two newspapers, Dei Tagesspiegel and Der Abend. The periodicals fall into the following categories: Youth 2 Women 6 Illustrated 1 Professional and trade .... 36 Miscellaneous literary .... 4 Religious 15 Political 4 The books and pamphlets published include text- books, scientific books, novels, art books, and approximately 40 translations of American authors. During the past year, this section has maintained a Magazine Servicing Unit by which articles printed in American magazines have been made available to Berlin publishers. It is also possible for any publisher to request an article on practically any subject concerning American life, economics, poli- tics, etc. Such articles have been secured through the New York Field Office. Additionally, a Publishers' Reading Room has been established, where approx- imately 150 American magazines are kept on file for the use of German publishers. A limited library Press, film, radio and the theater: these are the mass media which reach all Germans, and which Military Gov- ernment has used energetically during the past four years to diffuse its theme of responsible citizenship in a world community. Proof of the campaign's effectiveness has been the resolute stand of West Berliners against the pressure and threats of communist-coated totalitarianism. INFORMATION SERVICES 72 of available translation rights is also maintained in the Reading Room. Four Berlin newspaper or magazine publishers have been sent to the United States on orien- tation trips. Two other publishers were proces- sed and were ready to leave, but the serious financial difficulties for Berlin publishers since March 20, 1949, made it impossible for them to go. Also under the juris- diction of the Press and Publications Section is the Deutschei Verlag, the largest printing plant in Berlin. This printing house, which was founded by the Ullstein brothers and which, before the Nazi regime, was the biggest publishing house in Europe, was nothing but a damaged shell when American occupation troops came into Berlin in 1945. The Nazi government had acquired this plant in 1934 and made it one of their chief propaganda mills. The Russians, during the period when they were in Berlin alone, had taken all movable and working equipment out of the plant for trans- portation to the east zone or to Russia. It was necessary to equip the plant from bombed and rusted machinery after a long and difficult process of repair. At the time the American occupation be- gan in Berlin there were only two linotype ma- chines in the plant in operating order. There are now 47. The plant is now equipped with 75 cm ro- tary presses, 63 cm ro- tary presses, and it can produce letterpress, off- set and rotogravure printing for newspapers, periodicals and books. The daily newspapers Der Tagesspiegel (U.S.), Der Abend (U.S.), Die Neue Zeitung (overt U.S.), Die Welt (overt British), Der Tag (British) are all printed at the Deutscher Verlag. Approximately 60 percent of the book publishing and at least 50 percent of the periodical publishing in the three western sectors of Berlin is done in this plant. Because of restitution claims on the part of the Ullstein brothers, the plant is still operated under U.S. Property Control. Berlin publishing, which had been restricted since the occupation by limited paper .supplies, faced an Front-line newsstand: this kiosk, just west of the Soviet Sector border in central Berlin, is one of the farthest points east in Europe whete the free, uncen- sored press can be found openly and permanently displayed. PRE-BLOCKADE CIRCULATION Weekly Circulation of U.S. Sector Newspapers under the Blockade 73 INFORMATION SERVICES to Western Berlin except through the black market, U.S. Sector publishers were dependent for paper upon the Bavarian mills and one mill in Wiirttem- berg-Baden, Paper from West Zones When paper went on the free list in July, 1948, the mills were naturally disposed to favor customers in their normal trade area, and even without the blockade Military Government intervention would have been necessary to obtain enough paper for the normal needs of Berlin publishers. Despite the blockade and the consequently reduced demands of Berlin publishing, it was necessary for the German Economic Commission in Frankfurt to order the mills to supply Berlin with the necessary paper. With the beginning of the blockade, it was neces- sary for the three Western Powers through the Allied Cultural Affairs Committee to make provisions for enough paper to keep the newspapers of Western Berlin alive. It was decided at that time to pool all paper stocks and to allocate supplies with the intent to make them last until September 1st. Special Newsprint Rolls by Air Lift Meanwhile, investigation was made as to the possibility of bringing newsprint into Berlin by Air Lift. It was found that by getting the mills to make newsprint rolls of approximately 500 lbs. weight it would be possible to keep the newspapers in Berlin supplied by air. An allocation of 210 tons of newsprint per week was set up for Berlin, and the airlifting of paper was begun in the last weeks of August. At no time during the blockade did any West Berlin newspaper Once one of the largest publishing houses in Europe, the Deutscher Verlag had to rebuild from bombed scrap. Today it handles over hall the press, periodical, and book printing trade of the three western sectors. increasingly difficult situation in July, 1948, with the imposition of the blockade. Prior to and during the war Berlin publishers depended upon Saxony for their paper supplies. Since this is in the Russian Zone of Occupation and since even before the blockade no paper supplies came from the east zone US DAILY LIFT 7S cm “ " 63 " STOCKS ON HAND 75 cm " " " 63 - Newsprint Air Lift and Stock-Pile (approx, to June, 49) for West-Licensed Press, Berlin INFORMATION SERVICES 74 11 OPERATION BACKFIRE" What Six Months of Soviet Blockade Did to the Circulation of Soviet Licensed Press and Publications in West Sectors and Zones. DAILY BULK DELIVERY NEWSMPER SUBSCRIPTION PERIODICAL SUBSCRIPTION DELIVERIES BY NAIL DELIVERIES BY HAIL In July and August for all Berlin; September to January west sectors only. (Inset in left-hand chart indicates monthly totals.) Western Germany. miss an edition, although at one time (during the foggy period in November, 1948) newsprint stocks of 75 cm paper, which three of the western-licensed dailies used, were reduced to a precarious six tons. At the beginning of the blockade, book and period- ical publishers were told that very little, if any, paper could be brought in for their enterprises. It was possible during the blockade to allocate small amounts of newsprint to periodical publishers, and stocks of paper that had been impounded at the beginning of the occupation were allocated to book publishers. By February, 1949, however, it was possible to airlift 60 tons of book and periodical paper per month. During the first few months of the blockade, western sector publishers sold their newspapers and periodicals for West Marks. The heavy encroach- ment of Soviet-licensed papers and periodicals which could be sold for the cheaper East Marks made it necessary to find some means by which at least the newspapers could sell for the latter. The proposal of allowing the newspapers to convert 25 percent of their total East Mark income into West Marks at a rate of 1 : 1 was approved by the Kommandatura, put into effect on Sep- tember 1, and lasted until the currency reform on March 20, 1949. It was more difficult to show the necessity of a similar move for the periodical publishers. But in December, by agreement with the Economics De- partment of the Magistral, 900,000 East Marks were converted for periodical publishers in the western sectors. The situation of the book publishers was less acute, however, because (1) there was very little paper available in Berlin for them and (2) all of them who could move the major part of their publishing program to the western zones during the blockade were aided in so doing by Military Government. Soviets Bar Western-Licensed Press From the beginning of the blockade in June, 1948, there were constant activities on the part of the Soviet Military Administration to bar all western- licensed publications from the east sector and zone. Soviet-controlled distribution agencies were set up which refused to handle western sector publications and the east sector and zone Postzeitungsamt was closed to western publications. In spite of this move, a considerable circulation of newspapers, periodicals, and books was maintained in the eastern sector and zone, so long as it was possible for western sector publishers to pay a part of their wages and to purchase a part of their supplies in East Marks. West Berlin Press in Financial Difficulties The currency reform of March 20, 1949, had the effect of confining the Western Berlin publishing market to the three western sectors and a small percentage of sales in the western zones. The conse- quent effect upon the publishing industry of Western Berlin has been disastrous, and unless some means Soviet "return to sender" slips which accompanied rejected western-licensed newspapers. The serum of truth and the disease of communism cannot cohabit. 75 INFORMATION SERVICES can be found within the next few weeks to make the eastern market available to Western Berlin publishers, all except a few of them will be forced to go out of business. To the submission date of this report, four periodicals had. to suspend publication because of these hnancial difhculties. One periodical, Insulaner, important because of its political signihcance, had to be rehnanced and efforts are now being made to give assistance to Western Berlin newspaper publishers. FILM The great problem in the Berlin film industry when U.S. Military Government began to function was to find competent German operators, artists, and technicians who were not Nazis. This was a difficult task, since the German film industry for then years had been a virtual Reich monopoly. Individuals were found, however, who could qualify to be licensed for production and distribution. The next step was to procure German capital to enable the producers to make new films. This, too, was finally accomplished. The major difficulty that could not be overcome in the divided city was that of studio facilities. The finest studio in Germany was the new UFA studio located in Babelsberg in the Russian Zone. The Babelsberg studio is occupied by DEFA, the East German him monopoly. The only functioning studio in the U.S. Sector of Berlin was the original UFA studio at Tempelhof. It had always been small; the bombings of Tempel- hof airheld made it even smaller. Most successful post-war documentary film in Germany was produced during the Soviet blockade by the U.S.- sponsored company Zeit im Film, entitled "Luftbriicke". Tempelhof studio was rebuilt and has been in continual operation. Unfortunately, it cannot handle more than one feature production at a time. As a result much of the feature work, which had always been centered in Berlin, has moved since the end of the war to Munich and other areas. As part of the UFA organization there was AFIFA, a large film laboratory, near the Tempelhof studio. Although badly bomb-damaged, it has been restored and is now a first class him plant capable of processing 8,000 meters of picture negative and 10,000 meters of sound negative daily, and 64,000 meters of 35 mm positive and 12,000 meters of 16 mm positive per day. One large aspect of him work in Germany, as in other countries where English is not the language, is the synchronization of American and British movies into the native tongue. Tempelhof studios rebuilt new synchronization rooms until now it can handle the synchronization of three to four feature length films per month. Mosaik Film Studio was rebuilt and re-equipped and is under lease to MPEA (Motion Picture Export Association), the combined U.S. him industry in Germany, to synchronize features and shorts. In- addition, Mosaik has its own complete laboratories, so that all of the work can be done in one establish- ment. In May, 1947, the Documentary Film Unit of In- formation Services Division, OMGUS, moved into Tempelhof studio, occupying offices, and cutting rooms Production of the 20th Century-Fox him "Two Corridors Easi", first U*S. featuie film made entirely in Germany. INFORMATION SE RVICES 76 and renting the projection and synchronization facilities as it needed them. Special Blockade Newsreel Distributed During the blockade, the Documentary Film Unit, in cooperation with Film Section, OMG BS, pro- duced and distributed a special Berlin newsreel. This newsreel had a great significance to the German citizens in the western sectors of the city in terms of morale, political information, and education. The special newsreel terminated with the end of the blockade, but the film is anything but dead for it remains one of the most inter- esting historical visual docu- ments produced during this period. At the same time, the Docu- mentary Film Unit produced other films, some of which had a special significance to Ber- lin. All of these films have been exhibited in Berlin with great success, especially Nnrnberg, the story of the war crime trial; The Bridge, a film about the Air Lift; and Between East and West, which gives the political and economic background of the Cold War in Berlin. A crack team of newsreel cameramen has always been maintained in Berlin for Welt im Film, the overt Anglo- American newsreel. This team operates under Film Section, OMG-BS, and records the events of Berlin. One of the largest problems was not only the re-opening and registering of the motion picture theaters, but also keeping them in operation. The same was true of the distributors who ran the film exchanges. The latter had to have films to rent to the former. The problem was: what films could be shown to the German public? Certainly not the films made by Nazis which reflected Nazi ideology. In order to prevent this, all films were ordered to be turned into Film Sec- tion where they could be checked. At one time there were almost 15,000 films in the vaults. Since then the number has diminished. In the meanwhile the struggl- ing, newly-establish- ed German producers were not turning out enough products to keep the distributors and film houses in business. Military Government asked the U.S. movie in- dustry to send films suitable for German audiences. The film industry obliged by setting up the MPEA (Motion Picture Export Association), a legal combine of all the major film companies. Pictures were rushed into synchronization and to the theaters where, for the first time in ten years, German audiences could see films made in the United States. The French and British did the same with their films. Such a program had many benefits: it kept the theaters open and helped get the German film in- dustry started—useful during the blockade winter months—it provided theaters where our news reel, Welt im Film, and oui documentaries could be seen—an im- portant phase of Military Government's reorientation and education program. There are now 76 movie theaters in operation in the U.S. Sector of Berlin with a seating capacity of 34,765. The blockade played havoc with theater attendance; at one time it dropped to approximately 30 percent of capacity but the average has been 50 percent. During the full blockade it also cost the theaters more to operate, for elec- tric power rationing forced them either to close down or buy generators and gasoline to run the generators. Since the end of the blockade, theater attendance has not increased. This was anticipated, for theater attendance drops off during summer months and picks up in October. There is a large number of films at the German exchanges but unfor- tunately,most of them are of poorquality, It seems likely, however, that there will be more U.S. films available, since some of the major American companies are leaving MPEA and starting their own synchronization and distribution in Germany. MGM has already contracted with Film Studio Tempelhof to synchronize 18 films in the next five months. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Studios recently began the filming of Two Corridors East at Tempel- hof, the first wholly German-made U.S. film. Theater billboards have re- turned to Berlin. Poster in upper center advertizes a post-war satire: “The Thou- sand-Year Reich— 1933-1945''. German Cinema Attendance, U.S. Sector 77 INFORMATION SERVICES RADIO The story of RIAS begins with the organization of the Diahtiunk by Information Branch, OMG-BS, on February 7, 1946. The so-called wired radio or Diahtiunk was brought into being because of the unwillingness of the Soviet Occupation Authorities to permit the Western Allies to participate in the broadcasting or direction of the Berliner Rundfunk (Radio Berlin). As the date of the first post-war elections in Berlin approached, i't was realized that the non-communist parties were being dis- criminated against by Soviet authorities in the broadcasting field just as elsewhere. On September 4, 1946, RIAS came into being as a radio sender, primarily through the efforts of the Information Control Di- vision, OMGUS, which provided a 1,000-watt transmitter. In the begin- ning of 1947, power was increased to 2,500 watts and on July 1, 1947, a 20,000-watt station went on the air. The trans- mitter was a mobile unit captured from the Ger- man Wehrmacht in Italy and, though old and in- efficient, increased the effective RIAS range to about 75 km. Considerable difficulty was experienced and is still being experienced in the matter of frequency. RIAS transmissions were on assigned European frequencies including Flo- rence, Belgrade, and the Norwegian Sender. Operation "Back-Talk" On February 12, 1948, General Clay announced his policy of exposing the Russian brand of com- munism and created the position of Director of RIAS. Operation "Back-Talk" has been most power- fully implemented in the subsequent period. The original studios located in the telephone office in the U.S. Sector of Berlin were exceedingly primitive and because of the lack of facilities permitted only a limited number of transmission hours per day. On March 1, 1948, RIAS increased its time on the air from eight hours daily to thir- teen hours. U.S. Army engineers rushed to com- pletion a new modern broadcasting plant lo- cated in Schoneberg, U.S. Sector, and it was officially opened on July 6, 1948. In the meantime, Soviet occupation auth- orities had clamped down the blockade. RIAS immediately began trans- mission 24 hours a day in order to provide radio service for the people of Berlin at any time they had power; and second- ly, at the request of the Air Force, to provide a homing beacon for the pilots carrying neces- sary materials for the besieged city. Concurrent with the improvement of the tech- nical and physical plant, an all-out effort was made to make RIAS the spearhead in the drive against the communists and to provide the democratic elements of Germany with a voice powerful enough to keep up the spirits and hopes of the vast majority of German citizens who were opposed to a new dictatorship. This was accomplished by the careful selection of top-notch commentators, by broadcasts from par- liamentary sessions, by the introduction of the political cabaret, round-tables, open forums, and direct broadcasting from political assemblies, meet- ings and conferences. In addition, a far stronger news- and repertorial department was organized with monitoring service on Russia and its satellite neighbors, which permit- ted RIAS to anticipate political actions and to coun- teract their propaganda attack. In the accomplishment of this mission, RIAS has seen its reporters kidnapped by the Soviet police and beaten up by communists in the City Hall. Most of the commentators have been subjected to threats and intimidation as well as personal attacks. The American Director of RIAS has been repeatedly The Voice Behind the Curtain Chart shows the expansion of RIAS coverage: 1 — primary area before July 1, 1949; II — secondary area; III — new primary area of the 100,000 watt transmitter; IV — new secondary area deep into Poland, and reaching even the smallest radio sets in Soviet-occupied Germany. In addition to supplying information and entertain- ment to the blockaded Berlin population, RIAS has been the spearhead of America's efforts to share the truth with the suppressed people of Eastern Europe. INFORMATION SERVICES 78 attacked in the Soviet press and radio. The ef- fectiveness of RIAS as a propaganda instrument, however, may be judged by the following statistics: In the winter of 1947/48 RIAS, by independent surveys, was found to have 34°/o of the listening audience at any given time. By March of 1948, the survey showed 56%; in October 1948, 80% and in July 1949, 91%. Accompanying this steady rise in the effectiveness and popularity of the station there has been a steady decline in the Soviet-controlled radio instruments, including Radio Berlin. Reading room facilities in the U.S. Information Center have helped thousands of Berliners to become better acquainted with the meaning of American democracy. German staff af approximately 600 and an American staff of four. The effectiveness of its operation from the economic standpoint may be measured by com- parison to other German stations: Radio Berlin, the key Soviet station, has a staff of more than 1,300 and a budget exceeding 30 mil- lion Marks per year. This is also true of Radio Hamburg. Radio Munich and Radio Frankfurt have staffs of approximately 800 and budgets in access of 20 million Marks. RIAS, with its staff of 600 and a budget of ap- proximately one million Marks a month, broad- casts more hours per day, more effectively, in a more dangerous situation than any station in Germany. U.S. INFORMATION CENTER U.S. Information Center, Berlin, saw the light of day on February 28, 1946, when a library of 1,200 volumes, all of them in English, was opened in rooms in Schoneberg. Since then the number of books has grown to 19,000 in the English language and 4,000 in German. "Man in the Street" surveys have kept Military Govern- ment in close touch with public opinion trends. RIAS has become such a powerful factor that its broadcasts must be most carefully controlled, since they definitely affect the thoughts and actions of the majority of residents within the listening area. This area at present embraces a part of Germany includ- ing Berlin with a population of some 11 millions. Shortly after the administrative transfer of RIAS from OMG-BS to OMGUS, on June 15, 1949, a new 100,000-watt transmitter was completed. When permission is granted for it to commence sending, the RIAS orbit will include a population group of some forty millions. RIAS, at the time of its transfer to OMGUS, had a Communist propaganaa in Berlin since the war's end has generally consisted of blocking main streets with Stalin's picture and of supplying irresponsible mobs with red banners, crude placards, and empty slogans. 