ARMY MEDICAL LIBRARY WASHINGTON Founded 1836 Section___...........__.........____ Number .Z.^....^r...G_.3..^t.. e r o 3—10543 Form 113c, W. D.. S. G. O. (Revised June 13, 1936) OBSERVATIONS U ? O N THE PftESENt GOVERNMENT O F PENNSYLVANIA. I N <• F O U R L K T T V R .S r 'J T H E PEOP.LL or rKNNjrLVANIA* " A Ripullr (•:<. '■'. '.' is an -.n/ire rf lav:; and r.-J of men) is the best df governments; ana that arrangement ofthcpotxasoffociety, or, in other words, that form uf government -v.'hici is btjl contrived to jecure an impar- tial and exaii execution of tbt laws, is tk-: eest of republics." . A d a m s on Go\ ei-nment. " Nothing is m.. : <.ituin fro-n the hr ay of nation:, and the nature of man, than that scme i-ORMS of govr : no. t are better fitted for being WELL ADMINIsTlKED than ethers." IdEAI, PHILADFLPHIA: * "inter and Sold by STYNER and CIST, in Se:cndfreet, vx doo:- ?b'->v- A>\l- ;l--?t. ?* r> c c ixxvn. OBSERVATIONS, .&c. LETTER I. EVERY free government mould confift of three parts, viz. I. A Bill of Rights. II. A Constitution. Andlll. Laws. 1, The Bill ofRights mould contain the great principles of na- tural and civil liberty. It mould be unalterable by any human power. II. The Constitution is the executive part of the Bill of Rights. It mould contain the divifion and diftribution of the power of the people.—The modes and forms of making laws, of executing juftice, and of tranfa&ing bufinefs: Alfo the limitation of power, as to time and jurifdittion. It mould be unalterable by the legiflature, :md mould be changed only by a reprefentation of the people, cholen for that purpofe. III. Laws are the executive part of a conftitution. They ceafe to be binding whenever they tranfgrefs the principles of Liberty, as laid down in the Conftitution and Bill of Rights. Let us now apply thefe principles tp the Bill ofRights, Conftitution and Laws of Pennfylvania. But previous to my entering upon this talk, I beg leave to declare, that I am not led to it. by a angle party or perfonal prejudice; on the contrary, I honour moft of the friends of the prefent government as the warmeft Whigs among us, and I am proud of numbering feveral of the gentlemen who were concerned in making, and in attempting to execute the government, among my particular fiends, I. The Bill of Rights has confounded natural and civil.rights in fuch a manner as to produce endlefs confufion in fociety. II. The Conftitution in the grofs is exceptionable in the following particulars: i. No regard is paid in it to the ancient habits and cuftoms of the people of Pennfylvania in the diftribution of the fupreme power of the ilate, nor in the forms of bufinefs, or in the ftile of the Conftitution. The fuddennefs of the late revolution, the attachment of a large body of the people to the old Conftitution of the ftate, and the general principles of human nature made an attention to ancient forms and prejudices a matter of the utmoft importance to this ftate in the prefent controverfy with Great-Britain. Of fo much confequence did the wife Athenians view the force of ancient habits and cuftoms in their laws and government, that they punifhed z\\f rangers with death who interfered in their politics. They well knew the effedls of novelty upon the minds of the people, and that a more fatal ftab could not be A 2 given 3?-fd ?4 C 4 J given to the peace and fafety of their ftate than by expofmg its hr.vs and government to frequent or unneceffary innovations. 2. The Conftitution is wholly repugnant to the principles of action in man, and has a direci tendency to check the progrefs of genius and virtue in human nature. It fuppofes perfect equality, and an equal diftribution of pwp'erty, wifdom and virtue, among the inhabitant.; of the ftate. 3. It comprehends many things which belong to a Bill ofRights, and to Laws, and which form no part of a Conftitution. 4. It is contrary, in an important article, to the Bill of Rights, By the fecond article of the Bill ofRights, " no man can be abridged of any civil right, who acknowledges the being of a GOD;" but by the Conftitution, no man can take his feat in the AfTembly, who doei not " acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New Teftament to be given by divine inrjpiration." 5.' It is deficient in point of perfpicuity and method. Inftead of reducing the legiflative, executive and judicial parrs of the conftitution, with thdr feveral powers and forms of bufinefs, to diftinft heads, the wholfeof them are jumbled together in a moft unfyftematic manner. 6. It fixes all thefe imperfections upon the people for feven years, by precluding them from the exercife of their own power to remove them at any other time, or in any other manner than by a feptennial convention, called by a Council of Cenfors. III. The laws and proceedings of the AfTembly of Pennfylvania are in many particulars contrary to the conftitution. Only one half of the Members1'took the oath of allegiance, prefcribed in the tenth fe&ion of the conftitution. The Speaker of the' Houfe ifiued writs for the eleftion of Members of AfTembly and of Counfellors, notwith- ftariding this ppwer is lodged, by the 19th feftion of the conftitution, only in the' Prefident and Council. Two gentlemen were appointed Members of Congrefs, who held offices under the Congrefs, which is exprefsly forbidden in the nth fedlion of the conftitution. The con- ftitution requires further in the 40th feftion, that every military officer fhould take "die oath of allegiance, before he enters upon the execution of.his office; but the AfTembly have difpenfed with this oath in their Militia Law. The 15th feftion of the conftitution declares, that no law lhall be pail'ed, unlefs it be previoufly publifhed for the confider- ation of the People; but the AfTembly pafTed all the laws of their late feffion, without giving the People an opportunity of feeing them, till they were called upon to obey them. Thefe proceedings of th~ Af- fembly lead to one, and perhaps to all the three following conclufions: Firft, That the AfTembly have violated the principles of the confti- tution; fecondly, that the conftitution is fo formed, that it could not be executed by the Aflembly, confident with the fafety of the State ; laftly, that none of their laws are binding, inafmuch as they are con- trary to the fuperior and radical laws of the conftitution. Thefe con- fiderations are all of a moft alarming nature. Farewel to Liberty, when the facred bulwarks of a conftitution can be invaded by a legif-, lature I And if the conftitution cannot be executed in all its parts, without. [ 5 ] wirnout endangering the fafety of the State, and if all our late lav,-s muft be fet afide in a court of juftice, becaufe they were not affented to by the People, previous to their being enafted, is it not high time for the People to unite and form a more effectual, and more practi- cable fyftem of government?--- If ftiia juftice mould poife the fcale in the trial of tory property, 1 can eafily forefee from the virtus cf the People, on which fide the beam would turn; but it becomes us to reflect, that all trials for for- feited property muft be held in courts oi muritten la,v, and the flaws of our conftitution and laws are fo wide, that the moft gigantic Tory criminal might efcape through them. LETTER II. I SHALL now proceed to fay a few words upon particular f.-art'o of the Conftitution. In the fecond fe&ion, " the fupreme legiflature is vefted in a ' fingle* Houfe of Reprefentatives of the Freemen of the Commonwealth." By this feftion we find, that the fupreme, abfolute, and uncontrouled power of the whole State is lodged in the hands of one body of men. Had it been lodged in the hands of one man, it would have been lefs dangerous to the fafety and liberties of the community. Abfolute power fhould never be trufted to man. It has perverted the wifeft heads, and corrupted the belt hearts in the world. I fhould be afraid to commit my property, liberty and life to a body of angels for one whole year. The Supreme Being alone is qualified to poffefs fupreme power over his creatures. It requires the wifdom and goodnefs of a Deity to controul, and direct it properly. In order to fhew the extreme danger of truftjing all the legiflative power of a State to a fingle reprefentation, I fhall beg leave to tran- fcribe a few fentences from a letter, written by Mr. John Adams, to one of his friends in North-Carolina, who requefted him to favour him with a plan of government for that State above a twelve-month ago. This illuftrious Citizen, who is fecond to no man in America, in an inflexible attachment to the liberties of this country, and to re- publican forms of government, writes as follows, " I think a people cannot be long free, nor ever happy, whofe government is in one AfTembly. My reafons for this opinion are as follow, i. " A fingle AfTembly is liable to all the vices, follies and frail- ties of an individual,—fubject to fits of humour,—ftartsof paffions,' flights of enthufiafm,—partialities of prejudice, and confequently pro- A 3 duftive * A Committee of the Convention, which formed the Conftitution of Pennfylvania, publtjhed in the Pennfylvania Packet of Oclober 15, 177b, as an apology for one of their Ordinances, that was thought to be arbitrary and unjuft, 'that it was pafied when " the mi ads of the Convention were agitated, end their pajjions inflamed." [ 6 ] duclive of itaftv remits and abfurd judgments. All titefe errors ought to be corrected, and defects fupplied by fome controuling power. 2. "A fingle AfTembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time will "ot Temple to exempt itfelf from burdens, which it will lay, without compunction, upon its conftituents. j. " A fingle AfTembly is apt to grow ambitious, and after a time will not hefitate to vote itfelf perpetual. This was one fault' of the long parliament, but more remarkably of Holland, whofe AfTembly firft voted themTelves from annual to Jeptennial, then for life, and after a courfe of years, tint all vacancies happening by death or otherwife, fhould be filled by themfelves, without any application t<*conftituents at all. 4.. " Becaufe a fingle AfTembly pofTefTed of all the powers of go- vernment wou:d make arbitrary laws for their own intcreft, and ad- judge all controverfies in their own favor."f If any thing could be necefTary upon this fubjed, after fuch an authority, I might here add, that Montefquieu—Harrington—Mil- ton—Addifon—Price—Bolingbroke, and others, the wifeft ftatefmen, and the greateft friends to Liberty in the world, have left teftimonies upon record of the extreme folly and danger of a people's being go- verned by a fingle legiflature. I fhall content myfeif with the follow- ing excract from the laft of thofe authors. The lentiments correspond exactly with thofe of our countryman before-mentioned. " By fimple forms of government, I mean fuch as lodge the whole fupreme power, abfolutely and without controul, either in a fingle perfon, or in the principal perfons of the community, or in the whole body of the people. Such governments are governments of arbitrary will, and therefore of all imaginable abfurdides the moft abfurd. They ftand in direct oppofition to the fole motive of fubmiflion to any jvvemrr.cnt whatiorvcr; for if men quit the State, and renounce the rights of nature, (one of which is, to be fure, that of being governed by their own will) they do this, that they may not remain expofed to the arbitrary will of other men, the weakeft to that of the ftrongeft, the few to that of the many. Now, in fubmitting to any fingle form of government whatever, they eftablifh what they mean to avoid, and for fear of being expofed to arbitrary will fometimes, they choofe to be governed by it always. Thefe governments do not only degenerate into tyranny; they are tyranny in their very inftitution ; and they who fubmit to them, are ftaves, not fubjefts, however the fupreme power may be exercifed; for tyranny and flavery do not fo properly confift in the f Thefe reafons are given by cur Author for not lodging all power Je- giftati've, executive and judicial, in one body of me/'. This has been done, as will be Jhewn hereafter in the Conftitution of Pennfylvania: But, fup- pofir.g it had been ctherwi/e, cur Author adds, " /hall the whole power of legiflation reft in one Affembly ? Moft of the foregoing reafons (one is '.mined) apply equally to prove, that the whole legiftative power ought to be more complex." L 7 J the ftripes-that are given and received, as in the power of giving thei/i at pleafure, and the neceffity of receiving them, whenever and fcr Whatever they are infiided." I might go on further and fhew, that all the diffentions of Athens and Rome, fo dreadful in their nature, and fo fatal in their confe- quences, originated in fingle AfTemblies pofTefling all the power of thofe commonwealths; but this would be the bufinefs of a volume, and not of a fingle efTay.— I fhall therefore pafs on, to anfwer the various arguments that have been ufed in Pennfylvania, in fupport of a fingle legiflature. i. We are told, that the perfection of every thing confifts in its fimplicity,—that all mixtures in government are impurities, and that a fingle legiflature is perfect, becaufe it is fimple.—To this I anfwer, that we fhould diftinguifh between fimplicity in principles, and fim- plicity in the application of principles to practice. What can be more fimple than the principles of mechanics, and yet into how many thou- fand forms have they been tortured by the ingenuity of man. A few fimple elementary bodies compofe all the matter of the univerfe, and yet how infinitely are they combined in the various forms and fub- liances which they afTume in the animal, vegetable, and mineral king- doms. In like manner a few fimple principles enter into the compo- fition of all free governments. Thefe principles are perfect fecurity for property, liberty and life; but thefe principles admit of extenfive com- binations, when reduced to practice:—Nay more, they require them. \ defpotic government is the moft fimple government in the world, but inftead of affording fecurity to property, liberty or life, it obliges us to hold them all on the fimple will of a capricious fovereign. I maintain therefore, that all governments are fafe and free in proportion as they are compounded in a certain degree, and on the contrary, that all governments are dangerous and tyrannical in proportion as they approach to fimplicity. 2. We are told by the friends of a fingle legiflature, that there can be no danger of their becoming tyrannical, fince they muft partake of all the burdens they lay upon their conftituents. Here we forget the changes that are made upon the head and heart by arbitrary power, and the cafes that are recorded in hiftory of annual AfTemblies having re- fufed to fhare with their conftituents in the burdens which they had impofed upon them. If every elector in Pennfylvania is capable of being ele&ed an afTembly-man, then agreeably to the fixth feftion of the conftitution, it is poffible for an AfTembly to exift who do not pof- fefs a fingle foot of property in the State, and who can give no other evidence of a common intereft in, or attachment to, the community than having paid " public taxes," which may mean poor-taxes, Should this be the cafe, (and there is no obftacle in the confutation to prevent it) furely it will be in the power of fuch an AfTembly to draw from die State the whole of its wealth in a few years, without contri- buting any thing further towards it than their proportion of the trifling tax neceflary to fupport the poor.—-Hut I ihall .'h-w in another place equal [ 8 J equal dangers from another clafs of men, becoming a majority in the AfTembly. 3. We are told of inftances of the Houfe of Lords, in England, checking the moft falutary laws, after they had parted the Houfe of Commons, as a proof of the inconvenience of a compound legiflature. I believe the fad to be true, but I deny its application in the prefent Controverfy. The Houfe of Lords, in England, poflefs privileges and interefts, which do not belong to the Houfe of Commons. More- Over they derive their power from the crown and not from the people. No wonder therefore they confult their own interefts, in preference to thofe of the People. In the State of Pennfylvania we wifh for a coun- cil, with no one exclufive privilege,' and we difclaim every idea of their pofTerfing the fmalleft degree of power, but what is derived from fhe annual fuffrages of the People. A body thus chofen could have no object in view but the happinefs of their conftituents. It is remarkable in Connecticut, that the legiflative council of that State has in no one iiiftance made amendments, or put a negative upon the acts of their AfTembly, in the courfe of above one hundr1' ye-irs, in which l>ch have not appeared to the people in a few months to have been calcu- late! to promote their liberty and happinefs. 