79 INFORMATION SERVICES A lively and popular lecture and discussion program was initiated in the fall of 1946 and at the present time there is at least one activity every day in one of the centers or reading rooms. This policy of bringing our wares to the Berlin population has been more than justified. During the month of June, 1949, for example, the number of visitors to the three reading rooms was well over ten thousand. The blockade did not affect the number of books circulated nor the number of our activities. These, however, were held at an earlier hour to enable people to come by underground U-Bahn, though they had to return by S-Bahn, the overhead rail- way, which involved considerable time and energy. During the winter months many Berliners used the centers as a refuge from the blackout and the cold. This was to be expected and it was encouraged on humanitarian grounds. DOCUMENTATION SECTION How the Soviet policy of pressure has been applied to the people of Berlin and the western Occupation Powers is the story that the Docu- mentation Section of ISB has been putting together since July, 1948. It is represented by more than 800 displays. Included in its contents are translated newspaper articles, cartoons, periodicals, original photographs of evidential value, brochures, monographs, posters, stickers, legal documents, and significant official orders of the Soviet Military Administration and its subordinate organizations. Included also is the complete week-to-week story of Berlin under the blockade as told by Welt im Film and supplemented by news stills and documentary films on the same theme. The entire operation of the Documentation Sec- tion is devoted to describing in visual detail what the Soviet Military Government has done to Berlin and the pattern of that doing. MONUMENTS AND FINE ARTS Responsibility for the supervision and protection of seven monuments and fine arts' installations in the U.S. Sector was delegated to OMG-BS on March 16, 1947. In July of the same year, Information Services Branch was assigned the task of administering these monuments together with the attendant restitution work. At the beginning of the Berlin blockade in June, 1948, resti'tutional investigations of procedure had been cleared to the point where the section was a token operation of dwindling importance except for the seven remaining Monuments and Fine Arts in- stallations. These included: Prehistoric Museum, 110 Stresemann Slralie, Kreuzberg. Museum lur Volkerkunde fEthnological Museum), 23 Amim Allee, Berlin-Dahlem, Kunstbibliothek (Arts and Craft Library) 23 Arnim Allee, Berlin-Dahlem, Magazinbau of the Ethnological Museum, 23 Amim Allee, Berlin-Dahlem, Botanisches Museum, 69 Konigin Luise Strafle, Berlin- Dahlem. PreuBisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv (State Archives) 12-13 Archiv StraBe, Berlin-Dahlem, JagdschloB Grunewald (Hunting Lodge Grunewald). These buildings and their contents represented millions of Marks and many more millions in historic and artistic values. City elections of December 5, 1948, set up a responsible West-Berlin Magistral and eliminated East-thinking influences and pressures on monu- ments and fine arts installations in the U.S. Sector. Following the general U.S. policy of delegating responsibility and returning functions to German agencies whenever possible, OMG-BS turned back to the City of Berlin in May, 1949, administration of and responsibility for all these installations. A new section of the Magistral Educational. De- partment, created at the suggestion of U.S. Military Government, is now fully responsible for these in- stallations as well as all preliminary investigation on restitutional matters. Some damaged museums protected by Military Govern- ment after the war and later returned to German custody. Left: the 400-year old Jagdschloss Grune- wald; upper center: the Ethnological museum; be- low; the Prinz Albrecht Strasse Museum; right: the "Summer Castle" on Peacock Island on the Wannsee. INFORMATION SERVICES 80 Berliners hurry to exchange their Marks during the Currency Reform. FINANCE The history of Berlin city finances since July, 1945, may well be divided into two periods. The first was that covering the attempted quadripartite administration of the city; and the second was that following the break-up of the four-power Komman- datura and the complex era of a divided city. The first phase was especially characterized by the relative importance of political considerations in all high-level financial undertakings. From a purely economic and financial point of view, nego- tiations in the Kommandatura's Finance Committee during this time were primarily political and only secondarily practical. During the period of attempted quadripartite ad- ministration, negotiations were distinctly fruitless, insofar as the realization of U.S. Military Govern- ment objectives was concerned. In the field of finance, the ideological differences between East and West were particularly apparent. These differences were so extreme that there existed only the most meager basis for discussion or mutual understanding of most of the problems confronting the City of Berlin. When the first detachments of American para- troopers and tankmen entered Berlin on July 4, 1945, they found a great metropolis not only physically wrecked, but in a state of financial chaos. The degree of stagnation was not readily apparent because of the easy availability of inflated cur- rency and the fact that rationing procedures used during the war had been retained. Yet the city was indeed financially moribund, and strong measures were necessary to revive its economy. Berlin was operating without a budget. The newly-installed—and in many cases incompetent— German fiscal officials were unable to make head- way in their attempts to formulate a city budget under the existing confused situation. These conditions, however understandable in view of the catastrophic end of the war for Ger- many, were in sharp contrast to those normally prevailing in Berlin. In addition to tax receipts, the city's income had previously included rents from buildings owned by the central Reich administration and profits from the metropolitan public utilities. Before the end of the war, Berlin had been the only city in Germany which did not share in the distribution of federal revenues for the support of cities and towns. Berlin had always been self- supporting. A preliminary survey conducted by U.S. finance officers showed that taxes were being collected, on both national and municipal level, at pre-Occu- pation rates. There was no evidence of tax evasion, but collections were almost at a standstill, because all pre-Occupation bank accounts had been blocked by the Soviet authorities. All of the city’s banks were closed by order of the Soviet Commandant. In their stead, the Soviets had ordered the formation of a Berliner Stadtbank (later to become the Berliner Stadtkontor) and the Sparkasse der Stadt Berlin. These institutions were respectively intended to serve all commercial and savings requirements in the city. 81 FINANCE This clearing system permitted the transfer of funds upon the order of the Occupation Forces in the respective zones. The Berliner Stadtkontor acted as clearing house and all members kept accounts with this interzonal clearing office. The expenses for the management of the system were borne by the member banks in accordance with services rendered. The clearings represented the authorized trans- fers of goods between the zones, and unfortunately did not provide for either capital transfers or such essential current transactions as taxes, insurance premiums, etc. Closed Berlin Banks Probably no question that has come before the Finance Committee brought out the differences in thinking between East and West as clearly as that of the closed Berlin banks. The Soviet Commandant s authority to close the banks is unquestioned, as a 0 moratorium was prob- ably necessary. It was the question of reopening the banks and allowing their or- derly reorganization or liquidation, over which so much disagreement occurred. Two events did take place which gave cause for some optimism. The Finance Committee was finally able to agree on the establishment of a Collection Commission in April, 1947. The four-man commission, responsible only to the Kommandatura, was charged by very general instructions with the collection of outstand- ing loans and mortgages of closed Berlin banks. Army finance officers, in the early days of the Occu- pation, examine hoards of European currencies found in enormous quantities in the vaults of city banks. Soviet Financial Monopoly Both were entirely city-owned and the Western Allies were thus confronted with a monopolistic banking system that was already an accomplished fact. This condition was fur- ther aggravated by the fact that the Soviets were entirely satisfied with the arrangement and conveniently used their right of veto in the Kommandatura to pre- vent any alterations in the status quo. During repeated meetings of the Finance Commit- tee in 1946, 1947, and the spring of 1948, the Soviets effectively vetoed every effort by the Western Allies to establish a free, competitive banking system in Berlin. As the economic life of the city recovered, the Stadtkontor became, quite understandably, larger and more prosperous. It developed into an institu- tion of 69 branches and, after 1946, became a self- sustaining organization. This self-sufficiency, how- ever, was realized only because the Allied Kom- mandatura authorized the bank to make no interest payments on deposits, including savings deposits. In the spring of 1946 a limited system of bank clearings among the zones was established through the following ten institutions: Berlin Stadtkontor Bank Provinzialhank Mark Brandenburg, Potsdam Bank der Provinz Sachsen, Halle/Saale Sdchsische Landesbank, Dresden Landesbank Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Schwerin Landesbank Thiiringen, Weimar Reichsbankhauptstelle Hannover Reichsbankhauptstelle Hamburg Reichsbankhauptstelle Frankfurt/Main Reichsbankstelle Speyer DEPOSITS IN BERLIN BANKS Berliner Sparkasse Berliner Date Stadt- dev Stadt Volks- TOTAL kontor') Berlin bank (lOOO^M) (1000RM) (1000i?M) (1000RM) Dec. 31. 1945 990,234 91,312 — 1,081,546 June30,1946 1,825,769 167,806 11,445 2,005,020 Dec.31, 1946 2,362,901 183,139 23,820 2,569,860 June30,1947 2,039,927 171,673 31,495 2,843,095 Dec.31, 1947 2,928,252 159,949 40,834 3,129,035 May 31, 1948 3,161,902 188,461 49,494 3,399,857 *) Allied deposits of 80 million RM not included. Unfinished goods: the war ended too soon for the Nazis to finish wrecking Europe’s economy: these notes, for flooding occupied countries, had only been printed on one side before the Allied armies over-ran all Germany. 82 FINANCE Revenue and Expenditure (actual) of the City of Berlin Fiscal year 1945—1946 Fiscal year 1946—1947 Fiscal year 1947—1948 Period from 1.4.48—30.9.48 Revenue Expenditure (100(1 RM) 901,587 1,068,853 (1000 RM) 1,875,952 1,268,159 (1000 RM) 2,165,965 1,513,167 (1000 RM)(* 1,037,304 765,058 Surplus or Deficit —167,266 + 607,793 + 652,798 + 272,246 (• From 24/6/1948 in DM supervision of insurance practices and policies effectively took these companies out from under the Magistral's complete domination, allowing for a freer and more competitive insurance in Berlin. It was never possible to secure quadripartite ap- proval for the establishment of either security or commodity exchanges in Berlin. A stock exchange for the city was looked upon by the Soviets with great misgivings, and it was scarcely possible to have the subject objectively discussed in four- power committee meetings. Financial Problems in a Split City The second and more complex period of Berlin's financial history began in June, 1948, when—despite continuous quadripartite efforts at understanding— it had finally become clear that disagreements be- tween East and West were basic. During the months of negotiation, the inflation- ary conditions in the western zones of Germany had become so severe that they threatened to prevent any substantial revival of the German economy. To prevent this, and to provide a basis for healthy economic recovery, the British, French, and U.S. Military Governors ordered a currency reform for the western zones on June 20, 1948, generally devaluating the Mark to one-tenth its former worth. This measure was taken with reluctance and only after the Military Governors were convinced that quadripartite agreement on a unified currency for the whole of Germany—as envisaged in the 1945 Potsdam Agreement—was entirely impossible. In the announcement of the currency reform, it was pointed out that the new measures were not to be applied in Berlin because of its four-power Allied Kommandatura government. The Soviets, however, were quickly forced to carry out, on June 23, 1948, a similar currency reform While its creation was regarded as a step in the right direction, however, the results of the commission's work were far from spectacular. The commission was designed as an interim measure to help prepare the banks for whatever decision might be made as to their ultimate disposition. But the physical destruction in Germany, the communications difficulties, and the fact of a widely scattered population made its work extremely diffi- cult. Additionally, records located in banks in the Soviet Sector of Berlin had been for the most part removed by the Soviet authorities. A second development in connection with the closed banks began in May, 1948. The Komman- datura Finance Committee prepared and reported a plan for the liquidation of the banks. A British paper was submitted and found acceptable by both French and American delegations as a basis for discussion. It was countered, however, by a Soviet paper which was indeed no liquidation plan at all and was en- tirely unacceptable to the other three delegations. The result of lengthy discussions was to refer the entire matter to the Collection Commission, in- structing it to prepare a plan of liquidating the banks for submission to the Finance Committee. This compromise was not viewed with much op- timism. In fact, the commission was never able to agree on a plan, and none was submitted to the Kommandatura. Insurance in Sounder Condition Insurance companies had suffered a somewhat less disastrous fate than Berlin banks, due probably to an oversight on the part of the Soviet authorities. The some 284 companies licensed to operate in the city found themselves more solvent than the banks. Whereas the banks had compulsorily invested some 80°/o of their assets in Reich bonds and similar government certificates of indebtedness, the in- surance companies were burdened with fewer Reich liabilities, but held a higher percentage of mortgage bonds, real estate and similar non-gov- ernmental credits. Nonetheless, the full payment of pre-war in- surance claims was out of the question, and the companies mutually agreed to meet all post-war claims and a percentage of pre-war claims that would increase as their liquidity improved. One notable achievement during the quadripartite period was the approval and establishment of the Insurance Aufsichtsamt. This organization and its The Berlin Staatsdruckerei, where banknotes, stamps, government bonds, and official papers are printed. 83 FINANCE in their zone of Germany. The terms of the Soviet action included all of Berlin. This was of course unacceptable to the Western Commandants, and 24 hours later the new western zone currency, overstamped with a “B", was introduced in the western sectors of Berlin. Thus, two separate currencies circulated in the city, although up to this date it was still governed by a single Magistral. West Mark Warmly Received The technical difficulties of introducing the West- mark into Berlin had been enormous, but its reception by the population was whole-heartedly favorable. While the reform was drastic and caused considerable hardship, the people of West Berlin felt that the reform had been inevitable anyway, and almost anything was better than the highly inflated Reichsmark. On the assurance of the Soviets that the funds of the Magistral, located in the head office of the Stadt- kontor in the Soviet Sector, would be converted into the Eastmark, it was agreed that the city budget would continue to be drawn in Eastmarks. Westmarks were made available to the residents of the western sectors in the form of a head quota also by a conversion of Reichsmark balances and afterwards in a proportion of their wages. The pro- portion varied as did the ability of the employers to acquire Westmarks. The fact that the West- mark immediately became a premium currency was extremely irritating to the Eastmark authorities, and in reprisal the Soviets refused to convert the Magistral's reserves in the Rerliner Stadtkontor. This measure made the city government bankrupt almost overnight. Between the time of the currency reform and the final split of the city gov- eminent in November, 1948, the activities of the Finance Branch, as for that matter of the Magistrat, were largely concerned with trying to supply the city with the Eastmarks needed for its commit- ments. Often municipal salaries were paid several days after coming due because of lack of cash, and the payment of contractors' bills was sometimes several weeks late. Moreover, the situation was further worsened during the blockade when, due to commercial and industrial stagnation and resulting unemployment, the Magistral's tax receipts were seriously reduced. The Finance Committee of the Kommandatura has worked and is still working with the Ma- gistrat, trying to solve the almost insurmountable problems connected with the claims of and against the Magistrat resulting from the two currencies and the splitting of the city. The Western Magistrat has maintained that it is the legal and original city government. The question then arises as to what liabilities of the former city government should now be borne by the West Magistrat. The many outstanding Reichsmark and Eastmark claims against the original Magistrat become quite complicated and will require the cooperation of the east sector Magistrat to make equitable settlement. The West Magistrat has no intention of taking all of the liabilities of the former city government, having lost all of its assets located in the east .sector. With the final split of the city government and the establishment of the West Magistrat at the end of 1948, it became imme- diately apparent that Ber- lin's deficit of some thirty million Eastmarks a month would have to be met by outside help. This support came in the form of food supplies and West Berlin banks, alter the split of the city system, have steadily improved their finan- cial position. They are no longer subject to Soviet whims, orders, and confiscations. F I N A N C E 84 other commodities from the western zones, pay- ment for which was charged against a joint United States United Kingdom account. The West Magistrat was allowed to use the proceeds from the food and commodity sales in Berlin. Despite this support and efforts to reduce the city budget, however, the finances of the Magistrat remainded precarious. This was regarded by all concerned as inevitable, since the Magistrat had lost its entire capital in the head office of the Stadtkontor, as well as other assets and tax receipts from the east sector. City Banks Split The split of the city also required a div- ision in the banking system. The Berliner Stadtkontor^r the Spar- kasse derStadt Berlin, and the Volksbank were thus immediately split, and each estab- lished fully indepen- dent offices in the western sectors. Their operations began un- der the handicap of having lost their share of the reserves lo- cated in the former head offices, but they have nonetheless been able to report con- tinued and steady progress since that time. During the winter 1948/49 growing criticizm of the provisions of the Westmark currency reform developed in the western sectors. The Eastmark, for example, was still legal currency in the western sectors, although the Westmark was banned—and any discovered holders of Westmarks were severely punished—in the east sector. The West Berlin public also complained that, while all wages were fixed in Marks, the real value of wages received depended largely on the currency —Westmarks or Eastmarks—in which the person was paid. For after the currency reforms the West- mark quickly gained a purchasing power tripling and quadrupling that of the Eastmark. Moreover, West Berliners were permitted to pay for rationed foods, medicine, taxes, and rent in Eastmarks, and this quickly brought about a situa- tion where almost all other goods and services were obtainable only for the Westmarks. This situation not only hampered production and distribution, but made price control very difficult and facilitated tax: evasion by allowing businessmen and speculators to juggle the two currencies in their accounts. East Mark Barred in West Sectors By March, 1949, it became evident that certain modifications would have to be made in the currency reform ordinances, the UN Security Council having been unable to work out a satisfactory solution to the Berlin currency and trade problems. On March 20th, therefore, and in response to a unanimous request by theCity Assembly, it was announced that the East- mark would cease to be legal tender in West Berlin. The new measures, known as the Third Ordinance for Monetary Reform, brought into existence a Berliner Zentralbank. While not serving as a bank of issue, it became the highest German authority for the control of monetary and credit policies in Berlin. It serves as banker for the city administration and deals in foreign exchange transactions under regulations issued by the Bank Deutscher Lander. The bank has progressively been able to take over more functions per- formed in the past by the Military Gov- ernments. Many matters of city financing, the unblocking and trans- fer of funds from Ber- lin, and problems of credit policy were effectively assumed by the Zentralbank. The value of the Westmark has stead- ily increased. The average free market rate of exchange bet- ween Eastmark and Westmark for the month of April, 1949, was one Westmark: 4.15 Eastmarks. In August, 1949, the average rate had increased to one Westmark: 5.68 Eastmarks. The budgetary problems of the city were not eased by the adoption of the Westmark as sole legal tender. Since the splitting of the city, the West Magistral operated on a hand-to-mouth budget basis. A draft budget drawn up for the year 1949/50, for example, anticipated a deficit of some 500,000,000 Marks. During the first six months of 1949, support from Allied counterpart funds had amounted to some 60,000,000 Marks per month. Additional assist- The three Western Commandants explain the Third Ordinance for Monetary Reform at a press conference. The questions were technical; the answers thoughtful. DEPOSITS IN WEST BERLIN BANKS 31. 12. 1948 30. 0. 1949 DM-West DM-East DM-West DM-East with (1000) (1000) (1000) (1000) Berliner Stadt- kontor West 78,728 143,058 134,558 139,529 Sparkasse der Stadt Berlin West 10,349 2,003 15,747 2,864 Berliner Volks- bank West 2,893 5,178 6,287 2,958 Totals 91,970 150,239 156,592 145,351 ance, varying between 25 and 40 million Marks per month, had been contributed by the west zone Lander (from a special coffee tax, postal levies, etc.). In June, 1949, the Military Governors decided 85 FINANCE that the responsibility for meeting Berlin's deficit should rest entirely upon the three western zones. The US/UK Counterpart Fund was urgently needed in the western zones for long-term investment pur- poses, and could no longer be made available to help Berlin solve its budgetary ailments. By November, 1949, the three western zones of Germany will bear full responsibility for any deficits in the Berlin budget. It has now become ne- cessary, therefore, for the Magistral to convince the western zone Lander that Berlin's deficits are justi- fied. Previously, when the proceeds from sales of food from the West—the original purchase of which represented dollars and Sterling—figured in the budget, the Military Govern- ments closely scrutinized all Berlin's city receipts and expenditures. This scrutiny, it may be reason- ably anticipated, will now be carried out by the Lander. During the blockade, considerable progress was made in the three-power Kommandatura in the field of finance. In the absence of the Soviets it was possible to achieve many progressive measures. New private banks have been licensed, the first opening for operation in June, 1949. Insurance regulations have been approved and insurance companies are functioning on a progressive and sound basis. BERLIN CURRENCY The Quadripartite Col- lection Commission was reformed and is now func- tioning much more ef- ficiently. Effective plans for the re-organization or liquidation of the closed banks of Berlin are being drawn up. After the lifting of the blockade, the financial problems of the city, its industry, and individual residents were far from solved, however. The role of Military Government in this respect, as in nearly all its fields of activity, has changed vastly since 1945. The solution of most current problems now rests primarily in German hands. Fortunately, how- ever, the Military Govern- ments have set up machin- ery whereby the Germans can and will be able to solve these problems. Middle- and long-term credits of the city and of its industry are being worked out between the authorities in Berlin and appropriate agencies in the zones. Legislation for the equalization of war damage claims has been prepared by the City Assembly. Money remains in very short supply in Berlin, and financial experts believe it probably will and should remain in short supply for a long time to come. Without political unity, it is difficult to envisage an early end to the city's present deficits. \ - —(——i—f - —j -DM-WEST IN CIRCULATION * t DM-WEST SUPPLIED BY THE BANK DEUTSCHER LANDER TOTAL OF DM. RECEIVED FROM FRANKFURT/M, LESS BALANCE KEPT IN THE VAULTS OF THE 2ENTRALBANK, AND LESS AMOUNT OF B-NOTES WITHDRAWN FROM' CIRCULATION IN THE WESTERN ZONES BY THE BANK DEUTSCHER LANDER AND NOT YET RE- TURNED TO THE BERLINER ZENTRALBANK: 1948 1949 Distribution of Anticipated Revenue and Expenditures in Draft Budget for Berlin 1949/50 REVENUE EXPENDITURES FINANCE 86 Deutscher Verlag, one of the world's largest publishing houses, is held in U. S. custody. Entrance to Deutscher Verlag, 1945 PROPERTY CONTROL The pattern of property control in the U.S. Sector of Berlin has been shaped during the past four years by three basic considerations closely inte- grated into the overall purpose of the American occupation of Germany. It has been necessary to restore looted properties and those acquired by the Nazis under duress to their original owners. ft has been necessary to remove designated persons, in line with the demilitarization of Ger- many, from positions of power which they held by possessing important properties. And it has been necessary to break up large economic combines and cartels, most of which were instrumental in making almost possible the mad Nazi dream of world domination. The problems and the complexities of the program have been many. During one several months' period, U.S. Military Government in Berlin had under its control properties valued at 1,315,000,000 pre-war Reichsmarks—more than half a billion dollars. The volume of cases treated by Occupation offi- cials from June, 1948, to July, 1949, can be measured by the volume of correspondence received and handled during that period. There were approx- imately 22,000 items of incoming correspondence requiring attention. Upwards of a thousand custodians, agents, and administrators—during the peak period of activities in 1948—were employed in the management and administration of properties under control. Two underlying problems have faced Military Government in this field during the past four years of operation: To devise methods of locating, placing in custody, safeguardingand administering various specified categories of property under control, and To release properties after decisions had been made providing lor their ultimate disposition. Initial emphasis was placed on organizing a workable system of locating properties subject to control, on placing such properties under custody, and providing for their proper administration. Five chief custodians were assigned the duty of inves- tigating what properties should be seized. On the basis of Military Government Law 52 (Blocking and Control of Property) six major cate- gories of properties were established. These in- cluded: Properties of United Nations, neutral, and other absentee owners, Properties of the former German Reich, and states (Lander), Properties of former Nazi organizations (e. g. property of the Deutsche Arbeitstront), Properties of NSDAP members (Nazi Party members including blacklisted persons), Properties of the IG Farbenindustrie, and Properties claimed by persons as having been transferred under duress. As Berlin was originally governed by a quadri- partite Kommandatura, no law concerning property control could be issued in the individual sectors without the approval of that body. The problem was largely solved by operating unofficially under 87 PROPERTY CONTROL the provisions of Military Government Law 52 in- sofar as that was possible without a formal exact- ment of the law. This procedure was, however, not recognized officially until the end of August, 1945, when the Kommandatura passed a resolution permitting the Commandant of each of the city's sectors to apply the laws in effect in his respective zone of occu- pation. How Custody Was Effected The work of locating and investigating property of United Nations, neutral, and other absentee owners was facilitated by the use of the records of the former Enemy Alien Property Custodian in Germany (Reichskommissar fur die Behandlung ieindlichen Vermogens). Records of properties of the former German Reich were found available in the Finanz- amt iiir Liegenschatten, the administrative office for Reich property. In the Vermogensverwertungsstelle, a central agency for the administration of confiscated Jewish properties, records were located concerning proper- ties transferred by confiscation or expropriation. Valuable information was also furnished by the records of the Vermogensverwaltung der Deutschen Arbeitsiront regarding the enormous holdings of that organization. And information about the holdings of Nazi Party members was largely obtained from local authorities. citizens of the United Nations and neutral nations, and the program was later extended to nationals of former enemy countries with whom peace treaties had been signed. Properties of Nazi Party organizations are being transferred to the trade unions, cooperatives, and other democratic organizations which formerly held title to the properties. If such organizations no longer exist, the properties are then transferred to new groups whose aims are found to be similar to those of the former organizations, or to the City of Berlin. How Control Was Exercised In order to standardize measures of control, properties were classified into three groups: operat- ing properties, other income-producing properties, and non-income-producing properties. In the case of operating properties—business and industrial enterprises, manufacturing plants, and trading organizations—which normally require a larger share of attention than properties consisting of real estate or other rentable units, it was the practice to appoint a custodian for each business enterprise. Other income-producing and non-income-produc- ing real estate—including rentable properties and destroyed properties—were normally managed by administrators responsible to the chief custodians, COMPARATIVE STATEMENT SHOWING UNITS OF PROPERTIES UNDER CONTROL Reason for Control 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 31.7. 30. 9. 31. 12. 31.3. 30. 6. 30. 9. 31.12. 31.3. 30. 6. 30.9. 31. 12. 31.3. 30. 6. 30. 9. 31. 12. 31.3. 30. 6. United Nations, neutral, and other absentee owners 13 210 315 574 801 978 1,034 1,324 1,396 1,497 1,577 1,744 2,094 2,146 2,115 1,957 1,109 German states (Lander) etc., Reich — 6 7 565 586 656 672 1,403 1,402 1,405 1,404 1,433 1,534 1,540 1,523 1,438 12 Nazi Party organizations — 1 7 9 5fU fian £74 1 03? 1 ion 1 1 98 244 229 251 271 220 240 332 340 NSDAF members — 1 943 1,353 1,466 1,573 1,419 1,288 1,087 968 Duress — 7 19 454 474 565 630 1,060 1,023 1,204 1,369 1,481 1,700 1,811 1,887 1,955 2,061 Other (blacklisted persons, external loot, mis- cellaneous) — 2 8 19 22 38 62 68 66 91 107 134 216 238 369 333 295 Totals: 13 232 358 2,176 2,566 3,111 3,430 4,955 5,085 5,384 6,039 6,509 7,388 7,374 7,422 7,102 4,785 A property was normally placed under control whenever it was established that the provisions of MG Law 52 were applicable. Property control was carried out in two phases, the first being that of locating and adequately protecting the properties seizable under Law 52. As early as June, 1947, the second phase was begun: that of releasing properties from control and returning them to their rightful owners. In that month a program was announced provid- ing for the decontrol of properties belonging to whose activities were in turn supervised by the Property Control Branch of Military Government. For the control of many smaller enterprises owned by leading NSDAP members, or of units taken over by the Berlin Magistral under its denazification program in the early days of the occupation, a plan had been worked out whereby custodians were appointed for each of the six U.S. boroughs and were responsible to Military Government. It was the duty of the custodian to manage and operate the properties under his supervision in a PROPERTY CONTROL 88 adequate file system was devised, in which all property records and other relevant information could be distributed for easy reference. Later, an accounts and audits section was added to check custodian’s financial reports and record surplus funds. A large number of small businesses, shops, and the like, owned by Nazi Party members and not warranting administration by custodians, were leased to third persons pending denazification of the owners. When the Soviets decided, in March, 1948, to with- draw their representatives from the Control Council and to restrict the movement of persons and goods between Berlin and the western zones, it was agreed for reasons of security to transfer the bulk of surplus funds to the Landeszentralbank in Frank- furt-am-Main. Twenty-one million Reichsmark were thus transferred and later converted by approval of the Allied Banking Commission into West Marks at the rate of 10:1 in accordance with MG Law 63. The Soviet blockade and the resulting drastic cur- tailment of gas and power supply, the shortage of raw materials, and lack of transportation resulted in a considerable reduction in sales by Berlin firms to customers in the western zones. Thus, the financial position of many operating properties quickly de- teriorated and the restoration of damaged properties was greatly curtailed. On the other hand, the financial condition of real estate since the promulgation of the third ordinance on monetary reform (see page 85), which made the West Mark sole legal tender in the western sectors of Berlin, has shown signs of improvement. How The Program Has Been Administered The six categories of properties under control are not administered identically. The administration of property of absentee owners (first category), for manner that would best achieve the tollowing purposes: to preserve the corpus in the best operating condition, to husband and increase the resources, and to produce the largest income. The problems involved in property control were rendered more difficult and complex because Berlin was a ruined and defeated city. Some 75,000 tons of bombs had avalanched down on the metropolis Hinz, paper and furniture factory, is typical of many damaged plants in Western Berlin under property control. in giant day and night aerial attacks during the war. In some areas destruction was greater than ninety percent; and overall damage has been variously estimated at between sixty and seventy percent of all built-up properties. Moreover, many business enterprises which were operating before the end of the war, including large industrial plants, had been dismantled by the Soviets. Their machinery, raw materials, and finished products had been shipped to Russia as war booty and reparations. Numerous concerns which were subject to Allied control were struggling to carry on operations on a greatly reduced scale. Under the circumstances, the most immediate task was to find suitable custodians and administrators capable of handling and improving the properties subject to control. Real estate custodians were encouraged to use available surplus funds (from rentals) for the rehabilitation and repair of buildings. Custodians appointed for operating properties were given authority to carry on normal business trans- actions. Much of the property control officer's time was devoted to helping and advising custodians in solving their problems, handicapped as they were by inadequate machinery and material, lack of trans- portation and other means of communication, and, above all, shortage of funds. It will be recalled that the financial institutions operating in Berlin before the collapse of Germany had been closed (see page 81) and all credit balances of depositors blocked ever since. In order to start operations and to accomplish necessary rehabilitation work, extensive loans to some of the larger concerns were approved. To cope with the increasing detail of the activities, an Lorenz, an important West-Berlin radio tube and appli- ance plant under U. S. property control, did a large export business via the Air Lift during the blockade. example, is intended to protect it until such time as the owners can take protective steps themselves. Until the middle of 1947, there was no communica- tion of a transactional nature and only limited travel to and from Berlin. On June 25, 1947, just after the restoration of transactional communications, it was 89 PROPERTY CONTROL tions) number 331 with an estimated value in Reichs- mark of 35,129,600. In April, 1947, the Control Council issued Directive 50, which provided for the disposition of properties having belonged to Nazi organizations. In Berlin the directive was implemented by a Kommandatura order on February 3, 1949, which called for a special commission to be established by the Magistral. Properties of leading Nazi Party members were taken into custody as part of the overall program of the denazification and demilitarization of Germany. In line with the general Military Government policy of transferring greater responsibility to German governmental authorities, the custody and administration of this category of properties will be assumed in the near future by the Magistrat of Berlin. IG Faihen properties (fifth category) were taken under control on the basis of General Order 2. In July, 1948, all IG Farben properties under control—numbering 24 units with a value of RM 43,319,800—were released to disignated agents of the IG Farben Control Officer. Control has been exercised over any property in the sixth category for which a claim has been filed alleging that the property had been transferred under duress. Attempts were made in Berlin through long drawn out negotiations on quadripartite and, later, on tripartite bases to develop a uniform restitution The Opta radio plant in Steglitz, held under U.S. custodian- ship, makes receiving sets and wire-recorders for export. announced that owners of property in Germany— owners who resided outside the country—could apply under certain conditions for the release or decontrol of their properties to nominees who were permanent residents of Germany and who would be given properly executed powers of attorney. It was soon evident, however, that owners were slow in assuming responsibility for their possessions. One apparent reason was that they felt property control custody afforded protection which would not be present after decontrol. Nonetheless, all pro- perties in this category will have been released, it is estimated, by the end of September, 1949. A large number of properties in the second cate- gory (former Reich or state property) were not taken under control, because many of them—the Reichs- bahn, Reichspost, and Inland Waterways, properties used to house or facilitate functions of the city gov- ernment, or properties under requisition by the Military Government—were under supervision of either the Magistrat or interested branches of the U.S. or other Allied Occupation Forces. On April 20, 1949, MG Law 19 was promulgated, transferring title to all properties in this category to the City of Berlin, either as trustee for a subsequent German state or as owner. Units in the third category (former Nazi organiza- Osram, a leading light-bulb manufacturer in West Berlin, has been under property control since the end of the war. program, Fundamental differences among the occu- pation powers prevented agreement for a longtime. On July 15, 1949, however, a Restitution Law was signed by the three western sector Commandants creating restitution agencies charged with effect- ing amicable settlement of claims between the parties, and providing judicial procedures for the proper adjudication of disputed claims. The Goetze Brothers linen manufacturing plant in the borough of Kreuzberg is also held in U.S. custody. PROPERTY CONTROL 90 PUBLIC WELFARE Dedication ceremony at Mittelhol Neighborhdod Center, first of five such community homes in U. S. Sector. Early Military Government interest in Berlin welfare problems focused, naturally enough, on the tragic situation of the displaced persons, millions of whom were scattered throughout Europe and nearly all in imme- diate need of assistance. By February, 1946, when that problem was assign- ed to other U.S. authori- ties, 16,670 displaced per- sons (DP's) in the U.S. Sec- tor of Berlin alone had been processed and sent on their way homeward. One of the last projects in this field was the open- ing of a special camp in southwest Berlin to house Polish Jewish DP's. The Diippel Camp was created within forty-eight hours almost from nothing. Ninety German laborers worked two days and nights preparing barracks to house 2,500 refugees, installing kitchens and equipment, and for months afterwards the camp serv- ed as a temporary home for displaced persons pas- sing though Berlin. Infrequent Four-Power Agreement During the quadipartite period of control in Berlin (July, 1945—June, 1948) agreement could be reached on few important matters. In reviewing the work of the Welfare and Refugee Committee of the Kom- mandatura, one is im- pressed mainly with the delays and the incon- clusive character of the committee’s ownactivities. Fundamental concepts of the problems at hand were in too many cases at wide variance between the East and West. Up to December, 1947, some 30 applications were received from welfare or- ganizations for permission to operate on a city-wide basis. Unanimous agree- ment on their approval, however, was not possible in any instance. The Soviet delegation argued for the recognition of only a few organi- zations, so that they might be carefully controlled. The three associations which the Soviets were The work of the Public Welfare Branch during the past four years has fallen under the following categories: Displaced Persons and Refugees—until Febru- ary, 1946, thousands of displaced persons were cared for, processed, and sent on their way home. Public Welfare Services—the planning of budgets, selection of personnel, institutional fa- cilities, and the processing of relief supplies for public programs. Care For Children—the establishment, of day care centers, homes, correctional services, adop- tions, and holiday and recuperation programs. Foreign Relief Supplies and Services—special feec ing programs, neighborhood centers, and pro- grams to meet special needs. Private Welfare Agencies—organization and authorization of church and non-denominational agenc'es, institutio al needs, and training programs. Quadripartite Matters—supervision of central city welfare administration, establishment of welfare policies, and approval of new welfare programs and voluntary agencies. Welfare Activities of the American Community —facilitation of the work of women's clubs and other groups interested in welfare. 91 PUBLIC WELFARE REFUGEE MOVEMENTS — U.S. SECTOR BERLIN 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 July thru Dec. Jan. thru Dec. Jan.thru Dec. Jan. thruDec. Jan.thruJune Incoming 409,530 80,965 13,998 4,183 16,765 Outgoing 402,572 85,336 15,451 4,986 3,711 Costs RM 832,702. RM 2,459,384. not available Note: The 1945-46 figures of refugee movements represent to a large extent persons (moving through the sector in search of relatives or enroute to their former homes. Since 1947, the character of the refugee movement has changed and those coming to West Berlin are mainly persons fleeing from unfavorable political or economic conditions in their home countries or in the Soviet Zone. The figures for 1948 are incomplete, since there was no central office and many refugees lived on the black market. The upward trend of 1949 may result from the better weather conditions, which encourage travel. The movement of refugees has continuously been a serious burden on welfare authorities, who are without funds or housing accommodations. of the war. In most respects they have operated as before, except that all former privileged categories of relief recipients were abolished and Nazi Party members were removed from their positions. Victims of Nazi persecution, on the other hand, were placed in a special category, entitling them to priority in allocation of housing and distri- bution of clothing, and were given a higher ration classification. These were rehabilitative measures. The return of men who had been in the army and the re-uniting of families began to lighten the relief rolls as early as January, 1946. A month-by-month drop occurred in the number of people receiving relief— from 501,582 in Greater Berlin in December of 1945, to 139,437 on July 1, 1948. At the time of the currency reform in June, 1948 (see page 83) the number of people in the three western sectors being aided by public relief was willing to approve—one organization for the blind, one for war injured, and a Red Cross Society—had already been working for some time in the east sector, and each was heavily dominated by com- munists. Finally, agreement was reached on the recogni- tion of two politically affiliated welfare groups to operate on a city-wide basis: The Sozialhilfe, a Com- munist Unity Party (SED) affiliate, and the Arbeiler- wohUahrt, sponsored by the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The second-named, however, was never really allowed to operate in the Soviet Sector. A few matters in another field of welfare were carried through to agreement: recognition of CRALOG and CARE for city-wide distribution of relief supplies; the re-establishment of Pestalozzi- Frobel-Haus, an institution for the training of social workers; and agreements permitting former resi- dents to return to Berlin, although officially it was a closed city. Heavy Burden on City Welfare The public welfare departments in the boroughs of Berlin have carried a heavy burden since the end NUMBER OF PERSONS IN BERLIN (3 WESTERN SECTORS) RECEIVING PUBLIC SUPPORT (Including Dependents) June June 1946 1949 I. RELIEF RECIPIENTS 216,501 135,236 II. VAB PENSIONERS 134,236 255,426 III. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION xxxx 285,734 Totals 350,737 676,396 88,542. But the reform measure had a marked adverse effect on the relief figures. Many old people who had had savings, or who were assisted by relatives, now had to ask for help. There was much less money in circulation—the Mark was in fact devaluted to one-tenth its former, inflated worth— and marginal businessmen and even former black marketeers now found themselves on the public welfare lists. This situation was further aggravated during the Soviet blockade, when for lack of fuel, raw materials, and customers many industries closed down in the western sectors or worked only part time. By Sep- tember, 1948, the number of persons on relief had increased by 15,400—a rate of about 1,000 a week. By June, 1949, there were 135,236 persons on relief in the three western sectors. Moreover, in addition to the above figures on that date, there were 255,426 persons drawing social insurance payments and 285,734 receiving un- employment compensation. So in some respects the situation in June, 1949, was worse than that in July, A few of the nearly one million CARE parcels which have been distributed in Berlin since the end of the war. PUBLIC WELFARE 92 1945. More than a third of the population of the western sectors (counting dependents) were living on public grants. as in the west. Certainly the communists were faced with an impossible task in trying to present Russia as a benevolent friendly power, when relief trucks with food supplies were confiscated or turned back to the western zones in the fall of 1948. There- after, church and other voluntary agencies had to abandon their attempts to truck in relief supplies. The Swedish Red Cross brought in some supplies by ship and rail from Sweden through the Soviet Zone to carry out a feeding project during the winters of 1947/48 and 1948/49 for groups of approximately 20,000 small and undernourished children. In December, 1948, however, the Soviets prohibited the Swedish Red Cross from transporting any of the supplies into the western sectors and the project was prematurelly ended a few months later. The International Red Cross shipped food supplies by rail through Czechoslovakia during the blockade with Russian permission. These supplies were used to carry out the badly needed old-age feeding War-time evacuees return to their homes in Berlin: a special problem ior public welfare agencies in 1945/46, as most of them were poor, hungry, and homeless. Clothing, Blankets, Food by Air Lift The blockade caused great misery among the population during the winter of 1948/49. There was a dire shortage of coal, gas, and electricity for households and welfare institutions. To help meet the new problems, an Air Lift allowance was made for clothing and blankets and an extensive plan was developed for public “warming centers". The east sector was also badly affected by the blockade, and relief lists lengthened there as well Soup-kitchens set up after the war near lower grade schools in Berlin—with U.S.Army equipment and supplies— helped prevent epidemics among the city's underfed youth. project in Greater Berlin, until the Russians refused permission to transport any supplies into the wes- tern sectors. Consequently, in January, 1949, this project was abandoned in the west. Child Welfare Stressed Military Government has had from the outset a special interest in child welfare, not only because such welfare agencies in Germany have played an important role in the life of nearly every German child through its kindergartens, recreation, and special programs, but also because child welfare has a liberal tradition and is better able to accept new and democratic ideas. The progressive, forward-looking record of the pre-Nazi child wmlfare leaders is reflected in the National Child Welfare Law of 1922, which says— “Every German child has the right to education The return of thousands of German prisoners from forced- labor in Russia also presented a special problem, as most were in ill health, undernourished, and demoralized. 93 PUBLIC WELFARE for the development of its pnysical, mental, spiritual, and social competence”. Juvenile delinquency has shown a fluctuation in numbers between a serious increase in the early occupation period to a slight decrease in recent months. German authorities believe this may be due partially to better food supplies and the lessening of black market activities. Also, undoubtedly there is now better cooperation between German juvenile courts and youth offices in the treatment of youth- ful delinquents. During the blockade period, however, offenses were found to be of a more serious nature among the older group. Assistance was extended by Military Government to the German agencies in efforts to combat the delinquency problem, both in relation to a better understanding of the need for specialized service's and in the treatment of cases. Problem Number One for public welfare agencies: food, clothing, and guidance for tomorrow's citizens of Germany. tutions in the Soviet Sector, were no longer accepted there and that more commitments were now being made to Jugendhof rather than to prisons. The continuing need of adequate facilities for institutions, day care centers, and foster homes, both public and private, is reflected in present overcrowded conditions. Child guidance offices are func- tioning within the framework of the welfare program on a limited scale. Special emphasis has been placed on encouraging the German agen- cies to develop mental hygiene clinics in accordance with modern thinking in this field. In this connection, assistance has been given in planning for demonstration projects under the JUVENILE DELINQUENCY — U.S. SECTOR BERLIN SENTENCES BY QUARTERLY PERIOD 1945 1946 1947 1949 January thru March 597 485 776 510 April thru June No 488 676 695 518 July thru September Records 655 796 745 October thru December 635 638 321 (amnesty) 2,375 2,595 2,537 1,028 Thereof sentenced by Military Court 266 299 294 109 Breakdown by sex;— boys 2,031 2,206 2,136 914 girls 344 (15%) 389 (15%) 401 (16%) 114 (11%) The first accomplishment in this connection was the establishment of "Jugendhof", a boys detention home, in November, 1946. By the fall of 1948 the population at the institution had increased from 207 to 300. This, however, should not be judged as an indication of increased delinquency, but, rather, that many boys, formerly committed to insti- POPULATION CHANGES — Children s Institutions and Day Care Centers Number of Children in Institutions January, 1947 80 Homes with 1,249 Inmates January, 1948 63 ” ” 2,046 April, 1949 67 ” ” 2,361 Number of Children in Day Care Centers January, 1947 186 Centers with 7,384 Inmates January, 1948 213 ” ” 7,850 April, 1949 231 ” ” 9,092 direction of professional experts from the U.S. and other foreign countries. Among the outstanding accomplishments of the German authorities in the field of child welfare have been the child welfare conferences held in Berlin during May, 1948, and May, 1949. The "Interzonale Sozialpddagogische Tagung und Ausstellung" in 1948 was the first conference of its kind to be held in Germany. It brought together Santa Claus became reality for the children of destroyed Berlin with the airborne arrival of hundreds of tons of gift clothing parcels from America during the blockade. PUBLIC WELFARE 94 teachers, supervisors, and all persons actively work- ing with children. Approximately 1,000 persons attended the conference to discuss developments in this field in the U.S., Switzerland, and other coun- tries. The subject of adoption has been a much debated one for the entire period of Occupation. There has been considerable interest on the part of Americans in the adoption of German or Allied national children. Many legal difficulties had to be met, but in De- cember, 1947, an adoption law for nationals of the U.S. was issued and put into effect in the U.S. Zone GIFT PACKAGES DISTRIBUTED IN BERLIN FOOD CLOTH- ING TOTAL PER- CENT- AGE VALUE IN DOLLARS 1946/47 CARE 345,508 13,993 359,501 62.1 3,595,010 CARITAS 186,669 17,855 204,524 35.3 1,227,114 SWISS 15,044 — 15,044 2.6 90,264 547,221 31,848 579,069 100.0 4,912,388 1948 CARE 213,921 14,199 228,120 49.0 2,281,200 CARITAS 142,532 7,597 150,129 32.3 900,774 SWISS 87,215 — 87,215 18.7 523,290 443,668 21,796 465,464 100.0 3,705,264 1949 (January thru August) CARE 179,875 18,160 198,035 55.4 1,980,350 CARITAS 65,318 — 65,318 18.3 391,908 SWISS 71,803 — 71,803 20.0 430,818 NETHERLAND CARITAS 22,500 — 22,500 6.3 135,000 339,496 18,160 357,656 100.0 2,938,076 GRAND TOTAL CARE 739,304 46,352 785,656 56.0 7,856,560 CARITAS 394,519 25,452 419,971 30.0 2,519,796 SWISS 174,062 — 174,062 12.4 1,041,372 NETHERLAND CARITAS 22,500 — 22,500 1.6 135,000 1,330,385 71,804 1,402,189 100.0 $ 11,555,728 packages In October, 1948, plans were made in cooperation with the British public welfare and German officials for additional help for malnourished children through placement in the western zones. A total of 15,450 children were transported to the zones during the period of October, 1948, to March, 1949. The first 55 of these children returned to Berlin on May 22, 1949. Other assistance to malnourished children has been through feeding programs, such as those con- More than 15,000 children were airlifted from Berlin to temporary homes in the western zones during the Soviet blockade. All returned heavier, rosy-cheeked, happier. and U.S. Sector of Berlin. Since the program began, 88 applicants for adoption, involving a total of 105 children, have been handled. A problem of major concern in the field of child welfare is the large proportion of children suffering from undernourishment and malnutrition. In order to combat this, many children's recuperation homes have had to be established. One of the most success- ful homes is operated by the borough of Neukolln. This home, since its inception, has provided care for a period of one month to a total of 2,078 children. New hope came to the near-hopeless—thousands of old people in city institutions—when U.S. and other relief agencies sent large shipment of blankets, books, food. ducted under the direction of the Swedish Red Cross, and through the summer recreation and feeding programs. In addition, through the Berlin American Women's Club and "General Clay’s Children's Christmas Fund" many other families and institu- tions were helped. Still other contributions were made available by the American Women’s Press Club and the "Little Vittles” chocolate program, sponsored by the men in service. The Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce voluntarily organized a project to clothe the 80 children under Gift parcels of food, clothing, and shoes from a generous American public were received with wide-eyed enthusiasm by orphans in Berlin pubficwelfare institutions. 95 PUBLIC WELFARE The American Friends Service Committee was the first of the foreign welfare societies to undertake a service project in Berlin. Their neighborhood conference and rest home center, called Mittelhof, opened in June. 1947. Military Government has assisted in many ways in getting this and several other such projects started and counselling those in charge, so that they serve as channels of re- orientation. To assist the Berlin schools of social work in developing new and much needed teaching material, Military Government made a small grant of funds to a working committee of social workers. This Despite shortages of every kind, Berlin municipal children's homes saved thousands of war-orphaned youngsters. care at the Blindenschule. Likewise, through special ‘‘adoption projects", many individual children's institutions have received generous and repeated gifts of food and clothing. There is still much to be done to bring German child welfare into line with sound democratic prac- tices. Too many children are in institutions, consider- able resistance to foster home care still exists, and there is only an embryonic beginning of child guidance programs. There are extremely few trained workers for specialized child welfare services and for leadership in this field. The public authorities need help in developing youth recreation activities which are free from military regimentation or political in- doctrination. Better methods of dealing with delinquency and coordination of child welfare services also are needed. Although the 1922 law is basically sound, the experience of American child welfare workers is needed to implement it and focus the thinking and action of welfare authorities on developing plans for youth re- creation, specialized ser- vices for children, and preventive work in the field of juvenile delin- quency. Community Projects It was early recognized that the doling out of food and clothing could not in itself do much to improve community life in Germany and give in- dividuals greater free- dom and security. Bor- rowing from experience in the United States, where a tremendous amount has been done through demonstration projects, efforts were made to find sponsors for "service" projects. Police arrest black marketeers: a war-nurtured ailment that only now is disappearing from Europe’s cities. group adopted the name Arbeitsgruppe fur die Her- ausgabe sozial-pddagogischer Arbeitshefte and out- lined six pamphlets in July of 1948. This valuable work will have been completed by the fall of 1949. There are many similar ways in which the Ger- mans can be helped to help themselves. All this falls under the heading of "community organi- zation” in the U.S. Such work requires some per- sonnel and funds, but in proportion to its cost, community organization is an economical and practical way to plant seeds and to foster pro- grams which can have a significant, long-term effects Foreign Relief Supplies Program The Foreign Relief Supplies Program, spon- sored by Military Gov- ernment and carried out through the coope- ration of the foreign Community "self help" became the keynote of Welfare Branch. Vegetable gardens amidst the levelled rubble helped supply fresh food to defeat the Soviet blockade. PUBLIC WELFARE 96 welfare and German governmental and private agencies began in January, 1946. Since that time, the program has depended mainly on gift supplies and packages made through CRALOG, IRC, CARE, Swedish Red Cross, and the Mormons. All supplies and packages received under this program have been distributed in all Berlin, despite the lack of Russian cooperation, in approximately the following percentages: Soviet Sector 36.6 °/o American Sector 30.5 % British Sector 19.4 % French Sector 13.5 % Under other circumstances these young people would be strutting Nazis. U.S. Military Government ottered an alternative which they have not been slow to take. During the period of January, 1946-September, 1949, a total of 37,348,409 pounds of bulk foreign relief supplies for distribution by German welfare agen- cies and worth $14,855,927 were received in Berlin. During the same period, 1,402,189 individual gift Displaced persons and refugees: a continuing problem in Berlin, with thousands forced to flee the countries of East Europe for political and economic reasons. FOREIGN RELIEF AGENCIES OPERATING IN BERLIN CRALOG Council of Relief Agencies licensed for Operation in Germany American sponsored— serves as forwarding agency for 16 American welfare, religious, labor, and civic groups CENTRE Centre d'Entr’aide Internationale aux Populations Civiles A Swiss agency sponsor- ed by 9 welfare organiza- tions in Switzerland. Si- milar to CRALOG, and CARE IRC International Committee of the Red Cross Swiss sponsored—sup- plies come mainly from Switzerland, but also from other national Red Cross societies. Mormons Church of the Latter Day Saints Sponsored by the Ameri- can Church—help for German Mormons. Adventists 7th Day Ad- ventists Sponsored by the Ameri- can and Canadian Chur- ches—help for German Adventists. LICROSS League of Red Cross Societies Membership consists of national Red Cross or- ganizations of many countries. Supplies large- ly come from U.S. UNICEF UN Specialized Agency providing cod-liver oil, leather and wool, for Berlin children. CARE Cooperative for American Remit- tances to Europe Sponsored by 26 Ameri- can welfare, labor, reli- gious, and civic agencies. Distributes individual gift packages. International Children’s Emer- gency Fund AFSC American Friends Service Committee Sponsored by the Ameri- can Friends Church. In addition to bringing in relief supplies, the AFSC has sponsored the Mittel- hof Neighborhood Center SRC Swedish Red Cross Carries out welfare- health projects sponsor- ed by several Swedish agencies. All supplies come frcm Sweden. BHAC Berlin Hilfswerk Action Commit- tee of the western zones Organized by govern- mental and civic groups in three western zones to provide assistance to the people of the three western sectors of Ber- lin during the blockade. MSC Mennonite Ser- vice Committee Sponsored by the Ameri- can Mennonite Church. In addition to bringing in relief supplies, the MSC has sponsored the Kreuz- berg Neighborhood Cen- ter. 97 PUBLIC WELFARE food and clothing packages, worth $11,555,728, were received and distributed. The bulk of gift supplies and packages originated in America, with Switzerland and Sweden following in the order mentioned. relief programs. This does not include 1,809,429 gift packages received through the mail mainly from the U.S., plus several hundred thousand gift packages which were brought into the city, generally by agencies without proper Allied clearance. A substantial number of ad- ditional individual packages have been shipped into Berlin by commercial gift package concerns which have been licensed by the Joint Export- Import Agency (JEIA). The Berlin CRALOG Com- mittee, representing the Ma- gistral Departments of Public Welfare, Youth, Health, and La- bor, and the main German and foreign welfare agencies, has been responsible for allocating the foreign relief supplies, except those coming through the International Red Cross. Under this committee sup- plies have been allocated and distributed through carefully selected and approved projects. Through the main projects sponsored by the CRALOG Committee ap- proximately 780,000 persons—a quarter of the population—benefited by the distribution of about 6,890,000 pounds of food and clothing. WELFARE INSTITUTIONS — U.S. SECTOR BERLIN Homes:— 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 No. No. No. No. 'No. No. No. No. No. No. homes inmates homes inmates homes inmates homes inmates homes inmates Aged 30 859 58 1,884 66 2,458 71 2,657 70 2,734 Blind 3 42 3 69 3 128 3 137 6 214 Convalescent — — 2 44 3 141 4 143 4 140 Children 20 759 45 1,604 56 1,704 59 2,002 60 2,048 Apprentices — — 4 46 5 97 6 118 6 126 Detention & Correctional — — I 64 2 245 3 289 4 460 Other — — 4 232 11 472 9 651 9 514 Total 53 1,660 117 3,943 146 5,245 155 5,997 159 6,236 Additional Welfare Institutions: Refugee Camps 18 6,958 10 2,587 8 1,134 4 331 5 1,348 plus 1,644 Day Care Centers 1 fed only) for Children 107 5,789 186 7,384 213 7,850 227 8,376 231 | 8,462 with average attendance Seventy-five percent of all Berliners Helped It is estimated that at one time or another during the period from 1946 to July, 1949, 75 % of the 3,300,000 population of Greater Berlin have received substantial help through these foreign MAIN PROJECTS RECEIVING CRALOG SUPPLIES ALLOCATED BY THE BERLIN CRALOG COMMITTEE, From Jan., 1947 to Sept., 1949 PROJECT PERIOD OF PROJECT NUMBER BENEFITING SUPPLIES RECEIVED Clothing distribution Continuous from 125,000 550,000 pieces of clothing and pairs of shoes Returning prisoners of war August, 1947 Continuous from 25,000 Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food Widowed, self-supporting women with children June, 1948 May, 1947 11,000 Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food Old age feeding December, January, 54,000 1 hot meal per day Women working on rubble clearance ( Triimmerfrauen) February.and March, 1947-1948 March, 1948 18,000 Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food Student aid March-April, 1948 3,000 Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food Physically exhausted social welfare workers March-April, 1948 6,000 Same as above Expectant mothers April-May, 1948 7,000 Same as above Roll (Brotchen) program April-July, 1948 277,000 1 roll per day for school children Summer recreation program for children 3-6 years 40 days during 1948 12,000 2 rolls per day for students 1 hot meal per day Same as above for children 6-14 years 24 days during 1948 60,000 2 rolls per day Same as above for youths 10 days during 1948 40,000 1 hot meal per day Help for victims of Fascism Oct-Nov, 1948 10,000 Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food Expectant mothers July, 1949 8,000 Each received 4 lb. pkg. of assorted food Old people completely depen- dent on public welfare July, 1949 40,000 Each received 5 lb. pkg. of assorted food Summer recreation program for children and youths Summer, 1949 84,000 1 hot meal per day Total 780,000 persons Appx. 6,890,000 lbs. of food and clothing PUBLIC WELFARE 98 One of the positive results of the blockade period was the Berlin Hilfswerk Action Committee. Esta- blished by Germans of the west zones to help Ger- EFFECT OF BLOCKADE ON IMPORT OF CRALOG RELIEF SUPPLIES TO BERLIN 1948 January thru June (6 months) monthly average 455,840 lbs PRE- BLOCKADE 2,735,038 lbs 1948/1949 July thru April (10 months) monthly average 91,246 lbs 912,463 lbs BLOCKADE 1949 May thru August (4 months) monthly average 567,400 lbs POST- BLOCKADE 2,279,566 lbs Blockade scene: children stealing coal from a delivery truck to warm their homes against the long, cold nights. mans of the western sectors of Ber- lin, this agency raised five million Marks and nearly two million pounds of food supplies and clothing be- tween January and August, 1949. The many forms of material aid from the U.S. have been a signi- ficant factor in demonstrating to Berliners the sympathy America and other countries had for them in their fight for democratic self-deter- mination. Welfare in its broadest sense touches a great many people. More- over, it has a fairly liberal tradition in Germany. If reorientation efforts are to continue the important work of helping people to help them- selves, programs which recognize the dignity and individuality of all people should not be overlooked. There is much that needs to be done: to take old people out of in- stitutions, improve the training of the handicapped, put the treatment of the delinquent child and youth on a higher level, and improve the training of social workers, group leaders, and day center workers. There are German workers who see the need for all this. They need support in various ways over a period of years. It is in such ways as this that a reorientation program can be made effective. FOREIGN RELIEF BULK SUPPLIES DISTRIBUTED IN BERLIN WEIGHT IN POUNDS FOOD CLOTH- ING MISCEL- LANE- OUS TOTAL PER- CENT- AGE VALUE $ 1946/47 CRALOG 595,715 324,414 42,967 963,096 8.8 340,936 IRC 4,900,439 124,778 540,523 5,565,740 50.9 1,635,360 ADVENTISTS 80,430 12,804 4,415 97,649 .9 48,825 SWEDISH R. C. 2,962,472 450,331 — 3,412,803 31.2 1,706,399 MORMONS 551,578 340,554 — 892,132 8.2 446,066 1948 9,090,634 1,252,881 587,905 10,931,420 100.0 4,177,586 CRALOG 2,354,973 786,976 245,533 3,387,482 21.3 1,198,158 IRC 7,312,205 228,185 799,497 8,339,887 52.3 2,683,069 LICROSS 11,037 20,320 139,300 170,657 1.1 118,402 ADVENTISTS 136,149 46,185 14,908 197,242 1.2 98,621 SWEDISH R. C. 958,057 267,108 — 1,225,165 7.7 612,583 MORMONS 2,333,934 2,625 — 2,336,559 14.6 1,168,280 BERLIN HILFSWERK — — 281,840 281,840 1.8 140,920 1949 (January thru August) CRALOG 13,106,355 1,351,399 1,481,078 15,938,832 100.0 6,020,033 1,820,465 465,587 253,533 2,539,585 24.2 898,893 IRC 983,442 — 56,033 1,039,475 9.9 307,788 LICROSS 15 1,587 27,385 28,987 .3 16,572 ADVENTISTS 148,668 13,680 3,215 165,563 1.5 82,782 SWEDISH R. C. 46,358 — — 46,358 .5 23,179 MORMONS 747,620 — 1,250 748,870 7.2 374,435 BERLIN HILFSWERK 1,721,844 10,636 17,464 1,749,944 16.8 874,972 NETHERLAND CARITAS 2,876,375 1,283,000 — 4,159,375 39.6 2,079,687 GRAND TOTAL CRALOG 8,344,787 1,774,490 358,880 10,478,157 100.0 4,658,308 4,771,153 1,576,977 542,033 6,890,163 18.5 2,437,987 IRC 13,196,086 352,963 1,396,053 14,945,102 40.0 4,626,217 LICROSS 11,052 21,907 166,685 199,644 .5 134,974 ADVENTISTS 365,247 72,669 22,538 460,454 1.2 230,228 SWEDISH R. C. 3,966,887 717,439 — 4,684,326 12.7 2,342,161 MORMONS 3,633,132 343,179 1,250 3,977,561 10.6 1,988,781 BERLIN HILFSWERK 1,721,844 10,636 299,304 2,031,784 5.4 1,015,892 NETHERLAND CARITAS 2,876,375 1,283,000 — 4,159,375 ii.i 2,079,687 30,541,776 4,378,770 2,427,863 37,348,409 100.0 14,855,927 lbs. 99 PUBLIC WELFARE STADTRAT MAY DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC EDUCATION ( VOLKS BILDU NCSA M T) ADMINISTRATION PersonneljFinancial I Legal Office I Office j Office MAIN SCHOOL OFFICE MAIN OFFICE FOR SCIENCE RESEARCH MAIN OFFICE FOR ART AND LITERATURE MAIN OFFICE FOR GYMNASTICS School Adminis- tration School Super- vision 1. Office for Higher Institutes & Scientific Institutes 1. Office for Theater and Stage Personnel Records Local School Super- vision 2. Office for Music 2. Office for Higher Technical Schools 3. Office for Art Schools School Buildings & Equip- ment Secondary Schools 3. Office for Adult Evening Schools 4. Office for Museums, Palaces, Parks School Materials Prof. & Pri- vate Schools 5. Office for Literature Books: Publishing Trade Loan Libraries Public Libraries School Hygiene Social Pedagogy School Feeding Special Schools Statistics Technical Sections EDUCATION 100 Berlin students help build their own Free University in the U. S. Sector. EDUCATION The school system of Berlin had already been re- organized and was operating on a limited scale when U.S. troops entered the city in July, 1945. A trio of Moscow-trained Germans, Wandel, Winzer and Wildangel, headed the Public Education De- partment of the city government. All three were Communist Party members and their work was closely controlled by the Soviets. The Public Education Department of the Magi- strat (the Volksbildungsamt) was heavily col- onized by communists, and the problem of establishing a less lop-sided political supervision became an immediate and last- ing headache for the Western Allies. After the October, 1946, gen- eral elections (see page 15), the communist Winzer was re- placed by the Social Democrat Party candidate, Dr. Nestriepke. Efforts by the latter to combat communist influence, however, brought on Soviet wrath and eventually his dismissal, despite American opposition. In July, 1947, Walter May (Social Democrat Party) replac- ed Nestriepke. Only after four months of haggling at the Allied Kommandatura, however, did the Soviets recognize May. It was on their insistence, moreover, that May retained Wildangel, who claimed the status of Deputy. (After the final split in the city government—No- vember, 1948—May moved to the British Sector, and the Soviets established Wildangel as head of the VoJksbildungsamt of the east sector rump Magistral.) First Problems: Buildings, Books, Fuel Political conflict in the Kommandatura was only one aspect of the problems faced in the educational field. A more basic and urgent problem was that of the phy- sical conditions of schools in the sectors. Some 222 schools existed in the U.S. Sector in 1945, with 70,679 pupils and only 1,795 teachers (excluding higher edu- cation instructors). Denazifica- tion procedures eliminated many otherwise competent teachers, and the ratio of students to one trained teacher rose from 60 to 88. Many teachers of apprentice status, with only sketchy train- ing and often no field experi- ence, were of necessity em- ployed to bridge the emergency period. Forty-six percent of all school buildings in the U.S. Sector were destroyed or in need of major The work of the Education and Cultural Relations' Branch during its past four years of operation has been five-fold: Supervision and control of the schools, scientific institutes, and in- stitutions of higher learning in the U.S. Sector of Berlin, Supervision of and assistance to youth activities, adult education, vo- cational education, and -women's affairs, Control of and assistance to reli- gious afiairs, and theater and music activities, Administration of a program of exchange of cultuial personnel and materials, Administration of various reorien- tation fund projects, and the operation of the Educational Service Center and numerous youth centers. 