4. We are told, that the Congrefs is a fingle legiflature, therefore a fingle legiflature is to be preferred to a compound one.—The objects of legiflatien in the Congrefs relate only to peace and war, alliance:, trade, the Poft-Office, and the government of the army and navy. They never touch'the liberty, property, nor life of the individuals of s.ny State' in their refolutions, and even in their ordinary fubjefts of legiflation, they are liable to be checked by each of the Thirteen States, 5. We have, been told, that a legiflative council or governor lays the foundation forariftocraticaland monarchical power in a community. However ridiculous this objection to a compound legiflature may appear, I have more than once heard it mentioned by the advocates for a fingle AfTembly. Who would believe, that the Tame fountain of pure water fhould fend forth, at the fame time, wholefome a:id deadly ftreams ? Are not the Council and AfTembly both formed alike by the annual breath of the people? But I will fuppofe, that a legiflative Council afpired after the honors of hereditary titles and power, would they not be ejfeclually checked by the AfTembly ? I cannot help.commending the zeal that appears in my countrymen againft the power of a King of a Houfe of Lords. I concur with them in all their prejudices againft hereditary titles, honour and power. Hifto'ry is little elfe than a recital of the follies and vices of kings and noblemen, and it is becaufe I dread fo much from them, that I wifh to exclude them for ever from Pennfylvania, for notwithftanding our' government has been called a fimple democracy, I maintain, that a foundation is laid in it for the moft complete ariftocracy that ever c.-Ji'e:! in the world. In order to prove this afTertion, I fhall premife two propofitions, which have" never been controverted: Firft, where there is wealth, the:C £ 9, 3 there will be power; and, fecondly, the rich have always been an over-match for the poor in all contefb for power. Thefe truths being admitted, I defire to know what can prevent our fingle reprelentation being filled, in the courfe of a few years, with a majority of rich men? Say not, the people will not choofe f.ich men to reprefent them. The influence of wealth at elections is irrefiftible. It has been feen and felt in Pennfylvania, and I am obliged in juftice to my fubjeft to fay, that there are poor men among us as prepared to be influenced, as the rich are prepared to influence them. The fault irtuft be laid in both cafes upon human nature. The confequence of a majority of rich men getting into the legiflature is plain. Their wealth will adminifter fuel to the love of arbitrary power that is com- mon to all men. The prefent AfTembly have furnifhed them with precedents for breaking the Conftitution. Farewel now to annual ele&ions ! Public emergencies will fanptify the moft daring meafures. The clamours of their conftituents will be iilenced with offices, bribes or punifhments. An ariftocracy will be eftablifhed, and Pennfylvania will be inhabited like moft of the countries in Europe, with only two forts of animals, tyrants and flaves. It has often been faid, that there is but one rank of men in Ame- rica, and therefore, that there fhould be only one reprelentation of them in a government. I agree, that we have no artificial diftinctions of men into noblemen and commoners among us, but it ought to be re- marked, that fuperior degrees of induftry and capacity, and above all, commerce, have introduced inequality of property among us, and thefe have introduced natural diftinctions of rank in Pennfylvania, as certain and general as the artificial diftinctions of men in Europe. This will ever be the cafe while commerce exirts in this country. The men of middling property and poor men can never be fafe in a mixed repre- fentation with the men of over-grown property. Their liberties can only befecured by having exact bounds prefcribed to their power, in the fundamental principles of the Constitution. By a reprefentatlon of the men of middling fortunes in one houfe, their whole ftrength is collected againft the influence of wealth. 'Without fuch a reprefenta- tion, the moft violent efforts of individuals to oppofe it would be di- vided and broken, and would want that fyftem, vyhich alone would enable them b check that luft for dominion which is always conn'efted with opulence. The government of Pennfylvania therefore has been called moft improperly a government for poor men. It carries in every part of it a poifon to their liberties. It is impoflible to form a govern- ment more fuited to the paffions and interefts of rich men. 6. But fays the advocate for a fingle legiflature, if one of the ad- vantages of having a Legiflative Council arifes from the Counfellors poilelfing more wifdom than the AfTembly, why may not the members of the Council be thrown into the AfTembly, in order to inftruft and enlighten them? If found reafoning always prevailed in popular Af- Temblies, this objection to a Legiflative Council might have fome weight. The danger in this cafe would be, that the Counfellors would [ io ] partake of the paflions and prejudices of the Afiemb!y, by taking prrt in their debates; or, if they did not, that they would be fo incon- fiderable in point of numbers, that they would be conitantly out-voted by the members of the AfTembly. " ■7. But would you Tuffer twenty or thirty men in a Legiflative Coun- cil to controul feventy or eighty in an Aifembly? Yes and that for two reafons: Firft, I fhall fuppofe that they will confift of men of \h». moft knowledge and experience in the State: Secondly, that their ligations to wifdom and integrity wijl be much frrongv'- than the Af- fembly's can be, becaufe fewer men will be anfwer:-: bb for unjuft or improper proceedings at the bar of the public. But'I beg pardon of my readers for introducing an anfv.er to an'objection to a lmall num- ber of men cen.trculing the proceedings of a greater. The fn*-v> ds of the prefent Conftitution of Pennfyivan.i cannot urge this.objection with any force, for in the 47th feftion of the Conftitution I find twenty-four men called a Council of Censors, invelted with a fupreme and uncontrolled power to revife and to cenfure all the law: and proceedings of not a Tingle AfTemblv, but of all the AfTemblies that fhall exift fo- feven years, which AfTemblies may contain the united wiTdom of five hundred and four AfTembly-men. They are moreover, inverted with more wiTdom than the Convention that is to bechofen by their recom- mendation; for this Convention, which is to confift of Teventy-two men, is to make no one alteration in the Confutation but what was fuggefted to them by the Council of Cenfors. I can eafily conceive, that two houTes confifting of an unequal number of members, both viewino-objects through the fame medium of time'and place, may agree in every thing efTential, and diTagree in matters only of doubtful iffue to the welfare of the ftate; but I am fure, a body of twenty-four men fitting in judgment upon the proceedings of a body of men defunct. in their public capacity feven years before them, cannot fail of com- mitting the moft egregious miftakes from the obfcurity which time, and their ignorance of a thoufand fafts and reafonings muft throw upon all their deliberations. But more of the arbitrary power of the Cen- fors hereafter. g. We are told that the ftate of Pennfylvania has always been go- verned by a fingle legiflature, and therefore, that part of our Confti- tution is not an innovation. There is a fhort way of confuting this aflertion by pronouncing it without any foundation. The Governor al- ways had a negative power upon our laws, and was a diftinft branch of our legiflature. It is true, he fometimes exercifed his power to the dif- advantage of the people; for he was the fervant of a King who pofTefTed an intereft diftinft from that of his people, and in fome cafes the Go- vernor himfelf pofTefTed an intereft incompatible with the rights of the people, God forbid that ever we fhould fee a refurreftion of his power in Pennfylvania, but I am obliged to own, that I have known inftancex in which the whole ftate have thanked him for the interpofition of his fcegative and amendments upon the afts of the AfTembly. Even the Afiembly-r?.en themTelves have acknowledged the juftice of his conduct upon [ II J upon thefe occafions, by condemning in their cooler hours their own n.uly, and ill-digefted refolutions. 