101 EDUCATION repairs, and sixty-six school buildings were being used for purposes other than school work, many of them as hospitals. All schools were cold, lacking in sanitary facilities, and seriously over-crowded. outlines for history teaching in grades 5-12 were drafted and accepted by the Kommandatura in the spring of 1947. Until this legislation was promul- gated, there was no post-war teaching of history in Berlin schools. Therefore, a committee of German historians and history instructors was formed, and it began preparing textbooks for those eight grades. Denazification, Food, Teaching Techniques Denazification procedures increased sharply the problem of finding qualified teaching personnel. It also tended to increase the average age of remain- ing instructors (by July, 1946, the average age of a Berlin school teacher was 57). Approximately a quarter of the employees of schools and of branches of the Public Education Department had been dismissed by the Magistral SCHOOL FEEDING Nearly half the schools in the U.S. Sector were destroyed, badly-wrecked, or used for other purposes. This damaged girls' school housed an emergency hospital in 1945. Pupils and teachers alike were badly-clothed. Many were in poor health, and all schools were desperately in need of textbooks, visual aids, and instructional materials. Even commonplace essen- tials such as pencils and chalk were rarities. Despite these obstacles, much progress was achieved in the first period of readjustment and planning towards the eradication of Nazi influences in the Berlin school system. An Education Com- mittee began meeting at the Kommandatura in August, 1945. Despite underlying differences of view, the four-power members of the committee succeeded in establishing a basic policy under which the city's school system has since operated. Sweeping School Reform Passed Of outstanding importance among the four-power decisions was the agreement on the School Reform Law for Berlin; approval of the history- teaching outline for grades 5-12; abolition of corporal punishment in the schools, provision for religious instruction in schools; and the estab- lishment of a much-needed school feeding program. The Berlin school law, put into effect on June 1, 1948, was the first school reform bill anywhere in Ger- many since the war. It provided for a unified school system of 12 years (Einheitsschule), compulsory for all children aged 6-18. The bill also provided for the supply of free textbooks and other teaching aids to schools, for a coedu- cational attendance system, and for the (advanced training of all teachers. The underlying principles and the before U.S. Military Government arrived din Berlin. From July, 1945, onward, 650 additional teachers (including religious instructors) were dismissed under denazification laws. Of these, however, 326 were later permitted to be reinstated. A special school feeding program was instituted by Military Government in cooperation with the Central Food Office of the Magistral. Soups and other foods made avail- able to children at their schools throughout the city provided 350 ad- ditional, much-needed calories daily. By November 2, 1945, 120,000 school books, printed under Ameri- can auspices, had been distributed to Berlin schools. In February, 1946, approval was given a Magistral plan for an eight months' teacher training program for the four sectors of Ber- lin. It was also during this month that the Kommandatura sent a delegation of represen- tative teachers to wit- ness the Niirnberg War Crimes Trials to inform Berlin educators and children of the fair Preamble to the School He form Law ’ for Greater Berlin "The task of the school la to develop fully all valuable dispositions of children, aa3 Juveniles and to impart to them the ut- most possible power of Judgement, thorough knowledge and skill# The aim aust be the formation of personalities who are capable of bringing about the complete reconstruct- ion of German life on a peaceful and demo- cratic basis, and who are imbued with an irreconcilable opposition to the Kazl ideol- ogy and a sense of responsibility towards hiBoanity. "These personalities must be fully aware of their responsibility towards the public, and their action will be guided hy recognis- ing the basic eouality of all men, respecting every honest .conviction and comprehending the modernising social conditions and of a peaceful accord amongst the nations, "Is this task, the Ancient -orId, Christian’- ity and those social movements vdiich are es- sential to t'-*> development of humanism, freedom and democracy, in at her words, all the Inherit- ance of human culture, Including German, is to find its place," EDUCATION 102 the summer of 1948, 6,500 selected boys and girls enjoyed 1he wholesome food and facilities of the camp which had been equipped with the cooperation of the U.S. Army. The Wannsee Center for Youth Work celebrated its first anniversary on February 20, 1949. The Center has served to provide educational facilities for Berlin's youth leaders and prospective com- munity leaders. Groups of forty young people between 17 and 24 years of age are accommodated for 12-day periods. During its first year of work the Center was thus able to give this special training to 700 young people. Four Main Youth Groups There are today four main youth organizations in Berlin, one of which—the Freie Deutsche Jugend —is Soviet-sponsored and communist-controlled. In U.S. Army equipment and guidance helped create summer camps, where thousands of needy Berlin youth found refuge from the city's ruins and want. legal processes used to bring their former Nazi leaders to justice. Films and lecture courses also assisted in a broad program of teacher training. A Curriculum and Textbook Writing Center (latter known as the Educa- tional Service Center) has been functioning since August, 1947—with up-to-date professional books, periodicals, library facilities, and conference rooms —to help reorient and broaden school administra- tors and teachers. The library at the Center, for example, now has over 10,000 books. Guidance for Youth Emphasized The formation of voluntary groups of young people for cultural, religious, and recreational purposes has been strongly emphasized by U.S. Military Government in Berlin. A youth center under U.S. sponsorship was opened in Zehlendorf, in the southwest of the city, in December, 1946, with facilities for 1,200 German young people. Six months later a summer camp was opened on Peacock Island on the Wannsee. During Seal of the Free University of Berlin July, 1949, the FDJ had a membership of 13,000, of which only 1,600 were from the U.S. Sector. The other three groups are located in the western sectors and include the Falken, a Social Democratic oriented group with a membership of 7,000, the Bund Deutscher Jugend, which follows Boy Scout lines of organization and activities and has become a strong, non-political group of 3,800 members, and the Demokratischer Jugendverband, a group more interested in discussions and camping, with 1,000 members. One of the most recent and most helpful contri- butions to German-American relations in the youth field was the establishment of a large Haus der Jugend in the U.S. Sector to serve as headquarters for the three organizations. Maintenance, rent, and salaries for its administrators are paid by the U.S. Army. The Berlin city government has gradually ex- panded its activities for youth in the past months, and, except for specific examples of help, Military Sports help bring home the meaning of Democracy: team-spirit. And American baseball has become a favorite game among youngsters of West Berlin. 103 EDUCATION Government has gradually been able to relinquish its role of initiator and sponsor. During the summer of 1949, for example, the Berlin Maaistrat was able to sponsor a variety of youth activities which reached nearly 100,000 of the city's young people. Higher Education: Soviet Monopoly Broken Continuous efforts were made between 1946 and 1948 by U.S. Military Government to bring the University of Berlin, located on Unter den Linden in the Soviet Sector, under quadri- partite control. The Russians were determined to keep the school, which had re-opened in January, 1946, under their own control. Both professors and students were selected on a political basis and academic freedom was denied. The university served, in fact, as a training ground for young com- munist "intellectuals” and professionals. Stu- dents who opposed the Soviet political line were expelled. An aspect of the Soviet attitude towards stu- dents is contained in the following report from a group of Berlin Uni- versity pupils who spent four weeks of their sum- mer vacation in Thu- ringia (Soviet Zone) to pursue field studies. They had been induced to do this by the com- munist-dominated "Stu- dents’ Union”. On their arrival they were treated as forced laborers; they spent their four weeks cutting down trees and carrying out other man- ual labor and were al- lowed no time for their intended study. Free University Projected The need for a free university steadily in- creased at that time, as did the demands of leading Berliners for a new university in the western sectors of the city, where objective education, and not propaganda for totali- tarianism, could be emphasized in the class-room. In the summer of 1948, plans were advanced to create a new university in the west of Berlin. Pro- fessor Ernst Reuter, later to become Head Mayor of Berlin, was appointed chair- man of a twelve-man committee to study the problems which first would have to be solved. By the end of July, a newly- organized secretariat was able to move into an empty building in the borough of Dahlem, and by September students were busy furnishing another building across the street and repairing the wing of a large museum three blocks away, preparing them to house the new school. During November, a faculty committee interviewed and screened more than 3,500 stu- dents. Finally, 2,200 were ad- vised that they might enroll. The first semester's classes were organized under three faculties of philosophy, law-economics, On December 4, 1948, and medicine-dentistry, the Titania-Palast was crowded to its more than 2,000 capacity for the inaugural ceremony of the Free University. General Frank L. How- ley, U.S. Sector Com- mandant, Head Mayor Reuter, and the novelist ThorntonWilder,address- ed the gathered stu- dents and civic leaders. Today, at the close of its first scholastic year, there are 4,000 students working in the 15 build- ings of the Free Uni- versity. There is a wait- ing list of more than 4,000 prospective stu- dents for the next term. Of those young men and women now in at- tendance—many of them helped repair the school buildings in their spare time—nearly a third are from the Soviet Zone. A quarter are from the Soviet-controlled Berlin University, from which they transferred as soon as there was an alternative. Forty-two of the remaining students are from outside Germany. Qualified observers report that the university has already attained a high academic standard. From a report by the OMGBS Education Officer, July, 1946: “No single phase of public life is more im- portant for the development of a country than is the education of its youth. For the future of Germany as a free and peaceful land, and thus in a larger sense for the future of the entire world, the training of German youth is a task of enormous signifi- cance; and the duty of those charged with its accomplishment is a grave and serious duty . . "There was never a richer opportunity. Ele- ments of Fascism undoubtedly persist, ele- ments of the youth who still cling blindly and desperately to a belief in Hitler and Na- tional-Socialism. The vast percentage, how- ever, is bitterly disillusioned. The only system of life most of them have ever known has collapsed about them, leaving them noth- ing to believe in, nothing to hope for, noth- ing to work for. And yet, being young, they will believe, they will hope, they will work. "Perhaps no generation of young people has ever before been so receptive, so hungry for knowledge. The old has failed them, and they want to have something new. The totalitarianism offered them through the Com- munist Party seems to them often only a repetition of Nazism. What they are to learn and what new ways they are to take is the trust of their teachers and their leaders in the fields of religion and of youth activities ..." Objective learning has replaced totalitarian propaganda in West Berlin schools. The Free University has 4,000 students, with thousands more on the waiting list. EDUCATION 104 the Soviet Sector—with 104 instructors and 1,160 students—should be moved at once to the west. On December 3rd, Stadtrat May was able to announce that 771 students and 75% of the teachers of the Teachers’ College were established in new quarters in the U.S. Sector. By the middle of December, 1948, seven vocation- al and professional schools—with an enrolment of 5,653 students and 226 teachers—had left the Soviet Sector and were established in the west. The number of schools increased to fifteen within the next several months, eight of them located in the American Sector. Their problems of equipment, TREND OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT Education Department Splits The establishment of the Free University was preceded by the transfer of the Public Education Department of the Magistral from the Soviet Sector to the West. On November 27, 1948, Stadtrat May reported to U.S. Military Government that his "deputy”, Wildangel had been conspiring with the Soviets to break up the Department. He declared TREND OF VOCATIONAL SCHOOL ENROLMENT books, and money have been difficult, but are now being gradually solved. Assistance, both financial and educational, has been forthcoming from U.S. Military Government for more than five thousand needy students at the several advanced schools in the city. Freedom of Faith Restored The U.S. Sector of Berlin at the end of the war contained thirty-six separate and distinct religious groups, of which the Evangelical Church was the largest with nearly 700,000 adherents, and the Roman Catholic Church second, with 120,000. TREND OF SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT that the Magistral would probably suspend the communist agent; and that the Soviets would in retaliation probably suspend May. In anticipation of such an action, therefore, May transferred his headquarters and all important files of the Public Education Department to the British Sector, and about 50% of the department personnel followed him. The immediate problem then was to provide a haven for the many east sector officials, teachers and principals who were forced to flee immediately because of their known sympathies with the West. May’s new office was so swamped with applica- tions for positions in the western school system that a policy was adopted accepting only those who were in immediate professional or personal danger. A week later, it was decided that the Pddago- gische Hochschule (Teachers’ College) located in TREND OF SPECIAL SCHOOL ENROLMENT Note: Graphs refer to enrolment in U.S. Sector. 105 EDUCATION ganizations as the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra and the RIAS Symphony, and accommodates visiting foreign artists and OMGUS-sponsored American artists. The world-known Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra has made extensive tours through the British and REORIENTATION FILM PROGRAM American Zones and completed this past spring its first guest tour of England since the war. The orchestra is also scheduled to make a series of guest appearances in Edinburgh during August, 1949. American and other foreign dramatic productions have been in great demand since the war in Berlin theaters. The ten theaters in the U. S. Sector have produced a large number of successful adaptations during the past four years, ranging from "A Mid- summer Night's Dream" to "Three Men on a Horse". The revival of free worship is typified by this Jewish service held openly for the first time in over a decade in a city where anti-Semitism was once a vicious fad- An important step in the field of religious affairs was the re-establishment of the Evangelical theo- logical seminary, the Kirchliche Hochschule, which at first had been forced underground and then liqui- dated by the Nazis. A second step was a Komman- datura order permitting religious instruction in Berlin schools to all children whose parents so desired. Aid has also been given during the past four years to church leaders to assist in the resumption of religious services, in the repair of churches—of which 65% were totally destroyed or badly damaged and only one percent remained intact—and in the printing of several approved church publications. Other Kommandatura orders facilitated the inter- zonal travel of religious authorities and made possible the radio broadcasting of religious services. Officers of Military Government have also been able on many occasions to help religious leaders to reorganize the adherents of their faiths after long periods underground during the Nazi regime. Strong Revival in Cultural Field Theater and Music, formerly a concern of the Information Services Branch, was transferred to the Education Branch in December, 1948. Activities in this field during the past months have consisted of supervision and assistance to the Berlin Philhar- monic Orchestra and ten American-licensed thea- ters, the distribution of American plays on request, and the registration and political clearance of artists, publishers, and agencies. Titania Palast, the largest theater in the U.S. Sec- tor, was formerly the home of the American radio station, RIAS. It now houses such cultural or- Only one percent of Berlin's churches remained intact in 1945. But with the enthusiastic help and willing labor of their faithful, many have since been restored. EDUCATION 106 Repairing bombed water mains irf p 1945 was only the beginning pi Public Utility problems in Beylin. A PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES Berlin is the world's largest city in area. Its 880 square kilometers (compared with 655 for London, 588 for New York, 500 for Paris) were before the war only about 28 °/o fully developed. Lakes and forests cover 27 °/« of the city, with the remaining 45 % mainly undeveloped and consisting of scattered small houses and industries. During the war Berlin's population decreased from about 4V4 to 3V4 million, making the city's population density less than one-third that of New York. Because of the large area and lower density of population, the utility problems of Berlin are some- what. different from those of other large cities. The wholesale destruction suffered by the city through air bombardment and artillery fire during the war also altered these problems considerably. After four years of repair and restoration of public works and utilities, there are still restricted allocations and rationing of electricity and gas throughout Berlin. The major difficulties experienced in the rehabilitation and maintenance of the city's utilities since the war has been the shortage of all types of repair and construction materials and the shortage of labor, especially trained and experienced technical employees. A high percentage of the present utilities workers are far above normal age for the occupation. (Before the war the average age of electric company employees was 33 years; it is now 45 years. The average age of gas company employees is 50, compared with a pre-war age of 42.) An additional major problem is absenteeism, amounting to 15 to 20 percent in winter and 8 to 10 percent in summer. Obvious reasons for this high rate are shortages of food, housing, and other per- ponal problems, as well as recurring sickness. British-Soviet Power Agreement The Berlin utilities companies, and indirectly the consumers, were benefited by the Coal and Import Power Agieement reached between British and Soviet zonal authorities in the latter part of 1947. This agreement, effective for one year beginning October 1, 1947, specified the amounts of coal and import power to be brought into Berlin. Before the agreement, the city's utilities had no advance indication as to what amounts of imported elec- tricity and coal would be available. The supply of materials and repair parts from the zones was increasingly important because of the nearly complete exhaustion of the small reserves previously available in Berlin. Increased difficulty was encountered by Berlin utility companies in attempting to purchase materials and supplies from the zones. On the other hand, quadripartite agree- ments and assistance from Military Government officials improved the availability of some of the more critical repair items. Because of the shortage of coal supply and limited production capacity of utility plants, rationing of gas and electric service continued. Under the provisions of Allied Control Authority Law # 19, penalties for consumption in excess of allocation were severe, varying from a surcharge at the rate 107 PUBLIC WORKS of 100 times the normal charge to the same surcharge plus 30 days disconnection of supply and up to three months imprisonment. Quadripartite operation of the public utilities was split by the Soviet Military Government on June 23, 1948, when the Soviets ordered the stoppage of the distribution of import power. A second Soviet order forbade the distribution of electricity to the western sectors from power plants located in the eastern sector, breaking the Coal and Import Power Agreement formulated in the latter part of 1947. A blockade of all transportation facilities in and out of Berlin followed the power blockade. Coal stocks for all utilities, at the beginning of the blockade, totalled approximately 90,000 tons. In an effort to conserve coal, restrictions were immediately ordered. Since coal deliveries into Berlin were completely halted, further restrictions were orderd July 8 and August 8, 1948. Although the Air Lift was immediately inaugurated, coal deliveries were small until late July, 1948. Prior deliveries were only sufficient to meet the daily demand, thus presenting a stock-piling problem for winter consumption vital to public utility oper- ation. ELECTRICITY ALLOCATION IN BERLIN On approximately August 1st, deliveries began to exceed consumption. On November 1st, the stocks again reached the 90,000 ton mark. Dense fogs and cold weather during November, December, 1948, and February, 1949, played havoc with coal deliveries. During this critical period, coal stocks dwindled to approximately 30,000 tons amounting to a 12-day stock. Beginning March 15, 1948, coal stocks began rising due to the increase of Air Lift and seasonal decrease of consumption. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY The City of Berlin is supplied with electric power by one company, the Berliner Kraft- und Licht Aktiengesellschaft (Berlin Power and Light Com- pany, Inc.), known as BEWAG. It was one of the first joint stock companies in Germany, formed as a private enterprise in 1885. Before and during the war, two-thirds of Berlin's electric power were generated in nine local power plants and one-third was imported over six overhead lines. As a result of war damages, the capacity of the local plants dropped from 800,000 to 175,000 KW, while the imported power dropped from 202,000 to 130,000 KW. The imported power, under control of Soviet authorities, has been unreliable. Even since May 12, 1949, when the siege was lifted, import power has been less reliable than before the blockade. The British-Russian agreement on the importation of coal and electricity provided that 650,000,000 KWH and 812,000 tons of coal be imported for the BEWAG system from October 1, 1947, to September 30, 1948, and guaranteed a minimum of 60,000 KW of import power during peak load periods. This minimum of import power would have aided considerably in stabilizing the electricity situation, had it not been broken by the Soviets on June 23, 1948. Operation of Power Plants The following table lists the power plants of the BEWAG system for the City of Berlin, indicating Coal Consumption by Public Utilities (Western Sectors) Blockade Period, 1948-1949 Electricity Service Gas Service Water and Sewerage Service PUBLIC WORKS 108 installed and available boiler and turbine capacities, as of August, 1949: Fortunately, weather conditions for the winter of 1948/49 were mild and restrictions were well enforced. Therefore, no serious difficulties were presented by failure of power plant equipment. By the shifting of load and balancing the distribution system, the specific consumption was improved to .9 kg coal/kwh. "Berlin West" Being Restored In April, 1948, BEWAG was ordered to rehabilitate the power plant known as Berlin West, one of the city’s most modern local power plants. Before the war this plant was one of Berlin's largest single manufacturers of electricity, with a capacity of 228.000 KW. The plant was completely dismantled and removed as reparations by the Russians. It is now being rehabilitated to a capacity of 100,000 KW with a target completion date of December 1, 1949. Over 7.000 tons of construction material and machinery from the western zones are required for the rehabilitation of the Berlin West plant. Considerable planning was required to transport about 1,500 tons of heavy and bulky items via Air Lift. With the completion of this power plant, some of the older plants will be removed from service, re- sulting in greatly increased efficiency and capacity. Early in December, 1948, the Soviet Military Government effected a split in the BEWAG administration, thus creating separate admini- strations for BEWAG East and BEWAG West. The grid system connecting the east and west sectors, however, was not af- Boiler and Turbine Capacities -p t>, . Installed Available Installed Available .rower runts KW KW KW KW PLANT CAPAC- ITY KW Klingenberg (s) 182,000 131,000 230,000 145,000 131,000 Rummelsburg (s) 50,000 30,000 76,000 60,000 30,000 Charlqttenburg (w) Charlottenburg 60,000 24,000 43,000 22,500 22,500 (Ruths accum) — — 40,000 40,000 20,000 Moabit (w) 54,000 27,000 65,500 30,000 27,200 Spandau (w) 16,000 12,000 14,000 5,000 5,000 Wilmersdorf (w) 18,000 9,500 25,000 25,000 9,500 Stegl'itz (w) 11,500 9,600 6,000 3,000 3,000 Schoneberg (w) 8,700 4,200 7,500 7,500 2,000 Unterspree (w) 16,000 8,000 31,700 22,000 8,000 TOTAL 416,200 255,500 538,700* 360,000* 258,200* •) Including Ruths accumulator turbine capacity. This capac- ity can be maintained for two hours. (s) Power Plants located in Soviet Sector (w) Power Plants located in western sectors "Berlin West", a modern power station, stripped bare by the Rus- sians in 1945 for war reparations. Due to repairs and scheduled overhauling of two of the three units at Klingenberg, the out- put of this plant has decreased, requiring the older power plants to operate at maximum capacity. This, combined with the non- availability of repair parts, has shortened the life of the old equipment. As a result, con- tinuity of service from this old equipment cannot be depended upon. The breaking of the Bri- tish-Russian agreement on the importation of coal and electricity and dis- continuance of electric power transfers from the Soviet Sector and Zone forced the western authorities to harness all available power plants in the western sectors. These plants, with an average age of approximately 35 years, had a specific coal con- sumption of approximately 1 kg of coal per KWh. The continuity of service was greatly impaired by full utilization of old power plant equipment. Being repaired with airlifted equipment. Right in final stageof restoration. fected by the administrative split, and power con- tinued to flow from the east sector to the west sec- tors and vice versa. Rationing of Electricity The first order relative to the rationing of electric power was issued on August 20, 1945, permitting a maximum consumption of 2,700,000 KWh per day. On November 15, 1945, this was 109 PUBLIC WORKS increased to 3,400,000 KWh per day and on January 17, 1946, to 4,900,000 KWh per day. A new basic order was issued to the mayor of Berlin on January 29, 1946, providing rationing prin- ciples, specific regulations for domestic consumers, specialists, etc., rules for operation and penalties. By this order the City Council established in- dividual allocations for various types of industries. Because of the shortage of coal deliveries and small plant capacity, however, the Allied Kom- mandatura ordered on November 30, 1946 a re- duction of all allocations established in the city. On June 5, 1947, this order was revoked and a new maximum allocation of 3,726,000 KWh per day was established. Due to difficulties in repairing and maintaining power plants, as well as the decrease of coal shipments, the city again was forced to reduce the allocations during the winter of 1947/48. This second reduction remained in effect until February 1, 1948. A Kommandatura order of March 13, 1948, established a new rationing system and granted higher allocations of electricity for domestic con- sumers. The order stated in part: "The electricity allocation ior domestic consumers for lighting, ironing, and minor purposes is fixed at 300 WH per day per family, plus 100 WH per day per person. If electric cooking is the only means of preparing a meal, an additional allocation of 700 WH per day per family plus 600 WH per day per person will be granted An additional 100 WH per day was authorized to children under five, families living in cellars without natural light, and sick persons certified as needing the extra allocation for recovery. Current Cuts To Save Coal The current and transportation blockade imposed by the Soviets forced the western sectors to reimpose current interruptions in an effort to con- serve coal stocks and provide an equitable current distribution with the limited available capacity. Effective June 24, 1948, current interruptions in effect during the winter of 1947/48 were re- established. Electric allocations were reduced to the following percentage of the previous allocations: Industries 25 °/o Cooking allocation, domestic consumers . 75 % Lighting, ironing, domestic consumers . . 50 % Municipal buildings 25 °/o Transportation 50% Medical-educational group 75 % On July 8, 1948, a further reduction of electric consumption by consumer groups and coal con- sumption for electric plants was placed into effect. Effective August 6th, a reduction from 1,000 tons per day to 750 tons per day was ordered and an additional 25% reduction of cooking allocation for domestic consumers. On May 21, 1949, after the blockade had been lifted, the allocations were again restored to pre- siege level, made possible by increased coal stocks and partial lifting of the transportation and power blockade. On July 1, 1949, the allocation for domestic cooking was increased by 1 KWh per day per house- hold until September 30, 1949. In an effort to improve the supervision and control of electric consumption, the Kommandatura estab- lished a Ration Control Office in November, 1945. Inspectors made continuous surveys throughout the city to determine whether or not the orders of the Kommandatura covering electricity rationing were being obeyed. Any failure on the part of the Magistrat or its employees, the BEWAG or its employees, in com- plying with Kommandatura directives were reported ELECTRICITY SUPPLY OF BERLIN all V jtciorj July, 1945—June, 1949 J Western Sectors PUBLIC WORKS to the quadripartite Public Utilities Committee of the Kommandatura. Any violations of individ- uals or establishments in carrying out orders of the Magistral or BEWAG were reported to thq Magistral. In spite of the blockade and breaking of quadripartite operation by the Soviets, the Ration Control Office functioned until December, 1948. Due to the increase of load, shortage of available capacity, and shortage of coal, the power demands have exceeded the plant capacity during the winter months. It has been necessary therefore to disconnect electric circuits throughout the city during peak load periods. The difference between supply and demand was so great by January, 1947, that inter- ruptions of eight to ten hours per day were neces- sary. Disconnections were reduced by March, 1947, to four hours per day, and almost com- pletely eliminated by April, 1947. Beginning in September, 1947, however, disconnections were again initiated with scheduled interruptions for periods of two to four hours per day, and were, in October and November, 1947, in- creased to four to six hours. The implementation of the British and Russian Power Agreement in- creased the amount of import power sufficiently, so that inter- ruptions were discontinued after December 20, 1947. Disconnections were again in- itiated the latter part of June, 1948, with the discontinuance of import and locally generated power by the Soviets. These interruptions were for periods of 17 to 20 hours per day and con- tinued until the end of the blockade on May 12, 1949. GAS SUPPLY In 1923, the Berlin municipality formed the Ber- liner Stddtische Gaswerke AG (GASAG)—(Berlin City Gasworks, Inc.) to operate its various gas properties. This is a city-owned and operated corpo- ration, controlling all of Berlin's 120-year old gas industry. From 1940 to 1945, Berlin received gas by pipe line from coke plants about 125 miles west of the city. The maximum capacity of this line was 1,600,000 cbm per day, with an average daily import of.601,000 cbm. The pipe line was partly removed by the Soviets in 1946, and has not been replaced. During the war, gas was generated in eight widely separated gas plants in Berlin. The highest, gas consumption was reached during the period 1942/1943 and amounted to 2,150,000 cbm per day. As a result of war damages the capacity of the gas plants was reduced to approximately 32,300 cbm. One gas plant was totally destroyed by air raids. Another was shut down after the war. The other six plants are in operation, although none are back to pre-war capacity. Most of the city’s gas holders were destroyed during the war. Their capacities were, at the beginn- ing of the war, 2,100,000 cbm. By the end of the war this figure had been reduced to 360,000 cbm. At the present time the capacity os 750,000 cbm. The rehabilitation of the gas distribution system in Berlin is indicated as follows: Pipe Lines Kilometers Beginning of the war Kilometers End of the war Kilometers July, 1949 High Pressure 290 260 290 Middle Pressure 120 116 120 Low Pressure 6,598 2,270 6,104 Total 7,008 2,646 6,514 Service to the center of the city has been dis- continued. In this district the low pressure pipe lines were so completely destroyed that the whole district had to be cut off. Plans have not yet been GAS SERVICE OF BERLIN July, 1945 — June, 1949 > all ♦ sectors J Western Jectorj completed for the rehabilitation of gas supply to this section. The restoration of service to gas consumers is as follows: _ Beqinninq Consumers c or war September 1, 1945 Present time Factories and industrial enterprises 22,000 0 22,500 Small trades and house- holds 1,353,000 180,000 918,500 Total 1,375,000 180,000 941,000 Before the war 80°/o of Berlin's street lighting was done with gas, with 87,300 gas lights in operation. From a complete discontinuance of all gas lights at the end of the war, 14,200 have now been re-installed. During the blockade, all street lights were discontinued, except at dangerous inter- sections, to help conserve the coal stocks. Gas Rationing The first order by the Kommandatura establishing a domestic gas ration was issued on October 8, 1945, and provided for the preparation of one hot meal per day. The original order has been revised twice, increasing the allocation by about 50°/o for an average household of three persons. The allocations for individual commercial and industrial undertakings are fixed by the City Council 111 PUBLIC WORKS GAS ALLOCATION IN BERLIN of water. In addition there are five booster stations with a daily total capacity of 500,000 cubic meters, seven water towers with a storage capacity of 12,000 cubic meters cast iron pipe distribution system, 6,400 kilometers in length and varying in diameter from eight to 150 centimeters, and 69 reser- voirs with a total storage capacity of 475,000 cubic meters. The annual total water output of all plants in 1939 amounted to 175,000,000 cubic meters. In 1945 it had decreased to 147,000,000 cubic meters. After the completion of a two-year repair and recon- struction program, water production has been increased to the present figure of approximately 234,000,000 cubic meters. Approximately 90% of Berlin’s water supply is obtained from 1,800 wells, which vary in depth from 100 to 160 feet. All water is filtered, aerated, and stored in 69 reservoirs, where chlorine is added before it is pumped into the distribution system. During hostilities, one of the city's 16 water plants was totally destroyed, eight were partially de- stroyed, six slightly damaged and one undamaged. Of the 69 reservoirs, seven were damaged. Five booster stations were damaged and six of the seven water towers were partially destroyed. By the end of 1945, repairs were completed sufficiently to restore water service to most of the city. Now, after more than four years of intensive reconstruction, the Berlin Water Works has repaired 98°/o of all known breaks in the distribution system, 88°/o of its plant destruction, more than, 60°/o of the booster station damage, and 90% of the demolished water towers. Of 140 bridge lines destroyed, more than 60 have been permanently reconstructed. With the exception of the split in the admini- stration, March 26, 1949, the water works operated normally during the period of the blockade. SEWERAGE SERVICE Before the war, the sewerage system in Greater Berlin consisted of a network of pipes constructed of stoneware, clay, cast iron, and wrought iron, with from group allocations established by the Kom- mandatura. On July 10, 1948, because of the blockade, a 50°/o reduction of all gas consumers, and a coal con- sumption not to exceed 600 tons per day, was ordered. To conserve further the rapidly decreasing coal stocks, GASAG was ordered a month later to reduce the coal consumption to 550 tons per day and to reduce the gas pressure in the pressure net to five mm between nine o'clock at night and five o'clock in the morning. The coal allocation was increased to 1,000 tons per day on December 1, 1948, which allowed a production of 300 tons of coke per day for distri- bution to households and industries. This also allowed an increase of the domestic gas allocation to 75°/o of the normal allocation. By May 16, 1949, the normal gas allocation had been restored. The Soviet Military Authorities, on March 26, 1949, ordered a split in the administration of GASAG east and west. This did not affect the physical operation of the gas plants, how- ever, since gas mains leading to the east sector had to be dis- connected because of limited ca- pacity and shortage of coal stocks. WATER SUPPLY Before 1945, Greater Berlin was supplied with water by two com- panies, the Berlin Municipal Wa- ter-Works and the Charlottenbur- ger Water and Industrial Works Inc. In September, 1945, the two firms incorporated as "Berlin Wa- ter-Works", with the controlling shares held by the City of Berlin. At present, the Berlin Water- Works has under its control 16 water plants with a daily capac- ity of 1,200,000 cubic meters WATER SERVICE OF BERLIN July, 1945 — June, 1S49 PUBLIC WORKS 112 SEWERAGE SERVICE OF BERLIN July, 1945 — June, 1949 either totally or partially destroy- ed during the war. A combination of these two losses resulted in a complete collapse in the entire cleaning and disposal system. Clean-Up Campaigns Since July, 1945, this department has made a remarkable recovery by restoring to full time operation more than 300 pieces of damaged street cleaning equipment. This is augmented by additional horse- drawn vehicles and a substantial number of manually-drawn carts. During the spring of 1947, and again in 1948, the Street Cleaning Department, implementing a U.S. Military Government order, conducted a special clean-up campaign to remove accumulated refuse from the U. S. Sector. Because of war damages which had not yet been repaired, thousands of apartments, houses, and other buildings had no toilet or kitchen-waste disposal connections to the city sewerage system. Toilet and kitchen refuse was dumped into garbage cans or strewn in the back yards. The purpose of the campaign was to eliminate these breeding places of disease-carry- ing insects and rodents. During the clean-up drive in 1947, 187,000 tons of refuse were removed from the U.S. Sector by more than 4,800 laborers and 335 trucks, including 60 U. S. Army trucks. In the 1948 clean-up campaign the Street Cleaning Department removed a total of 30,000 tons. Approximately 1,400 laborers and 175 vehicles, including 25 U. S. Army trucks, were employed to complete this drive. At the end of the war, the entire system of collecting and removing garbage in the City of Berlin was completely disorganized. Four hundred and forty-four pieces of motorized, horse-drawn, and hand-operated equipment were either destroyed or damaged. Rail transportation facilities for remov- ing garbage were destroyed. Barges that norm- ally carried garbage through the city waterways to outlying dumps could not operate because the channels built of cement and bricks. This system consisted of approximately 3,750 miles of gravity lines, 437 miles of pressure lines, 87 pumping stations, and two clarification plants. At the end of the war, the gravity and pressure pipe network had 4,354 known major breaks. Of the 87 pumping stations, five were totally destroyed, 10 partially destroyed and 33 slightly damaged. The remainder of the pumping stations were in- operative because of the numerous breaks in the drainage and collecting system. Approximately 400,000 cbm of sewage flowed daily into the lakes, rivers, and canals, creating a serious health problem. The clarification plants sustained major bomb damages during the war and the irrigation fields were honeycombed with craters. Two gas collectors and a sludge bed were destroyed, resulting in the loss of the use of the digester tanks. The digest or tank and gas collection reservoir located at the city's other installation were also destroyed. Due to current interruptions during the blockade, many of the pumping stations became inoperative. The sewerage was discharged by gravity flow into the canals and lakes of the western sectors. The Sewage Department was not effected by the blockade, however, except for the splitting of the adminis- tration, in December, 1948. STREET CLEANING AND GARBAGE REMOVAL In Berlin, street cleaning and garbage removal are combined under one city department. The Street Cleaning Section is responsible for the cleanliness of 50,000,000 square meters of public streets in the city, of which 17,000,000 square meters are in the U.S. Sector. Before the war the department had 745 trucks, sweepers, sprin- klers, and other special street cleaning equipment in operation. During the war and after the ca- pitulation of Berlin, 740 of these vehicles were destroyed, damaged, or removed. Moreover, most of the maintenance and repair shops were GARBAGE REMOVAL IN U. S. SECTOR July, 1945 — June, 1949 113 PUBLIC WORKS Spring Ciean-Up Campaigns 1947-48, U.S. Sector public utility functions, the So- viets also split the administration of the garbage removal depart- ment on December 1, 1948. STREETS AND BRIDGES The reconstruction and repair of public streets in Berlin began in July, 1945. The first step was carried out by the civil popula- tion in clearing rubble from main thoroughfares and side- walks. The second step was the repair of road surfaces, which was accomplished with a limited number of skilled road laborers. Main traffic lines and connect- ing streets were the first to be repaired. The work was under- taken by 160 private contractors, with 20 of these firms repairing asphalt roads and the remaining 140 working on stoneblock or cobblestone streets. Public streets in the U. S. Sector of Berlin total 1,070 kilometers, with an overall surface area of 7,500,000 square meters. Since July, 1945, 5,500,000 square meters of street surface and 2,500,000 square meters of sidewalk have been repaired in the U. S. Sector. Of the 225 street bridges in Greater Berlin, 165 were demolished or badly damaged during the war. Within the U. S. Sector, 51 of 65 bridges were either destroyed or damaged. Ten of these U. S. Sector bridges have been reconstructed by the City Bridge Department. Five were repaired by the U. S. Army Engineers during the early days of the occupation. Remnants of 11 bridges were entirely removed from the canals to open the waterways. Eight bridges are presently under reconstruction or repair, with plans completed to rebuild the remaining seventeen. Total refuse remowa (tons) Average no. of laborers employed daily Average no. of venicles employed daily Total cost of operation (RM) canals were not navigable. Rail loading platforms and barge loading docks for garbage removal were destroyed. Since July, 1945, almost half of the total amount of equipment damaged during the war has been repaired and pressed into service. With the resto- ration of rail transportation facilities, opening of the waterways, and the procurement of new garbage removal equipment during 1945-1947, the Garbage Removal Department made satisfactory progress towards reaching its pre-war capacity. In 1945, the worst year in the history of the Garbage Removal Department, only 125,000 tons of garbage were removed, while in 1947 1,500,000 tons were removed. Seventy-eight percent of the pre-war capacity was reached in 1948. Bridge repairs in Berlin were essential before normal transportation could be resumed. Five out of every six bridges in the U.S. Sector had been destroyed. The blockade of Berlin presented difficulties to the garbage department due to lack of rail and barge facilities for garbage disposal. Garbage in- cinerators were established in large bomb craters and this proved to be a very effective method of garbage disposal. As in other departments of Electric, gas, and water meters were closely watched in blockaded Berlin and ration offenders severely punished. PUBLIC WORKS 114 MANPOWER 'A* Armed Soviet police patrol West Berlin rail yards during the UGO strike. Military Government has sought for the past four years to awaken among German work- men a sense of initiative, cooperation, and under- standing of the meaning of freedom. That real pro- gress has been achieved is evident from the revi- val of responsible trade unionism and from the cour- age and self-confidence of the workers of Western Berlin. At the beginning, we found the Germans thoroughly cowed, apathetic, and fearful of display- ing any initiative. Today, these same people have openly and repeatedly resisted the physical threat of communist domination. We have found labor union leaders emerge from the mass, assert them- selves, gain wisdom, and organize an effective grouping, the UGO, whidi has successfully resisted Soviet pressure and blandishments of all kinds. We have seen, during the blockade period, Ger- man labor office personnel working daily in cold, unheated offices, in order to pay out vitally-needed unemployment compensation to their fellow- citizens. This heartening progress has not been without problems, hurdles, and sometimes heartbreaks. And it has been made against a tumultous background of continuing conflict between East-West ideolo- gies, a conflict in which the Berlin workman has played a front-line role. The Magistral Labor Department The three Western Allies fell heir to an adminis- trative frame-work which had been established by the Soviets in May and June, 1945. It followed closely the form of the pre-war German city governmental system. Each of Berlin’s twenty boroughs (Bezirke) has a district labor office responsible for the registration and administration of its local population. Above these offices is the main Labor Department of the Magistral. Its major responsibilities are five-fold: Labor allocation Wage tariffs and labor standards Labor protection Vocational training and re-training Social insurance The Allied Kommandatura authorized the con- tinued use of pre-1945 wage tariffs, and has since permitted relaxations of the salary ceilings when, necessary. In this field, Military Government ad- visers have always maintained a specialized rela- tionship with the Labor Department of the Magistral. All apprentices and vocational training facilities were placed under the Magistral's supervision in 1945. During the blockade, emergency regulations were issued, setting up twelve special workshops because—with the considerable decrease in indus- trial activity—there were no longer facilities enough for apprenticeships. Compulsory insurance for all workers, employees, and independent tradesmen (who do not employ more than five persons) was established by Kom- mandatura order at the beginning of the Occupation. This insurance is financed by a 10°/« tax on employers against their gross wage bill and an 115 MANPOWER equal rate of tax on employees against their gross wage. At the present time, approximately 900,000 Ber- liners from the three western sectors are active paying members of the scheme. The split of the VAB (Social Insurance Institute) in February, 1949, upset its financial position. A large percentage of its assets were retained in the Soviet Sector, and it was necessary for the Magistral to issue credits to it. Today, the VAB has no reserves and exists on a hand-to-mouth basis. Its total monthly income is about 35 million Westmarks; its monthly expendi- tures in benefits are 33 million Westmarks, and administration expenses require the remaining two million. Some 12,000 German civilians are at present employed by the U.S. Occupation Forces and Mili- On the other hand, the inflated Reichsmark, me widespread black market and the generally low morale following the collapse of Germany had an adverse effect on woiking standards. (The blade market sale of a single package of cigarettes, for example, would finance three months' supply of rationed food, rent, telephone, and transportation costs.) There was, therefore, little incentive for the average person to work diligently and faithfully. Employers were compelled in many cases to have over-sized staffs to accomplish the same work that a smaller group could have done before the war. At the beginning of the blockade, the total labor force in the three western sectors was 940,000. At the present time it is 1,091,000. Employment fell rapidly during the blockade because of the much reduced supplies of fuel, power, and raw materials. At the same time the number of persons seeking work increased, because the currency re- form had wiped out Reichsmark holdings and greatly decreased blade marketeering. Elaborate demolition and reha- bilitation projects were drawn up by the Magistrat to absorb the ever- increasing number of laid-off work- ers. Eventually over 40,000 people were employed in the various public schemes. At the beginning of the blockade, 35,000 people were registered as “unemployed and seeking work". By the end of the blockade, this figure had increased to more than 150,000. Three months later, 227,000 per- sons are now registered as seeking work, and 885,000 are actually em- ployed. Western Berlin is also heavily burdened with an unproductive population, includ- ing many thousands of welfare, social insurance, and unemployment compensation recipients. Before NUMBER OF PERSONS RECEIVING PUBLIC SUPPORT IN BERLIN 3 WESTERN SECTORS JUNE 1948 JUNE 1949 I. Relief Recipients: g. VA B Pensioners m. Jnemptoyment Compensation * Includes 61,865 people receiving short-time workers' compensation. tary Government in Berlin. This is a sharp reduc- tion from the figure of 45,000 in 1947. The service of this labor force is charged against Occupation costs, and its administration is the re- sponsibility of the military organization. Manpower Branch is in continuous contact with the problems of labor allocation, wage tariff, and employment practices as they arise, and is thus able to guide the U.S. German Personnel Office in aligning its policies with those prevailing among the mass of workers. Employment Drops During Blockade Until the currency reform and the Soviet blockade, employment in Greater Berlin had always been very high. Allied Control Authority Order 3 required the compulsory registration of all males between the ages of 14 and 65 and of all females between 15 and 50. WPA-Iike projects, sponsored by the Magistral, helped absorb blockade unemployment in Western Berlin and clear some of the mountainous debris from the city's nuns. MANPOWER 116 and during the war an important segment of the city's population was employed in federal govern- ment jobs. Unless Berlin is restored as a federal capital or there is a great commercial-industrial boom in the city, it is to be expected that the pre- sent level of unemployment will be continuous. This political stress was reflected in the almost exclusive use of political propaganda in so-called trade union schools, the straight communist line of the official newspaper of the FDGB, the sup- pression of differing points of view in trade union councils, the political manipulation to exclude other than communists from key positions of the leadership, interference and competition with the functions of the Magistral and political use of those functions such as food and clothing allocation. There developed within the FDGB, however, an increasingly strong group opposed to the communist concept of unionism and in favor of the develop- ment of a non-partisan federation of autonomous unions based on the maintenance of individual rights, freedom, and responsibilities and upon the free expression of differing points of view. The spearhead of the opposition appeared in two unions which soon achieved a majority opposition vote, namely, the Commercial Employees’ and the Technicians' Unions. Majority opposition also appeared in the Teachers' and Agricultural Unions. In the fall of 1947, opposition members were estimated at approximately 120,000 to 150,000 out of a total of 600,000. In November, 1947, union leaders consolidated the various opposition groups into a single force, on a non-partisan basis, which was quickly made representative of all opposition forces in all existing unions. In the elections of the communist-dominated FDGB in the spring of 1948 the opposition polled a majority which was stolen by the communist election committee. At this point the opposition declared itself to be the provisional management of the FDGB of Greater Berlin and established its own headquarters and its own operating mechanism. Estimated increase ol unemployment in % of available total labor force in western sectors of Berlin during the blockade Employed Unemployed Note: The T.L.F. increased from approx. 940,000 in July, 1948 to approx. 1,091,000 in June, 1949; unemployed from approx 40,000 in July, 1948 to approx. 151,000 in June, 1949. Total available labor force = 100 %. Trade Union Development Military Government has from the beginning en- couraged the re-development of democratic trade unionism in Germany. From June, 1945, until May, 1948, the Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaitsbund (FDGB) was the union federation of Berlin. This was a highly centralized organization controlled by officials appointed by or elected through the influence of the communist faction or the Soviet Military Administration. In such a federation the unions existed as departments and not as autonomousunits.Finances were cen- tralized through the collection of in- dividual dues by the central treasury, with the resulting financial subjuga- tion of individual union activities to the will of the central federation. The control from the central feder- ation was effected through district offices manned by paid FDGB offi- cials, who were directed primarily not by individual unions but by a 45-member managing committee of the FDGB, consisting of 40 commu- nists and five independents. The character of the FDGB has been shaped by the policies of Ger- man communists working under the direction of the Russians. Chief emphasis has shifted from matters primarily the concern of trade unions to political activities. Population and Employment Three Western Sectors As reported for March, 1949 by the Magistral 117 MANPOWER On June 9, 1948, the U.S. Commandant recognized the provisional management of the FDGB as the authoritative governmental body of the trade union federation in Berlin. At the same time, recognition of the U.S. Military Government was withdrawn from the executive committee of the FDGB, whose headquarters are in the Soviet Sector, as the, properly elected representatives of the trade unions. A Berlin member of UGO, who was an official dele- gate of Germany at the Geneva Conference in June, 1949, called for the formation of the international democratic trade union federation. Nearly every individual union within UGO has been invited to join its corresponding international federation. In terms of democratic organization, UGO has in its short life developed individual union autonomy to a high degree. Although young leadership is lacking, the existing leaders, most of whom are of the pre-1933 era, bring to their work a thorough knowledge of trade unionism and a growing grasp of democratic principles. In combatting the effects of the Soviet blockade, the Independent Trade Union Organization has taken its place in the front ranks of Berliners. It has been a stabilizing influence in maintaining the work- ers' morale; it has assumed obligations in order to maintain the trade union unemployment benefit payments. The leaders of UGO have taken the initiative in developing personal relations with the leaders of industry. In spite of the depression which inevitably descended upon the population when factories closed and lights went out in the summer of 1948, UGO rallied to the standard of trade unionism hundreds of young people, who spent many hours of their time in groups for discussion and study in the new trade union center, Leuschner-Haus. The new democratic trade union federation fruit- fully maintained its non-partisan position. This attitude contributed toward a most successful re- lationship of individual trade unionists with the political parties of their choice. UGO trade union members in West Berlin have learned the meaning and the importance of the secret ballot. This action on the part of the U.S. Commandant was based on the result of the 1948 spring elections when the provisional management of the FDGB received a clear victory of 75—80°/« in the 12 western boroughs. They won a minimum of 45°/« in the Metal Union and a majority in the Public Services', Commercial Employees', Railroad, Post, Technical Employees', Teachers' and Agricultural Unions. The estimate of the popular vote for all of Berlin was that the opposition achieved approximately a 60% majority. Within the next month, recognition came to this democratic trade union federation from the two great federations in America, the CIO and AF of L (including the Brotherhoods of Railway Workers), and from the Trade Union Congress of Great Britain. In July, the three Western Commandants autho- rized the Oherbilrgermeister to recognize the new trade union federation, which had by then become known under its new name (Independent Trade Union Organization—UGO), as the competent agency to conclude wage agreements under German labor law in the western sectors. The Independent Trade Union Organization em- barked at once on a broad program of trade union activity, developing collective bargaining, educa- tion, training of apprentices, and relations with the Magistral in an advisory capacity. Although faced with incredible financial diffi- culties due to the currency reform and the impact of blockade unemployment, it forged ahead on all fronts including the development of active inter- national relations in the labor field. Fifteen of its members have gone to America since the summer of 1948, either as members of special visiting groups or as official German dele- gates to trade union conventions. Population of West Berlin as of August 31, 1949 It was on the initiative of trade union leaders that the demonstration of 300,000 Berliners took place before the Reichstag on September 9, 1948. The Soviet blockade reduced industrial activity by 60 to 75 percent, forced curtailed use of electric 118 MANPOWER power, gas, and coal, and brought in its train the many hardships that inevitably accompany the strangling of an economy. On the other hand, it brought to the foreground the strength and courage of people who have convictions which they will fight for. It evoked a new kind of cooperation between the trade unions and the city government, on one hand, and the employer, on the other. It called forth in- creased initiative in meeting the problems of read- justments. It called forth also new willingness and desire on the part of the states of Western Germany to aid their fellow workers in Berlin. Not all of the credit for accomplishments in Berlin is due to the workers. But it is true that the action of the democratic trade union leaders of Berlin in 1947, in breaking away from communist leadership, was a leading factor contributing to the confidence with which the workers and the people of the city now face an uncertain future. Railroad Strike of 1949 Among the workers hardest hit by the first currency reform in June, 1948, were the railroad- men who live in Western Berlin. They represented the largest single body of people who did not receive any Westmarks in wage payments. (The general practice in Western Berlin from June, 1948, to March, 1949, was to pay 25% of wages in Westmarks, vitally sup- plementing the buying power of the worker's income.) In March, 1949, when the Westmark was made sole legal tender in Western Berlin, the rail- road workers could no longer contain their dis- content. They were ac- tually suffering because their employer, the So- viet-controlled Reichs- bahndirektion, refused to abide by the law of the territory in which it was operating. From the rise of the opposition trade union federa- tion, the Reichsbahndirektion had discriminated against UGO adherents by discharging lifelong rail- road workers without cause. By April 1, 1949, the number of people so discharged had reached approx- imately 1,200 to 1,500. This was a second cause for the strike. A third cause was simply the worker’s strong desire for the freedom which he understood demo- cracy to offer. He asked only that he have the right to join any legitimate organization without fear of persecution, discrimination, or reprisal. Accordingly, on May 6, 1949, the railroad union voted to strike. They postponed action to give the Magistral time to try to persuade the Reichsbahn- direktion to negotiate with the workers or with the Magistral as a mediator. With the failure of these efforts, the possibility of a peaceful solution was gone. The union, with the support of the federation, stopped work at 12.01 a.m., May 21, 1949. Its demands, immediately made public, were: a. Payment of wages in Westmarks in accordance with the law. b. Justice for persecuted employees. c. The right of "free coalition", which means fieedom of speech and assembly. Approximately 11,000 people joined the work stoppage, led by the 3,000 members of the UGO railroad union. During the next few days the number of strikers increased to about 15,000, and within a relatively short time the membership of the union increased to 8,000. Immediate response by telegrams and shipments of supplies came from the major western trade union federations: the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the British Trade Union Congress, and the International Trans- port Workers Federation. Recognizing the delicate international situation, the Berlin union and the federation declared at the outset that they would retain emergency crews to operate all traffic grow- ing out of the Paris Agreement ending the blockade. When, through per- haps a certain lack of foresight and planning, incoming trains began to jam the yards, the union renewed its offer in writ- ing to increase emer- gency crews and place them under Reichsbahn- direktion orders. All such offers were categoric- ally refused by the Reichsbahndirektion. Railroad properties were patrolled by So- viet-controlled railroad police. On May 21, the Russians brought into all stations in the western sectors large rein- forcements of Soviet railroad police, supplemented by thousands of Volkspolizei from the Soviet Zone, FDGB (communist trade unionists) and FDJ (communist youth organization members), and civilians in and out of uniform, many of whom were armed with carbines, pistols or tommy-guns. The intended strike-breakers were brought in on special trains and they debarked in squads. The peaceful picketing of UGO was immediately disrupted by mob violence accompanied by the use of firearms. The Western Commandants thereupon ordered the Soviet police out of the stations and assigned resoonsibilitv for maintainina law and order to the Rail-yard battle: rifles and tommyguns were the weapons of communism—"the upholder of workers' rights"—against a legitimate railroad strike in Berlin. 119 MANPOWER west sector police, after which no single act of violence was recorded during the entire strike. The Soviet strike-breaking procedure pointed up to the public of Berlin and to the world the Soviet methods of dealing with working people. It stiffened the determination of the members of the railroad union to achieve their objectives. Once again the Magistral (May, 27-May, 30) urged the Reichsbuhndirektion to negotiate with the workers, or with an acceptable mediator as being the simple, direct, and right way to settle the strike. An offer by the Oberburgermeister to conduct a meeting of the conflicting parties on June 1st was refused, but the Reichshahndirektion informed the Mayor that it would announce a settlement nego- tiated between themselves and the communist labor federation (FDGB). On May 31 st, Soviet front pages blazoned the terms of the iso-called settlement of the strike between the Reichsbahndirektion and the FDGB. These terms were: (a) The railroaders would return to work at six a.m. on June 1st; (b) the railroad would collect Westmarks for west sector services; (c) it would pay 60% of the wages of west sector resident work- ers in Westmarks; (d) it would permit no reprisals against striking workers. This was the occasion for the first strike referendum which was held on June 2nd, and record- ed a 95% opposition to accepting a proposal which was in no sense an agr eement between the striking work- ers and their em- ployers. The three West- ern Commandants, recognizing that Military Govern- ment not only had an interest in this strike, but also shared responsi- bility, initiated a meeting with the Soviet Comman- dant on June 3rd, prepared to pro- pose a number of possible solutions. The Soviet Commandant refused to admit that a strike existed, because he did not recognize the UGO, and refused to listen to as many as six reasonable solutions proposed by the Western Commandants. A mediation proposal by the U.S. Sector Com- mandant was the next step. This proposal, agreed to by the other Western Commandants, was simply that General Howley—acting as a mediator—would obtain personal confirmation of the terms of the Reichsbahndirektion-FDGB agreement from General Kvashnin (Soviet transport chief), deposit these terms with the Western Magistrat, and announce the terms publicly to UGO. This he did in a letter of June 10th, addressed to UGO announcing the conversation with Kvashnin and the confirmation by the Soviet General and urging UGO to accept this method of settlement. The labor leaders were prepared to accept this method, although there was much misgiving con- cerning Soviet sincerity. So great was 1 his mis- giving that, instead of ordering the railroaders to return to work, the union leaders submitted the question in the second referendum to be voted on June 14th. The leaders confidently expected the majority to favor the Howley mediation plan. A typical Soviet surprise move was carried out during the night of June 13th. Waiting until it was impossible for other papers than their own to get the news, the Russians issued a release which appeared in the Soviet-licensed Tagliche Rundschau on the morning of June 14th, denying that there was any validity in the Kvashnin assurances to General Howley. A resurgence of fear among the people produced, on June 14th not an overwhelming vote to return to work, but rather an overwhelming vote not to return to work. The Western Commandants then asked Maj. Gen. Kvashnin to re-confirm his conversation with Gen- eral Howley in writing. To everyone's surprise he did this on June 20th. His letter lacked clarity and directness, but on the basis of it the Western Com- mandants asked the UGO leaders to accept the compromise terms as a basis for settlement. On June 22nd, the UGO rail- road union leadership voted not to accept the Kvashnin letter as an adequate guar- antee of their safety. The Deputy Military Gov- ernors then conferred with the Berlin Commandants, and a plan was evolved on June 25th to break the impasse. The union thereupon called on all West Berlin railroaders to resume their duties on June 28th at eight a.m. The terms of the settlement were: a. Renewed expression of the Western Commandants' continued support of UGO. b. Acceptance at their face value of General Kvashnin's written assurances. c. Acceptance at its face value of the Reichsbahn- direktion promise to pay at least 60°/o of the wages of West Berlin railroaders in Westmarks, accompanied by an authorization of the Western Commandants to the Magistral to exchange for railroad workers residing in the western sectors the difference between what the Reichsbahndirek- tion might pay and 100°/o of the wages in West- marks for a period of three months. d. Workers who through fear of reprisals did not wish to return to work might indicate that in writing and would be given every possible aid in finding other employment. The railroaders returned to work and were ready to operate the trains