9. But why ail thefe arguments in favor of checks for the AfTembly. The Conftitution (lay., the Tingle legiflutive-rnan) has provided nolefs than four for them. Firft, Elections will be annual. Secondly, The doors of the AfTembly are to„be always open. Thirdly, All laws are to be publifhed Tor the confideration and aflent of the people: And, Fourthly, The Council of Cenfors wjll punifh, by their cenfures, all /iqldtions of the Conftitution, and rthe. authors of bad laws. I fhall examine the eflieacy of each of thefe checks Teparately. 1 hope, for the peace of the.ftate,, that .we'fhall'never fee a body cf men in power more attached to the prefent Conftitution than the pre- luit AfTembly, and if, with all their affection for it, they have broken it in many articles,, it is rea;cn»ole to fuppofe that future AfTemblies will ufe the fame freedoms with it. They may, if they chufe, abolifh annual elections. J They may tell their conftituents that elections draw off the minds of the pdople from neceffary labour; or, if a war fhould exiii, they may fhew the impollibility of holding elections when there is a chance of the;.militia being called into the fieldjto oppofe a common enemy : Or laftly, they may fetter elections with oaths in fuch a man- ner as to exclude nine-tenths of the electors from voting. Such ftra- tage,rft,s ior perpetual power will never want men nor a fociety of men to fupport them; for the AfTembly pofTefTe.s Tuch a plenitude of power from.the influence pf the many offices of profit and honour'' that are in their gift, that they may always promile themfelves fupport from a great part of the ftate. But I will fuppofe that no infringement is ever made upon annual elections. In the courfepf even one year a fingle AfTembly may do the moft irreparable miTchief to a ftate. Socrates and Barnevelt were both put to death by AfTemblies that held their powers at the election of the people. The Tame AfTemblies would have fhed oceans of tears to have recalled thofe illuftrious citizens to life again, in lefs than half a year after they imbrued their hands in their blood. I.am highly pleafed with having the doors of our AfTembly kept conftantly open; but how can this check the proceedings of the Af- Tembly, when none but a few citizens of the town or county, where B 2 the * The late Convention was chofen for the, fole purpofe cf making a go- vernment, and was compofed of honeft, well-meaning men^ and yet, I have good authority to Juj , that feveral of them propofed fo their friends forming thenifelaes into an Affembly, to execute r'ke government. * The Prefident is appointed chiefly ly th? Affembly. Hii Jalary, toge- ther ufiisns. When ci defied icgef&ert they nafo a /if tie army of placemen, I 12 ] the Affembly fits or a few travelling ftrangers, can ever attend or watch them?, I fhall 'take n® notice of the delays of bufinefs, which muft arife from publifliing' all laws for the conlideration and affent of the people; but I beg to be informed how long they muft be publifhed before they are paffed ? Fdr I take it for granted, that each county has a right to equal degrees df time to conlider of the laws. In what manner are they to be1 circulated} How are the fentiments of the people, fcattered over a countyJifty or fixty miles in extent, to be collected? Whether by ballot, or by voting in a tumultuary manner? Thefe are inTur- moun table difficulties in the way of the people at largea&ing as a check upon the Affembly. But iuppofing an attempt fhould be made to re- ftrain the fingle legiflature in this manner, are wefure the disappro- bation of the people would be fufficient to put a negative upon impro- per or arbitrary laws ? Would not the Affembly, ffom their partiality to their own proceedings, 'be apt to pafs over the complaints of the people in filence ? to negleft or fefufe to enter their petitions or re monftrances upon their Journals? or to raiTe the hue and cry of a fo ftered junto upon them, as " tsries" or " apoftate'whigsf or " a?. arifiocratic failion ?'' To'talk of the Council of CenTors, as a check upon the Affembly is to forget thut a man of a body of men may deceive, rob, and en- flave the public for feven years, and then may efcape the intended efficacy of "trie cenfures of the Council by death, or by flying into r» neighbouring ftate. 10. Wc are informed that a fingle legiflature was fupported in the Convention by Drl Franklin, and afTented to by Mr. RittenhouTe; gentlemen diftinguifhed for their uncommon abilities, and defervedly dear for their virtues to every lover of human nature. The only an- fwer", after what has been faid, that I fhall give to this'argument, la- titat Divine Providence feems to have permitted them to err upon this fubjeft, in order to conTole the world for the very great fuperiority they both-pcfiefs over the reft of mankind in every thing elfe, except the Tciehce of government. Thus have I anfwered all the arguments that ever I have heard of- fered in favour of a fingle legiflature, and I hope, filenced all the ob- jections that have been made to a double representation of the people. I might here appeal further to the practice of our courts of law in fa- vour of repeated deliberations and divifions. In a free government, the moft inconfiderable portion of our liberty and property cannot be taken from us, without the judgment of two or three courts; but, by • the Conftitution of Pennfylvania, the whole of our liberty and pro- perty, and even our lives, may be taken from us, by the hafty and paffionate decifion of a fingle Affembly. I fhall conclude my obfervations upon this part of the Conftitution, by firni.-huj np the advantages of a compound or double legiflature. i. There is the utmoft freedom in a compound legiflature. The decifions [ 13 1 •hTcifions of two legiflative bodies cannot fail of coinciding with the wills of a great majority of the community. 2. There is fafety in fuch a government, in as much as each body : offeffcs a free and independant power, fo that they mutually check ambition and ufurpation in each other. 3. There is the greatett wifdom in fuch a government. Every aft being obliged to undergo the revifion and amendments of two bodies of men, is neceffarily ftrained of every mixture of folly, paflion, and prejuaice.f 4. There is the longeft duration of freedom in fuch a government.* 5. There is the moft order in fuch a government. By order, I mean obedience to laws, Tubordination to magiftrates, civility and decency of behaviour, and the contrary of every thing like mobs and faftions. 6. Compound governments are moft agreeable to human nature, inafmuch as they afford the greateft Tcope for the expanfion of the powers and virtues of the mind. Wifdom, learning, experience, with Liic moft extenfive benevolence, the moft unfhaken firmnefs, and the utmoft elevation of foul, are all called intoexercife by the oppofite and different duties of the different reprefentations of the people. LETTER III. THE powers of government have been very jufHy divided into legiflative, executive and judicial. Having difcuffed the legis- lative power of the government of PennTylvania, I fhall proceed new to confidcr the executive and judicial. It is agreed on all hands that the executive and judicial powers of government fhould be wholly independant of the legiflative. The authors of the PennTylvania Conftitution feem to have given their Tanftion to this opinion, by Separating thoTe powers from the powers of the Af- Tembly.---It becomes us to enquire whether they have made them To independant of the AfTembly as to give them the free exerciTe of their own judgments. The infignificant figure the Prefident and Council make in the Con- ftitution f The Militia Law of the Delaware State received twenty-four amend- ments from the Council after it had had three readings in the Affembly; all cf which ivrre adopted at onc-e by the Affembly. I grant, the wifdom of men colletled in any way that can be devifed, cannot make a perfeft law; but 1 am fure a Legiflative Council would not have overlooked many inac- curacies in the laws paffed in the laft fejficn of the prefent Affembly of Pennfylvania. * Sparta, which,poffeffed a compound legiflature, preferred her liberties above five hundred years. The fatal dififentions of Athens ar.d Rome ceafed as foon as their Senates, which were filled only with rich men, nx'ere checked by another Representation nf the people. £ H ] ftitution from not having a negative upon the laws of the AfTembly, alone would Toon have deitroyed their authority and influence in the State. But the authors of the Conftitution have taken pains to throw the whole power of the Council at once into the hands of the AfTembly, bv rendering the former dependant upon the latter in the two followincr particulars, I. The Prefident is choTen by the joint ballot of the Affembly an i Council. The Affembly being to the Council, in point of numbers, as five are to one, of courfe chuTe the Prefident. Each member will expeft in his turn to fill the firft chair in the State, and hence the whole Council will yield themlelves up to the will of the Affembly. 2. The Talaries of the Prefident and of each of the Counfellors are fixed by the Affembly. This will neceffarily render them dependant upon them. It is worthy of notice here, that a rotation is eftablilhed in the 19th feftion of the Conftitution, to " prevent'the danger of an inconvenient ariftocracy."—From what abufe of power can this ari- ftocracy aiife ? Are they not the creatures of the Affembly ? But there is a magic terror in the Tound of a Counfellor. Call a man an Afltm- blyman, or a CenTor, and he becomes an innocent creature, though you inveft him with the deTpotifin of an eaftern monarch. If the Council are dependant upon the Affembly, it follows of courfe that the Judges, who are appointed by the_ Council, are likewife depend- ant upon them. But in order more fully to fecine their depend- nnce upon the will of the AfTembly, they are obliged to hold their falaries upon the tenure of their will. In vain do they hold their commiffions for feven'years, this is but the fhadow of independance. They cannot live upon the air, and their abfolute de- pendance upon the Affembly gives that body a tranfcendent influence over all the courts of law in the State. Here then we have difcovered the legiflative, executive and judicial powers of the State all blended to- gether.—The liberty, the property and life of every individual in the State are laid proftrate by the Conftitution at the feet of the Affembly. This combination of powers in one body has in all ages been pro- nounced a tyranny. To live by one man's will became the caufe of all men's mifery; but better, far better, would it be to live by the will of one man, than to live, or rather to die, by the will of a body of men. Unhappy Pennfylvania ! Methinks I fee the fcales of juftice broken in thy courts.—I fee the dowry of the widow and the portion of the or- phans unjuftly taken from them, in order lo gratify the avarice of fome demagogue who rules the Affembly by his eloquence and arts.— I Tee the fcaflolds ftreaming with the blood of the wiTeft and belt men in the State.—I Tee the offices of government......But the profpeft is too painful, I fhall proceed to take notice of fome other parts of the Con- ftitution. "It was not fufficient to contaminate juftice at its fountain, but its fmalleft firearm are made to partake of impurity by the Convention. In the 30th feftion of the Conftitution " all Juftices of the Peace are to be elected by the freeholders of each city and county." The belt obfervation; [ 15 1 obfervations that can be made on this part of the Conftitution is to in- form the public, that not above one half the people of the State chofe magiftrates agreeable to-theVlaws cf the AfTembly for that purpofe; that more than one half of thofe that were chofen have refufed to ac- cept of commiffions, and that many of thofe who aft are totally dif- qualified from the want of education or leifure for the office.—It has been faid often* and I wifh the iayjng was engraven over the doors of every ftatehoufe on the Continent,'that " all power is derived from the people," but it has never yet been faid that all power is feated in the people'. Government fuppofes and requires a delegation of power: It cannot exift without it. And the idea of making the people at large judges of the qualifications neceffary for magiftrates, or judges of laws, or checks for Affemblies proceeds upon the fuppoiition that mankind are all alike wife, and juft, and have equal leifure. It more- over deftroys the neceffity for all government. What man ever made himfelf his own attorney ? And yet this would not be more abfurd than for the people at large to pretend to give up their power to a fet of rulers, and afterwards, referve the right of making and of judging of all their laws themfelves. Such a government is a monlter in nature. It contains as many Governors, Affemblymen, Judges and Mr-nitrates as there are freemen in the State, all exercifing the fame powers and at the fame time. Happy would it be for us, if this monfter was remark- able only for his abfurdity; but, alas! he contains a tyrant in his bowels. AU hiftory fhews us that'the people foon grow weary of the folly and tyranny of one another. They prefer one to many matters, and ftabi- lity to inftability of flavery. They prefer a Julius Czefar to a Senate, and a Cromwell to a perpetual parliament. I cannot help thinking a miftake lays rather in words than ideas when we talk of the rights of the people. Where is the difference be- tween my chufing a Juftice of Peace, and my chufing an Affemblyman and a Counfellor, by whofe joint fuffrages a Governor is chofen, who appoints a Juftice for me ? I am ftill the firft link of the facred chain of the power of the State. But are there no cafes in which I may be found by afts of a fingle, or of abody of magiftrates in the State, whom I have had no hand in chufing ? Yes, there are. Here then I am bound contrary to the principles of liberty (which confift in a man be- ing governed by men chofen by himfelf), whereas if all the magiftrates in the State were appointed by the Governor, or executive part of the State, it would be impoffble Tor me to appear before the bar of a ma- giftrate any where who did not derive his power originally from me. By the cth Teftion all militia officers below the rank of a Brigadier General a-e.to be chofen by the people. Moft of the objeftions that have been mentioned againft magiftrates being chofen by the people, apply with equal force againft the people's chufing their military of- ficers. By the militia law of thii State we find the foldier ceafes to be commanded bv the officer of his choice as foon as he comes in the field. He might as well be commanded by an officer of another State as by one of his own State, for whom he did not vote. Had he been ap, nnin tf*ri L 16 ] pointed by the executiv" power of the government, he might have xooked upon him originally as the creature of his own power, and might have claimed his care in the camp, from his influence at elections, in moving thofe fprings in government, from which he derived his commiffion. But the unTuitablenefs of this part of the Conftitution to the genius of the people of Pennfylvania, will appear in the ftrongeft point of light, from attending to the two following fafts: ift: Moft of the irregularities committed by the militia, that were in fervice laft year, were occafioned by that laxity of difcipline, which was intro- duced and kept up by officers holding their commiffions by the breath of the people: And 2dly, Above one half of the State have refufed or neglected to chufe officers, agreeably to the recommendation of the Affembly.