on June 28th. Striking UGO railroadmen run for cover when the Soviet-directed Reichshahn police open fire in Berlin. MANPOWER 120 Pages from a liaison officer's reports to Headquarters. LIAISON ACTIVITIES Political Liaison Most blanches of Military Government, as of any government, have a technical function. Liaison has almost none, and political liaison has the least. It has no clear-cut objectives, because it deals with intangibles, like ideas or known and unknown human factors. Military Government in Berlin felt strongly from the first day how much it needed political liaison. The quadripartite character of the city made it desirable not only to strive for certain objectives but also to achieve them with the least friction. Sometimes it was wiser to postpone an objective than to succeed at a too great expense of goodwill; for quadripartite government meant always quadri- partite competition, sometimes between the Allies and sometimes between them and the Germans. Nowhere in the LLS. Occupation area is political life more fluid than in Berlin, with its peculiar lines of connections and disconnections between enemies, allies, aggressors, and victims. Local Problems of World Concern In this city, international politics often appear first as local politics and are then inflated to inter- national politics, problems for the great capitals of the world. One fact especially is of great import; it is today not yet determined whether Berlin is only the shad- ow or still has the substance of a national capital. Political liaison has not only continuous, close contact with the whole alphabet of German politi- cians from Adenauer to Ulbricht, but exists also to guide, advise, and influence by warning, prompting, and creating good will. Its customers are also the members of Military Government’s own staff. Politics and Protocol Some of the specialists had to learn by experience, that technical problems are not technical problems in Berlin. Questions like the exchange of meat for fish or the prevention of a non-authorized meeting are frequently decided upon suggestion by Political Liaison for extraneous reasons. As a result, public welfare and public utility experts are today almost politicians themselves after years of Berlin experience. Political liaison in Berlin had to establish many precedents proving that a final line between policy- making level and operational agency does not exist. In the early days of non-fratemization it already had very friendly contact with the political world of the city, with the result that nobody today doubts the genuinely democratic character of the West Berlin population. Political liaison in Berlin shows as the net result of its work that, over a hundred miles east of the western zones, the Brandenburg Gate—once the symbol of militant Prussianism—is today the Euro- pean counterpart of the Statue of Liberty in the harbor of New York City. 121 LIAISON ACTIVITIES Liaison with the Magistral The activities of the liaison office with the Ma- gistral have developed from those of a purely control agency to a genuine linking up of Military Government and the local German author- ities, smoothing the relations and communicating to each side the point of view of the other. During the first phase af liaison work with the Magistral, it be- came increasingly ev- ident that the Soviet liaison officer and his superiors considered the communist members Df the city government as friends, and the non- communist members— together with the liai- son officers of the three Western Allies—as anemies. Unilateral commands, :ransmitted from the Russian officer, were aniformly designed to undermine the non- communist members of ;he Magistral and to embarrass the elected government as a whole. This attitude crystallized eventually with the split in the city, the blockade, and the complete break- down of Russian-U.S. parallel liaison work. There was, in fact, no longer even physical contact, for the Russians remained in the Soviet Sector, con- trolling their illegal parliament and Magistral, and we remained in the west. Liaison in the Boroughs At the beginning of the American Occupation in Berlin, detachments were stationed in each of the seven boroughs (later condensed to six) of the U.S. Sector. In the two months of their exclusive occupation, however, the Soviets had effectively adapted borough administration similar to that to their own political structure in the USSR. Many communists had been appointed borough mayors and the majority of leading public em- ployees were communists or sympathizers. Initially, the U.S. detachments retained the Soviet- appointed officials in office. But gradually many of them were weeded out through de- nazification procedures. Eventually, the sys- tem of house and street stewards was abol- ished, and this was an important blow against the communist influ- ence in the U.S. Sector. During early 1946, the U.S. detachments were abolished, and liaison officers appoint- ed, in line with the policy of gradually devolving more author- ity to the Germans. Since that time, there has been a steady increase of faith in the west, and it has been proportionately possible to alter the relationship of Military Govern- ment liaison officers to the German authorities. Since the statement of principles (see page 21) was pro- mulgated in May, 1949, the liaison offices have acted as the eyes and ears of Military Government, rather than as controlling or directing agencies. The continuing task is clearly to make German motives understandable to Military Government, and American motives to the Germans. Only through the maintenance of mutual trust and under- standing will it be possible to keep in Berlin a strong bulwark against Soviet totalitarianism. A town-hall bulletin board in one of the six U.S. Sector boroughs—where a complex multiplicity of neighborhood business has been transacted since the war: bartering, lost- and-found, work wanted, search for war-estranged relatives... A borough city hail, the focal point of local politics, where people gossip over the latest rumors and queue up for their new food and clothes ration cards. Right: A Berlin Sector liaison ofhcer, Military Government's link between the policy and the people, hears a local problem. LIAISON ACTIVITIES 122 These are the West Berliners—here attending a mass anti-communist demon- stration—who have been brought to increasing political consciousness and civic responsibility by the guidance and leadership of Military Government. They are ready now for the next step towards partnership in the world community. 123 OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT-BERLIN SECTOR ADMINISTRATION WITH magistratJ FINANCE PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH ECONOMICS SCHOENEBERG PROPERTY CONTROL LEGAL PUBLIC WORKS ZEHLENDORF PUBLIC HEALTH a WELFARE LIAISON I OFFICERS EXECUTIVE OFFICER DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR BRANCHES STE6LITZ COMMUNICATION CIVIL ADMINISTRATION TEMPELHOF INFORMATION SERVICES INTELLIGENCE NEUKOELLN ALLIED KOMMANDATURA EDUCATION MANPOWER KREUZBERG PUBLIC SAFETY 124 The Men and Women Attached To U.S. Military Government BERLIN SECTOR July 1, 1945—Sept. 1, 1949 Addy, Major James H. — Economics Adelman, Miss Rachel — Admin. Ahlschier, Mr. Joseph B. — Admin. Alex, Captain Millard A. — Executive Alexeeff, Mr. Alexander G. — Pub. Safety Allard, Dr. Lucile E. — Education Allison, Mr. Joe F. — Executive Ammann, Mr. Eugene O. — Pub. Safety Anderson, Mr. George T. — Pub. Safety Angers, Captain Henry A. — Executive Arner, Miss Norma W. — Pub. Health Arnold, Captain Lewis F. — Infor. Services Arnoldy, Major Francis N. — Admin. Arnow, 2nd Lt. Robert O. — Pub. Safety Aronovitz, Captain Sidney M. — Admin. Artzrouni, Mr. P. Leon — Admin. Ashworth, Mr. Ray — Pub. Safety Babcock, Col. William T. — Deputy Director Bachman, Mr. Lawrence P. — Infor. Services Baker, Mr. Porter — Prop. Control Baker, Mr. Sigmund — JEIA Ballard, Mr. Charles R. — Communications Barbour, Mr. Philip L. — Civ. Admin. Barkan, Lt. Mark — Education Barnhart, Captain William S. — Liaison Barringer, 2nd Lt. Fred A. — Admin. Barten, Lt. Col. George A. — Kommandatura Bassett, Pvt. Walter E. — Economics Bauce, Mr. Adileno E. — Pub. Safety Bean, Major Stephen S. — Legal Beckner, Dr. Meta S. — Education Behm, Captain Howard J. — Admin. Bell, Pfc. Murray — Intelligence Benedetto, Mr. Nicholas — Legal Benedik, Mr. Frank P. — Kommandatura Bennett, Mr. Lowell ■— Pub. Relations Benning, Dr. Charles H. — Pub. Health Connors, Mr. T. — Communications Biel, Dr. Ulrich E. — Liaison Billings, Miss Mary A. — Education Birnkrant, Mr. Arthur A. — Legal Bitter, Mr. John — Infor. Services Blakemoore, Pvt. George E. — Admin. Bleistein, Mr. Fred B. — Infor. Services Boecker, Mr. Virgil R. — Admin. Bond, Mr. Charles C. — Pub. Safety Bond, Lt. Col. Eugene H. — Legal Booze, Mr. Virgil L. — Admin. Bosley, Mr. Jackson W. — Pub. Relations Brackett, Mrs. Elsie W. — Kommandatura Bracksmayer, Mr. Joseph — Legal Brand, Mr. Edward C. — Intelligence Brantley, Captain Francis E. — Admin. Bright, Lt. James L. — Pub. Safety Broome, Dr. Edwin C. — Education Brossard, Mr. George W. — Legal Brown, Lt. Charles G. — Admin. Brown, Mr. Clark F. — Manpower Brown, Mr. Ralph A. — Infor. Services Brown, Mr. Samuel A. — Education Buchanan, Captain Robert J. — Liaison Buckland, Lt. Col. Charles O. — Executive Buglion, Mr. Godfrey — Legal Bullard, Colonel Peter C. — Kommandatura Burgess Jr., Lt. Col. John S. — Economics Burke, Lt. Frederick R. — Economics Burke, Mr. James W. — Pub. Relations Burnham, Major Lee H. — Liaison Butterwick, Mr. John T. — Civ. Admin. Buttles, Mr. Brune — Infor. Services Butze, Mr. Paul L. — Economics Byran, Lt. George W. — Legal Byrne, Captain Norman T. — Infor. Services Callender, Mr. John R. — Kommandatura Campanella, Major Samuel S. — Pub. Works Canales, Miss Laudelina P. — Executive Carlson, Mr. Harold G. — Intelligence Cells, Mrs. Marline S. — JEIA Cerio, Major James M. — Liaison Chamberlain, Colonel Robert W. — Pub. Safety Charles, Miss Eulalia M. — Intelligence Chaskel, Miss Ruth — Pub. Welfare Chipchin, Mr. Nelson — Kommandatura Chrisinger, Miss V. Irene — Pub. Safety Clark, Captain Laura A. — Pub. Health Clausen, Mr. Fred L. — Legal 125 PERSONNEL Claybaugh, Mr. Eugene M. — JEIA Cline, Mr. Hubert F. — Admin. Cobb, CWO Jack R. — Executive Coe, Mr. Francis M. — JEIA Coleman, Mrs. Marion S. — Infor. Services Colton, Mr. Ernest J. — Infor. Services Conlin, Captain John P. — Pub. Safety Conner, Lt. Col. Ray M. — Pub. Health Connors, Mr. T. — Communication Cottam, Captain Henry E. — Liaison Cozart, Mr. David L. — Education Cranmer, Miss Betty J. — Admin. Cunneen, Major Odell R. — Economics Curran, Mr. Owen S. — Economics Dahlin, Mr. William F. — Economics Dame, Captain Flartley F. — Pub, Safety Daoust, Miss Florence C. — Civ. Admin. Darling, Mr. Joseph W. — Economics Davidoff, Lt. Milton — Liaison Davis, Miss Lyndal M. — Pub. Relations Davis, Mr. William O. — Pub. Relations Davis, Captain William R. — Pub. Safety Davisson, Major John E. — Pub. Safety Demaret, Captain Allen N. — Economics Denamur, Mr. Louis — JEIA Denby, Mr. Howard — Inior. Services Derthick, Mr. Lawrence G. — Education Diebold, Mr. Peter B. — Economics Dietz, Mr. Waldemar E. — Infor. Services Diggs, Mr. John C. — Pub.Works Dilger, Mr. Frederick A. — Civ. Admin, Dismukes, Miss M. Adeline — Pub. Safety Dix, Mr. Charles A. — Economics Dobbs, 1st Lt. Joseph W. — Economics Dodge, Mr. George G. — Economics Doering, 2nd Lt. William F. — Economics Downs, Mr. Kenneth T. — Infor. Services Draper, Lt, Arthur F. — Communications Duke, Major Cecil A. — Economics Durst, Mr. Leon H. — Pub. Relations Eisenberg, Mrs. Lorraine M. — Pub. Health Eliot, Lt. Mather G. — Infor. Services Entin, Mr. Gary— Pub, Safety Erdreich, Mr. Emil — Economics van Eyck, Mr. Peter — Infor. Services Eyre, Major Frank R. — Liaison Falck, Miss Barbara W. — Pub. Safety Falise, Captain Alphonse — Pub. Safety Fernandez, Miss Helen K. — Kommandatura Fielden, Mr. Bert S. — Infor. Services Figiela, Miss Clementine — Economics Fischer, Lt. Col. Sigmund W. — Legal Fitzgerald, Mrs. Margaret F. — Executive Flatow, Mr. Max F. — Pub. Safety Flint, Mrs. Margaret L. — Pub. Welfare Foley, Major M. Robert — Executive Ford, Mrs. Janeece K, — Manpower Fowler, Mr. Harvey B. — Legal Fox, Lt.CoI. Paul S. — Pub. Health Francovich, Mrs. Virginia C. — Kommandatura Frank, Mr, Henry H. — Legal Franklin, Dr. Harry L. — Civ. Admin. Frauenheim, Captain Walter G. — Economics Freedman Lt. L. — Communications Freeman, Mr. Warren G. — Admin. Friedman, Mr. Herman G. — Pub. Safety Frohman, Mr. Harry N. — Infor. Services Froistad, Mr. Wilmer — Pub.Weliare Fuldner, Mr. John G. — Pub. Safety Fuller, Mr. Allan B. — Economics Gaiduk, Mr. Ronald A. — Pub. Safety Ganglolf, Mr. Perry J. — Pub. Welfare Gardner, Mr. Clinton C. — Infor. Services Gardner, Mr. Edwin L. — Manpower Garnett Jr., Dr. Christopher B. — Education Garrett, Mr. Richard G. — Intelligence Gayer, Mr. John H. — Communications Gentle, Major James G. — Economics Genung, Mr. James H. — Manpower Geriak, Mr. Nicholas — Admin. Gerlt, Captain Karl H. — Infor. Services Germano, Mr. Alfred T. — Pub. Works Gibson, Mr. James J. — Pub. Health Giese, Major Walter C. — Legal Gill, Captain Louis J. — Economics Ginder, Major Grove R. — Prop. Control Glaser, Mr. Louis — Civ. Admin. Glisson, Mr. Jack E. — Legal Goodwin, Miss Mathilde — Education Goosby, Lt. John W. — Executive Gorham, Major Fordyce — Economics Gran, Mr, Leonid A. — Admin. Grant, Mrs. Mooza V. — Pub. Safety Graves, Mrs. Frida M. — JEIA Gray, Captain Floyd W. — Economics Gregg, Mr. Frederic J. — Prop. Control Greifer, Mr. Elisha — Infor. Services Gress, Mr. Ulrich R. — Pub. Safety Gries, Mr. Robert G. — Finance Griffin, 1st Lt. William M. — Manpower Grommesh, Miss Lucy J. — Pub. Relations Gunn, Mr. John H. — Economics Gunther, Dr. Trude —• Infor. Services Flair, Mr. David H. — Economics Halbert, CpI. Eric H. — Legal Hammer, Mr. Otto J. — Kommandatura Harkins, Mr. Daniel J. — Intelligence Hart, Lt.CoI. Alan L. — Liaison Haskell, Pfc. Charles L. — Economics Haverty, Miss Margaret J. — Legal Hayes, Miss Mary L. — Kommandatura Hayn, Lt. Arthur — Pub. Safety Haywood, 2nd Lt, Earl D. — Pub. Works Heimlich, Mr. William F, — Infor. Services Henschel, Mr. Frederic W. — Infor. Services Hensley, Lt. Conley L. — Economics Herald, Mr. Peter V. — Infor. Services Heredia, Mr. Leon M. — Pub. Relations von Herr, Mr. James W. — Admin. Herz, Mr. Henry — Infor. Services Hickman, Mr. George F. — Pub. Safety Hiebert, Mr. Alvin H. — Admin. Higgins, Mr. Herbert N. — JEIA Hlopoff, Mr. Svetoslao N. — Kommandatura Hobbing, Mr. Enno R. — Infor. Services Homan, Captain Robert W. — Economics Homey, Lt. Col. Daniel J. — Liaison Howley, Brig.General Frank L. — Director Hudson, Lt. George P. — Pub. Safety Hunter, Miss Eleanor R. — Manpower Hutton, Mr. Thomas R. — Infor. Services Izdebsky, Mr. Witold P. — Admin. Jerumbo, Miss Irene — Infor. Services Johnston, Mr. Howard W. — Education Jones, 1st Lt. Donald. M. — Pub. Safety PERSONNEL 126 Jones, Miss Elsie M. — Pub. Health Joniak, Mr. Louis — Admin. Josselson. Mr. Michael — Infor. Services Joublanc, Lt. Col. Joseph C. — Legal Kchn, Miss Frances — Pub. Health Kaiser, Lt. Col. James L. — Liaison Karlinsky, Mr. Simon A. — Admin. Kasprzycki, Major Matthew J. — Liaison Keay, Mrs. Ellen R. — JEIA Kelly, Captain James W. — Executive Kclly-Roehr, Miss Alice H. — Pub. Welfare Kendall, Mr. Sidney S. — Economics Kennedy, Miss Ann E. — Communications Kent, Mr. Paul J. — Liaison Kickhaler, Pic. Clarence H. — Executive Kilduff, Mr. John F. — Finance Kilduff, Mrs. Rosemary M. — Kommandatura Kirk, 1st Lt. Earl C. — Economics Kish, Miss Betty A. — Pub. Works Klingenfeld, Mr. John H. — Manpower Klinker, Mr. Rudolph T. — Pub. Safety Knettle, Major Leroy J. — Legal Kobre, Mr. Samuel L. — Legal Kock, Mr. Frederick — Infor. Services Kolste, Mr. Lester A. — Legal Kovacik, Mr. Velimir N. — Pub. Safety Kowalik, Mr. Michael — Kommandatura Kowalski, Mr. Walter S. — Legal Kramer, Major Abe — Manpower Kraus, Mr. John F. — Pub. Relations Krisman, Lt. Col. Michael J. — Kommandatura Kucera, Lt. Wesley J. — Economics Kunkel, Mr. Edward W. — Economics Kutuzov, Mr. llarion G. — Kommandatura Laks, Mr. Szymon — Prop. Control Lambert Jr.. Mr. George J. — Pub. Safety Lampe, Mr. Henry O. — Pub. Safety Landman, Pfc. Simon — Pub. Safety Lanou, Major Paul E. — Economics Leahy, Mr. Donald J. — Legal Leary, Mr. Thomas F. — Economics Legge, Mr. Christopher A. — Infor. Services Lehman, Dr. Martin C. — Intelligence Lennon, Mr. Edward F. — Prop. Control Leonard, Mr. Frederick N. — Infor. Services Leonetti, Captain Charles — Liaison Letanishen, Mr. Steve — Executive Lettunich, Mr. Mateo — Education Leven, Mr. Charles L. — Infor. Services Levin, 1st Lt. Edward H. — Liaison Levno, Lt. Col. Anthony F. — Pub. Safety l.ocw, Mr. Peter — Pub. Safety Loewenthal, Captain V. L. — Kommandatura Looney, Captain Walter A. — Liaison Loop, Mr. Laverne W. — Finance de Luca, Miss Sara — Infor. Services Lund, Mr. Marvin L. — Admin. Lustig, Mr. Peter — Pub. Safely Macomber, Mr. Richard H. — Economics Madden, Major Charles A. — Executive Madden, Captain Ruth E. — Executive Maginms, Colonel John J. — Executive Maiden, Mr. Stephen W. — JEIA Maltese, Mr. Eduard J. — Infor. Services Mandel, Lt. Robert D. — Liaison Maring, Lt. Col. Wilbur F. — Kommandatura Markman, Mr. Robert P. — Economics Marshall, Mr. Snowden H. — Economics Martay, Mr. Oscar — Infer. Services Mason, Mr. Ned G. — Economics Mathews, Mr. Frank — Civ. Admin. Mathieu, Mr. Gustave — Infor. Services Mautner, Mr. Karl F. — Liaison Mazeika, Sgt. John F. — Admin. McCIintig, Lt. Col. George M. — Kommandatura McCIusky, Mr. George N. — Manpower McCoy, Lt. Charles E. — Pub. Welfare McCusig, Mr. Bell O. — Pub. Welfare McDonald, Mr. William C — Admin. McKay, Mr. Ellis H. — Pub. Relations McNeill, Lt. Col. John F. — Legal McNulty, Mr. Joseph P. — Prop. Control Medaniel, Pfc. Colvin C. — Economics Meister, Captain Charles W. — Education Meichcrs, Mr. Christel J. — Liaison Mellinger, Mr. Frederic —- Infor. Services Meltzer, Mr. Theodore F. — Infor. Services Mercer, Mrs Betline S. — Admin. Mercer, Lt. Col. Harold — Pub. Welfare Michels, Mr. Andrew J. — Economics Mikesh, Mr. George R. — Legal Miles, Miss Aileen S. — Infor. Services Miller, Major Maxwell — Legal Miller, Mr. Saul — Education Mitchell, Mi. William — Kommandatura Montalbano, Miss Marjorie — Admin. Montenegro, Mrs. Helen H. — Admin. Moore, Captain Robert J. — Admin. Moran, Mr. Alfred W. — Deputy Director Morgenstern, Mr. Abraham — Manpower Morris, Captain Gerald S. — Pub. Safety Moselle, Miss Katharine M. — Pub. Health Muhlman, Mr. Anatol T. — Pub. Safety Murdoch, Miss Gertrude W. — Communications Murphy, Captain Milton C. — Pub. Safety Murray, Miss Rosalie E. — Pub. Safety Mychaluk, Sgt. Michael — Liaison Neal, Major Noel A. — Liaison Neumann, Lt. Col. Ernest — Pub. Safely Neuwirth, Lt. David O. — Pub. Safety Ney, Lt. John J. — Pub. Safety Nichols, Mr. Andrew J. — Economics Nobles, Mr. James H. — Prop. Control Noone, Captain Edward J. — Prop. Control Norden, Miss Ruth — Infor. Services Nowalsky, Captain Harry — Liaison Nowell, Mr. Rhett T. — Pub. Safety Nowicki Jr., Mr. John — Liaison Nusbaum, Mr. Russel F. — Admin. Omara, Lt. Col. John F. — Pub. Safety Orley, Mr. Alexander A. — Admin. Osborne, Lt. Col. Harold F. — Executive Ostrander, Mr. Donald A. — CARE Ott, Miss Frances E. — Economics Owens, Mr. Robert L. — Legal Paddock, Major Albert W. — Pub. Welfare Paine, Mayor Richmond S. — Pub. Health Pape, Mr. Wesley F. — Legal Parson, Mr. Glenn R. — Infor. Services Pawling, Major George F. — Liaison Peters, Mr. John D. — Admin. Piernick, Lt. Roman T. — Executive Pitts, Miss Virginia A. — Kommandatura Powell, Lt. Col. Glenn A. — Pub. Works 127 PERSONNEL Proctor, Major Flarry N. — Economics Prouty, Mr. Ernest K. — Manpower Pugh, Mr. Walter J. — Liaison Purser, Mrs. Loretta G. — Economics Purser, Captain Paul J. — Admin. Radosta, Mr. Adolph J. — Legal Raeder, Mr. Frederick W. — Prop. Control Rapalski, Lt. Col. Adam J. — Pub. Health Reed, Captain Arthur D. — Prop. Control Rehwoldt, Miss Vivian M. — Kommandatura Reidel, Lt. Harley E. — Economics Reinert, Mr. Henry — Infor. Services Richmond, Lt. Col. Clarence — Legal Ring, Major Carlyle C. — Admin. Robbins, Mr. Irvin — Legal Robertson, Captain Walter G. — Pub. Works Rohrbaugh, Mr. Earl C. — Pub. Works Russell, Captain Edward E. — Admin. Russo, Mr. Anthony — Admin. Sabo, Mr. John A. — Legal Sala, Mr. John R. — Education Saltzman, Mr. Wolf — Public Safety Satterlee, Mr. Joseph C. — Executive Saunders, Miss Marion — Pub. Safety Sause, Mr. Oliver L. — JEIA Savage, Miss Evelyn A. — Executive Scarborough, Major Donald D. — Pub. Safety Scheffer, Lt. Col. I. Herbert — Pub. Health Scheinman, Lt. Col. Benjamin J. — Legal Schelkun, CpI. Fred — Pub. Safety Schmidt, Mr. John P. — Pub. Safety Schnell, Mrs. Ruth M. — Pub. Welfare Schroder, Miss Harriet M. — Intelligence Schulberg, Mrs. Barbara G. — Infor. Services Schuster, Mr. Anton — Pub. Safety Schwarz, Dr. Eugene E. — Pub. Health Scrivner, Captain Russell — Pub. Welfare Sears, Mr. Richard — Infor. Services Shafer, Mr. Nathanel L. ■— Civ. Admin. Shafer, Mr. Paul F. — Education Shaw, Mr. Frederick W. — Pub. Relations Shepardson, Mrs. Marjorie L. — Admin. Shireman, Mr. Charles A. — Pub. Welfare Shark, 1st Lt. Ralph H. — Pub. Safety Shub, Mr. Boris — Infor. Services Siler, Miss Cynthia — Infor. Services Silver, 1st Lt. Seymour M. — Liaison Simon, Mr. Raymond — Infor. Services Skina, Mr. Ansbert G. — Pub. Works Smith, WOJG Charles C. — Admin. Smith, Mr. Kent S. — Infor. Services Smith, Major Merle H. — Liaison Smith, Mrs. Mildred L. — Pub. Welfare Smith, Major Roger F. — Legal Smith, Captain William G. — Pub. Works Solbjer, Captain John I. — Prop. Control Solomito, Mr. Salvatore — Admin. Speakman, Lt. Anita — Pub. Health Speece, Captain Harold E. — Pub. Safety Spencer, Miss E. Leonora — Kommandatura Sponholz, 1st Lt. Kuno A. — Liaison Stahl, Lt. Col. Elmer G. — Liaison Stanley, 1st Lt. Paul T. — Pub. Safety Stearns, Dr. Harold E. — Intelligence Steck, Mr. Leon J. — Economics Steele, Miss Frances C. — Pub. Welfare van Steenberg, Mr. Neil J. — Education Stokes, Mr. Merl W. — Admin. Strash, Mr. Victor — Pub. Welfare Strebel, Mr. Ralph F. — Education Strieker, Mr. William — Inf or. Services Strong, Mr. Tracy — Education Strouse, WOJG Charles L. — Communications Studd, Mr. Howard R. — Pub. Welfare Sludd, Mrs. Rita L. — Pub. Welfare Sullivan, Mr. Herbert N. — Prop. Control Sullivan, Mrs. Ruth M. — Infor. Services Sullivan, Mr. Thomas F. — Pub. Safety Swanson, Mr. Flarold A. — Economics Sweeney, Lt. Daniel A. — Liaison Sweeney, Mr. Robert E. — Economics Swoboda, Lt. Col. Leo A. — Legal Tappan, Mr. Fred A. — Legal Taylor, Mr. Evan A. — Kommandatura Taylor, Miss H. Jean — Executive Taylor, Mr. Lloyd L. — Admin. Tesmer, Mr. Francis J. — Pub. Safety Thomas, Mr. Patrick R. — Admin. Thompson, Mr. John C. — Education Thompson, Major Richard — Pub. Welfare Thorkelson, 2nd Lt. Halsten J. — Manpower True, Miss Dona F. — Executive van Valkenburgh, Mr. Robert A. — Economics Vance, Miss Martha M. — Education Vogel, Pic. Irvin — Pub. Welfare Wagstaff, Lt. Col. Jack — Kommandatura Waid, Mr. H. Warner — Infor. Services Wall, Captain Joseph J. — Pub. Welfare Wangler, Mr. Jules — Finance Ware, Miss Elise — Infor. Services Ware, Captain Stephen E. — Liaison Watson, Colonel John W. — Economics Wechsler, Mr. Mitchell — Prop. Control Welch, Miss Jeanne — Infor. Services Wells, Mr. John E. — Pub. Health Westervelt, Mr. Alan H. — Communications Westrum, Mr. Carl E. — Pub. Safely Wheat, Miss Mary E. — Admin. Whetston, Mr. Darrel — Infor. Services Williams, Mr. Harrison G. — Pub. Safety Willis, Miss Gladys B. — Pub. Welfare Wilson, Mr. Frank B. — Economics Wilson, Pic. Luther L. — Liaison Wingate, Mr. Harvey P. — Communications Winston, Mr. Carl. — Infor. Services Woehlk, Mr. Helmut A. — Pub. Safety Wolston, Mr. Ilya E — Executive Wood, Mr. Roy S. — Legal Woods, Mrs. Helen A. — Executive Wroton, Mr. Charles H. — Legal Wye, Mr. Mason S. — Manpower Wyman, Dr. Harry B. — Education Yahraes, Mr. Richard A. — Pub. Relations Yarosh, Captain Walter S. — Economics Zane, Mr. Richard W. — Economics Zuccaro, Mr. Peter P. — Admin. PERSONNEL