---And even in many of thofe places, where elections for officers have been held, Colonels have been chofen by forty and Cap- tains and Subalterns by only four or five votes. In the Z2d feftion of the Conftitution it is faid, " every officer of the ftate, whether judicial or executive, fhall be liable to be impeached by the General Affembly, before the Prefident and Council, either when in office or after his refignation or removal for maladminiftration." Why is a man in this caTe to be deprived of a trial by jury ? and what is the reafon that no time is fixed Tor the commencement of thi= im- peachment after refignation or removal for maladminiftration? A ju- dicial or military officer may be innocent, and yet, from the delay of his trial for fix or feven years, he may be deprived by death or other- ways of the vouchers of his innocence. Woe to the man that ever holds one of the high offices of the State of Pennfylvania! He muft ever, after his- refignation, hold his life at the pleafure of the orator. who rules the Affembly. The leaft mark of difrefpeft fhewn to him, or to any of the Affembly, rouTes the Conftitution and laws of his country againft him; and perhaps, after an interval of twenty or thirty years conTcious integrity, his grey hairs are dragged with Tor- row to the grave. Let not this be thought to be too high a pifture of this part of the Conftitution of Pennfylvania. It is a pifture of human. nature in fimilar circumftances, in every age and country. Men pof- TefTed of unlimited and uncontrouled power are beafts of prey. But, is there no power lodged in the Conftitution to alter thefe im- perfeftions? Has our Convention monopolized all the wifdom of fuc- ceeding years, fo as to preclude any improvements being made in -the infant fcience of government? Muft we groan away our lives in a pa- tient fubmiflion to all the evils in the Conftitution which have been defcribed ? Let the 47th and laft Teftion of the Conftitution anfwer thefe queftions. By this feftion it is declared, that after the expiration of feven years, there fhall ** be chofen two men from each city and county, (a majority of whom fhall be a quorum in every cafe, except as to calling a Convention) who fhall be called a Council of Cenfors, and who fhall have power to call a Convention within two years after their fitting, if there appears to them an abfolute neceffity of amending any article of the Conftitution which may be defeftive, explaining Tucn as [ 17 J as may be thought not clearly expreffed, and of adding Tuch as are neceflary for the prefervation of the rights and happinefe of the people.' From this paragraph it is evident, that the Conftitution was thought to be the perfeftion of human wifdom, and that the authors of it in- tended that it fhould laft for ever. Every feftion of the Conftitution, I believe, was determined by a majority of the Members of the Con- vention, and in the 12th feftion of the Conftitution we find, that it only two-thirds of the people concur in the execution of it, the mem- bers of Affembly choTen by them, are to " poffeTs all the powers, of the General Affembly as fully and amply as if the whole were prefent." This is ftriftly agreeable to the principles of good government; but, why are thefe principles to be trampled upon, when the great queftion is to be agitated, whether the Conftitution fhall be altered ? For, un- lefs every county and city in the State concur in elefting Cenfors, and unlefs two thirds of them agree in calling a Convention, there is no poffibility of obtaining an alteration of a fingle article of the Confti- tution. If the Affembly had not taught us that it was neither treaTon nor perjury to break the Conftitution, I am Ture it would have remained inviolate for ever; for I am perfuaded that feveral of the counties would have refiifed to have chofen Cenfors. But fuppofe they had, if only one fliort of two thirds of them refufed to agree in the meafure, we could have no Convention. The minority would give laws to a ma- jority. A folecifm in government! But there is no end to the tyranny and abfurdity of our Conftitution. The Council of Cenfors have not yet finifhed their bufinefs. They are empowered by the Conftitution " to enquire, whether the Conftitution has been preferved inviolate in every part? and whether the legiflative and executive branches of government have performed their duty, as guardians of the people; or affumed to themTelyes, or exercifed'<>//&«.- or greater powers than they are entitled to by the Con- ftitution : They are alfo to enquire, whether the public taxes have been juftly laid and collafted in all parts of this commonwealth;—-m what manner the public monies have been difpofed of, and whether the laws have been duly executed : For thefe purpofes they fhall have power to fend for perfons, papers and records; they fhall have autho- rity to pafs public cenfures, and to recommend to the legiflature, the repealing fuch laws as appear to them to have been enafted contrary to the principles of the Conftitution: Thefe powers they fhall continue to have for, and during the fpace of one year, from the day of their eleftion, and no longer." h this the commiffion oT a Spanifh viceroy ? or is it an extraft from an aft of the Britifh Parliament, teeming with vengeance againft the liberties of America?---No.—-It is an epitome of the powers of the Council of Cenfors eftablifhed by the late Convention of Pennfylvania. Innocence has nothing to fear from juftice, when it flows through the regular channels of law; but where is the man who can enfure himfelf a moment's fafety from a body of men invefted with abfolute power for one whole vear to cenfure and condemn, without jqtfge or jury, C everY [ 18 ] -very individual in the State. I fhall fuppofe the Council to confift of a majority of thole Members of Affembly, who took the oath of alle- giance to the Conftitution, and who voted, that no officer fhould be excufed from taking it, who accepted of a militia-commiffion under the authority of this State. I fhall TuppoTe them affembled for the bufinef; of their office. The work of an age is to be performed in a fingle year.---Methinks I Tee Tuch of thoTe worthy gentlemen as are living, who, for the Take of union, conTented to difpenTe with the oath of al- legiance to the Conftitution, led like criminals to their bar.---1 hear peals of wrath denounced againft them. I Tee thoTe virtuous gentle- men, who compoTed the Executive Council in the year 1777, Turn moned to appear at their tribunal, to anfwer for their having abdi- dicated the duties of their office, by an adjournment, at a time when the State was threatened with an invafion. In vain they plead, that the Conftitution had inverted them with no power for the defence of the State. Their names and their families are branded with infamy by a " public cenfure." I fee hundreds and thoufands coming, one after another, before the Council, to be cenfured for refufing to chufe magiftrates and militia-officers, agreeably to the laws of the Affemblyi But who are they who are dragged with To much violence to the inqui- sitorial tribunal ? They are a number oT citizens who prayed Tor Tome alterations to be made in the Conftitution. In vain they plead the obligations of reafen and confeience againft fubmitting to the govern- ment. In vain they plead their zeal and fervices in the common caufe of America. It is all to no purpofe. They recommend to the Af- fembly to impeach them for high treafon. They are condemned a* traitors, and the ftreets fwim with their blood.—Good heavens! where was the mild genius of Pennfylvania, when this part of the Conftitution obtained the affent of the Convention ?-----Spirit of liberty, whither waft thou fled ?— But perhaps the Conftitution has provided a remedy for its defefts, without the aid of the Council of Cenfors r No—this cannot be done ; for every Member of Affembly, before he takes his feat, is obliged, by the 10th feftion of the Conftitution, to fwear that he will not " do nor confent to any aft whatever, that fhall have a tendency to leffen or abridge their rights and privileges as declared in the Conftitution of this State," as alfo, " that he will not directly or indireftly do or confent to any aft or thing prejudicial or injurious to the Conftitution or Go- vernment thereof, as eftabliftjed by the Convention," agreeably to the 40th feftion of the Conftitution. Thefe oaths of infallibility and paf- five obedience to the form of the Conftitution, effeftually preclude every man, who holds an office under it, from attempting to procure the leaft amendment in any part of it.* It is a mere quibble upon words * That it was the defiign cf tie Convention, that the Ccrfilluticn fhculd ■ict be touched by any power tut a Convention to be called by the Council of Cenfors, appears from the oath contained in the /1.0th fetlion, being required by one of their ordinances as the only condition upon which en Elcclcr ccrld [ '19 ) words to fay, that a man may mend the Conftitution, without " doing '■ny thing prejudicial or injurious to it." The Convention did not intend any Tuch conftruftion to be put upon their oaths, and hence we find in the introduftion to the Conftitution, they " declare, the frame of government to be the Conftitution of this commonwealth, and to remain in force therein for ever, unaltered, except in fuch articles as fhall hereafter, upon experience, be found to require improvement, and which fhall, by the Tame authority of the people fairly delegated-, as this frame of government directs, be amended and improved." Now we know, that the frame of government forbids the leaft amendment being made in the Conftitution in any other way than by the recom- mendation of a Council of Cenfors. Had the Conftitution appeared to me to have been unexceptionable in every part, and had it been the'refult of the united wifdom cf men and angels, I would not have taken an oath of paflive obedience to it, Tor feven or nine years. The conftant changes in human affairs, and in the difpofitions of a people, might render occafional alterations, in that time, neceflary in the moft perTeft Conftitution. But to take an oath cf allegiance to a Conftitution,—-full of experiments,—a Confti- tution rhat was indeed a new thing under the fun,---that had never been tried in fome of its parts in any country,—and that had produced mifery in other of its parts in every country.—I fay to fwear to lupport or even to fubmit, for feven or nine years, to fuch a Conftitution, is to trifle with all morality, and to difhohour.the facred name of God himfelf. What would you think of a man, who would confent to fliut his eyes, and fwallow a quantity of food that had never before been tailed by a human creature, and fwear at the fame time, that if it fhould dif- order him in ever fo great a degree, he would take nothing to relieve himfelf for eight and forty hours ? Such a man would be wife, compared with the man who takes an oath of allegiance to the Conftitution of Pennfylvania. It is to no purpofe to talk here of the many excellent articles in the Bill ofRights; fuch as religious toleration,—the habeas corpus aft,-r~ trials by juries,—the rotation of office, &c. None of them can flourifh long in the neighbourhood of a fingle Affembly, and a Council of CenTors poffeffmg all the powers of the State.......Thefe ineftimable privileges in the Conftitution of Pennfylvania refemble a tree loaded with the moft lufcious fruit, but furrounded with thorns, in fuch a manner, as to be for ever inacceffible to the hungry traveller. Perhaps, while the government is upon its good behaviour, and C 2 while vote for an Affembly man. Strange! that men fhould call God to witnefs their determination to fupport a government, which a majority of them had notfeen, and which even the minority cfthem did not underftand or difkkedf But, for the honour of the State it fhould be recorded, that not above 1500 cfthe 25004 who voted for the Afembly, took the oath required by the or- dinance of the Conventiv.. [ *o ] while the paflions of the State are directed againft a cruel and common enemy, we may not experience all the calamities that have been de- monftrated to flow from the Conftitution.-----But the revolution of a few years, and the return of peace, will moft certainly render Penn- fylvania, under her prefent Conftitution, the moft miferable fpot upon the furface of the globe. I believe all the Members of the late Convention were true Whigs, and aimed fincerely at forming a free and happy government: But, I am fure, that if Filmar and Hobbes had fat among them, they could not have formed a government more deftruftive of human happinefs; nor could Lord North or General Howe have formed one more der ftruftive of union and vigour, in our public affairs, than the prefent Conftitution of PennTylvania. It is one thing to underftand the principles, and another thing to underftand the forms of government. The former are fimple; the latter are difficult and complicated. There is the Tame difference be- tween principles and forms in all other Tciences. Who underftood the principles of mechanics and optics better than Sir ITaac Newton ? and yet Sir ITaac could not for his life have made a watch or a microTcope. Mr. Locke is an oracle as to the principles, Harrington and Montef- quieu are oracles as to the forms of government. LETTER IV. AQueftion very naturally arifes from taking a review of the tyranny of the government of Pennfylvania, What meafutes fhall be taken to amend them ? There can be but two anfwers to this queftion. ift. To fubmit to the Conftitution for the prefent, till a peace with Great-Britain will give us leifure to make a better ; or, 2dly, to call a Convention immediately for the purpofe of making a new Conftitution. I believe the State is divided only about thefe two things j for the party who believe the government to be a good one, is too inconfiderable to be noticed in this place. I beg leave to offer a. few objections to our fubmitting to the Con- sul tion, and fhall afterwards endeavour to obviate the objections that have been made to the immediate calling of a Convention, for the purpofe of altering and amending it. There is the utmoft danger to the State of Pennfylvania in a tem- porary fubmiflion to the Conftitution from the following caufes, i. The government is a tyranny. The moment we fubmit to it we become flaves. We hold every thing dear to us in fociety upon the tenure of the will of a fingle man in a fingle Affembly. Perhaps the mark of the beat may not be fixed immediately upon us, but the contract is made, and we are fold, together with our pofterity, to be hewers cf wood and drawers of water for ever. 2. The Conftitution cannot be executed in part without being broken. Now there cannot be a more dangerous precedent in a free country, than a legiflature violating in a [ 21 1 fmgle article even the forms of a Conftitution. 3 The prefent govern- n>ent will not draw forth the wifdom nor ftrength of the State, nor afford that affiftance to our Sifter States which is expefted from us in the pre- fent conteft with Great-Britain. Wife and good men every where re- fufe to accept of the firft offices in the government. The militia law is only partially executed. We have no courts of juftice open for the fequeftration or confifcation of Tory property; and, laftly, we fhall never be able under the prefent government to contribute our fhare towards finking the Continental debt by taxes. There is not force enough in the whole State to draw taxes from a fingle county againft their confent.f Alas! we are on the brink of ruin. Our State has lifted a knife to her throat, and is about to undo herfelf by a hafty and ill-judged exercife of her own power. Our enemies are exulting, and our friends are weeping over our alarming fituation. Our anceftors look down, and our pofterity look up to us for a happier Conftitution. We are united with our Sifter States in a bloody and expenfive war. The liberty of the whole world is the price for which we fight. Human nature looks to us to avenge the mighty ills fhe has fuffered from the tyrants of the old vyorld. She has already dropped a tear of joy upon the profpeft of recovering among us her firft and original dignity. A giod government is an engine n>t lefs neceffary to accomplifh theTe olorious purpoTes than ammunition and fire-arms. The way oT duty fs plain. Let a Convention be chofen, to alter and amend the government. This meaTure alone will reftore vigor and union to Penn- lylvania. Say not, my dear countrymen, this is not the time, THE ENEMY ARE AT OUR GATES, LET US FIRST RETELTHEM. Look at our militia on a field day—Tee the attempts of the friends to the Conftitution to open our courts—hear the complaints and mur- murs of the people. They all proclaim that now is the time for alter- ing our Conftitution. No confufion can arife from it. The gentlemen in the oppofition declare their determination to fupport the prefent Affembly in the execution of every law neceftary for the fafety and de- C 3 fence f The gentlemen in the oppofition to the government have conftantly prayed, that the Conftitution might be referred to the arbitration of a Con- vention, and have declared their willingnefs to fubmit to, or concur in the execution of it, if it fhould be confirmed by a reprefentation of the people fairly chofen. I am forry to find upon the Journals of the, Affembly, an addrefs from a battalion of militia in Chefier county, to the Honourable Houfe, affuring them, that " they will fupport the prefent government with their lives and fortunes." Such addreffes indicated the weaknefs, and foreboded the prejent contemptible fituation of the court of Britain. They were prefented in times finular to cur own, viz. when the American cnlsuirs were upon their knees to the throne, praying to be governed by their own reprefentaiives, and to be delivered from impending flavery. But it is charaaeriftic of the prefent Conftitution, that, in the firft year of its exe- cution, the journals of our rulers were ftained with threats of bloodfhcd, againft men who only petit' cm d for a redrefs of grievances. [ ** J fence of t!v: State, and above all in the execution of the militia and tefl laws. They have no intereft unconnefted with yours. They fee with the fame diftrefs as yo'i do the Tories triumphing in ouf difunion. Be not deceived. The Tories are not enemies to the prefent government; thev enjoy the benefits of its weaknefs, and there is good authority to fay they have fiecretly helped to carry it into execution. Let us beware of being impoTed upon by the popular cry rf the necefifiiy of the times. When the Diffenters in Virginia and South Carolina prayed for the abolition of the EpiTcopal eftablifhment in thofe States, the High- Churchmen acknowledged that their demands were juft, but faid, that this was not the time for attending to them, and that fuch a change in the government would throw all things into confufion. The demands were notwithftanding complied with, and en union unparalleled in for- mer times was immediately produced in thofe States. When a decla- ration of indepenclar.ee laft fummer appeared to be the only meafure that could fave America, the Tories and moderate men acknowledged the juftice of our feparation from Great-Britain, but faid, " This is not the time." The event fhevved that the time was come, for, e\r- ciufive of the advantages we have gained from it in foreign Courts, it ferved to precipitate the timid, the doubtful and the difaffefted cha- racters from their mixture with the real Whigs, and although it leffened the numbers in the oppofition, it added to their ftrength by producing union and decificn amongthem. To delay juftice (has been emphatically Taid) is to deny it. In like manner to delay liberty is to take it away. The Convention of New-York formed their government within the reach of the thunder of the enemy's cannon, and while one half ot their State was in their poffeflion. Is our fituation more dangerous than it was laft year ? The members of the late Convention were chofen on a day when the Affociators of the whole State were in motion. The Conftitution was made while above 5000 of them were in the field. The TenTe of the people was not aflked upon the fubjeft of the Con- ftitution; but it was given in the moft public manner. No more than 1500 freemen voted for its being executed, for that number only took the oath of allegiance to the Conftitution at the eleftion in Novem- ber. Let us talk no more then of the " neceffity of the times." This is the ftale apology at St. James's for all the crimes of the preTent reign and for all the ravages and bloodfhed we have witneffed in America. The State of MaffachuTetts Bay are preparing againft an invafion ; they expect General Burgoyne every hour in their harbours with a powerful army, and yet in a Bolton paper, of the 15 th of May, I find the follow- ing reTolution of their Affembly and Council, STATE of MASSACHUSETTS BAT. In the HOUSE of RE PR E S E NTATIVE S, May 5,1777. " Refolved, That it be, and hereby is recommended to the feveral towns and places in this State, impowered by the laws thereof, to fend Members to the General Affembly, that, at their next eleftion of a Member or Members to reprefent them, they make choice of men, in whofe [ 23 ] whole integrity and abilities they can place the greateft confidence; and, in addition to the common and ordinary powers of reprefentation, inftruft them in one Body with the Council, to form fuch a Confti- tution of Government, as they fhall judge belt calculated to promote the happinefs of this State ; and when compleated, to caufe the fame to be printed in all the Bofton News-Papers, and alfo in Hand-Bills, one of which to be tranfmitted to the Seleftmen of each town, or the Committee of each plantation, to be by them laid before their re- fpeftive towns or plantations, at a regular meeting of the inhabitants thereof, to be called for that purpofe; in order to its being, by each town and plantation, duly confidered. And a return of their appro- bation or difapprobation to be made into the Secretary's Office of this State, at a reasonable time to be fixed on by the General Court, fpe- cifying the numbers prefent in fuch meeting, voting for, and thofe voting againft the fame: And if, upon a fair examination of the faid returns by the General Court, or fuch Committee as they fhall appoint for that purpofe, it fhall appear, that the faid Form of Government is approved of by at leaft two thirds of thofe who are free, and twenty one years of age, belonging to this State, and prefent in the feveral meetings, then the General Court fhall be impowered to eftablifh the fame as the Conftitution and Form of Government of the State of Mafifachufetts Bay, according to which the inhabitants thereof fhall be governed in all fucceeding generations, unlefs the fame fhall be altered by their own exprefs direftion, or that of at leaft two thirds of them. And it is further recommended to the Seleftmen of the feveral towns, in the return of their precepts for the choice of Reprefentatives, to fignify their having confidered this Refolve, and their doings thereon." Wife people ! happy State of Maffachufetts Bay ! But further, recolleft, my dear countrymen, our conduft upon read- ing the reiblution oTthe Honourable Congrefs of the 15th of May, 1776. We feized it as a Warrant that proclaimed liberty to us and our po- fterity for ever. It was faid by fome people at that time, " Let the Affembly execute that reTolution ;" but we Tpurned the advice, and we acted like men. We Taid, that the " Affembly was not choTen by a majority of votes in the State," owing to the inequality of our repre- fentation, and that they wanted the " confidence of the people." We thought nothing then of the lofs of time occafioned by the meeting of a Conference of Committees, to fettle the mode and time of chufing a Convention. The delay of months, the diftraftions of the State, and the danger of an invafion, were thought to be trifling when compared with the proTpeft of a good Conftitution, that fhould im- mediately colleft and exert the Whig ftrength cf the State. Thus have I finifhed my obfervations upon the Conftitution of Penn- Tylvania. I have taken notice only of its moft effential defects, ani have aimed to difcufs them with candour. The occafional remarks upon the proceedings of the Affembly, are to be charged entirely to the faults of the Conftitution.—I believe the gentlemen in power have ::cth;nr in view but ths freedom and indeoendance of the State; and f.rh r 24 j fuch have been the zeal and integrity of many of them in the purfuh or thofe great objects, that it gives me pain to refleft, that I have been obliged to differ from them in the beft means of obtaining them. With this declaration I fhall clofe my letters to the people.of Penn- fylvania. Accept thou dear afylum of my anceftors, nurfe of my in- fancy, proteftrefs of my childhood, and generous rewarder of the toils of my youth, accept of thefe humble efforts to reftoie thee to freedom and happinefs! If I have laboured in vain, I fhall henceforth mourn ir. fecret only over my beloved county and lament the day that I wa.i born a Pennfylvanian. » MclJL Hist VIZ no Rl5^ob I777 c'\ 1; * t